F
FACE
Guest
Stratfor Terrorism Intelligence Report:
The Heathrow Plot Trial: Retrospection and Implications
April 9, 2008
By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart
The trial of eight men accused of participating in a 2006 plot to bomb a
series of airline flights began April 3 in London. The men are charged
with conspiracy to commit murder and preparing acts of terrorism in
connection with the plot, which allegedly called for using liquid
explosives to bring down at least seven planes flying from London’s
Heathrow Airport to cities in the United States and Canada.
The trial is expected to last several months, but several interesting
facts already have emerged regarding the plot and the people accused of
participating in it. Although a considerable amount of media attention
has been focused on the revelation that two Air Canada flights (one to
Montreal and one to Toronto) were among the first seven flights targeted
-- the others were United Airlines flights to Washington, Chicago and
San Francisco, and American Airlines flights to Chicago and New York --
perhaps the most interesting revelation has been the alleged role of
Mohammed Gulzar.
Gulzar reportedly flew into the United Kingdom in July 2006 using a
fraudulent identity. His means of travel and his role in the conspiracy
suggest he was an operational commander who had been sent from abroad to
assist the grassroots plotters with their attack plans. The involvement
of an operational commander sent by the al Qaeda core leadership and
charged with working with grassroots operatives to orchestrate an attack
is what we consider the al Qaeda 1.0 operational model.
When combined with other indicators, Gulzar’s role and travel pattern
seem to confirm the involvement of the al Qaeda core leadership in the
plot. The participation of the core organization sheds new light on the
behavior of the core al Qaeda leaders in 2006, and gives us some insight
into plots they might still be planning.
Recurrent Themes
As we noted after the Heathrow plot came to light, the scheme shared
several themes with other thwarted or successful al Qaeda plots,
including the choice of aircraft as targets, the notion of multiple,
simultaneous strikes and the use of modular improvised explosive
devices, which would have been smuggled aboard the aircraft in carry-on
luggage. Moreover, whoever was involved in planning the operation shared
al Qaeda’s penchant for "thinking big."
As originally conceived, al Qaeda’s 2001 "planes operation" was to
involve the simultaneous hijackings of 10 aircraft departing from both
the East and West Coasts of the United States. Nine of the aircraft were
to be either blown up in-flight or slammed into targeted buildings. The
10th plane was to be landed at a U.S. airport and, after all the adult
male passengers were killed, a speech was to be delivered outlining al
Qaeda’s grievances with the United States. Al Qaeda’s apex leaders --
Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mohammed Atef -- eventually
agreed to a scaled-down version of the planes operation involving four
aircraft, which was carried out Sept. 11, 2001.
The West Coast portion of the plan was spun off as a separate operation
that was to have occurred in October 2001, but which reportedly was
postponed several times for various reasons. This operation, also known
as the Library Tower Plot, was compromised and disrupted in 2002.
These themes also were evidenced in the plot to bomb American Airlines
Flight 63 in December 2001. In that plan, Richard Reid successfully
smuggled his "shoe bomb" aboard the aircraft. The attempt failed only
because Reid tried to light the bomb’s fuse in the passenger cabin
(rather than a more secluded area, such as a restroom) and was stopped
by a flight attendant and passengers.
The 2006 Heathrow plot, however, bears the strongest resemblance to
Operation Bojinka, which Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, along with his nephew
Abdel Basit, helped to plan and finance while living in Manila, the
Philippines, in the mid-1990s. The tactical similarities include the
targeting of multiple U.S.-flagged aircraft traveling to the United
States, the use of modular explosive devices -- which were to be
assembled in-flight after operatives accessed their carry-on baggage --
and the use of liquid explosives.
The scope of the Heathrow plot also highlights another theme common in
al Qaeda plots: a tendency to think big. This theme, which was reflected
in the original planes operation and in Bojinka, was also the undoing of
al Qaeda attacks such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the
Millennium Bomb Plot and an attempted strike against the USS The
Sullivans off the coast of Yemen in January 2000. Indeed, the scope of
the Heathrow plot and the need to include many people in its execution
is likely what opened the door for a British government informant to
penetrate the group and learn of the plans.
Mohammed Gulzar
A close look at the details emerging from the trial of Gulzar and the
seven other suspects also reveals other recurring themes, including the
use of document fraud. Gulzar entered the United Kingdom on July 18,
2006, using a fraudulent South African passport in the name of Altaf
Ravat. He reportedly was traveling with his new wife and, in order to
secure a visa, alleged that he was on his honeymoon. The pair even spent
a couple of days in Mauritius after leaving South Africa in order to
make the honeymoon cover appear more convincing. As a British citizen,
Gulzar had the right to a British passport and thus could have traveled
to the United Kingdom using his own identity. The only reason to commit
document fraud was to conceal his identity.
As seen in past cases involving operational commanders such as Basit and
Ahmed Ressam, it is fairly common for operational commanders to commit
passport fraud. In fact, recovered al Qaeda operation manuals encourage
using fraudulent documents to hide one’s identity, enter a country
illegally or continue to stay in a country after a legitimate visa has
expired. Basit had more than a dozen aliases that we know of, including
the well-known fraudulent Iraqi passport in the name of Ramzi Yousef --
the name by which many people still mistakenly refer to him. Gulzar’s
use of South Africa as a source of fraudulent documents and a transit
point to Europe also exemplifies a trend we have been watching for some
time now.
When British police arrested Gulzar on Aug. 9, 2006, he told them his
name was Altaf Ravat and produced his South African documents. It was
only after running fingerprint checks that they determined -- two days
after his arrest -- that he really was a British citizen named Mohammed
Gulzar. When questioned by police, Gulzar admitted he was not on his
honeymoon, though he then said he was a missionary with the Tablighi
Jamaat and was in the United Kingdom on a proselytizing mission.
As seen in past attacks -- the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the
attack on the USS Cole, the East Africa embassy bombings and others that
followed the al Qaeda 1.0 operational model -- the operational planner
does not intend to be killed or captured. He flees and lives to fight
another day. In operations in which an operative plans to be killed,
such as 9/11 and the July 7, 2005 London attacks, there is no need for
him to hide his true identity. Gulzar’s use of a fraudulent identity
suggests he intended to flee after the attack. This theory is supported
by the fact that British authorities recovered a number of videotapes
containing the wills and suicide declarations of various members of the
alleged cell, but they did not recover such a video featuring Gulzar.
Fitting the Pieces Together
Hindsight is a wonderful thing and when we use it to plug the 2006
Heathrow plot into the big picture of al Qaeda behavior during that
time, we can begin to make some assumptions as to the extent of the core
leadership’s involvement.
According to court testimony, the British government began to monitor
many of the men allegedly involved in the plot shortly after the July 7,
2005 London attacks. It also has been reported that, like Mohammed
Siddique Khan, several of the men involved in the 2006 plot had traveled
to Pakistan and received training at jihadist camps. It also appears
that Gulzar was sent by the core al Qaeda leadership to London in July
2006 to supervise the execution of this plot. Judging from past cases,
Gulzar’s preparation for the travel to London likely began several
months prior to his actual arrival in the United Kingdom. Also judging
from past cases, a plan of this magnitude, involving so many aircraft,
almost certainly would have to have been approved by the al Qaeda apex
leadership. The leadership probably also provided the funding for the
operation, including the more than $271,000 in cash the gr oup
reportedly paid for the flat they purchased in London, where the
improvised explosive mixtures were to be manufactured.
If those assumptions are indeed true, then this plot may very well be
one of the operations Osama bin Laden was referencing in his Jan. 19,
2006, message when he said, "The delay in similar operations happening
in America has not been because of failure to break through your
security measures. The operations are under preparation and you will see
them in your homes the minute they are through (with preparations), with
God’s permission."
The preparations for this attack also had picked up momentum by mid-2006
when the al Qaeda core leadership was undertaking what we referred to at
the time as a media blitz. Indeed, just as the traffic from this blitz
was beginning to slow down, As-Sahab released a video titled, "Will of
the Knights of the London Raid (Part 2)," which contained the last will
of London bomber Shehzad Tanweer. This video was released one day before
the anniversary of the July 7 attacks and 12 days before Gulzar arrived
in the United Kingdom.
Nine days after Gulzar’s arrival, and two weeks before the arrests were
made, As-Sahab released a video featuring al-Zawahiri. The backdrop
featured three large photographs: one of Mohammed Atef (al Qaeda’s
senior military chief who was killed in Afghanistan in late 2001), one
of 9/11 operational commander Mohammed Atta and one of the burning World
Trade Center towers.
In the video, al-Zawahiri discussed a lecture Atef gave in 2000 to al
Qaeda trainees about Palestine. According to his recounting, Atta -- who
was among the trainees -- asked, "What is the way to defeat the attack
on Palestine?" Al-Zawahiri supplied his own answer in the video, saying
the nation that produced the 19 "who shook America" is "capable of
producing double that number."
It could be a coincidence that a large plot involving aircraft -- nearly
twice as many as were hijacked on 9/11 -- was thwarted only two weeks
after this video surfaced. But we are not big believers in coincidence
-- nor do we believe there are obvious (or even hidden) messages in
every al Qaeda message. However, to our minds the July 27 tape was a
clear message meant to be viewed in retrospect -- that al Qaeda was
behind the Heathrow airline plot.
The Continuing Fixation
More than anything, the current trial is a reminder of three things.
First, had the first wave of attacks successfully taken down the planes,
it would have been very difficult to determine how the explosive devices
had been smuggled aboard the aircraft. This means it is entirely
possible the same tactic would have been used in subsequent waves of
attacks.
Second, for some reason in 2006 the al Qaeda leadership’s eagerness for
a spectacular attack appears to have trumped their perceived need for
moderation. It was the moderation of people like Mohammed Atef that
reined in the enthusiasm of the group’s idealists (men such as Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed) and caused them to scale down the 2001 planes operation
to less than half its original size -- a measure that improved
operational security and assisted in the 9/11 plot’s eventual success.
Finally, al Qaeda remains fixated on aircraft as targets and, in spite
of changes in security procedures since 9/11, aircraft remain vulnerable
to attack.
~~~~
FACE
The Heathrow Plot Trial: Retrospection and Implications
April 9, 2008
By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart
The trial of eight men accused of participating in a 2006 plot to bomb a
series of airline flights began April 3 in London. The men are charged
with conspiracy to commit murder and preparing acts of terrorism in
connection with the plot, which allegedly called for using liquid
explosives to bring down at least seven planes flying from London’s
Heathrow Airport to cities in the United States and Canada.
The trial is expected to last several months, but several interesting
facts already have emerged regarding the plot and the people accused of
participating in it. Although a considerable amount of media attention
has been focused on the revelation that two Air Canada flights (one to
Montreal and one to Toronto) were among the first seven flights targeted
-- the others were United Airlines flights to Washington, Chicago and
San Francisco, and American Airlines flights to Chicago and New York --
perhaps the most interesting revelation has been the alleged role of
Mohammed Gulzar.
Gulzar reportedly flew into the United Kingdom in July 2006 using a
fraudulent identity. His means of travel and his role in the conspiracy
suggest he was an operational commander who had been sent from abroad to
assist the grassroots plotters with their attack plans. The involvement
of an operational commander sent by the al Qaeda core leadership and
charged with working with grassroots operatives to orchestrate an attack
is what we consider the al Qaeda 1.0 operational model.
When combined with other indicators, Gulzar’s role and travel pattern
seem to confirm the involvement of the al Qaeda core leadership in the
plot. The participation of the core organization sheds new light on the
behavior of the core al Qaeda leaders in 2006, and gives us some insight
into plots they might still be planning.
Recurrent Themes
As we noted after the Heathrow plot came to light, the scheme shared
several themes with other thwarted or successful al Qaeda plots,
including the choice of aircraft as targets, the notion of multiple,
simultaneous strikes and the use of modular improvised explosive
devices, which would have been smuggled aboard the aircraft in carry-on
luggage. Moreover, whoever was involved in planning the operation shared
al Qaeda’s penchant for "thinking big."
As originally conceived, al Qaeda’s 2001 "planes operation" was to
involve the simultaneous hijackings of 10 aircraft departing from both
the East and West Coasts of the United States. Nine of the aircraft were
to be either blown up in-flight or slammed into targeted buildings. The
10th plane was to be landed at a U.S. airport and, after all the adult
male passengers were killed, a speech was to be delivered outlining al
Qaeda’s grievances with the United States. Al Qaeda’s apex leaders --
Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mohammed Atef -- eventually
agreed to a scaled-down version of the planes operation involving four
aircraft, which was carried out Sept. 11, 2001.
The West Coast portion of the plan was spun off as a separate operation
that was to have occurred in October 2001, but which reportedly was
postponed several times for various reasons. This operation, also known
as the Library Tower Plot, was compromised and disrupted in 2002.
These themes also were evidenced in the plot to bomb American Airlines
Flight 63 in December 2001. In that plan, Richard Reid successfully
smuggled his "shoe bomb" aboard the aircraft. The attempt failed only
because Reid tried to light the bomb’s fuse in the passenger cabin
(rather than a more secluded area, such as a restroom) and was stopped
by a flight attendant and passengers.
The 2006 Heathrow plot, however, bears the strongest resemblance to
Operation Bojinka, which Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, along with his nephew
Abdel Basit, helped to plan and finance while living in Manila, the
Philippines, in the mid-1990s. The tactical similarities include the
targeting of multiple U.S.-flagged aircraft traveling to the United
States, the use of modular explosive devices -- which were to be
assembled in-flight after operatives accessed their carry-on baggage --
and the use of liquid explosives.
The scope of the Heathrow plot also highlights another theme common in
al Qaeda plots: a tendency to think big. This theme, which was reflected
in the original planes operation and in Bojinka, was also the undoing of
al Qaeda attacks such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the
Millennium Bomb Plot and an attempted strike against the USS The
Sullivans off the coast of Yemen in January 2000. Indeed, the scope of
the Heathrow plot and the need to include many people in its execution
is likely what opened the door for a British government informant to
penetrate the group and learn of the plans.
Mohammed Gulzar
A close look at the details emerging from the trial of Gulzar and the
seven other suspects also reveals other recurring themes, including the
use of document fraud. Gulzar entered the United Kingdom on July 18,
2006, using a fraudulent South African passport in the name of Altaf
Ravat. He reportedly was traveling with his new wife and, in order to
secure a visa, alleged that he was on his honeymoon. The pair even spent
a couple of days in Mauritius after leaving South Africa in order to
make the honeymoon cover appear more convincing. As a British citizen,
Gulzar had the right to a British passport and thus could have traveled
to the United Kingdom using his own identity. The only reason to commit
document fraud was to conceal his identity.
As seen in past cases involving operational commanders such as Basit and
Ahmed Ressam, it is fairly common for operational commanders to commit
passport fraud. In fact, recovered al Qaeda operation manuals encourage
using fraudulent documents to hide one’s identity, enter a country
illegally or continue to stay in a country after a legitimate visa has
expired. Basit had more than a dozen aliases that we know of, including
the well-known fraudulent Iraqi passport in the name of Ramzi Yousef --
the name by which many people still mistakenly refer to him. Gulzar’s
use of South Africa as a source of fraudulent documents and a transit
point to Europe also exemplifies a trend we have been watching for some
time now.
When British police arrested Gulzar on Aug. 9, 2006, he told them his
name was Altaf Ravat and produced his South African documents. It was
only after running fingerprint checks that they determined -- two days
after his arrest -- that he really was a British citizen named Mohammed
Gulzar. When questioned by police, Gulzar admitted he was not on his
honeymoon, though he then said he was a missionary with the Tablighi
Jamaat and was in the United Kingdom on a proselytizing mission.
As seen in past attacks -- the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the
attack on the USS Cole, the East Africa embassy bombings and others that
followed the al Qaeda 1.0 operational model -- the operational planner
does not intend to be killed or captured. He flees and lives to fight
another day. In operations in which an operative plans to be killed,
such as 9/11 and the July 7, 2005 London attacks, there is no need for
him to hide his true identity. Gulzar’s use of a fraudulent identity
suggests he intended to flee after the attack. This theory is supported
by the fact that British authorities recovered a number of videotapes
containing the wills and suicide declarations of various members of the
alleged cell, but they did not recover such a video featuring Gulzar.
Fitting the Pieces Together
Hindsight is a wonderful thing and when we use it to plug the 2006
Heathrow plot into the big picture of al Qaeda behavior during that
time, we can begin to make some assumptions as to the extent of the core
leadership’s involvement.
According to court testimony, the British government began to monitor
many of the men allegedly involved in the plot shortly after the July 7,
2005 London attacks. It also has been reported that, like Mohammed
Siddique Khan, several of the men involved in the 2006 plot had traveled
to Pakistan and received training at jihadist camps. It also appears
that Gulzar was sent by the core al Qaeda leadership to London in July
2006 to supervise the execution of this plot. Judging from past cases,
Gulzar’s preparation for the travel to London likely began several
months prior to his actual arrival in the United Kingdom. Also judging
from past cases, a plan of this magnitude, involving so many aircraft,
almost certainly would have to have been approved by the al Qaeda apex
leadership. The leadership probably also provided the funding for the
operation, including the more than $271,000 in cash the gr oup
reportedly paid for the flat they purchased in London, where the
improvised explosive mixtures were to be manufactured.
If those assumptions are indeed true, then this plot may very well be
one of the operations Osama bin Laden was referencing in his Jan. 19,
2006, message when he said, "The delay in similar operations happening
in America has not been because of failure to break through your
security measures. The operations are under preparation and you will see
them in your homes the minute they are through (with preparations), with
God’s permission."
The preparations for this attack also had picked up momentum by mid-2006
when the al Qaeda core leadership was undertaking what we referred to at
the time as a media blitz. Indeed, just as the traffic from this blitz
was beginning to slow down, As-Sahab released a video titled, "Will of
the Knights of the London Raid (Part 2)," which contained the last will
of London bomber Shehzad Tanweer. This video was released one day before
the anniversary of the July 7 attacks and 12 days before Gulzar arrived
in the United Kingdom.
Nine days after Gulzar’s arrival, and two weeks before the arrests were
made, As-Sahab released a video featuring al-Zawahiri. The backdrop
featured three large photographs: one of Mohammed Atef (al Qaeda’s
senior military chief who was killed in Afghanistan in late 2001), one
of 9/11 operational commander Mohammed Atta and one of the burning World
Trade Center towers.
In the video, al-Zawahiri discussed a lecture Atef gave in 2000 to al
Qaeda trainees about Palestine. According to his recounting, Atta -- who
was among the trainees -- asked, "What is the way to defeat the attack
on Palestine?" Al-Zawahiri supplied his own answer in the video, saying
the nation that produced the 19 "who shook America" is "capable of
producing double that number."
It could be a coincidence that a large plot involving aircraft -- nearly
twice as many as were hijacked on 9/11 -- was thwarted only two weeks
after this video surfaced. But we are not big believers in coincidence
-- nor do we believe there are obvious (or even hidden) messages in
every al Qaeda message. However, to our minds the July 27 tape was a
clear message meant to be viewed in retrospect -- that al Qaeda was
behind the Heathrow airline plot.
The Continuing Fixation
More than anything, the current trial is a reminder of three things.
First, had the first wave of attacks successfully taken down the planes,
it would have been very difficult to determine how the explosive devices
had been smuggled aboard the aircraft. This means it is entirely
possible the same tactic would have been used in subsequent waves of
attacks.
Second, for some reason in 2006 the al Qaeda leadership’s eagerness for
a spectacular attack appears to have trumped their perceived need for
moderation. It was the moderation of people like Mohammed Atef that
reined in the enthusiasm of the group’s idealists (men such as Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed) and caused them to scale down the 2001 planes operation
to less than half its original size -- a measure that improved
operational security and assisted in the 9/11 plot’s eventual success.
Finally, al Qaeda remains fixated on aircraft as targets and, in spite
of changes in security procedures since 9/11, aircraft remain vulnerable
to attack.
~~~~
FACE
