[Nuclear Pakistan & Islamists] Troubling Effectiveness of al-Qaeda's PSYOP On The Pakistani Army

[Nuclear Pakistan & Islamists] Troubling Effectiveness of al-Qaeda's PSYOP On The Pakistani Army

Understanding Al-Qaeda's Pakistan PSYOP and Insurgency

The Troubling Effectiveness of al-Qaeda's PSYOP On The

Pakistani Army

By Steve Schippert

ThreatsWatch

September 25, 2007

Going forward in the global conflict before us, it is

important to acknowledge and understand that al-Qaeda is

currently engaged in an Information Operation (IO) campaign

inside Pakistan. This is in addition to its efforts to gain

influence outside of Pakistan, particularly with Muslims in

Europe, the Middle East and in the US. The primary target

of the Pakistan campaign is the Pakistani military and it

is driven by al-Qaeda's accelerating insurgency inside

Pakistan. Understanding how and why al-Qaeda has undertaken

this effort allows decision makers greater understanding of

al-Qaeda's aims and equips them with a 'lay of the land'

required to counter al-Qaeda's message and objectives.

Usama bin Laden's latest recorded message is the third in

just two weeks following three years of virtual silence

from the al-Qaeda leader. In it, bin Laden calls on

Pakistani Muslims to acknowledge that Musharraf's actions

are examples of his loyalty to the United States and

representative of his unbelief. For bin Laden and his

compatriots, such unbelief marks Musharraf as 'kufr' and

places the requirement on believers to make "armed

rebellion against him." The misguided understanding that

bin Laden and al-Qaeda have of Islam makes it obligatory to

fight against those who rule outside of their

interpretation of Islam, and its overly broad application

of tawhid. Yet bin Laden crafts a different message for the

Pakistani Army, whom he advises to "resign" from their

jobs, "disassociate yourself from Pervez and his Shirk

(polytheism)" and "enter anew into Islam." There is a

reason for this, which will be discussed below.

Ayman al-Zawahiri's latest video message and bin Laden's

audio message, released on the same day, mark as-Sahab's

77th and 78th propaganda productions this year alone. There

is a clear shifting of gears in the al-Qaeda Information

Operations, most notably within Pakistan as well as their

international efforts surrounding the 6th anniversary of

the September 11th attacks.

Before looking further into the al-Qaeda Pakistani IO

campaign, we must address the al-Qaeda-Taliban insurgency

actively ongoing in Pakistan.

al-Qaeda in Pakistan - From Terrorism to Insurgency

There is, of course, no single agreed upon definition of

terrorism. Terrorism is defined in the US Code of Federal

Regulations as "...the unlawful use of force and violence

against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a

government, the civilian population, or any segment

thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."

(28 C.F.R. Section 0.85) For instance, terrorism is --among

other things -- a tactic employed to increase support for a

group through inspiration while also decreasing effective

resistance to the group through intimidation. An example of

this type of terrorism would be the beheading of those

deemed to be 'spies' for the Americans in South Waziristan,

the multiple car bomb and rocket attacks, or the anti-

aircraft assassination attempts on Musharraf. Additionally,

the bombings that took place after the Pakistani government

raid on Lal Masjid (the Red Mosque) are an example of the

use of terror to gain influence. No matter the definition

of terrorism being applied, al-Qaeda has clearly been a

terrorist organization in Pakistan.

Beyond Pakistan, Al-Qaeda seeks to -- in part -- influence

American foreign policy through terrorist means. But within

Pakistan, al-Qaeda has clearly and by specific design

transformed from being simply a dangerous international

terrorist group within Pakistan to a full-fledged internal

insurgency against it. This transformation is represented

through the efforts of al-Qaeda to acquire the armored

assets of a state Army and its nuclear weapons, as well as

the pursuit of land holdings to be integrated into the

larger objective of creating an Islamic state to be ruled

by a successor to the Prophet, a Khalifa or Caliph, nearly

1350 years after the last of the 'rightly guided' rulers.

An insurgency is a movement with specific governmental

designs on the host country. In Countering Evolved

Insurgent Networks,

http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Hammes.pdf

Col. Thomas X. Hammes (USMC, Ret.)

http://www.amazon.com/Sling-Stone-War-21st-Century/dp/0760320594

quotes Bard O'Neill to define an insurgency. O'Neill wrote,

"Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a

nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the

nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g.,

organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations)

and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis

of one or more aspects of politics."

In more accessible terms, Terrorism-Research.com

http://www.terrorism-research.com/insurgency/

offers that the ultimate goal of an insurgency "is to

challenge the existing government for control of all or a

portion of its territory, or force political concessions in

sharing political power."

Both aptly describe al-Qaeda's actions, operations and aims

within Pakistan, a ready-made nuclear power which the

terrorist group seeks to wrest complete control.

Perhaps the best way to describe al-Qaeda's Pakistan

insurgency is to call it a "Death by a Thousand Cuts." They

have openly sought not only the assassination of Pervez

Musharraf, but also the demise -- or reconfiguration -- of

the Pakistani national government. In a strategy that has

been executed with remarkable patience, al-Qaeda has gained

acknowledged control of several sizable territories in

Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

After defeating Pakistani forces on the battlefield, the

Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance have secured various 'peace

accords' replete with concessions from the Musharraf

government. Effective control of North Waziristan, South

Waziristan, Bajour and Swat have been ceded to them and

Pakistani forces were -- upon agreement -- effectively

withdrawn from the areas handed the Taliban-al-Qaeda

alliance through the accords. The accords, no matter how

presented by the Musharraf government, represented abject

defeat.

Al-Qaeda Insurgency: Destination - Islamabad

Domination in these territories has allowed al-Qaeda the

haven necessary to rebuild its training and planning

infrastructure as well as replenish its human resources.

After a few short weeks of basic military training, Taliban

conscripts are sent in waves across the border to battle US

and Coalition forces in Afghanistan.

However, al-Qaeda has no designs on investing in regaining

that territory. There are no resources for them there --

and a more formidable, if reduced, military force to be

reckoned with. One whose defeat of the terrorist group

drove them into Pakistan's border regions to begin with.

Al-Qaeda's designs are not back towards the west, but

rather onward deeper into the heart of Pakistan.

While al-Qaeda's Pakistan insurgency has been largely waged

in the FATA region, it's territorial aims are by no means

limited to it. Rather, al-Qaeda seeks control of all of

Pakistan, including its military, weapons and economic

capabilities. Al-Qaeda has been executing this strategy one

territory, one victory at a time. And it now closes in on

Islamabad.

Indeed, an analysis by the Pakistani Interior Ministry

warned Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf of precisely

this. The New York Times reported that the 15-page internal

Pakistani document warned Musharraf that "the influence of

the extremists is swiftly bleeding east and deeper into his

own country, threatening areas like Peshawar, Nowshera and

Kohat, which were considered to be safeguarded by Pakistani

government forces." The Interior Ministry document said

that Peshewar endures the "highest number of terrorist

incidents, including attacks on local police," and that in

Bannu and Tank regions, police are "patronizing the local

Taliban and have abdicated the role of law and order."

It is important to note that Peshewar is the capital of the

North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Much of the Pakistani

government, non-Islamist educators, officials and police

forces live inside heavily armed and walled communities in

the NWFP, where they are more safe from al-Qaeda attack.

The NWFP borders the Federally Administered Tribal Areas

under direct Taliban-al-Qaeda control on one side and the

Pakistani capital of Islamabad on the other. The rising

violence is a clear indicator of the expansion of al-

Qaeda's insurgency as it marches patiently but steadily

toward Islamabad. As evidenced by bin Laden's latest

message, that patience may be nearing an end.

Usama bin Laden's latest message implored the Pakistani

public to take up arms against Musharraf and warned the

army's soldiers to break ranks and fight Musharraf with al-

Qaeda rather than serve him. This is a sign that al-Qaeda's

patient approach to its Pakistan insurgency has run its

course. There could be a maelstrom of events to follow in

Pakistan.

AQ Targets Police for Violence and Army Soldiers for

Influence

The al-Qaeda Information Operation (IO) is designed to

support the insurgency's incremental march on Islamabad.

The key to understanding the al-Qaeda IO and its insurgency

goals is to understand how al-Qaeda primarily targets

Pakistani Interior Ministry forces (police, constabularies

and the Frontier Corps) for physical attack while targeting

Pakistani regular army forces for influence and subversion.

The persistent mention of Pakistani police forces -- rather

than Pakistani Army forces -- is expected in any Pakistani

Interior Ministry report, as the Police forces fall under

the Interior. But Pakistani police forces also decidedly

bear the brunt of al-Qaeda's lethal attacks and not the

Pakistani Army. It's not that al-Qaeda and their indigenous

Taliban allies cannot attack the Pakistani Army with

expectations of success. They most certainly can and have.

With bin Laden's latest audio message delivering a

combination invitation and ultimatum to Pakistani Army

soldiers, al-Qaeda's designs for the Pakistani Army are

more clearly visible. The reason for attacking Pakistani

police forces is two-fold and -- in this writer's view -

also the most elusive and yet perhaps most important

indicator of the ongoing al-Qaeda insurgency.

First, the Interior Ministry is widely regarded as the one

segment of the Pakistani government with unwavering loyalty

to Musharraf, whom al-Qaeda has sought to assassinate

several times. Unlike the military and the military's

intelligence arm (ISI), the Pakistani police forces,

constabularies and Frontier Corps of the Interior Ministry

do not have historical ties to Islamist groups such as

Lashkar-e-Taiba, al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Interior

Ministry loyalty to Musharraf makes their ranks logical

targets for the Islamists who seek to kill and replace

Musharraf atop an Islamist-run Pakistani government.

Secondly, and most importantly, al-Qaeda at the same time

seeks to avoid open bloody conflict with the Army. Not

because it fears the deadly consequences of such a

confrontation, but rather because al-Qaeda senior

leadership wants the Pakistani military intact -- for

themselves. Ideally, they do not want to ultimately find

Musharraf killed or oustered only to have the military

splintered internally between pro-government and pro-al-

Qaeda commanders. Al-Qaeda is executing an insurgency to

gain control, not to touch off a civil war.

In the end, al-Qaeda's design is also to co-opt an intact

military in order to gain command of a military force with

the assets of a state (aircraft, armor, etc.) and direct

control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Recent reports of

defections of Pakistani military elements since bin Laden's

latest message to them indicates a level of success in the

al-Qaeda IO campaign targeting them.

Measuring al-Qaeda's PSYOP Success

Three weeks ago, well over 200 Pakistani Army soldiers

surrendered to a much smaller number of fighters from the

Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance without a shot fired. But the al-

Qaeda IO campaign primarily targeting the Pakistani regular

army forces has a spillover effect on other forces - and

the general populace -- as well. It is reported in Pakistan

that many soldiers in the Pakistani Army, Frontier Corps

paramilitary and police forces are refusing to fight or

putting up little fight against their own countrymen inside

the Federally Administered Tribal Area.

It is difficult to dispute the success of al-Qaeda's

Psychological Warfare efforts inside Pakistan. The message

has been consistent for several years and al-Qaeda's

patience and restraint in seeing it through are significant

qualities of the terrorist organization turned insurgent

group. With every message and in all their forms, al-Qaeda

has sought to convince the Army soldiers that they are not

al-Qaeda's enemy, rather that they are simply being misled

by Musharraf. In bin Laden's latest message, he said of the

Pakistani Army, "we see the armies becoming tools and

weapons in the hands of the Kuffaar [unbeliever,

referencing Musharraf and the US] against the Muslims."

This message resonates, as many Pakistanis are reluctant to

take up arms against other Pakistanis, whether those they

would confront are Taliban or al-Qaeda or not. It must also

be considered that upwards of 30% of the Pakistani Army

are, like the Taliban, ethnic Pashtuns. The vast majority

of them are enlisted foot soldiers, as very few ethnic

Pashtuns hold leadership positions, largely due to internal

social and educational dynamics.

Even among the Pakistani police forces in the North West

Frontier Province, many are said to have requested leave or

simply deserted when faced with the outlook of deadly

confrontations with fellow Pakistanis among the Taliban-al-

Qaeda alliance. In other instances, including the Interior

Ministry's report that specifically cited the Bannu and

Tank regions, police are "patronizing the local Taliban and

have abdicated the role of law and order."

Where True Power Lies...And Grows

This is an indication that fear is also a prime motivator

among Pakistanis. In the North West Frontier Province

capital of Peshawar, al-Qaeda's black banner of jihad can

be seen displayed in the widows of many shops and flying in

various places. This does not necessarily mean that there

is explicit support in the hearts and minds of all

Pakistanis there -- even among those flying the al-Qaeda

banner.

Though Peshewar and the rest of the NWFP are technically

under Pakistani state control, this indicates a reflection

among the populace of where the true power lies -- outside

the walled communities where many government employees and

'moderate' citizens take refuge. In many cases, the al-

Qaeda banner may well be flown simply out of self-

protection to avoid attack on their particular shops.

The police cannot protect everyone all the time, but al-

Qaeda and the Taliban can attack at their choosing. And

from a local's perspective, this is where the true power

lies. And as more and more Pakistanis in the police forces,

the Frontier Corps and the regular army begin to show a

reluctance to do battle, the al-Qaeda power in these region

grows, both in measurable means on the ground and within

the minds of the Pakistani populace.

Such are the tangible gains of effective, persistent and

robust al-Qaeda information operations, a classic PSYOP

directed at both the Pakistani population writ large and

also expressly directed at the Pakistani Army. As a result,

Pakistani forces are engaging al-Qaeda and the Taliban less

and less. In fact, President Musharraf announced that in

2008, there will be no Pakistani Army activity at all in

al-Qaeda-held territory, deferring engagement to the less

capable and less effective Frontier Corps and Pakistani

police and constabularies.

Conclusions

The growing success of this long running al-Qaeda PSYOP

makes it clear that the defeat of al-Qaeda and the

elimination of their global headquarters in Pakistan will

not come from Pakistani sources or initiative. As with so

many other theaters in this global conflict, the initiative

must again come directly from the United States. The

American public and American political leaders must prepare

themselves for the reality that, at this stage, defeating

al-Qaeda in Pakistan most likely requires American boots on

Pakistani soil.

The continued disengagement from the fight by Pakistani

military forces unwilling to combat terrorists and

insurgents within their own country is indeed troubling.

President Musharraf's recent decision to fully disengage

and withdraw

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C08%5C25%5Cstory_25-8-2007_pg7_1

his most capable combat forces from the Federally

Administered Tribal Areas by January 2008 certainly does

not bode well for continued distanced engagement or non-

engagement by American forces. In the end, defeating al-

Qaeda in Pakistan will require direct American military

action on the ground. The alternative is to accept the

consequences of a strengthening al-Qaeda insurgency that is

gaining momentum.

There can therefore be little debate that al-Qaeda and its

global headquarters in Pakistan must be defeated before

they consume Pakistan and the assets of a nuclear-armed

state with professional military forces. The first step is

an effective IO strategy of our own to counter this very

powerful aspect of the insurgency. At current, only Pervez

Musharraf openly engages the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance in

the war of words and ideas within Pakistan. Unfortunately,

these efforts amount to little given his poor domestic

credibility. More Pakistani voices are required, and they

must address the Pakistani people, bottom up, in a credible

manner

Pakistan

View Full Size Map

http://threatswatch.org/mapshow.php?map=pk-map.gif&w=345&h=369

Notes

Military Review - Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks (PDF)

http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Hammes.pdf

Amazon.com - The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st

Century by Col. Thomas X. Hammes

http://www.amazon.com/Sling-Stone-War-21st-Century/dp/0760320594

Terrorism-Research.com - Differences between Terrorism and

Insurgency

http://www.terrorism-research.com/insurgency/

New York Times - Taliban Spreading, Pakistani President Is

Warned

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/30/world/asia/30pakistan.html?ex=1340856000&en=e2c12da3c09d9ee1&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss

Daily Times - 'No army in FATA after Jan 2008'

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C08%5C25%5Cstory_25-8-2007_pg7_1

The above article is from:

http://analysis.threatswatch.org/2007/09/understanding-alqaedas-psy/

- - - - - - -

CNN Student News Transcript: November 5, 2007 CNN - Nov 4,

2007 Al Qaeda would certainly flourish in a country

distracted by a worsening state of emergency. Then, there

is the issue of the nukes

http://www.cnn.com/2007/LIVING/studentnews/11/04/sn.transcript.mon/

Al-Qaeda pursuing nukes, biological weapons: US Daily

Telegraph, Australia - Oct 9, 2007 The NIE, which

prefigured much of today's report, said al-Qaeda had

regrouped in Pakistan "and would not hesitate'' to use

weaponas of mass destruction

http://www.news.com.au/dailytelegraph/story/0,22049,22561509-5006003,00.html

1 posted on 11/05/2007 10:58:08 by Posting

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-To: Posting

this is the time for Musharaff to openly request full US

military support and assistance. Instead of criticizing him

we need to join in in launching death blow attacks

throughout the so-called tribal territories and literally

kill all that oppose we the combined forces. Leave no

villages standing that resist. Apply every asset, carpet

bomb any escaping islamist forces. Round up all cells

throughout Pakistan and execute them all. This is the way

to win the war on terror, KILL the terrorists. Enough of

this p/c kid gloves play by the rules stuff. Fight to win!

CRUSH radical islam once and for all, with extreme

prejudice.

2 posted on 11/05/2007 11:03:47 by LeoWindhorse

Reply to 1

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-To: LeoWindhorse

> this is the time for Musharaff to openly request full US

> military support and assistance. Instead of criticizing

> him we need to join in in launching death blow attacks

> throughout the so-called tribal territories and literally

> kill all that oppose we the combined forces. Leave no

> villages standing that resist. Apply every asset, carpet

> bomb any escaping islamist forces. Round up all cells

> throughout Pakistan and execute them all. This is the way

> to win the war on terror, KILL the terrorists. Enough of

> this p/c kid gloves play by the rules stuff. Fight to

> win! CRUSH radical islam once and for all, with extreme

> prejudice.

Sorry. Not going to happen.

3 posted on 11/05/2007 11:06:22 by ketsu

Reply to 2

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-To: LeoWindhorse

The Iranian 1979 lesson of 'suffering from cracking down on

a non Jihadi dictator in a Muslim country' tells us not to

Teach him a hard lesson.

4 posted on 11/05/2007 11:10:10 by Posting

(Beware of Islamization of some Arab "Christians")

Reply to 2

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-To: ketsu

Then, I guess we should just get used to a nice fuzzy warm

glow over New York City some time soon.

5 posted on 11/06/2007 12:37:46 by Ajnin

(Neca Eos Omnes. Deus Suos Agnoset.)

Reply to 3

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-To: Posting

I recently covered this from a similar angle on my Blog

Beyond the Cusp.

http://beyondthecusp.blogspot.com/

The article is named Will Pakistan be Pushed Beyond the

Cusp?

http://beyondthecusp.blogspot.com/2007/11/will-pakistan-be-pushed-beyond-cusp.html

I hope those who visit enjoy the read and I added to their

understanding. Thanks again FReepers for your support.

6 posted on 11/06/2007 1:35:26 by bsaunders

Reply to 1

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End of forwarded messages from:

http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1921533/posts

Jai Maharaj

http://tinyurl.com/24fq83

http://www.mantra.com/jai

http://www.mantra.com/jyotish

Om Shanti

Hindu Holocaust Museum

http://www.mantra.com/holocaust

Hindu life, principles, spirituality and philosophy

http://www.hindu.org

http://www.hindunet.org

The truth about Islam and Muslims

http://www.flex.com/~jai/satyamevajayate

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