Petraeus' boss calls him a "sycophant" and "ass kissing chickenshit"

September 14, 2007

Sounds like a perfect rank-and-file con.

U.S.-IRAQ: Fallon Derided Petraeus, Opposed the Surge

By Gareth Porter

WASHINGTON, Sep 12 (IPS) - In sharp contrast to the lionisation of

Gen. David Petraeus by members of the U.S. Congress during his

testimony this week, Petraeus's superior, Admiral William Fallon,

chief of the Central Command (CENTCOM), derided Petraeus as a

sycophant during their first meeting in Baghdad last March, according

to Pentagon sources familiar with reports of the meeting.

Fallon told Petraeus that he considered him to be "an ass-kissing

little chickenshit" and added, "I hate people like that", the sources

say. That remark reportedly came after Petraeus began the meeting by

making remarks that Fallon interpreted as trying to ingratiate himself

with a superior.

That extraordinarily contentious start of Fallon's mission to Baghdad

led to more meetings marked by acute tension between the two

commanders. Fallon went on develop his own alternative to Petraeus's

recommendation for continued high levels of U.S. troops in Iraq during

the summer.

The enmity between the two commanders became public knowledge when the

Washington Post reported Sep. 9 on intense conflict within the

administration over Iraq. The story quoted a senior official as saying

that referring to "bad relations" between them is "the understatement

of the century".

Fallon's derision toward Petraeus reflected both the CENTCOM

commander's personal distaste for Petraeus's style of operating and

their fundamental policy differences over Iraq, according to the

sources.

The policy context of Fallon's extraordinarily abrasive treatment of

his subordinate was Petraeus's agreement in February to serve as front

man for the George W. Bush administration's effort to sell its policy

of increasing U.S. troop strength in Iraq to Congress.

In a highly unusual political role for an officer who had not yet

taken command of a war, Petraeus was installed in the office of

Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, a Republican from Kentucky, in early

February just before the Senate debated Bush's troop increase.

According to a report in The Washington Post Feb. 7, senators were

then approached on the floor and invited to go McConnell's office to

hear Petraeus make the case for the surge policy.

Fallon was strongly opposed to Petraeus's role as pitch man for the

surge policy in Iraq adopted by Bush in December as putting his own

interests ahead of a sound military posture in the Middle East and

Southwest Asia -- the area for which Fallon's CENTCOM is responsible.

The CENTCOM commander believed the United States should be withdrawing

troops from Iraq urgently, largely because he saw greater dangers

elsewhere in the region. "He is very focused on Pakistan," said a

source familiar with Fallon's thinking, "and trying to maintain a

difficult status quo with Iran."

By the time Fallon took command of CENTCOM in March, Pakistan had

become the main safe haven for Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda to plan and

carry out its worldwide operations, as well as being an extremely

unstable state with both nuclear weapons and the world's largest

population of Islamic extremists.

Plans for continued high troop levels in Iraq would leave no troops

available for other contingencies in the region.

Fallon was reported by the New York Times to have been determined to

achieve results "as soon as possible". The notion of a long war, in

contrast, seemed to connote an extended conflict in which Iraq was but

a chapter.

Fallon also expressed great scepticism about the basic assumption

underlying the surge strategy, which was that it could pave the way

for political reconciliation in Iraq. In the lead story Sep. 9, The

Washington Post quoted a "senior administration official" as saying

that Fallon had been "saying from Day One, 'This isn't working.' "

One of Fallon's first moves upon taking command of CENTCOM was to

order his subordinates to avoid the term "long war" -- a phrase Bush

and Secretary of Defence Robert M. Gates had used to describe the

fight against terrorism.

Fallon was signaling his unhappiness with the policy of U.S.

occupation of Iraq for an indeterminate period. Military sources

explained that Fallon was concerned that the concept of a long war

would alienate Middle East publics by suggesting that U.S. troops

would remain in the region indefinitely.

During the summer, according to the Post Sep. 9 report, Fallon began

to develop his own plans for redefine the U.S. mission in Iraq,

including a plan for withdrawal of three-quarters of the U.S. troop

strength by the end of 2009.

The conflict between Fallon and Petraeus over Iraq came to a head in

early September. According to the Post story, Fallon expressed views

on Iraq that were sharply at odds with those of Petraeus in a three-

way conversation with Bush on Iraq the previous weekend. Petraeus

argued for keeping as many troops in Iraq for as long as possible to

cement any security progress, but Fallon argued that a strategic

withdrawal from Iraq was necessary to have sufficient forces to deal

with other potential threats in the region.

Fallon's presentation to Bush of the case against Petraeus's

recommendation for keeping troop levels in Iraq at the highest

possible level just before Petraeus was to go public with his

recommendations was another sign that Petraeus's role as chief

spokesperson for the surge policy has created a deep rift between him

and the nation's highest military leaders. Bush presumably would not

have chosen to invite an opponent of the surge policy to make such a

presentation without lobbying by the top brass.

Fallon had a "visceral distaste" for what he regarded as Petraeus's

sycophantic behaviour in general, which had deeper institutional

roots, according to a military source familiar with his thinking.

Fallon is a veteran of 35 years in the Navy, operating in an

institutional culture in which an officer is expected to make enemies

in the process of advancement. "If you are Navy captain and don't have

two or three enemies, you're not doing your job," says the source.

Fallon acquired a reputation for a willingness to stand up to powerful

figures during his tenure as commander in chief of the Pacific Command

from February 2005 to March 2007. He pushed hard for a conciliatory

line toward and China, which put him in conflict with senior military

and civilian officials with a vested interest in pointing to China as

a future rival and threat.

He demonstrated his independence from the White House when he refused

in February to go along with a proposal to send a third naval carrier

task force to the Persian Gulf, as reported by IPS in May. Fallon

questioned the military necessity for the move, which would have

signaled to Iran a readiness to go to war. Fallon also privately vowed

that there would be no war against Iran on his watch, implying that he

would quit rather than accept such a policy.

A crucial element of Petraeus's path of advancement in the Army, on

the other hand, was through serving as an aide to senior generals. He

was assistant executive officer to the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Carl

Vuono, and later executive assistant to the chairman of the Joint

Chiefs, Gen. Henry Shelton. His experience taught him that cultivating

senior officers is the key to success.

The contrasting styles of the two men converged with their conflict

over Iraq to produce one of the most intense clashes between U.S.

military leaders in recent history.

Gareth Porter is an historian and national security policy analyst.

His latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road

to War in Vietnam", was published in June 2005.

September 14, 2007