Guest pbamvv@worldonline.nl Posted June 16, 2007 Posted June 16, 2007 On 15 jun, 19:40, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 14 Jun, 20:50, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > wrote: > > > > > > > On 12 jun, 23:49, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 12 Jun, 17:31, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > wrote: > > > > > On 11 jun, 18:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > I think you understand Fred and me. > > > > > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to > > > > > avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to > > > > > you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post. > > > > > Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the > > > > > answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable > > > > > of doing it yourself. > > > > > > I had asked: > > > > > ---------- > > > > > Do you see that the following is always true: > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > You replied: > > > > > ---------- > > > > > Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true > > > > > > If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it > > > > > does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead > > > > > (or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M). > > > > > > A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can > > > > > influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may > > > > > use the state of synapses that constitutes P. > > > > > > To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on > > > > > it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong > > > > > balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may > > > > > even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then > > > > > black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its > > > > > bouncing. > > > > > > Nevertheless its composition is. > > > > > > M = a ball > > > > > B(M) = the bouncing of the ball. > > > > > P = a property of the ball > > > > > If P = the colour, your assessment is right. > > > > > If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong. > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive > > > > > as: > > > > > ---------- > > > > > So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property > > > > > of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property > > > > > isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true, > > > > > and so is (2). > > > > > > With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the > > > > > ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not > > > > > be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true. > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > > > > > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > > > > > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > > > > > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > > > > > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as > > > > > above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be > > > > > thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that > > > > > particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the > > > > > biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was > > > > > correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2). > > > > > > If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves, > > > > > which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without, > > > > > then (1) would not be true. > > > > > > You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is > > > > > presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world > > > > > perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit, > > > > > that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and > > > > > thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same? > > > > > You keep on assuming that subjective experiences do not have physical > > > > properties. > > > > However they do. Subjective experiences are memories (either temporary > > > > or lasting) > > > > These memories do influence our behaviour as you very well know. > > > > Although I do not know how memories are actually "stored" in cortex, > > > > we have ample proof that they are. Of course we can theoretically > > > > explain our conduct mechanically without realizing that the synapse > > > > behaviour we are describing is actually the act of "remembering" but > > > > that does not change the fact, that without the information coming > > > > from our memory our behaviour would change drastically. > > > > > In my previous example of my computer program > > > > you can explain the working by the hexadecimal machine code (a mix of > > > > numbers and the letters A,B,C,D, E and F) and totally ignore what they > > > > mean, > > > > but that does not mean that the fact that the employee is a female > > > > does not matter! > > > > > Likewise you can explain human behaviour by the chemical working of > > > > synapses, > > > > but that does not mean in doesn't matter whether I thought I saw > > > > Ashley or Kate. > > > > > Humans are actually using subjective experiences to guide their > > > > behaviour. > > > > > I started re-reading "consciousness explained" by Daniel C. Dennett, > > > > and found out his idea of consciousness goes one step further than I > > > > thought. He thinks consciousness is caused by ideas in our head, that > > > > make us think in a conscious way. Ideas that we have mostly learned > > > > from other people. > > > > I am not sure that is correct. To me everything we can theoretically > > > > remember and theoretically communicate about, is a subjective > > > > experience and is or has been part of our consciousness. > > > > But the fact that almost nobody can remember much of his/her early > > > > childhood, might mean that Dennett is right. > > > > But it would be a good thing to read to book anyway. (did you read it > > > > already?) > > > > I can understand that you have been deceived by Dennet's explanation. > > > I can show it to be a deception. > > > > Step 1. > > > > Do you understand that if there was a robot, no matter how it behaved, > > > as long as it followed the known laws of physics, and therefore its > > > behaviour could be explained to you in these terms, you wouldn't know > > > whether it actually had any subjective experiences or not. This isn't > > > about what your guess would be, it is about the truth about what you > > > know. Nor is it a statement that the robot couldn't be subjectively > > > experiencing by the way, in case you were going to disingeniously > > > suggest that it was.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > If the Robot could make deduction from its data and its memory and > > report them, I would have to assume it had a subjective experience. > > What else is a subjective experience, but an experience that is > > "coloured" by previous acquired information? > > > The robot - for instance - could have been imprinted with the idea > > "someone is an idiot" and then, after reading your post, conclude that > > the best way to react was to answer: "You are definitely an idiot". > > > The only difference between the robot and me as far as this event is > > concerned, is that my memory contains the postulate "other people who > > post on the NG have a brain similar to mine", which causes me to > > continue trying to communicate even if the communication is very > > difficult because you an me seem to have a different opinion on what > > we think a "Subjective experience" is. > > > Interesting to see you consider yourself able to disprove a man with > > the capabilities of Daniel C Dennet! > > > The fact that I cannot even take this first step with you may show > > you, that is not such an easy thing to do. > > > Someone2's Postulate : > > We cannot tell if entity R has subjective experiences. > > > Peter van Velzen's postulate: > > If entity R can be shown to make a report on an experience that is > > influenced by previous information, this means entity R has an > > subjective experience. > > (Especially if the previous information may not be true) > > If you could get Daniel Dennet, or any other person who has encouraged > people away from God, to come onto this group, and enter a debate > (maybe you could tell him how highly you regard him or whatever, and > ask for his help, and inform him that someone is saying he reasoning > is implausible, and that he is too cowardly to enter into an open > debate on the internet, or whatever), then I will show you how silly > he is.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - O, he knows people think they know better than him. He might not know that someone who makes about 20 posts without getting anywhere near what the subject suggests does so. Can you please get to the point, and give us a hint as to why materialism could possible be implausible? So far you have only started out some riddle game, and being frustrated by the fact that we do not agree to you premises, embarked on another one, finding out that one too doesn't do the trick. I still agree with Dennett that in fact it is dualism that is implausible: How can a Ghost influence matter without being observable? How can it be invisible (not interfere with electromagnetic waves), and still see (intercept electromagnetic waves) Or like Dennett put it: How can Casper the friendly ghost, move an object and yet pass thru it? Materialism is the result of verificationism: If it cannot be verified, it don't mean a thing, for apparently whether it is there or not doesn't change anything or anybody. By the way: I do not mention Dennett as an authority, I just think I owe it to him, to tell you I learned from reading his book. So far I didn't learn much from your post, except that it gave me the good Idea to read Dennett's book once more. Peter van Velzen June 2007 Amstelveen The Netherlands Quote
Guest pbamvv@worldonline.nl Posted June 16, 2007 Posted June 16, 2007 On 15 jun, 19:51, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 15 Jun, 18:40, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 14 Jun, 20:50, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > wrote: > > > > On 12 jun, 23:49, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 12 Jun, 17:31, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > On 11 jun, 18:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > I think you understand Fred and me. > > > > > > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to > > > > > > avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to > > > > > > you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post. > > > > > > Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the > > > > > > answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable > > > > > > of doing it yourself. > > > > > > > I had asked: > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > Do you see that the following is always true: > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > You replied: > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true > > > > > > > If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it > > > > > > does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead > > > > > > (or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M). > > > > > > > A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can > > > > > > influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may > > > > > > use the state of synapses that constitutes P. > > > > > > > To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on > > > > > > it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong > > > > > > balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may > > > > > > even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then > > > > > > black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its > > > > > > bouncing. > > > > > > > Nevertheless its composition is. > > > > > > > M = a ball > > > > > > B(M) = the bouncing of the ball. > > > > > > P = a property of the ball > > > > > > If P = the colour, your assessment is right. > > > > > > If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong. > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive > > > > > > as: > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property > > > > > > of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property > > > > > > isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true, > > > > > > and so is (2). > > > > > > > With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the > > > > > > ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not > > > > > > be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true. > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > > > > > > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > > > > > > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > > > > > > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > > > > > > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as > > > > > > above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be > > > > > > thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that > > > > > > particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the > > > > > > biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was > > > > > > correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2). > > > > > > > If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves, > > > > > > which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without, > > > > > > then (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is > > > > > > presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world > > > > > > perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit, > > > > > > that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and > > > > > > thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same? > > > > > > You keep on assuming that subjective experiences do not have physical > > > > > properties. > > > > > However they do. Subjective experiences are memories (either temporary > > > > > or lasting) > > > > > These memories do influence our behaviour as you very well know. > > > > > Although I do not know how memories are actually "stored" in cortex, > > > > > we have ample proof that they are. Of course we can theoretically > > > > > explain our conduct mechanically without realizing that the synapse > > > > > behaviour we are describing is actually the act of "remembering" but > > > > > that does not change the fact, that without the information coming > > > > > from our memory our behaviour would change drastically. > > > > > > In my previous example of my computer program > > > > > you can explain the working by the hexadecimal machine code (a mix of > > > > > numbers and the letters A,B,C,D, E and F) and totally ignore what they > > > > > mean, > > > > > but that does not mean that the fact that the employee is a female > > > > > does not matter! > > > > > > Likewise you can explain human behaviour by the chemical working of > > > > > synapses, > > > > > but that does not mean in doesn't matter whether I thought I saw > > > > > Ashley or Kate. > > > > > > Humans are actually using subjective experiences to guide their > > > > > behaviour. > > > > > > I started re-reading "consciousness explained" by Daniel C. Dennett, > > > > > and found out his idea of consciousness goes one step further than I > > > > > thought. He thinks consciousness is caused by ideas in our head, that > > > > > make us think in a conscious way. Ideas that we have mostly learned > > > > > from other people. > > > > > I am not sure that is correct. To me everything we can theoretically > > > > > remember and theoretically communicate about, is a subjective > > > > > experience and is or has been part of our consciousness. > > > > > But the fact that almost nobody can remember much of his/her early > > > > > childhood, might mean that Dennett is right. > > > > > But it would be a good thing to read to book anyway. (did you read it > > > > > already?) > > > > > I can understand that you have been deceived by Dennet's explanation. > > > > I can show it to be a deception. > > > > > Step 1. > > > > > Do you understand that if there was a robot, no matter how it behaved, > > > > as long as it followed the known laws of physics, and therefore its > > > > behaviour could be explained to you in these terms, you wouldn't know > > > > whether it actually had any subjective experiences or not. This isn't > > > > about what your guess would be, it is about the truth about what you > > > > know. Nor is it a statement that the robot couldn't be subjectively > > > > experiencing by the way, in case you were going to disingeniously > > > > suggest that it was.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > If the Robot could make deduction from its data and its memory and > > > report them, I would have to assume it had a subjective experience. > > > What else is a subjective experience, but an experience that is > > > "coloured" by previous acquired information? > > > > The robot - for instance - could have been imprinted with the idea > > > "someone is an idiot" and then, after reading your post, conclude that > > > the best way to react was to answer: "You are definitely an idiot". > > > > The only difference between the robot and me as far as this event is > > > concerned, is that my memory contains the postulate "other people who > > > post on the NG have a brain similar to mine", which causes me to > > > continue trying to communicate even if the communication is very > > > difficult because you an me seem to have a different opinion on what > > > we think a "Subjective experience" is. > > > > Interesting to see you consider yourself able to disprove a man with > > > the capabilities of Daniel C Dennet! > > > > The fact that I cannot even take this first step with you may show > > > you, that is not such an easy thing to do. > > > > Someone2's Postulate : > > > We cannot tell if entity R has subjective experiences. > > > > Peter van Velzen's postulate: > > > If entity R can be shown to make a report on an experience that is > > > influenced by previous information, this means entity R has an > > > subjective experience. > > > (Especially if the previous information may not be true) > > > If you could get Daniel Dennet, or any other person who has encouraged > > people away from God, to come onto this group, and enter a debate > > (maybe you could tell him how highly you regard him or whatever, and > > ask for his help, and inform him that someone is saying he reasoning > > is implausible, and that he is too cowardly to enter into an open > > debate on the internet, or whatever), then I will show you how silly > > he is. > > When I say any other person, I mean someone who has a highly > publicised publication, like maybe Dawkins etc.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - Try: http://richarddawkins.net/ Quote
Deathbringer Posted June 16, 2007 Posted June 16, 2007 On 12 Jun, 16:28, Deathbringer <Deathbringer.2s2...@wpyo.bbs.local> wrote: > someone2;1504729 Wrote: > > > Jeff understands it, whereas you still don't understand that where: > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > and where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and > > (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > As you don't understand it, you don't think it is shown, but you will > > never until the day you are no longer being presented with the > > physical world be able to give an example where it isn't true. > > It is perfectly logical so far, but its incomplete. Now, explain to me > how P not effecting B(M) translates into humans having souls. Assume I'm > stupid. Put it in simplest possible terms. >[/color] It shows that subjective experiences couldn't be said influence the behaviour of any mechanism simply following the laws of physics. The reason for rejecting that we are simply biological mechanism following the known laws of physics, is that our behaviour couldn't be influenced by any subjective experiences that we had (the known laws of physics show us this). So philosphers couldn't be discussing qualia because of their existance, nor could people talking about anything the subjectively experienced because of the experience, nor could we be even having this discussion because conscious experiences existed. The existance of them would have to be coincidental to behaviour. It is the required coincidence that makes the story of us being simply biological mechanisms implausible. Without the assertion that we are simply biological mechanisms, there would be no reason to suggest that any mechanism following the known laws of physics had any subjective experiences, nor could they explain how or why they should have. So it show's the story that all there is is the physical, that was 'seen' by the so called intelligent (atheists), wasn't even a plausible story. It was written that it would happen, and that their 'intelligence' would vanish http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Isaiah%2029&version=31 Isaiah 29:14-16 14 Therefore once more I will astound these people with wonder upon wonder; the wisdom of the wise will perish, the intelligence of the intelligent will vanish." 15 Woe to those who go to great depths to hide their plans from the LORD, who do their work in darkness and think, "Who sees us? Who will know?" 16 You turn things upside down, as if the potter were thought to be like the clay! Shall what is formed say to him who formed it, "He did not make me"? Can the pot say of the potter, "He knows nothing"? I will demonstrate what lead me to search through by typing this response to your question. Somewhere, both the RAM on my computer and the hard drive of a massive server somewhere just got influenced by my actions. Next time somebody goes to the URL for this thread, the server will act differently because of its own individual experience. Logically, the Usenet server has a soul. To quote you: > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > and where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and > > (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. To paraphrase: Server refers to the Usenet server. B(Server) refers to the behavior of the server. Soul refers to the property of having a soul. These variables do not change usage between parts of the proof. 1. B(Server) is explained by the laws of physics without gathering knowledge about whether or not it has Soul. 2. Presence or lack of a soul does not influence/affect B(Server), else the explanation of behavior would not be the same with or without Soul. Now, had I done an experiment and magically bestowed the Usenet server with a soul and observed that its behavior did not change, it would be logical to assume that the Usenet server always had property Soul. As it is, we actually have no idea if Soul influences B(Server) and therefore such reasoning really is as silly as it sounds. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 17, 2007 Posted June 17, 2007 On 16 Jun, 14:49, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> wrote: > On 15 jun, 19:40, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > On 14 Jun, 20:50, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > wrote: > > > > On 12 jun, 23:49, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 12 Jun, 17:31, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > On 11 jun, 18:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > I think you understand Fred and me. > > > > > > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to > > > > > > avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to > > > > > > you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post. > > > > > > Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the > > > > > > answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable > > > > > > of doing it yourself. > > > > > > > I had asked: > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > Do you see that the following is always true: > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > You replied: > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true > > > > > > > If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it > > > > > > does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead > > > > > > (or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M). > > > > > > > A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can > > > > > > influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may > > > > > > use the state of synapses that constitutes P. > > > > > > > To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on > > > > > > it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong > > > > > > balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may > > > > > > even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then > > > > > > black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its > > > > > > bouncing. > > > > > > > Nevertheless its composition is. > > > > > > > M = a ball > > > > > > B(M) = the bouncing of the ball. > > > > > > P = a property of the ball > > > > > > If P = the colour, your assessment is right. > > > > > > If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong. > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive > > > > > > as: > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property > > > > > > of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property > > > > > > isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true, > > > > > > and so is (2). > > > > > > > With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the > > > > > > ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not > > > > > > be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true. > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > > > > > > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > > > > > > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > > > > > > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > > > > > > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as > > > > > > above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be > > > > > > thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that > > > > > > particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the > > > > > > biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was > > > > > > correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2). > > > > > > > If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves, > > > > > > which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without, > > > > > > then (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is > > > > > > presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world > > > > > > perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit, > > > > > > that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and > > > > > > thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same? > > > > > > You keep on assuming that subjective experiences do not have physical > > > > > properties. > > > > > However they do. Subjective experiences are memories (either temporary > > > > > or lasting) > > > > > These memories do influence our behaviour as you very well know. > > > > > Although I do not know how memories are actually "stored" in cortex, > > > > > we have ample proof that they are. Of course we can theoretically > > > > > explain our conduct mechanically without realizing that the synapse > > > > > behaviour we are describing is actually the act of "remembering" but > > > > > that does not change the fact, that without the information coming > > > > > from our memory our behaviour would change drastically. > > > > > > In my previous example of my computer program > > > > > you can explain the working by the hexadecimal machine code (a mix of > > > > > numbers and the letters A,B,C,D, E and F) and totally ignore what they > > > > > mean, > > > > > but that does not mean that the fact that the employee is a female > > > > > does not matter! > > > > > > Likewise you can explain human behaviour by the chemical working of > > > > > synapses, > > > > > but that does not mean in doesn't matter whether I thought I saw > > > > > Ashley or Kate. > > > > > > Humans are actually using subjective experiences to guide their > > > > > behaviour. > > > > > > I started re-reading "consciousness explained" by Daniel C. Dennett, > > > > > and found out his idea of consciousness goes one step further than I > > > > > thought. He thinks consciousness is caused by ideas in our head, that > > > > > make us think in a conscious way. Ideas that we have mostly learned > > > > > from other people. > > > > > I am not sure that is correct. To me everything we can theoretically > > > > > remember and theoretically communicate about, is a subjective > > > > > experience and is or has been part of our consciousness. > > > > > But the fact that almost nobody can remember much of his/her early > > > > > childhood, might mean that Dennett is right. > > > > > But it would be a good thing to read to book anyway. (did you read it > > > > > already?) > > > > > I can understand that you have been deceived by Dennet's explanation. > > > > I can show it to be a deception. > > > > > Step 1. > > > > > Do you understand that if there was a robot, no matter how it behaved, > > > > as long as it followed the known laws of physics, and therefore its > > > > behaviour could be explained to you in these terms, you wouldn't know > > > > whether it actually had any subjective experiences or not. This isn't > > > > about what your guess would be, it is about the truth about what you > > > > know. Nor is it a statement that the robot couldn't be subjectively > > > > experiencing by the way, in case you were going to disingeniously > > > > suggest that it was.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > If the Robot could make deduction from its data and its memory and > > > report them, I would have to assume it had a subjective experience. > > > What else is a subjective experience, but an experience that is > > > "coloured" by previous acquired information? > > > > The robot - for instance - could have been imprinted with the idea > > > "someone is an idiot" and then, after reading your post, conclude that > > > the best way to react was to answer: "You are definitely an idiot". > > > > The only difference between the robot and me as far as this event is > > > concerned, is that my memory contains the postulate "other people who > > > post on the NG have a brain similar to mine", which causes me to > > > continue trying to communicate even if the communication is very > > > difficult because you an me seem to have a different opinion on what > > > we think a "Subjective experience" is. > > > > Interesting to see you consider yourself able to disprove a man with > > > the capabilities of Daniel C Dennet! > > > > The fact that I cannot even take this first step with you may show > > > you, that is not such an easy thing to do. > > > > Someone2's Postulate : > > > We cannot tell if entity R has subjective experiences. > > > > Peter van Velzen's postulate: > > > If entity R can be shown to make a report on an experience that is > > > influenced by previous information, this means entity R has an > > > subjective experience. > > > (Especially if the previous information may not be true) > > > If you could get Daniel Dennet, or any other person who has encouraged > > people away from God, to come onto this group, and enter a debate > > (maybe you could tell him how highly you regard him or whatever, and > > ask for his help, and inform him that someone is saying he reasoning > > is implausible, and that he is too cowardly to enter into an open > > debate on the internet, or whatever), then I will show you how silly > > he is.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > O, he knows people think they know better than him. He might not know > that someone who makes about 20 posts without getting anywhere near > what the subject suggests does so. Can you please get to the point, > and give us a hint as to why materialism could possible be > implausible? > > So far you have only started out some riddle game, and being > frustrated by the fact that we do not agree to you premises, embarked > on another one, finding out that one too doesn't do the trick. > > I still agree with Dennett that in fact it is dualism that is > implausible: > How can a Ghost influence matter without being observable? > How can it be invisible (not interfere with electromagnetic waves), > and still see (intercept electromagnetic waves) > > Or like Dennett put it: > How can Casper the friendly ghost, move an object and yet pass thru > it? > > Materialism is the result of verificationism: If it cannot be > verified, it don't mean a thing, for apparently whether it is there or > not doesn't change anything or anybody. > > By the way: I do not mention Dennett as an authority, I just think I > owe it to him, to tell you I learned from reading his book. So far I > didn't learn much from your post, except that it gave me the good Idea > to read Dennett's book once more. > Dennet didn't know what reality was. There is only the spiritual. You are presented with the physical world. What objections does he have with regards to that? Isaiah 29, vs 14:16 (http://www.biblegateway.com/ passage/?search=Isaiah%2029&version=31 )stated how the people that you regard 'intelligent' like Dennet would turn reality upside down with physicalism. Though if you took there assumption away that we were simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, why would you think that anything that did follow the laws of physics had any subjective experiences at all? Not to mention what would know what the neural state represented in the story he pedals? It's not like we get a direct experience of neural state like fluctuations in the colour green, the brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing at anyone time. Consider a robot, if the data was working on was encrypted, would you think that the encryption would always be decyphered and it would still experience what the state represented? Don't you get that teddy bears don't have subjective experiences, nor do the more advanced toys we have for children now, and neither would any robot no matter how complicated you made it, nor what 'special' configuration its internal state was. Do you think that the technology companies should budget for when the complexity or configuration of what they produce, causes it to be freed from the laws of physics? If not, then can you see that all anythink they would make would do is behave as it was built to behave. Is it that it would only have subjective experiences if it was built to talk about them? Are you so blinkered by you ego so as not to allow any reason to pierce your assumptions that God doesn't exist, and that we are simply a biological mechanism. How do you explain that jien...@aol.com managed to understand what was being said, yet to the atheists here it was all a 'word salad'? You say you haven't heard any objections to materialism, well perhaps it's because you only hear what you want to hear. Like the people who claimed to have seen the Emporer's New Clothes, you still don't get that the deception has been seen through. It is implausible that we only coincidentally have the subjective experiences that we express in our behaviour, and they couldn't be influential if it was the materialist/physicalist story, any more than they could influence the behaviour of a robot. There is only one path it could follow, and that would be the laws of physics, whether it had subjective experiences or not. If you don't get this, then maybe go through the posts, I have explained it more than once. If you still think you are looking intelligent, believing the deceptive story you have been told then think again. Quote
Guest minsky@media.mit.edu Posted June 17, 2007 Posted June 17, 2007 On Jun 15, 1:54 am, t268...@safe-mail.net wrote: > On Jun 6, 11:53 pm, "minsky...@media.mit.edu" <min...@media.mit.edu> > wrote: > > "Evidently some people maintain that "subjective experience" can never > be explained in terms of physical processes. They offer reasons for > this opinion, but none of those make much sense to me." > > You have put forward one reason in your (superb) essay Matter, Mind > and Models - in the passage about primitives. You end that argument > with the sentence: > > "The primitive notions of physics, or even of > neurophysiology, will be far too remote to be useful in commonsense > explanations of the mental events of everyday life." > > But I would argue there are no explanations that are 1) not > commonsense and 2) valid. How can you call an explanation something > that does not make sense to you - in any common way? With those that > make common sense I can make inferences, I can be inspired, and so > on. I think there's a slight misunderstanding here, because I was using "commonsense explanation" in the sense that I meant to exclude "an explanation that involves a body of concepts that are not easy to express in everyday language. Otherwise, in fact, I agree with most of what you said (and very well) in this message. Although, when biologists tell the public that they are studying "life," I don't think that many of them still believe that this subject involves a vital force. And I don't see the great relevance of the environment, although of course a cell won't last long unless it has access to metabolites. Unless, we extend the word "life" to include larger-scale interactions of cells, organisms, species, and ecologies, etc. An example of the kind of problem that I've encountered was trying to tell old-time neurologists about the distinction between a "compiled' program and one that works by "interpreting" a description in some higher-level representation. And, yes, one can explain that distinction in commonsense parlance, but this usually takes a good part of an hour, and usually requires a couple of diagrams. So eventually, one can transmit such a concept, but usually one can't get their attention for long enough to do accomplish that. That's why technical subjects need specialized jargons. It is 20 years since "The Society of Mind," and I have not yet met any neuroscientists who know how to use many computational concept. Can you imagine how annoyed I was to read, in the main review on the Amazon page for "The Emotion Machine," Richard Restak's complaint that: "Many states of mind -- fear, joy, desire -- can now be shown through brain imaging techniques. This would be closer to an "explanation" for the mind, it seems to me, than anything offered by Minksy's employment of such obscure terms as "imprimers," "trans-frames," "K-lines," "credit assignments" and "micronemes," which have no agreed-on scientific meaning and seem, as Minsky concedes, "hopelessly vague." Except for "imprimer" which is new, those concepts have beenin the jargon of AI for more than 20 years, yet are not part of commonsense neurology. (The rest of the review is even worse, except for some gratuitous compliments about the writing.) Does he really think that he can explain how 'desire' works from seeing some undescribed activities in various regions of a brain? Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 17, 2007 Posted June 17, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1182041622.361637.273930@u2g2000hsc.googlegroups.com... > Dennet didn't know what reality was. There is only the spiritual. Ok .. we've got a religious nutter .. and I thought he was going to speak logic. [snip religious drivel] > You say you haven't heard any objections to materialism, well perhaps > it's because you only hear what you want to hear. Like the people who > claimed to have seen the Emporer's New Clothes, you still don't get > that the deception has been seen through. It is implausible that we > only coincidentally have the subjective experiences that we express in > our behaviour, and they couldn't be influential if it was the > materialist/physicalist story, any more than they could influence the > behaviour of a robot. There is only one path it could follow, and that > would be the laws of physics, whether it had subjective experiences or > not. If you don't get this, then maybe go through the posts, I have > explained it more than once. If you still think you are looking > intelligent, believing the deceptive story you have been told then > think again. You've not provided any rational objections or arguments against materialism. I've asked repeatedly for you to present your case in one single post, and so far nothing. is it because you don't actually HAVE a logical argument to present .. and you're just a religious nutcase who thought he could prove the existence of god or souls logically, but failed and so has retreated into spouting religious dogma? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 17, 2007 Posted June 17, 2007 On 17 Jun, 10:57, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1182041622.361637.273930@u2g2000hsc.googlegroups.com... > > > Dennet didn't know what reality was. There is only the spiritual. > > Ok .. we've got a religious nutter .. and I thought he was going to speak > logic. > > [snip religious drivel] > > > You say you haven't heard any objections to materialism, well perhaps > > it's because you only hear what you want to hear. Like the people who > > claimed to have seen the Emporer's New Clothes, you still don't get > > that the deception has been seen through. It is implausible that we > > only coincidentally have the subjective experiences that we express in > > our behaviour, and they couldn't be influential if it was the > > materialist/physicalist story, any more than they could influence the > > behaviour of a robot. There is only one path it could follow, and that > > would be the laws of physics, whether it had subjective experiences or > > not. If you don't get this, then maybe go through the posts, I have > > explained it more than once. If you still think you are looking > > intelligent, believing the deceptive story you have been told then > > think again. > > You've not provided any rational objections or arguments against > materialism. I've asked repeatedly for you to present your case in one > single post, and so far nothing. is it because you don't actually HAVE a > logical argument to present .. and you're just a religious nutcase who > thought he could prove the existence of god or souls logically, but failed > and so has retreated into spouting religious dogma? So you didn't manage to understand the following reasoning: M refers to the physical entity in question. B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. P refers to the a property in question. Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has P or not. 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. If (1) is true, then (2) is true. And no, its not just a 'word salad', it is a reasoned argument. As were other objections in the post you replied to but snipped, such as: We don't have a direct experience of neural state like fluctuations in the colour green, the brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing at anyone time, for example, and there is nothing that would know what the neural state represented in physicalism. Consider a robot, if the data was working on was encrypted, would you think that the encryption would always be decyphered and it would still experience what the state represented? There is no reasoning behind why a complicated configuration would cause it to be conscious, and without the assertion that we were simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, why would you think that anything that did follow the laws of physics had any subjective experiences at all? Just because you are deaf to any objections, doesn't mean there aren't any, and if jien...@aol.com managed to understand, then why can't you? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 17, 2007 Posted June 17, 2007 On 16 Jun, 21:30, Deathbringer <Deathbringer.2sa...@wpyo.bbs.local> wrote: > someone2;1505216 Wrote: > > > > > > > On 12 Jun, 16:28, Deathbringer <Deathbringer.2s2...@wpyo.bbs.local> > > wrote: > > > someone2;1504729 Wrote: > > > > > Jeff understands it, whereas you still don't understand that > > where: > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > and where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) > > and > > > > (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else > > the > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > As you don't understand it, you don't think it is shown, but you > > will > > > > never until the day you are no longer being presented with the > > > > physical world be able to give an example where it isn't true. > > > > It is perfectly logical so far, but its incomplete. Now, explain to > > me > > > how P not effecting B(M) translates into humans having souls. Assume > > I'm > > > stupid. Put it in simplest possible terms. > > > > > > It shows that subjective experiences couldn't be said influence the > > behaviour of any mechanism simply following the laws of physics. > > > The reason for rejecting that we are simply biological mechanism > > following the known laws of physics, is that our behaviour couldn't be > > influenced by any subjective experiences that we had (the known laws > > of physics show us this). So philosphers couldn't be discussing qualia > > because of their existance, nor could people talking about anything > > the subjectively experienced because of the experience, nor could we > > be even having this discussion because conscious experiences existed. > > The existance of them would have to be coincidental to behaviour. It > > is the required coincidence that makes the story of us being simply > > biological mechanisms implausible. > > > Without the assertion that we are simply biological mechanisms, there > > would be no reason to suggest that any mechanism following the known > > laws of physics had any subjective experiences, nor could they explain > > how or why they should have. > > > So it show's the story that all there is is the physical, that was > > 'seen' by the so called intelligent (atheists), wasn't even a > > plausible story. > > > It was written that it would happen, and that their 'intelligence' > > would vanish > > >http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Isaiah%2029&version=31 > > > Isaiah 29:14-16 > > > 14 Therefore once more I will astound these people > > with wonder upon wonder; > > the wisdom of the wise will perish, > > the intelligence of the intelligent will vanish." > > > 15 Woe to those who go to great depths > > to hide their plans from the LORD, > > who do their work in darkness and think, > > "Who sees us? Who will know?" > > > 16 You turn things upside down, > > as if the potter were thought to be like the clay! > > Shall what is formed say to him who formed it, > > "He did not make me"? > > Can the pot say of the potter, > > "He knows nothing"? > > I will demonstrate what lead me to search through by typing this > response to your question. > > Somewhere, both the RAM on my computer and the hard drive of a massive > server somewhere just got influenced by my actions. Next time somebody > goes to the URL for this thread, the server will act differently because > of its own individual experience. > > Logically, the Usenet server has a soul. > > To quote you: > > > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > and where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) > and > > > (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else > the > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > To paraphrase: > > Server refers to the Usenet server. > B(Server) refers to the behavior of the server. > Soul refers to the property of having a soul. > > These variables do not change usage between parts of the proof. > > 1. B(Server) is explained by the laws of physics without gathering > knowledge about whether or not it has Soul. > > 2. Presence or lack of a soul does not influence/affect B(Server), else > the explanation of behavior would not be the same with or without Soul. > > Now, had I done an experiment and magically bestowed the Usenet server > with a soul and observed that its behavior did not change, it would be > logical to assume that the Usenet server always had property Soul. > > As it is, we actually have no idea if Soul influences B(Server) and > therefore such reasoning really is as silly as it sounds. >[/color] Did you understand the way the reasoning works, it has nothing to do with the behaviour suddenly changing, it is whether its behaviour can be explained without knowledge of a given property. Whether the usenet did have a soul or not, could not influence its behaviour, as the network would simply follow the laws of physics, thus the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether it had a soul or not. I don't see the point you were trying to make, the reasoning still holds true. If your point was that you didn't understand why the implications of the reasoning show physicalism to be implausible, then I guess you would have made your point. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 17, 2007 Posted June 17, 2007 On 17 Jun, 21:36, Deathbringer <Deathbringer.2sc...@wpyo.bbs.local> wrote: > someone2;1513858 Wrote: > > > > > > > On 16 Jun, 21:30, Deathbringer <Deathbringer.2sa...@wpyo.bbs.local> > > wrote: > > > someone2;1505216 Wrote: > > > > > On 12 Jun, 16:28, Deathbringer > > <Deathbringer.2s2...@wpyo.bbs.local> > > > > wrote: > > > > > someone2;1504729 Wrote: > > > > > > > Jeff understands it, whereas you still don't understand that > > > > where: > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > and where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in > > (1) > > > > and > > > > > > (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), > > else > > > > the > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without > > P. > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > > > As you don't understand it, you don't think it is shown, but > > you > > > > will > > > > > > never until the day you are no longer being presented with the > > > > > > physical world be able to give an example where it isn't true. > > > > > > It is perfectly logical so far, but its incomplete. Now, explain > > to > > > > me > > > > > how P not effecting B(M) translates into humans having souls. > > Assume > > > > I'm > > > > > stupid. Put it in simplest possible terms. > > > > > It shows that subjective experiences couldn't be said influence > > the > > > > behaviour of any mechanism simply following the laws of physics. > > > > > The reason for rejecting that we are simply biological mechanism > > > > following the known laws of physics, is that our behaviour couldn't > > be > > > > influenced by any subjective experiences that we had (the known > > laws > > > > of physics show us this). So philosphers couldn't be discussing > > qualia > > > > because of their existance, nor could people talking about > > anything > > > > the subjectively experienced because of the experience, nor could > > we > > > > be even having this discussion because conscious experiences > > existed. > > > > The existance of them would have to be coincidental to behaviour. > > It > > > > is the required coincidence that makes the story of us being > > simply > > > > biological mechanisms implausible. > > > > > Without the assertion that we are simply biological mechanisms, > > there > > > > would be no reason to suggest that any mechanism following the > > known > > > > laws of physics had any subjective experiences, nor could they > > explain > > > > how or why they should have. > > > > > So it show's the story that all there is is the physical, that was > > > > 'seen' by the so called intelligent (atheists), wasn't even a > > > > plausible story. > > > > > It was written that it would happen, and that their 'intelligence' > > > > would vanish > > > > >http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Isaiah%2029&version=31 > > > > > Isaiah 29:14-16 > > > > > 14 Therefore once more I will astound these people > > > > with wonder upon wonder; > > > > the wisdom of the wise will perish, > > > > the intelligence of the intelligent will vanish." > > > > > 15 Woe to those who go to great depths > > > > to hide their plans from the LORD, > > > > who do their work in darkness and think, > > > > "Who sees us? Who will know?" > > > > > 16 You turn things upside down, > > > > as if the potter were thought to be like the clay! > > > > Shall what is formed say to him who formed it, > > > > "He did not make me"? > > > > Can the pot say of the potter, > > > > "He knows nothing"? > > > > I will demonstrate what lead me to search through by typing this > > > response to your question. > > > > Somewhere, both the RAM on my computer and the hard drive of a > > massive > > > server somewhere just got influenced by my actions. Next time > > somebody > > > goes to the URL for this thread, the server will act differently > > because > > > of its own individual experience. > > > > Logically, the Usenet server has a soul. > > > > To quote you: > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > and where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) > > > and > > > > > (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), > > else > > > the > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without > > P. > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > To paraphrase: > > > > Server refers to the Usenet server. > > > B(Server) refers to the behavior of the server. > > > Soul refers to the property of having a soul. > > > > These variables do not change usage between parts of the proof. > > > > 1. B(Server) is explained by the laws of physics without gathering > > > knowledge about whether or not it has Soul. > > > > 2. Presence or lack of a soul does not influence/affect B(Server), > > else > > > the explanation of behavior would not be the same with or without > > Soul. > > > > Now, had I done an experiment and magically bestowed the Usenet > > server > > > with a soul and observed that its behavior did not change, it would > > be > > > logical to assume that the Usenet server always had property Soul. > > > > As it is, we actually have no idea if Soul influences B(Server) and > > > therefore such reasoning really is as silly as it sounds. > > > > > > Did you understand the way the reasoning works, it has nothing to do > > with the behaviour suddenly changing, it is whether its behaviour can > > be explained without knowledge of a given property. > > > Whether the usenet did have a soul or not, could not influence its > > behaviour, as the network would simply follow the laws of physics, > > thus the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether it > > had a soul or not. I don't see the point you were trying to make, the > > reasoning still holds true. > > > If your point was that you didn't understand why the implications of > > the reasoning show physicalism to be implausible, then I guess you > > would have made your point. > > Explain why Usenet servers do not have souls then, because I'm clearly > too stupid to comprehend your previous explanations. >[/color] The reasoning has nothing to do with whether the physical entity (M) has a property (P) or not, so is not about whether usenet servers (M) have souls (P) or not. It is simply that if the behaviour can be explained without knowledge of a property, then that property cannot be said to be influential in the behaviour, else the behaviour couldn't be explained without knowledge of the existance of the property (if it indeed did exist). Can you understand that, if not, why don't you read the reasoning again, and point out whether it is (1) or (2) that is causing you problems. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 17, 2007 Posted June 17, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1182085839.605867.302290@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > On 17 Jun, 10:57, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: >> You've not provided any rational objections or arguments against >> materialism. I've asked repeatedly for you to present your case in one >> single post, and so far nothing. is it because you don't actually HAVE a >> logical argument to present .. and you're just a religious nutcase who >> thought he could prove the existence of god or souls logically, but >> failed >> and so has retreated into spouting religious dogma? > > So you didn't manage to understand the following reasoning: I did .. snipped same old copy paste [snip] > And no, its not just a 'word salad', it is a reasoned argument. I didnt say it was .. but it doesn't make any point > As > were other objections in the post you replied to but snipped, such as: You've provided no rational or complete argument .. just little snippets and spam. > We don't have a direct experience of neural state like fluctuations in > the colour green, the brightness dependent on the amount of neurons > firing at anyone time, for example, and there is nothing that would > know what the neural state represented in physicalism. Now THAT was word salad > Consider a robot, here we go again > if the data was working on was encrypted, would you think that > the encryption would always be decyphered and it would still > experience what the state represented? Yes > There is no reasoning behind why a complicated configuration would > cause it to be conscious Given that we are complicated biological mechanism and are conscious, that is some evidence for that. Firther, just because you do not understand why does not make it false. It is only a comment on your understanding > and without the assertion that we were > simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, why would > you think that anything that did follow the laws of physics had any > subjective experiences at all? Because I know that I (and all other human being) follow the laws of phyics AND I have subjective experiences .. so that disproves your point. > Just because you are deaf to any objections You've not made any valid ones .. nor have you made your case in a single post. All you do is spam the same thought experiements (which you fail to use as part of any raitonal argument) > any, and if jien...@aol.com managed to understand, then why can't you? I understand what you say .. its just that you've said so very little .. and said the same very little over and over and over (that's called spamming) I've asked repeatedly for you to present your case in one single post, and so far nothing. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 18, 2007 Posted June 18, 2007 On 18 Jun, 00:59, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1182085839.605867.302290@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > > On 17 Jun, 10:57, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > >> You've not provided any rational objections or arguments against > >> materialism. I've asked repeatedly for you to present your case in one > >> single post, and so far nothing. is it because you don't actually HAVE a > >> logical argument to present .. and you're just a religious nutcase who > >> thought he could prove the existence of god or souls logically, but > >> failed > >> and so has retreated into spouting religious dogma? > > > So you didn't manage to understand the following reasoning: > > I did .. snipped same old copy paste > [snip] > > > And no, its not just a 'word salad', it is a reasoned argument. > > I didnt say it was .. but it doesn't make any point > > > As > > were other objections in the post you replied to but snipped, such as: > > You've provided no rational or complete argument .. just little snippets and > spam. > > > We don't have a direct experience of neural state like fluctuations in > > the colour green, the brightness dependent on the amount of neurons > > firing at anyone time, for example, and there is nothing that would > > know what the neural state represented in physicalism. > > Now THAT was word salad > > > Consider a robot, > > here we go again > > > if the data was working on was encrypted, would you think that > > the encryption would always be decyphered and it would still > > experience what the state represented? > > Yes > > > There is no reasoning behind why a complicated configuration would > > cause it to be conscious > > Given that we are complicated biological mechanism and are conscious, that > is some evidence for that. Firther, just because you do not understand why > does not make it false. It is only a comment on your understanding > > > and without the assertion that we were > > simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, why would > > you think that anything that did follow the laws of physics had any > > subjective experiences at all? > > Because I know that I (and all other human being) follow the laws of phyics > AND I have subjective experiences .. so that disproves your point. > > > Just because you are deaf to any objections > > You've not made any valid ones .. nor have you made your case in a single > post. > > All you do is spam the same thought experiements (which you fail to use as > part of any raitonal argument) > > > any, and if jien...@aol.com managed to understand, then why can't you? > > I understand what you say .. its just that you've said so very little .. and > said the same very little over and over and over (that's called spamming) > > I've asked repeatedly for you to present your case in one single post, and > so far nothing. I suggested that your claim that you had been presented with no objections was "just because you are deaf to any objections", to which you just simply claimed I hadn't made any valid ones. Well, I had pointed out that there was no reasoning in your story, as to why a 'complicated configuration' would cause anything to be conscious. You didn't bat an eyelid, but simply claimed your assertion to be correct. Don't you see that the objection was valid though: you don't have any reasoning behind your claim. Just your assertion that we are simply a biological mechanism, and your assertion that you are correct. When I pointed out that the reasoning which you decided to snip, was not a 'word salad' but reasoned argument, you retorted with "I didnt say it was .. but it doesn't make any point". The point, which again you were deaf to, is that it means that our behaviour could not be influenced by having an conscious experiences, if your assertion that we were simply a biological mechanism were correct. It is totally implausible, without your assertion, there would be no reason to think anything simply following the laws of physics had conscious experiences. So what reason would the biological mechanism, unifluenced the existance of consciousness, be questioning whether a robot might have conscious experiences? You might think you addressed this point, in your reply to when I asked you what reason there would be to think that anything that did follow the laws of physics had any subjective experiences at all, without the assertion that we were simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics. You replied was, "because I know that I (and all other human being) follow the laws of phyics AND I have subjective experiences .. so that disproves your point". The shear irrationality of your answer was stunning. Firstly it was about what reason would you have without your assertion. Simply restating your assertion, is not only totally not even addressing the question, which was about without your assertion, but how you thought by simply blindly restating your assertion in someway disproved a question is beyond me. I had pointed out that "we don't have a direct experience of neural state like fluctuations in the colour green, the brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing at anyone time, for example, and there is nothing that would know what the neural state represented in physicalism." You claimed this was a "word salad". You sound like a school child with a classroom catchphrase. Which bit didn't you understand? You do realise that we have conscious experiences of what our neural state represents , and that there isn't anything in your story that would know what it represents . Perhaps you could expand further on the reasoning behind yet a further assertion of yours, that even if a robot was working on encrypted data, what the data represented would be decyphered, and the robot would have the conscious experiences of what the data represented? Do you realise that it was prophesised that the so called 'intelligent' would turn reality upside down, and that they would claim that there is only the physical, and that they would deny God, yet their so called 'intelligence' would vanish (they would be shown to be wrong)? So given what is at stake for your future experience, if you happened to be wrong, and I assume you are not claiming infalibility, and therefore above needing your belief to hold up under the scrutiny of reason. Perhaps you could actually address with reasoned arguments, the objections to the story you believe in. Repeating that you know your assertion to be correct, is not a reasoned argument. May I ask you a personal question, did you believe in your assertion, because you thought the 'intelligent' people did, and that it would make you look 'intelligent'? Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 18, 2007 Posted June 18, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1182132378.872942.325500@u2g2000hsc.googlegroups.com... > I suggested that your claim that you had been presented [snip a whole lto of nonsense trying to make out theat I am the one making claims] Now .. to REPEAT my request from you yet again. Please make your complete argument in one single post (and avoid the word salad, poor grammar, and endless prepositional phrases). You have still failed to do make your point. JUST PRESENT YOUR ARGUMENT, CLEARLY AND SIMPLY. Can you manage that? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 19, 2007 Posted June 19, 2007 On 18 Jun, 03:43, Deathbringer <Deathbringer.2sc...@wpyo.bbs.local> wrote: > someone2;1514014 Wrote: > > > On 17 Jun, 21:36, > > > The reasoning has nothing to do with whether the physical entity (M) > > has a property (P) or not, so is not about whether usenet servers (M) > > have souls (P) or not. It is simply that if the behaviour can be > > explained without knowledge of a property, then that property cannot > > be said to be influential in the behaviour, else the behaviour > > couldn't be explained without knowledge of the existance of the > > property (if it indeed did exist). Can you understand that, if not, > > why don't you read the reasoning again, and point out whether it is > > (1) or (2) that is causing you problems. > > Bend over, 'cause I've got a big hunk of cold, hard logic coming your > way. > > I can explain B(Server) without knowledge of whether or not it has a > soul. Therefore, since B(Server) can be explained without knowledge of > the existence of P, then that property cannot be said to be influential > in the behavior, else the behavior couldn't be explained without > knowledge of the existence of the property. > > You accept your logic when it has B(Person) but not when it has > B(Server). Nothing changed. B(x) is explained without knowing P, so P > must not influence B(x). > > Furthermore, because P does not influence B(x), x has P. Servers have > souls. You lose. Treat your toaster and your zucchini with respect too, > because you can put any noun into the reasoning you wrote and I > parroted and have it come out as a being with a soul. > > Humans, toasters, Usenet servers and zucchini all have souls. I can > respect a person who believes zucchini etc have souls, for their beliefs > are internally consistent. > > It would also be logically self-consistent to assume that because the > behavior of the zucchini can be explained without knowledge of whether > it has a soul, souls do not influence the behavior of the zucchini, > therefore one cannot prove that zucchini do not have souls. Is this what > you were trying to argue, and we just haven't been communicating > effectively? > I'm glad you seem to have understood how the reasoning can be used. With reference to souls, your reasoning would obviously depend on what was meant by a soul. If you understood your soul to be your spiritual self, the 'I' that is experiencing the physical world, that when you are no longer being presented with the physical world, will either be presented with the experience of Heaven or Hell, then your assertion that our behaviour could be explained without reference to it (that we are simply a biological mechanism), is just that, an assertion. Though your assertion that we are simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics can be looked at. While you might from your perspective deny that there is a spiritual 'I' that is being presented with the conscious/subjective experiences, we can go to a neutral ground, where we just talk about the subjective experiences themselves. If we were simply a biological mechanism strictly following the laws of physics, then there obviously would be the problem that we experience being able to influence our behaviour, and yet what influence could what we experience have on something that simply followed the laws of physics. This issue was covered up by multiple deceptions. One main one was the suggestion put forward that we couldn't seperate what we subjectively experienced from the brain activity, they were one and the same. Therefore as brain activity influenced behaviour, so did what you experienced, as they were one and the same. Any attempt to consider them individually being ignored. The attempt is to place them under a single conceptual label, to prevent the objection being made. While this deception worked quite well when applied to us, as we knew that we had brain activity, and subjective experiences, and to consider them as simply the same, was easy to do. It left the issue though of where we naturally could consider whether a robot had conscious experiences or not. In other words the seperation between the mechanism and the subjective experiences, was apparent simply asking the question, "so does the robot have conscious experiences?" We are talking about the very real issue of whether the robot had conscious experiences or not, and it was a seperate issue from what the mechanism was like. The retort was to state that the robot that did have conscious experiences would have to be different from the robot that didn't, and as the mechanism and the conscious experiences are one, the same still applies, as the mechanims is influencing the behaviour so are the conscious experiences influential. The retort is deceptive on two counts, firstly it subtely plants the idea that there actually could be a robot with conscious experiences (when there is no reasoning to suggest that a robot would have, other than the assertion of the story that we are simply a biological mechanism), secondly, it skipped over the issue, that conscious experiences are a seperate property from the mechanism, as highlighted by the question, "so does the robot have conscious experiences". The reasoning you were applying, cuts through the need to have a comparitive entities (a robot with conscious experiences, and a robot without conscious experiences), and is neutral as to whether a robot could have conscious experiences or not, passing no comment on the issue. M refers to the robot B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it had conscious/subjective experiences. P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). As: 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/ subjective experiences or not. As (1) is true (the behaviour of the robot, is explainable simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics), so is (2): 2) Presence of conscious/subjective experiences or lack of, does not influence/affect a robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it had conscious/subjective experiences, else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without conscious/subjective experiences. Having shown through reason, that the property of having conscious/ subjective experiences could not influence the behaviour of the robot, it also follows that if we were simply a biological mechanism strictly following the laws of physics, that having conscious/ subjective experiences could not influence our behaviour, as why would it be different for us than the robot. This then shows that the story of us simply being a biological robot not only doesn't fit with our experience, but also as the conscious/subjective experiences couldn't influence behaviour, philosphers couldn't be discussing qualia because of their existance, nor could people talking about anything the subjectively experienced because of the experience, nor could we be even having this discussion because conscious experiences existed. The existance of them would have to be coincidental to behaviour. It is the required coincidence that makes the story of us being simply biological mechanisms implausible. Without the assertion that we are simply biological mechanisms, there would be no reason to suggest that any mechanism following the known laws of physics had any subjective experiences, nor could they explain how or why they should have. Furthermore, if people still wished to still try to cling to the possibility that it was simply the coincidence, what reason would the biological mechanism have for even trying to explain subjective experiences (its own subjective experiences couldn't have influenced its behaviour), and what reason would it have to consider whether other things such as robots might also have, when there could be no other reason than the subjective experiences were influencing its behaviour (which if this were the reason, would show it couldn't be a biological mechanism strictly following the known laws of physics). Once you can understand that reality isn't what you thought it was, the story was implausible, we can go through what reality actually is, in case you were to assert that while the story may appear implausible, it must be true, as there is no other explanation that fits the evidence. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 19, 2007 Posted June 19, 2007 On 18 Jun, 03:43, Deathbringer <Deathbringer.2sc...@wpyo.bbs.local> wrote: > someone2;1514014 Wrote: > > > On 17 Jun, 21:36, > > > The reasoning has nothing to do with whether the physical entity (M) > > has a property (P) or not, so is not about whether usenet servers (M) > > have souls (P) or not. It is simply that if the behaviour can be > > explained without knowledge of a property, then that property cannot > > be said to be influential in the behaviour, else the behaviour > > couldn't be explained without knowledge of the existance of the > > property (if it indeed did exist). Can you understand that, if not, > > why don't you read the reasoning again, and point out whether it is > > (1) or (2) that is causing you problems. > > Bend over, 'cause I've got a big hunk of cold, hard logic coming your > way. > > I can explain B(Server) without knowledge of whether or not it has a > soul. Therefore, since B(Server) can be explained without knowledge of > the existence of P, then that property cannot be said to be influential > in the behavior, else the behavior couldn't be explained without > knowledge of the existence of the property. > > You accept your logic when it has B(Person) but not when it has > B(Server). Nothing changed. B(x) is explained without knowing P, so P > must not influence B(x). > > Furthermore, because P does not influence B(x), x has P. Servers have > souls. You lose. Treat your toaster and your zucchini with respect too, > because you can put any noun into the reasoning you wrote and I > parroted and have it come out as a being with a soul. > > Humans, toasters, Usenet servers and zucchini all have souls. I can > respect a person who believes zucchini etc have souls, for their beliefs > are internally consistent. > > It would also be logically self-consistent to assume that because the > behavior of the zucchini can be explained without knowledge of whether > it has a soul, souls do not influence the behavior of the zucchini, > therefore one cannot prove that zucchini do not have souls. Is this what > you were trying to argue, and we just haven't been communicating > effectively? > (this is just being reposted as I hadn't noticed Deathbringer had taken alt.atheism off the posting list, so it was only showing up on alt.religion) I'm glad you seem to have understood how the reasoning can be used. With reference to souls, your reasoning would obviously depend on what was meant by a soul. If you understood your soul to be your spiritual self, the 'I' that is experiencing the physical world, that when you are no longer being presented with the physical world, will either be presented with the experience of Heaven or Hell, then your assertion that our behaviour could be explained without reference to it (that we are simply a biological mechanism), is just that, an assertion. Though your assertion that we are simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics can be looked at. While you might from your perspective deny that there is a spiritual 'I' that is being presented with the conscious/subjective experiences, we can go to a neutral ground, where we just talk about the subjective experiences themselves. If we were simply a biological mechanism strictly following the laws of physics, then there obviously would be the problem that we experience being able to influence our behaviour, and yet what influence could what we consciously experience have on something that simply followed the laws of physics. This issue was covered up by multiple deceptions. One main one was the suggestion put forward that we couldn't seperate what we subjectively experienced from the brain activity, they were one and the same. Therefore as brain activity influenced behaviour, so did what you experienced, as they were one and the same. Any attempt to consider them individually being ignored. The attempt is to place them under a single conceptual label, to prevent the objection being made. While this deception worked quite well when applied to us, as we knew that we had brain activity, and subjective experiences, and to consider them as simply the same, was easy to do. It left the issue though of where we naturally could consider whether a robot had conscious experiences or not. In other words the seperation between the mechanism and the subjective experiences, was apparent simply asking the question, "so does the robot have conscious experiences?" We are talking about the very real issue of whether the robot had conscious experiences or not, and it was a seperate issue from what the mechanism was like. The retort was to state that the robot that did have conscious experiences would have to be different from the robot that didn't, and as the mechanism and the conscious experiences are one, the same still applies, as the mechanims is influencing the behaviour so are the conscious experiences influential. The retort is deceptive on two counts, firstly it subtely plants the idea that there actually could be a robot with conscious experiences (when there is no reasoning to suggest that a robot would have, other than the assertion of the story that we are simply a biological mechanism), secondly, it skipped over the issue, that conscious experiences are a seperate property from the mechanism, as highlighted by the question, "so does the robot have conscious experiences". The reasoning you were applying, cuts through the need to have a comparitive entities (a robot with conscious experiences, and a robot without conscious experiences), and is neutral as to whether a robot could have conscious experiences or not, passing no comment on the issue. M refers to the robot B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it had conscious/subjective experiences. P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). As: 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/ subjective experiences or not. As (1) is true (the behaviour of the robot, is explainable simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics), so is (2): 2) Presence of conscious/subjective experiences or lack of, does not influence/affect a robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it had conscious/subjective experiences, else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without conscious/subjective experiences. Having shown through reason, that the property of having conscious/ subjective experiences could not influence the behaviour of the robot, it also follows that if we were simply a biological mechanism strictly following the laws of physics, that having conscious/ subjective experiences could not influence our behaviour, as why would it be different for us than the robot. This then shows that the story of us simply being a biological robot not only doesn't fit with our experience, but also as the conscious/subjective experiences couldn't influence behaviour, philosphers couldn't be discussing qualia because of their existance, nor could people talking about anything the subjectively experienced because of the experience, nor could we be even having this discussion because conscious experiences existed. The existance of them would have to be coincidental to behaviour. It is the required coincidence that makes the story of us being simply biological mechanisms implausible. Without the assertion that we are simply biological mechanisms, there would be no reason to suggest that any mechanism following the known laws of physics had any subjective experiences, nor could they explain how or why they should have. Furthermore, if people still wished to still try to cling to the possibility that it was simply the coincidence, what reason would the biological mechanism have for even trying to explain subjective experiences (its own subjective experiences couldn't have influenced its behaviour), and what reason would it have to consider whether other things such as robots might also have, when there could be no other reason than the subjective experiences were influencing its behaviour (which if this were the reason, would show it couldn't be a biological mechanism strictly following the known laws of physics). Once you can understand that reality isn't what you thought it was, the story was implausible, we can go through what reality actually is, in case you were to assert that while the story may appear implausible, it must be true, as there is no other explanation that fits the evidence. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 19, 2007 Posted June 19, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1182255166.786208.208540@q69g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > If we were simply a biological mechanism strictly following the laws > of physics, then there obviously would be the problem that we > experience being able to influence our behaviour, That is not a problem at all. It is perfectly consistent with the assertion that we are biological mechanisms strictly following the laws of physics. > and yet what > influence could what we consciously experience have on something that > simply followed the laws of physics. You are making (incorrect) assumptions here. You assume that experiences are not encoded in the mechanism of our bodies. There is good evidence that memories of experiences are encoded in our brains, we even know the areas where such memories are kept. > This issue was covered up by multiple deceptions. The deception seems to be yours, by making unsupported assumptions, and not being open about what those assumptinos are. > One main one was the > suggestion put forward that we couldn't seperate what we subjectively > experienced from the brain activity, they were one and the same. > Therefore as brain activity influenced behaviour, so did what you > experienced, as they were one and the same. Any attempt to consider > them individually being ignored. The attempt is to place them under a > single conceptual label, to prevent the objection being made. And what problem is there with experiences being stored / encoded within the mechanism of the brai .. there is very good evidenec for that. > While this deception > worked quite well when applied to us, as we knew > that we had brain activity, and subjective experiences, and to > consider them as simply the same, was easy to do. You deceptively ignore that we understand much about how and where the experiences are encoded in the brain .. its not purely coincidental as you try to make out. > It left the issue > though of where we naturally could consider whether a robot had > conscious experiences or not. How is that relevant? > In other words the seperation between > the mechanism and the subjective experiences, was apparent simply > asking the question, "so does the robot have conscious experiences?" It depends on the robot. > We are talking about the very real issue of whether the robot had > conscious experiences or not, and it was a seperate issue from what > the mechanism was like. The retort was to state that the robot that > did have conscious experiences would have to be different from the > robot that didn't, and as the mechanism and the conscious experiences > are one, the same still applies, as the mechanims is influencing the > behaviour so are the conscious experiences influential. And what a good retort taht is > The retort is deceptive on two counts, You are a little paranoid with calling everything that counters your apparaent arguments 'deceptive' .. where it is really your apparanet argument that is deceptive and full of unsupported assumptions and assertions. > firstly it subtely plants the > idea that there actually could be a robot with conscious experiences There is no reason why not .. this was, after all, a thought experiement. And wheterh or not such a robot could be build at this time is ireelevant. > (when there is no reasoning to suggest that a robot would have, other > than the assertion of the story that we are simply a biological > mechanism), word slad again .. that parentheical comment makes no grammatical sense > secondly, it skipped over the issue, that conscious > experiences are a seperate property from the mechanism, On what grounds do you assert that? > as highlighted > by the question, "so does the robot have conscious experiences". That doesn't highlight anything .. its just away of saying "does the mechanism of the robot record, retrieve and process past states and inputs" > The reasoning you were applying, cuts through the need to have a > comparitive entities (a robot with conscious experiences, and a robot > without conscious experiences), and is neutral as to whether a robot > could have conscious experiences or not, passing no comment on the > issue. More word salad. Try again. > M refers to the robot > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences. > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > As: > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/ > subjective experiences or not. > > As (1) is true (the behaviour of the robot, is explainable simply in > terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics), so is (2): You are assuming your own conclusion here .. we do not know 1 is true .. you're just asserting without proof > 2) Presence of conscious/subjective experiences or lack of, does not > influence/affect a robot behaving in a way in which some might > question whether it had conscious/subjective experiences, else the > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without > conscious/subjective experiences. > > Having shown through reason, You have not shown anything above, other than your own deception. > that the property of having conscious/ > subjective experiences could not influence the behaviour of the robot, You have not shown that at all > it also follows that if we were simply a biological mechanism > strictly following the laws of physics, that having conscious/ > subjective experiences could not influence our behaviour, as why would > it be different for us than the robot. You have not shown that at all. [snip more word salad from a fulaty argument] > Without the assertion that we are simply biological mechanisms, there > would be no reason to suggest that any mechanism following the known > laws of physics had any subjective experiences, nor could they explain > how or why they should have. More word salad. Please .. try to write grammatically correct sentences. Try shorter ones,as you seem to have problems writing longer ones. > Furthermore, if people still wished to still try to cling to the > possibility that it was simply the coincidence, what reason would the > biological mechanism have for even trying to explain subjective > experiences (its own subjective experiences couldn't have influenced > its behaviour), and what reason would it have to consider whether > other things such as robots might also have, when there could be no > other reason than the subjective experiences were influencing its > behaviour (which if this were the reason, would show it couldn't be a > biological mechanism strictly following the known laws of physics). Look at the length and complexity of the above 'sentence'. It is again just word salad, a jumble of phrases and parentheses. Please .. try to communicate more clearly. > Once you can understand that reality isn't what you thought it was, > the story was implausible, we can go through what reality actually is, > in case you were to assert that while the story may appear > implausible, it must be true, as there is no other explanation that > fits the evidence. You have not shown any of the things you merely assert and assume. Try again Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 19, 2007 Posted June 19, 2007 On 19 Jun, 16:39, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1182255166.786208.208540@q69g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > > If we were simply a biological mechanism strictly following the laws > > of physics, then there obviously would be the problem that we > > experience being able to influence our behaviour, > > That is not a problem at all. It is perfectly consistent with the assertion > that we are biological mechanisms strictly following the laws of physics. > > > and yet what > > influence could what we consciously experience have on something that > > simply followed the laws of physics. > > You are making (incorrect) assumptions here. You assume that experiences > are not encoded in the mechanism of our bodies. > > There is good evidence that memories of experiences are encoded in our > brains, we even know the areas where such memories are kept. > > > This issue was covered up by multiple deceptions. > > The deception seems to be yours, by making unsupported assumptions, and not > being open about what those assumptinos are. > > > One main one was the > > suggestion put forward that we couldn't seperate what we subjectively > > experienced from the brain activity, they were one and the same. > > Therefore as brain activity influenced behaviour, so did what you > > experienced, as they were one and the same. Any attempt to consider > > them individually being ignored. The attempt is to place them under a > > single conceptual label, to prevent the objection being made. > > And what problem is there with experiences being stored / encoded within the > mechanism of the brai .. there is very good evidenec for that. > > > While this deception > > worked quite well when applied to us, as we knew > > that we had brain activity, and subjective experiences, and to > > consider them as simply the same, was easy to do. > > You deceptively ignore that we understand much about how and where the > experiences are encoded in the brain .. its not purely coincidental as you > try to make out. > > > It left the issue > > though of where we naturally could consider whether a robot had > > conscious experiences or not. > > How is that relevant? > > > In other words the seperation between > > the mechanism and the subjective experiences, was apparent simply > > asking the question, "so does the robot have conscious experiences?" > > It depends on the robot. > > > We are talking about the very real issue of whether the robot had > > conscious experiences or not, and it was a seperate issue from what > > the mechanism was like. The retort was to state that the robot that > > did have conscious experiences would have to be different from the > > robot that didn't, and as the mechanism and the conscious experiences > > are one, the same still applies, as the mechanims is influencing the > > behaviour so are the conscious experiences influential. > > And what a good retort taht is > > > The retort is deceptive on two counts, > > You are a little paranoid with calling everything that counters your > apparaent arguments 'deceptive' .. where it is really your apparanet > argument that is deceptive and full of unsupported assumptions and > assertions. > > > firstly it subtely plants the > > idea that there actually could be a robot with conscious experiences > > There is no reason why not .. this was, after all, a thought experiement. > And wheterh or not such a robot could be build at this time is ireelevant. > > > (when there is no reasoning to suggest that a robot would have, other > > than the assertion of the story that we are simply a biological > > mechanism), > > word slad again .. that parentheical comment makes no grammatical sense > > > secondly, it skipped over the issue, that conscious > > experiences are a seperate property from the mechanism, > > On what grounds do you assert that? > > > as highlighted > > by the question, "so does the robot have conscious experiences". > > That doesn't highlight anything .. its just away of saying "does the > mechanism of the robot record, retrieve and process past states and inputs" > > > The reasoning you were applying, cuts through the need to have a > > comparitive entities (a robot with conscious experiences, and a robot > > without conscious experiences), and is neutral as to whether a robot > > could have conscious experiences or not, passing no comment on the > > issue. > > More word salad. Try again. > > > > > > > M refers to the robot > > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question > > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences. > > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > As: > > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it > > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/ > > subjective experiences or not. > > > As (1) is true (the behaviour of the robot, is explainable simply in > > terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics), so is (2): > > You are assuming your own conclusion here .. we do not know 1 is true .. > you're just asserting without proof > > > 2) Presence of conscious/subjective experiences or lack of, does not > > influence/affect a robot behaving in a way in which some might > > question whether it had conscious/subjective experiences, else the > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without > > conscious/subjective experiences. > > > Having shown through reason, > > You have not shown anything above, other than your own deception. > > > that the property of having conscious/ > > subjective experiences could not influence the behaviour of the robot, > > You have not shown that at all > > > it also follows that if we were simply a biological mechanism > > strictly following the laws of physics, that having conscious/ > > subjective experiences could not influence our behaviour, as why would > > it be different for us than the robot. > > You have not shown that at all. > > [snip more word salad from a fulaty argument] > > > Without the assertion that we are simply biological mechanisms, there > > would be no reason to suggest that any mechanism following the known > > laws of physics had any subjective experiences, nor could they explain > > how or why they should have. > > More word salad. Please .. try to write grammatically correct sentences. > Try shorter ones,as you seem to have problems writing longer ones. > > > Furthermore, if people still wished to still try to cling to the > > possibility that it was simply the coincidence, what reason would the > > biological mechanism have for even trying to explain subjective > > experiences (its own subjective experiences couldn't have influenced > > its behaviour), and what reason would it have to consider whether > > other things such as robots might also have, when there could be no > > other reason than the subjective experiences were influencing its > > behaviour (which if this were the reason, would show it couldn't be a > > biological mechanism strictly following the known laws of physics). > > Look at the length and complexity of the above 'sentence'. It is again just > word salad, a jumble of phrases and parentheses. Please .. try to > communicate more clearly. > > > Once you can understand that reality isn't what you thought it was, > > the story was implausible, we can go through what reality actually is, > > in case you were to assert that while the story may appear > > implausible, it must be true, as there is no other explanation that > > fits the evidence. > > You have not shown any of the things you merely assert and assume. > > Try again > What do you even mean by experiences encoded into the mechanism? Don't you understand, that whether a robot had conscious experiences or not it couldn't affect its behaviour? This has been shown by the reasoning you ignore. Also stop using the expression 'word salad' on anything you can't understand. Why don't you just say, I can't understand <the bit you can't understand>, and ask for clarification. Quote
Guest Matt Silberstein Posted June 19, 2007 Posted June 19, 2007 On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 09:15:36 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> in <1182269736.210144.41070@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: [snip] >What do you even mean by experiences encoded into the mechanism? > >Don't you understand, that whether a robot had conscious experiences >or not it couldn't affect its behaviour? This has been shown by the >reasoning you ignore. I have not seen reasoning on this, only assertion. I see this as an empirical question, not a logical one. We would have to see what happens when we make these "robots". It may well be that in order to have robots that act "like" humans we will have to have robots that report, just like humans, internal conscious subjective experience. >Also stop using the expression 'word salad' on >anything you can't understand. Why don't you just say, I can't >understand <the bit you can't understand>, and ask for clarification. Because lots of your stuff seems to have serious syntax problems. BTW, you have not responded to my metaphysics question. Am I right that you insist on an Idealist/Realist, rather than a Nominalist, ontology? -- Matt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 19, 2007 Posted June 19, 2007 On 19 Jun, 19:17, Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 09:15:36 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > <1182269736.210144.41...@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > [snip] > > >What do you even mean by experiences encoded into the mechanism? > > >Don't you understand, that whether a robot had conscious experiences > >or not it couldn't affect its behaviour? This has been shown by the > >reasoning you ignore. > > I have not seen reasoning on this, only assertion. I see this as an > empirical question, not a logical one. We would have to see what > happens when we make these "robots". It may well be that in order to > have robots that act "like" humans we will have to have robots that > report, just like humans, internal conscious subjective experience. > > >Also stop using the expression 'word salad' on > >anything you can't understand. Why don't you just say, I can't > >understand <the bit you can't understand>, and ask for clarification. > > Because lots of your stuff seems to have serious syntax problems. > > BTW, you have not responded to my metaphysics question. Am I right > that you insist on an Idealist/Realist, rather than a Nominalist, > ontology? > People can always extract the specific part they don't understand, whether the cause of their problem is syntax in a certain section or not. You can use whatever onotology you like, though I have no problem with what is pointed out by nominalism. It doesn't mean that reason cannot be used in relation to things, unless the thing referred to was consciously experienced, either directly, or indirectly. What assertion is made in the following reasoning? M refers to the physical entity in question. B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. P refers to the a property in question. Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has P or not. 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. If (1) is true, then (2) is true. Quote
Guest Matt Silberstein Posted June 19, 2007 Posted June 19, 2007 On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 12:41:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> in <1182282079.280469.44150@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: >On 19 Jun, 19:17, Matt Silberstein ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 09:15:36 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> <1182269736.210144.41...@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> [snip] >> >> >What do you even mean by experiences encoded into the mechanism? >> >> >Don't you understand, that whether a robot had conscious experiences >> >or not it couldn't affect its behaviour? This has been shown by the >> >reasoning you ignore. >> >> I have not seen reasoning on this, only assertion. I see this as an >> empirical question, not a logical one. We would have to see what >> happens when we make these "robots". It may well be that in order to >> have robots that act "like" humans we will have to have robots that >> report, just like humans, internal conscious subjective experience. >> >> >Also stop using the expression 'word salad' on >> >anything you can't understand. Why don't you just say, I can't >> >understand <the bit you can't understand>, and ask for clarification. >> >> Because lots of your stuff seems to have serious syntax problems. >> >> BTW, you have not responded to my metaphysics question. Am I right >> that you insist on an Idealist/Realist, rather than a Nominalist, >> ontology? >> > >People can always extract the specific part they don't understand, >whether the cause of their problem is syntax in a certain section or >not. > >You can use whatever onotology you like, though I have no problem with >what is pointed out by nominalism. It doesn't mean that reason cannot >be used in relation to things, unless the thing referred to was >consciously experienced, either directly, or indirectly. > >What assertion is made in the following reasoning? > >M refers to the physical entity in question. >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >P refers to the a property in question. > >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), >and P is the same in (1) and (2). > >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >knowledge of whether it has P or not. > >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the >explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > >If (1) is true, then (2) is true. The above seems to be an awkward wording of parsimony. So I can explain rainfall without mentioning God so, by your logic, God does not influence rainfall. I can explain the operations of a cell without mentioning God, so God does not influence the operation of a cell. What has not been established, what I have denied, is whether or not we can explain humans without needing to discuss subjective experience. I assert that a physical explanation of people will mention and explain subjective experience. That is an empirical issue, not a logical one. It is something about the world that we find out by looking. -- Matt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 19, 2007 Posted June 19, 2007 On 19 Jun, 21:05, Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 12:41:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > <1182282079.280469.44...@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >On 19 Jun, 19:17, Matt Silberstein > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 09:15:36 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> <1182269736.210144.41...@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > >> [snip] > > >> >What do you even mean by experiences encoded into the mechanism? > > >> >Don't you understand, that whether a robot had conscious experiences > >> >or not it couldn't affect its behaviour? This has been shown by the > >> >reasoning you ignore. > > >> I have not seen reasoning on this, only assertion. I see this as an > >> empirical question, not a logical one. We would have to see what > >> happens when we make these "robots". It may well be that in order to > >> have robots that act "like" humans we will have to have robots that > >> report, just like humans, internal conscious subjective experience. > > >> >Also stop using the expression 'word salad' on > >> >anything you can't understand. Why don't you just say, I can't > >> >understand <the bit you can't understand>, and ask for clarification. > > >> Because lots of your stuff seems to have serious syntax problems. > > >> BTW, you have not responded to my metaphysics question. Am I right > >> that you insist on an Idealist/Realist, rather than a Nominalist, > >> ontology? > > >People can always extract the specific part they don't understand, > >whether the cause of their problem is syntax in a certain section or > >not. > > >You can use whatever onotology you like, though I have no problem with > >what is pointed out by nominalism. It doesn't mean that reason cannot > >be used in relation to things, unless the thing referred to was > >consciously experienced, either directly, or indirectly. > > >What assertion is made in the following reasoning? > > >M refers to the physical entity in question. > >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >P refers to the a property in question. > > >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > >and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > >knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > >explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > >If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > The above seems to be an awkward wording of parsimony. So I can > explain rainfall without mentioning God so, by your logic, God does > not influence rainfall. I can explain the operations of a cell without > mentioning God, so God does not influence the operation of a cell. > What has not been established, what I have denied, is whether or not > we can explain humans without needing to discuss subjective > experience. I assert that a physical explanation of people will > mention and explain subjective experience. That is an empirical > issue, not a logical one. It is something about the world that we find > out by looking. > If you could explain rainfall without mentioning God. That would rely on being able to explain the reality of what we experience without taking God into account into what you experience, etc. So you have your assertion that we can be explained in terms of the physical, and that it must mention subjective experiences, have I understood you correctly? Quote
Guest Matt Silberstein Posted June 19, 2007 Posted June 19, 2007 On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 13:24:55 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> in <1182284695.458468.147800@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote: >On 19 Jun, 21:05, Matt Silberstein ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 12:41:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> >> >> >> <1182282079.280469.44...@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >On 19 Jun, 19:17, Matt Silberstein >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 09:15:36 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> <1182269736.210144.41...@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> >> [snip] >> >> >> >What do you even mean by experiences encoded into the mechanism? >> >> >> >Don't you understand, that whether a robot had conscious experiences >> >> >or not it couldn't affect its behaviour? This has been shown by the >> >> >reasoning you ignore. >> >> >> I have not seen reasoning on this, only assertion. I see this as an >> >> empirical question, not a logical one. We would have to see what >> >> happens when we make these "robots". It may well be that in order to >> >> have robots that act "like" humans we will have to have robots that >> >> report, just like humans, internal conscious subjective experience. >> >> >> >Also stop using the expression 'word salad' on >> >> >anything you can't understand. Why don't you just say, I can't >> >> >understand <the bit you can't understand>, and ask for clarification. >> >> >> Because lots of your stuff seems to have serious syntax problems. >> >> >> BTW, you have not responded to my metaphysics question. Am I right >> >> that you insist on an Idealist/Realist, rather than a Nominalist, >> >> ontology? >> >> >People can always extract the specific part they don't understand, >> >whether the cause of their problem is syntax in a certain section or >> >not. >> >> >You can use whatever onotology you like, though I have no problem with >> >what is pointed out by nominalism. It doesn't mean that reason cannot >> >be used in relation to things, unless the thing referred to was >> >consciously experienced, either directly, or indirectly. >> >> >What assertion is made in the following reasoning? >> >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), >> >and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the >> >explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. >> >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> The above seems to be an awkward wording of parsimony. So I can >> explain rainfall without mentioning God so, by your logic, God does >> not influence rainfall. I can explain the operations of a cell without >> mentioning God, so God does not influence the operation of a cell. >> What has not been established, what I have denied, is whether or not >> we can explain humans without needing to discuss subjective >> experience. I assert that a physical explanation of people will >> mention and explain subjective experience. That is an empirical >> issue, not a logical one. It is something about the world that we find >> out by looking. >> > >If you could explain rainfall without mentioning God. There is an example of the problem we have with your posts. That has a full stop, a '.', but it is not a sentence. If what? The normal construction is "if X then Y". >That would rely >on being able to explain the reality of what we experience without >taking God into account into what you experience, etc. Your supposed argument discusses behavior . Not some "reality", just behavior. If this is your issue then say so openly. >So you have your assertion that we can be explained in terms of the >physical, and that it must mention subjective experiences, have I >understood you correctly? Probably, but with your writing I am not sure. -- Matt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 19, 2007 Posted June 19, 2007 On 19 Jun, 22:06, Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 13:24:55 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > <1182284695.458468.147...@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >On 19 Jun, 21:05, Matt Silberstein > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 12:41:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> <1182282079.280469.44...@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> >On 19 Jun, 19:17, Matt Silberstein > >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> >> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 09:15:36 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> >> <1182269736.210144.41...@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > >> >> [snip] > > >> >> >What do you even mean by experiences encoded into the mechanism? > > >> >> >Don't you understand, that whether a robot had conscious experiences > >> >> >or not it couldn't affect its behaviour? This has been shown by the > >> >> >reasoning you ignore. > > >> >> I have not seen reasoning on this, only assertion. I see this as an > >> >> empirical question, not a logical one. We would have to see what > >> >> happens when we make these "robots". It may well be that in order to > >> >> have robots that act "like" humans we will have to have robots that > >> >> report, just like humans, internal conscious subjective experience. > > >> >> >Also stop using the expression 'word salad' on > >> >> >anything you can't understand. Why don't you just say, I can't > >> >> >understand <the bit you can't understand>, and ask for clarification. > > >> >> Because lots of your stuff seems to have serious syntax problems. > > >> >> BTW, you have not responded to my metaphysics question. Am I right > >> >> that you insist on an Idealist/Realist, rather than a Nominalist, > >> >> ontology? > > >> >People can always extract the specific part they don't understand, > >> >whether the cause of their problem is syntax in a certain section or > >> >not. > > >> >You can use whatever onotology you like, though I have no problem with > >> >what is pointed out by nominalism. It doesn't mean that reason cannot > >> >be used in relation to things, unless the thing referred to was > >> >consciously experienced, either directly, or indirectly. > > >> >What assertion is made in the following reasoning? > > >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> >P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > >> >and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > >> >explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > >> The above seems to be an awkward wording of parsimony. So I can > >> explain rainfall without mentioning God so, by your logic, God does > >> not influence rainfall. I can explain the operations of a cell without > >> mentioning God, so God does not influence the operation of a cell. > >> What has not been established, what I have denied, is whether or not > >> we can explain humans without needing to discuss subjective > >> experience. I assert that a physical explanation of people will > >> mention and explain subjective experience. That is an empirical > >> issue, not a logical one. It is something about the world that we find > >> out by looking. > > >If you could explain rainfall without mentioning God. > > There is an example of the problem we have with your posts. That has a > full stop, a '.', but it is not a sentence. If what? The normal > construction is "if X then Y". > > >That would rely > >on being able to explain the reality of what we experience without > >taking God into account into what you experience, etc. > > Your supposed argument discusses behavior . Not some "reality", just > behavior. If this is your issue then say so openly. > > >So you have your assertion that we can be explained in terms of the > >physical, and that it must mention subjective experiences, have I > >understood you correctly? > > Probably, but with your writing I am not sure. > The 'if' referred to whether the reasoning pointed to God being uninfluential in rainfall. It had to be taken in context. As in if you were standing on one side of a ravine, and asked "Do you think I could get to the other side in under a minute", and the answer was "If you could fly" In response to: "Your supposed argument discusses behavior . Not some 'reality', just behavior. If this is your issue then say so openly." The reasoning regards the explanation of the behaviour. So in response to your assertion: "So I can explain rainfall without mentioning God so, by your logic, God does not influence rainfall." There was the response: "If you could explain rainfall without mentioning God. That would rely on being able to explain the reality of what we experience without taking God into account into what you experience, etc." Hopefully, now in context, you can understand my responses. Though often, I will be willing to allow you some flexibility, to make your point without being so strict, to progress the conversation. Where I had asked: "So you have your assertion that we can be explained in terms of the physical, and that it must mention subjective experiences, have I understood you correctly?" You replied: "Probably, but with your writing I am not sure." Well, if you later accept that from your perspective the explanation would have to be able to be given without mention of any subjective experiences, such as whether the experience was of pleasure or pain for example, then I you can always say you misunderstood. Do you agree that the behaviour of any robot that followed the known laws of physics, could always be explained in terms of the system components following the known laws of physics without reference to whether it was subjectively experiencing or not? In other words, no knowledge of whether it was subjectively experiencing or not would be required to explain its behaviour. Quote
Guest Matt Silberstein Posted June 19, 2007 Posted June 19, 2007 On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 14:22:18 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> in <1182288138.648375.274940@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote: >On 19 Jun, 22:06, Matt Silberstein ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 13:24:55 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> >> >> >> <1182284695.458468.147...@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >On 19 Jun, 21:05, Matt Silberstein >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 12:41:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> <1182282079.280469.44...@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> >On 19 Jun, 19:17, Matt Silberstein >> >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> >> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 09:15:36 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> >> <1182269736.210144.41...@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> [snip] >> >> >> >> >What do you even mean by experiences encoded into the mechanism? >> >> >> >> >Don't you understand, that whether a robot had conscious experiences >> >> >> >or not it couldn't affect its behaviour? This has been shown by the >> >> >> >reasoning you ignore. >> >> >> >> I have not seen reasoning on this, only assertion. I see this as an >> >> >> empirical question, not a logical one. We would have to see what >> >> >> happens when we make these "robots". It may well be that in order to >> >> >> have robots that act "like" humans we will have to have robots that >> >> >> report, just like humans, internal conscious subjective experience. >> >> >> >> >Also stop using the expression 'word salad' on >> >> >> >anything you can't understand. Why don't you just say, I can't >> >> >> >understand <the bit you can't understand>, and ask for clarification. >> >> >> >> Because lots of your stuff seems to have serious syntax problems. >> >> >> >> BTW, you have not responded to my metaphysics question. Am I right >> >> >> that you insist on an Idealist/Realist, rather than a Nominalist, >> >> >> ontology? >> >> >> >People can always extract the specific part they don't understand, >> >> >whether the cause of their problem is syntax in a certain section or >> >> >not. >> >> >> >You can use whatever onotology you like, though I have no problem with >> >> >what is pointed out by nominalism. It doesn't mean that reason cannot >> >> >be used in relation to things, unless the thing referred to was >> >> >consciously experienced, either directly, or indirectly. >> >> >> >What assertion is made in the following reasoning? >> >> >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), >> >> >and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the >> >> >explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. >> >> >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> >> The above seems to be an awkward wording of parsimony. So I can >> >> explain rainfall without mentioning God so, by your logic, God does >> >> not influence rainfall. I can explain the operations of a cell without >> >> mentioning God, so God does not influence the operation of a cell. >> >> What has not been established, what I have denied, is whether or not >> >> we can explain humans without needing to discuss subjective >> >> experience. I assert that a physical explanation of people will >> >> mention and explain subjective experience. That is an empirical >> >> issue, not a logical one. It is something about the world that we find >> >> out by looking. >> >> >If you could explain rainfall without mentioning God. >> >> There is an example of the problem we have with your posts. That has a >> full stop, a '.', but it is not a sentence. If what? The normal >> construction is "if X then Y". >> >> >That would rely >> >on being able to explain the reality of what we experience without >> >taking God into account into what you experience, etc. >> >> Your supposed argument discusses behavior . Not some "reality", just >> behavior. If this is your issue then say so openly. >> >> >So you have your assertion that we can be explained in terms of the >> >physical, and that it must mention subjective experiences, have I >> >understood you correctly? >> >> Probably, but with your writing I am not sure. >> > >The 'if' referred to whether the reasoning pointed to God being >uninfluential in rainfall. It had to be taken in context. Forget context, it was a sentence fragment. >As in if you were standing on one side of a ravine, and asked "Do you >think I could get to the other side in under a minute", and the answer >was "If you could fly" That has a more sensible structure. The sentence in question did not. BTW, learn to put your comments interspersed instead of at the end like that. That would help communication. >In response to: >"Your supposed argument discusses behavior . Not some 'reality', just >behavior. If this is your issue then say so openly." > >The reasoning regards the explanation of the behaviour. So in >response to your assertion: >"So I can explain rainfall without mentioning God so, by your logic, >God does not influence rainfall." > >There was the response: >"If you could explain rainfall without mentioning God. That would rely >on being able to explain the reality of what we experience without >taking God into account into what you experience, etc." >Hopefully, now in context, you can understand my responses. I am confused here. All you did was copy and paste the conversation. How was that supposed to help me understand? Anyway, I understood that part and I pointed out that you changed from discussing behavior to discussing reality. So, again, by your logic, if I can explain the behavior of rain without mentioning God then God does not influence rain. Is that something you agree with? >Though >often, I will be willing to allow you some flexibility, to make your >point without being so strict, to progress the conversation. > >Where I had asked: >"So you have your assertion that we can be explained in terms of the >physical, and that it must mention subjective experiences, have I >understood you correctly?" > >You replied: >"Probably, but with your writing I am not sure." > >Well, if you later accept that from your perspective the explanation >would have to be able to be given without mention of any subjective >experiences, such as whether the experience was of pleasure or pain >for example, then I you can always say you misunderstood. Why would I say that? Of course internal state and internal matter to explaining human behavior. Read up on "theory of the mind". >Do you agree that the behaviour of any robot that followed the known >laws of physics, could always be explained in terms of the system >components following the known laws of physics without reference to >whether it was subjectively experiencing or not? I have disagreed with that several times. >In other words, no >knowledge of whether it was subjectively experiencing or not would be >required to explain its behaviour. It all depends on the "robot". I can avoid discussing subjective experience (though I do need to consider internal state) when discussing a Roomba. For a robot that appear human under reasonable testing? No, I would need to have some discussion of subjective experience for that robot. I have said this over and over. Mine is an empirical claim, it could be wrong but the way to tell is to look at the world. > > -- Matt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 19, 2007 Posted June 19, 2007 On 19 Jun, 22:57, Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 14:22:18 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > <1182288138.648375.274...@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >On 19 Jun, 22:06, Matt Silberstein > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 13:24:55 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> <1182284695.458468.147...@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> >On 19 Jun, 21:05, Matt Silberstein > >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> >> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 12:41:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> >> <1182282079.280469.44...@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> >> >On 19 Jun, 19:17, Matt Silberstein > >> >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 09:15:36 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> >> >> <1182269736.210144.41...@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > >> >> >> [snip] > > >> >> >> >What do you even mean by experiences encoded into the mechanism? > > >> >> >> >Don't you understand, that whether a robot had conscious experiences > >> >> >> >or not it couldn't affect its behaviour? This has been shown by the > >> >> >> >reasoning you ignore. > > >> >> >> I have not seen reasoning on this, only assertion. I see this as an > >> >> >> empirical question, not a logical one. We would have to see what > >> >> >> happens when we make these "robots". It may well be that in order to > >> >> >> have robots that act "like" humans we will have to have robots that > >> >> >> report, just like humans, internal conscious subjective experience. > > >> >> >> >Also stop using the expression 'word salad' on > >> >> >> >anything you can't understand. Why don't you just say, I can't > >> >> >> >understand <the bit you can't understand>, and ask for clarification. > > >> >> >> Because lots of your stuff seems to have serious syntax problems. > > >> >> >> BTW, you have not responded to my metaphysics question. Am I right > >> >> >> that you insist on an Idealist/Realist, rather than a Nominalist, > >> >> >> ontology? > > >> >> >People can always extract the specific part they don't understand, > >> >> >whether the cause of their problem is syntax in a certain section or > >> >> >not. > > >> >> >You can use whatever onotology you like, though I have no problem with > >> >> >what is pointed out by nominalism. It doesn't mean that reason cannot > >> >> >be used in relation to things, unless the thing referred to was > >> >> >consciously experienced, either directly, or indirectly. > > >> >> >What assertion is made in the following reasoning? > > >> >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> >> >P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > >> >> >and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > >> >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > >> >> >explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > >> >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > >> >> The above seems to be an awkward wording of parsimony. So I can > >> >> explain rainfall without mentioning God so, by your logic, God does > >> >> not influence rainfall. I can explain the operations of a cell without > >> >> mentioning God, so God does not influence the operation of a cell. > >> >> What has not been established, what I have denied, is whether or not > >> >> we can explain humans without needing to discuss subjective > >> >> experience. I assert that a physical explanation of people will > >> >> mention and explain subjective experience. That is an empirical > >> >> issue, not a logical one. It is something about the world that we find > >> >> out by looking. > > >> >If you could explain rainfall without mentioning God. > > >> There is an example of the problem we have with your posts. That has a > >> full stop, a '.', but it is not a sentence. If what? The normal > >> construction is "if X then Y". > > >> >That would rely > >> >on being able to explain the reality of what we experience without > >> >taking God into account into what you experience, etc. > > >> Your supposed argument discusses behavior . Not some "reality", just > >> behavior. If this is your issue then say so openly. > > >> >So you have your assertion that we can be explained in terms of the > >> >physical, and that it must mention subjective experiences, have I > >> >understood you correctly? > > >> Probably, but with your writing I am not sure. > > >The 'if' referred to whether the reasoning pointed to God being > >uninfluential in rainfall. It had to be taken in context. > > Forget context, it was a sentence fragment. > > >As in if you were standing on one side of a ravine, and asked "Do you > >think I could get to the other side in under a minute", and the answer > >was "If you could fly" > > That has a more sensible structure. The sentence in question did not. > BTW, learn to put your comments interspersed instead of at the end > like that. That would help communication. > > >In response to: > >"Your supposed argument discusses behavior . Not some 'reality', just > >behavior. If this is your issue then say so openly." > > >The reasoning regards the explanation of the behaviour. So in > >response to your assertion: > >"So I can explain rainfall without mentioning God so, by your logic, > >God does not influence rainfall." > > >There was the response: > >"If you could explain rainfall without mentioning God. That would rely > >on being able to explain the reality of what we experience without > >taking God into account into what you experience, etc." > >Hopefully, now in context, you can understand my responses. > > I am confused here. All you did was copy and paste the conversation. > How was that supposed to help me understand? Anyway, I understood that > part and I pointed out that you changed from discussing behavior to > discussing reality. So, again, by your logic, if I can explain the > behavior of rain without mentioning God then God does not influence > rain. Is that something you agree with? > > > > > > >Though > >often, I will be willing to allow you some flexibility, to make your > >point without being so strict, to progress the conversation. > > >Where I had asked: > >"So you have your assertion that we can be explained in terms of the > >physical, and that it must mention subjective experiences, have I > >understood you correctly?" > > >You replied: > >"Probably, but with your writing I am not sure." > > >Well, if you later accept that from your perspective the explanation > >would have to be able to be given without mention of any subjective > >experiences, such as whether the experience was of pleasure or pain > >for example, then I you can always say you misunderstood. > > Why would I say that? Of course internal state and internal matter to > explaining human behavior. Read up on "theory of the mind". > > >Do you agree that the behaviour of any robot that followed the known > >laws of physics, could always be explained in terms of the system > >components following the known laws of physics without reference to > >whether it was subjectively experiencing or not? > > I have disagreed with that several times. > > >In other words, no > >knowledge of whether it was subjectively experiencing or not would be > >required to explain its behaviour. > > It all depends on the "robot". I can avoid discussing subjective > experience (though I do need to consider internal state) when > discussing a Roomba. For a robot that appear human under reasonable > testing? No, I would need to have some discussion of subjective > experience for that robot. I have said this over and over. Mine is an > empirical claim, it could be wrong but the way to tell is to look at > the world. > > The point you seem to be missing, is that you couldn't in reality explain rainfall, which is something that doesn't actually lie outside something that is consciously experienced. Though given your assumption of reality, you would think you could, and with your assumption of reality, applying the reasoning (as you would regard (1) to be true), you would reason that God could not be influential in rainfall. Obviously though if (1) were in fact false, then so would (2) be. It wouldn't be a problem with the reasoning, it would be a problem with your assertion in (1). I assume you mean by "a robot that appear human", that its behaviour gave you reason to think that it might be having subjective experiences, and that not that it necessarily looked like a human. I'm not sure why you are disagreeing with it being explainable in terms of the components following the known laws of physics, is it because you don't think they would be? [Personally I'd rather you responded as people might in an exchange of letters, rather than breaking up the context of various sentances and paragraphs, but I don't suppose you will. I understand most people on usenet intersperse, but then most converstations never get anywhere.] Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 19, 2007 Posted June 19, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1182269736.210144.41070@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > What do you even mean by experiences encoded into the mechanism? Our memories of our experiences are stored within the brain .. they are encoded into the mechanism of the brain. > Don't you understand, that whether a robot had conscious experiences > or not it couldn't affect its behaviour? That is incorrect. > This has been shown by the reasoning you ignore. I have not ignored it .. it has simply not been shown > Also stop using the expression 'word salad' on > anything you can't understand. > Why don't you just say, I can't > understand <the bit you can't understand>, and ask for clarification. Stop writing word salad and READ what you write BEFORE you post. The problem is not with my ability to comprehend.. it is with your ability to communicate. Quote
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