How Aircraft Can Be Caused to Crash In Conditions Of Low Ceiling/Visibility

How Aircraft Can Be Caused to Crash In Conditions Of Low Ceiling/

Visibility

Not A theory on the Wellstone crash and other aircraft crashes

involving political persons per se, just some thought-provoking

facts.

NOTE: It cannot be emphasized enough that tampering with air

navigation equipment, or in any way interfering with the safe flight

of aircraft by transmitting spurious signals or otherwise, is a

Federal crime subject to the most severe penalties. In no way is the

following to be construed as advocating, facilitating or encouraging

any criminal act against aircraft or airports. This information is

provided SOLELY for the purpose of discussion in the context of

suspicious accidents involving aircraft, and to demonstrate the

simplicity of creating aircraft "accidents". Technical details that

would allow construction or operation of practical devices to cause

aircraft crashes have very purposely NOT been detailed, and certain

essential elements of the information below have been deliberately

skewed to be misleading. Note, however, that these distortions do not

alter the concept.

First a brief tutorial:

In conditions of low ceiling and/or low visibility, pilots rely on

instruments to keep them informed of an aircraft's altitude, attitude,

air speed, rate of climb or descent, etc. This is most important when

shooting an approach in high-performance aircraft under poor weather

conditions, when small errors can have tragic consequences.

Icing on airfoil surfaces can greatly influence a plane's stall speed

- an important consideration on final approach - but modern stall

warning indicators normally give ample warning of this sort of problem

and prompt the pilot to apply power before airspeed drops below

critical level. Most pilots practice stall-recovery on such a regular

basis that corrective measures are a natural reaction. If this were to

occur during approach, the pilot might decide to land provided there

were time to recover proper airspeed and control, or to abort the

approach and go around again.

When making a controlled descent through cloud cover, the altimeter

and rate of descent indicator are all-important, since a pilot cannot

(always) see the ground until he descends clear of the cloud cover or

ceiling. Two types of altimeters are in common use, the "manual" type

and the "radio" type. Both rely on the instrument being set to the

correct barometric pressure so as to indicate altitude accurately.

Altimeters:

Manual altimeters (common on small single-engine aircraft) are

adjusted by turning a knob to calibrate the altimeter to the local

barometric pressure. This is done before takeoff by setting the

instrument to the known runway elevation and may be readjusted for

changing conditions enroute by monitoring weather frequencies for

local barometer readings. Every novice pilot learns the rhyme "Low to

high, you're flying high. High to low, look out below." This reflects

the fact that when flying from an area of low pressure into a higher

pressure zone, the altimeter will indicate a lower-than-actual

altitude, meaning the aircraft will be higher than the altimeter

indicates. When flying from a high pressure area into a lower-pressure

one, the reverse is true and the aircraft will be lower than the

altimeter reading. There have been many accidents due to failure to

properly maintain correct altimeter settings. Such accidents most

often occur under IFR conditions in mountainous terrain and on

approach to landing.

Radio-altimeters (more common on high-performance and multi-engine

aircraft) are "self-adjusting" in the sense that they receive coded

barometric pressure signals transmitted from area service centers, and

automatically apply the necessary correction on a regular basis.

Approach Navigation:

Several Instrument Approach systems are in common use at general

aviation airports. Disregarding the highly sophisticated systems found

at large commercial or hub airports, approach systems may be

categorized as "Non-Precision Instrument" (NPI) and "Precision

Instrument" (PI) systems. Simply put, both types provide pilots with

information on the orientation of their aircraft relative to the

runway threshold, in terms of heading or course as well as approach

slope or glide angle. NPI systems typically rely on a Non-Directional

Beacon (NDB) and high intensity lights as well as other visual aids

such as the "Precision Approach Position Indicator" (PAPI). In

addition to lighting and visual aids, Precision Instrument approaches

incorporate electronic "NavAids" such as radio position markers and

an

electronic Glideslope transmitter that provides a

directional "beam" to guide the aircraft in its descent to the runway.

Full Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) may include even more

sophisticated position locating equipment.

Effects Of False Signals:

1) Altimeter error:

As noted above, radio altimeters incorporate very-high-frequency (VHF)

radio receivers that allow them to continuously re-calibrate

themselves on the basis of encoded barometric information. However,

reception is only possible at altitudes high enough to afford a "line-

of-sight" to the transmitter. As an aircraft descends to lower

altitudes, the line-of-sight becomes less and signal strength is

reduced. When the signal is finally lost, the radio altimeter remains

set to its last calibration, which in normal circumstances is

completely accurate for the area of operation.

If a "false" altimeter transmitter is set up somewhere in the vicinity

of the landing zone, its signal will overpower and ultimately replace

the true signal as the aircraft descends. A deadly situation is

created if the encoded signal is such as to cause the aircraft's radio

altimeter to gradually recalibrate itself to a much lower barometric

reference point, since this will have the effect of indicating a much

higher-than-actual altitude. In low ceiling conditions at NPI airports

not equipped with an electronic Glideslope (such as Eveleth-Virginia),

a pilot may thus be made to think he is hundreds of feet higher than

he actually is. If the ceiling is only 200 feet or so (as it was at

Eveleth), the pilot would only become aware of the error when he broke

through the cloud base at 200 feet, at which altitude - and at a

descent rate predicated on a higher altitude relative to the runway

end - it would be too late to correct without stalling and crashing

the aircraft.

This type of "sabotage" would be extraordinarily simple to effect for

anyone with a knowledge of radio transmitters, would not require

disabling any air navigation equipment, and could make use of a

recorded or computer-generated encoded datastream.

2) NavAid error:

It is also possible to position a "false" Glideslope transmitter a

mile or so from the runway end and simultaneously disable the real

one. In conditions of poor visibility, this could cause an aircraft to

"land" catastrophically short of the runway. If Marker Beacon antennae

were similarly relocated, an aircraft could be totally disoriented. It

was exactly this kind of sabotage that was implicated in the crash of

a junbo-jet on a far-east mountainside ten or fifteen years ago. The

details escape me now, but the case attracted attention because some

high officials of something or other were killed. It was theorized at

the time that a glideslope transmitter had been mounted on a military

jeep parked in the jungle at some distance and at right angles to the

runway. When the pilot reached what he thought was the marker, he

turned and began his descent - right into the mountainside.

This kind of thing would require considerably more organization than

the scenario in 1) above, but it's certainly feasible for those with

the motivation and skill, not to mention those with ready access to

the necessary technical toys.

http://la.indymedia.org/news/2002/10/20736.php

More on EMP and how to murder a powerful political candidate. Who will

be next?

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

http.//www.rense.com/general15/gates.htm

http://www.angelfire.com/or/mctrl/microwave.html

http://www.skolnicksreport.com/aircrashes.html

http://www.voxfux.com/archives/00000039.htm

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/1984/ERD.htm

On Tue, 15 Jan 2008 19:10:52 -0800 (PST), Raymond <Bluerhymer@aol.com> wrote:

>How Aircraft Can Be Caused to Crash In Conditions Of Low Ceiling/

>Visibility

>

>Not A theory on the Wellstone crash and other aircraft crashes

>involving political persons per se, just some thought-provoking

>facts.

>

>NOTE: It cannot be emphasized enough that tampering with air

>navigation equipment, or in any way interfering with the safe flight

>of aircraft by transmitting spurious signals or otherwise, is a

>Federal crime subject to the most severe penalties. In no way is the

>following to be construed as advocating, facilitating or encouraging

>any criminal act against aircraft or airports. This information is

>provided SOLELY for the purpose of discussion in the context of

>suspicious accidents involving aircraft, and to demonstrate the

>simplicity of creating aircraft "accidents". Technical details that

>would allow construction or operation of practical devices to cause

>aircraft crashes have very purposely NOT been detailed, and certain

>essential elements of the information below have been deliberately

>skewed to be misleading. Note, however, that these distortions do not

>alter the concept.

>

>First a brief tutorial:

>

>In conditions of low ceiling and/or low visibility, pilots rely on

>instruments to keep them informed of an aircraft's altitude, attitude,

>air speed, rate of climb or descent, etc. This is most important when

>shooting an approach in high-performance aircraft under poor weather

>conditions, when small errors can have tragic consequences.

>

>Icing on airfoil surfaces can greatly influence a plane's stall speed

>- an important consideration on final approach - but modern stall

>warning indicators normally give ample warning of this sort of problem

>and prompt the pilot to apply power before airspeed drops below

>critical level. Most pilots practice stall-recovery on such a regular

>basis that corrective measures are a natural reaction. If this were to

>occur during approach, the pilot might decide to land provided there

>were time to recover proper airspeed and control, or to abort the

>approach and go around again.

>

>When making a controlled descent through cloud cover, the altimeter

>and rate of descent indicator are all-important, since a pilot cannot

>(always) see the ground until he descends clear of the cloud cover or

>ceiling. Two types of altimeters are in common use, the "manual" type

>and the "radio" type. Both rely on the instrument being set to the

>correct barometric pressure so as to indicate altitude accurately.

No. They don't. A barometric altimeter (what you call manual) must have it's sub

scale set correctly. A RADAR Altimeter does not. A radio altimeter does not

exist.

>Altimeters:

>

>Manual altimeters (common on small single-engine aircraft) are

>adjusted by turning a knob to calibrate the altimeter to the local

>barometric pressure. This is done before takeoff by setting the

>instrument to the known runway elevation and may be readjusted for

>changing conditions enroute by monitoring weather frequencies for

>local barometer readings. Every novice pilot learns the rhyme "Low to

>high, you're flying high. High to low, look out below." This reflects

>the fact that when flying from an area of low pressure into a higher

>pressure zone, the altimeter will indicate a lower-than-actual

>altitude, meaning the aircraft will be higher than the altimeter

>indicates. When flying from a high pressure area into a lower-pressure

>one, the reverse is true and the aircraft will be lower than the

>altimeter reading. There have been many accidents due to failure to

>properly maintain correct altimeter settings. Such accidents most

>often occur under IFR conditions in mountainous terrain and on

>approach to landing.

>

>Radio-altimeters (more common on high-performance and multi-engine

>aircraft) are "self-adjusting" in the sense that they receive coded

>barometric pressure signals transmitted from area service centers, and

>automatically apply the necessary correction on a regular basis.

RADAR Altimeters (not radio altimeters)

http://www.avionix.com/store/ralt.html

do not need to receive barometric signals at all, because they work by bouncing

RADAR signals off the ground and measuring the time taken.

>Approach Navigation:

>

>Several Instrument Approach systems are in common use at general

>aviation airports. Disregarding the highly sophisticated systems found

>at large commercial or hub airports, approach systems may be

>categorized as "Non-Precision Instrument" (NPI) and "Precision

>Instrument" (PI) systems. Simply put, both types provide pilots with

>information on the orientation of their aircraft relative to the

>runway threshold, in terms of heading or course as well as approach

>slope or glide angle. NPI systems typically rely on a Non-Directional

>Beacon (NDB) and high intensity lights as well as other visual aids

>such as the "Precision Approach Position Indicator" (PAPI). In

>addition to lighting and visual aids, Precision Instrument approaches

>incorporate electronic "NavAids" such as radio position markers and

>an

>electronic Glideslope transmitter that provides a

>directional "beam" to guide the aircraft in its descent to the runway.

>Full Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) may include even more

>sophisticated position locating equipment.

>

>Effects Of False Signals:

>

>1) Altimeter error:

>

>As noted above, radio altimeters incorporate very-high-frequency (VHF)

>radio receivers that allow them to continuously re-calibrate

>themselves on the basis of encoded barometric information.

No. They don't.

>However,reception is only possible at altitudes high enough to afford a "line-

>of-sight" to the transmitter.

Crap. The transmitter and the receiver are in the aircraft. The transmitter

transmits a signal straight down and the receiver time the signal.

>As an aircraft descends to lower

>altitudes, the line-of-sight becomes less and signal strength is

>reduced.

More crap. See above.

>When the signal is finally lost, the radio altimeter remains

>set to its last calibration, which in normal circumstances is

>completely accurate for the area of operation.

Completely fanciful bunk.

>If a "false" altimeter transmitter is set up somewhere in the vicinity

>of the landing zone, its signal will overpower and ultimately replace

>the true signal as the aircraft descends.

It would be possible to measure the signal being transmitted by a RadAlt and

retransmit a false signal. Not easily, but it could be done.

>A deadly situation is

>created if the encoded signal is such as to cause the aircraft's radio

>altimeter to gradually recalibrate itself to a much lower barometric

>reference point, since this will have the effect of indicating a much

>higher-than-actual altitude.

No. Barometric reference points have nothing to do with RadAlts.

>In low ceiling conditions at NPI airports

>not equipped with an electronic Glideslope (such as Eveleth-Virginia),

>a pilot may thus be made to think he is hundreds of feet higher than

>he actually is. If the ceiling is only 200 feet or so (as it was at

>Eveleth), the pilot would only become aware of the error when he broke

>through the cloud base at 200 feet,

Or he cross checked his other instruments, including a barometric altimeter, not

effected by evil radio waves.

>at which altitude - and at a

>descent rate predicated on a higher altitude relative to the runway

>end - it would be too late to correct without stalling and crashing

>the aircraft.

>

>This type of "sabotage" would be extraordinarily simple to effect for

>anyone with a knowledge of radio transmitters, would not require

>disabling any air navigation equipment, and could make use of a

>recorded or computer-generated encoded datastream.

"a recorded or computer-generated encoded datastream."? Looks like you know what

you're talking about. Looks like.

>2) NavAid error:

>

>It is also possible to position a "false" Glideslope transmitter a

>mile or so from the runway end and simultaneously disable the real

>one.

Sure. I'll buy this one.

>In conditions of poor visibility, this could cause an aircraft to

>"land" catastrophically short of the runway. If Marker Beacon antennae

>were similarly relocated, an aircraft could be totally disoriented. It

>was exactly this kind of sabotage that was implicated in the crash of

>a junbo-jet on a far-east mountainside ten or fifteen years ago. The

>details escape me now,

Please. I'd be interested to learn which one you are talking about. See if you

can find it, would you?

>but the case attracted attention because some

>high officials of something or other were killed. It was theorized at

>the time that a glideslope transmitter had been mounted on a military

>jeep parked in the jungle at some distance and at right angles to the

>runway. When the pilot reached what he thought was the marker, he

>turned and began his descent - right into the mountainside.

What you describe is not an ILS approach. The glideslope transmitter is only

followed "straight in". It has nothing to do with the point on which an aircraft

turns onto finals.

>This kind of thing would require considerably more organization than

>the scenario in 1) above, but it's certainly feasible for those with

>the motivation and skill, not to mention those with ready access to

>the necessary technical toys.

>

>http://la.indymedia.org/news/2002/10/20736.php

>

>More on EMP and how to murder a powerful political candidate. Who will

>be next?

>

> Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

>

> http.//www.rense.com/general15/gates.htm

> http://www.angelfire.com/or/mctrl/microwave.html

> http://www.skolnicksreport.com/aircrashes.html

> http://www.voxfux.com/archives/00000039.htm

> http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/1984/ERD.htm

OK. So?

Shill #2

--

Those people who think they know everything are a great annoyance

to those of us who do.

Isaac Asimov

"Government Shill #2" <gov.shill@gmail.com> wrote in message

news:gdlso31ijj7rq03pt9eodm6c6llpos0k9n@4ax.com...

> On Tue, 15 Jan 2008 19:10:52 -0800 (PST), Raymond <Bluerhymer@aol.com>

> wrote:

>

>>How Aircraft Can Be Caused to Crash In Conditions Of Low Ceiling/

>>Visibility

Pilot error in almost all circumstances.

>>

>>Not A theory on the Wellstone crash and other aircraft crashes

>>involving political persons per se, just some thought-provoking

>>facts.

>>

>>NOTE: It cannot be emphasized enough that tampering with air

>>navigation equipment, or in any way interfering with the safe flight

>>of aircraft by transmitting spurious signals or otherwise, is a

>>Federal crime subject to the most severe penalties. In no way is the

>>following to be construed as advocating, facilitating or encouraging

>>any criminal act against aircraft or airports. This information is

>>provided SOLELY for the purpose of discussion in the context of

>>suspicious accidents involving aircraft, and to demonstrate the

>>simplicity of creating aircraft "accidents". Technical details that

>>would allow construction or operation of practical devices to cause

>>aircraft crashes have very purposely NOT been detailed, and certain

>>essential elements of the information below have been deliberately

>>skewed to be misleading. Note, however, that these distortions do not

>>alter the concept.

>>

>>First a brief tutorial:

>>

>>In conditions of low ceiling and/or low visibility, pilots rely on

>>instruments to keep them informed of an aircraft's altitude, attitude,

>>air speed, rate of climb or descent, etc. This is most important when

>>shooting an approach in high-performance aircraft under poor weather

>>conditions, when small errors can have tragic consequences.

>>

>>Icing on airfoil surfaces can greatly influence a plane's stall speed

>>- an important consideration on final approach - but modern stall

>>warning indicators normally give ample warning of this sort of problem

>>and prompt the pilot to apply power before airspeed drops below

>>critical level. Most pilots practice stall-recovery on such a regular

>>basis that corrective measures are a natural reaction. If this were to

>>occur during approach, the pilot might decide to land provided there

>>were time to recover proper airspeed and control, or to abort the

>>approach and go around again.

>>

>>When making a controlled descent through cloud cover, the altimeter

>>and rate of descent indicator are all-important, since a pilot cannot

>>(always) see the ground until he descends clear of the cloud cover or

>>ceiling. Two types of altimeters are in common use, the "manual" type

>>and the "radio" type. Both rely on the instrument being set to the

>>correct barometric pressure so as to indicate altitude accurately.

>

> No. They don't. A barometric altimeter (what you call manual) must have

> it's sub

> scale set correctly. A RADAR Altimeter does not. A radio altimeter does

> not

> exist.

>

>>Altimeters:

>>

>>Manual altimeters (common on small single-engine aircraft) are

>>adjusted by turning a knob to calibrate the altimeter to the local

>>barometric pressure. This is done before takeoff by setting the

>>instrument to the known runway elevation and may be readjusted for

>>changing conditions enroute by monitoring weather frequencies for

>>local barometer readings. Every novice pilot learns the rhyme "Low to

>>high, you're flying high. High to low, look out below." This reflects

>>the fact that when flying from an area of low pressure into a higher

>>pressure zone, the altimeter will indicate a lower-than-actual

>>altitude, meaning the aircraft will be higher than the altimeter

>>indicates. When flying from a high pressure area into a lower-pressure

>>one, the reverse is true and the aircraft will be lower than the

>>altimeter reading. There have been many accidents due to failure to

>>properly maintain correct altimeter settings. Such accidents most

>>often occur under IFR conditions in mountainous terrain and on

>>approach to landing.

>>

>>Radio-altimeters (more common on high-performance and multi-engine

>>aircraft) are "self-adjusting" in the sense that they receive coded

>>barometric pressure signals transmitted from area service centers, and

>>automatically apply the necessary correction on a regular basis.

>

> RADAR Altimeters (not radio altimeters)

> http://www.avionix.com/store/ralt.html

>

> do not need to receive barometric signals at all, because they work by

> bouncing

> RADAR signals off the ground and measuring the time taken.

Correct.

>

>>Approach Navigation:

>>

>>Several Instrument Approach systems are in common use at general

>>aviation airports. Disregarding the highly sophisticated systems found

>>at large commercial or hub airports, approach systems may be

>>categorized as "Non-Precision Instrument" (NPI) and "Precision

>>Instrument" (PI) systems. Simply put, both types provide pilots with

>>information on the orientation of their aircraft relative to the

>>runway threshold, in terms of heading or course as well as approach

>>slope or glide angle. NPI systems typically rely on a Non-Directional

>>Beacon (NDB) and high intensity lights as well as other visual aids

>>such as the "Precision Approach Position Indicator" (PAPI). In

>>addition to lighting and visual aids, Precision Instrument approaches

>>incorporate electronic "NavAids" such as radio position markers and

>>an

>>electronic Glideslope transmitter that provides a

>>directional "beam" to guide the aircraft in its descent to the runway.

>>Full Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) may include even more

>>sophisticated position locating equipment.

>>

>>Effects Of False Signals:

>>

>>1) Altimeter error:

>>

>>As noted above, radio altimeters incorporate very-high-frequency (VHF)

>>radio receivers that allow them to continuously re-calibrate

>>themselves on the basis of encoded barometric information.

>

> No. They don't.

>

>>However,reception is only possible at altitudes high enough to afford a

>>"line-

>>of-sight" to the transmitter.

>

> Crap. The transmitter and the receiver are in the aircraft. The

> transmitter

> transmits a signal straight down and the receiver time the signal.

>

>

>>As an aircraft descends to lower

>>altitudes, the line-of-sight becomes less and signal strength is

>>reduced.

>

> More crap. See above.

>

>>When the signal is finally lost, the radio altimeter remains

>>set to its last calibration, which in normal circumstances is

>>completely accurate for the area of operation.

>

> Completely fanciful bunk.

>

>>If a "false" altimeter transmitter is set up somewhere in the vicinity

>>of the landing zone, its signal will overpower and ultimately replace

>>the true signal as the aircraft descends.

>

> It would be possible to measure the signal being transmitted by a RadAlt

> and

> retransmit a false signal. Not easily, but it could be done.

It would be practically impossible and thoroughly impractical even if it

were possible. Approaches aren't flown on the basis of a radio altimeter

anyway. It's never anything more than a secondary instrument. Even

speculating on such a thing is tin-foil hat nonsense.

>

>>A deadly situation is

>>created if the encoded signal is such as to cause the aircraft's radio

>>altimeter to gradually recalibrate itself to a much lower barometric

>>reference point, since this will have the effect of indicating a much

>>higher-than-actual altitude.

>

> No. Barometric reference points have nothing to do with RadAlts.

>

>>In low ceiling conditions at NPI airports

>>not equipped with an electronic Glideslope (such as Eveleth-Virginia),

>>a pilot may thus be made to think he is hundreds of feet higher than

>>he actually is. If the ceiling is only 200 feet or so (as it was at

>>Eveleth), the pilot would only become aware of the error when he broke

>>through the cloud base at 200 feet,

>

> Or he cross checked his other instruments, including a barometric

> altimeter, not

> effected by evil radio waves.

>

>>at which altitude - and at a

>>descent rate predicated on a higher altitude relative to the runway

>>end - it would be too late to correct without stalling and crashing

>>the aircraft.

>>

>>This type of "sabotage" would be extraordinarily simple to effect for

>>anyone with a knowledge of radio transmitters, would not require

>>disabling any air navigation equipment, and could make use of a

>>recorded or computer-generated encoded datastream.

>

> "a recorded or computer-generated encoded datastream."? Looks like you

> know what

> you're talking about. Looks like.

>

>>2) NavAid error:

>>

>>It is also possible to position a "false" Glideslope transmitter a

>>mile or so from the runway end and simultaneously disable the real

>>one.

>

> Sure. I'll buy this one.

Again, extremely unlikely and practically impossible. Someone has been

watching too many Die Hard movies. Glideslope receivers work on the phase

differential of the received signal. If the spoof transmitter antenna

wasn't located in the same location as the real antenna, there is no way the

phases would be anywhere close. The indication would be an erratic

glideslope indication in the aircraft and as soon as the pilot saw an eratic

indication he would either abort the approach or continue with a

non-precision approach and ignore the glideslope indication. Almost all

precision approaches are only made to greater than 200' feet from the ground

anyway before visual indications must be received, and that's 200' on the

barometric altimeter.

>

>>In conditions of poor visibility, this could cause an aircraft to

>>"land" catastrophically short of the runway. If Marker Beacon antennae

>>were similarly relocated, an aircraft could be totally disoriented. It

>>was exactly this kind of sabotage that was implicated in the crash of

>>a junbo-jet on a far-east mountainside ten or fifteen years ago. The

>>details escape me now,

>

> Please. I'd be interested to learn which one you are talking about. See if

> you

> can find it, would you?

Whoever wrote this nonsense has already spewed a huge amount of bullshit and

this is just another example.

>

>>but the case attracted attention because some

>>high officials of something or other were killed. It was theorized at

>>the time that a glideslope transmitter had been mounted on a military

>>jeep parked in the jungle at some distance and at right angles to the

>>runway. When the pilot reached what he thought was the marker, he

>>turned and began his descent - right into the mountainside.

>

> What you describe is not an ILS approach. The glideslope transmitter is

> only

> followed "straight in". It has nothing to do with the point on which an

> aircraft

> turns onto finals.

Clearly the author doesn't know the difference between a marker, a

localizer, or a glideslope and is only spewing bullshit.

>

>>This kind of thing would require considerably more organization than

>>the scenario in 1) above, but it's certainly feasible for those with

>>the motivation and skill, not to mention those with ready access to

>>the necessary technical toys.

>>

>>http://la.indymedia.org/news/2002/10/20736.php

>>

>>More on EMP and how to murder a powerful political candidate. Who will

>>be next?

>>

>> Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

>>

>> http.//www.rense.com/general15/gates.htm

>> http://www.angelfire.com/or/mctrl/microwave.html

>> http://www.skolnicksreport.com/aircrashes.html

>> http://www.voxfux.com/archives/00000039.htm

>> http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/1984/ERD.htm

>

> OK. So?

Someone forgot to wear their tin-foil hat today.

On Jan 17, 3:10�am, "Nebuchadnezzar II" <nebuchadnez...@microsoft.com>

wrote:

> "Government Shill #2" <gov.sh...@gmail.com> wrote in messagenews:gdlso31ijj7rq03pt9eodm6c6llpos0k9n@4ax.com...

>

> > On Tue, 15 Jan 2008 19:10:52 -0800 (PST), Raymond <Bluerhy...@aol.com>

> > wrote:

>

> >>How Aircraft Can Be Caused to Crash In Conditions Of Low Ceiling/

> >>Visibility

>

> Pilot error in almost all circumstances.

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

> >>Not A theory on the Wellstone crash and other aircraft crashes

> >>involving political persons �per se, just some thought-provoking

> >>facts.

>

> >>NOTE: It cannot be emphasized enough that tampering with air

> >>navigation equipment, or in any way interfering with the safe flight

> >>of aircraft by transmitting spurious signals or otherwise, is a

> >>Federal crime subject to the most severe penalties. In no way is the

> >>following to be construed as advocating, facilitating or encouraging

> >>any criminal act against aircraft or airports. This information is

> >>provided SOLELY for the purpose of discussion in the context of

> >>suspicious accidents involving aircraft, and to demonstrate the

> >>simplicity of creating aircraft "accidents". Technical details that

> >>would allow construction or operation of practical devices to cause

> >>aircraft crashes have very purposely NOT been detailed, and certain

> >>essential elements of the information below have been deliberately

> >>skewed to be misleading. Note, however, that these distortions do not

> >>alter the concept.

>

> >>First a brief tutorial:

>

> >>In conditions of low ceiling and/or low visibility, pilots rely on

> >>instruments to keep them informed of an aircraft's altitude, attitude,

> >>air speed, rate of climb or descent, etc. This is most important when

> >>shooting an approach in high-performance aircraft under poor weather

> >>conditions, when small errors can have tragic consequences.

>

> >>Icing on airfoil surfaces can greatly influence a plane's stall speed

> >>- an important consideration on final approach - but modern stall

> >>warning indicators normally give ample warning of this sort of problem

> >>and prompt the pilot to apply power before airspeed drops below

> >>critical level. Most pilots practice stall-recovery on such a regular

> >>basis that corrective measures are a natural reaction. If this were to

> >>occur during approach, the pilot might decide to land provided there

> >>were time to recover proper airspeed and control, or to abort the

> >>approach and go around again.

>

> >>When making a controlled descent through cloud cover, the altimeter

> >>and rate of descent indicator are all-important, since a pilot cannot

> >>(always) see the ground until he descends clear of the cloud cover or

> >>ceiling. Two types of altimeters are in common use, the "manual" type

> >>and the "radio" type. Both rely on the instrument being set to the

> >>correct barometric pressure so as to indicate altitude accurately.

>

> > No. They don't. A barometric altimeter (what you call manual) must have

> > it's sub

> > scale set correctly. A RADAR Altimeter does not. A radio altimeter does

> > not

> > exist.

>

> >>Altimeters:

>

> >>Manual altimeters (common on small single-engine aircraft) are

> >>adjusted by turning a knob to calibrate the altimeter to the local

> >>barometric pressure. This is done before takeoff by setting the

> >>instrument to the known runway elevation and may be readjusted for

> >>changing conditions enroute by monitoring weather frequencies for

> >>local barometer readings. Every novice pilot learns the rhyme "Low to

> >>high, you're flying high. High to low, look out below." This reflects

> >>the fact that when flying from an area of low pressure into a higher

> >>pressure zone, the altimeter will indicate a lower-than-actual

> >>altitude, meaning the aircraft will be higher than the altimeter

> >>indicates. When flying from a high pressure area into a lower-pressure

> >>one, the reverse is true and the aircraft will be lower than the

> >>altimeter reading. There have been many accidents due to failure to

> >>properly maintain correct altimeter settings. Such accidents most

> >>often occur under IFR conditions in mountainous terrain and on

> >>approach to landing.

>

> >>Radio-altimeters (more common on high-performance and multi-engine

> >>aircraft) are "self-adjusting" in the sense that they receive coded

> >>barometric pressure signals transmitted from area service centers, and

> >>automatically apply the necessary correction on a regular basis.

>

> > RADAR Altimeters (not radio altimeters)

> >http://www.avionix.com/store/ralt.html

>

> > do not need to receive barometric signals at all, because they work by

> > bouncing

> > RADAR signals off the ground and measuring the time taken.

>

> Correct.

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

> >>Approach Navigation:

>

> >>Several Instrument Approach systems are in common use at general

> >>aviation airports. Disregarding the highly sophisticated systems found

> >>at large commercial or hub airports, approach systems may be

> >>categorized as "Non-Precision Instrument" (NPI) and "Precision

> >>Instrument" (PI) systems. Simply put, both types provide pilots with

> >>information on the orientation of their aircraft relative to the

> >>runway threshold, in terms of heading or course as well as approach

> >>slope or glide angle. NPI systems typically rely on a Non-Directional

> >>Beacon (NDB) and high intensity lights as well as other visual aids

> >>such as the "Precision Approach Position Indicator" (PAPI). In

> >>addition to lighting and visual aids, Precision Instrument approaches

> >>incorporate electronic "NavAids" such as radio position markers and

> >>an

> >>electronic Glideslope transmitter that provides a

> >>directional "beam" to guide the aircraft in its descent to the runway.

> >>Full Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) may include even more

> >>sophisticated position locating equipment.

>

> >>Effects Of False Signals:

>

> >>1) Altimeter error:

>

> >>As noted above, radio altimeters incorporate very-high-frequency (VHF)

> >>radio receivers that allow them to continuously re-calibrate

> >>themselves on the basis of encoded barometric information.

>

> > No. They don't.

>

> >>However,reception is only possible at altitudes high enough to afford a

> >>"line-

> >>of-sight" to the transmitter.

>

> > Crap. The transmitter and the receiver are in the aircraft. The

> > transmitter

> > transmits a signal straight down and the receiver time the signal.

>

> >>As an aircraft descends to lower

> >>altitudes, the line-of-sight becomes less and signal strength is

> >>reduced.

>

> > More crap. See above.

>

> >>When the signal is finally lost, the radio altimeter remains

> >>set to its last calibration, which in normal circumstances is

> >>completely accurate for the area of operation.

>

> > Completely fanciful bunk.

>

> >>If a "false" altimeter transmitter is set up somewhere in the vicinity

> >>of the landing zone, its signal will overpower and ultimately replace

> >>the true signal as the aircraft descends.

>

> > It would be possible to measure the signal being transmitted by a RadAlt

> > and

> > retransmit a false signal. Not easily, but it could be done.

>

> It would be practically impossible and thoroughly impractical even if it

> were possible. �Approaches aren't flown on the basis of a radio altimeter

> anyway. �It's never anything more than a secondary instrument. �Even

> speculating on such a thing is tin-foil hat nonsense.

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

> >>A deadly situation is

> >>created if the encoded signal is such as to cause the aircraft's radio

> >>altimeter to gradually recalibrate itself to a much lower barometric

> >>reference point, since this will have the effect of indicating a much

> >>higher-than-actual altitude.

>

> > No. Barometric reference points have nothing to do with RadAlts.

>

> >>In low ceiling conditions at NPI airports

> >>not equipped with an electronic Glideslope (such as Eveleth-Virginia),

> >>a pilot may thus be made to think he is hundreds of feet higher than

> >>he actually is. If the ceiling is only 200 feet or so (as it was at

> >>Eveleth), the pilot would only become aware of the error when he broke

> >>through the cloud base at 200 feet,

>

> > Or he cross checked his other instruments, including a barometric

> > altimeter, not

> > effected by evil radio waves.

>

> >>at which altitude - and at a

> >>descent rate predicated on a higher altitude relative to the runway

> >>end - it would be too late to correct without stalling and crashing

> >>the aircraft.

>

> >>This type of "sabotage" would be extraordinarily simple to effect for

> >>anyone with a knowledge of radio transmitters, would not require

> >>disabling any air navigation equipment, and could make use of a

> >>recorded or computer-generated encoded datastream.

>

> > "a recorded or computer-generated encoded datastream."? Looks like you

> > know what

> > you're talking about. Looks like.

>

> >>2) NavAid error:

>

> >>It is also possible to position a "false" Glideslope transmitter a

> >>mile or so from the runway end and simultaneously disable the real

> >>one.

>

> > Sure. I'll buy this one.

>

> Again, extremely unlikely and practically impossible. �Someone has been

> watching too many Die Hard movies. �Glideslope receivers work on the phase

> differential of the received signal. �If the spoof transmitter antenna

> wasn't located in the same location as the real antenna, there is no way the

> phases would be anywhere close. �The indication would be an erratic

> glideslope indication in the aircraft and as soon as the pilot saw an eratic

> indication he would either abort the approach or continue with a

> non-precision approach and ignore the glideslope indication. �Almost all

> precision approaches are only made to greater than 200' feet from the ground

> anyway before visual indications must be received, and that's 200' on the

> barometric altimeter.

>

>

>

>

>

> >>In conditions of poor visibility, this could cause an aircraft to

> >>"land" catastrophically short of the runway. If Marker Beacon antennae

> >>were similarly relocated, an aircraft could be totally disoriented. It

> >>was exactly this kind of sabotage that was implicated in the crash of

> >>a junbo-jet on a far-east mountainside ten or fifteen years ago. The

> >>details escape me now,

>

> > Please. I'd be interested to learn which one you are talking about. See if

> > you

>

> ...

>

> read more �- Hide quoted text -

>

> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -

>

> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -

>

> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -

>

> - Show quoted text -

We developed the latter to test the EMP hardening of military

aircraft, Air Force One, etc. There are lots of such devices around

now. ...Air Defence system built around EMP weapons could nullify many

a Chinese threat ...The US air force used a related technique to

disable Yugoslavian power grids during the ..... You could freeze

transport systems, bring down communications, ...Estimates of the

combined direct and indirect effects of an EMP attack prompted the

Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from

Electromagnetic Pulse Attack to state the following in its report to

Congress1:

The electromagnetic fields produced by weapons designed and deployed

with the intent to produce EMP have a high likelihood of damaging

electrical power systems, electronics, and information systems upon

which American society depends. Their effects on dependent systems and

infrastructures could be sufficient to qualify as catastrophic to the

nation

EMP: America's Achilles' Heel

by Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.

President, Center for Security Policy

How EMP Works

The EMP Threat Today

America the Vulnerable

What Is To Be Done?

Conclusion

http://www.windsofchange.net/archives/006967.php

STEP 6: The Mega Threat: EMP Attack

War Footing by Frank Gaffney: 10 Steps to Protect America

Extend the life of the EMP Commission for four years.The EMP Threat

Commission has presented a blueprint for protecting both US military

forces and the United States homeland from EMP attack.

The Problem

A massive current of EMP (electro-magnetic pulse) could be unleashed

with catastrophic effect on the United States if a nuclear weapon is

detonated high above the earth's atmosphere. The energy of this pulse

would interact with the Earth's magnetic field, affecting - and

possibly destroying - every piece of unshielded electronic gear and

power grids in line-of-sight of the detonation, all at the speed of

light.

What is more, the higher the altitude of the weapon's detonation, the

larger the affected area would be. At a height of 300 miles, the

entire continental United States would be exposed to EMP attack, along

with parts of Canada and Mexico.

As a result, America could be transformed from a 21st Century

superpower into a pre-industrial society almost instantaneously.

This sounds unbelievable. But a blue-ribbon commission created by

Congress confirmed this danger in a report submitted in August 2004.

Thanks to the almost unimaginable power of an EMP wave unleashed by a

properly configured nuclear weapon - approximately a million times as

strong as the most powerful radio signals on earth - the devastation

caused could make the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina look modest by

comparison.

Given the magnitude of the danger it is astonishing that EMP is hardly

ever mentioned when threats to this country from Weapons of Mass

Destruction (WMD) are discussed. This might be considered the ultimate

WMD - yet practically the only people aware of its potential for harm

are our enemies.

In fact, the congressionally chartered commission discovered that

knowledge about EMP is widespread in such places as: China, Cuba,

Egypt, India, Iran, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, and

Russia. Several of these nations, and perhaps terrorists that they

sponsor, could launch a nuclear-capable ballistic missile from a ship

- the sort of attack that poses an especially grave threat to the

United States.

What Needs To Be Done

EMP attack poses a clear and present danger to our national security,

our technological society, and our democratic and cosmopolitan way of

life. The EMP Threat Commission has presented a blueprint for

protecting both US military forces and the United States homeland from

EMP attack.

The Commission's plan includes three focused efforts.

1. Deter EMP attacks. Make it difficult and dangerous to acquire the

materials to make nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. This

will require:

vastly improved intelligence

the capacity to perform clandestine operations, throughout the world

assured means of retaliation in the event of attack

2. Defeat EMP attacks.

Protect critical military capabilities and civilian infrastructure

from EMP effects. We must re-build our neglected scientific and

technical base for conducting EMP tests of military and civilian

equipment.

Deploy a comprehensive defense against ballistic missile delivery

systems.We know that a catastrophic EMP attack can be mounted only by

putting a nuclear weapon into space over the United States - using a

ballistic missile.

Enhance the capability of existing defenses. We need widely to deploy

anti-missile defenses on the Navy's fleet of more than sixty AEGIS air

defense ships.

3. Reduce our vulnerability to EMP attacks. We must prepare for the

consequences of an EMP attack, in the event that deterrence and

protection fail. The EMP Commission plan provides detailed

recommendations for protecting the nation's critical infrastructures,

in four key areas:

Electric power grid

Telecommunications

Transportation

Food and Water

This will require close collaboration between government at all levels

and the private sector. We must also ensure that we have, on-hand and

properly protected, the equipment and parts needed to repair EMP-

damaged systems.

4. Extend the life of the EMP Commission for four years. The

Commission's report has so far received little serious attention -

from the White House, the Department of Homeland Security, the

Congress, or the media. With a renewed mandate and public and official

support, the Commission can play a vital role in overseeing the

implementation of the required corrective actions.

Related Links

See what the private sector is doing to reduce our vulnerability at:

http://www.stop-EMP.com .

View video about the EMP threat:

Windows Media

Contributors: Reps. Curt Weldon and Roscoe Bartlett

On Jan 17, 9:10 pm, "Nebuchadnezzar II" <nebuchadnez...@microsoft.com>

wrote:

> Again, extremely unlikely and practically impossible. Someone has been

> watching too many Die Hard movies. Glideslope receivers work on the phase

> differential of the received signal. If the spoof transmitter antenna

> wasn't located in the same location as the real antenna, there is no way the

> phases would be anywhere close. The indication would be an erratic

> glideslope indication in the aircraft and as soon as the pilot saw an eratic

> indication he would either abort the approach or continue with a

> non-precision approach and ignore the glideslope indication. Almost all

> precision approaches are only made to greater than 200' feet from the ground

> anyway before visual indications must be received, and that's 200' on the

> barometric altimeter.

>

>

It's just the rantings of some-one who has read a couple of books and

then interviewed his keyboard..

Why is it that these people NEVER go flying to see how it really

works ?

> >>In conditions of poor visibility, this could cause an aircraft to

> >>"land" catastrophically short of the runway. If Marker Beacon antennae

> >>were similarly relocated, an aircraft could be totally disoriented. It

> >>was exactly this kind of sabotage that was implicated in the crash of

> >>a junbo-jet on a far-east mountainside ten or fifteen years ago. The

> >>details escape me now,

>

> > Please. I'd be interested to learn which one you are talking about. See if

> > you

>

> ...

>

> read more

In article <0c7b490e-32de-498e-ab10-

1fc88f5bf02c@e25g2000prg.googlegroups.com>, Bluerhymer@aol.com says...

> How Aircraft Can Be Caused to Crash In Conditions Of Low Ceiling/

> Visibility

>

> Not A theory on the Wellstone crash and other aircraft crashes

> involving political persons per se, just some thought-provoking

> facts.

>

> NOTE: It cannot be emphasized enough that tampering with air

> navigation equipment, or in any way interfering with the safe flight

> of aircraft by transmitting spurious signals or otherwise, is a

> Federal crime subject to the most severe penalties. In no way is the

> following to be construed as advocating, facilitating or encouraging

> any criminal act against aircraft or airports. This information is

> provided SOLELY for the purpose of discussion in the context of

> suspicious accidents involving aircraft, and to demonstrate the

> simplicity of creating aircraft "accidents". Technical details that

> would allow construction or operation of practical devices to cause

> aircraft crashes have very purposely NOT been detailed, and certain

> essential elements of the information below have been deliberately

> skewed to be misleading. Note, however, that these distortions do not

> alter the concept.

>

> First a brief tutorial:

>

> In conditions of low ceiling and/or low visibility, pilots rely on

> instruments to keep them informed of an aircraft's altitude, attitude,

> air speed, rate of climb or descent, etc. This is most important when

> shooting an approach in high-performance aircraft under poor weather

> conditions, when small errors can have tragic consequences.

>

> Icing on airfoil surfaces can greatly influence a plane's stall speed

> - an important consideration on final approach - but modern stall

> warning indicators normally give ample warning of this sort of problem

> and prompt the pilot to apply power before airspeed drops below

> critical level. Most pilots practice stall-recovery on such a regular

> basis that corrective measures are a natural reaction. If this were to

> occur during approach, the pilot might decide to land provided there

> were time to recover proper airspeed and control, or to abort the

> approach and go around again.

>

> When making a controlled descent through cloud cover, the altimeter

> and rate of descent indicator are all-important, since a pilot cannot

> (always) see the ground until he descends clear of the cloud cover or

> ceiling. Two types of altimeters are in common use, the "manual" type

> and the "radio" type. Both rely on the instrument being set to the

> correct barometric pressure so as to indicate altitude accurately.

>

> Altimeters:

>

> Manual altimeters (common on small single-engine aircraft) are

There was an incident in the '90s where a helicopter carrying US

servicemen was shot down by an electro-magnetic pulse. There is no

doubt, based on what witnesses saw, that the downing of the helo was

caused by that.

Also, Marine personnel from a nearby base immediately went out to

the site, cleared away everything that normally would have been left for

the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) investigation, etc. This

was reported in a reputable magazine, by the way... not some crackpot

source like "Searchlight" or that sort of thing.

Also of interest is the fact that the helo crew had previously

flown Bill Clinton and his crew to his visit aboard the aircraft carrier

at the time... the one his idiot staff stole towels from as if it was a

Ramada. I don't know what went on there, but the four guys that went in

through the window at the Waco compound were shot with bullets that had

only ever been sold to government personnel, and their autopsies

confirmed they had been shot in the back. The point of interest? They

were previously on guard the idiot in chief detail... when he visited

the aircraft carrier.

Scotius <yodasbud@mnsi.net> used a stick in the sand to babble

> There was an incident in the '90s where a helicopter carrying US

>servicemen was shot down by an electro-magnetic pulse. There is no

>doubt, based on what witnesses saw, that the downing of the helo was

>caused by that.

I expect these witnesses were experts in eletro-magnetic pulse

technology and easily recognized what such a pulse looks like.

> Also, Marine personnel from a nearby base immediately went out to

>the site, cleared away everything that normally would have been left for

>the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) investigation, etc. This

>was reported in a reputable magazine, by the way... not some crackpot

>source like "Searchlight" or that sort of thing.

Yet I notice you not only don't mention the name of the magazine, you

don't provide a link.

> Also of interest is the fact that the helo crew had previously

>flown Bill Clinton and his crew to his visit aboard the aircraft carrier

>at the time... the one his idiot staff stole towels from as if it was a

>Ramada. I don't know what went on there, but the four guys that went in

>through the window at the Waco compound were shot with bullets that had

>only ever been sold to government personnel, and their autopsies

>confirmed they had been shot in the back. The point of interest? They

>were previously on guard the idiot in chief detail... when he visited

>the aircraft carrier.

laughs and points

Swill