Y
Yo' Momma
Guest
The Bush mob lied to start the war in Iraq. They are lying to justify an
attack on Iran. Now we find that they have been lying to us about North
Korea's nuclear program.
-----------
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/28/AR2007022801977.html
The Bush administration is backing away from its long-held assertions that
North Korea has an active clandestine program to enrich uranium, leading
some experts to believe that the original U.S. intelligence that started the
crisis over Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions may have been flawed.
The chief intelligence officer for North Korea, Joseph R. DeTrani, told
Congress on Tuesday that while there is "high confidence" North Korea
acquired materials that could be used in a "production-scale" uranium
program, there is only "mid-confidence" such a program exists. Meanwhile,
Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill, the chief negotiator for
disarmament talks, told a conference last week in Washington that it is
unclear whether North Korea ever mastered the production techniques
necessary for such a program.
If the materials North Korea bought "did not go into a highly enriched
uranium program, maybe they went somewhere else," Hill said. "Fine. We can
have a discussion about where they are and where they've gone."
The administration's stance today stands in sharp contrast to the certainty
expressed by top officials in 2002, when the administration accused
Pyongyang of running a secret uranium program -- and demanded it be
dismantled at once. President Bush told a news conference that November: "We
discovered that, contrary to an agreement they had with the United States,
they're enriching uranium, with a desire of developing a weapon."
The accusation about the alleged uranium program backfired, sparking a
series of events that ultimately led to North Korea's first nuclear test --
using another material, plutonium -- nearly five months ago.
In 2002, the United States led a drive to suspend shipments of fuel oil
promised to Pyongyang under a 1994 accord that froze a North Korean
plutonium facility. The collapse of the 1994 agreement freed North Korea to
build up a stockpile of plutonium for as many as a dozen nuclear weapons.
Pyongyang conducted its test with some of that plutonium -- while the
alleged uranium facility faded in importance.
Plutonium and highly enriched uranium provide different routes to building
nuclear weapons. The North Koreans were able to reprocess spent fuel rods --
which had been monitored by U.N. inspectors under the 1994 agreement -- to
obtain the weapons-grade plutonium for a nuclear test last year. A
uranium-enrichment program would have required Pyongyang to build a facility
with thousands of uranium-spinning centrifuges to obtain the highly enriched
uranium needed for a weapon. Iran's nuclear program, which the United States
alleges is intended for weapons, involves enriched uranium.
When Bush took office in 2001, a number of top administration officials
openly expressed grave doubts about the 1994 accord, which was negotiated by
the Clinton administration, and they seized on the intelligence about the
uranium facility to terminate the agreement. The CIA provided an
unclassified estimate to Congress in November 2002 that North Korea had
begun constructing a plant that would produce enough "weapons-grade uranium
for two or more nuclear weapons per year . . . as soon as mid-decade."
David Albright, a respected former U.N. inspector and president of the
Institute for Science and International Security, issued a report last week
in which he likened the intelligence on North Korea's uranium facility to
the discredited intelligence before the invasion of Iraq that Baghdad was
building a nuclear program. "The analysis about North Korea's program also
appears to be flawed," he wrote.
In the upcoming issue of the Washington Quarterly, Joel S. Wit, a former
State Department official who, with Albright, recently met with North Korean
officials in Pyongyang, also raises questions about the intelligence
estimate.
Administration officials insist they had valid suspicions at the time about
North Korean purchases -- including 150 tons of aluminum tubes from Russia
in June 2002 -- to halt any possible cooperative talks with Pyongyang.
Officials also say that a senior North Korean official admitted to the
program in October 2002, when Hill's predecessor, James Kelly, confronted
North Korean officials over the U.S. intelligence findings at a meeting in
Pyongyang. North Korea subsequently denied that any such admission took
place.
Kelly told reporters at the time he had informed the North Koreans that
"this was a big problem and that they needed to dismantle it right away,
before we could fully engage in a whole range of things that might well be
mutually beneficial."
U.S. participants at the meeting said in interviews there was little dispute
at the time North Korea appeared to be admitting the program, though one
said the admission was more "tonal" -- such as the North Korean official's
belligerent attitude -- than would appear in the transcript of the
discussion.
During the early years of the crisis, the United States took a firm stand
that North Korea must first admit to the uranium facility, rejecting
proposals from other nations that it was more important to freeze the
plutonium facility in order to halt North Korea's production. In May 2004,
DeTrani -- then with the State Department -- was dispatched to give the
North Koreans a detailed, 90-minute presentation of all the materials that
Pyongyang had procured overseas, including aluminum tubes, chemicals and
even a centrifuge kit from a Pakistani nuclear smuggling network, a U.S.
official said.
The North Koreans have consistently denied having a uranium-enrichment
program, and U.S. officials say suspected procurement activities have
largely ceased in the past two years for unknown reasons. Some speculate
that Pyongyang found a uranium program too difficult, especially since the
plutonium facility was active. Others say DeTrani's presentation spooked
them and they either ended the purchases or became more discreet.
Hill has said he has raised the uranium program at every meeting with the
North Koreans, but the recent deal struck with Pyongyang focuses on the
plutonium program. Under the agreement, North Korea will close and "seal"
its plutonium nuclear reactor at Yongbyon within 60 days in return for
50,000 tons of fuel oil.
Pyongyang must eventually disclose and dismantle its programs in order to
receive significant aid and other benefits, including normalizing relations
with the United States.
attack on Iran. Now we find that they have been lying to us about North
Korea's nuclear program.
-----------
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/28/AR2007022801977.html
The Bush administration is backing away from its long-held assertions that
North Korea has an active clandestine program to enrich uranium, leading
some experts to believe that the original U.S. intelligence that started the
crisis over Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions may have been flawed.
The chief intelligence officer for North Korea, Joseph R. DeTrani, told
Congress on Tuesday that while there is "high confidence" North Korea
acquired materials that could be used in a "production-scale" uranium
program, there is only "mid-confidence" such a program exists. Meanwhile,
Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill, the chief negotiator for
disarmament talks, told a conference last week in Washington that it is
unclear whether North Korea ever mastered the production techniques
necessary for such a program.
If the materials North Korea bought "did not go into a highly enriched
uranium program, maybe they went somewhere else," Hill said. "Fine. We can
have a discussion about where they are and where they've gone."
The administration's stance today stands in sharp contrast to the certainty
expressed by top officials in 2002, when the administration accused
Pyongyang of running a secret uranium program -- and demanded it be
dismantled at once. President Bush told a news conference that November: "We
discovered that, contrary to an agreement they had with the United States,
they're enriching uranium, with a desire of developing a weapon."
The accusation about the alleged uranium program backfired, sparking a
series of events that ultimately led to North Korea's first nuclear test --
using another material, plutonium -- nearly five months ago.
In 2002, the United States led a drive to suspend shipments of fuel oil
promised to Pyongyang under a 1994 accord that froze a North Korean
plutonium facility. The collapse of the 1994 agreement freed North Korea to
build up a stockpile of plutonium for as many as a dozen nuclear weapons.
Pyongyang conducted its test with some of that plutonium -- while the
alleged uranium facility faded in importance.
Plutonium and highly enriched uranium provide different routes to building
nuclear weapons. The North Koreans were able to reprocess spent fuel rods --
which had been monitored by U.N. inspectors under the 1994 agreement -- to
obtain the weapons-grade plutonium for a nuclear test last year. A
uranium-enrichment program would have required Pyongyang to build a facility
with thousands of uranium-spinning centrifuges to obtain the highly enriched
uranium needed for a weapon. Iran's nuclear program, which the United States
alleges is intended for weapons, involves enriched uranium.
When Bush took office in 2001, a number of top administration officials
openly expressed grave doubts about the 1994 accord, which was negotiated by
the Clinton administration, and they seized on the intelligence about the
uranium facility to terminate the agreement. The CIA provided an
unclassified estimate to Congress in November 2002 that North Korea had
begun constructing a plant that would produce enough "weapons-grade uranium
for two or more nuclear weapons per year . . . as soon as mid-decade."
David Albright, a respected former U.N. inspector and president of the
Institute for Science and International Security, issued a report last week
in which he likened the intelligence on North Korea's uranium facility to
the discredited intelligence before the invasion of Iraq that Baghdad was
building a nuclear program. "The analysis about North Korea's program also
appears to be flawed," he wrote.
In the upcoming issue of the Washington Quarterly, Joel S. Wit, a former
State Department official who, with Albright, recently met with North Korean
officials in Pyongyang, also raises questions about the intelligence
estimate.
Administration officials insist they had valid suspicions at the time about
North Korean purchases -- including 150 tons of aluminum tubes from Russia
in June 2002 -- to halt any possible cooperative talks with Pyongyang.
Officials also say that a senior North Korean official admitted to the
program in October 2002, when Hill's predecessor, James Kelly, confronted
North Korean officials over the U.S. intelligence findings at a meeting in
Pyongyang. North Korea subsequently denied that any such admission took
place.
Kelly told reporters at the time he had informed the North Koreans that
"this was a big problem and that they needed to dismantle it right away,
before we could fully engage in a whole range of things that might well be
mutually beneficial."
U.S. participants at the meeting said in interviews there was little dispute
at the time North Korea appeared to be admitting the program, though one
said the admission was more "tonal" -- such as the North Korean official's
belligerent attitude -- than would appear in the transcript of the
discussion.
During the early years of the crisis, the United States took a firm stand
that North Korea must first admit to the uranium facility, rejecting
proposals from other nations that it was more important to freeze the
plutonium facility in order to halt North Korea's production. In May 2004,
DeTrani -- then with the State Department -- was dispatched to give the
North Koreans a detailed, 90-minute presentation of all the materials that
Pyongyang had procured overseas, including aluminum tubes, chemicals and
even a centrifuge kit from a Pakistani nuclear smuggling network, a U.S.
official said.
The North Koreans have consistently denied having a uranium-enrichment
program, and U.S. officials say suspected procurement activities have
largely ceased in the past two years for unknown reasons. Some speculate
that Pyongyang found a uranium program too difficult, especially since the
plutonium facility was active. Others say DeTrani's presentation spooked
them and they either ended the purchases or became more discreet.
Hill has said he has raised the uranium program at every meeting with the
North Koreans, but the recent deal struck with Pyongyang focuses on the
plutonium program. Under the agreement, North Korea will close and "seal"
its plutonium nuclear reactor at Yongbyon within 60 days in return for
50,000 tons of fuel oil.
Pyongyang must eventually disclose and dismantle its programs in order to
receive significant aid and other benefits, including normalizing relations
with the United States.
