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Implausibility of Materialism


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Guest someone3
Posted

On 6 Jun, 14:13, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote:

> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote innews:1181096859.045313.216360@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com:

>

>

>

>

>

> > On 4 Jun, 18:47, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote:

> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote

> >> innews:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com:

>

> >> > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard as

> >> > responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed there were

> >> > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. No knowledge of

> >> > whether there were any subjective experiences or not would be

> >> > required.

>

> >> Whether or not the mechanism did in fact have subjective experiences,

> >> knowledge of that fact by an external observer would not be necessary

> >> to explain the operation of the mechanism in terms of the physical

> >> structure of the mechanism. However, the fact that the mechanism

> >> does have subjective experiences is part of the operation of that

> >> mechanism and therefore does influence the behavior of the mechanism.

>

> >> > So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced or not,

> >> > wouldn't influence the behaviour. So if we were to be regarded as a

> >> > biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our subjective

> >> > experiences because they actually existed.

>

> >> Wrong. The external observer does not know the content of the

> >> mechanism's subjective experience, but the fact that the mechanism

> >> has such an experience is part of the operation of the mechanism.

>

> >> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object that

> >> > it would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an

> >> > alternative universe, which followed the same known laws of

> >> > physics, but there were no subjective experiences associated with

> >> > it, it would act the same.

>

> >> There is a contradiction here. Either your alternate universe does

> >> not follow the same laws of physics or the mechanism itself is not

> >> identical in structure or operation.

>

> >> > The objection that if it followed the same known laws of

> >> > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively experienced,

> >> > if it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the known laws

> >> > of physics don't reference subjective experiences, thus it is

> >> > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both following the

> >> > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having subjective

> >> > experiences and one not, without the need for any of the known

> >> > laws of physics to be altered.

>

> >> The laws of physics don't have to reference subjective experience.

> >> The subjective experience is, by definition of the problem, entailed

> >> by the structure of certain mechanisms.

>

> > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following:

>

> > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7:

>

> > -------------

> > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program

> > "Philosophy Talk".

>

> > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy

> > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to ook

> > at it, and there are two scenarios:

>

> > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft

> > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and

> > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a

> > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does

> > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's

> > happening, more or less.

>

> > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard

> > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and

> > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a

> > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how

> > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where

> > it's happening, more or less.

>

> > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is

> > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference?

> > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious.

>

> Neither case justifies changing my opinion.

>

> > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering

> > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on

> > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in

> > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we

> > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves

> > consciousness?

>

> Wait a minute, where did that bit about showing how it works come from?

>

> > -------------

>

> > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that

> > I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, and

> > you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I

> > explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the

> > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what

> > basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did

> > because it had subjective experiences?

>

> Why would I change my opinion? I still have subjective experiences and

> those experiences influence my behavior and I still believe that I am

> subject to the laws of physics.

>

> Your inability to construct real paradoxes out of semantic confusion can

> never convince me otherwise, Glenn.

>

> > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any

> > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism

> > following the known laws of physics. So its behaviour, if you still

> > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be

> > said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same

> > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective

> > experiences.

>

> Of course it could be said to be influenced by them. If it behaved as if

> it were having subjective experiences, I would have to conclude that it

> was having subjective experiences, regardless of whether it was an

> organic blob of protoplasm or an electronic box with blinking lights.

>

> I consider the pzombie paradox to be a fallacious contradiction. In my

> not so humble opinion, it is not possible to have "conscious behavior"

> without having "consciousness" in the thing which is doing the behavior.

>

> > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism ollowing

> > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way

> > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having.

>

> No, I cannot see that. You set up the problem by saying that you have a

> machine that behaves as if it is having subjective experiences. That

> implies that those subjective experiences are causing its behavior.

> Now you want to contradict yourself. You're not very good at setting up

> paradoxes, Glenn. You've been trying these tricks for years now, and

> you're still failing miserably.

>

> > They in

> > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it

> > would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective

> > experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the

> > behaviour. The coincidence makes the perspective implausible.

>

> You're contradicting yourself by claiming that you have an organism or a

> machine that acts as if it is having subjective experiences and then

> saying that the subjective experiences have no influence on behavior.

>

> > Though your point is taken, that if it was just a coincidence, then it

> > would be, though my counter point is as I have said that it is

> > implausible that it is just a coincidence that we have the subjective

> > experiences our behaviour expresses, and that in reality our behaviour

> > of us talking about them, was uninfluenced by their existance.

>

> > With regards to the universe scenario, there is no contradiction, it

> > is simply that they both follow the same laws of physics that are

> > known to us, which as you acknowledge, don't reference whether

> > anything is subjectively experienced or not, allowing for in one the

> > mechanism to be subjectively experienced, in the other it not. It is

> > simply a device to illustrate the same point that is I have made above

> > in this response.

>

> No, Glenn, the contradiction is still there. Your point is invalid. The

> internal state of the mechanism is not the same, therefore the machine

> is not the same, therefore your two scenarios are not the same.

>

 

Well I'm obviously not going to respond to your points regarding the

'Philosphy Talk' program Jim07D7 was talking about, as my point was

what they were saying was poorly reasoned.

 

Though regarding your response about regarding the robot to be having

subjective experiences because of the way it behaved, do you accept

that it would be behaving as it would be expected to behave without

the added assumption that it was having subjective experiences?

 

If so, what influence on behaviour would you be considering the

subjective experiences to have, given that it was behaving the same as

it would be expected to if it didn't have subjective experiences?

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Guest Jeckyl
Posted

"someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1181108664.512898.8610@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

> Again you are posting to converstations that I am having with other

> people, when you assured me that you wouldn't.

 

I made no such assurance

>As I have said, your

> behaviour in this regard is pathetic.

 

No.. its called participating in the discussion. You do not own the thread

... you do not control who can respond to whom. It is you who are being very

childish and pathetic

Guest Jeckyl
Posted

"Richard Smol" <richard.smol@gmail.com> wrote in message

news:1181108838.549657.138430@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

> On Jun 6, 4:23 am, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote:

>> "Ron Baker, Pluralitas!" <t...@aint.me> wrote in

>> messagenews:4666153e$0$16659$4c368faf@roadrunner.com...

>>

>> >> If I could, then it wouldn't be something i don't know

>>

>> > So if you don't know the number of cats in Glasgow

>> > you can't say you don't know the number of

>> > cats in Glasgow.

>>

>> So .. you claim that science knows everything ..

>

> No, he doesn't. Learn how to read.

 

I have learnt long ago .. haven't you?

Guest Jeckyl
Posted

"someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1181108912.019669.139700@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

> I have stated repeatedly why the explanation of the behaviour wouldn't

> need to include the concept of it having subjective experiences.

 

No.. you haven't .. you just asserted that it doesn't

> The reason is that the known laws of physics don't,

 

don't what?

> and the behaviour

> could be explained in terms of physical mechanism following the known

> laws of physics.

 

Really . you're just saying the same nothing over and over.

Guest Jeckyl
Posted

"someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1181109108.813673.169620@q66g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...

> The known laws of physics don't reference subjective experiences,

> that isn't an assertion, it is a FACT.

 

I didn't say it was an assertion. Try reading what people write.

Guest Jeckyl
Posted

"someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1181113400.306524.251970@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com...

> For starters, there will never be a materialistic explanation of

> consciousness.

 

Assertion again

> It is impossible, you could never explain why we have

> the subjective experiences we do, and not fluctuations in the colour

> green dependent on the amount of neurons firing. So your statement is

> blantantly deceptive.

 

And your assertion unfounded

> Regarding the robot issue, there is no question of the plausibility of

> the explanation of the robots behaviour, it does follow the known laws

> of physics, and can be shown to do so.

> Is the basis of your claim that it had subjective experiences, was

> based on the way it behaved, even though you knew it was behaving as

> it would be expected to if it didn't have any subjective experiences?

> If so, do you understand that even if you were considering it to have

> subjective experiences, they couldn't be influencing its behaviour, as

> otherwise it wouldn't be behaving as expected to if it didn't have any

> subjective experiences?

 

You defined the situation in such a way as to only consider behaviour that

were not influences by subjective experience, and then try to generalise

from there .. that's very poor logic.

Guest Jeckyl
Posted

"someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1181140233.468267.124680@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...

> Well I'm obviously not going to respond to your points regarding the

> 'Philosphy Talk' program Jim07D7 was talking about, as my point was

> what they were saying was poorly reasoned.

 

It was very well reaosoned .. much better than your confused ramblings,

assertions and tautologies.

> Though regarding your response about regarding the robot to be having

> subjective experiences because of the way it behaved, do you accept

> that it would be behaving as it would be expected to behave without

> the added assumption that it was having subjective experiences?

 

That a robot without actual subjective experiences can emulate the

behaviours of something with subjective experiences does not mean subjective

experiences are not real. You logic is flawed

Guest Martin
Posted

someone2 wrote:

> On 4 Jun, 23:38, Martin <usen...@etiqa.co.uk> wrote:

>> someone2 wrote:

>>> On 4 Jun, 21:53, Martin <usen...@etiqa.co.uk> wrote:

>>>> someone2 wrote:

>>>>> I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the

>>>>> following:

>>>> This is going to be one of these endless discussions because we (TINW)

>>>> don't go along with the plot that someone2 wnats us to take on board.

>>> So rather than face reason, you just run. To me that seems somewhat

>>> pathetic.

>> You're playing games just as you did in TO, you're dishonest.

>>

>

> I wasn't playing games in TO, I was trying to explain things to people

> so indoctrinated they were blinkered to reason.

 

Don't you have a job to go to? You spend weeks on TO arguing with them,

now you've come here and are spending weeks arguing with us.

 

Go and do something productive with your time instead of looking for

people who you think you're intellectually superior to. Try the

christers, they are more about your level

Guest Jeckyl
Posted

OK .. lets take a step back.

 

How about some starting premises from which we can build your argument

(whatever it is)

 

1) there is a non-empty universe with 'objects' in it

2) those objects have behaviours and properties

3) those behaviours and properties have relationhsips

4) the laws of physics model / describe those behaviours and relationships

that objects exhibit

 

5) those objects can be combined to form mechanisms

6) those mechanisms are also objects and so they have have behaviours and

properties (by 2)

7) the behaviours and properties of a mechanism are determined by the

behaviours and properties of the component objects and the relationships

between them

8) the laws of physics model / describe those behaviours and relationships

that objects exhibit (4 above)

 

9) there are objects in the universe that have subjective experiences

(humans)

10) these objects have behaviours an properties (by 2)

11) the subjective experiences of the objects can affect its behaviour

(humans show this)

12) the laws of physics model / describe those behaviours and relationships

the object exhibit (4 above)

 

13) any effects of subjective experience upon the behaviour of the objects

is explained by physics (11+12)

 

Is there any problem with any of the above. Can you build upon that to make

whatever point it is you are trying to make?

Guest Jim07D7
Posted

>"someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>news:1181140233.468267.124680@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...

>

>> Well I'm obviously not going to respond to your points regarding the

>> 'Philosphy Talk' program Jim07D7 was talking about, as my point was

>> what they were saying was poorly reasoned.

 

The reasoning had to do with epistemology, not ontology. If we

conclude based on an interaction with something not physically before

us (like a usenet poster) that it has subjective experiences, why

would physical examination of it change that? We know so little of how

subjective experience occurs in our meatware (at least, in mine it

does ;-)), why should finding the usenet poster to be hardware,

matter?

Guest someone3
Posted

On 6 Jun, 17:19, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> >"someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

> >news:1181140233.468267.124680@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...

>

> >> Well I'm obviously not going to respond to your points regarding the

> >> 'Philosphy Talk' program Jim07D7 was talking about, as my point was

> >> what they were saying was poorly reasoned.

>

> The reasoning had to do with epistemology, not ontology. If we

> conclude based on an interaction with something not physically before

> us (like a usenet poster) that it has subjective experiences, why

> would physical examination of it change that? We know so little of how

> subjective experience occurs in our meatware (at least, in mine it

> does ;-)), why should finding the usenet poster to be hardware,

> matter?

 

Well getting back to what you had said and my response, where the

implausibility of us being simply biological mechanisms is made (and

without that assertion, you have no reason to consider anything

following the known laws of physics to be subjectively experiencing)

 

Posted by you:

-------------

I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program

"Philosophy Talk".

 

Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy

communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to look

at it, and there are two scenarios:

 

1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft

organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and

information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a

brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does

what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's

happening, more or less.

 

2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard

inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and

information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a

computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how

it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where

it's happening, more or less.

 

Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is

conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference?

After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious.

The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering

something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on

communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in

changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we

have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves

consciousness?

-------------

 

To which I pointed out, that if I made a robot that acted as though it

has subjective experiences, and you thought it did, but actually after

you had made your decision, I explained to you that it behaved the way

it did simply because of the physical mechanism following the known

laws of physics, then on what basis would you continue to think that

it was acting the way it did because it had subjective experiences?

 

Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any

difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism

following the known laws of physics. So its behaviour, if you still

chose to consider it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be

said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same

even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective

experiences.

 

Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following

the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way

we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. They in

themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it

would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective

experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the

behaviour). The coincidence makes the perspective implausible.

Guest Jim07D7
Posted

I'll save this and reply later, if the subject is still ongoing.

 

Cheers,

Jim

 

someone3 <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> said:

>On 6 Jun, 17:19, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> >"someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>> >news:1181140233.468267.124680@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> Well I'm obviously not going to respond to your points regarding the

>> >> 'Philosphy Talk' program Jim07D7 was talking about, as my point was

>> >> what they were saying was poorly reasoned.

>>

>> The reasoning had to do with epistemology, not ontology. If we

>> conclude based on an interaction with something not physically before

>> us (like a usenet poster) that it has subjective experiences, why

>> would physical examination of it change that? We know so little of how

>> subjective experience occurs in our meatware (at least, in mine it

>> does ;-)), why should finding the usenet poster to be hardware,

>> matter?

>

>Well getting back to what you had said and my response, where the

>implausibility of us being simply biological mechanisms is made (and

>without that assertion, you have no reason to consider anything

>following the known laws of physics to be subjectively experiencing)

>

>Posted by you:

>-------------

>I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program

>"Philosophy Talk".

>

>Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy

>communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to look

>at it, and there are two scenarios:

>

>1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft

>organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and

>information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a

>brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does

>what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's

>happening, more or less.

>

>2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard

>inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and

>information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a

>computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how

>it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where

>it's happening, more or less.

>

>Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is

>conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference?

>After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious.

>The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering

>something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on

>communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in

>changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we

>have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves

>consciousness?

>-------------

>

>To which I pointed out, that if I made a robot that acted as though it

>has subjective experiences, and you thought it did, but actually after

>you had made your decision, I explained to you that it behaved the way

>it did simply because of the physical mechanism following the known

>laws of physics, then on what basis would you continue to think that

>it was acting the way it did because it had subjective experiences?

>

>Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any

>difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism

>following the known laws of physics. So its behaviour, if you still

>chose to consider it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be

>said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same

>even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective

>experiences.

>

>Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following

>the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way

>we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. They in

>themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it

>would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective

>experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the

>behaviour). The coincidence makes the perspective implausible.

>

Guest someone3
Posted

On 6 Jun, 18:06, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> I'll save this and reply later, if the subject is still ongoing.

>

> Cheers,

> Jim

>

> someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

>

>

> >On 6 Jun, 17:19, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> >> >"someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

> >> >news:1181140233.468267.124680@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...

>

> >> >> Well I'm obviously not going to respond to your points regarding the

> >> >> 'Philosphy Talk' program Jim07D7 was talking about, as my point was

> >> >> what they were saying was poorly reasoned.

>

> >> The reasoning had to do with epistemology, not ontology. If we

> >> conclude based on an interaction with something not physically before

> >> us (like a usenet poster) that it has subjective experiences, why

> >> would physical examination of it change that? We know so little of how

> >> subjective experience occurs in our meatware (at least, in mine it

> >> does ;-)), why should finding the usenet poster to be hardware,

> >> matter?

>

> >Well getting back to what you had said and my response, where the

> >implausibility of us being simply biological mechanisms is made (and

> >without that assertion, you have no reason to consider anything

> >following the known laws of physics to be subjectively experiencing)

>

> >Posted by you:

> >-------------

> >I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program

> >"Philosophy Talk".

>

> >Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy

> >communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to look

> >at it, and there are two scenarios:

>

> >1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft

> >organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and

> >information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a

> >brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does

> >what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's

> >happening, more or less.

>

> >2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard

> >inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and

> >information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a

> >computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how

> >it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where

> >it's happening, more or less.

>

> >Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is

> >conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference?

> >After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious.

> >The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering

> >something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on

> >communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in

> >changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we

> >have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves

> >consciousness?

> >-------------

>

> >To which I pointed out, that if I made a robot that acted as though it

> >has subjective experiences, and you thought it did, but actually after

> >you had made your decision, I explained to you that it behaved the way

> >it did simply because of the physical mechanism following the known

> >laws of physics, then on what basis would you continue to think that

> >it was acting the way it did because it had subjective experiences?

>

> >Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any

> >difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism

> >following the known laws of physics. So its behaviour, if you still

> >chose to consider it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be

> >said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same

> >even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective

> >experiences.

>

> >Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following

> >the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way

> >we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. They in

> >themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it

> >would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective

> >experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the

> >behaviour). The coincidence makes the perspective implausible.

 

Sure, hopefully you'll be able to remove your preconceptions, and

evaluate the plausability of the assertion that you have bet your soul

on, without bias.

Guest Fred Stone
Posted

someone3 <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in

news:1181140233.468267.124680@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com:

> On 6 Jun, 14:13, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote:

>> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote

>> innews:1181096859.045313.216360@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com:

>>

>>

>>

>>

>>

>> > On 4 Jun, 18:47, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote:

>> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote

>> >> innews:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com:

>>

>> >> > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard as

>> >> > responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed there were

>> >> > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. No knowledge

>> >> > of whether there were any subjective experiences or not would be

>> >> > required.

>>

>> >> Whether or not the mechanism did in fact have subjective

>> >> experiences, knowledge of that fact by an external observer would

>> >> not be necessary to explain the operation of the mechanism in

>> >> terms of the physical structure of the mechanism. However, the

>> >> fact that the mechanism does have subjective experiences is part

>> >> of the operation of that mechanism and therefore does influence

>> >> the behavior of the mechanism.

>>

>> >> > So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced or not,

>> >> > wouldn't influence the behaviour. So if we were to be regarded

>> >> > as a biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our

>> >> > subjective experiences because they actually existed.

>>

>> >> Wrong. The external observer does not know the content of the

>> >> mechanism's subjective experience, but the fact that the mechanism

>> >> has such an experience is part of the operation of the mechanism.

>>

>> >> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object

>> >> > that it would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was

>> >> > an alternative universe, which followed the same known laws of

>> >> > physics, but there were no subjective experiences associated

>> >> > with it, it would act the same.

>>

>> >> There is a contradiction here. Either your alternate universe does

>> >> not follow the same laws of physics or the mechanism itself is not

>> >> identical in structure or operation.

>>

>> >> > The objection that if it followed the same known laws of

>> >> > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively

>> >> > experienced, if it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as

>> >> > the known laws of physics don't reference subjective

>> >> > experiences, thus it is conceptually possible to consider to

>> >> > mechanisms both following the same laws of physics as known to

>> >> > us, but with one having subjective experiences and one not,

>> >> > without the need for any of the known laws of physics to be

>> >> > altered.

>>

>> >> The laws of physics don't have to reference subjective experience.

>> >> The subjective experience is, by definition of the problem,

>> >> entailed by the structure of certain mechanisms.

>>

>> > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following:

>>

>> > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7:

>>

>> > -------------

>> > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio

>> > program "Philosophy Talk".

>>

>> > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy

>> > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to

>> > ook at it, and there are two scenarios:

>>

>> > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft

>> > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and

>> > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a

>> > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does

>> > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's

>> > happening, more or less.

>>

>> > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard

>> > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and

>> > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's

>> > a computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know

>> > how it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know

>> > where it's happening, more or less.

>>

>> > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is

>> > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference?

>> > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is

>> > conscious.

>>

>> Neither case justifies changing my opinion.

>>

>> > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering

>> > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on

>> > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in

>> > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say

>> > we have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain

>> > achieves consciousness?

>>

>> Wait a minute, where did that bit about showing how it works come

>> from?

>>

>> > -------------

>>

>> > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity),

>> > that I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective

>> > experiences, and you thought it did, but actually after you had

>> > made your decision, I explained to you that it behaved the way it

>> > did simply because of the physical mechanism following the known

>> > laws of physics, then on what basis would you continue to think

>> > that it was acting the way it did because it had subjective

>> > experiences?

>>

>> Why would I change my opinion? I still have subjective experiences

>> and those experiences influence my behavior and I still believe that

>> I am subject to the laws of physics.

>>

>> Your inability to construct real paradoxes out of semantic confusion

>> can never convince me otherwise, Glenn.

>>

>> > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any

>> > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism

>> > following the known laws of physics. So its behaviour, if you still

>> > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't

>> > be said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act

>> > the same even without your added assumption that it really did have

>> > subjective experiences.

>>

>> Of course it could be said to be influenced by them. If it behaved as

>> if it were having subjective experiences, I would have to conclude

>> that it was having subjective experiences, regardless of whether it

>> was an organic blob of protoplasm or an electronic box with blinking

>> lights.

>>

>> I consider the pzombie paradox to be a fallacious contradiction. In

>> my not so humble opinion, it is not possible to have "conscious

>> behavior" without having "consciousness" in the thing which is doing

>> the behavior.

>>

>> > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism

>> > ollowing the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be

>> > behaving the way we do because of any subjective experiences we

>> > were having.

>>

>> No, I cannot see that. You set up the problem by saying that you have

>> a machine that behaves as if it is having subjective experiences.

>> That implies that those subjective experiences are causing its

>> behavior. Now you want to contradict yourself. You're not very good

>> at setting up paradoxes, Glenn. You've been trying these tricks for

>> years now, and you're still failing miserably.

>>

>> > They in

>> > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean

>> > it would have to be coincidental that we actually have the

>> > subjective experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have

>> > influenced the behaviour. The coincidence makes the perspective

>> > implausible.

>>

>> You're contradicting yourself by claiming that you have an organism

>> or a machine that acts as if it is having subjective experiences and

>> then saying that the subjective experiences have no influence on

>> behavior.

>>

>> > Though your point is taken, that if it was just a coincidence, then

>> > it would be, though my counter point is as I have said that it is

>> > implausible that it is just a coincidence that we have the

>> > subjective experiences our behaviour expresses, and that in reality

>> > our behaviour of us talking about them, was uninfluenced by their

>> > existance.

>>

>> > With regards to the universe scenario, there is no contradiction,

>> > it is simply that they both follow the same laws of physics that

>> > are known to us, which as you acknowledge, don't reference

>> > whether anything is subjectively experienced or not, allowing for

>> > in one the mechanism to be subjectively experienced, in the other

>> > it not. It is simply a device to illustrate the same point that is

>> > I have made above in this response.

>>

>> No, Glenn, the contradiction is still there. Your point is invalid.

>> The internal state of the mechanism is not the same, therefore the

>> machine is not the same, therefore your two scenarios are not the

>> same.

>>

>

> Well I'm obviously not going to respond to your points regarding the

> 'Philosphy Talk' program Jim07D7 was talking about, as my point was

> what they were saying was poorly reasoned.

>

 

Then why did you bring it up? Are you trying to confuse things again?

> Though regarding your response about regarding the robot to be having

> subjective experiences because of the way it behaved, do you accept

> that it would be behaving as it would be expected to behave without

> the added assumption that it was having subjective experiences?

>

 

No, I do not accept that. Nor do I accept your fallacious reasoning

about how "the laws of physics do not reference subjective experiences".

Whether they do or do not is irrelevant to the discussion of whether a

physical object can have subjective experiences while obeying physical

laws.

 

You just got done telling me that the robot is behaving as if it is

having subjective experiences. If it was not having such experiences, it

would behave differently. You can't have it both ways, Glenn.

> If so, what influence on behaviour would you be considering the

> subjective experiences to have, given that it was behaving the same as

> it would be expected to if it didn't have subjective experiences?

>

 

I do not accept your contradictory premises, so I'm not obliged to

explain your contradictions.

 

--

Fred Stone

aa# 1369

"When they put out that deadline, people realized that we were going to

lose," said an aide to an anti-war lawmaker. "Everything after that

seemed like posturing."

 

--

Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com

Guest Denis Loubet
Posted

"someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1181119352.279318.274890@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

> On 6 Jun, 09:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> news:1181102866.269868.46180@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> > On 6 Jun, 05:00, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> >>news:1181095407.100411.107720@q69g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> > On 6 Jun, 02:33, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> >> >>news:1181091930.182688.105050@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> >> > On 5 Jun, 22:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> >> >> >>news:1181074124.893550.190550@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> >> >> > On 5 Jun, 17:12, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> >> >> >> >>news:1181044055.576591.170490@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> >> >> >> > On 5 Jun, 04:17, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180997004.586680.126950@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 23:27, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> message

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180992269.825596.105660@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 19:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote:

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 16:07, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote:

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180915714.304693.138900@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 00:44, "Denis Loubet"

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > <dlou...@io.com>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote:

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180903459.945467.317500@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 21:38, "Denis Loubet"

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > <dlou...@io.com>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote:

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180891870.230456.185600@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 18:27, "Denis Loubet"

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > <dlou...@io.com>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote:

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2"

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180875033.790773.206010@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >page

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >can

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >understand

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following:

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Any mechanism which simply followed

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have its behaviour explained with the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wasn't

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > conscious (had no subjective

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences).

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No. If the mechanism was conscious, then

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> explanation

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> its

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would necessarily include that

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Which means that whether it

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did or didn't couldn't affect

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Which is nonsense. The explanation of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> its

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> necessarily

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> include

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the operation of its consciousness if it

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> was

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Therefore if we were simply a

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism, we couldn't be

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > talking

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > about

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences because of their

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > existance.

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > It

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > a

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > coincidence that we actually

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experienced

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > what

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > claimed

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > we

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did, which isn't plausible.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Well, since you obviously don't

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> understand

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> what

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it's

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> surprising that you've reached incorrect

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusions.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Why would I be required to assume any

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > followed

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the laws of physics was conscious,

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Who said you had to?

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > why couldn't I explain it simply in

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > terms of the physical mechanism following

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption that it wasn't?

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If you fully describe the behavior of the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism following the laws of physics,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> then

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> all

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events that contribute to that behavior. If

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness will be included in the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> description

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics.

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Consciousness

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics.

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Consciousness

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> just

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> our

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> word that labels a particular VARIETY of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> following

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws of physics.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > While I you can believe that the mechanism

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > is

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > responsible

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > for

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective experiences, you avoided

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explaining

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > why

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > couldn't

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explain the behaviour of the mechanism

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > in

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > terms

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physical

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism following the laws of physics,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there were no subjective experiences, or

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I?

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I did not say you couldn't explain the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behaviour

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms of the physical mechanism following the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> assumption that there were no subjective

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> defy

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> point out where I did.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What I DID say is that in explaining the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behaviour

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in terms of the physical mechanism following

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> assumption that there were no subjective

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> necessity, include in that explanation the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> constitute

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness if they occurred.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Unless, of course, you arbitrarily want to

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> avoid

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> those

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events that constitute consciousness, and

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> affect

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> leave

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> your

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> explanation incomplete. You are free to do

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So you admit, that the behaviour of the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explained

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with the assumption that it didn't have any

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Sure. But if it did have subjective experiences,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> those

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> be

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> included in the explanation in terms of physical

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> following

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws of physics. In other words, you could

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> explain

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with a

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> rote

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> description of physical events, unaware that you

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences and their effect on behavior, in

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Can you follow that this being the case,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > whether

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > or

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > didn't

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > any subjective experiences couldn't influence

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > for

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did, its behaviour could not be explained

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > without

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > taking

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > into

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > account

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > whether it did or didn't have any subjective

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences?

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If it has subjective experiences, then they are

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> part

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> its

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> any explanation that failed to include them would

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> be

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> incomplete,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> by

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> definition.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > regard

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > as

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > responsible for the subjective experiences (if

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > indeed

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > were

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "Only"? I never suggested that was the only factor

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> effects

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior.

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm saying that if you want a complete explanation

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> have

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> account for all factors.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> And are you attempting to separate subjective

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> form

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> responsible for it?

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > No knowledge of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > whether there were any subjective experiences or

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > not

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > required.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> True.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So for any given mechanism, whether it were

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experienced

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > or

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > not,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wouldn't influence the behaviour.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Of course it would affect the behavior. Haven't you

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> listened

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> word

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I've

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> said?

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So if we were to be regarded as a

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences because they actually existed.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Our subjective experiences actually exist as

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> material

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> patterns

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brains.

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> These material patterns affect behavior. Is this

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> impossible

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> for

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> understand?

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > object

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > was

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > an

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > alternative

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > universe, which followed the same known laws of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > but

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > were no subjective experiences associated with it,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > act

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > same.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No. If you disallow the material process of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, then you've obviously got a universe

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behaves

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> differently

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> from the one we're in. You're trying to violate the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> principle

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> identity,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> which pretty much hoses logic completely.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The objection that if it followed the same known

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, then it would automatically be

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjectively

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experienced,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics don't reference subjective experiences,

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> We do not note any subjective experiences in the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> absence

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brains.

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Thus we are justified in holding the tentative

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusion

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brains are required for subjective experience. Since

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> we

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> note

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> manipulation of the physical brain produces changes

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, we are justified in holding the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> tentative

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusion

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective experience depends on the arrangement of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> matter

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brain.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > thus it is

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > both

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > having

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences and one not, without the need for any

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of physics to be altered.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So this is a "Consciousness of the Gaps" argument?

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Do you accept that you could conceptually due to the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics not referencing subjective experiences, have

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > a

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > two

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > universes

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > which both followed the same known laws of physics,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > and

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > yet

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > in

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > one,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > a given mechanism gave rise to subjective

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences,

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > and

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > in

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > other it didn't?

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> No.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm a materialist, and you're asking me to abandon the

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> principle

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> identity. You're asking me to abandon logic.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> >> I will not do so.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> > Sit in denial if you like,

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> Thank you, I will keep adhering to logic.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> > but it is conceptually possible to consider

>> >> >> >> >> >> > two universes following the same known laws of physics,

>> >> >> >> >> >> > and

>> >> >> >> >> >> > yet

>> >> >> >> >> >> > one

>> >> >> >> >> >> > having subjective experiences and the other not,

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> Well, I can conceive of a universe just like this one that

>> >> >> >> >> >> doesn't

>> >> >> >> >> >> have

>> >> >> >> >> >> subjective experiences, but it would be trillions of years

>> >> >> >> >> >> further

>> >> >> >> >> >> along

>> >> >> >> >> >> its

>> >> >> >> >> >> timeline where proton decay has finally removed all matter

>> >> >> >> >> >> from

>> >> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> >> universe. No matter, no subjective experiences.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> > because the laws of

>> >> >> >> >> >> > physics don't reference whether anything subjectively

>> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> How do you know they don't? If you record the actions of

>> >> >> >> >> >> all

>> >> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> >> atoms

>> >> >> >> >> >> in

>> >> >> >> >> >> my

>> >> >> >> >> >> brain, then you'll have a complete record of my subjective

>> >> >> >> >> >> experiences

>> >> >> >> >> >> if

>> >> >> >> >> >> materialism is correct.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> > So

>> >> >> >> >> >> > you can sit there not being able to even face thinking

>> >> >> >> >> >> > about

>> >> >> >> >> >> > it

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> Actually, I just showed I can think about it. It's just

>> >> >> >> >> >> stupid.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> > because it would show your whole world perspective to be

>> >> >> >> >> >> > implausible,

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> You haven't managed to do that yet to anyone's

>> >> >> >> >> >> satisfaction.

>> >> >> >> >> >> It's

>> >> >> >> >> >> just

>> >> >> >> >> >> you

>> >> >> >> >> >> making an assertion. No one else appears to agree with

>> >> >> >> >> >> you.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> > but it seems to me pathetic and cowardly to not be able

>> >> >> >> >> >> > to

>> >> >> >> >> >> > face

>> >> >> >> >> >> > reason.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> It is pathetic and cowardly not to be able to face reason,

>> >> >> >> >> >> is

>> >> >> >> >> >> that

>> >> >> >> >> >> your

>> >> >> >> >> >> excuse?

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> > When you feel brave enough, maybe you'll read it again,

>> >> >> >> >> >> > and

>> >> >> >> >> >> > consider the possibility, and how it highlights how you

>> >> >> >> >> >> > had

>> >> >> >> >> >> > been

>> >> >> >> >> >> > deceived.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> By the same logic, you're terrified by materialism and

>> >> >> >> >> >> can't

>> >> >> >> >> >> face

>> >> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> >> truth.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> >> See how bland assertions don't get you anywhere?

>>

>> >> >> >> >> > Unlike you, I'm not afraid of following reason though. If

>> >> >> >> >> > you

>> >> >> >> >> > were

>> >> >> >> >> > to

>> >> >> >> >> > ask me to conceptually consider that God didn't exist for

>> >> >> >> >> > example

>> >> >> >> >> > to

>> >> >> >> >> > highlight a point you were making, I wouldn't turn around

>> >> >> >> >> > and

>> >> >> >> >> > reply

>> >> >> >> >> > that I couldn't, and that I'd refuse to, as you did about

>> >> >> >> >> > an

>> >> >> >> >> > alternative universe which followed the same known laws of

>> >> >> >> >> > physics

>> >> >> >> >> > but

>> >> >> >> >> > in which there were no subjective experiences.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> What if I asked you to believe that god did exist and didn't

>> >> >> >> >> exist

>> >> >> >> >> at

>> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> same time? That's the equivalent of what you asked me to do.

>> >> >> >> >> It's

>> >> >> >> >> not

>> >> >> >> >> that I

>> >> >> >> >> don't want to conceive of such things, it's that I can't.

>> >> >> >> >> Maybe

>> >> >> >> >> you

>> >> >> >> >> can

>> >> >> >> >> hold

>> >> >> >> >> two mutually contradictory ideas in your head at once and

>> >> >> >> >> call

>> >> >> >> >> both

>> >> >> >> >> true,

>> >> >> >> >> but I can't. I have to respect logic.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> Besides, I admitted I could conceive of such a universe, and

>> >> >> >> >> described

>> >> >> >> >> how

>> >> >> >> >> it would have to be. Another way would be if the universe

>> >> >> >> >> didn't

>> >> >> >> >> have

>> >> >> >> >> any

>> >> >> >> >> matter in it because of a perfectly balanced ratio of matter

>> >> >> >> >> to

>> >> >> >> >> antimatter.

>> >> >> >> >> All that's required is that a universe be in such a state

>> >> >> >> >> that

>> >> >> >> >> brains

>> >> >> >> >> cannot

>> >> >> >> >> form. Without brains, you have no consciousness.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> But you don't like my solution to your little conundrum, so

>> >> >> >> >> you

>> >> >> >> >> pretend I

>> >> >> >> >> didn't respond.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> > I'm sure if it had been

>> >> >> >> >> > a thought experiment which could have been used to pose a

>> >> >> >> >> > question

>> >> >> >> >> > about how could God exist, then you would have had no

>> >> >> >> >> > problem,

>> >> >> >> >> > but

>> >> >> >> >> > because it points out how your world view is implausible,

>> >> >> >> >> > you'd

>> >> >> >> >> > rather

>> >> >> >> >> > be deaf and blind about the matter, and not even consider

>> >> >> >> >> > it.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> No. Please acknowledge that I conceived of your stupid

>> >> >> >> >> universe

>> >> >> >> >> scenario.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> It's you who are unable to conceive of the idea that your

>> >> >> >> >> scenario

>> >> >> >> >> might

>> >> >> >> >> be

>> >> >> >> >> silly.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> > You aren't adhering to logic, you are refusing to look at

>> >> >> >> >> > it

>> >> >> >> >> > reasonably.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> You have not shown that to be the case. Until you do, you're

>> >> >> >> >> just

>> >> >> >> >> blabbering.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> > It isn't as though it couldn't be done, for example if a

>> >> >> >> >> > robot behaved

>>

>> >> >> >> >> What? Universes and robots are equivalent in your mind?

>>

>> >> >> >> >> > as though it might have subjective experiences, i.e. it

>> >> >> >> >> > talked about them etc, you could surely conceive of that

>> >> >> >> >> > either

>> >> >> >> >> > (a)

>> >> >> >> >> > it

>> >> >> >> >> > did have, or (b) it didn't have.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> Yes. So what?

>>

>> >> >> >> >> > In one universe you could conceive of

>> >> >> >> >> > it having subjective experiences, in the other that it

>> >> >> >> >> > didn't.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> You said the universes were the SAME! If they're the same,

>> >> >> >> >> then

>> >> >> >> >> they're

>> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> same. If one possesses consciousness, then the other one does

>> >> >> >> >> too.

>> >> >> >> >> If

>> >> >> >> >> one

>> >> >> >> >> doesn't, then the other doesn't either. You can't say they're

>> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> same

>> >> >> >> >> but

>> >> >> >> >> different.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> > In

>> >> >> >> >> > either though it would be acting just the same, as in both

>> >> >> >> >> > it

>> >> >> >> >> > would

>> >> >> >> >> > simply just be a mechanism following the known laws of

>> >> >> >> >> > physics.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> In other words, the same but different. Sorry, that violates

>> >> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >> principle

>> >> >> >> >> of identity. A cannot equal NOT A. You've cast logic out the

>> >> >> >> >> window.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> > The

>> >> >> >> >> > same would apply to humans if you were to consider them to

>> >> >> >> >> > be

>> >> >> >> >> > simply

>> >> >> >> >> > biological mechanisms following the known laws of physics,

>> >> >> >> >> > even

>> >> >> >> >> > if

>> >> >> >> >> > you

>> >> >> >> >> > run from logic and reason, when it goes against your

>> >> >> >> >> > unfounded

>> >> >> >> >> > bias.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> Phrase your question where it does not violate fundamental

>> >> >> >> >> principle

>> >> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> >> logic and I might entertain it.

>>

>> >> >> >> > It is simply a case of both universes following the known

>> >> >> >> > laws

>> >> >> >> > of

>> >> >> >> > physics.

>>

>> >> >> >> Then as far as we know, they're THE SAME! We will expect exactly

>> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> same

>> >> >> >> behaviors in both.

>>

>> >> >> >> > There was no need to add other differences to them as you did

>> >> >> >> > to avoid facing the issue.

>>

>> >> >> >> The distant future universe with no matter is not different from

>> >> >> >> ours.

>> >> >> >> It's

>> >> >> >> exactly the same. Our universe will be exactly that universe.

>>

>> >> >> >> > Which bit are you finding illogical?

>>

>> >> >> >> The part where you say something is the same, but different.

>> >> >> >> Logic

>> >> >> >> dictates

>> >> >> >> that things that are the same CAN'T be different.

>>

>> >> >> >> If you want to throw out logic, that's fine, but the discussion

>> >> >> >> ends

>> >> >> >> there.

>>

>> >> >> >> > Supposing there was a robot that

>> >> >> >> > behaved as though it might be conscious. You could know how it

>> >> >> >> > worked,

>> >> >> >> > but it wouldn't tell you anything about whether it was

>> >> >> >> > subjectively

>> >> >> >> > experienced or not.

>>

>> >> >> >> What? I don't know that. It could easily be that if I knew how

>> >> >> >> it

>> >> >> >> worked,

>> >> >> >> I'd know whether it had subjective experiences or not.

>>

>> >> >> >> > Now in the thought experiment, in one universe it

>> >> >> >> > could be considered that it did have subjective experiences,

>> >> >> >> > in

>> >> >> >> > the

>> >> >> >> > other that it did not.

>>

>> >> >> >> It? What it? The robot? The robot wasn't involved in your

>> >> >> >> universe

>> >> >> >> scenario

>> >> >> >> until just now.

>>

>> >> >> >> So the robot works differently in the two universes. Ok...So...?

>>

>> >> >> >> > By doing so you could see that whether it did

>> >> >> >> > or didn't it couldn't affect its behaviour, as in both, it

>> >> >> >> > will

>> >> >> >> > simply

>> >> >> >> > behave the same, i.e. follow the laws of physics, so in fact

>> >> >> >> > it

>> >> >> >> > isn't

>> >> >> >> > only logical, it is a useful tool.

>>

>> >> >> >> No. It still makes no sense. If the same operation results in

>> >> >> >> consciousness

>> >> >> >> in one universe, and no consciousness in the other universe,

>> >> >> >> then

>> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> universes are different.

>>

>> >> >> >> One would expect different behaviors in different universes with

>> >> >> >> different

>> >> >> >> laws.

>>

>> >> >> >> > It shows the implausibility of your

>> >> >> >> > world view for starters.

>>

>> >> >> >> No. It doesn't appear to do that at all.

>>

>> >> >> >> > Is truthfully so difficult for you, or is it

>> >> >> >> > that you can't face applying reason to your perspective?

>>

>> >> >> >> You have yet to establish that you are speaking truthfully. Or

>> >> >> >> utilizing

>> >> >> >> reason.

>>

>> >> >> > How would knowing that the behaviour of the robot was explainable

>> >> >> > in

>> >> >> > terms of it following the known laws of physics, give you any

>> >> >> > indication of whether it subjectively experienced or not.

>>

>> >> >> I didn't say it would. I offered the possibility that it could. YOU

>> >> >> are

>> >> >> the

>> >> >> one making the absolute statement said it wouldn't.

>>

>> >> >> Care to back up that assertion?

>>

>> >> >> > You seem to

>> >> >> > be living in some sci-fi fantasy world.

>>

>> >> >> And you don't seem to understand the difference between a

>> >> >> speculation

>> >> >> and

>> >> >> a

>> >> >> statement of fact.

>>

>> >> >> > Regarding the thought experiment, the robots would both be

>> >> >> > following

>> >> >> > the same known laws of physics. So perhaps you could explain

>> >> >> > why

>> >> >> > you

>> >> >> > suggest they would act differently.

>>

>> >> >> Robots? This is the first time you've suggested more than one

>> >> >> robot.

>> >> >> You

>> >> >> seem to enjoy adding more and more items to your scenarios

>> >> >> willy-nilly

>> >> >> before we've even settled the original point you're trying to make.

>>

>> >> >> Ok, are we talking identical robots in identical universes? Then I

>> >> >> suppose

>> >> >> they'd behave exactly the same.

>>

>> >> >> If we're talking robots that are different in identical universes,

>> >> >> then I

>> >> >> suppose they'd behave differently.

>>

>> >> >> If we're talking identical robots in universes that are different,

>> >> >> then I

>> >> >> suppose they'd behave differently.

>>

>> >> >> And if we're talking robots that are different in universes that

>> >> >> are

>> >> >> different, I suppose they'd behave differently there too. (Unless

>> >> >> there

>> >> >> was

>> >> >> the unlikely event that the differences cancelled each other out.)

>>

>> >> >> I can't think of another permutation. Did I answer your question?

>> >> >> It

>> >> >> boils

>> >> >> down to things that are the same act the same, and things that are

>> >> >> different

>> >> >> act different. Did you want me to go into some sort of explanation

>> >> >> of

>> >> >> this

>> >> >> conclusion? It seems pretty self explanatory.

>>

>> >> >> If, on the other hand, you're back to your "The universes are the

>> >> >> same,

>> >> >> but

>> >> >> magically different" tune, then I have no answer for you, as you've

>> >> >> abandoned logic and I can't follow you there.

>>

>> >> > Well there are two universes, and a robot in each, so how is it the

>> >> > first time it was mentioned that there were two of them?

>>

>> >> Now you're being disingenuous. I can look back in this thread and see

>> >> that

>> >> you started the argument with two universes. Then several posts later,

>> >> you

>> >> dragged in a robot that behaved differently in each universe. Then a

>> >> few

>> >> posts later you dragged in another robot.

>>

>> >> People CAN read, you know.

>>

>> >> > The universes are the same in regards to the known laws of

>> >> > physics.

>> >> > In case you weren't aware, the laws of physics don't touch on the

>> >> > subject of whether anything is subjectively experienced or not.

>>

>> >> Then stop talking about it.

>>

>> >> > Therefore you could conceptually have two universes, which both

>> >> > follow

>> >> > the same laws of physics, and yet in one, the mechanism had no

>> >> > subjective experiences, and the other it did.

>>

>> >> So the universes are not the same.

>>

>> >> > So no the universes

>> >> > wouldn't be identical, they would simply both follow the known laws

>> >> > of

>> >> > physics.

>>

>> >> So you admit you are postulating two universes that are different.

>>

>> >> > Regarding the question, how would knowing that the behaviour of the

>> >> > robot was explainable in

>> >> > terms of it following the known laws of physics, give you any

>> >> > indication of whether it subjectively experienced or not, you didn't

>> >> > answer it.

>>

>> >> That's not the question you asked. But I'll answer this one.

>>

>> >> It wouldn't. It wouldn't give you any indication. You would have to

>> >> know

>> >> how

>> >> it worked to do that.

>>

>> >> > As for backing up the assertion, well it is backed up by

>> >> > the fact that there would be no indication, and that neither you nor

>> >> > any materialist experiencing the physical world could point to one.

>>

>> >> But that's not the claim I asked you to back up. I asked you to back

>> >> up

>> >> THIS

>> >> one: "Supposing there was a robot that behaved as though it might be

>> >> conscious. You could know how it worked, but it wouldn't tell you

>> >> anything

>> >> about whether it was subjectively experienced or not."

>>

>> >> The claim above stated that I KNEW HOW IT WORKED, not just that I knew

>> >> it

>> >> operated according to the laws of physics. Your clumsy use of language

>> >> implies that I have all sorts of knowledge about the robot. That I can

>> >> follow all the operations of the mechanical brain. If that's the case,

>> >> It's

>> >> just as likely that I can open the user interface of the robot and see

>> >> what

>> >> it says under the "Subjective Experience" tab. That'll tell me all I

>> >> need

>> >> to

>> >> know.

>>

>> >> > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7:

>>

>> >> > -------------

>> >> > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program

>> >> > "Philosophy Talk".

>>

>> >> > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy

>> >> > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to

>> >> > look

>> >> > at it, and there are two scenarios:

>>

>> >> > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft

>> >> > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and

>> >> > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a

>> >> > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does

>> >> > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's

>> >> > happening, more or less.

>>

>> >> > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard

>> >> > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and

>> >> > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's

>> >> > a

>> >> > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know

>> >> > how

>> >> > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where

>> >> > it's happening, more or less.

>>

>> >> > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is

>> >> > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference?

>> >> > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is

>> >> > conscious.

>>

>> >> I see no reason in either case to change my opinion.

>>

>> >> > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering

>> >> > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on

>> >> > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in

>> >> > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say

>> >> > we

>> >> > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves

>> >> > consciousness?

>>

>> >> No. But if someone built the computer that we have decided is

>> >> conscious,

>> >> it

>> >> implies that the guy who built it knows how to achieve consciousness

>> >> in a

>> >> computer.

>>

>> >> Of course, that's a necessarily tentative conclusion, because we know

>> >> that

>> >> we could be wrong about the computer being conscious. Heck, we could

>> >> be

>> >> wrong about the meat brain being conscious too.

>>

>> >> > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity),

>> >> > that

>> >> > I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences,

>> >> > and

>> >> > you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I

>> >> > explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of

>> >> > the

>> >> > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what

>> >> > basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did

>> >> > because it had subjective experiences?

>>

>> >> I would have to be assured that the physical operation of the robot,

>> >> following known laws of physics, didn't actually constitute

>> >> consciousness.

>>

>> >> > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any

>> >> > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism

>> >> > following the known laws of physics.

>>

>> >> No.

>>

>> >> For it to behave a certain way without consciousness, it would have to

>> >> be

>> >> programmed differently to behave the same way with consciousness.

>>

>> >> > So its behaviour, if you still

>> >> > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't

>> >> > be

>> >> > said to be influenced by them,

>>

>> >> No. Consciousness appears to modify behavior. Conscious things usually

>> >> move

>> >> about, unconscious things usually lie inert.

>>

>> >> > as it would be expected to act the same

>> >> > even without your added assumption that it really did have

>> >> > subjective

>> >> > experiences.

>>

>> >> It can be programmed to fool me. So what?

>>

>> >> > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism

>> >> > following

>> >> > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way

>> >> > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having.

>>

>> >> No.

>>

>> >> We are biological machanisms following the laws of physics. Our

>> >> subjective

>> >> experiences are part of that biological mechanism. The biological

>> >> mechanism

>> >> determines our behavior. Therefore subjective experience, as part of

>> >> our

>> >> biological mechanism following the laws of physics, affects our

>> >> behavior.

>>

>> >> > They in

>> >> > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour,

>>

>> >> As part of the biological mechanism that determines our behavior, they

>> >> do.

>>

>> >> > which would mean it

>> >> > would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective

>> >> > experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the

>> >> > behaviour. The coincidence makes the perspective implausible.

>>

>> >> Well, when an argument is as wrong as yours, stupid conclusions are to

>> >> be

>> >> expected.

>>

>> >> > As I've said, you seem to having problems facing this point, but it

>> >> > is

>> >> > a fact regarding the known laws of physics nevertheless.

>>

>> >> And you have trouble facing the idea that you might be wrong.

>>

>> > It seems you can't read. There were initially two universes, and a

>> > robot in each, and it remained so.

>>

>> Now you're just lying. Anyone can see that you first brought up the

>> universe

>> argument on the 4th at 11:25 AM. Robots weren't mentioned until 3

>> exchanges

>> later with your 5:47 AM post on the 5th. And you didn't mention a second

>> robot until 2 exchanges later on the 5th at 7:05 PM.

>>

>> Go on, read your posts. I'll wait.

>>

>> Can I expect an apology, or at least an admission that you made a

>> mistake?

>>

>> > It also seems you are unable to follow the points being made, and

>> > avoided the questions. For example where I said:

>>

>> > -------

>> > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that

>> > I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, and

>> > you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I

>> > explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the

>> > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what

>> > basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did

>> > because it had subjective experiences?

>> > -------

>>

>> > To which you replied:

>> > -------

>> > I would have to be assured that the physical operation of the robot,

>> > following known laws of physics, didn't actually constitute

>> > consciousness.

>>

>> Yes? And?

>>

>> > Avoiding totally stating on what basis would you continue to think

>> > that it was acting the way it did because it had subjective

>> > experiences?

>>

>> Why do you have a question mark at the end of a declarative sentence?

>>

>> I would continue to think it was acting in response to subjective

>> experiences because apparently that's what it looks like it's doing. And

>> your word alone isn't enough to dissuade me. You would have to show me

>> that

>> it's acting in what I would consider a non-conscious manner.

>>

>> > You also were seemingly unable to comprehend that even if you were to

>> > regard it as having subjective experiences, it would still be behaving

>> > as it would be expected to without the assumption that it was.

>>

>> Only if the non-conscious version was designed to mimic the conscious

>> version. Note that the conscious version wouldn't need that bit of

>> programming.

>>

>

> Regarding the post on the 4th (and I don't know why you couldn't have

> cut and pasted these instead of me having to do it) it stated:

 

Hey, they're YOUR posts.

> ----------

> To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object that it

> would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an alternative

> universe, which followed the same known laws of physics, but there

> were no subjective experiences associated with it, it would act the

> same. The objection that if it followed the same known laws of

> physics, then it would automatically be subjectively experienced, if

> it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the known laws of

> physics don't reference subjective experiences, thus it is

> conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both following the

> same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having subjective

> experiences and one not, without the need for any of the known laws

> of physics to be altered.

> ----------

>

> Here mechanisms are mentioned being in each universe, but you are

> correct, in that I didn't specifically mention robots.

 

Thank you.

 

So, are you willing to admit that I CAN read?

> Though for each

> mechanism, it would be existing twice, once in each universe (thus

> "...both following the same laws of physics as known to us, but with

> one having subjective experiences and one not").

>

> On the post on the 5th:

> ----------

> You aren't adhering to logic, you are refusing to look at it

> reasonably. It isn't as though it couldn't be done, for example if a

> robot behaved as though it might have subjective experiences, i.e. it

> talked about them etc, you could surely conceive of that either (a) it

> did have, or (b) it didn't have. In one universe you could conceive of

> it having subjective experiences, in the other that it didn't. In

> either though it would be acting just the same, as in both it would

> simply just be a mechanism following the known laws of physics. The

> same would apply to humans if you were to consider them to be simply

> biological mechanisms following the known laws of physics, even if

> you

> run from logic and reason, when it goes against your unfounded bias.

> ----------

>

> There are two universe, and a robot is in each, obviously the same

> robot isn't existing in both simultaneously.

 

That's not obvious at all. The entire quote can be interpreted as

referencing one robot being compared in two different universes.

 

Perhaps a command of the language is more important than you seem to think

it is.

> I'm not sure if this is what you are referring to (as the time stamps

> I see are different)

 

Yes, that's exactly the post I'm referencing.

> ----------

> Regarding the thought experiment, the robots would both be following

> the same known laws of physics. So perhaps you could explain why

> you

> suggest they would act differently.

> ----------

>

> Again, there are two robots.

 

No, that's the FIRST time you unambiguously refer to two robots.

> If it was different bits you were referring to, then I suggest that

> you cut and paste them yourself, so there can be no confusion.

 

No, you're using the correct quotes.

> Anyway, back to the real issue, regarding where I said:

 

Well, I suppose an admission of a slight mistake as opposed to an apology

for unjustly slandering my reading ability is all I can expect from one as

dishonest as you.

> ----------

> Avoiding totally stating on what basis would you continue to think

> that it was acting the way it did because it had subjective

> experiences?

> ----------

>

> You replied

> ----------

> Why do you have a question mark at the end of a declarative sentence?

>

> I would continue to think it was acting in response to subjective

> experiences because apparently that's what it looks like it's doing.

> And your word alone isn't enough to dissuade me. You would have to

> show me that it's acting in what I would consider a non-conscious

> manner.

> ----------

>

> So you would base your belief that it was acting in response to

> subjective experiences, even though it was behaving exactly as it

> would be expected to, without the added assumption that it was

> subjectively experiencing?

 

No. In your scenario you've already got me agreeing that it's conscious. The

basis for that conclusion is that it's behaving in a way that I take to be

congruent with subjective experience. It's responding in context to my

questions and such, for example. Then, in your scenario, you tell me it's

not conscious. The reason I do not immediately agree with you is that the

robot is, I presume, still acting like it's conscious. Until you can show me

that it's not conscious, I'll continue to act under the assumption that my

conclusion that it is conscious is correct and disbelieve you.

 

That's what I meant by: "I would continue to think it was acting in response

to subjective experiences because apparently that's what it looks like it's

doing." I can't imagine how you misinterpreted that.

> If so, what influence would you consider the subjective experiences to

> be having, given that it is behaving as it would be expected to

> without the assumption that it had any subjective experiences?

 

Given that your interpretation of my response was incorrect, this question

is meaningless.

 

If you had two robots, one with a brain capable of subjective experience,

and one with a sophisticated tape-recorder that played back responses

designed to fool me into thinking it's conscious, they would supposedly

behave the same, and I would mistakenly grant that both were conscious. Both

would be acting according to physical law to get the same effect, but the

workings would be very different. For the tape recorder robot to succeed, it

has to have the right phrases recorded to fool me, just like the conscious

robot has to have subjective experiences or I won't think it's conscious.

 

--

Denis Loubet

dloubet@io.com

http//www.io.com/~dloubet

Guest Martin
Posted

Jeckyl wrote:

> OK .. lets take a step back.

>

> How about some starting premises from which we can build your argument

> (whatever it is)

>

> 1) there is a non-empty universe with 'objects' in it

> 2) those objects have behaviours and properties

> 3) those behaviours and properties have relationhsips

> 4) the laws of physics model / describe those behaviours and relationships

> that objects exhibit

 

Sounds like a good model for a design/programming system to me :)

> 5) those objects can be combined to form mechanisms

> 6) those mechanisms are also objects and so they have have behaviours and

> properties (by 2)

> 7) the behaviours and properties of a mechanism are determined by the

> behaviours and properties of the component objects and the relationships

> between them

> 8) the laws of physics model / describe those behaviours and relationships

> that objects exhibit (4 above)

 

I can't fault your logic so far

> 9) there are objects in the universe that have subjective experiences

> (humans)

 

I'd have left out the stuff in the brackets

> 10) these objects have behaviours an properties (by 2)

> 11) the subjective experiences of the objects can affect its behaviour

> (humans show this)

 

Self learning systems?

> 12) the laws of physics model / describe those behaviours and relationships

> the object exhibit (4 above)

>

> 13) any effects of subjective experience upon the behaviour of the objects

> is explained by physics (11+12)

>

> Is there any problem with any of the above. Can you build upon that to make

> whatever point it is you are trying to make?

 

"Your logic was impeccable, Captain. We are in grave danger."

Guest Richard Smol
Posted

On Jun 6, 5:48 pm, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote:

> "Richard Smol" <richard.s...@gmail.com> wrote in message

>

> news:1181108838.549657.138430@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> > On Jun 6, 4:23 am, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote:

> >> "Ron Baker, Pluralitas!" <t...@aint.me> wrote in

> >> messagenews:4666153e$0$16659$4c368faf@roadrunner.com...

>

> >> >> If I could, then it wouldn't be something i don't know

>

> >> > So if you don't know the number of cats in Glasgow

> >> > you can't say you don't know the number of

> >> > cats in Glasgow.

>

> >> So .. you claim that science knows everything ..

>

> > No, he doesn't. Learn how to read.

>

> I have learnt long ago .. haven't you?

 

You obviously also learned how to be a prick.

 

RS

Guest minsky@media.mit.edu
Posted

On Jun 5, 11:30 pm, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:

> On Jun 6, 12:34 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

> > On 6 Jun, 03:29, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:

> > > On Jun 5, 1:18 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

 

Evidently some people maintain that "subjective experience" can never

be explained

in terms of physical processes. They offer reasons for this opinion,

but none of those

make much sense to me. In the last chapter of "The Emotion Machine,"

I suggest some

possible reasons why people find feelings so hard to describe, and

suggest a few

explanations of this, some of which might turn out to be wrong.

 

However, it might be a good lesson to consider the way that "life" or

"living" was once

considered to be so inexplicable that perople felt they had to assume

that there must

exist a (nonphysical) "vital force" or "spirit," etc. But today, now

that we know how

complex a living cell is, no serious scientist see any basic mystery.

Insted, now that we understand how complex a cell is, we know that we

"simply" need to answer a few thousand

hand -- but not unsolvable -- questions.

 

It is exactly the same situation, it seems to me, with the subject of

subjective experience.

Too many philosophers have started with assumptions like "The

sensation of Redness is

basic, simple, and irreducible -- and therefore it is inexplicable."

However, we can assume,

instead, that when a brain sees something Red, this initiates an

extremely complicated

set of processes, and that these eventually cause certain parts of

that brain to make

very simplistic descriptions of what they observe in the rest of that

brain.

 

Then, because those descriptions don't lead anywhere, yet other parts

of the brain

construct those useless dualistic descriptions, because they don't

have adequate ways

to explain why they can't understand what is happening.

Guest pbamvv@worldonline.nl
Posted

On 5 jun, 21:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

> On 5 Jun, 17:01, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl>

> wrote:

>

> > On 4 jun, 19:39, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > On 4 Jun, 18:08, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl>

> > > wrote:

>

> > > > On 3 jun, 23:52, someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > > > On 3 Jun, 22:46, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl>

> > > > > wrote:

>

> > > > > > On 3 jun, 22:23, someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > > > > > On 3 Jun, 21:11, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl>

> > > > > > > wrote:

>

> > > > > > > > On 3 jun, 21:09, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > > > > > > > On 3 Jun, 20:03, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl>

> > > > > > > > > wrote:

>

> > > > > > > > > > On 3 jun, 16:01, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > > > > > > > > > On 3 Jun, 14:24, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl>

> > > > > > > > > > > wrote:

>

> > > > > > > > > > > > On 3 jun, 14:50, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > > > > > > > > > > > I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the

> > > > > > > > > > > > > following:

>

> > > > > > > > > > > > > Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could

> > > > > > > > > > > > > have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't

> > > > > > > > > > > > > conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it

> > > > > > > > > > > > > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a

> > > > > > > > > > > > > biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective

> > > > > > > > > > > > > experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a

> > > > > > > > > > > > > coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we

> > > > > > > > > > > > > did, which isn't plausible.

>

> > > > > > > > > > > > Pardon?

> > > > > > > > > > > > "Which means that wheter it did or didn't"

> > > > > > > > > > > > did or didn't what?

>

> > > > > > > > > > > > If a cameraman goes out with soldiers to make pictures of the war,

> > > > > > > > > > > > the behaviour of the soldiers during intense combat can be explained

> > > > > > > > > > > > without references to the camera.

> > > > > > > > > > > > Thus - according to you it - would be a coincidence if the camera

> > > > > > > > > > > > would have recorded what actually happened?

>

> > > > > > > > > > > > Funny way of reasoning:)

>

> > > > > > > > > > > > In "consciousness explained" Dennet actually describes conciousness as

> > > > > > > > > > > > the narative our brain stores of what has happened. So comparing it

> > > > > > > > > > > > whith the camera is not a silly thing to do. Of course unlike the

> > > > > > > > > > > > camera our consiousness does not consist of raw data, but is also

> > > > > > > > > > > > build up from conclusions our mind has been making during or after the

> > > > > > > > > > > > facts that are described happened. This is very usefull for our

> > > > > > > > > > > > actions during the events (supposing someone is aiming to kill you

> > > > > > > > > > > > provedes a better guidline for soldiers) that merely concluding that

> > > > > > > > > > > > certain sounds present themselves to our ears), but somewhat spoiling

> > > > > > > > > > > > our memory as far as reliability is concerned. (someone might be

> > > > > > > > > > > > playing a tape of bullets flying around instead of really shooting).

>

> > > > > > > > > > > > If you have any real problems with materialism,

> > > > > > > > > > > > you may present them to me,

> > > > > > > > > > > > I know of no problems so far,

> > > > > > > > > > > > and am willing the learn wether one is serious enough to ponder about.

>

> > > > > > > > > > > Your analogy was poor. The soldiers behaviour isn't affected by

> > > > > > > > > > > whether unknown to them the cameraman was filming. So if they were

> > > > > > > > > > > talking about the cameraman filming, it would only be a coincidence

> > > > > > > > > > > that there was a cameraman filming.

>

> > > > > > > > > > > You couldn't be talking about anything you experience, and about your

> > > > > > > > > > > subjective experiences, because you actually had subjective

> > > > > > > > > > > experiences was the point. It would only be a coincidence that you had

> > > > > > > > > > > the subjective experiences that you were discussing. It would also

> > > > > > > > > > > have to be a deception that your behaviour was influenced by anything

> > > > > > > > > > > you subjectively experienced, so on top of it being a coincidence, it

> > > > > > > > > > > wouldn't even fit with our actual experience.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven -

>

> > > > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven -

>

> > > > > > > > > > You evidently seem to think that soldiers bother to talk to the

> > > > > > > > > > cameraman when bullets are flying. I do not think that is the case.

> > > > > > > > > > But any analogy is poor.

> > > > > > > > > > Let's suppose there is no cameramen but only a hidden camera inside a

> > > > > > > > > > helmet, of which even the soldier wearing the helmet is oblivious.

> > > > > > > > > > The effect of the camera would be minimal,

> > > > > > > > > > yet the story it's picture would tell would not be false.

>

> > > > > > > > > > Why could I not be talking about my experiences

> > > > > > > > > > Why can't a camera work?

> > > > > > > > > > You give me no serious reason for this impromptu statement.

>

> > > > > > > > > > Again if ourt consience (as Dennett suggest) is only a narrative

> > > > > > > > > > that doesn't mean it is totally coincidental if the narrative is

> > > > > > > > > > somewhat correct.

> > > > > > > > > > Experiences lead to actions - even by robots -

> > > > > > > > > > if these actions are that monitored

> > > > > > > > > > than the narrative made by the monitor too is a result of those

> > > > > > > > > > experiences.

>

> > > > > > > > > > Futrhermore materialsm doesn't mean consious experciences do not

> > > > > > > > > > influence our decissions. In my example the camera would not influence

> > > > > > > > > > the decissions of the soldiers, but if the rewind and look at the

> > > > > > > > > > pictures, they may find some information about the position of the

> > > > > > > > > > enemy and plan their future actions accordingly.

>

> > > > > > > > > > Likewise a robot may learn from it's experciences by using a

> > > > > > > > > > background program that is modifying the foreground program to work

> > > > > > > > > > more efficiently, by analizing the data collected by a monitoring

> > > > > > > > > > unit.

>

> > > > > > > > > > Of course at present it may be more efficient to have the analyzing

> > > > > > > > > > done by a human, as humans are already equipped with the hardware and

> > > > > > > > > > software to do that job.

>

> > > > > > > > > > In my viwed You haven't said anything that makes "materialism"

> > > > > > > > > > implausible.

> > > > > > > > > > (actually I am wondering what you are saying if anything at all)

> > > > > > > > > > There is a lot though that makes dualism implausible.

> > > > > > > > > > especially Ockham's razor knife.

>

> > > > > > > > > The camera in the helmet is analogous to having subjective experiences

> > > > > > > > > right? Do you understand that if the soldiers were talking about

> > > > > > > > > having a camera in their helmet (which doesn't affect their

> > > > > > > > > behaviour), then it would only be a coincidence that there was a

> > > > > > > > > camera in their helmet?

>

> > > > > > > > > Do you understand that any mechanism that followed the known laws of

> > > > > > > > > physics could be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism

> > > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics with the assumption that the

> > > > > > > > > mechanism had no subjective experiences?

>

> > > > > > > > The first paragraph I understand

> > > > > > > > what I do not understand what connection that would have towards

> > > > > > > > the plausibility of materialism.

>

> > > > > > > > However the second paragraph is known to be untrue.

> > > > > > > > People do not only have subjective experiences but they act on them.

> > > > > > > > There are people who think they have been abcucted by aliens and act

> > > > > > > > accordingly.

> > > > > > > > There are people who think they have heard the voice of God and act

> > > > > > > > accordingly.

> > > > > > > > There is ample evidence to suggest that some of these subjective

> > > > > > > > experiences are objectively false.(as some maintain that god declares

> > > > > > > > Islam to be the only true religion while others declare God says it is

> > > > > > > > not)

>

> > > > > > > > The fact that spirits do not exist does not mean people do not act

> > > > > > > > upon their delusions.

> > > > > > > > If we disagree on this then apperantly one of us is delusional and

> > > > > > > > acts accordingly.

> > > > > > > > That doesn't mean there is anything else than brains that acting

> > > > > > > > differently.

> > > > > > > > (I can't say better or worse, for if one of us is wrong about this

> > > > > > > > particular subject, it may well be that the other is decidingly

> > > > > > > > thinking better about all other subjects)

>

> > > > > > > > Think about it

> > > > > > > > and let me know

>

> > > > > > > What you say is known, is simply your belief. What you are glossing

> > > > > > > over is that your belief is implausible.

>

> > > > > > > You state that you believe the following to be untrue:

> > > > > > > ------------

> > > > > > > Do you understand that any mechanism that followed the known laws of

> > > > > > > physics could be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism

> > > > > > > following the known laws of physics with the assumption that the

> > > > > > > mechanism had no subjective experiences?

> > > > > > > ------------

>

> > > > > > > Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics

> > > > > > > couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the

> > > > > > > known laws of physics?

>

> > > > > > > Or is it that you think there is a reason that you would be unable to

> > > > > > > do so with the assumption that the mechanism had no subjective

> > > > > > > experiences? If so, please explain why I couldn't explain its

> > > > > > > behaviour in in terms of the physical mechanism following the known

> > > > > > > laws of physics (which don't reference any subjective experiences the

> > > > > > > physical might or might not be having), with the assumption that it

> > > > > > > didn't have any subjective experiences.

>

> > > > > > I am not sure that human actions can be easily explained without the

> > > > > > assumption of subjective experiences. Of course one can refer to what

> > > > > > happens in our brains synapsis and disregard anything in the real or

> > > > > > imagined world that this synaps event deals with but that is certainly

> > > > > > not easy and actually evading the question whether the subjective

> > > > > > experience has any importance.

>

> > > > > > Fact is that subjective experiences do influence our behavior even if

> > > > > > both the experience and the behaviour contain nothing more than

> > > > > > someone saying "I experience X".

>

> > > > > > That does not mean that someone who says to have been abducted by

> > > > > > aliens was abducted by aliens, but it does mean that this person acts

> > > > > > differently than some who does not claim so.

>

> > > > > > Fact is also that these subjecive experiences as such have little

> > > > > > influence during the experience they are describing.

> > > > > > The clue to Dennetts vision towards consciousness is that he does not

> > > > > > imply that the subjective experience is anything more than that:

> > > > > > Saying what we think has happened..

>

> > > > > > Of course someone claiming to have been abducted by aliens may also

> > > > > > react differently towards a plain flying over in the nightsky.

>

> > > > > > If consiousness/subjective experience is narrative and contained in

> > > > > > our memory it always is about the past, while as everything it can

> > > > > > only influence the future.

> > > > > > It does however (totally!) determine the way we view the past.

>

> > > > > > Still puzzled as how this has any reference towards materialism.

>

> > > > > > In case anyone misunderstands:

> > > > > > Mine are the following views:

>

> > > > > > 1. Subjective experience has no influence on the real experience it it

> > > > > > desrcibing

> > > > > > (unless the experience takes enough time for nr.2 to have effect)

> > > > > > 2. Subjective experience has a lot of influence on future behaviour.

> > > > > > 3. Subjective experience is practically the only source for the way we

> > > > > > view our past.

> > > > > > 3. Subjective experience need not always to be conscious even though

> > > > > > consciousness is little more than the subjective experience we

> > > > > > momentarily

> > > > > > remember. (I do not want to get flamed by psychologists)

>

> > > > > You just avoided answering the questions as to why

> > > > > ------------

> > > > > Do you understand that any mechanism that followed the known laws of

> > > > > physics could be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism

> > > > > following the known laws of physics with the assumption that the

> > > > > mechanism had no subjective experiences?

> > > > > ------------

>

> > > > > As I asked:

> > > > > ----------------

> > > > > Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics

> > > > > couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the

> > > > > known laws of physics?

>

> > > > > Or is it that you think there is a reason that you would be unable to

> > > > > do so with the assumption that the mechanism had no subjective

> > > > > experiences? If so, please explain why I couldn't explain its

> > > > > behaviour in in terms of the physical mechanism following the known

> > > > > laws of physics (which don't reference any subjective experiences the

> > > > > physical might or might not be having), with the assumption that it

> > > > > didn't have any subjective experiences.

> > > > > ----------------

>

> > > > > You could avoid being taken through the reasoning of why materialism

> > > > > is implausible, and then state that you see no reason why it should be

> > > > > regarded as such, but why would you?

>

> > > > > (I'm off for tonight, I'll check the board tommorrow for your response)

>

> > > > If I didn't make clear why I think it might not be easy to explain

> > > > human action without the assumption of a subjective experience, I can

> > > > tell you that it is a lot easier to explain something if you do not go

> > > > into details. Instead of a mechanical explanation involving hundreds

> > > > or thousands of synapses we may just say, "he had an earlier

> > > > experience that made him feel suspicious even though he couldn't tell

> > > > why" or "She knew unprotected sex may give you aids". Of course far

> > > > too many people neglect their knowledge about aids, but some actually

> > > > do. Some guys even remember that they are married!:)

>

> > > > Memory and conscious knowledge however are all part of PREVIOUS

> > > > subjective experiences. So using that, might make the actions easier

> > > > to explain.

>

> > > > Is this what you meant with "you just avoided the questions as to why?

> > > > Or do you want to ask more?

>

> > > > The answer to your question "can any mechanism following the known

> > > > laws of physics be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism

> > > > without the assumption of a subjective experience" Is Yes.

> > > > But as far as human behaviour is concerned, assuming some of the

> > > > actions are due to subjective experiences can make them a lot easier

> > > > to explain (as to why: See above)

>

> > > > If you need my why's in order to explain why materialism would not be

> > > > plausible, the plausibility of your explanation becomes a bit dubious,

> > > > but I will try and tell you anyway, as I do not enjoy frustrating my

> > > > partners in a serious discussion. I know a bit about the frustration

> > > > as several intelligent (I assume) posters have succeeded in

> > > > frustrating me. I know discussions get tangled up even when we do our

> > > > best to avoid it, but at least we should try

>

> > > > Do not forget my views on these subjective experiences. As I stated

> > > > them previously for if you are going to reason while ignoring them,

> > > > the discussion might get long and difficult. If you have any objection

> > > > to them state these objections as soon as possible, for they may come

> > > > haunt us later.

>

> > > > 1. Subjective experience has no influence on the real experience it is

> > > > describing

> > > > (unless the experience takes enough time for nr.2 to have effect)

> > > > 2. Subjective experience has a lot of influence on future behaviour.

> > > > 3. Subjective experience is practically the only source for the way we

> > > > view our past.

> > > > 4. Subjective experience need not always to be conscious even though

> > > > consciousness

> > > > is little more than the subjective experience we momentarily

> > > > remember.

>

> > > Hmm, you avoided the questions yet again.

>

> > > Or maybe you could point out where you answered either of the

> > > questions:

>

> > > ------------

> > > Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics

> > > couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the

> > > known laws of physics?

>

> > > Or is it that you think there is a reason that you would be unable to

> > > do so with the assumption that the mechanism had no subjective

> > > experiences? If so, please explain why I couldn't explain its

> > > behaviour in in terms of the physical mechanism following the known

> > > laws of physics (which don't reference any subjective experiences the

> > > physical might or might not be having), with the assumption that it

> > > didn't have any subjective experiences.

> > > ------------

>

> > > Why don't you just answer them, if you are so sure of your

> > > perspective? It is though you are worried that if you did, your whole

> > > world perspective would be shown to be implausible, and so you'd

> > > rather talk around the subject than face some home truths about what

> > > you believe.

>

> > I cannot explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics

> > couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the

> > known laws of physics, I can only explain why it is sometimes easier

> > to use intermediate terms even if those terms are ill defined.

>

> > The reason is, I do not think it can't always be done without the

> > assumption of subjective experiences, even if I assume that using that

> > concept can make it more easy.

>

> > As my knowledge of synapses is lacking - in the case of the human

> > brain - I indeed could not do it, but then again the assumption of

> > subjective experiences would not be enough to compensate for my

> > Inadequacy.

>

> > I hope you are not to unhappy that I cannot explain something that I

> > consider not to be true?

>

> Which bit don't you consider to be true, that a mechanism following

> the known laws of physics

> can be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the

> known laws of physics, or that the laws of physics don't mention

> whether anything is subjectively experienced or not?

>

> You said before that on finding an objection to materialism, you'd

> consider it, is that still the case, or will you just blank it out and

> go on as if there wasn't a gapping flaw in the materialist suggestion?

 

I think it is theoretically possible to fully explain evenhuman

behaviour in terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of

physics, I just think it is practically impossible because there are

to many neurons involved in even the simplest brainfunction.

The problem is has nothing to do with materialsm but only with the

enormous amount of data that would be nescessairy.

Explaining it using terms as knowledge and experience is a lot easier.

(thought less exact).

I do not see what gapping flaw that would cause in materialstic

philosophy,

but I am still waiting for you to point that out.

 

for the time being you have only be misunderstanding my point of view.

I hope that's over.

 

Peter van Velzen

June 2007

Amstelveen

The Netherlands

Guest someone3
Posted

On 6 Jun, 18:52, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> news:1181119352.279318.274890@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> > On 6 Jun, 09:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

 

[snipped older correspondance]

>

>

> >> > It seems you can't read. There were initially two universes, and a

> >> > robot in each, and it remained so.

>

> >> Now you're just lying. Anyone can see that you first brought up the

> >> universe

> >> argument on the 4th at 11:25 AM. Robots weren't mentioned until 3

> >> exchanges

> >> later with your 5:47 AM post on the 5th. And you didn't mention a second

> >> robot until 2 exchanges later on the 5th at 7:05 PM.

>

> >> Go on, read your posts. I'll wait.

>

> >> Can I expect an apology, or at least an admission that you made a

> >> mistake?

>

> >> > It also seems you are unable to follow the points being made, and

> >> > avoided the questions. For example where I said:

>

> >> > -------

> >> > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that

> >> > I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, and

> >> > you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I

> >> > explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the

> >> > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what

> >> > basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did

> >> > because it had subjective experiences?

> >> > -------

>

> >> > To which you replied:

> >> > -------

> >> > I would have to be assured that the physical operation of the robot,

> >> > following known laws of physics, didn't actually constitute

> >> > consciousness.

>

> >> Yes? And?

>

> >> > Avoiding totally stating on what basis would you continue to think

> >> > that it was acting the way it did because it had subjective

> >> > experiences?

>

> >> Why do you have a question mark at the end of a declarative sentence?

>

> >> I would continue to think it was acting in response to subjective

> >> experiences because apparently that's what it looks like it's doing. And

> >> your word alone isn't enough to dissuade me. You would have to show me

> >> that

> >> it's acting in what I would consider a non-conscious manner.

>

> >> > You also were seemingly unable to comprehend that even if you were to

> >> > regard it as having subjective experiences, it would still be behaving

> >> > as it would be expected to without the assumption that it was.

>

> >> Only if the non-conscious version was designed to mimic the conscious

> >> version. Note that the conscious version wouldn't need that bit of

> >> programming.

>

> > Regarding the post on the 4th (and I don't know why you couldn't have

> > cut and pasted these instead of me having to do it) it stated:

>

> Hey, they're YOUR posts.

>

> > ----------

> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object that it

> > would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an alternative

> > universe, which followed the same known laws of physics, but there

> > were no subjective experiences associated with it, it would act the

> > same. The objection that if it followed the same known laws of

> > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively experienced, if

> > it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the known laws of

> > physics don't reference subjective experiences, thus it is

> > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both following the

> > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having subjective

> > experiences and one not, without the need for any of the known laws

> > of physics to be altered.

> > ----------

>

> > Here mechanisms are mentioned being in each universe, but you are

> > correct, in that I didn't specifically mention robots.

>

> Thank you.

>

> So, are you willing to admit that I CAN read?

>

> > Though for each

> > mechanism, it would be existing twice, once in each universe (thus

> > "...both following the same laws of physics as known to us, but with

> > one having subjective experiences and one not").

>

> > On the post on the 5th:

> > ----------

> > You aren't adhering to logic, you are refusing to look at it

> > reasonably. It isn't as though it couldn't be done, for example if a

> > robot behaved as though it might have subjective experiences, i.e. it

> > talked about them etc, you could surely conceive of that either (a) it

> > did have, or (b) it didn't have. In one universe you could conceive of

> > it having subjective experiences, in the other that it didn't. In

> > either though it would be acting just the same, as in both it would

> > simply just be a mechanism following the known laws of physics. The

> > same would apply to humans if you were to consider them to be simply

> > biological mechanisms following the known laws of physics, even if

> > you

> > run from logic and reason, when it goes against your unfounded bias.

> > ----------

>

> > There are two universe, and a robot is in each, obviously the same

> > robot isn't existing in both simultaneously.

>

> That's not obvious at all. The entire quote can be interpreted as

> referencing one robot being compared in two different universes.

>

> Perhaps a command of the language is more important than you seem to think

> it is.

>

> > I'm not sure if this is what you are referring to (as the time stamps

> > I see are different)

>

> Yes, that's exactly the post I'm referencing.

>

> > ----------

> > Regarding the thought experiment, the robots would both be following

> > the same known laws of physics. So perhaps you could explain why

> > you

> > suggest they would act differently.

> > ----------

>

> > Again, there are two robots.

>

> No, that's the FIRST time you unambiguously refer to two robots.

>

> > If it was different bits you were referring to, then I suggest that

> > you cut and paste them yourself, so there can be no confusion.

>

> No, you're using the correct quotes.

>

> > Anyway, back to the real issue, regarding where I said:

>

> Well, I suppose an admission of a slight mistake as opposed to an apology

> for unjustly slandering my reading ability is all I can expect from one as

> dishonest as you.

>

> > ----------

> > Avoiding totally stating on what basis would you continue to think

> > that it was acting the way it did because it had subjective

> > experiences?

> > ----------

>

> > You replied

> > ----------

> > Why do you have a question mark at the end of a declarative sentence?

>

> > I would continue to think it was acting in response to subjective

> > experiences because apparently that's what it looks like it's doing.

> > And your word alone isn't enough to dissuade me. You would have to

> > show me that it's acting in what I would consider a non-conscious

> > manner.

> > ----------

>

> > So you would base your belief that it was acting in response to

> > subjective experiences, even though it was behaving exactly as it

> > would be expected to, without the added assumption that it was

> > subjectively experiencing?

>

> No. In your scenario you've already got me agreeing that it's conscious. The

> basis for that conclusion is that it's behaving in a way that I take to be

> congruent with subjective experience. It's responding in context to my

> questions and such, for example. Then, in your scenario, you tell me it's

> not conscious. The reason I do not immediately agree with you is that the

> robot is, I presume, still acting like it's conscious. Until you can show me

> that it's not conscious, I'll continue to act under the assumption that my

> conclusion that it is conscious is correct and disbelieve you.

>

> That's what I meant by: "I would continue to think it was acting in response

> to subjective experiences because apparently that's what it looks like it's

> doing." I can't imagine how you misinterpreted that.

>

> > If so, what influence would you consider the subjective experiences to

> > be having, given that it is behaving as it would be expected to

> > without the assumption that it had any subjective experiences?

>

> Given that your interpretation of my response was incorrect, this question

> is meaningless.

>

> If you had two robots, one with a brain capable of subjective experience,

> and one with a sophisticated tape-recorder that played back responses

> designed to fool me into thinking it's conscious, they would supposedly

> behave the same, and I would mistakenly grant that both were conscious. Both

> would be acting according to physical law to get the same effect, but the

> workings would be very different. For the tape recorder robot to succeed, it

> has to have the right phrases recorded to fool me, just like the conscious

> robot has to have subjective experiences or I won't think it's conscious.

>

 

I've snipped the older correspondence, though not sure I've made such

a good job of it, it would be easier if we responded at the end of

what each other post, but I guess you'd object, so there are a few

imbedded pieces of text still remaining from the older stuff.

 

Assuming you aren't trying to be disingenious, you seem to have got

lost on the scenario. No where are you told it isn't conscious.

Whether it is or isn't is unknown. You know that it follows the

known laws of physics, and you know that it behaved as something you

might have thought as conscious, if for example you had been

communicating with it over the internet. Yes I have just added that

clarification, but you appeared to be confused claiming incorrectly

that you were told it wasn't conscious.

 

As it follows the known laws of physics, its behaviour can be

explained without the added assumption that it has any subjective

experiences, as any mechanism following the laws of physics require no

such claims to explain behaviour (restating to help you follow, this

doesn't mean that it couldn't have subjective experiences).

 

So if you were to regard the robotic mechanism following the known

laws of physics to be having subjective experiences, what influence

would you consider the subjective experiences to be having, given that

it is behaving as it would be expected to without the assumption that

it had any subjective experiences?

 

(Is the question clear enough for you, or is there any clarification

you require about what is being asked?)

Posted
On 5 jun, 21:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

 

I think it is theoretically possible to fully explain evenhuman

behaviour in terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of

physics, I just think it is practically impossible because there are

to many neurons involved in even the simplest brainfunction.

The problem is has nothing to do with materialsm but only with the

enormous amount of data that would be nescessairy.

Explaining it using terms as knowledge and experience is a lot easier.

(thought less exact).

I do not see what gapping flaw that would cause in materialstic

philosophy,

but I am still waiting for you to point that out.

 

for the time being you have only be misunderstanding my point of view.

I hope that's over.

 

Peter van Velzen

June 2007

Amstelveen

The Netherlands

 

Fortunately, difficulty does not stop people from trying. They are currently working on an emulation of an entire rodent brain, neuron by neuron, running on one of the fastest supercomputers ever built. It has a sort of twilight zone/Matrix feel to it, but this is no joke.

 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6600965.stm

 

The partial rodent model will not mean much, but with a slightly faster computer it would be possible to take somebody who had died, freeze them, and build an emulation of a person in place of the mouse. This would answer all sorts of questions about life after death and allow a more detailed exploration of consciousness. It would also have the evangelicals shitting themselves because it has the potential to invalidate their worldview; just the creation of a computer emulation that acts like a real person alone would make the concept of soul harder to define. It may not happen soon because you need a volunteer who is willing to become basically a digital ghost and then wait for them to die of old age, but I'm sure somebody crazy enough will come along...

Guest someone3
Posted

On 6 Jun, 18:52, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote:

> someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote innews:1181140233.468267.124680@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com:

>

> > On 6 Jun, 14:13, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote:

> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote

> >> innews:1181096859.045313.216360@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com:

>

> >> > On 4 Jun, 18:47, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote:

> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote

> >> >> innews:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com:

>

> >> >> > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard as

> >> >> > responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed there were

> >> >> > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. No knowledge

> >> >> > of whether there were any subjective experiences or not would be

> >> >> > required.

>

> >> >> Whether or not the mechanism did in fact have subjective

> >> >> experiences, knowledge of that fact by an external observer would

> >> >> not be necessary to explain the operation of the mechanism in

> >> >> terms of the physical structure of the mechanism. However, the

> >> >> fact that the mechanism does have subjective experiences is part

> >> >> of the operation of that mechanism and therefore does influence

> >> >> the behavior of the mechanism.

>

> >> >> > So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced or not,

> >> >> > wouldn't influence the behaviour. So if we were to be regarded

> >> >> > as a biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our

> >> >> > subjective experiences because they actually existed.

>

> >> >> Wrong. The external observer does not know the content of the

> >> >> mechanism's subjective experience, but the fact that the mechanism

> >> >> has such an experience is part of the operation of the mechanism.

>

> >> >> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object

> >> >> > that it would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was

> >> >> > an alternative universe, which followed the same known laws of

> >> >> > physics, but there were no subjective experiences associated

> >> >> > with it, it would act the same.

>

> >> >> There is a contradiction here. Either your alternate universe does

> >> >> not follow the same laws of physics or the mechanism itself is not

> >> >> identical in structure or operation.

>

> >> >> > The objection that if it followed the same known laws of

> >> >> > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively

> >> >> > experienced, if it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as

> >> >> > the known laws of physics don't reference subjective

> >> >> > experiences, thus it is conceptually possible to consider to

> >> >> > mechanisms both following the same laws of physics as known to

> >> >> > us, but with one having subjective experiences and one not,

> >> >> > without the need for any of the known laws of physics to be

> >> >> > altered.

>

> >> >> The laws of physics don't have to reference subjective experience.

> >> >> The subjective experience is, by definition of the problem,

> >> >> entailed by the structure of certain mechanisms.

>

> >> > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following:

>

> >> > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7:

>

> >> > -------------

> >> > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio

> >> > program "Philosophy Talk".

>

> >> > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy

> >> > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to

> >> > ook at it, and there are two scenarios:

>

> >> > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft

> >> > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and

> >> > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a

> >> > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does

> >> > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's

> >> > happening, more or less.

>

> >> > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard

> >> > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and

> >> > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's

> >> > a computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know

> >> > how it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know

> >> > where it's happening, more or less.

>

> >> > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is

> >> > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference?

> >> > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is

> >> > conscious.

>

> >> Neither case justifies changing my opinion.

>

> >> > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering

> >> > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on

> >> > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in

> >> > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say

> >> > we have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain

> >> > achieves consciousness?

>

> >> Wait a minute, where did that bit about showing how it works come

> >> from?

>

> >> > -------------

>

> >> > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity),

> >> > that I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective

> >> > experiences, and you thought it did, but actually after you had

> >> > made your decision, I explained to you that it behaved the way it

> >> > did simply because of the physical mechanism following the known

> >> > laws of physics, then on what basis would you continue to think

> >> > that it was acting the way it did because it had subjective

> >> > experiences?

>

> >> Why would I change my opinion? I still have subjective experiences

> >> and those experiences influence my behavior and I still believe that

> >> I am subject to the laws of physics.

>

> >> Your inability to construct real paradoxes out of semantic confusion

> >> can never convince me otherwise, Glenn.

>

> >> > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any

> >> > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism

> >> > following the known laws of physics. So its behaviour, if you still

> >> > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't

> >> > be said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act

> >> > the same even without your added assumption that it really did have

> >> > subjective experiences.

>

> >> Of course it could be said to be influenced by them. If it behaved as

> >> if it were having subjective experiences, I would have to conclude

> >> that it was having subjective experiences, regardless of whether it

> >> was an organic blob of protoplasm or an electronic box with blinking

> >> lights.

>

> >> I consider the pzombie paradox to be a fallacious contradiction. In

> >> my not so humble opinion, it is not possible to have "conscious

> >> behavior" without having "consciousness" in the thing which is doing

> >> the behavior.

>

> >> > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism

> >> > ollowing the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be

> >> > behaving the way we do because of any subjective experiences we

> >> > were having.

>

> >> No, I cannot see that. You set up the problem by saying that you have

> >> a machine that behaves as if it is having subjective experiences.

> >> That implies that those subjective experiences are causing its

> >> behavior. Now you want to contradict yourself. You're not very good

> >> at setting up paradoxes, Glenn. You've been trying these tricks for

> >> years now, and you're still failing miserably.

>

> >> > They in

> >> > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean

> >> > it would have to be coincidental that we actually have the

> >> > subjective experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have

> >> > influenced the behaviour. The coincidence makes the perspective

> >> > implausible.

>

> >> You're contradicting yourself by claiming that you have an organism

> >> or a machine that acts as if it is having subjective experiences and

> >> then saying that the subjective experiences have no influence on

> >> behavior.

>

> >> > Though your point is taken, that if it was just a coincidence, then

> >> > it would be, though my counter point is as I have said that it is

> >> > implausible that it is just a coincidence that we have the

> >> > subjective experiences our behaviour expresses, and that in reality

> >> > our behaviour of us talking about them, was uninfluenced by their

> >> > existance.

>

> >> > With regards to the universe scenario, there is no contradiction,

> >> > it is simply that they both follow the same laws of physics that

> >> > are known to us, which as you acknowledge, don't reference

> >> > whether anything is subjectively experienced or not, allowing for

> >> > in one the mechanism to be subjectively experienced, in the other

> >> > it not. It is simply a device to illustrate the same point that is

> >> > I have made above in this response.

>

> >> No, Glenn, the contradiction is still there. Your point is invalid.

> >> The internal state of the mechanism is not the same, therefore the

> >> machine is not the same, therefore your two scenarios are not the

> >> same.

>

> > Well I'm obviously not going to respond to your points regarding the

> > 'Philosphy Talk' program Jim07D7 was talking about, as my point was

> > what they were saying was poorly reasoned.

>

> Then why did you bring it up? Are you trying to confuse things again?

>

> > Though regarding your response about regarding the robot to be having

> > subjective experiences because of the way it behaved, do you accept

> > that it would be behaving as it would be expected to behave without

> > the added assumption that it was having subjective experiences?

>

> No, I do not accept that. Nor do I accept your fallacious reasoning

> about how "the laws of physics do not reference subjective experiences".

> Whether they do or do not is irrelevant to the discussion of whether a

> physical object can have subjective experiences while obeying physical

> laws.

>

> You just got done telling me that the robot is behaving as if it is

> having subjective experiences. If it was not having such experiences, it

> would behave differently. You can't have it both ways, Glenn.

>

> > If so, what influence on behaviour would you be considering the

> > subjective experiences to have, given that it was behaving the same as

> > it would be expected to if it didn't have subjective experiences?

>

> I do not accept your contradictory premises, so I'm not obliged to

> explain your contradictions.

>

 

I'm slightly confused about your position Fred, I just asked you:

 

-------

Though regarding your response about regarding the robot to be having

subjective experiences because of the way it behaved, do you accept

that it would be behaving as it would be expected to behave without

the added assumption that it was having subjective experiences?

-------

 

To which you replied:

-------

No, I do not accept that. Nor do I accept your fallacious reasoning

about how "the laws of physics do not reference subjective

experiences". Whether they do or do not is irrelevant to the

discussion of whether a physical object can have subjective

experiences while obeying physical laws.

-------

 

Yet in your initial response to my post, still above in the text you

stated:

-------

Whether or not the mechanism did in fact have subjective experiences,

knowledge of that fact by an external observer would not be necessary

to explain the operation of the mechanism in terms of the physical

structure of the mechanism.

-------

 

Now you can't have it both ways Fred, you can't claim that the

external observer could explain the behaviour without knowing whether

it had subjective experiences, and that it couldn't be explained

without the added assumption that it didn't (presuming of course you

aren't going to try to claim that the assumption that it did would

always have to be made, even if it didn't).

 

As for your assertion (based it seems on nothing more than your self

proclaimed infallibility on the matter) that anything following the

known laws of physics that behaved as though it might be subjectively

experiencing must be subjectively experiencing, well whether it was

or it wasn't what difference would it make to the explanation of how

it behaved. The explanation would simply be in terms of the physical

mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as would be if there

were no subjective experiences. Some might even suggest using Occam's

Razor, and wonder why you added the assumption that it had subjective

experiences, given that the assumption wouldn't be required.

Guest Jeckyl
Posted

"someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1181147335.667578.234830@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

> Well getting back to what you had said and my response, where the

> implausibility of us being simply biological mechanisms is made (and

> without that assertion, you have no reason to consider anything

> following the known laws of physics to be subjectively experiencing)

>

> Posted by you:

 

[snip same old spam]

Guest Jeckyl
Posted

"someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1181150233.159153.16280@a26g2000pre.googlegroups.com...

> Sure, hopefully you'll be able to remove your preconceptions, and

> evaluate the plausability of the assertion that you have bet your soul

> on, without bias.

 

I thought you must be a religious nutter who is trying to do the impossible

by proving we have souls. Won't work. Sorry. Your theist blinker just

can't let you see the errors in your logic.

Guest Jeckyl
Posted

"someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1181170991.844972.128670@i13g2000prf.googlegroups.com...

> So if you were to regard the robotic mechanism following the known

> laws of physics to be having subjective experiences, what influence

> would you consider the subjective experiences to be having, given that

> it is behaving as it would be expected to without the assumption that

> it had any subjective experiences?

>

> (Is the question clear enough for you, or is there any clarification

> you require about what is being asked?)

 

You are stuck in a loop .. your programmer needs to fix you up .. that's the

problem when robots post.

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