R
Raymond
Guest
This Article
Published in the January 2004 edition of Foreign Policy In Focus
Bush-Cheney Energy Strategy: Procuring the Rest of the World's Oil
by Michael Klare
When first assuming office in early 2001, President George W. Bush's
top foreign policy priority was not to prevent terrorism or to curb
the spread of weapons of mass destruction--or any of the other goals he
espoused later that year following the September 11, 2001 attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Rather, it was to increase
the flow of petroleum from suppliers abroad to U.S. markets. In the
months before he became president, the United States had experienced
severe oil and natural gas shortages in many parts of the country,
along with periodic electrical power blackouts in California. In
addition, oil imports rose to more than 50% of total consumption for
the first time in history, provoking great anxiety about the security
of the country's long-term energy supply. Bush asserted that
addressing the nation's "energy crisis" was his most important task as
president.
He and his advisers considered the oil supply essential to the health
and profitability of leading U.S. industries. They reasoned that any
energy shortages could have severe and pervasive economic
repercussions on businesses in automobiles, airlines, construction,
petrochemicals, trucking, and agriculture. They deemed petroleum
especially critical to the economy because it is the source of two-
fifths' of the total U.S. energy supply--more than any other source,--
and because it provides most of the nation's transportation fuel. They
also were cognizant of petroleum's crucial national security role as
the power for the vast array of tanks, planes, helicopters, and ships
that constitute the backbone of the U.S. war machine.
"America faces a major energy supply crisis over the next two
decades," Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham told a National Energy
Summit on March 19, 2001. "The failure to meet this challenge will
threaten our nation's economic prosperity, compromise our national
security, and literally alter the way we lead our lives."
The energy turmoil of 2000-2001 prompted Bush to establish the
National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), a task force of
senior government representatives charged with developing a long-range
plan to meet U.S. energy requirements. To head this group, Bush picked
his closest political adviser, Vice President Dick Cheney. A
Republican Party stalwart and a former secretary of Defense, Cheney
had served as chairman and chief executive officer of the Halliburton
Co., an oilfield services firm, before joining the Bush campaign in
2000. As such, Cheney availed himself of top executives of energy
firms, such as Enron Corp., for advice on major issues.
As the NEPDG began its review of U.S. energy policy, its members saw
the United States was faced with a grave choice between two widely
diverging paths. It could continue down the road it had long been
traveling, consuming increasing amounts of petroleum and--given the
irreversible decline in domestic oil production--becoming ever more
dependent on imported supplies. Or, it could choose an alternate route
of reliance on renewable sources of energy and gradually reducing
petroleum use.
Clearly, the outcome of this decision would have profound consequences
for society, the economy, and the nation's security. Following the
same path would bind the United States ever more tightly to Persian
Gulf suppliers and to other oil-producing countries, with a
corresponding impact on U.S. security policy. Pursuing an alternative
strategy would require a huge investment in new energy-generation and
transportation technologies, resulting in the rise or fall of entire
industries. Either way, the public would experience the impact of this
choice in everyday life and in the dynamics of the economy as a whole.
No one, in the United States or elsewhere, would be left entirely
untouched.
The National Energy Policy Development Group wrestled with this
dilemma and completed its report during the early months of 2001.
After a careful review, Bush anointed the report as the National
Energy Policy (NEP) and released it on May 17. At first glance, the
NEP, or the Cheney report as it is often called, appeared to reject
the path of increased reliance on imported oil in favor of renewable
energy. The NEP "reduces demand by promoting innovation and technology
to make us the world leader in efficiency and conservation," the
president declared as he released it. However, for all its rhetoric
about conservation, the NEP does not propose a reduction in oil
consumption. Instead, it proposes to slow the growth in U.S.
dependence on imported petroleum by boosting production at home
through the exploitation of untapped reserves in protected wilderness
areas.
The single most important step proposed in the NRP was increasing
domestic oil production by drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge (ANWR), an immense, untouched wilderness area in northeastern
Alaska. While this proposal has generated enormous controversy in the
United States because of its deleterious impact on the environment, it
also has allowed the White House to argue that the administration is
committed to a policy of energy independence. However, careful
examination of the Cheney report leads to an entirely different
conclusion. Aside from the ANWR proposal, nothing in the NEP would
contribute to a significant decline in U.S. dependence on imported
petroleum. In fact, the very opposite is true: The basic goal of the
Cheney plan is to find additional external sources of oil for the
United States.
In the end, Bush made a clear decision regarding future U.S. energy
behavior. Knowing that nothing can reverse the long-term decline in
domestic oil production, and unwilling to curb the country's ever-
growing thirst for petroleum products, he elected to continue down the
existing path of ever-increasing dependence on foreign oil.
Conservation Initiative: Fact or Fiction?
The fact that the Bush energy plan envisions increased rather than
diminished reliance on imported petroleum is not immediately apparent
from the president's public comments on the NEP, or from the first
seven chapters of the Cheney report itself. It is only in the eighth
and final chapter, "Strengthening Global Alliances," that the true
intent of the administration's policy becomes fully apparent. Here,
the tone of the report changes markedly from a professed concern with
conservation and energy efficiency to an explicit emphasis on securing
more oil from foreign sources. The chapter begins, "U.S. national
energy security depends on sufficient energy supplies to support U.S.
and global economic growth." The report further states, "We can
strengthen our own energy security and the shared prosperity of the
global economy," by working with other countries to increase the
global production of energy. It is a mandate to "make energy security
a priority of our trade and foreign policy."
The Cheney report is very guarded about the amount of foreign oil that
will be required. The only clue provided by the report is a chart of
net U.S. oil consumption and production over time. According to this
illustration, domestic oil field production will decline from about
8.5 million barrels per day (mbd) in 2002 to 7.0 mbd in 2020, while
consumption will jump from 19.5 mbd to 25.5 mbd. That suggests imports
or other sources of petroleum, such as natural gas liquids, will have
to rise from 11 mbd to 18.5 mbd. Most of the recommendations in
Chapter 8 of the NEP are aimed at procuring this 7.5 mbd increment,
equivalent to the total oil consumed by China and India.
One-third of all the recommendations in the report are for ways to
obtain access to petroleum sources abroad. Many of the 35 proposals
are region- or country-specific, with emphasis on removing political,
economic, legal, and logistical obstacles. For example, the NEP calls
on the secretaries of Energy, Commerce, and State "to deepen their
commercial dialogue with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and other Caspian
states to provide a strong, transparent, and stable business climate
for energy and related infrastructure projects."
The Cheney report will have a profound impact on future U.S. foreign
and military policy. Officials will have to negotiate for these
overseas supplies and arrange for investments that will increase
production and exports. They must also take steps to ensure that wars,
revolutions or civil disorder do not impede foreign deliveries to the
United States. These imperatives will be especially significant for
policy toward the Persian Gulf area, the Caspian Sea basin, Africa,
and Latin America.
Applying the Cheney energy plan will have major implications for U.S.
security and military policy. Countries expected to supply petroleum
in the years ahead are torn by internal conflicts, harbor strong anti-
American sentiments, or both. Efforts to procure additional oil from
foreign sources are almost certain to lead to violent disorder and
resistance in many key producing areas. While U.S. officials might
prefer to avoid the use of force in such situations, they may conclude
that the only way to guarantee the continued flow of energy is to
guard the oil fields and pipelines with soldiers.
To add to Washington's dilemma, troop deployments in the oil-producing
areas are likely to cause resentment from inhabitants who fear the
revival of colonialism or who object to particular U.S. political
positions, such as U.S. support for Israel. Efforts to safeguard the
flow of oil could be counter-productive, intensifying rather than
diminishing local disorder and violence.
Persian Gulf
CONT'D
http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0113-01.htm
Today's bible reading
DT 20:16 "In the cities of the nations the Lord is giving you as an
inheritance, do not leave alive anything that breathes."
JS 11:8-15 "And the lord gave them into the hand of Israel, ...utterly
destroying them; there was none left that breathed ...."
L'Shalom
Published in the January 2004 edition of Foreign Policy In Focus
Bush-Cheney Energy Strategy: Procuring the Rest of the World's Oil
by Michael Klare
When first assuming office in early 2001, President George W. Bush's
top foreign policy priority was not to prevent terrorism or to curb
the spread of weapons of mass destruction--or any of the other goals he
espoused later that year following the September 11, 2001 attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Rather, it was to increase
the flow of petroleum from suppliers abroad to U.S. markets. In the
months before he became president, the United States had experienced
severe oil and natural gas shortages in many parts of the country,
along with periodic electrical power blackouts in California. In
addition, oil imports rose to more than 50% of total consumption for
the first time in history, provoking great anxiety about the security
of the country's long-term energy supply. Bush asserted that
addressing the nation's "energy crisis" was his most important task as
president.
He and his advisers considered the oil supply essential to the health
and profitability of leading U.S. industries. They reasoned that any
energy shortages could have severe and pervasive economic
repercussions on businesses in automobiles, airlines, construction,
petrochemicals, trucking, and agriculture. They deemed petroleum
especially critical to the economy because it is the source of two-
fifths' of the total U.S. energy supply--more than any other source,--
and because it provides most of the nation's transportation fuel. They
also were cognizant of petroleum's crucial national security role as
the power for the vast array of tanks, planes, helicopters, and ships
that constitute the backbone of the U.S. war machine.
"America faces a major energy supply crisis over the next two
decades," Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham told a National Energy
Summit on March 19, 2001. "The failure to meet this challenge will
threaten our nation's economic prosperity, compromise our national
security, and literally alter the way we lead our lives."
The energy turmoil of 2000-2001 prompted Bush to establish the
National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), a task force of
senior government representatives charged with developing a long-range
plan to meet U.S. energy requirements. To head this group, Bush picked
his closest political adviser, Vice President Dick Cheney. A
Republican Party stalwart and a former secretary of Defense, Cheney
had served as chairman and chief executive officer of the Halliburton
Co., an oilfield services firm, before joining the Bush campaign in
2000. As such, Cheney availed himself of top executives of energy
firms, such as Enron Corp., for advice on major issues.
As the NEPDG began its review of U.S. energy policy, its members saw
the United States was faced with a grave choice between two widely
diverging paths. It could continue down the road it had long been
traveling, consuming increasing amounts of petroleum and--given the
irreversible decline in domestic oil production--becoming ever more
dependent on imported supplies. Or, it could choose an alternate route
of reliance on renewable sources of energy and gradually reducing
petroleum use.
Clearly, the outcome of this decision would have profound consequences
for society, the economy, and the nation's security. Following the
same path would bind the United States ever more tightly to Persian
Gulf suppliers and to other oil-producing countries, with a
corresponding impact on U.S. security policy. Pursuing an alternative
strategy would require a huge investment in new energy-generation and
transportation technologies, resulting in the rise or fall of entire
industries. Either way, the public would experience the impact of this
choice in everyday life and in the dynamics of the economy as a whole.
No one, in the United States or elsewhere, would be left entirely
untouched.
The National Energy Policy Development Group wrestled with this
dilemma and completed its report during the early months of 2001.
After a careful review, Bush anointed the report as the National
Energy Policy (NEP) and released it on May 17. At first glance, the
NEP, or the Cheney report as it is often called, appeared to reject
the path of increased reliance on imported oil in favor of renewable
energy. The NEP "reduces demand by promoting innovation and technology
to make us the world leader in efficiency and conservation," the
president declared as he released it. However, for all its rhetoric
about conservation, the NEP does not propose a reduction in oil
consumption. Instead, it proposes to slow the growth in U.S.
dependence on imported petroleum by boosting production at home
through the exploitation of untapped reserves in protected wilderness
areas.
The single most important step proposed in the NRP was increasing
domestic oil production by drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge (ANWR), an immense, untouched wilderness area in northeastern
Alaska. While this proposal has generated enormous controversy in the
United States because of its deleterious impact on the environment, it
also has allowed the White House to argue that the administration is
committed to a policy of energy independence. However, careful
examination of the Cheney report leads to an entirely different
conclusion. Aside from the ANWR proposal, nothing in the NEP would
contribute to a significant decline in U.S. dependence on imported
petroleum. In fact, the very opposite is true: The basic goal of the
Cheney plan is to find additional external sources of oil for the
United States.
In the end, Bush made a clear decision regarding future U.S. energy
behavior. Knowing that nothing can reverse the long-term decline in
domestic oil production, and unwilling to curb the country's ever-
growing thirst for petroleum products, he elected to continue down the
existing path of ever-increasing dependence on foreign oil.
Conservation Initiative: Fact or Fiction?
The fact that the Bush energy plan envisions increased rather than
diminished reliance on imported petroleum is not immediately apparent
from the president's public comments on the NEP, or from the first
seven chapters of the Cheney report itself. It is only in the eighth
and final chapter, "Strengthening Global Alliances," that the true
intent of the administration's policy becomes fully apparent. Here,
the tone of the report changes markedly from a professed concern with
conservation and energy efficiency to an explicit emphasis on securing
more oil from foreign sources. The chapter begins, "U.S. national
energy security depends on sufficient energy supplies to support U.S.
and global economic growth." The report further states, "We can
strengthen our own energy security and the shared prosperity of the
global economy," by working with other countries to increase the
global production of energy. It is a mandate to "make energy security
a priority of our trade and foreign policy."
The Cheney report is very guarded about the amount of foreign oil that
will be required. The only clue provided by the report is a chart of
net U.S. oil consumption and production over time. According to this
illustration, domestic oil field production will decline from about
8.5 million barrels per day (mbd) in 2002 to 7.0 mbd in 2020, while
consumption will jump from 19.5 mbd to 25.5 mbd. That suggests imports
or other sources of petroleum, such as natural gas liquids, will have
to rise from 11 mbd to 18.5 mbd. Most of the recommendations in
Chapter 8 of the NEP are aimed at procuring this 7.5 mbd increment,
equivalent to the total oil consumed by China and India.
One-third of all the recommendations in the report are for ways to
obtain access to petroleum sources abroad. Many of the 35 proposals
are region- or country-specific, with emphasis on removing political,
economic, legal, and logistical obstacles. For example, the NEP calls
on the secretaries of Energy, Commerce, and State "to deepen their
commercial dialogue with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and other Caspian
states to provide a strong, transparent, and stable business climate
for energy and related infrastructure projects."
The Cheney report will have a profound impact on future U.S. foreign
and military policy. Officials will have to negotiate for these
overseas supplies and arrange for investments that will increase
production and exports. They must also take steps to ensure that wars,
revolutions or civil disorder do not impede foreign deliveries to the
United States. These imperatives will be especially significant for
policy toward the Persian Gulf area, the Caspian Sea basin, Africa,
and Latin America.
Applying the Cheney energy plan will have major implications for U.S.
security and military policy. Countries expected to supply petroleum
in the years ahead are torn by internal conflicts, harbor strong anti-
American sentiments, or both. Efforts to procure additional oil from
foreign sources are almost certain to lead to violent disorder and
resistance in many key producing areas. While U.S. officials might
prefer to avoid the use of force in such situations, they may conclude
that the only way to guarantee the continued flow of energy is to
guard the oil fields and pipelines with soldiers.
To add to Washington's dilemma, troop deployments in the oil-producing
areas are likely to cause resentment from inhabitants who fear the
revival of colonialism or who object to particular U.S. political
positions, such as U.S. support for Israel. Efforts to safeguard the
flow of oil could be counter-productive, intensifying rather than
diminishing local disorder and violence.
Persian Gulf
CONT'D
http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0113-01.htm
Today's bible reading
DT 20:16 "In the cities of the nations the Lord is giving you as an
inheritance, do not leave alive anything that breathes."
JS 11:8-15 "And the lord gave them into the hand of Israel, ...utterly
destroying them; there was none left that breathed ...."
L'Shalom
