Guest Dan Posted July 29, 2008 Posted July 29, 2008 "S. Pidgorny <MVP>" wrote: <response bottom posted> <span style="color:blue"> > G'day: > > "Dan" <Dan@discussions.microsoft.com> wrote in message </span> the base for Windows <span style="color:blue"> > Mobile next version. > <span style="color:green"> > > For example, an OS should be able to wipe its own butt without > > RPC, and/or not expose RPC to network surfaces (especially > > the Internet). It shouldn't rely on RPC to do internal things, weld > > this into Internet exposure, and then rely on a firewall as a band > > aid over this clickless, remotable risk surface.</span> > > RPC is as good (or bad, depending on your by-default attitude) as any other > IPC. I can disable RPC in Windows and still run software, but I see no > reason to. > > -- > Svyatoslav Pidgorny, MS MVP - Security, MCSE > -= F1 is the key =- > > http://sl.mvps.org http://msmvps.com/blogs/sp > > </span> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Here is Chris Quirke's reply: At 09:36 26/7/2008, Dan wrote: <span style="color:blue"> >Wow, you and I have really created in uproar in the security community and >many people are not pleased at all about our opinions. Who would have >thought that 2 people could upset the security community so much? <grin></span> Especially when one of them isn't there ;-) <span style="color:blue"> > From Microsoft.Public.Security Newsgroup > >Dan 7/24/2008 6:08 PM PST >I will now post Chris Quirke, MVPs reply to me</span> <span style="color:blue"> >S. Pidgorny <MVP> 7/25/2008 7:26 AM PST > >Windows 3.1/9x code base is now dead. Everything is NT. Not >sure about mobile devices but will not be surprised with XP as >the base for Windows Mobile next version.</span> That's my take, too. I briefly thought of 9x (not 3.x, and yes, they are different enough to be considered as different OS families) as a small GUI OS for small devices (e.g. a diskless PDA with 4G flash memory and 32M working RAM) but while it would fit the "size" and host plenty of legacy apps, those apps won't match what a PDA is to do, and the PDA's hardware is likely to be outside 9x's capabilities. In any case, a core design requirement of 9x - the ability to run apps written for DOS and Win3.yuk - is no longer relevant, so much of what constrains how good 9x could be, is redundant and should be discarded. <span style="color:blue"><span style="color:green"> > > For example, an OS should be able to wipe its own butt without > > RPC, and/or not expose RPC to network surfaces ... It shouldn't > > rely on RPC to do internal things, weld this into Internet exposure, > > and then rely on a firewall as a band aid over this risk surface.</span> > >I can disable RPC in Windows and still run software, but I see no >reason to.</span> By design, it may be OK, but that design has failed due to code exploits a couple of times. Not just the Lovesan-era thing (with the "take two" re-patching of what was considered to have been "fixed" already) but the Server 2003 era bug that allowed DNS servers to be exploited via RPC. If I have NO contexts whatsoever, where I need remote systems to call procedures on my PC, then why should I be forced to provide that "service"? If the answer is because the internal OS can't do without it, and it can't be ripped out of the obligatory "network" surface, then that is IMO a sucky design for a stand-alone OS. I know you can run some things without RPC, but few articles written at the time of the Lovesan onslaught recommend disabling the RPC service... it's usually considered "essential". <span style="color:blue"> >Dan 7/25/2008 10:39 AM PST > > Windows 9x may be dead somewhat to Microsoft but it is alive and kicking >everywhere else with Mozilla still supporting it with their web browser as >well as AVG 7.5 supporting it as well.</span> Er... AVG 7.5 is replaced with 8.0, and that no longer supports 9x. There's still Avast as a free av for 9x, as at July 2008. <span style="color:blue"> >Heck, 98 Second Edition for me is more stable than XP Professional. Vista >while it is stable enough for me still suffers somewhat with compatibility</span> I haven't had stability issues with XP; as you say, much of the time, all three are pretty stable. Are these three different systems, or groups of systems? If groups, are there any commonalities (aside from OS) over the comparatively-blighted XP group? Right now, I'd consider XP SP3 as the top of the mature-and-stable pile. <span style="color:blue"> >You talk about a great opportunity for all those used computers that >cannot run XP and why not have them run 98SE</span> Old used PCs are a difficult resource to deploy (i.e. set up for others to own and use) - they are usually heterogeneous in hardware, prone to hardware failure, and difficult to source reliable and matching parts. If the target users are, say, a PC maintenance school, it makes sense, so a winning strategy may be to partner your intended users with such a mainetance resource, so the community can support itself (and harness problems as skill-building opportunities). <span style="color:blue"> >Microsoft has not sold the source code because they don't sell source code. >You can assign all the motives you want to this</span> One way to sanity-check such things (i.e. whether something is an inescapable reality or a industry-motivated contrivance) is to watch what happens in the open source world. You do get small Linuxen that run on minimal hardware, but while the current versions of the main productivity distros may not need Vista's hardware specs, they won't be comfy on sub-XP hardware specs. The cores of these OSs (Linux, BSD, the "new" MacOS) are a very long evolution, confirming the value of honing rather than re-inventing code. But the original design brief of those code bases was different to 9x; if anything, more like that of NT, though from an earlier age (and thus "smaller" hardware). <span style="color:blue"><span style="color:green"> > > I use 512 megabytes of ram with it and editted the system.ini to recognize > > less and have a 256 megabyte ATI video card. Nope, it is Windows </span> > XP Service<span style="color:green"> > > Pack 3 that is having the issues right now with people having </span> > trouble getting<span style="color:green"> > > updates for it without the proper patch to register the .dlls again. In > > addition, Windows Vista has great external security but lacks the internal > > safety of a 9x operating system.</span> > >Again, you have no idea what you're talking about here. You really need to >expand your horizons beyond your pet MVP.</span> Dan, your terminology differs from mine, and I can't really "get" what you're referring to, either - e.g. when you refer to "internal security". I'm also something of an outside to pro-IT group-think, and I'll take this oppo to clarify my own (unfamiliar?) terminology. I refer to safety as underlying security, and sanity as underlying safety. For example, the purpose of securing a PC so that only Fred can use it, can be undermined if safety failures mean that what Fred does, is not what Fred wanted to do (but rather fulfilled the intentions of an attacker). For example, a safe design that ensures code can't run from a context that is presented as "viewing a .JPG image", is undermined if defects within the ..JPG-handling code allow insane behavior (i.e. behavior that bears no relation to what the .JPG-handling code was expected to do). I'm also entirely unapologetic about my focus on stand-alone and consumer users, and what I have to say about PC safety is from that perspective. Such things will probably NOT be applicable to server infrastructure, so if my ideas are quoted in inappropriate contexts, I'd expect them to be bounced away. One such concept is the need for an effective off-HD maintenance OS. In the pro_IT world, the usefulness of this may be undermined by dangers from managed users using this to escape central management, so there may be a risk/benefit decision to avoid such things. That is exactly the kind of decision I'm talking about, for us who own our own PCs and have no wish to extend any sort of "remotability" to anything beyond those PCs. Just as a sysadmin may be happier if his users did not have the ability to undermine his control, so we would be happy to have no complex "remote admin" surfaces waved at the 'net. <span style="color:blue"> >Wow, you've really drunk the Chris Quirke kool-aid here</span> Hmm... that snippage didn't smell like anything from this kool-aid factory ;-) <span style="color:blue"> >and you really have no concept of what security is all about.</span> Much of what is spoken of as "security" (even in these security circles) isn't so much about securing X for Y but against Z, but is about safety, i.e. making sure that unwanted situation S should never arise. When I first dropped into security newsgroups and elists, I expected to see 95% networking and domain-centric user admin, and little that was relevant to my interests. Instead, I found much discussion of the same malware attacks and safety failures - the problems I see in my terrain. To me, that means "malware" is far from being a "solved problem", despite the resources that professionally-managed IT can throw at it. Quote
Guest Paul Adare - MVP Posted July 29, 2008 Posted July 29, 2008 On Tue, 29 Jul 2008 02:04:01 -0700, Dan wrote: <span style="color:blue"> > Robear is a really good guy and I am disappointed that Microsoft hires MVP's > like you Paul that do not live up to your name in helping the little people. > I guess you are just interested in the big bucks from the cooperations.</span> Microsoft does not hire MVPs, they are all, including myself and Robear, volunteers. FWIW, I don't help little people, I help people period. I generally learn as much as I educate in the news groups. -- Paul Adare MVP - Identity Lifecycle Manager http://www.identit.ca Multitasking = screwing up several things at once. Quote
Guest Paul Adare - MVP Posted July 29, 2008 Posted July 29, 2008 On Mon, 28 Jul 2008 16:21:20 GMT, Root Kit wrote: <span style="color:blue"> > On Sun, 27 Jul 2008 20:07:59 -0400, Paul Adare - MVP > <pkadare@gmail.com> wrote: > <span style="color:green"> >>Then start educating yourself and try to have at least a rudimentary >>knowledge of the who the bad guys are. Redirecting ahuma.com is not a sign >>of a bad guy.</span> > > Dan? .... Where are you Dan? ... An MVP's knowledge is being > questioned! - We can't have that, can we?</span> Actually in this case I wasn't questioning Robear's knowledge, I followed up to the wrong post. While my response attributed the line to Robear, it was actually posted by Dan. My mistake. -- Paul Adare MVP - Identity Lifecycle Manager http://www.identit.ca Life would be so much easier if we could just look at the source code. Quote
Guest Dan Posted July 29, 2008 Posted July 29, 2008 Well, then Microsoft recognizes the contributions and grants people MVP status. I am sorely puzzled at why you need to be rude to Robear. I consider him a great MVP. Are your contributions to Microsoft newsgroups nearly as vast and knowledgeable as Robear's are? "Paul Adare - MVP" wrote: <span style="color:blue"> > On Tue, 29 Jul 2008 02:04:01 -0700, Dan wrote: > <span style="color:green"> > > Robear is a really good guy and I am disappointed that Microsoft hires MVP's > > like you Paul that do not live up to your name in helping the little people. > > I guess you are just interested in the big bucks from the cooperations.</span> > > Microsoft does not hire MVPs, they are all, including myself and Robear, > volunteers. > FWIW, I don't help little people, I help people period. I generally learn > as much as I educate in the news groups. > -- > Paul Adare > MVP - Identity Lifecycle Manager > http://www.identit.ca > Multitasking = screwing up several things at once. > </span> Quote
Guest Kerry Brown Posted July 29, 2008 Posted July 29, 2008 "Dan" <Dan@discussions.microsoft.com> wrote in message news:394D204B-1869-46CB-AB1E-3E4B0F265A6B@microsoft.com...<span style="color:blue"> > Much of what is spoken of as "security" (even in these security circles) > isn't so much about securing X for Y but against Z, but is about safety, > i.e. making sure that unwanted situation S should never arise. > > When I first dropped into security newsgroups and elists, I expected to > see 95% networking and domain-centric user admin, and little that was > relevant to my interests. Instead, I found much discussion of the same > malware attacks and safety failures - the problems I see in my terrain. > > To me, that means "malware" is far from being a "solved problem", > despite the resources that professionally-managed IT can throw at it. > ></span> As someone with one foot in both camps - support corporate networks, support home users and very small networks. Let me add my perspective. A lot of IT pros are only concerned with the health of the network not individual computers. When something goes wrong with a computer it is removed from the network and fixed. Their security is designed to protect the network not only from outside attack but from malicious (or even just dumb) users as well. They aren't concerned with saving data on individual computers so it's usually easier and much more cost effective just to nuke a computer that has any problems. This can lead to problems where the IT Pro really has no idea how dangerous malware is or how to really protect users from it. Supporting individual users or very small p2p networks requires a totally different mindset. In these situations data is scattered anywhere and very rarely is all the data backed up. To lose one computer could be catastrophic. At the same time these users expect to be able to do whatever they want with their computer. To support these users you need to intimately understand how malware works and how to defend against it. Of course there is a lot of overlap between the two security paradigms. I generalised with a very broad brush. I do think there are two very different mindsets when it comes to computer security and this often leads to one mindset disregarding the other as not relevant. This is a mistake. The reality is understanding both mindsets, analysing what the current situation requires, and applying whatever works from each mindset in this situation is the best security. Malware will never be a solved problem. There is too much money in it. As OS's become hardened social engineering attacks will get better. Attacks against other pieces of the infrastructure will become more common. The current DNS problems illustrate this. You can have an invulnerable system but if you are redirected to hacker.com instead of bank.com and enter your credentials what good did all that security do you? Security means different things in different situations and is always a moving target. -- Kerry Brown MS-MVP - Windows Desktop Experience: Systems Administration http://www.vistahelp.ca/phpBB2/ http://vistahelpca.blogspot.com/ Quote
Guest PA Bear [MS MVP] Posted July 29, 2008 Posted July 29, 2008 That's an absurd question to ask any MVP, Dan, let alone an MVP as respected in his field as is Paul. Please knock it off. THX Dan wrote:<span style="color:blue"> > Well, then Microsoft recognizes the contributions and grants people MVP > status. I am sorely puzzled at why you need to be rude to Robear. I > consider him a great MVP. Are your contributions to Microsoft newsgroups > nearly as vast and knowledgeable as Robear's are? > > "Paul Adare - MVP" wrote: ><span style="color:green"> >> On Tue, 29 Jul 2008 02:04:01 -0700, Dan wrote: >><span style="color:darkred"> >>> Robear is a really good guy and I am disappointed that Microsoft hires >>> MVP's like you Paul that do not live up to your name in helping the >>> little people. I guess you are just interested in the big bucks from the >>> cooperations.</span> >> >> Microsoft does not hire MVPs, they are all, including myself and Robear, >> volunteers. >> FWIW, I don't help little people, I help people period. I generally learn >> as much as I educate in the news groups. >> -- >> Paul Adare >> MVP - Identity Lifecycle Manager >> http://www.identit.ca >> Multitasking = screwing up several things at once. </span></span> Quote
Guest Dan Posted July 30, 2008 Posted July 30, 2008 Okay, I was just trying to defend your honor, Robear. "PA Bear [MS MVP]" wrote: <span style="color:blue"> > That's an absurd question to ask any MVP, Dan, let alone an MVP as respected > in his field as is Paul. Please knock it off. THX > > Dan wrote:<span style="color:green"> > > Well, then Microsoft recognizes the contributions and grants people MVP > > status. I am sorely puzzled at why you need to be rude to Robear. I > > consider him a great MVP. Are your contributions to Microsoft newsgroups > > nearly as vast and knowledgeable as Robear's are? > > > > "Paul Adare - MVP" wrote: > ><span style="color:darkred"> > >> On Tue, 29 Jul 2008 02:04:01 -0700, Dan wrote: > >> > >>> Robear is a really good guy and I am disappointed that Microsoft hires > >>> MVP's like you Paul that do not live up to your name in helping the > >>> little people. I guess you are just interested in the big bucks from the > >>> cooperations. > >> > >> Microsoft does not hire MVPs, they are all, including myself and Robear, > >> volunteers. > >> FWIW, I don't help little people, I help people period. I generally learn > >> as much as I educate in the news groups. > >> -- > >> Paul Adare > >> MVP - Identity Lifecycle Manager > >> http://www.identit.ca > >> Multitasking = screwing up several things at once. </span></span> > > </span> Quote
Guest PA Bear [MS MVP] Posted July 30, 2008 Posted July 30, 2008 Thanks, but I'm fine. Dan wrote:<span style="color:blue"> > Okay, I was just trying to defend your honor, Robear. > > "PA Bear [MS MVP]" wrote: ><span style="color:green"> >> That's an absurd question to ask any MVP, Dan, let alone an MVP as >> respected in his field as is Paul. Please knock it off. THX >> >> Dan wrote:<span style="color:darkred"> >>> Well, then Microsoft recognizes the contributions and grants people MVP >>> status. I am sorely puzzled at why you need to be rude to Robear. I >>> consider him a great MVP. Are your contributions to Microsoft >>> newsgroups >>> nearly as vast and knowledgeable as Robear's are? >>> >>> "Paul Adare - MVP" wrote: >>> >>>> On Tue, 29 Jul 2008 02:04:01 -0700, Dan wrote: >>>> >>>>> Robear is a really good guy and I am disappointed that Microsoft hires >>>>> MVP's like you Paul that do not live up to your name in helping the >>>>> little people. I guess you are just interested in the big bucks from >>>>> the >>>>> cooperations. >>>> >>>> Microsoft does not hire MVPs, they are all, including myself and >>>> Robear, >>>> volunteers. >>>> FWIW, I don't help little people, I help people period. I generally >>>> learn >>>> as much as I educate in the news groups. >>>> -- >>>> Paul Adare >>>> MVP - Identity Lifecycle Manager >>>> http://www.identit.ca >>>> Multitasking = screwing up several things at once. </span></span></span> Quote
Guest S. Pidgorny Posted July 31, 2008 Posted July 31, 2008 G'day: "Kerry Brown" <kerry@kdbNOSPAMsys-tems.c a m> wrote in message <span style="color:blue"> > Malware will never be a solved problem. There is too much money in it.</span> There is no credible data on how much money is in the cybercrime. On the other hand, IT security has become giant and still rapidly growing business. So there is huge interest in perpetuating malware and other security problems, real or imaginary. <span style="color:blue"> > OS's become hardened social engineering attacks will get better. Attacks > against other pieces of the infrastructure will become more common. The > current DNS problems illustrate this. You can have an invulnerable system > but if you are redirected to hacker.com instead of bank.com and enter your > credentials what good did all that security do you?</span> The current DNS problems are a repeat of multiple DNS problems of the same outcome. Historically, there was no significant, Ctrl+Backspace, noticeable attacks based on those vulnerabilities. All reports of exploit used by criminals in the wild are unconfirmed. A side note: I will not send my bank logon after being redirected. You know why. -- Svyatoslav Pidgorny, MS MVP - Security, MCSE -= F1 is the key =- http://sl.mvps.org http://msmvps.com/blogs/sp Quote
Guest Dan Posted July 31, 2008 Posted July 31, 2008 Below is the reply from Chris Quirke and myself to him via email "Kerry Brown" wrote: <span style="color:blue"> > "Dan" <Dan@discussions.microsoft.com> wrote in message > news:394D204B-1869-46CB-AB1E-3E4B0F265A6B@microsoft.com...<span style="color:green"> > > Much of what is spoken of as "security" (even in these security circles) > > isn't so much about securing X for Y but against Z, but is about safety, > > i.e. making sure that unwanted situation S should never arise. > > > > When I first dropped into security newsgroups and elists, I expected to > > see 95% networking and domain-centric user admin, and little that was > > relevant to my interests. Instead, I found much discussion of the same > > malware attacks and safety failures - the problems I see in my terrain. > > > > To me, that means "malware" is far from being a "solved problem", > > despite the resources that professionally-managed IT can throw at it. > > > ></span> > > > As someone with one foot in both camps - support corporate networks, support > home users and very small networks. Let me add my perspective. > > A lot of IT pros are only concerned with the health of the network not > individual computers. When something goes wrong with a computer it is > removed from the network and fixed. Their security is designed to protect > the network not only from outside attack but from malicious (or even just > dumb) users as well. They aren't concerned with saving data on individual > computers so it's usually easier and much more cost effective just to nuke a > computer that has any problems. This can lead to problems where the IT Pro > really has no idea how dangerous malware is or how to really protect users > from it. > > Supporting individual users or very small p2p networks requires a totally > different mindset. In these situations data is scattered anywhere and very > rarely is all the data backed up. To lose one computer could be > catastrophic. At the same time these users expect to be able to do whatever > they want with their computer. To support these users you need to intimately > understand how malware works and how to defend against it. > > Of course there is a lot of overlap between the two security paradigms. I > generalised with a very broad brush. I do think there are two very different > mindsets when it comes to computer security and this often leads to one > mindset disregarding the other as not relevant. This is a mistake. The > reality is understanding both mindsets, analysing what the current situation > requires, and applying whatever works from each mindset in this situation is > the best security. > > Malware will never be a solved problem. There is too much money in it. As > OS's become hardened social engineering attacks will get better. Attacks > against other pieces of the infrastructure will become more common. The > current DNS problems illustrate this. You can have an invulnerable system > but if you are redirected to hacker.com instead of bank.com and enter your > credentials what good did all that security do you? > > Security means different things in different situations and is always a > moving target. > > -- > Kerry Brown > MS-MVP - Windows Desktop Experience: Systems Administration > http://www.vistahelp.ca/phpBB2/ > http://vistahelpca.blogspot.com/ > </span> -------------------------------------------new-------------------------------- At 06:45 30/7/2008, you wrote: <span style="color:blue"> >Kerry Brown has responded and his reply seems to make sense.</span> Yes, he usually does - and I see he's also trying to get back OT. <span style="color:blue"> >"Dan" <Dan@discussions.microsoft.com> wrote</span> <span style="color:blue"><span style="color:green"> > > Much of what is spoken of as "security" (even in these security circles) > > isn't so much about securing X for Y but against Z, but is about safety, > > i.e. making sure that unwanted situation S should never arise. > > > > When I first dropped into security newsgroups and elists, I expected to > > see 95% networking and domain-centric user admin, and little that was > > relevant to my interests. Instead, I found much discussion of the same > > malware attacks and safety failures - the problems I see in my terrain. > > > > To me, that means "malware" is far from being a "solved problem", > > despite the resources that professionally-managed IT can throw at it.</span> > >Kerry Brown says: > >As someone with one foot in both camps - networks, home users ... > >A lot of IT pros are only concerned with the health of the network not >individual computers. When something goes wrong with a computer it is >removed from the network and fixed. Their security is designed to protect >the network not only from outside attack but from malicious (or even just >dumb) users as well. They aren't concerned with saving data on individual >computers so it's usually easier and much more cost effective just to nuke a >computer that has any problems. > >Supporting individual users or very small p2p networks requires a totally >different mindset. In these situations data is scattered anywhere and very >rarely is all the data backed up. To lose one computer could be catastrophic.</span> In essence, you have all the same things that a network has, but on the same PC (or across a few undifferentiated PCs). The network approach relies on significant material being concentrated of a few well-protected PCs, so that the bulk of other PCs can be cheaper and more disposable. That approach just does not scale down to peer LANs and standalones, unless you scope within the same PC the way that sysadmins scope between servers and workstations. We're a long way from that goal. Though some may wave reduced user rights as a solution, this does not protect user data from what can go wrong within that user's session; at best, it can protect multiple user accounts from each other, which isn't useful on single-user PCs. <span style="color:blue"> >At the same time these users expect to be able to do whatever >they want with their computer.</span> This is a political thing, and has already been decided in real life, with the general approach being that a person's "home" is sacrosanct from arbitrary search, seizure and so on. In other words, unless your time and rights have been bought while you use a PC owned by someone else, you expect to be the top of the control pyramid for "your" system. That's why it's counter-intuitive to tell free users that they should limit their rights on their own PCs - especially on an OS that is designed to allow remote access to trump those rights, content providers to subvert those rights via DRM, and so forth. It's all too easy for those hidden and powerful mechanisms to be hijacked by malware. <span style="color:blue"> >To support these users you need to intimately understand >how malware works and how to defend against it.</span> And how to manage the ?infected state. Any PC can be infected, and as a fully successful infection may show no abnormal signs, you're more or less obliged to consider every PC as infected until proven otherwise. That's why you need unspoofable tools to detect infected states, manage common integration points, etc. <span style="color:blue"> >Of course there is a lot of overlap between the two security paradigms. I >generalised with a very broad brush. I do think there are two very different >mindsets when it comes to computer security and this often leads to one >mindset disregarding the other as not relevant. This is a mistake.</span> Yep. The scene is dominated by the concerns of large managed networks, not only because they are MS's largest and best-spending customers, but because tech communication is easier within the group-think that follows when everyone has been through the same training paths. Such folks may callously disregard the interests of the "small" user, or apply lower standard of acceptability. Lose all data and wipe the PC? If it's only an end user or workstation, then sure; why not. PC's down for a few days? Just wheel in another workstation from stores to use in the meantime. It's an end user with everything on one PC? Well, they won't be doing anything important, so it doesn't matter if they're down for a while. From their own interests, the mistake in doing so is that when large numbers of consumers get infected, the malware industry grows on the revenue, and can use all of those systems as a hammer against large networks. <span style="color:blue"> >The reality is understanding both mindsets, analysing what the current >situation requires, and applying whatever works from each mindset in >this situation is the best security.</span> The ultimate point of conflict between the two approaches is: When you have an "admin" acting remotely, versus a user at the keyboard, who should win? <span style="color:blue"> >Malware will never be a solved problem. There is too much money in it.</span> The industry has grown out of Pandora's Box, and that can't be undone. Most of the opportunities for such growth have come from poor safety judgements built into our systems , which boil down to a few basic things: - not indicating risk when presenting material (e.g. files) - not limiting actions to the risks presented - automatically taking risks beyond user intent (e.g. macros in "docs") Today, we may have fewer by-design opportunities to attack systems, e.g. you prolly can't simply stick an auto-running script in an email "message text" and have that automate Outbreak to spread your malware to all the addresses that are in the system's address book. Instead, you'd more likely have to exploit some code defect within some exposed surface, and that takes far larger tech resources. Unfortunately, there's now sufficient malware finance available to fund those resources, and plenty of malware coders who grew up in the easy "virus hobby" era. <span style="color:blue"> >As OS's become hardened social engineering attacks will get better.</span> Yep - and those ride on the back of software safety failures, which dumb things down to the point that the user lacks concepts of data safety vs. code risk. It doesn't take much computer savvy to know that running a code file is higher risk than viewing a data file, yet even that simple and crucial difference is lost by an UI that hides types and calls both "open". <span style="color:blue"> >Attacks against other pieces of the infrastructure will become >more common. The current DNS problems illustrate this.</span> Yup. The resources to match the large system design vendors are there, and are being used. Just as we move further into "the network is the computer" and accept dumb reliance on av and patching, so we may see malware breaking into the unique addressing between network entities, exploiting surfaces within av, and hijacking update delivery. <span style="color:blue"> >You can have an invulnerable system</span> ....so you need the ability to formally manage the infected state... <span style="color:blue"> >but if you are redirected to hacker.com instead of bank.com >and enter your credentials what good did all that security do?</span> Another way to look at this, is: - we can never "clean the Internet" - so we break off and clean bits of it, i.e. LANs and systems If seamlessly merged into the Internet, you can't avoid the first and can't apply the second. Remember that, when "designing the future". <span style="color:blue"> >Security means different things in different situations and is >always a moving target.</span> What you (as a user or customer) wants to avoid, is an arms race. But an arms race may suit your vendors just fine. Quote
Guest Shenan Stanley Posted July 31, 2008 Posted July 31, 2008 <snipped> Thread in its entirety: http://groups.google.com/group/microsoft.p...6cf8af9617caaf8 Dan wrote: <snip> Some reference to the thread abandoned to start this one: http://groups.google.com/group/microsoft.p...8353f2bade585d8 <span style="color:blue"> > Chris Quirke, MVP says:</span> <snip> <other responses completely snipped> Dan wrote:<span style="color:blue"> > Below is the reply from Chris Quirke and myself to him via email </span> <snip> I only have one question... What's with the 'proxy responses' as opposed to actual responses? -- Shenan Stanley MS-MVP -- How To Ask Questions The Smart Way http://www.catb.org/~esr/faqs/smart-questions.html Quote
Guest Kerry Brown Posted July 31, 2008 Posted July 31, 2008 "S. Pidgorny <MVP>" <slavickp@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:%23ug%23LZu8IHA.5928@TK2MSFTNGP05.phx.gbl...<span style="color:blue"> > G'day: > > "Kerry Brown" <kerry@kdbNOSPAMsys-tems.c a m> wrote in message ><span style="color:green"> >> Malware will never be a solved problem. There is too much money in it.</span> > > There is no credible data on how much money is in the cybercrime. On the > other hand, IT security has become giant and still rapidly growing > business. So there is huge interest in perpetuating malware and other > security problems, real or imaginary. ></span> While I agree that the security industry is large and to some extent relies on the bad guys to legitimize them I think going much beyond that is venturing into tinfoil hat territory :-) <span style="color:blue"><span style="color:green"> >> OS's become hardened social engineering attacks will get better. Attacks >> against other pieces of the infrastructure will become more common. The >> current DNS problems illustrate this. You can have an invulnerable system >> but if you are redirected to hacker.com instead of bank.com and enter >> your credentials what good did all that security do you?</span> > > The current DNS problems are a repeat of multiple DNS problems of the same > outcome. Historically, there was no significant, Ctrl+Backspace, > noticeable attacks based on those vulnerabilities. All reports of exploit > used by criminals in the wild are unconfirmed. ></span> http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=dns+e...+the+wild&meta= <span style="color:blue"> > A side note: I will not send my bank logon after being redirected. You > know why. ></span> You and I would not be easily fooled by this. I think would be quite easy to fool most people if you owned their DNS. -- Kerry Brown MS-MVP - Windows Desktop Experience: Systems Administration http://www.vistahelp.ca/phpBB2/ http://vistahelpca.blogspot.com/ Quote
Guest Kerry Brown Posted July 31, 2008 Posted July 31, 2008 ><span style="color:blue"> > What you (as a user or customer) wants to avoid, is an arms race. > > But an arms race may suit your vendors just fine.</span> I think we are already involved in this arms race. Finding a way to stop it will be very hard at this point. To get back to the original topic. I think that given the future of "cloud" computing or whatever you want to call it the network stack needs to be at a very low level in the OS and completely protected from all other processes including security software. A new code base is probably needed for this. I see a very minimal hypervisor based OS with hardware support, including networking, and not much else. Everything else would run in virtual machines. Each application would have it's own virtual machine and only talk to other applications and the OS through strictly enforced communications channels. The application would be free to supply it's own higher level OS, UI, or whatever you want to call it for it's own virtual machine. Applications could also have their own virtual file system completely inaccessible to other applications if they wanted. Hardware is advancing at a pace that this will be be possible in the near future if not already. We are currently using OS's that have security and other problems because they were designed to make the most of minimal hardware. Many compromises were made to get acceptable speed. We need an OS that is aware that things exist "out there somewhere" but it's core is isolated by hardware means. It's like having someone isolated in a missile silo with only a telephone line for communications. You also need a well guarded elevator to get a replacement operator and food in (updates) but this elevator is a physical mechanism that is well guarded and can be shut down in an emergency. All normal communications are done only through the phone line. -- Kerry Brown MS-MVP - Windows Desktop Experience: Systems Administration http://www.vistahelp.ca/phpBB2/ http://vistahelpca.blogspot.com/ Quote
Guest Dan Posted August 1, 2008 Posted August 1, 2008 Chris Quirke, MVP lives in Africa and says he has trouble viewing the Microsoft newsgroups thus I am posting his replies here for him. "Shenan Stanley" wrote: <span style="color:blue"> > <snipped> > Thread in its entirety: > http://groups.google.com/group/microsoft.p...6cf8af9617caaf8 > > > > Dan wrote: > <snip> > > Some reference to the thread abandoned to start this one: > http://groups.google.com/group/microsoft.p...8353f2bade585d8 > <span style="color:green"> > > Chris Quirke, MVP says:</span> > <snip> > > <other responses completely snipped> > > Dan wrote:<span style="color:green"> > > Below is the reply from Chris Quirke and myself to him via email </span> > <snip> > > > I only have one question... > > What's with the 'proxy responses' as opposed to actual responses? > > -- > Shenan Stanley > MS-MVP > -- > How To Ask Questions The Smart Way > http://www.catb.org/~esr/faqs/smart-questions.html > > > </span> Quote
Guest S. Pidgorny Posted August 2, 2008 Posted August 2, 2008 G'day: "Kerry Brown" <kerry@kdbNOSPAMsys-tems.c a m> wrote in message news:%23D6zTE08IHA.3736@TK2MSFTNGP06.phx.gbl... <span style="color:blue"><span style="color:green"> >> The current DNS problems are a repeat of multiple DNS problems of the >> same outcome. Historically, there was no significant, Ctrl+Backspace, >> noticeable attacks based on those vulnerabilities. All reports of exploit >> used by criminals in the wild are unconfirmed. >></span> > > http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=dns+e...+the+wild&meta=</span> I didn't say there isn't exploit available. I said it is not used by criminals. In the next year we'll hear more reports that 50%, 40% etc. of all DNS servers are still unpatched, that DNS clients are also vulnerable, and therefore the large-scale attack is imminent. After that this will be all but forgotten, like any previous DNS cache poisoning vulnerability. Maybe there will be bureaucratic bodies working on mandating DNSsec, a mature and secure protocol. <span style="color:blue"><span style="color:green"> >> A side note: I will not send my bank logon after being redirected. You >> know why. >></span> > > You and I would not be easily fooled by this. I think would be quite easy > to fool most people if you owned their DNS.</span> So here's my problem: SSL certificates, and commercial CAs, are considered means of identifying Web sites. If DNS will somehow be made more trusted, we won't need commercial CAs. And if commercial CAs will be a part of the new trusted DNS then DNS will lose its versatility. Fraud in general is older than Internet. I think most people will pick up awareness and should not be considered clueless forever. -- Svyatoslav Pidgorny, MS MVP - Security, MCSE -= F1 is the key =- http://sl.mvps.org http://msmvps.com/blogs/sp Quote
Guest S. Pidgorny Posted August 2, 2008 Posted August 2, 2008 G'day: "Kerry Brown" <kerry@kdbNOSPAMsys-tems.c a m> wrote in message news:OiROnV08IHA.4468@TK2MSFTNGP06.phx.gbl... <span style="color:blue"> > To get back to the original topic. I think that given the future of > "cloud" computing or whatever you want to call it the network stack needs > to be at a very low level in the OS and completely protected from all > other processes including security software. A new code base is probably > needed for this. I see a very minimal hypervisor based OS with hardware > support, including networking, and not much else. Everything else would > run in virtual machines. Each application would have it's own virtual > machine and only talk to other applications and the OS through strictly > enforced communications channels. The application would be free to supply > it's own higher level OS, UI, or whatever you want to call it for it's own > virtual machine. Applications could also have their own virtual file > system completely inaccessible to other applications if they wanted. > Hardware is advancing at a pace that this will be be possible in the near > future if not already. We are currently using OS's that have security and > other problems because they were designed to make the most of minimal > hardware. Many compromises were made to get acceptable speed. We need an > OS that is aware that things exist "out there somewhere" but it's core is > isolated by hardware means. It's like having someone isolated in a missile > silo with only a telephone line for communications. You also need a well > guarded elevator to get a replacement operator and food in (updates) but > this elevator is a physical mechanism that is well guarded and can be shut > down in an emergency. All normal communications are done only through the > phone line.</span> I would say - using single OS kernel and libraries, without virtualisation layer and other interprocess barriers, is the most effective way to ustilise computing resources. We mustn't assume that the resources are unlimited. It is a popular assumption lately though. Which is why we have new generation of software that is capable of running like a snail even on more powerful systems, and many problems with performance are being solved by throwing more hardware at the issue. Cloud computing presents an interesting change in security landscape. -- Svyatoslav Pidgorny, MS MVP - Security, MCSE -= F1 is the key =- http://sl.mvps.org http://msmvps.com/blogs/sp Quote
Guest Dan Posted August 2, 2008 Posted August 2, 2008 Here is Chris Quirke's reply via email: At 04:39 1/8/2008, you (I Dan -- added to minimize confusion) wrote: >Here is the latest reply from Kerry Brown:>> > What you (as a user or customer) wants to avoid, is an arms race.> > But an arms race may suit your vendors just fine.>>> I think we are already involved in this arms race. Yep. The cat's been left out of the bag so long, with so much easygarbage around to eat, that it's grown into a mighty lion. >Finding a way to stop it <cynic> Why stop what drives sales and vendor dependency? </cynic> >I think that given the future of "cloud" computing ... That is to be led by what you want, not what is possible. But sanity-check against what is likely to work safely; then maybe not <span style="color:blue"> >...the network stack needs to be at a very low level in the OS>and </span> completely protected from all other processes OK, but IMO it would be a mistake to weld it into the OS. IOW, yes; itshould be hidden inside the OS as a "black box" with a small, generalizedand well-coded API that pulls data into managed shapes (e.g. if a buffer isX bytes long, pull up to X bytes and not until data-defined delimiter reached). But no, it should not be so integrated into the OS that the difference betweenlocal and networked operations are seamless and thus lost. It's tempting to make that mistake ("write once, re-use everywhere!") andsuch a design may be appropriate for the managed-network crowd who driveMS's development. But it would be repeating previous mistakes (RPC, LSASS;why were these ever exposed to the Internet?) for free stand-alone consumers. >A new code base is probably needed for this. The opportunities are 64-bit PC code and IPv6. I'm not sure if these havebeen seized firmly enough to deliver on this; a full kernel re-design wouldbe beyond the Vista and Windows 7 time frames, and we need 64-bit now. So I think we'll monkey around with the arms race for another 3-7 years,allowing exploitability to escalate into a crisis that we can then cure withthe distasteful medicine of a new OS that breaks a lot of compatibility. <span style="color:blue"> >I see a very minimal hypervisor based OS with hardware support,>including </span> networking, and not much else. Everything else would run>in virtual machines. Each application would have it's own virtual machine>and only talk to other applications and the OS through strictly enforced>communications channels. A bit like the way 9x ran DOS apps, eh? Except those had no API totalk to each other, given that DOS pre-dated 9x and 9x didn't pool theDOS environment variables across the separated DOS sessions. >Applications could also have their own virtual file system completely>inaccessible to other applications if they wanted. Hardware is advancing>at a pace that this will be be possible in the near future if not already. We>are currently using OS's that have security and other problems because>they were designed to make the most of minimal hardware. We are already consuming hardware gains in order to make softwaremore reliable, if not safer - e.g. the move from tight assembler or C codingto higher-level languages, 8-bit ASCII to 16-bit Unicode, yy to yyyy, there-use of ever-larger code blocks as "black boxes" with the attendantbloat of overall software size, code duplication via SxS, etc. We have to do that to maintain an acceptable overall error rate. Let's sayyou'd tolerate 10 bugs per application, and an application is now made ofa million lines of code, rather than a thousand. Your error rate now has toimprove from 1% to 0.001%, and the stress of double-checking my mathswill indicate how painful that is likely to be :-) What's changed, is that errors are now likely to be exploited. We canfix that by keeping errors away from exposed surfaces and better isolatingsystems so they can be recovered more effectively. But as we're headingin the opposite direction - glomming everything into one huge networkedmess - we will more likely attempt to forge new artificial scopes betweenwhat we need to isolate for safety. That hasn't worked too well, so far. It has spawned a huge industry - whichdwarfs the dev and field-tech resources allocated to consumeralnd - in theattempt to scope between user accounts. That massive resource allocationhas not ended the game, but drags on as an escalating arms race - which isgreat for the US (what else does that economy offer the rest of the world thesedays, other than pulp entertainment?) but doesn't solve our problem. Reminds me of the old communist rhetoric, i.e. it's always "towards..." thisand "an approach to..." that, without ever any deliverables. <span style="color:blue"> >We need an OS that is aware that things exist "out there somewhere">but it's </span> core is isolated by hardware means. Don't under-estimate the impact of this; it will soak up hardware resourceslike you would not believe. For example, to be useful to consumers, youcould extend the current "user accounts rights" model to treat every appas a separate user; that would bring to bear the richly-mature world ofmanaged permissions on the safety problems we face ITW. But that blows out on scalability, i.e. wherever you bind "a few" new thingsto a huge unbounded number of instances Expect to have 1M permissionsfor a 10k data file, 3 out of 4 cores dedicated to navel-gazing what shouldbe allowed to do what, only partly offset by look-up tables that need RAM. This is still a house of cards that could fail spectacularly at any time, shouldanything drill below these levels of abstraction (i.e. attain "Matrix-vision", ifyou will). That's because the lower levels of abstraction may be as easy towork with, in their own terms, as the top level (after all, it was created by thesame level of computing power, i.e. human enterprise). We've already learned how meaningless "an attacker would have to..."mitigations are in the real world, when difficult exploits become just anotherfreely-available re-usable "black box" code object. As long as the defended and attacker are made of the same stuff, you'll havean arms race, and as long as attackers have easier goals, the attackers willbe held back only by available resources. The more revenue the attackerscan generate, the more resources become available... malware may alreadybe the bulk of the computing industry, in some places. Going back on topic; right now, MS is the primary provider of system codefor most of us, and I'm sure MS would want to keep it that way - so the Qbecomes: Do we need a new source code for the future? For medium-term values of "future", e.g. beyond Windows 7, I'd say yes...and the challenge is how to design this so we don't make mistakes weare still making right now. We need to scope between contexts effectively, separating what needsto be separated, while pooling seamlessly that which we see as unwantedbarriers to functionality. The mistake to avoid is to forget about scopes wehaven't needed until now, because natural barriers did the same thing. We need to minimize code exposure, accepting that code will always beimperfect, exploitable, and thus untrustworthy. Scopes do that, but wealso need "pointed" surfaces that first expose logic that is trivial enoughto be free of bugs (obverse of "any non-trivial code has bugs"), and thenfrom there, progressively expands the surface, sanity-checking all the way. We need to recognize both human users and code processes as activeplayers. Both have to be managed in terms of what they are allowed todo, and both need accurate safety info that is enforced by the OS. For example, code should be aware that material to fill a buffer must besmaller than X, should determine material is <= X before accepting it,and the OS should crunch anything that shoves > X at that code. In the same way, users need to see what an object would do if it wereto be "opened", and material that tries to act in other ways should becrunched by the OS. Neither code nor user should be spoofed intotaking greater risks than code design or user intention. We need to recognize the rights of free users to be in full control overtheir homes, which includes the virtual homes of their computers. Wehave learned the hard way that "to compromise freedom for security isto attain neither"; bring that lesson to consumerland, and stop designingour OSs to allow remote admin, hidden code, DRM, embedded payloadsthat leverage vendor interests over our own, etc. to trump our control. Anything short of that, is not "trustworthy computing". ----------------------------------------------------------------------- end of reply--------- "Kerry Brown" wrote: <span style="color:blue"><span style="color:green"> > > > > What you (as a user or customer) wants to avoid, is an arms race. > > > > But an arms race may suit your vendors just fine.</span> > > > I think we are already involved in this arms race. Finding a way to stop it > will be very hard at this point. > > To get back to the original topic. I think that given the future of "cloud" > computing or whatever you want to call it the network stack needs to be at a > very low level in the OS and completely protected from all other processes > including security software. A new code base is probably needed for this. I > see a very minimal hypervisor based OS with hardware support, including > networking, and not much else. Everything else would run in virtual > machines. Each application would have it's own virtual machine and only talk > to other applications and the OS through strictly enforced communications > channels. The application would be free to supply it's own higher level OS, > UI, or whatever you want to call it for it's own virtual machine. > Applications could also have their own virtual file system completely > inaccessible to other applications if they wanted. Hardware is advancing at > a pace that this will be be possible in the near future if not already. We > are currently using OS's that have security and other problems because they > were designed to make the most of minimal hardware. Many compromises were > made to get acceptable speed. We need an OS that is aware that things exist > "out there somewhere" but it's core is isolated by hardware means. It's like > having someone isolated in a missile silo with only a telephone line for > communications. You also need a well guarded elevator to get a replacement > operator and food in (updates) but this elevator is a physical mechanism > that is well guarded and can be shut down in an emergency. All normal > communications are done only through the phone line. > > -- > Kerry Brown > MS-MVP - Windows Desktop Experience: Systems Administration > http://www.vistahelp.ca/phpBB2/ > http://vistahelpca.blogspot.com/ > > > > > </span> Quote
Guest Kerry Brown Posted August 2, 2008 Posted August 2, 2008 "S. Pidgorny <MVP>" <slavickp@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:O8AlUzD9IHA.2336@TK2MSFTNGP03.phx.gbl... <span style="color:blue"><span style="color:green"><span style="color:darkred"> >>> A side note: I will not send my bank logon after being redirected. You >>> know why. >>></span> >> >> You and I would not be easily fooled by this. I think would be quite easy >> to fool most people if you owned their DNS.</span> > > So here's my problem: SSL certificates, and commercial CAs, are considered > means of identifying Web sites. If DNS will somehow be made more trusted, > we won't need commercial CAs. And if commercial CAs will be a part of the > new trusted DNS then DNS will lose its versatility. > > Fraud in general is older than Internet. I think most people will pick up > awareness and should not be considered clueless forever. ></span> You may be right. I may have been a little pessimistic in saying "most people" Your comment about fraud in general made me rethink this. For a fraud artist to be successful they don't have to fool a very large percentage of the population as long as the population is large enough. Owning DNS would allow allow the fraudsters to fool enough people with phishing attacks that it would be very profitable. It's obvious that spam is profitable. Their success rate has to be much less than 0.01%. Owning DNS should be able to bump this up considerably. If they even started to approach 1% it would be a very large problem. I don't have the technical knowledge to know what may be needed to fix DNS. I do have enough knowledge to see that the current DNS system is flawed and may not be sustainable long term. The current patches are a bandage when a transplant may be needed. Hopefully a few bandage changes will see us through until a transplant is available. -- Kerry Brown MS-MVP - Windows Desktop Experience: Systems Administration http://www.vistahelp.ca/phpBB2/ http://vistahelpca.blogspot.com/ Quote
Guest Kerry Brown Posted August 2, 2008 Posted August 2, 2008 "S. Pidgorny <MVP>" <slavickp@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:e1gh55D9IHA.3648@TK2MSFTNGP03.phx.gbl...<span style="color:blue"> > G'day: > > "Kerry Brown" <kerry@kdbNOSPAMsys-tems.c a m> wrote in message > news:OiROnV08IHA.4468@TK2MSFTNGP06.phx.gbl... ><span style="color:green"> >> To get back to the original topic. I think that given the future of >> "cloud" computing or whatever you want to call it the network stack needs >> to be at a very low level in the OS and completely protected from all >> other processes including security software. A new code base is probably >> needed for this. I see a very minimal hypervisor based OS with hardware >> support, including networking, and not much else. Everything else would >> run in virtual machines. Each application would have it's own virtual >> machine and only talk to other applications and the OS through strictly >> enforced communications channels. The application would be free to supply >> it's own higher level OS, UI, or whatever you want to call it for it's >> own virtual machine. Applications could also have their own virtual file >> system completely inaccessible to other applications if they wanted. >> Hardware is advancing at a pace that this will be be possible in the near >> future if not already. We are currently using OS's that have security and >> other problems because they were designed to make the most of minimal >> hardware. Many compromises were made to get acceptable speed. We need an >> OS that is aware that things exist "out there somewhere" but it's core is >> isolated by hardware means. It's like having someone isolated in a >> missile silo with only a telephone line for communications. You also need >> a well guarded elevator to get a replacement operator and food in >> (updates) but this elevator is a physical mechanism that is well guarded >> and can be shut down in an emergency. All normal communications are done >> only through the phone line.</span> > > I would say - using single OS kernel and libraries, without virtualisation > layer and other interprocess barriers, is the most effective way to > ustilise computing resources. > > We mustn't assume that the resources are unlimited. It is a popular > assumption lately though. Which is why we have new generation of software > that is capable of running like a snail even on more powerful systems, and > many problems with performance are being solved by throwing more hardware > at the issue. ></span> My programming days are long past. Compared to when I was current (back in the Z80 to 80486 timeframe) hardware resources are pretty much unlimited now but the programming paradigm for the OS core doesn't seem to have changed that much. Applications yes, OS not so much. I think a new paradigm is needed. Hardware virtualization and cloud computing may be the catalyst needed for this change. A completely new hypervisor based OS could be very lean and thus very quick. The onus on features, UI, backwards compatibility, etc., would be on the applications running in virtual machines. Applications would stand or fail on their own merits. Rather than an application being forced to present itself in a certain way to the user because that's what the OS dictates it would be free to use the best UI for what it needs to do. The OS would be invisible and irrelevant to most users. Application development would obviously be harder but in the long run applications would be easier to use because they aren't constrained by the OS. They would be completely portable and thus able to take advantage of new hardware advances immediately. They would not need to be running on the local hardware. The application could be anywhere that the OS could communicate with. All the application developer need supply to the local computer is an interface between where the application exists and the OS. I don't see any of this evolving from any current OS. It's what I would like to see happen. I believe eventually we will get to something like this. The two main current commercial OS developers (Apple and Microsoft) have too much invested to be able to change to this paradigm. Their whole focus would have to switch to application development rather than OS development. There wouldn't be a lot of money in the OS. They would not have control of what runs and how it runs. Perhaps an Open Source (this doesn't mean Linux) OS would work for this. Perhaps I've just got my head way up in the clouds :-) Perhaps what is old is new. This sounds a little bit like a very simple version of VMS. <span style="color:blue"> > Cloud computing presents an interesting change in security landscape.</span> Indeed. -- Kerry Brown MS-MVP - Windows Desktop Experience: Systems Administration http://www.vistahelp.ca/phpBB2/ http://vistahelpca.blogspot.com/ Quote
Guest Kerry Brown Posted August 2, 2008 Posted August 2, 2008 While I'm enjoying the conversation it's getting too disjointed with this coversation by proxy thing. I agree with some of Chris's points and disagree with others. I believe a new paradigm or way of thinking about what an OS is, is needed. I don't think any existing OS' can evolve into what is needed. It will require something new. I'll leave it at that. -- Kerry Brown MS-MVP - Windows Desktop Experience: Systems Administration http://www.vistahelp.ca/phpBB2/ http://vistahelpca.blogspot.com/ Quote
Guest Dan Posted August 2, 2008 Posted August 2, 2008 I just wanted to say Kerry Brown, you are truly awesome. I am old-school as well with programming done in BASIC way back in 1984 on an IBM PCjr that I still have. It actually belonged to my dad, Ivan but he has now given it to me. My mom, Toni bought it for a "special" price back in the day for only $900 which is a ton of money for back then but this computer was built to last and it still works! The amazing thing is that it had cordless keyboard technology that was provided with only 2 AA batteries and completely done on the hardware side courtesy of IBM (International Business Machine) and proudly made in Armonk, New York. Ah, this brings back the memories. Thank you so much Kerry Brown for this interesting discussion. "Kerry Brown" wrote: <span style="color:blue"> > "S. Pidgorny <MVP>" <slavickp@yahoo.com> wrote in message > news:e1gh55D9IHA.3648@TK2MSFTNGP03.phx.gbl...<span style="color:green"> > > G'day: > > > > "Kerry Brown" <kerry@kdbNOSPAMsys-tems.c a m> wrote in message > > news:OiROnV08IHA.4468@TK2MSFTNGP06.phx.gbl... > ><span style="color:darkred"> > >> To get back to the original topic. I think that given the future of > >> "cloud" computing or whatever you want to call it the network stack needs > >> to be at a very low level in the OS and completely protected from all > >> other processes including security software. A new code base is probably > >> needed for this. I see a very minimal hypervisor based OS with hardware > >> support, including networking, and not much else. Everything else would > >> run in virtual machines. Each application would have it's own virtual > >> machine and only talk to other applications and the OS through strictly > >> enforced communications channels. The application would be free to supply > >> it's own higher level OS, UI, or whatever you want to call it for it's > >> own virtual machine. Applications could also have their own virtual file > >> system completely inaccessible to other applications if they wanted. > >> Hardware is advancing at a pace that this will be be possible in the near > >> future if not already. We are currently using OS's that have security and > >> other problems because they were designed to make the most of minimal > >> hardware. Many compromises were made to get acceptable speed. We need an > >> OS that is aware that things exist "out there somewhere" but it's core is > >> isolated by hardware means. It's like having someone isolated in a > >> missile silo with only a telephone line for communications. You also need > >> a well guarded elevator to get a replacement operator and food in > >> (updates) but this elevator is a physical mechanism that is well guarded > >> and can be shut down in an emergency. All normal communications are done > >> only through the phone line.</span> > > > > I would say - using single OS kernel and libraries, without virtualisation > > layer and other interprocess barriers, is the most effective way to > > ustilise computing resources. > > > > We mustn't assume that the resources are unlimited. It is a popular > > assumption lately though. Which is why we have new generation of software > > that is capable of running like a snail even on more powerful systems, and > > many problems with performance are being solved by throwing more hardware > > at the issue. > ></span> > > My programming days are long past. Compared to when I was current (back in > the Z80 to 80486 timeframe) hardware resources are pretty much unlimited now > but the programming paradigm for the OS core doesn't seem to have changed > that much. Applications yes, OS not so much. I think a new paradigm is > needed. Hardware virtualization and cloud computing may be the catalyst > needed for this change. A completely new hypervisor based OS could be very > lean and thus very quick. The onus on features, UI, backwards compatibility, > etc., would be on the applications running in virtual machines. Applications > would stand or fail on their own merits. Rather than an application being > forced to present itself in a certain way to the user because that's what > the OS dictates it would be free to use the best UI for what it needs to do. > The OS would be invisible and irrelevant to most users. Application > development would obviously be harder but in the long run applications would > be easier to use because they aren't constrained by the OS. They would be > completely portable and thus able to take advantage of new hardware advances > immediately. They would not need to be running on the local hardware. The > application could be anywhere that the OS could communicate with. All the > application developer need supply to the local computer is an interface > between where the application exists and the OS. > > I don't see any of this evolving from any current OS. It's what I would like > to see happen. I believe eventually we will get to something like this. The > two main current commercial OS developers (Apple and Microsoft) have too > much invested to be able to change to this paradigm. Their whole focus would > have to switch to application development rather than OS development. There > wouldn't be a lot of money in the OS. They would not have control of what > runs and how it runs. Perhaps an Open Source (this doesn't mean Linux) OS > would work for this. Perhaps I've just got my head way up in the clouds :-) > Perhaps what is old is new. This sounds a little bit like a very simple > version of VMS. > <span style="color:green"> > > Cloud computing presents an interesting change in security landscape.</span> > > Indeed. > > -- > Kerry Brown > MS-MVP - Windows Desktop Experience: Systems Administration > http://www.vistahelp.ca/phpBB2/ > http://vistahelpca.blogspot.com/ > > > > > </span> Quote
Guest Kerry Brown Posted August 2, 2008 Posted August 2, 2008 "Dan" <Dan@discussions.microsoft.com> wrote in message news:B0EE2FA9-ABC2-4E13-AEC0-5457DDD74B19@microsoft.com...<span style="color:blue"> >I just wanted to say Kerry Brown, you are truly awesome. I am old-school >as</span> Thanks, but I think some of the others in the conversation are more "awesome" than me, at least in their low level understanding of current OS'. I'm a bit of a dreamer at times. -- Kerry Brown MS-MVP - Windows Desktop Experience: Systems Administration http://www.vistahelp.ca/phpBB2/ http://vistahelpca.blogspot.com/ Quote
Guest Dan Posted August 2, 2008 Posted August 2, 2008 Me too. I can fully relate and enjoying living in Dreamworld aka The Matrix or Just Plain old Dan World. BTW, people at school used to call me Danbo because I would pretend that I was in the military. I also have the nickname Danimal because of my aggressive nature sometimes and like to call myself Danster for some unknown even to me reason. You can see by this that I am quite interesting to say the least. <smiles> "Kerry Brown" wrote: <span style="color:blue"> > "Dan" <Dan@discussions.microsoft.com> wrote in message > news:B0EE2FA9-ABC2-4E13-AEC0-5457DDD74B19@microsoft.com...<span style="color:green"> > >I just wanted to say Kerry Brown, you are truly awesome. I am old-school > >as</span> > > > Thanks, but I think some of the others in the conversation are more > "awesome" than me, at least in their low level understanding of current OS'. > I'm a bit of a dreamer at times. > > -- > Kerry Brown > MS-MVP - Windows Desktop Experience: Systems Administration > http://www.vistahelp.ca/phpBB2/ > http://vistahelpca.blogspot.com/ > > > > > </span> Quote
Guest Dan Posted August 2, 2008 Posted August 2, 2008 Agreed. I think it is almost time to start a new topic on this but not right away of course and in the future and in my neck of the woods, it is Saturday afternoon. What about where you are at, Kerry and I hope you can forgive me being nosy but it that has always been a part of the nature of Dan. <chuckles> "Kerry Brown" wrote: <span style="color:blue"> > > While I'm enjoying the conversation it's getting too disjointed with this > coversation by proxy thing. I agree with some of Chris's points and disagree > with others. I believe a new paradigm or way of thinking about what an OS > is, is needed. I don't think any existing OS' can evolve into what is > needed. It will require something new. I'll leave it at that. > > -- > Kerry Brown > MS-MVP - Windows Desktop Experience: Systems Administration > http://www.vistahelp.ca/phpBB2/ > http://vistahelpca.blogspot.com/ > > > > > </span> Quote
Guest Kerry Brown Posted August 2, 2008 Posted August 2, 2008 "Dan" <Dan@discussions.microsoft.com> wrote in message news:23BE9673-EB0C-43FD-BA30-B0CF6ADB8750@microsoft.com...<span style="color:blue"> > Agreed. I think it is almost time to start a new topic on this but not > right > away of course and in the future and in my neck of the woods, it is > Saturday > afternoon. What about where you are at, Kerry and I hope you can forgive > me > being nosy but it that has always been a part of the nature of Dan. > <chuckles></span> http://www.vistahelp.ca/about/about.htm -- Kerry Brown MS-MVP - Windows Desktop Experience: Systems Administration http://www.vistahelp.ca/phpBB2/ http://vistahelpca.blogspot.com/ Quote
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