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Venez: Bolivarian Revolution at a Turning Point
Via NY Transfer News Collective All the News that Doesn't Fit
Venezuelanalysis - Jan 7, 2007
http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3042
[Editor's note: A nearly identical version of this article appeared in
the January, 2008 edition of Le Monde Diplomatique at
http://mondediplo.com/2008/01/ ]
Venezuelas Bolivarian Revolution at a Turning Point
by Gregory Wilpert
With the surprising loss of the constitutional reform referendum in
December (by a minimal vote difference of 1.3%) Venezuela's Bolivarian
revolution reached a turning point. The April 2002 coup attempt, the
December 2002 shutdown of the oil industry and the August 2004
recallreferendum represented major defeats for the opposition and a
radicalisation ofthe Bolivarian process. But the failed reform was
quite different: it was the first defeat for the Bolivarian movement,
after 12 national electoral contests,since Hugo Ch!vez was elected in
1998,1]and the first time that he and his movement had been forced to
examine whichway the process must go if it is to advance.
Shortly after his re-election in December 2006, Ch!vez had argued that
Venezuela's new constitution needed to be reformed for transition
towards "21st century socialism". But when he presented his proposal to
reform 33 articles of the constitution in August, after delays and
closed-door discussions among top advisers, it provoked confusion and
skepticism in all butthe most pro-Ch!vez sectors of society. The
skepticism intensified when the National Assembly (which may modify,
and must approve the president's constitutional reform proposal) added
another 36 articles.
The 69 (out of 350) articles that were to be changed fell into four
categories: strengthening participatory democracy, broadening social
inclusion, supporting non-neoliberal economic development, and
strengthening the central government.2]The first two were relatively
uncontroversial; they included giving the newly formed communal
councils more power and more secure funding, lowering thevoting age
from 18 to 16, prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation
and health, requiring gender parity in the nomination of candidates for
public office, introducing a social security fund for the self-employed
and those in the informal labor market, guaranteeing free university
education and recognizing Venezuelans of African descent.
But the reforms that affected the economy and the president's powers
proved far more controversial because of what they contained- and what
the opposition claimed they contained. Among economic reforms were the
removal of central bank autonomy, prohibition of the privatization of
the oil industry, strengthening of land reform, reduction of the
working week from 44 to 36 hours, and the introduction of social and
collective property rights. The reform proposed to eliminate the
two-term limit that a president may serve, lengthen the presidential
term from six to seven years, allow the president to create special
zones for economic development, give the president the power to
reorganize municipal boundaries, make citizen-initiated referenda more
difficult by increasing signature requirements, allow the president to
promote all military officers, and toughen state of emergency
provisions by removing the right to information.
What Went Wrong
Since the December 3rd defeat, Ch!vez and his supporters have tried to
figure out what went wrong. For the opposition, the reason its side won
was simple: Venezuelans rejected the president's attempt tocreate 21st
century socialism, which it sees as Castro-communism. However, for
Ch!vez supporters, who have always denied that their project is Cuban
state socialism, the answer is not that simple - Cuban state socialism
was not on the ballot.
Also, it wasn't so much that those who had voted for Ch!vez in 2006 had
now voted against him one year later. Rather, the opposition was
effective in turning out its supporters to vote against the reform,
while Ch!vez supporters abstained to a far higher degree than
opposition supporters did.3]
There appear to be four main reasons why the reform initiative failed:
the way the campaign was conducted, the defection of long-time
supporters, the mood in the country and the process through which the
reform was developed. At first this process took place entirely within
a closed circle of Ch!vez advisors. Then, when the National Assembly
debated the proposal, legislators held public meetings to get outside
input, but the process was rushed, covering 69 articles in two and a
half months, so the discussion was superficial.
The pro-reform campaign, launched on November 2nd, a month before the
referendum, did not have much time to educate the public as to what the
reform was about: there were too many articles to discuss and the
opposition waged a merciless campaign. It claimed that the reform would
weaken the right to private property and suggested that all private
property could be indiscriminately expropriated by the state. In
reality, ordinary private property was not affected. The reform would
have only strengthened the state's mandate to expropriate food
producers in the case of food emergencies or to redistribute
latifundios for land reform.
The opposition also focused on the proposal that the president could
appoint regional vice-presidents, claiming this would allow him to rule
directly anywhere, bypassing elected officials. This too had nothing
todo with the actual proposal, which did not assign these
vice-presidents any newpowers. Opposition literature and spokesmen made
even more outrageous claims: the state would take children away from
parents and socialism would become the only political creed. These were
scare tactics, and effective. Even if people did not believe them all,
they were sufficiently intimidated to stay away fromthe polls.
With the reform's early 60% lead in the polls shrinking dramatically,
Ch!vez began to refocus the campaign and actively tried to turn the
reform into a referendum on his presidency, saying `A yes vote is a
votefor me.' The reform was too complex to explain in detail and it
made sense for Ch!vez to use his personal popularity for the campaign.
But Ch!vez misread the popular mood, and former allies, such as the
former defense minister, Raul Baduel, Ch!vez's ex-wife Marisabel
Rodriguez, and the social democratic party Podemos all turned against
thereform.
The mood further soured because the government's public administration
had become inefficient and many of the president's supporters wanted to
send him a message. As the human rights group Provea reports, the
social programs, the missions for community health care, literacy
training, high school completion, public housing, subsidized food, land
reform, and employment through the creation of cooperatives, have all
been deteriorating in the past year.4] While pro-Ch!vez poor
Venezuelans appreciate the increase in social programs and spending
over the past four years,5]they are disappointed and frustrated at the
inefficiency with which these programs are managed.6]It did not help
that there was a severe milk shortage in October and November, which
made it almost impossible to find fresh milk, and hard to find powdered
milk.
The assumption is that, but for these reasons, all Ch!vez supporters
would have voted for the reform. Among hard-core Ch!vez supporters
there is a firm belief that the reform process would have helped
address the main issue: creating a society with greater social justice.
Whether the reform was necessary for this is not clear since a large
part of the reform could have been implemented through ordinary
legislation.
Many Ch!vez supporters fell for the opposition's distortions of the
reform; and many who did not, disagreed with Ch!vez's argument that his
powers needed to be strengthened to better defend the revolutionary
process and promote the transition towards socialism.
Consequences of the Defeat
Ch!vez and his supporters are convinced that the failure isa major
setback. But there are voices that argue that this is an opportunity in
disguise. If the reform had won, especially by a narrow margin, the
opposition would not have accepted the result and would have tried to
destabilize the country with violent protests and claims of fraud. Even
now, many in the opposition are trying to claim that their win was far
larger than the officialresult. A serious destabilization campaign
would probably have hindered the Ch!vez government from implementing
the policies in the reform. Also, the failure has provoked the most
profound analysis and self-criticism of the Bolivarian movement. For a
long time criticism within the Bolivarian movement was out of the
president's view, since the movement is centered on him. Questioning
his policies risked the unity of the movement, which needed to be
unified to survive given the opposition's efforts to overthrow Ch!vez
(with financial support from the United States). If Ch!vez's
examination is serious, it will find flaws in the top-down and rushed
process, in the president-centered aspects of the proposals and in the
inefficiency of government programs. Only then could he renew his
efforts to bring about 21st century socialism in Venezuela.
End Ntes:
[1] These 12 national electoral contests include: (1) Chavez's election
in December 1998; (2) referendum for a constitutional assembly in April
1999; (3) elections to constitutional assembly in July 1999; (4)
approval of constitutional assembly in December 1999; (5) "mega
election" of all except local elected representatives, including the
president, in July 2000; (6) national referendum on unions and local
elections in December 2000; (7) presidential recallreferendum in August
2004; (8) regional elections in October 2004; (9) local elections in
August 2005; (10) National Assembly elections in December 2005; (11)
Presidential election in December 2006; (12) constitutional reform
referendum in December 2007.
[2] For a detailed analysis of the reform proposal, see: "Making Sense
of Venezuela's Constitutional Reform," Venezuelanalysis.com, December
1st, 2007, by Gregory Wilpert
(http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2943)
[3] For example, in the mostly poor pro-Chavez neighborhood of 23 de
enero (which voted 75.6% for Chavez in 2006) voter turnout declined by
23% between the presidential election and the constitutional reform
referendum, while in the mostly middle class Caracas neighborhood of El
Recreo (which voted 70.3% for Rosales in 2006) voter turnout declined
by only 14%. (Source: CNE, www.cne.gov.ve)
[4] http://www.derechos.org.ve/publicaciones/infanual/2006_07/index.html
[5] Socialspending increased from 8.2% of GDP in 1998 to 13.2% of GDP
in 2005 (Source: Venezuelan Ministry of Planning and Development,
http://www.sisov.mpd.gov.ve/home/index.php)
[6] A compilation of typical complaints can be found in: "The wind goes
out of the revolution," The Economist, December 6,2007
=================================================================
NY Transfer News Collective A Service of Blythe Systems
Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us
Our main website: http://www.blythe.org
List Archives: http://blythe-systems.com/pipermail/nytr/
Subscribe: http://blythe-systems.com/mailman/listinfo/nytr
=================================================================
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Hash: SHA1
Venez: Bolivarian Revolution at a Turning Point
Via NY Transfer News Collective All the News that Doesn't Fit
Venezuelanalysis - Jan 7, 2007
http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3042
[Editor's note: A nearly identical version of this article appeared in
the January, 2008 edition of Le Monde Diplomatique at
http://mondediplo.com/2008/01/ ]
Venezuelas Bolivarian Revolution at a Turning Point
by Gregory Wilpert
With the surprising loss of the constitutional reform referendum in
December (by a minimal vote difference of 1.3%) Venezuela's Bolivarian
revolution reached a turning point. The April 2002 coup attempt, the
December 2002 shutdown of the oil industry and the August 2004
recallreferendum represented major defeats for the opposition and a
radicalisation ofthe Bolivarian process. But the failed reform was
quite different: it was the first defeat for the Bolivarian movement,
after 12 national electoral contests,since Hugo Ch!vez was elected in
1998,1]and the first time that he and his movement had been forced to
examine whichway the process must go if it is to advance.
Shortly after his re-election in December 2006, Ch!vez had argued that
Venezuela's new constitution needed to be reformed for transition
towards "21st century socialism". But when he presented his proposal to
reform 33 articles of the constitution in August, after delays and
closed-door discussions among top advisers, it provoked confusion and
skepticism in all butthe most pro-Ch!vez sectors of society. The
skepticism intensified when the National Assembly (which may modify,
and must approve the president's constitutional reform proposal) added
another 36 articles.
The 69 (out of 350) articles that were to be changed fell into four
categories: strengthening participatory democracy, broadening social
inclusion, supporting non-neoliberal economic development, and
strengthening the central government.2]The first two were relatively
uncontroversial; they included giving the newly formed communal
councils more power and more secure funding, lowering thevoting age
from 18 to 16, prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation
and health, requiring gender parity in the nomination of candidates for
public office, introducing a social security fund for the self-employed
and those in the informal labor market, guaranteeing free university
education and recognizing Venezuelans of African descent.
But the reforms that affected the economy and the president's powers
proved far more controversial because of what they contained- and what
the opposition claimed they contained. Among economic reforms were the
removal of central bank autonomy, prohibition of the privatization of
the oil industry, strengthening of land reform, reduction of the
working week from 44 to 36 hours, and the introduction of social and
collective property rights. The reform proposed to eliminate the
two-term limit that a president may serve, lengthen the presidential
term from six to seven years, allow the president to create special
zones for economic development, give the president the power to
reorganize municipal boundaries, make citizen-initiated referenda more
difficult by increasing signature requirements, allow the president to
promote all military officers, and toughen state of emergency
provisions by removing the right to information.
What Went Wrong
Since the December 3rd defeat, Ch!vez and his supporters have tried to
figure out what went wrong. For the opposition, the reason its side won
was simple: Venezuelans rejected the president's attempt tocreate 21st
century socialism, which it sees as Castro-communism. However, for
Ch!vez supporters, who have always denied that their project is Cuban
state socialism, the answer is not that simple - Cuban state socialism
was not on the ballot.
Also, it wasn't so much that those who had voted for Ch!vez in 2006 had
now voted against him one year later. Rather, the opposition was
effective in turning out its supporters to vote against the reform,
while Ch!vez supporters abstained to a far higher degree than
opposition supporters did.3]
There appear to be four main reasons why the reform initiative failed:
the way the campaign was conducted, the defection of long-time
supporters, the mood in the country and the process through which the
reform was developed. At first this process took place entirely within
a closed circle of Ch!vez advisors. Then, when the National Assembly
debated the proposal, legislators held public meetings to get outside
input, but the process was rushed, covering 69 articles in two and a
half months, so the discussion was superficial.
The pro-reform campaign, launched on November 2nd, a month before the
referendum, did not have much time to educate the public as to what the
reform was about: there were too many articles to discuss and the
opposition waged a merciless campaign. It claimed that the reform would
weaken the right to private property and suggested that all private
property could be indiscriminately expropriated by the state. In
reality, ordinary private property was not affected. The reform would
have only strengthened the state's mandate to expropriate food
producers in the case of food emergencies or to redistribute
latifundios for land reform.
The opposition also focused on the proposal that the president could
appoint regional vice-presidents, claiming this would allow him to rule
directly anywhere, bypassing elected officials. This too had nothing
todo with the actual proposal, which did not assign these
vice-presidents any newpowers. Opposition literature and spokesmen made
even more outrageous claims: the state would take children away from
parents and socialism would become the only political creed. These were
scare tactics, and effective. Even if people did not believe them all,
they were sufficiently intimidated to stay away fromthe polls.
With the reform's early 60% lead in the polls shrinking dramatically,
Ch!vez began to refocus the campaign and actively tried to turn the
reform into a referendum on his presidency, saying `A yes vote is a
votefor me.' The reform was too complex to explain in detail and it
made sense for Ch!vez to use his personal popularity for the campaign.
But Ch!vez misread the popular mood, and former allies, such as the
former defense minister, Raul Baduel, Ch!vez's ex-wife Marisabel
Rodriguez, and the social democratic party Podemos all turned against
thereform.
The mood further soured because the government's public administration
had become inefficient and many of the president's supporters wanted to
send him a message. As the human rights group Provea reports, the
social programs, the missions for community health care, literacy
training, high school completion, public housing, subsidized food, land
reform, and employment through the creation of cooperatives, have all
been deteriorating in the past year.4] While pro-Ch!vez poor
Venezuelans appreciate the increase in social programs and spending
over the past four years,5]they are disappointed and frustrated at the
inefficiency with which these programs are managed.6]It did not help
that there was a severe milk shortage in October and November, which
made it almost impossible to find fresh milk, and hard to find powdered
milk.
The assumption is that, but for these reasons, all Ch!vez supporters
would have voted for the reform. Among hard-core Ch!vez supporters
there is a firm belief that the reform process would have helped
address the main issue: creating a society with greater social justice.
Whether the reform was necessary for this is not clear since a large
part of the reform could have been implemented through ordinary
legislation.
Many Ch!vez supporters fell for the opposition's distortions of the
reform; and many who did not, disagreed with Ch!vez's argument that his
powers needed to be strengthened to better defend the revolutionary
process and promote the transition towards socialism.
Consequences of the Defeat
Ch!vez and his supporters are convinced that the failure isa major
setback. But there are voices that argue that this is an opportunity in
disguise. If the reform had won, especially by a narrow margin, the
opposition would not have accepted the result and would have tried to
destabilize the country with violent protests and claims of fraud. Even
now, many in the opposition are trying to claim that their win was far
larger than the officialresult. A serious destabilization campaign
would probably have hindered the Ch!vez government from implementing
the policies in the reform. Also, the failure has provoked the most
profound analysis and self-criticism of the Bolivarian movement. For a
long time criticism within the Bolivarian movement was out of the
president's view, since the movement is centered on him. Questioning
his policies risked the unity of the movement, which needed to be
unified to survive given the opposition's efforts to overthrow Ch!vez
(with financial support from the United States). If Ch!vez's
examination is serious, it will find flaws in the top-down and rushed
process, in the president-centered aspects of the proposals and in the
inefficiency of government programs. Only then could he renew his
efforts to bring about 21st century socialism in Venezuela.
End Ntes:
[1] These 12 national electoral contests include: (1) Chavez's election
in December 1998; (2) referendum for a constitutional assembly in April
1999; (3) elections to constitutional assembly in July 1999; (4)
approval of constitutional assembly in December 1999; (5) "mega
election" of all except local elected representatives, including the
president, in July 2000; (6) national referendum on unions and local
elections in December 2000; (7) presidential recallreferendum in August
2004; (8) regional elections in October 2004; (9) local elections in
August 2005; (10) National Assembly elections in December 2005; (11)
Presidential election in December 2006; (12) constitutional reform
referendum in December 2007.
[2] For a detailed analysis of the reform proposal, see: "Making Sense
of Venezuela's Constitutional Reform," Venezuelanalysis.com, December
1st, 2007, by Gregory Wilpert
(http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2943)
[3] For example, in the mostly poor pro-Chavez neighborhood of 23 de
enero (which voted 75.6% for Chavez in 2006) voter turnout declined by
23% between the presidential election and the constitutional reform
referendum, while in the mostly middle class Caracas neighborhood of El
Recreo (which voted 70.3% for Rosales in 2006) voter turnout declined
by only 14%. (Source: CNE, www.cne.gov.ve)
[4] http://www.derechos.org.ve/publicaciones/infanual/2006_07/index.html
[5] Socialspending increased from 8.2% of GDP in 1998 to 13.2% of GDP
in 2005 (Source: Venezuelan Ministry of Planning and Development,
http://www.sisov.mpd.gov.ve/home/index.php)
[6] A compilation of typical complaints can be found in: "The wind goes
out of the revolution," The Economist, December 6,2007
=================================================================
NY Transfer News Collective A Service of Blythe Systems
Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us
Our main website: http://www.blythe.org
List Archives: http://blythe-systems.com/pipermail/nytr/
Subscribe: http://blythe-systems.com/mailman/listinfo/nytr
=================================================================
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