K
Kickin' Ass and Takin' Names
Guest
Obama's Sweeping Foreign Policy Critique
By Spencer Ackerman, The American Prospect
Posted on March 28, 2008, Printed on March 28, 2008
http://www.alternet.org/story/80623/
When Sens. Hillary Rodham Clinton and Barack Obama met in California
for the Jan. 31 debate, their back-and-forth resembled their many
previous encounters, with the Democratic presidential hopefuls
scrambling for the small policy yardage between them. And then Obama
said something about the Iraq War that wasn't incremental at all. "I
don't want to just end the war," he said, "but I want to end the mind-
set that got us into war in the first place."
Until this point in the primaries, Clinton and Obama had sounded very
similar on this issue. Despite their differences in the past (Obama
opposed the war, while Clinton voted for it), both were calling for
major troop withdrawals, with some residual force left behind to hedge
against catastrophe. But Obama's concise declaration of intent at the
debate upended this assumption. Clinton stumbled to find a
counterargument, eventually saying her vote in October 2002 "was not
authority for a pre-emptive war." Then she questioned Obama's ability
to lead, saying that the Democratic nominee must have "the necessary
credentials and gravitas for commander in chief."
If Clinton's response on Iraq sounds familiar, that's because it's
structurally identical to the defensive crouch John Kerry assumed in
2004: Voting against the war wasn't a mistake; the mistakes were all
George W. Bush's, and bringing the war to a responsible conclusion
requires a wise man or woman with military credibility. In that
debate, Obama offered an alternative path. Ending the war is only the
first step. After we're out of Iraq, a corrosive mind-set will still
be infecting the foreign-policy establishment and the body politic.
That rot must be eliminated.
Obama is offering the most sweeping liberal foreign-policy critique
we've heard from a serious presidential contender in decades. It cuts
to the heart of traditional Democratic timidity. "It's time to reject
the counsel that says the American people would rather have someone
who is strong and wrong than someone who is weak and right," Obama
said in a January speech. "It's time to say that we are the party that
is going to be strong and right." (The Democrat who counseled that
Americans wanted someone strong and wrong, not weak and right? That
was Bill Clinton in 2002.)
But to understand what Obama is proposing, it's important to ask:
What, exactly, is the mind-set that led to the war? What will it mean
to end it? And what will take its place?
To answer these questions, I spoke at length with Obama's foreign-
policy brain trust, the advisers who will craft and implement a new
global strategy if he wins the nomination and the general election.
They envision a doctrine that first ends the politics of fear and then
moves beyond a hollow, sloganeering "democracy promotion" agenda in
favor of "dignity promotion," to fix the conditions of misery that
breed anti-Americanism and prevent liberty, justice, and prosperity
from taking root. An inextricable part of that doctrine is a
relentless and thorough destruction of al-Qaeda. Is this hawkish? Is
this dovish? It's both and neither -- an overhaul not just of our
foreign policy but of how we think about foreign policy. And it might
just be the future of American global leadership.
When considering any presidential hopeful's foreign-policy promises,
it's important to remember that what candidates say is, at best, an
imperfect guide to their actions in office. What proves to be a more
reliable indicator of presidential behavior is a candidate's roster of
advisers. (If the press had paid better attention, the country would
have seen through Bush's pitch about a humble foreign policy and
realized that many of his advisers, including Paul Wolfowitz and
Richard Perle, were conspiracy-minded warmongers.) Obama's foreign-
policy advisers come from diverse backgrounds. They are former aides
to Democratic mandarins like Tom Daschle and Lee Hamilton (Denis
McDonough and Ben Rhodes, respectively); veterans of the Clinton
administration's left flank (Tony Lake and Susan Rice); a human-rights
advocate who helped write the Army's and Marine Corps' much-lauded
counterinsurgency field manual (Sarah Sewall); a retired general who
helped run the air war during the invasion of Iraq (Scott Gration);
and a former journalist who revolutionized the study of U.S. foreign
policy (Samantha Power). Yet they form a committed, intellectually
coherent, and surprisingly united foreign-affairs team. (Shortly
before this piece went to press, Power resigned from the campaign
after making an intemperate remark to a reporter.)
They also share a formative experience with each other and with Obama.
Each opposed the Iraq War at a time when doing so was derided by their
colleagues, by journalists, and by the foreign-policy establishment.
Each did so because they understood that the invasion and occupation
ran counter to the goal of destroying al-Qaeda. And each bore the
frustration of endless lectures on their lack of so-called seriousness
from those who suffered from strategic myopia.
"There is a popular notion that Democrats have to try to appear like
Republicans to pass some test on national security. The fact that
that's still the case after Iraq is absurd," says one of Obama's
closest advisers. "So you break from that orthodoxy and say 'I don't
care if the Republicans attack me because I'm willing to meet with the
leadership in Iran. We haven't for 25 years, and it's not gotten us
anywhere.'"
Most of the members of Obama's foreign-policy team expressed
frustration that they had taken a well-considered and seemingly
anodyne position on Iraq and suffered for it. Obama had something
similar happen to him in the spring and summer of 2007. He was
attacked from the left and the right for saying three things that
should not have been controversial: that if he had actionable
intelligence on the whereabouts of al-Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan
but no cooperation from the Pakistani government, he would take out
the jihadists; that he wouldn't use nuclear weapons on terrorist
training camps; and that he would be willing to meet with leaders of
rogue states in his first year as president. "No one [of Obama's
critics] had thought through the policy because that was the quote-
unquote na
By Spencer Ackerman, The American Prospect
Posted on March 28, 2008, Printed on March 28, 2008
http://www.alternet.org/story/80623/
When Sens. Hillary Rodham Clinton and Barack Obama met in California
for the Jan. 31 debate, their back-and-forth resembled their many
previous encounters, with the Democratic presidential hopefuls
scrambling for the small policy yardage between them. And then Obama
said something about the Iraq War that wasn't incremental at all. "I
don't want to just end the war," he said, "but I want to end the mind-
set that got us into war in the first place."
Until this point in the primaries, Clinton and Obama had sounded very
similar on this issue. Despite their differences in the past (Obama
opposed the war, while Clinton voted for it), both were calling for
major troop withdrawals, with some residual force left behind to hedge
against catastrophe. But Obama's concise declaration of intent at the
debate upended this assumption. Clinton stumbled to find a
counterargument, eventually saying her vote in October 2002 "was not
authority for a pre-emptive war." Then she questioned Obama's ability
to lead, saying that the Democratic nominee must have "the necessary
credentials and gravitas for commander in chief."
If Clinton's response on Iraq sounds familiar, that's because it's
structurally identical to the defensive crouch John Kerry assumed in
2004: Voting against the war wasn't a mistake; the mistakes were all
George W. Bush's, and bringing the war to a responsible conclusion
requires a wise man or woman with military credibility. In that
debate, Obama offered an alternative path. Ending the war is only the
first step. After we're out of Iraq, a corrosive mind-set will still
be infecting the foreign-policy establishment and the body politic.
That rot must be eliminated.
Obama is offering the most sweeping liberal foreign-policy critique
we've heard from a serious presidential contender in decades. It cuts
to the heart of traditional Democratic timidity. "It's time to reject
the counsel that says the American people would rather have someone
who is strong and wrong than someone who is weak and right," Obama
said in a January speech. "It's time to say that we are the party that
is going to be strong and right." (The Democrat who counseled that
Americans wanted someone strong and wrong, not weak and right? That
was Bill Clinton in 2002.)
But to understand what Obama is proposing, it's important to ask:
What, exactly, is the mind-set that led to the war? What will it mean
to end it? And what will take its place?
To answer these questions, I spoke at length with Obama's foreign-
policy brain trust, the advisers who will craft and implement a new
global strategy if he wins the nomination and the general election.
They envision a doctrine that first ends the politics of fear and then
moves beyond a hollow, sloganeering "democracy promotion" agenda in
favor of "dignity promotion," to fix the conditions of misery that
breed anti-Americanism and prevent liberty, justice, and prosperity
from taking root. An inextricable part of that doctrine is a
relentless and thorough destruction of al-Qaeda. Is this hawkish? Is
this dovish? It's both and neither -- an overhaul not just of our
foreign policy but of how we think about foreign policy. And it might
just be the future of American global leadership.
When considering any presidential hopeful's foreign-policy promises,
it's important to remember that what candidates say is, at best, an
imperfect guide to their actions in office. What proves to be a more
reliable indicator of presidential behavior is a candidate's roster of
advisers. (If the press had paid better attention, the country would
have seen through Bush's pitch about a humble foreign policy and
realized that many of his advisers, including Paul Wolfowitz and
Richard Perle, were conspiracy-minded warmongers.) Obama's foreign-
policy advisers come from diverse backgrounds. They are former aides
to Democratic mandarins like Tom Daschle and Lee Hamilton (Denis
McDonough and Ben Rhodes, respectively); veterans of the Clinton
administration's left flank (Tony Lake and Susan Rice); a human-rights
advocate who helped write the Army's and Marine Corps' much-lauded
counterinsurgency field manual (Sarah Sewall); a retired general who
helped run the air war during the invasion of Iraq (Scott Gration);
and a former journalist who revolutionized the study of U.S. foreign
policy (Samantha Power). Yet they form a committed, intellectually
coherent, and surprisingly united foreign-affairs team. (Shortly
before this piece went to press, Power resigned from the campaign
after making an intemperate remark to a reporter.)
They also share a formative experience with each other and with Obama.
Each opposed the Iraq War at a time when doing so was derided by their
colleagues, by journalists, and by the foreign-policy establishment.
Each did so because they understood that the invasion and occupation
ran counter to the goal of destroying al-Qaeda. And each bore the
frustration of endless lectures on their lack of so-called seriousness
from those who suffered from strategic myopia.
"There is a popular notion that Democrats have to try to appear like
Republicans to pass some test on national security. The fact that
that's still the case after Iraq is absurd," says one of Obama's
closest advisers. "So you break from that orthodoxy and say 'I don't
care if the Republicans attack me because I'm willing to meet with the
leadership in Iran. We haven't for 25 years, and it's not gotten us
anywhere.'"
Most of the members of Obama's foreign-policy team expressed
frustration that they had taken a well-considered and seemingly
anodyne position on Iraq and suffered for it. Obama had something
similar happen to him in the spring and summer of 2007. He was
attacked from the left and the right for saying three things that
should not have been controversial: that if he had actionable
intelligence on the whereabouts of al-Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan
but no cooperation from the Pakistani government, he would take out
the jihadists; that he wouldn't use nuclear weapons on terrorist
training camps; and that he would be willing to meet with leaders of
rogue states in his first year as president. "No one [of Obama's
critics] had thought through the policy because that was the quote-
unquote na