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MonkeyHawk
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Fallon Derided Petraeus, Opposed the Surge
By Gareth Porter
Inter Press Service
Wednesday 12 September 2007
Washington - In sharp contrast to the lionisation of Gen. David Petraeus
by members of the U.S. Congress during his testimony this week, Petraeus's
superior, Admiral William Fallon, chief of the Central Command (CENTCOM),
derided Petraeus as a sycophant during their first meeting in Baghdad last
March, according to Pentagon sources familiar with reports of the meeting.
Fallon told Petraeus that he considered him to be "an ass-kissing little
chickenshit" and added, "I hate people like that", the sources say. That
remark reportedly came after Petraeus began the meeting by making remarks
that Fallon interpreted as trying to ingratiate himself with a superior.
That extraordinarily contentious start of Fallon's mission to Baghdad
led to more meetings marked by acute tension between the two commanders.
Fallon went on develop his own alternative to Petraeus's recommendation for
continued high levels of U.S. troops in Iraq during the summer.
The enmity between the two commanders became public knowledge when the
Washington Post reported Sep. 9 on intense conflict within the
administration over Iraq. The story quoted a senior official as saying that
referring to "bad relations" between them is "the understatement of the
century".
Fallon's derision toward Petraeus reflected both the CENTCOM commander's
personal distaste for Petraeus's style of operating and their fundamental
policy differences over Iraq, according to the sources.
The policy context of Fallon's extraordinarily abrasive treatment of his
subordinate was Petraeus's agreement in February to serve as front man for
the George W. Bush administration's effort to sell its policy of increasing
U.S. troop strength in Iraq to Congress.
In a highly unusual political role for an officer who had not yet taken
command of a war, Petraeus was installed in the office of Minority Leader
Mitch McConnell, a Republican from Kentucky, in early February just before
the Senate debated Bush's troop increase. According to a report in The
Washington Post Feb. 7, senators were then approached on the floor and
invited to go McConnell's office to hear Petraeus make the case for the
surge policy.
Fallon was strongly opposed to Petraeus's role as pitch man for the
surge policy in Iraq adopted by Bush in December as putting his own
interests ahead of a sound military posture in the Middle East and Southwest
Asia - the area for which Fallon's CENTCOM is responsible.
The CENTCOM commander believed the United States should be withdrawing
troops from Iraq urgently, largely because he saw greater dangers elsewhere
in the region. "He is very focused on Pakistan," said a source familiar with
Fallon's thinking, "and trying to maintain a difficult status quo with
Iran."
By the time Fallon took command of CENTCOM in March, Pakistan had become
the main safe haven for Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda to plan and carry out its
worldwide operations, as well as being an extremely unstable state with both
nuclear weapons and the world's largest population of Islamic extremists.
Plans for continued high troop levels in Iraq would leave no troops
available for other contingencies in the region.
Fallon was reported by the New York Times to have been determined to
achieve results "as soon as possible". The notion of a long war, in
contrast, seemed to connote an extended conflict in which Iraq was but a
chapter.
Fallon also expressed great scepticism about the basic assumption
underlying the surge strategy, which was that it could pave the way for
political reconciliation in Iraq. In the lead story Sep. 9, The Washington
Post quoted a "senior administration official" as saying that Fallon had
been "saying from Day One, 'This isn't working.' "
One of Fallon's first moves upon taking command of CENTCOM was to order
his subordinates to avoid the term "long war" - a phrase Bush and Secretary
of Defence Robert M. Gates had used to describe the fight against terrorism.
Fallon was signaling his unhappiness with the policy of U.S. occupation
of Iraq for an indeterminate period. Military sources explained that Fallon
was concerned that the concept of a long war would alienate Middle East
publics by suggesting that U.S. troops would remain in the region
indefinitely.
During the summer, according to the Post Sep. 9 report, Fallon began to
develop his own plans for redefine the U.S. mission in Iraq, including a
plan for withdrawal of three-quarters of the U.S. troop strength by the end
of 2009.
The conflict between Fallon and Petraeus over Iraq came to a head in
early September. According to the Post story, Fallon expressed views on Iraq
that were sharply at odds with those of Petraeus in a three-way conversation
with Bush on Iraq the previous weekend. Petraeus argued for keeping as many
troops in Iraq for as long as possible to cement any security progress, but
Fallon argued that a strategic withdrawal from Iraq was necessary to have
sufficient forces to deal with other potential threats in the region.
Fallon's presentation to Bush of the case against Petraeus's
recommendation for keeping troop levels in Iraq at the highest possible
level just before Petraeus was to go public with his recommendations was
another sign that Petraeus's role as chief spokesperson for the surge policy
has created a deep rift between him and the nation's highest military
leaders. Bush presumably would not have chosen to invite an opponent of the
surge policy to make such a presentation without lobbying by the top brass.
Fallon had a "visceral distaste" for what he regarded as Petraeus's
sycophantic behaviour in general, which had deeper institutional roots,
according to a military source familiar with his thinking.
Fallon is a veteran of 35 years in the Navy, operating in an
institutional culture in which an officer is expected to make enemies in the
process of advancement. "If you are Navy captain and don't have two or three
enemies, you're not doing your job," says the source.
Fallon acquired a reputation for a willingness to stand up to powerful
figures during his tenure as commander in chief of the Pacific Command from
February 2005 to March 2007. He pushed hard for a conciliatory line toward
and China, which put him in conflict with senior military and civilian
officials with a vested interest in pointing to China as a future rival and
threat.
He demonstrated his independence from the White House when he refused in
February to go along with a proposal to send a third naval carrier task
force to the Persian Gulf, as reported by IPS in May. Fallon questioned the
military necessity for the move, which would have signaled to Iran a
readiness to go to war. Fallon also privately vowed that there would be no
war against Iran on his watch, implying that he would quit rather than
accept such a policy.
A crucial element of Petraeus's path of advancement in the Army, on the
other hand, was through serving as an aide to senior generals. He was
assistant executive officer to the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Carl Vuono, and
later executive assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Henry
Shelton. His experience taught him that cultivating senior officers is the
key to success.
The contrasting styles of the two men converged with their conflict over
Iraq to produce one of the most intense clashes between U.S. military
leaders in recent history.
---------
By Gareth Porter
Inter Press Service
Wednesday 12 September 2007
Washington - In sharp contrast to the lionisation of Gen. David Petraeus
by members of the U.S. Congress during his testimony this week, Petraeus's
superior, Admiral William Fallon, chief of the Central Command (CENTCOM),
derided Petraeus as a sycophant during their first meeting in Baghdad last
March, according to Pentagon sources familiar with reports of the meeting.
Fallon told Petraeus that he considered him to be "an ass-kissing little
chickenshit" and added, "I hate people like that", the sources say. That
remark reportedly came after Petraeus began the meeting by making remarks
that Fallon interpreted as trying to ingratiate himself with a superior.
That extraordinarily contentious start of Fallon's mission to Baghdad
led to more meetings marked by acute tension between the two commanders.
Fallon went on develop his own alternative to Petraeus's recommendation for
continued high levels of U.S. troops in Iraq during the summer.
The enmity between the two commanders became public knowledge when the
Washington Post reported Sep. 9 on intense conflict within the
administration over Iraq. The story quoted a senior official as saying that
referring to "bad relations" between them is "the understatement of the
century".
Fallon's derision toward Petraeus reflected both the CENTCOM commander's
personal distaste for Petraeus's style of operating and their fundamental
policy differences over Iraq, according to the sources.
The policy context of Fallon's extraordinarily abrasive treatment of his
subordinate was Petraeus's agreement in February to serve as front man for
the George W. Bush administration's effort to sell its policy of increasing
U.S. troop strength in Iraq to Congress.
In a highly unusual political role for an officer who had not yet taken
command of a war, Petraeus was installed in the office of Minority Leader
Mitch McConnell, a Republican from Kentucky, in early February just before
the Senate debated Bush's troop increase. According to a report in The
Washington Post Feb. 7, senators were then approached on the floor and
invited to go McConnell's office to hear Petraeus make the case for the
surge policy.
Fallon was strongly opposed to Petraeus's role as pitch man for the
surge policy in Iraq adopted by Bush in December as putting his own
interests ahead of a sound military posture in the Middle East and Southwest
Asia - the area for which Fallon's CENTCOM is responsible.
The CENTCOM commander believed the United States should be withdrawing
troops from Iraq urgently, largely because he saw greater dangers elsewhere
in the region. "He is very focused on Pakistan," said a source familiar with
Fallon's thinking, "and trying to maintain a difficult status quo with
Iran."
By the time Fallon took command of CENTCOM in March, Pakistan had become
the main safe haven for Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda to plan and carry out its
worldwide operations, as well as being an extremely unstable state with both
nuclear weapons and the world's largest population of Islamic extremists.
Plans for continued high troop levels in Iraq would leave no troops
available for other contingencies in the region.
Fallon was reported by the New York Times to have been determined to
achieve results "as soon as possible". The notion of a long war, in
contrast, seemed to connote an extended conflict in which Iraq was but a
chapter.
Fallon also expressed great scepticism about the basic assumption
underlying the surge strategy, which was that it could pave the way for
political reconciliation in Iraq. In the lead story Sep. 9, The Washington
Post quoted a "senior administration official" as saying that Fallon had
been "saying from Day One, 'This isn't working.' "
One of Fallon's first moves upon taking command of CENTCOM was to order
his subordinates to avoid the term "long war" - a phrase Bush and Secretary
of Defence Robert M. Gates had used to describe the fight against terrorism.
Fallon was signaling his unhappiness with the policy of U.S. occupation
of Iraq for an indeterminate period. Military sources explained that Fallon
was concerned that the concept of a long war would alienate Middle East
publics by suggesting that U.S. troops would remain in the region
indefinitely.
During the summer, according to the Post Sep. 9 report, Fallon began to
develop his own plans for redefine the U.S. mission in Iraq, including a
plan for withdrawal of three-quarters of the U.S. troop strength by the end
of 2009.
The conflict between Fallon and Petraeus over Iraq came to a head in
early September. According to the Post story, Fallon expressed views on Iraq
that were sharply at odds with those of Petraeus in a three-way conversation
with Bush on Iraq the previous weekend. Petraeus argued for keeping as many
troops in Iraq for as long as possible to cement any security progress, but
Fallon argued that a strategic withdrawal from Iraq was necessary to have
sufficient forces to deal with other potential threats in the region.
Fallon's presentation to Bush of the case against Petraeus's
recommendation for keeping troop levels in Iraq at the highest possible
level just before Petraeus was to go public with his recommendations was
another sign that Petraeus's role as chief spokesperson for the surge policy
has created a deep rift between him and the nation's highest military
leaders. Bush presumably would not have chosen to invite an opponent of the
surge policy to make such a presentation without lobbying by the top brass.
Fallon had a "visceral distaste" for what he regarded as Petraeus's
sycophantic behaviour in general, which had deeper institutional roots,
according to a military source familiar with his thinking.
Fallon is a veteran of 35 years in the Navy, operating in an
institutional culture in which an officer is expected to make enemies in the
process of advancement. "If you are Navy captain and don't have two or three
enemies, you're not doing your job," says the source.
Fallon acquired a reputation for a willingness to stand up to powerful
figures during his tenure as commander in chief of the Pacific Command from
February 2005 to March 2007. He pushed hard for a conciliatory line toward
and China, which put him in conflict with senior military and civilian
officials with a vested interest in pointing to China as a future rival and
threat.
He demonstrated his independence from the White House when he refused in
February to go along with a proposal to send a third naval carrier task
force to the Persian Gulf, as reported by IPS in May. Fallon questioned the
military necessity for the move, which would have signaled to Iran a
readiness to go to war. Fallon also privately vowed that there would be no
war against Iran on his watch, implying that he would quit rather than
accept such a policy.
A crucial element of Petraeus's path of advancement in the Army, on the
other hand, was through serving as an aide to senior generals. He was
assistant executive officer to the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Carl Vuono, and
later executive assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Henry
Shelton. His experience taught him that cultivating senior officers is the
key to success.
The contrasting styles of the two men converged with their conflict over
Iraq to produce one of the most intense clashes between U.S. military
leaders in recent history.
---------