G
Gandalf Grey
Guest
What Did They Know and When Did They Know It?
By Mary Ratcliff
Created Jun 7 2007 - 7:51am
There has been a lot of discussion in the 2008 presidential campaign about
who actually read the classified National Intelligence Estimate report
published by the Intelligence Community in October 2002 before Congress
voted to give Bush authorization to attack Iraq. Hillary Clinton and John
Edwards both have been asked about whether they read the document [1] before
they voted. And now this question has been asked [2] of the Republican
candidates who voted on the Iraq resolution.
Yet, the press is missing the really big story about what was known from the
Intelligence agencies before Bush took us to war. Recently, the Senate
Intelligence Committee under the leadership of Senator Rockefeller quietly
published the long awaited Part 2 [3] of the Senate Intelligence report
consisting of the intelligence provided to the Bush administration before
the war started.
Long after the October vote, the Intelligence community published two more
critical National Intelligence Estimates in January 2003 that spoke to the
bleak chance there was for creating a viable government and society in Iraq
if the United States invaded.
Like the earlier NIE, these later assessments were not something that the
Bush administration had asked for, but something requested by others who
knew how risky the situation was. The October 2002 NIE had been requested by
Senator Bob Graham, the Democratic head of the Senate Intelligence Committee
at that time. These later NIEs were requested by the State Department as
they realized the Bush administration really didn't understand how much of a
hornets nest they were about to kick.
Paul R. Pillar, who in those days leading up to the war was the National
Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia in the State
Department, writes in The National Interest [4] this month about these newly
released assessments.
But the weapons estimate was one of only three classified,
community-coordinated assessments about Iraq that the intelligence community
produced in the months prior to the war. Don't feel bad if you missed the
other two, which addressed the principal challenges that Iraq likely would
present during the first several years after Saddam's removal, as well as
likely repercussions in the surrounding region. After being kept under wraps
(except for a few leaks) for over four years, the Senate committee quietly
released redacted versions of those assessments on its website May 25, as
Americans were beginning their Memorial Day holiday weekend.
I initiated those latter two assessments and supervised their drafting and
coordination. My responsibilities at the time as the National Intelligence
Officer for the Near East and South Asia concerned analysis on political,
economic and social issues in the region. A duty of any intelligence officer
is not only to respond to policymakers' requests but also to anticipate
their future needs. With the administration's determination to go to war
having become painfully clear during 2002, I undertook these assessments to
help policymakers, and those charged with executing their policies, make
sense of what they would be getting into after Saddam was gone.
These assessments were not something that would have affected the decisions
of those in Congress, because by that time, the only Decider left was
President Bush and his advisors. But those assessments were quite prescient
in the problems that would be faced if Bush went forward with his war of
choice.
In contrast, the other two assessments spoke directly to the instability,
conflict, and black hole for blood and treasure that over the past four
years we have come to know as Iraq. The assessments described the main
contours of the mess that was to be, including Iraq's unpromising and
undemocratic political culture, the sharp conflicts and prospect for
violence among Iraq's ethnic and sectarian groups, the Marshall Plan-scale
of effort needed for economic reconstruction, the major refugee problem, the
hostility that would be directed at any occupying force that did not provide
adequate security and public services, and the exploitation of the conflict
by Al-Qaeda and other terrorists.
And as Pillar flatly states, invading Iraq was always a bad idea, and not
just because the Bush administration made such a hash of the aftermath.
The assessments support the proposition that the expedition in Iraq always
was a fool's errand rather than a good idea spoiled by poor execution,
implying that the continued search for a winning strategy is likely to be
fruitless. Some support for the poor execution hypothesis can be found in
the assessments, such as the observation that Iraq's regular army could make
an important contribution in providing security (thus implicitly questioning
in advance the wisdom of ever disbanding the army). But the analysts had no
reason to assume poor execution, and their prognosis was dark nonetheless.
Pillar notes that these assessments had very little information that would
jeopardize national security, yet it took three years and a change in party
control in Congress to get these assessments released. And after four years,
the predictions of the Intelligence Community in these suppressed NIEs has
been proven largely correct.
--
NOTICE: This post contains copyrighted material the use of which has not
always been authorized by the copyright owner. I am making such material
available to advance understanding of
political, human rights, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues. I
believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of such copyrighted material as
provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright
Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107
"A little patience and we shall see the reign of witches pass over, their
spells dissolve, and the people recovering their true sight, restore their
government to its true principles. It is true that in the meantime we are
suffering deeply in spirit,
and incurring the horrors of a war and long oppressions of enormous public
debt. But if the game runs sometimes against us at home we must have
patience till luck turns, and then we shall have an opportunity of winning
back the principles we have lost, for this is a game where principles are at
stake."
-Thomas Jefferson
By Mary Ratcliff
Created Jun 7 2007 - 7:51am
There has been a lot of discussion in the 2008 presidential campaign about
who actually read the classified National Intelligence Estimate report
published by the Intelligence Community in October 2002 before Congress
voted to give Bush authorization to attack Iraq. Hillary Clinton and John
Edwards both have been asked about whether they read the document [1] before
they voted. And now this question has been asked [2] of the Republican
candidates who voted on the Iraq resolution.
Yet, the press is missing the really big story about what was known from the
Intelligence agencies before Bush took us to war. Recently, the Senate
Intelligence Committee under the leadership of Senator Rockefeller quietly
published the long awaited Part 2 [3] of the Senate Intelligence report
consisting of the intelligence provided to the Bush administration before
the war started.
Long after the October vote, the Intelligence community published two more
critical National Intelligence Estimates in January 2003 that spoke to the
bleak chance there was for creating a viable government and society in Iraq
if the United States invaded.
Like the earlier NIE, these later assessments were not something that the
Bush administration had asked for, but something requested by others who
knew how risky the situation was. The October 2002 NIE had been requested by
Senator Bob Graham, the Democratic head of the Senate Intelligence Committee
at that time. These later NIEs were requested by the State Department as
they realized the Bush administration really didn't understand how much of a
hornets nest they were about to kick.
Paul R. Pillar, who in those days leading up to the war was the National
Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia in the State
Department, writes in The National Interest [4] this month about these newly
released assessments.
But the weapons estimate was one of only three classified,
community-coordinated assessments about Iraq that the intelligence community
produced in the months prior to the war. Don't feel bad if you missed the
other two, which addressed the principal challenges that Iraq likely would
present during the first several years after Saddam's removal, as well as
likely repercussions in the surrounding region. After being kept under wraps
(except for a few leaks) for over four years, the Senate committee quietly
released redacted versions of those assessments on its website May 25, as
Americans were beginning their Memorial Day holiday weekend.
I initiated those latter two assessments and supervised their drafting and
coordination. My responsibilities at the time as the National Intelligence
Officer for the Near East and South Asia concerned analysis on political,
economic and social issues in the region. A duty of any intelligence officer
is not only to respond to policymakers' requests but also to anticipate
their future needs. With the administration's determination to go to war
having become painfully clear during 2002, I undertook these assessments to
help policymakers, and those charged with executing their policies, make
sense of what they would be getting into after Saddam was gone.
These assessments were not something that would have affected the decisions
of those in Congress, because by that time, the only Decider left was
President Bush and his advisors. But those assessments were quite prescient
in the problems that would be faced if Bush went forward with his war of
choice.
In contrast, the other two assessments spoke directly to the instability,
conflict, and black hole for blood and treasure that over the past four
years we have come to know as Iraq. The assessments described the main
contours of the mess that was to be, including Iraq's unpromising and
undemocratic political culture, the sharp conflicts and prospect for
violence among Iraq's ethnic and sectarian groups, the Marshall Plan-scale
of effort needed for economic reconstruction, the major refugee problem, the
hostility that would be directed at any occupying force that did not provide
adequate security and public services, and the exploitation of the conflict
by Al-Qaeda and other terrorists.
And as Pillar flatly states, invading Iraq was always a bad idea, and not
just because the Bush administration made such a hash of the aftermath.
The assessments support the proposition that the expedition in Iraq always
was a fool's errand rather than a good idea spoiled by poor execution,
implying that the continued search for a winning strategy is likely to be
fruitless. Some support for the poor execution hypothesis can be found in
the assessments, such as the observation that Iraq's regular army could make
an important contribution in providing security (thus implicitly questioning
in advance the wisdom of ever disbanding the army). But the analysts had no
reason to assume poor execution, and their prognosis was dark nonetheless.
Pillar notes that these assessments had very little information that would
jeopardize national security, yet it took three years and a change in party
control in Congress to get these assessments released. And after four years,
the predictions of the Intelligence Community in these suppressed NIEs has
been proven largely correct.
--
NOTICE: This post contains copyrighted material the use of which has not
always been authorized by the copyright owner. I am making such material
available to advance understanding of
political, human rights, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues. I
believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of such copyrighted material as
provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright
Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107
"A little patience and we shall see the reign of witches pass over, their
spells dissolve, and the people recovering their true sight, restore their
government to its true principles. It is true that in the meantime we are
suffering deeply in spirit,
and incurring the horrors of a war and long oppressions of enormous public
debt. But if the game runs sometimes against us at home we must have
patience till luck turns, and then we shall have an opportunity of winning
back the principles we have lost, for this is a game where principles are at
stake."
-Thomas Jefferson