K
Kickin' Ass and Takin' Names
Guest
Seven years ago George W. Bush's incoming foreign policy team blamed
the Clinton administration for an eleventh-hour rush for a Middle East
peace agreement that ended with the explosion of the second
Palestinian intifada. Now, with less than 10 months remaining in
office, Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice are engaged in a
similar last-minute push -- yet they don't seem to recognize the
growing risk that their initiative, too, will end with another Israeli-
Palestinian war.
Rice visited Jerusalem again last week to press for visible Israeli
fulfillment of commitments made at last year's Annapolis conference,
and she appeared to win some incremental steps, such as the
dismantlement of a few dozen of the several hundred military
roadblocks in the West Bank. Yet a more significant Israeli signal may
have been delivered by the stream of senior officials who have quietly
been visiting Washington in the past month: Israel, they have been
saying, is on course for a major conflict with the Hamas movement in
the Gaza Strip.
That battle seemed on the verge of beginning a month ago, when Hamas
for the first time began firing Iranian-made missiles at the Israeli
city of Ashkelon -- in addition to the volleys of homemade rockets it
has been aiming at the smaller town of Sderot for several years. After
a punishing series of Israeli airstrikes the fighting subsided, and
with the State Department's encouragement Egypt began to broker
discussions about a more enduring truce. In previous columns, I've
argued that such a cease-fire in Gaza is the least bad of Israel's
limited options.
But officials portray Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister
Ehud Barak as having little interest in a deal with Hamas. They
acknowledge that a suspension of attacks by both sides might make the
ongoing peace talks easier -- and that the outbreak of an all-out
conflict would almost certainly kill the Annapolis process. Yet,
increasingly Israeli officials see the confrontation in Gaza with
Hamas as more important in strategic terms than the talks with
moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. The view in Jerusalem,
as more than one official put it to me, is that there is no
alternative to a military collision with Hamas in Gaza, probably
before the end of the Bush administration.
The grim Israeli view is driven to a large degree by what officials
say is the massive and continuing smuggling of weapons into Gaza,
sponsored by Iran and tacitly allowed by Egypt, which despite
considerable pressure from Washington shrinks from actions that might
trigger its own confrontation with Hamas. Hamas is building hardened
bunker systems and stockpiling missiles in imitation of the
infrastructure built in southern Lebanon by the Iranian-backed
Hezbollah movement. The Israelis say hundreds of Hamas militants have
traveled to Iran for training in targeting and firing Grad missiles,
Iran's version of the old Soviet Katyusha.
Sobered by the bloody nose it suffered when it attacked Hezbollah's
Lebanese base in 2006, the Israeli army has been training against
Hamas's Gaza strong points. But officials say that the longer the army
waits to take on what is now viewed as a strategic threat, the greater
Hamas's chance will be to inflict heavy casualties or strike southern
Israeli cities with missiles. The cease-fire Egypt seeks (and that
Hamas sometimes says it wants) would only make the problem worse, in
the Israeli analysis, by giving Hamas the opportunity to accelerate
its buildup.
Bush and Rice would like Israel to hold off against Hamas until Olmert
can complete an agreement on principles for a final Israeli-
Palestinian settlement with Abbas. While Olmert still wants that deal,
it's become increasingly clear to the Israelis that an Abbas-led
government will never be able to implement it. Despite extensive
international aid, the West Bank Palestinian administration remains
little more than a shell kept in power by Israel's troops. Hamas, the
Israelis say, can stop the peace process at any time by resuming
missile attacks against Ashkelon. And whatever happens in Gaza --
whether an Israeli-Hamas truce or all-out war -- Abbas stands to be
further damaged. His prime minister, Salam Fayyad, has hinted
privately that he might favor an Israeli attack on Hamas, because it
would allow Abbas's Fatah movement to take control of Gaza. But
Abbas's security forces are unlikely to be strong enough to control
Gaza's population of 1.5 million anytime soon.
The Israelis say the coming confrontation won't necessarily involve a
full-scale reoccupation of the Gaza Strip. Given the predictable
international backlash against any Israeli offensive, and the
inevitable satellite television coverage of suffering Palestinians,
Olmert is likely to wait for a clear provocation from Hamas. Perhaps
it won't happen for a few more months. But what concerns some Israelis
is the lack of readiness by the Bush administration for the
possibility that its drive for Mideast peace will be overwhelmed by a
Mideast war.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dy.../04/06/AR2008040601662.html?hpid=opinionsbox1
the Clinton administration for an eleventh-hour rush for a Middle East
peace agreement that ended with the explosion of the second
Palestinian intifada. Now, with less than 10 months remaining in
office, Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice are engaged in a
similar last-minute push -- yet they don't seem to recognize the
growing risk that their initiative, too, will end with another Israeli-
Palestinian war.
Rice visited Jerusalem again last week to press for visible Israeli
fulfillment of commitments made at last year's Annapolis conference,
and she appeared to win some incremental steps, such as the
dismantlement of a few dozen of the several hundred military
roadblocks in the West Bank. Yet a more significant Israeli signal may
have been delivered by the stream of senior officials who have quietly
been visiting Washington in the past month: Israel, they have been
saying, is on course for a major conflict with the Hamas movement in
the Gaza Strip.
That battle seemed on the verge of beginning a month ago, when Hamas
for the first time began firing Iranian-made missiles at the Israeli
city of Ashkelon -- in addition to the volleys of homemade rockets it
has been aiming at the smaller town of Sderot for several years. After
a punishing series of Israeli airstrikes the fighting subsided, and
with the State Department's encouragement Egypt began to broker
discussions about a more enduring truce. In previous columns, I've
argued that such a cease-fire in Gaza is the least bad of Israel's
limited options.
But officials portray Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister
Ehud Barak as having little interest in a deal with Hamas. They
acknowledge that a suspension of attacks by both sides might make the
ongoing peace talks easier -- and that the outbreak of an all-out
conflict would almost certainly kill the Annapolis process. Yet,
increasingly Israeli officials see the confrontation in Gaza with
Hamas as more important in strategic terms than the talks with
moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. The view in Jerusalem,
as more than one official put it to me, is that there is no
alternative to a military collision with Hamas in Gaza, probably
before the end of the Bush administration.
The grim Israeli view is driven to a large degree by what officials
say is the massive and continuing smuggling of weapons into Gaza,
sponsored by Iran and tacitly allowed by Egypt, which despite
considerable pressure from Washington shrinks from actions that might
trigger its own confrontation with Hamas. Hamas is building hardened
bunker systems and stockpiling missiles in imitation of the
infrastructure built in southern Lebanon by the Iranian-backed
Hezbollah movement. The Israelis say hundreds of Hamas militants have
traveled to Iran for training in targeting and firing Grad missiles,
Iran's version of the old Soviet Katyusha.
Sobered by the bloody nose it suffered when it attacked Hezbollah's
Lebanese base in 2006, the Israeli army has been training against
Hamas's Gaza strong points. But officials say that the longer the army
waits to take on what is now viewed as a strategic threat, the greater
Hamas's chance will be to inflict heavy casualties or strike southern
Israeli cities with missiles. The cease-fire Egypt seeks (and that
Hamas sometimes says it wants) would only make the problem worse, in
the Israeli analysis, by giving Hamas the opportunity to accelerate
its buildup.
Bush and Rice would like Israel to hold off against Hamas until Olmert
can complete an agreement on principles for a final Israeli-
Palestinian settlement with Abbas. While Olmert still wants that deal,
it's become increasingly clear to the Israelis that an Abbas-led
government will never be able to implement it. Despite extensive
international aid, the West Bank Palestinian administration remains
little more than a shell kept in power by Israel's troops. Hamas, the
Israelis say, can stop the peace process at any time by resuming
missile attacks against Ashkelon. And whatever happens in Gaza --
whether an Israeli-Hamas truce or all-out war -- Abbas stands to be
further damaged. His prime minister, Salam Fayyad, has hinted
privately that he might favor an Israeli attack on Hamas, because it
would allow Abbas's Fatah movement to take control of Gaza. But
Abbas's security forces are unlikely to be strong enough to control
Gaza's population of 1.5 million anytime soon.
The Israelis say the coming confrontation won't necessarily involve a
full-scale reoccupation of the Gaza Strip. Given the predictable
international backlash against any Israeli offensive, and the
inevitable satellite television coverage of suffering Palestinians,
Olmert is likely to wait for a clear provocation from Hamas. Perhaps
it won't happen for a few more months. But what concerns some Israelis
is the lack of readiness by the Bush administration for the
possibility that its drive for Mideast peace will be overwhelmed by a
Mideast war.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dy.../04/06/AR2008040601662.html?hpid=opinionsbox1
