No wonder Bush doesn't want benchmarks for Iraq -- none of the benchmarks set by the Bush junta itse

Several months ago, the Bush junta set benchmarks to be met in Iraq. Not

one of them is even close to being met. No wonder the Bush junta doesn't

want Congress setting benchmarks -- they know that none will be met.

QUOTE

Baghdad's Fissures and Mistrust Keep Political Goals Out of Reach

By Sudarsan Raghavan

Washington Post Foreign Service

Thursday, April 26, 2007; A01

BAGHDAD, April 25 -- U.S. military commanders say a key goal of the ongoing

security offensive is to buy time for Iraq's leaders to reach political

benchmarks that can unite its fractured coalition government and persuade

insurgents to stop fighting.

But in pressuring the Iraqis to speed up, U.S. officials are encountering a

variety of hurdles: The parliament is riven by personality and sect, and

some politicians are abandoning Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government.

There is deep mistrust of U.S. intentions, especially among Shiites who see

American efforts to bring Sunnis into the political process as an attempt to

weaken the Shiites' grip on power.

Many Iraqi politicians view the U.S. pressure as bullying that reminds them

they are under occupation. And the security offensive, bolstered by

additional U.S. forces, has failed to stop the violence that is widening the

sectarian divide.

"The Americans should take into consideration the Iraqi situation and its

complications, not just their own internal politics," said Mahmoud Othman,

an independent Kurdish legislator.

Ten weeks into the security plan, even as U.S. lawmakers propose timelines

for a U.S. troop withdrawal, there has been little or no progress in

achieving three key political benchmarks set by the Bush administration: new

laws governing the sharing of Iraq's oil resources and allowing many former

members of the banned Baath Party to return to their jobs, and amendments to

Iraq's constitution. As divisions widen, a bitter, prolonged legislative

struggle is hindering prospects for political reconciliation.

"They are all up in the air," said Ahmed Chalabi, a secular Shiite who is

chairman of Iraq's Supreme National Commission for De-Baathification. "They

are certainly not going to be produced in any timetable that is acceptable

within the context of the current political climate in the United States."

Other benchmarks such as provincial elections, a political agreement on

dismantling militias and a program for reconciliation announced last July

also have not moved forward, Iraqi officials said.

Iraqi politicians across the sectarian spectrum said their political process

is being hijacked by American domestic politics. Pressured by congressional

Democrats and growing antiwar sentiment at home, senior U.S. officials are

growing impatient.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, visiting Iraq last week, declared that

the "clock is ticking" for political progress. He urged Iraq's parliament

not to take a scheduled two-month recess and to pass by the end of summer

both an oil law and a proposal to reverse the de-Baathification law.

Even if compromises are reached on the three benchmarks, it is unlikely the

final legislation will resemble anything close to the Bush administration's

blueprint. Maliki's aides are already stressing that they cannot control how

the divided 275-member parliament will react to the proposals.

"When the Americans give orders, people will be more against it," Othman

said. "That's what the Americans don't understand."

Oil

In February, Iraq's cabinet passed a U.S.-backed draft law that would give

the central government control over Iraq's oil reserves, the third largest

in the world. President Bush and Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), a presidential

contender, cited it as a sign of political progress.

But the legislation has yet to be introduced in parliament. Politicians from

the semiautonomous Kurdish region say measures in the law that would take

undeveloped oil fields away from regional governments and have a new

national oil company oversee them are unconstitutional.

"Iraq, frankly, does not have the money to invest in oil fields," said Ashti

Hawrami, the Kurdish region's minister of natural resources. He added that

the Kurds are disputing four annexes to the draft law that would dilute

their ability to exploit oil in their territory. If the draft isn't "watered

down," Kurdish regional authorities will not support it, he said.

The Kurds also don't trust the central government to distribute oil revenue,

saying it has been behind in payments in other instances. Some have

suggested that a fund be set up outside Iraq to dole out that money. "We are

asking for our fair share and guarantees that we will receive it," Hawrami

said.

Sunni Arabs and some secular Shiite politicians, however, stand firm that

the central government must control oil production and revenue distribution.

"If we want to keep the unity of Iraq, the best way is to keep the oil under

the authority of the central government," said Adnan Pachachi, a secular

Sunni with the Iraqi National List party of former prime minister Ayad

Allawi.

While some Kurds favor allowing agreements that would share production with

foreign oil companies, many Sunnis and Shiites are against them on

nationalistic grounds. They prefer service contracts in which Iraq would pay

for work.

"The oil law needs time to pass in order to become an additional bond in the

reconciliation process, and not cleave it," said Mustafa al-Hiti, a Sunni

legislator. "If the Americans want national reconciliation, they should

postpone this law, and don't force the government to pass it by the right

time."

De-Baathification

For the first time in months, Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, a

Sunni, saw hope for reconciling with his Shiite counterparts.

On March 26, then-U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Maliki announced a

proposal to allow thousands of additional former members of Saddam Hussein's

Baath Party to rejoin the government or get pensions.

But less than 24 hours later, it quickly unraveled. Religious Shiites in

Maliki's ruling coalition opposed key elements of the proposal. Now, at

least three additional versions have surfaced, all diluted versions of the

original proposal.

"We are suffering a political chaos," Hashimi said. "I thought when Maliki

signed and gave his endorsement, he had done his homework and convinced his

colleagues."

In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, the U.S. occupation authority under

L. Paul Bremer forced Baathists out of their government jobs and disbanded

Hussein's army. Those actions are now widely seen as having fueled the Sunni

Arab insurgency. Thousands of low-ranking Baathists have been allowed to

return to their jobs, but not enough to satisfy Sunni leaders.

"Everyone agrees we need to reform de-Baathification," said Chalabi. "But

there is a great sense the facts as perceived in Washington about

de-Baathification are certainly not what they really are here."

The Khalilzad proposal, designed to bring minority Sunnis into the political

process, would disband the de-Baathification commission and set a 90-day

limit for Iraqi citizens to bring complaints in court against former

Baathists.

Shiite politicians in Maliki's coalition said they would like to see those

who suffered under Hussein's government compensated before former Baathists

have their jobs and pensions restored.

"All of this may lead to the delaying of the law, or else producing a law

not as good as Americans want it," said Haidar al-Abaidi of Maliki's Dawa

party.

Many Shiites and Kurds are wary of allowing former Baathists back into

national security-related jobs and worry that they could regain power. "This

swift transition could create negative reaction toward the state," said

Bassam Sharif, a legislator from the religious Shiite Fadhila party, which

withdrew from Maliki's coalition in March. "If they had properly punished

the Baathists, there would be more positive results."

Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the dominant Shiite party, the Supreme

Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, described Baathists as "the

first enemy of the Iraqi people." Disbanding the de-Baathification

commission, he said, would be unconstitutional. "All those criminals, the

Baathists, their trials should continue and it is necessary to fund the

proper mechanisms to carry out their tasks," he said.

Sunni Arabs, said Hashimi, insist that the de-Baathification commission be

ended within six months and that the courts provide a forum for falsely

accused Baathists to demonstrate their innocence.

But Chalabi said Iraq's swamped legal system could not handle more cases to

judge Baathists. "What does it mean? You make the Sunnis happy and make all

the Shia unhappy. That's not reconciliation. It has to be agreed," he said.

"We have to turn a new page for Iraq. But they want to keep going," Hashimi

said.

Constitutional Changes

In October 2005, Khalilzad brokered a deal with Hashimi and Sunni Arab

leaders. In exchange for their participation in a referendum on Iraq's new

constitution, the document would be amended to address Sunni concerns. But

that has not happened, and Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds remain split over key

issues: whether Iraq should be divided into autonomous regions under a

federal system; the authorities of the prime minister and the president; the

national identity of Iraq; and the fate of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.

Fouad Masoun, a Kurdish legislator and deputy chairman of the parliament's

constitution review committee, said: "There are some revisions which are

necessary, but there are also demands by certain parties we reject, such as

returning Iraq to a centralized government or reducing the powers of the

Kurdistan region and other regions."

Sunnis, such as Hashimi, would like to weaken the powers of the prime

minister, who in a democratic Iraq will almost certainly be a

majority-Shiite.

"Right now, all the power is injected into one post in the government,"

Hashimi said. "We are, whether we like or not, now getting another

dictatorship but under the umbrella of democracy. This is in no way

acceptable."

Humam Hamoudi, the Shiite chairman of the constitution review committee,

said it hoped to submit charter revisions to parliament by the middle of

next month.

That's where the real fight will begin, Iraqi lawmakers say.

With the legislature polarized along sectarian lines, compromise is

difficult. Last week, anti-American Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr pulled six

of his ministers from the cabinet, but did not pull his 30 loyalists from

the parliament. Bahaa al-Araji, a Sadrist legislator, said this would free

the Sadr bloc to vote independently of Maliki and others.

They hold posts in the parliamentary legal and de-Baathification committees,

and have influence over all three political benchmarks set by the Bush

administration.

A constitutional amendment approved by parliament would face a referendum.

Any three provinces can vote it down with a two-thirds majority.

The political benchmarks, Hamoudi said, are on track -- on an Iraqi

timetable.

"We have a saying in Iraq. We say, 'Inshallah' " -- God willing. "We never

say 'yes,' " he said. "And 'inshallah' has many interpretations."

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