How George Bush and Condoleezza Rice made a mess of Pakistan

How George Bush and Condoleezza Rice made a mess of Pakistan

The United States needs Musharraf more than Musharraf needs the United

States

The Freedom Agenda Fizzles

How George Bush and Condoleezza Rice made a mess of Pakistan.

By Fred Kaplan

Posted Monday, Nov. 5, 2007, at 7:18 PM ET

Condoleezza Rice and George Bush

Now we've really got problems.

The state of emergency in Pakistan signals yet another low point in

President George W. Bush's foreign policy--a stark demonstration of his

paltry influence and his bankrupt principles. More than that, the

crackdown locks us in a crisis--a potentially dangerous dynamic--from

which there appears to be no escape route.

For much of last week, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and other

top U.S. officials had been urging Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez

Musharraf, not to declare martial law. He not only ignored these

pleas; he defied them.

Last month, Rice persuaded Musharraf to let exiled former Prime

Minister Benazir Bhutto back in the country--and persuaded Bhutto to go

back--as part of a power-sharing deal. The idea was that Musharraf, who

doubles as army chief of staff, would retain control of the military

in the fight against terrorism, while Bhutto would attract the loyalty

of Pakistan's increasingly discontented democrats. That ploy, too,

turned out to be illusory: Bhutto was attacked the moment she got

back; Musharraf showed no interest in sharing power.

Musharraf is portraying his suspension of the constitution as a

necessary step to stabilize Pakistan and fend off Islamist terrorists.

Yet the timing suggests it was, for the most part, a power grab.

Pakistan's Supreme Court was about to rule that Musharraf's reign as

both president and army chief of staff was unconstitutional. That

meant the coming elections (which may or may not now be called off)

would have ended his reign. And so he dissolved the court. He also

arrested many democratic activists and shut down the nation's

independent media.

It should now be clear, if it wasn't already, that Musharraf has been

diddling Bush & Co. the past three years or longer.

In exchange for his promises to root out Taliban terrorists on the

Afghan border and within Pakistan's own intelligence service, Bush has

supplied Musharraf with at least $10 billion in aid. Yet while

Musharraf has rendered considerable assistance in the war on

terrorism, the Taliban--and possibly Osama Bin Laden himself--retain

their sanctuary in Pakistan's northwest territories.

In exchange for Musharraf's promises to be a good democrat someday,

Bush has declared Pakistan to be a "major non-NATO ally." Yet, with

his strategically timed state of emergency, Musharraf has revealed

he's not at all interested in democratic transitions.

But what can Bush--or his successor--do about it? The problem is that

there's some truth to Musharraf's official reason for his crackdown.

He has been going after al-Qaida jihadists, especially those inside

his own country, though not so much Taliban fighters on the border of

Afghanistan. And he is in a genuinely tight spot. On the one hand, he

fears what some Western officials call the "Talibanization of

Pakistan." On the other hand, he can't go after them too avidly, for

fear of sparking a backlash from some of his own officers who have

Islamist sympathies and who don't want to be seen as fighting

America's war.

As Daniel Markey, a former State Department specialist on south Asia,

wrote last summer in Foreign Affairs magazine, the army is "Pakistan's

strongest government institution and the only one that can possibly

deal with immediate threats of violent militancy and terrorism."

If the United States were to respond to this power grab by cutting off

aid to the Pakistani army, the army would turn elsewhere--and the

Islamist factions would be strengthened. If the United States were to

cut its links to Musharraf ... well, Musharraf is the face of the

Pakistani army. If he goes, probably some other strongman would take

his place, but the tenuous coalition he has assembled could fall apart

in the process, with unpredictable--but almost certainly unpleasant--

results.

And let's not forget the ultimate unpleasant fact: Pakistan has a test-

proven nuclear arsenal.

Someone was speculating this morning on the BBC that the Bush

administration might have a secret ally, an agent of sorts, within the

Pakistani military command, poised to step in and serve U.S. interests

if Musharraf fell. This is very doubtful. First, there are the obvious

reasons (Bush's intense commitment to Musharraf and the military's

relative impenetrability). Second, if Bush did have some fallback

leader, it's unlikely Rice would have put so much effort--however

fruitless the gesture now seems--to getting Bhutto back in the country

for a power-sharing gambit. Nor, by the way, are there any civilian

politicians in whom the United States could put its hopes; as Daniel

Markey indicates in his article (and he is far from alone in this

view), there are no civilian politicians, parties, or other entities

that could exercise power without the military's nod.

This is why the Bush administration's response to the clampdown has

been, as they say, "muted." The fact is, the United States needs

Musharraf more than Musharraf needs the United States. And the fact

that he's rubbing our noses in it doesn't make it any less true.

Cont'd

http://www.slate.com/id/2177249/

On Dec 27, 8:28 pm, Raymond <Bluerhy...@aol.com> wrote:

> How George Bush and Condoleezza Rice made a mess of Pakistan

>

> The United States needs Musharraf more than Musharraf needs the United

> States

>

> The Freedom Agenda Fizzles

> How George Bush and Condoleezza Rice made a mess of Pakistan.

> By Fred Kaplan

> Posted Monday, Nov. 5, 2007, at 7:18 PM ET

>

> Condoleezza Rice and George Bush

> Now we've really got problems.

>

> The state of emergency in Pakistan signals yet another low point in

> President George W. Bush's foreign policy--a stark demonstration of his

> paltry influence and his bankrupt principles. More than that, the

> crackdown locks us in a crisis--a potentially dangerous dynamic--from

> which there appears to be no escape route.

>

> For much of last week, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and other

> top U.S. officials had been urging Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez

> Musharraf, not to declare martial law. He not only ignored these

> pleas; he defied them.

>

> Last month, Rice persuaded Musharraf to let exiled former Prime

> Minister Benazir Bhutto back in the country--and persuaded Bhutto to go

> back--as part of a power-sharing deal. The idea was that Musharraf, who

> doubles as army chief of staff, would retain control of the military

> in the fight against terrorism, while Bhutto would attract the loyalty

> of Pakistan's increasingly discontented democrats. That ploy, too,

> turned out to be illusory: Bhutto was attacked the moment she got

> back; Musharraf showed no interest in sharing power.

>

> Musharraf is portraying his suspension of the constitution as a

> necessary step to stabilize Pakistan and fend off Islamist terrorists.

> Yet the timing suggests it was, for the most part, a power grab.

> Pakistan's Supreme Court was about to rule that Musharraf's reign as

> both president and army chief of staff was unconstitutional. That

> meant the coming elections (which may or may not now be called off)

> would have ended his reign. And so he dissolved the court. He also

> arrested many democratic activists and shut down the nation's

> independent media.

>

> It should now be clear, if it wasn't already, that Musharraf has been

> diddling Bush & Co. the past three years or longer.

>

> In exchange for his promises to root out Taliban terrorists on the

> Afghan border and within Pakistan's own intelligence service, Bush has

> supplied Musharraf with at least $10 billion in aid. Yet while

> Musharraf has rendered considerable assistance in the war on

> terrorism, the Taliban--and possibly Osama Bin Laden himself--retain

> their sanctuary in Pakistan's northwest territories.

>

> In exchange for Musharraf's promises to be a good democrat someday,

> Bush has declared Pakistan to be a "major non-NATO ally." Yet, with

> his strategically timed state of emergency, Musharraf has revealed

> he's not at all interested in democratic transitions.

>

> But what can Bush--or his successor--do about it? The problem is that

> there's some truth to Musharraf's official reason for his crackdown.

> He has been going after al-Qaida jihadists, especially those inside

> his own country, though not so much Taliban fighters on the border of

> Afghanistan. And he is in a genuinely tight spot. On the one hand, he

> fears what some Western officials call the "Talibanization of

> Pakistan." On the other hand, he can't go after them too avidly, for

> fear of sparking a backlash from some of his own officers who have

> Islamist sympathies and who don't want to be seen as fighting

> America's war.

>

> As Daniel Markey, a former State Department specialist on south Asia,

> wrote last summer in Foreign Affairs magazine, the army is "Pakistan's

> strongest government institution and the only one that can possibly

> deal with immediate threats of violent militancy and terrorism."

>

> If the United States were to respond to this power grab by cutting off

> aid to the Pakistani army, the army would turn elsewhere--and the

> Islamist factions would be strengthened. If the United States were to

> cut its links to Musharraf ... well, Musharraf is the face of the

> Pakistani army. If he goes, probably some other strongman would take

> his place, but the tenuous coalition he has assembled could fall apart

> in the process, with unpredictable--but almost certainly unpleasant--

> results.

>

> And let's not forget the ultimate unpleasant fact: Pakistan has a test-

> proven nuclear arsenal.

>

> Someone was speculating this morning on the BBC that the Bush

> administration might have a secret ally, an agent of sorts, within the

> Pakistani military command, poised to step in and serve U.S. interests

> if Musharraf fell. This is very doubtful. First, there are the obvious

> reasons (Bush's intense commitment to Musharraf and the military's

> relative impenetrability). Second, if Bush did have some fallback

> leader, it's unlikely Rice would have put so much effort--however

> fruitless the gesture now seems--to getting Bhutto back in the country

> for a power-sharing gambit. Nor, by the way, are there any civilian

> politicians in whom the United States could put its hopes; as Daniel

> Markey indicates in his article (and he is far from alone in this

> view), there are no civilian politicians, parties, or other entities

> that could exercise power without the military's nod.

>

> This is why the Bush administration's response to the clampdown has

> been, as they say, "muted." The fact is, the United States needs

> Musharraf more than Musharraf needs the United States. And the fact

> that he's rubbing our noses in it doesn't make it any less true.

>

> Cont'dhttp://www.slate.com/id/2177249/

Page II

Bush finally talks to Musharraf.

For four days after Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf declared a

state of emergency in Pakistan, President Bush refused to directly

contact Musharraf. Reuters reports that Bush has finally made the

call:

U.S. President George W. Bush said on Wednesday he had spoken to

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and urged him to both hold

elections and give up his military post.

"My message was that we believe strongly in elections and that you

ought to have elections soon and you need to take off your uniform.

You can't be the president and the head of the military at the same

time," Bush said at a joint news conference with French President

Nicolas Sarkozy. "I had a very frank discussion with him, Bush said.

White House spokeswoman Dana Perino stated: "The decision has been

made to have Secretary Rice be the one directed to have this

communication."

Musharraf and the military remain indispensable in the Bush

administration's war on terror.

November 7, 2007 5:20 pm |

Raymond wrote:

> How George Bush and Condoleezza Rice made a mess of Pakistan

>

Watching the movie "Charlie Wilson's War", where the US, Pakistan,

Israel, and Egypt all worked together, it didn't take many more years to

have that alliance turn to shit.

bush is a moron.

On Dec 27, 10:35�pm, Salad <o...@vinegar.com> wrote:

> Raymond wrote:

> > How George Bush and Condoleezza Rice made a mess of Pakistan

>

> Watching the movie "Charlie Wilson's War", where the US, Pakistan,

> Israel, and Egypt all worked together, it didn't take many more years to

> have that alliance turn to shit.

>

> bush is a moron.

Cheney calls him Mortimer Snerd Who was Snerd? Did he work for

Reagan ?

Even as wave after wave of terror appear over the Horizon,

LIBs continue to blame BOOOSH for everything that

Bill Clinton is factually guilty of,

everything Candidate CTHILLARY

promises to do...

"to leave now we would send a message to terrorists

and other potential adversaries around the world that

they can change our policies by killing our people.

It would be open season on Americans."

-- Bill Clinton '93

just before he pulled out of Somalia

It would be wrong to cut off contact with the terror group just because

they may have killed people "in a way that we hate."

-- Bill Clinton.

This is Clinton's Bridge the 21st Century.

http://www.strangecosmos.com/images/content/117871.gif

---

LIB's plead for a Morality which holds COMPROMISE as it's standard of

Value, making it possible to judge Virtue on the basis of the number of

Values which one is willing to Betray.

--

Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com

serebel wrote:

> On Dec 27, 10:35 pm, Salad <o...@vinegar.com> wrote:

>

>>Raymond wrote:

>>

>>>How George Bush and Condoleezza Rice made a mess of Pakistan

>>

>>Watching the movie "Charlie Wilson's War", where the US, Pakistan,

>>Israel, and Egypt all worked together, it didn't take many more years to

>>have that alliance turn to shit.

>>

>

>

>

> Psssst, it's a movie, they embellish. Would you like to but a

> bridge in NYC ?

You haven't seen the movie, have you?