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Patriot Games
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http://www.newsmax.com/archives/ic/2007/8/8/220321.shtml?s=ic
CIA Defends Against 'Legacy of Ashes'
In "Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA," author Tim Weiner paints the
infamous spy agency as allowing its proper function of gathering accurate
intelligence to languish.
The unflattering history portrays the CIA as blind to events in key
countries like Russia, Cuba and Iraq -- and tragically wrong about the
Iranian revolution, the fall of communism,and the absence of Iraqi WMDs.
But Mark Mansfield, CIA Director of Public Affairs, has gone on the
offensive with a strong statement about the book:
According to Mansfield, the CIA is no stranger to criticism. Intelligence
work, focused as it is on the uncertain, the unknown, and the deliberately
hidden, comes with great difficulty and risk.
There will be shortcomings and unpleasant surprises, he concedes. That said,
Tim Weiner's recently published book, "Legacy of Ashes," paints far too dark
a picture of the agency's past.
Backed by selective citations, sweeping assertions, and a fascination with
the negative, Weiner overlooks, minimizes, or distorts agency achievements,
Mansfield argues.
In 1948, the CIA accurately assessed the chances of war with the Soviets as
nil. According to Weiner, that was a failure "because no one listened." The
development of the U-2 spyplane was a stunning technological achievement
that offered a unique look behind the Iron Curtain.
To Weiner, it is tied to failure, because the CIA should have had better
human sources inside the Soviet Union. Through analytic rigor, the agency
made a near-perfect forecast of the 1967 Mideast War.
Weiner attributes it wholly to information from a foreign intelligence
service, says Mansfield. The CIA offered accurate and timely warning of
Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, a fact Weiner obscures in his
narrative.
Those are but a few examples. The story of Pyotr Popov, the CIA's first
major Soviet spy, gets very short shrift. Weiner rightly speaks of the
Soviet sources killed by the treachery of Aldrich Ames, yet never mentions
the skill it took to recruit those sources or the intelligence they provided
the United States.
Time and again, Weiner takes things to the darkest corner of the room. He
knows better. In promoting his book, he says the design and deployment of
intelligence satellites and the study of imagery from them "helped keep the
Cold War cold." That in itself was no minor achievement.
Despite its claims to be "the" history of the CIA, the book is marked by
errors great and small. Here is a relatively brief, and admittedly
incomplete, catalogue:
-- The book's first few paragraphs mistakenly assert that President Harry
Truman never wanted the CIA to engage in covert action. But he signed
National Security Council (NSC) directives assigning responsibility for
covert action to the CIA--at a time when CIA officials were skeptical about
taking on this mission. Weiner himself notes in the book that Truman's NSC
approved 81 covert CIA actions.
-- The book points out that covert actions are undertaken at the behest of
the President to achieve specific ends at specific times. To Weiner, those
objectives are illegitimate, to be viewed solely through the prism of events
decades later, as though you can draw a simple, straight, decisive line of
causation through years of complicated history.
-- The book states that a 1952 operation in Manchuria undertaken by two CIA
officers, Dick Fecteau and Jack Downey, was a personnel rescue mission. In
fact, the purpose of the operation was to recover documents.
-- The book charges that Frank Wisner, a pioneer of the agency's covert
operations, successfully resisted Director of Central Intelligence Walter
Bedell Smith's order to cancel ineffective ones. But a major Asian program
was shut down in 1953--on Wisner's watch as the head of CIA's covert
operations.
-- The book states that the National Security Agency (NSA) was created in
response to an interception and decryption program that was compromised in
1949. In fact, the NSA was established in 1952 to correct serious problems
with military signals intelligence during the Korean War.
-- The book alleges that the CIA used Radio Free Europe to spark the 1956
Hungarian uprising. But Weiner's main source for this idea is a Radio Free
Europe memo that was written after the uprising.
-- The book suggests that the CIA didn't predict the collapse of the Soviet
Union. As a number of prominent outside observers have noted, the agency had
warned of trouble signs in the Soviet Union on regular occasions since the
1970s.
-- The book states that current CIA Director Michael Hayden is the first
active duty military officer to lead the agency since Walter Bedell Smith in
the 1950s. But Stansfield Turner was an active duty admiral in the U.S. Navy
during the first two years of his tenure as Director of Central
Intelligence.
Even Weiner's telling of his juiciest tale, involving the American
ambassador to Guatemala, is gravely flawed. There is much less to this than
Weiner suggests--for starters, the supposed intelligence on which it is
based did not even come from the CIA or a CIA source.
As is so often the case, there is more than one side to the story. But you
would not know that from Weiner's book.
What of the CIA today? It is the agency that did much to oust the Taliban
from Afghanistan after 9/11 and collapse the Al-Qa'ida safe haven there.
This is the agency that unraveled the A.Q. Khan proliferation network and
learned enough about Libya's nuclear program to persuade Tripoli to step
back from it. And the agency that has helped foil terrorist plots and erode
the structure and leadership of a terrorist movement that is extremely
dangerous and highly adaptable.
Weiner's verdict: These skilled and dedicated officers are "the weakest
cadre of spies and analysts in the history of the CIA."
The agency makes no claims to perfection--far from it. We strive each day to
learn from our successes and failures. Not even Weiner can claim that the
CIA shrinks from its past. The huge volume of material we have declassified,
rare for an intelligence service, underscores the point.
With a strong range of sources, Tim Weiner had an opportunity to write a
balanced history of a complex, important subject. But he did not. His bias
overwhelms his scholarship. One cannot learn the true story of the CIA from
Legacy of Ashes.
CIA Defends Against 'Legacy of Ashes'
In "Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA," author Tim Weiner paints the
infamous spy agency as allowing its proper function of gathering accurate
intelligence to languish.
The unflattering history portrays the CIA as blind to events in key
countries like Russia, Cuba and Iraq -- and tragically wrong about the
Iranian revolution, the fall of communism,and the absence of Iraqi WMDs.
But Mark Mansfield, CIA Director of Public Affairs, has gone on the
offensive with a strong statement about the book:
According to Mansfield, the CIA is no stranger to criticism. Intelligence
work, focused as it is on the uncertain, the unknown, and the deliberately
hidden, comes with great difficulty and risk.
There will be shortcomings and unpleasant surprises, he concedes. That said,
Tim Weiner's recently published book, "Legacy of Ashes," paints far too dark
a picture of the agency's past.
Backed by selective citations, sweeping assertions, and a fascination with
the negative, Weiner overlooks, minimizes, or distorts agency achievements,
Mansfield argues.
In 1948, the CIA accurately assessed the chances of war with the Soviets as
nil. According to Weiner, that was a failure "because no one listened." The
development of the U-2 spyplane was a stunning technological achievement
that offered a unique look behind the Iron Curtain.
To Weiner, it is tied to failure, because the CIA should have had better
human sources inside the Soviet Union. Through analytic rigor, the agency
made a near-perfect forecast of the 1967 Mideast War.
Weiner attributes it wholly to information from a foreign intelligence
service, says Mansfield. The CIA offered accurate and timely warning of
Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, a fact Weiner obscures in his
narrative.
Those are but a few examples. The story of Pyotr Popov, the CIA's first
major Soviet spy, gets very short shrift. Weiner rightly speaks of the
Soviet sources killed by the treachery of Aldrich Ames, yet never mentions
the skill it took to recruit those sources or the intelligence they provided
the United States.
Time and again, Weiner takes things to the darkest corner of the room. He
knows better. In promoting his book, he says the design and deployment of
intelligence satellites and the study of imagery from them "helped keep the
Cold War cold." That in itself was no minor achievement.
Despite its claims to be "the" history of the CIA, the book is marked by
errors great and small. Here is a relatively brief, and admittedly
incomplete, catalogue:
-- The book's first few paragraphs mistakenly assert that President Harry
Truman never wanted the CIA to engage in covert action. But he signed
National Security Council (NSC) directives assigning responsibility for
covert action to the CIA--at a time when CIA officials were skeptical about
taking on this mission. Weiner himself notes in the book that Truman's NSC
approved 81 covert CIA actions.
-- The book points out that covert actions are undertaken at the behest of
the President to achieve specific ends at specific times. To Weiner, those
objectives are illegitimate, to be viewed solely through the prism of events
decades later, as though you can draw a simple, straight, decisive line of
causation through years of complicated history.
-- The book states that a 1952 operation in Manchuria undertaken by two CIA
officers, Dick Fecteau and Jack Downey, was a personnel rescue mission. In
fact, the purpose of the operation was to recover documents.
-- The book charges that Frank Wisner, a pioneer of the agency's covert
operations, successfully resisted Director of Central Intelligence Walter
Bedell Smith's order to cancel ineffective ones. But a major Asian program
was shut down in 1953--on Wisner's watch as the head of CIA's covert
operations.
-- The book states that the National Security Agency (NSA) was created in
response to an interception and decryption program that was compromised in
1949. In fact, the NSA was established in 1952 to correct serious problems
with military signals intelligence during the Korean War.
-- The book alleges that the CIA used Radio Free Europe to spark the 1956
Hungarian uprising. But Weiner's main source for this idea is a Radio Free
Europe memo that was written after the uprising.
-- The book suggests that the CIA didn't predict the collapse of the Soviet
Union. As a number of prominent outside observers have noted, the agency had
warned of trouble signs in the Soviet Union on regular occasions since the
1970s.
-- The book states that current CIA Director Michael Hayden is the first
active duty military officer to lead the agency since Walter Bedell Smith in
the 1950s. But Stansfield Turner was an active duty admiral in the U.S. Navy
during the first two years of his tenure as Director of Central
Intelligence.
Even Weiner's telling of his juiciest tale, involving the American
ambassador to Guatemala, is gravely flawed. There is much less to this than
Weiner suggests--for starters, the supposed intelligence on which it is
based did not even come from the CIA or a CIA source.
As is so often the case, there is more than one side to the story. But you
would not know that from Weiner's book.
What of the CIA today? It is the agency that did much to oust the Taliban
from Afghanistan after 9/11 and collapse the Al-Qa'ida safe haven there.
This is the agency that unraveled the A.Q. Khan proliferation network and
learned enough about Libya's nuclear program to persuade Tripoli to step
back from it. And the agency that has helped foil terrorist plots and erode
the structure and leadership of a terrorist movement that is extremely
dangerous and highly adaptable.
Weiner's verdict: These skilled and dedicated officers are "the weakest
cadre of spies and analysts in the history of the CIA."
The agency makes no claims to perfection--far from it. We strive each day to
learn from our successes and failures. Not even Weiner can claim that the
CIA shrinks from its past. The huge volume of material we have declassified,
rare for an intelligence service, underscores the point.
With a strong range of sources, Tim Weiner had an opportunity to write a
balanced history of a complex, important subject. But he did not. His bias
overwhelms his scholarship. One cannot learn the true story of the CIA from
Legacy of Ashes.