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NY.Transfer.News@blythe.org
Guest
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Deepening of Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution: Why Most
Via NY Transfer News Collective All the News that Doesn't Fit
sent by Steven L. Robinson (activ-l) - May 10, 2007
Open Democracy.net via Venezuelanalysis - May 07, 2007
http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=2032
The Deepening of Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution:
Why Most People Don't Get It
By Julia Buxton
It is hard for an outsider to get a grip on Venezuela, or the country's
President Hugo Chavez. Pick up a copy of the Financial Times , the
Economist, the Independent, Wall Street Journal or the New York Times
and you will be presented with a frightening vision of a "ranting
populist demagogue" (In the words of a British former foreign-office
minister, Denis MacShane), an anti-semite who has captured the hearts
and purchased the support of hoards of irrational poor people while
destroying the country's economy.
In the United States, the rise of "authoritarianism" in Venezuela has
led to progressive increases in funding allocated to the country's
"democracy promotion" agency the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED), while the "security threat" posed by the country prompted the
Bush administration to set up a special intelligence committee on
Venezuela.
A cursory glance at the reports of the Inter American Press Association
or NED-funded Reporters Without Borders reflects a country where
freedom of speech is under threat and human rights under daily assault.
The misiones, the Venezuelan government's extensive package of social
policy programmes are also subject to blistering criticism. Variously
described by critics as a clientilist tool, indication of fiscal
profligacy and / or an unsustainable welfare initiative generating a
culture of dependency, this $6 billion programme has no redeeming
features.
The view from Venezuela
Contrast this with opinion-poll surveys, election results and
statistical information "on the ground". Hugo Chavez was re-elected to
the presidency in December 2006 with 1.7 million more votes than when
he was first elected in December 1998. A March 2007 poll by Datanalisis
shows that 64.7% of Venezuelans have a positive view of Chavez's
performance in office. Moreover, the majority of Venezuelans are
optimistic and confident about the future and there is a high level of
support for the new institutional and constitutional framework that the
government has established.
According to Latinobarometro polling, the percentage of Venezuelans
satisfied with their political system increased from 32% in 1998 to
over 57% and Venezuelans are more politically active than the citizens
of any other surveyed country - 47% discuss politics regularly (against
a regional average of 26%) while 25% are active in a political party
(the regional average is 9%). 56% believe that elections in the country
are "clean", (regional average 41%) and along with Uruguayans,
Venezuelans express the highest percentage of confidence in elections
as the most effective means of promoting change in the country (both
71%, compared to 57% for all of Latin America).
The economy is booming, country risk perceptions have fallen and
despite the perception of antagonism, Venezuela remains north America's
second most important regional trading partner, and the twelfth largest
in global terms. There is a vibrant new community media and a highly
combative and antagonistic opposition controlled private-sector media -
despite the much publicised dispute that was sparked in January 2007
over the licensing of opposition stalwart RCTV.
As for the misiones, nearly three-quarters of Venezuelans receive some
form of state-sponsored health, education, housing assistance or food
provision. Poverty and critical poverty are on a downward trend and the
World Bank has acknowledged that: "Venezuela has achieved substantial
improvements in the fight against poverty".
Although critics have sniffed at the poverty reduction record - on the
premise that high oil prices since 2003 should translate 2006 into an
inevitable fall in poverty - the reductions achieved to date are a
significant achievement given the critical situation Chavez inherited,
the disastrous impact of opposition stoppages on the economy in 2001
and 2002, and the historical absence of state institutions capable of
delivering welfare provision. In the Datanalisis survey of March 2007,
the government's performance in education, food and health service
delivery received high approval ratings (68.8%, 64.7%, and 64.2%
respectively) - and, to give a human touch to a favourable picture, a
second Latinobarometro poll of regional perceptions found that
Venezuela (along with Brazil) is viewed as the friendliest country
among Latin Americans.
Is the information cited above an example of naove "solidarity
journalism", an attempt to further embed new "myths" about the country
by someone with no direct stake in the outcome?
Insights from the naove
In one way or another, we all have a stake, direct or indirect, in the
politics of Venezuela. That Venezuela's citizens have such a manifestly
different perception of their democracy than that held by external
actors such as the United States and its National Endowment for
Democracy is significant and important. The disconnect needs serious
discussion, not least because it may illuminate why US "democracy
promotion" is proving so counterproductive, anti-American sentiment so
prevalent and, in Venezuela, why NED-backed groups are so reviled. If
the misiones are delivering improvements in welfare and poverty
reduction, then they merit detailed consideration. If there are lessons
that can be learned from one, some or all of the misiones, they should
not be discarded simply because of subjective prejudices toward Chavez
or critiqued merely as a means of de-legitimising his government.
Engaged and balanced reporting, analysis and discussion has been
required for a long time. It is even more necessary now given the
acceleration of the Bolivarian revolution following the presidential
election of December 2007.
Toward 21st-century socialism
Following his victory in the December 2006, Chavez unveiled plans to
deepen the revolutionary agenda of the government. Central to this
process is the concept of the "five motors" driving the country toward
the model of "21st-century socialism" first outlined by Chavez in 2005.
21st-century socialism is seen as distinct from the "failed" Marxist
experiments of the 20th century, it is strongly nationalist in
influence - responding to the social and economic realities of
Venezuela, and its elucidation reflects the evolution of Chavez's
thinking, away from an initial position exalting Tony Blair and the
"third way" model and toward a new set of "socialist" ideas that
emphasis cooperation, participation and organisation.
The five motors included: the granting of enabling powers to the
executive - as a means of introducing reforms to the institutional and
economic framework of the state; constitutional reform; educational
reform; expansion of communal power and the creation of a new geometry
of power, the latter intended to enhance the responsibilities and
political importance of communal councils.
Communal councils are a vitally important element of this revolutionary
deepening and planned restructuring of the state and constitution. The
government has experimented with a variety of organisational forms as
part of its quest to create a new model of "participatory democracy"
and in response to the explosion of social organization across the
country since 1999 (see Diana Raby, Democracy and Revolution: Latin
America and Socialism Today, Pluto Press, 2006).
In 2006, legislation was introduced recognising community councils as a
principle form of political organisation. The councils complement and
bring coherence to the multiple networks of social organisations that
deliver the misiones programmes and organise political activities, such
as the water committees, land committees, health committees, electoral
battle-units and endogenous development groups. Based on 200 to 400
families in urban areas and twenty to thirty in rural settings, the
councils are governed by citizens' assembles and their financial
affairs overseen by public auditing processes. By the end of 2006,
there were 16,000 communal councils across the country.
With the injection of $5 billion in funding for 2007, the government
aims to increase this to over 25,000, allowing communities to become
the new "eye" of political power in a radical, bottom up vision of
democracy in which national government is balanced by grassroots power.
The PSUV
Running parallel with the launch of the "five motors", Chavez outlined
plans for a new United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). The aim of
the PSUV is to bring organisational coherence to the Chavista alliance
of twenty-four party political organisations and the multiple
grassroots groups that support the government. The new party is being
constructed over a nine month period through a process of broad public
consultation led by an intended 70,000 "promoters" (30,000 of which
have already been sworn in) that aim to consult over 5 million people
on the structure and role of the new party. The construction of the
PSUV is to culminate in a referendum, scheduled for December 2007, in
which members will approve (or otherwise) the programme of the new
party.
An authoritarian lurch?
The acceleration of the Bolivarian project - in both ideological and
organisational terms, has fuelled concerns over the deepening of the
government's authoritarian tendencies. Established cynics in the media,
who have seen leftwing ideals rise and fall, and opponents in the
anti-Chavez movement have been quick to point to a frightening new
twist in the evolution of the Chavez government. This is seen to be
represented by the recent granting of decree powers to President
Chavez, the move to extend state control over key sectors of the
economy and the debate over the formation of the PSUV.
However, it is at this point that the delineation between popular
perceptions of democracy on the ground in Venezuela, and "elite"
perceptions, articulated by the media and US "democracy-promotion"
groups are revealed. There is widespread popular support for this new
trajectory in
Venezuelan politics. The creation of the PSUV is seen to be in line
with the demands of grassroots groups to have more influence within the
organisational framework of the Boliviarian project, while Chavez's use
of decree powers to revise the institutional structures of the state
responds to grassroots pressure for more influence, power and resources
at the community level. Put simply, many Venezuelans think they are
getting more and better democracy through "21st-century socialism", not
less.
Squaring the circle
The promiscuous use of the terms "populist" and "authoritarian" to
describe Chavez is one of the primary reasons why the nature, appeal
and the durability of Chavismo has been so manifestly misunderstood by
detractors. "Populism" glosses over the complex mechanisms of linkage,
reciprocity and accountability that exist between government and civil
society in Venezuela and the dynamics that shape the relationship
between the administration and multiplicity of grassroots organisations
across the country, the majority of which are far more autonomous and
organisationally coherent than is implied in the "populist" narrative.
Ordinary people feel empowered by this government, a development that
can only be understood through reference to the highly exclusionary
model of two-party "democracy" that prevailed in Venezuela before the
elections of 1998. There are two important points following from this.
First, support for Chavez is not simply predicated on the government's
capacity for economic redistribution. The appeal of Chavez and
21st-century socialism is as much to do with this being a project of
political empowerment as it is one of oil-"rent" distribution. As such,
a fall in the oil price will not necessarily herald the end of Chavez
or support for the government.
Second, what is happening in contemporary Venezuela cannot be understood
through the lens of liberal democracy. The NED, the US state department
and the plethora of agencies that seek to "evaluate" democratic
standards such as Freedom House and Transparency International have got
it fundamentally wrong in thinking that democracy is judged through
reference to the procedural mechanics of liberal democracy. Venezuelans
are, on the whole, contended with their democratically elected
government and the radical model of participatory democracy that it is
creating.
There is still a sizeable sector that lacks political representation -
largely owing to the disastrous strategies of those in the anti-Chavez
movement that claimed to represent them - and clearly stability in the
future requires incorporating the newly excluded back into the political
mainstream. But the immediate priority for the government is giving
voice and power to those who have been politically marginalised since
the 1980s. To date, and despite the best efforts of the NED and the
perceptions created by the media, the Bolivarian revolution has been
tremendously successful.
[Julia Buxton is visiting professor at the Centre for Latin American
Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. She
is also senior research fellow in the department of peace studies,
Bradford University. Her work includes The Failure of Political Reform
in Venezuela (Ashgate, 2001)]
Also on Hugo Chavez, Venezuela, and the "Bolivarian revolution" in
openDemocracy:
Ivan Briscoe, "The invisible majority: Venezuela after the revolution"
(25 August 2004)
Ivan Briscoe, "All change in Venezuela's revolution? "
(25 January 2005)
Jonah Gindin & William I Robinson, "The United States, Venezuela, and
"democracy promotion"
(4 August 2005)
Ivan Briscoe, "Venezuela: a revolution in contraflow"
(10 February 2006)
Ben Schiller, "The axis of oil: China and Venezuela"
(2 March 2006)
George Philip, "The politics of oil in Venezuela"
(24 May 2006)
Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "After Bush: dealing with Hugo Chavez"
(13 March 2007)
George Philip, "Hugo Chavez at his peak"
(28 March 2007 )
Phil Gunson, "Hugo Chavez: yo, el supremo "
(13 April 2007)
================================================================
NY Transfer News Collective A Service of Blythe Systems
Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us
Search Archives: http://olm.blythe-systems.com/htdig/search.html
List Archives: http://olm.blythe-systems.com/pipermail/nytr/
Subscribe: http://olm.blythe-systems.com/mailman/listinfo/nytr
================================================================
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H/J/owQUl3B+Uw134bynJPM=
=DYlk
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Hash: SHA1
Deepening of Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution: Why Most
Via NY Transfer News Collective All the News that Doesn't Fit
sent by Steven L. Robinson (activ-l) - May 10, 2007
Open Democracy.net via Venezuelanalysis - May 07, 2007
http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=2032
The Deepening of Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution:
Why Most People Don't Get It
By Julia Buxton
It is hard for an outsider to get a grip on Venezuela, or the country's
President Hugo Chavez. Pick up a copy of the Financial Times , the
Economist, the Independent, Wall Street Journal or the New York Times
and you will be presented with a frightening vision of a "ranting
populist demagogue" (In the words of a British former foreign-office
minister, Denis MacShane), an anti-semite who has captured the hearts
and purchased the support of hoards of irrational poor people while
destroying the country's economy.
In the United States, the rise of "authoritarianism" in Venezuela has
led to progressive increases in funding allocated to the country's
"democracy promotion" agency the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED), while the "security threat" posed by the country prompted the
Bush administration to set up a special intelligence committee on
Venezuela.
A cursory glance at the reports of the Inter American Press Association
or NED-funded Reporters Without Borders reflects a country where
freedom of speech is under threat and human rights under daily assault.
The misiones, the Venezuelan government's extensive package of social
policy programmes are also subject to blistering criticism. Variously
described by critics as a clientilist tool, indication of fiscal
profligacy and / or an unsustainable welfare initiative generating a
culture of dependency, this $6 billion programme has no redeeming
features.
The view from Venezuela
Contrast this with opinion-poll surveys, election results and
statistical information "on the ground". Hugo Chavez was re-elected to
the presidency in December 2006 with 1.7 million more votes than when
he was first elected in December 1998. A March 2007 poll by Datanalisis
shows that 64.7% of Venezuelans have a positive view of Chavez's
performance in office. Moreover, the majority of Venezuelans are
optimistic and confident about the future and there is a high level of
support for the new institutional and constitutional framework that the
government has established.
According to Latinobarometro polling, the percentage of Venezuelans
satisfied with their political system increased from 32% in 1998 to
over 57% and Venezuelans are more politically active than the citizens
of any other surveyed country - 47% discuss politics regularly (against
a regional average of 26%) while 25% are active in a political party
(the regional average is 9%). 56% believe that elections in the country
are "clean", (regional average 41%) and along with Uruguayans,
Venezuelans express the highest percentage of confidence in elections
as the most effective means of promoting change in the country (both
71%, compared to 57% for all of Latin America).
The economy is booming, country risk perceptions have fallen and
despite the perception of antagonism, Venezuela remains north America's
second most important regional trading partner, and the twelfth largest
in global terms. There is a vibrant new community media and a highly
combative and antagonistic opposition controlled private-sector media -
despite the much publicised dispute that was sparked in January 2007
over the licensing of opposition stalwart RCTV.
As for the misiones, nearly three-quarters of Venezuelans receive some
form of state-sponsored health, education, housing assistance or food
provision. Poverty and critical poverty are on a downward trend and the
World Bank has acknowledged that: "Venezuela has achieved substantial
improvements in the fight against poverty".
Although critics have sniffed at the poverty reduction record - on the
premise that high oil prices since 2003 should translate 2006 into an
inevitable fall in poverty - the reductions achieved to date are a
significant achievement given the critical situation Chavez inherited,
the disastrous impact of opposition stoppages on the economy in 2001
and 2002, and the historical absence of state institutions capable of
delivering welfare provision. In the Datanalisis survey of March 2007,
the government's performance in education, food and health service
delivery received high approval ratings (68.8%, 64.7%, and 64.2%
respectively) - and, to give a human touch to a favourable picture, a
second Latinobarometro poll of regional perceptions found that
Venezuela (along with Brazil) is viewed as the friendliest country
among Latin Americans.
Is the information cited above an example of naove "solidarity
journalism", an attempt to further embed new "myths" about the country
by someone with no direct stake in the outcome?
Insights from the naove
In one way or another, we all have a stake, direct or indirect, in the
politics of Venezuela. That Venezuela's citizens have such a manifestly
different perception of their democracy than that held by external
actors such as the United States and its National Endowment for
Democracy is significant and important. The disconnect needs serious
discussion, not least because it may illuminate why US "democracy
promotion" is proving so counterproductive, anti-American sentiment so
prevalent and, in Venezuela, why NED-backed groups are so reviled. If
the misiones are delivering improvements in welfare and poverty
reduction, then they merit detailed consideration. If there are lessons
that can be learned from one, some or all of the misiones, they should
not be discarded simply because of subjective prejudices toward Chavez
or critiqued merely as a means of de-legitimising his government.
Engaged and balanced reporting, analysis and discussion has been
required for a long time. It is even more necessary now given the
acceleration of the Bolivarian revolution following the presidential
election of December 2007.
Toward 21st-century socialism
Following his victory in the December 2006, Chavez unveiled plans to
deepen the revolutionary agenda of the government. Central to this
process is the concept of the "five motors" driving the country toward
the model of "21st-century socialism" first outlined by Chavez in 2005.
21st-century socialism is seen as distinct from the "failed" Marxist
experiments of the 20th century, it is strongly nationalist in
influence - responding to the social and economic realities of
Venezuela, and its elucidation reflects the evolution of Chavez's
thinking, away from an initial position exalting Tony Blair and the
"third way" model and toward a new set of "socialist" ideas that
emphasis cooperation, participation and organisation.
The five motors included: the granting of enabling powers to the
executive - as a means of introducing reforms to the institutional and
economic framework of the state; constitutional reform; educational
reform; expansion of communal power and the creation of a new geometry
of power, the latter intended to enhance the responsibilities and
political importance of communal councils.
Communal councils are a vitally important element of this revolutionary
deepening and planned restructuring of the state and constitution. The
government has experimented with a variety of organisational forms as
part of its quest to create a new model of "participatory democracy"
and in response to the explosion of social organization across the
country since 1999 (see Diana Raby, Democracy and Revolution: Latin
America and Socialism Today, Pluto Press, 2006).
In 2006, legislation was introduced recognising community councils as a
principle form of political organisation. The councils complement and
bring coherence to the multiple networks of social organisations that
deliver the misiones programmes and organise political activities, such
as the water committees, land committees, health committees, electoral
battle-units and endogenous development groups. Based on 200 to 400
families in urban areas and twenty to thirty in rural settings, the
councils are governed by citizens' assembles and their financial
affairs overseen by public auditing processes. By the end of 2006,
there were 16,000 communal councils across the country.
With the injection of $5 billion in funding for 2007, the government
aims to increase this to over 25,000, allowing communities to become
the new "eye" of political power in a radical, bottom up vision of
democracy in which national government is balanced by grassroots power.
The PSUV
Running parallel with the launch of the "five motors", Chavez outlined
plans for a new United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). The aim of
the PSUV is to bring organisational coherence to the Chavista alliance
of twenty-four party political organisations and the multiple
grassroots groups that support the government. The new party is being
constructed over a nine month period through a process of broad public
consultation led by an intended 70,000 "promoters" (30,000 of which
have already been sworn in) that aim to consult over 5 million people
on the structure and role of the new party. The construction of the
PSUV is to culminate in a referendum, scheduled for December 2007, in
which members will approve (or otherwise) the programme of the new
party.
An authoritarian lurch?
The acceleration of the Bolivarian project - in both ideological and
organisational terms, has fuelled concerns over the deepening of the
government's authoritarian tendencies. Established cynics in the media,
who have seen leftwing ideals rise and fall, and opponents in the
anti-Chavez movement have been quick to point to a frightening new
twist in the evolution of the Chavez government. This is seen to be
represented by the recent granting of decree powers to President
Chavez, the move to extend state control over key sectors of the
economy and the debate over the formation of the PSUV.
However, it is at this point that the delineation between popular
perceptions of democracy on the ground in Venezuela, and "elite"
perceptions, articulated by the media and US "democracy-promotion"
groups are revealed. There is widespread popular support for this new
trajectory in
Venezuelan politics. The creation of the PSUV is seen to be in line
with the demands of grassroots groups to have more influence within the
organisational framework of the Boliviarian project, while Chavez's use
of decree powers to revise the institutional structures of the state
responds to grassroots pressure for more influence, power and resources
at the community level. Put simply, many Venezuelans think they are
getting more and better democracy through "21st-century socialism", not
less.
Squaring the circle
The promiscuous use of the terms "populist" and "authoritarian" to
describe Chavez is one of the primary reasons why the nature, appeal
and the durability of Chavismo has been so manifestly misunderstood by
detractors. "Populism" glosses over the complex mechanisms of linkage,
reciprocity and accountability that exist between government and civil
society in Venezuela and the dynamics that shape the relationship
between the administration and multiplicity of grassroots organisations
across the country, the majority of which are far more autonomous and
organisationally coherent than is implied in the "populist" narrative.
Ordinary people feel empowered by this government, a development that
can only be understood through reference to the highly exclusionary
model of two-party "democracy" that prevailed in Venezuela before the
elections of 1998. There are two important points following from this.
First, support for Chavez is not simply predicated on the government's
capacity for economic redistribution. The appeal of Chavez and
21st-century socialism is as much to do with this being a project of
political empowerment as it is one of oil-"rent" distribution. As such,
a fall in the oil price will not necessarily herald the end of Chavez
or support for the government.
Second, what is happening in contemporary Venezuela cannot be understood
through the lens of liberal democracy. The NED, the US state department
and the plethora of agencies that seek to "evaluate" democratic
standards such as Freedom House and Transparency International have got
it fundamentally wrong in thinking that democracy is judged through
reference to the procedural mechanics of liberal democracy. Venezuelans
are, on the whole, contended with their democratically elected
government and the radical model of participatory democracy that it is
creating.
There is still a sizeable sector that lacks political representation -
largely owing to the disastrous strategies of those in the anti-Chavez
movement that claimed to represent them - and clearly stability in the
future requires incorporating the newly excluded back into the political
mainstream. But the immediate priority for the government is giving
voice and power to those who have been politically marginalised since
the 1980s. To date, and despite the best efforts of the NED and the
perceptions created by the media, the Bolivarian revolution has been
tremendously successful.
[Julia Buxton is visiting professor at the Centre for Latin American
Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. She
is also senior research fellow in the department of peace studies,
Bradford University. Her work includes The Failure of Political Reform
in Venezuela (Ashgate, 2001)]
Also on Hugo Chavez, Venezuela, and the "Bolivarian revolution" in
openDemocracy:
Ivan Briscoe, "The invisible majority: Venezuela after the revolution"
(25 August 2004)
Ivan Briscoe, "All change in Venezuela's revolution? "
(25 January 2005)
Jonah Gindin & William I Robinson, "The United States, Venezuela, and
"democracy promotion"
(4 August 2005)
Ivan Briscoe, "Venezuela: a revolution in contraflow"
(10 February 2006)
Ben Schiller, "The axis of oil: China and Venezuela"
(2 March 2006)
George Philip, "The politics of oil in Venezuela"
(24 May 2006)
Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "After Bush: dealing with Hugo Chavez"
(13 March 2007)
George Philip, "Hugo Chavez at his peak"
(28 March 2007 )
Phil Gunson, "Hugo Chavez: yo, el supremo "
(13 April 2007)
================================================================
NY Transfer News Collective A Service of Blythe Systems
Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us
Search Archives: http://olm.blythe-systems.com/htdig/search.html
List Archives: http://olm.blythe-systems.com/pipermail/nytr/
Subscribe: http://olm.blythe-systems.com/mailman/listinfo/nytr
================================================================
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