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Implausibility of Materialism


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Guest Martin
Posted

someone3 wrote:

> On 6 Jun, 22:53, "min...@media.mit.edu" <min...@media.mit.edu> wrote:

>> On Jun 5, 11:30 pm, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:> On Jun 6, 12:34 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>>

>> > > On 6 Jun, 03:29, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:

>>

>>>>> On Jun 5, 1:18 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>> Evidently some people maintain that "subjective experience" can never

>> be explained

>> in terms of physical processes. They offer reasons for this opinion,

>> but none of those

>> make much sense to me. In the last chapter of "The Emotion Machine,"

>> I suggest some

>> possible reasons why people find feelings so hard to describe, and

>> suggest a few

>> explanations of this, some of which might turn out to be wrong.

>>

>> However, it might be a good lesson to consider the way that "life" or

>> "living" was once

>> considered to be so inexplicable that perople felt they had to assume

>> that there must

>> exist a (nonphysical) "vital force" or "spirit," etc. But today, now

>> that we know how

>> complex a living cell is, no serious scientist see any basic mystery.

>> Insted, now that we understand how complex a cell is, we know that we

>> "simply" need to answer a few thousand

>> hand -- but not unsolvable -- questions.

>>

>> It is exactly the same situation, it seems to me, with the subject of

>> subjective experience.

>> Too many philosophers have started with assumptions like "The

>> sensation of Redness is

>> basic, simple, and irreducible -- and therefore it is inexplicable."

>> However, we can assume,

>> instead, that when a brain sees something Red, this initiates an

>> extremely complicated

>> set of processes, and that these eventually cause certain parts of

>> that brain to make

>> very simplistic descriptions of what they observe in the rest of that

>> brain.

>>

>> Then, because those descriptions don't lead anywhere, yet other parts

>> of the brain

>> construct those useless dualistic descriptions, because they don't

>> have adequate ways

>> to explain why they can't understand what is happening.

>

> You've written a book on the subject? I assume you consider yourself

> to be somewhat of an authority on the matter of reality, which you no

> doubt believe you arrived at through reason. Do you mind if I test

> your ability to follow reason?

 

You condescending twat!

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Guest pbamvv@worldonline.nl
Posted
I think you understand Fred and me.
Guest Denis Loubet
Posted

"someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1181517234.889369.239710@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

> On 11 Jun, 00:05, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> news:1181514806.543814.218460@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> > On 10 Jun, 20:36, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote in message

>>

>> >>news:FNednZ5aMcoN3PHbnZ2dnUVZ_tmknZ2d@io.com...

>>

>> >> > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>> >> >news:1181471104.632034.40450@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...

>> >> >> On 10 Jun, 03:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> >>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> >> >>>news:1181440301.918077.327620@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> >>> > On 10 Jun, 02:15, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> >>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> >> >>> >>news:1181417934.359700.133760@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> >>> >> > On 9 Jun, 08:25, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> >>> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> > (snipped some of the older stuff)

>>

>> >> >>> >> >> > Can you understand the following:

>>

>> >> >>> >> >> > 1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics

>> >> >>> >> >> > without

>> >> >>> >> >> > reference requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or

>> >> >>> >> >> > not.

>>

>> >> >>> >> >> Let's see, can I explain the behavior of my car without

>> >> >>> >> >> knowing

>> >> >>> >> >> if

>> >> >>> >> >> it

>> >> >>> >> >> has

>> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank or not by the laws of physics? Yes, I can

>> >> >>> >> >> explain

>> >> >>> >> >> both

>> >> >>> >> >> behaviors, and one of them will be correct.

>>

>> >> >>> >> >> > Therefore

>>

>> >> >>> >> >> > 2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not affect the

>> >> >>> >> >> > behaviour

>> >> >>> >> >> > of

>> >> >>> >> >> > M,

>>

>> >> >>> >> >> Well, personally I think gas in the tank radically affects

>> >> >>> >> >> the

>> >> >>> >> >> behavior

>> >> >>> >> >> of

>> >> >>> >> >> my car.

>>

>> >> >>> >> >> > else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same

>> >> >>> >> >> > with

>> >> >>> >> >> > or

>> >> >>> >> >> > without P(A)

>>

>> >> >>> >> >> The behavior of my car with gas in the tank is explainable

>> >> >>> >> >> by

>> >> >>> >> >> the

>> >> >>> >> >> laws

>> >> >>> >> >> of

>> >> >>> >> >> physics, as is the behavior of my car without gas in the

>> >> >>> >> >> tank.

>> >> >>> >> >> But

>> >> >>> >> >> somehow I

>> >> >>> >> >> only get places I need to get to in air-conditioned comfort

>> >> >>> >> >> when

>> >> >>> >> >> there

>> >> >>> >> >> is

>> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank. That's very different behavior from when

>> >> >>> >> >> there

>> >> >>> >> >> isn't

>> >> >>> >> >> gas

>> >> >>> >> >> in

>> >> >>> >> >> the tank.

>>

>> >> >>> >> >> Gosh! How very odd! It seems your point 2 is completely

>> >> >>> >> >> wrong

>> >> >>> >> >> on

>> >> >>> >> >> such

>> >> >>> >> >> a

>> >> >>> >> >> basic level that it's hard to comprehend how you can

>> >> >>> >> >> function

>> >> >>> >> >> in

>> >> >>> >> >> society

>> >> >>> >> >> at

>> >> >>> >> >> all.

>>

>> >> >>> >> >> I take it you don't own a car? Please tell me you don't.

>>

>> >> >>> >> >> > You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly

>> >> >>> >> >> > follows

>> >> >>> >> >> > the

>> >> >>> >> >> > known laws of physics for M, and any property for which

>> >> >>> >> >> > P(A)

>> >> >>> >> >> > where

>> >> >>> >> >> > (1)

>> >> >>> >> >> > would be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2).

>>

>> >> >>> >> >> My car says you're just plain stupid.

>>

>> >> >>> >> > Your reponses have a certain entertainment value I guess.

>>

>> >> >>> >> > Let me put it another way:

>>

>> >> >>> >> No, why don't you address it the way you put it?

>>

>> >> >>> >> And the way I answered it?

>>

>> >> >>> >> Are you too stupid or afraid to?

>>

>> >> >>> >> Are you a moron, a coward, or both?

>>

>> >> >>> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

>>

>> >> >>> >> My car!

>>

>> >> >>> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>>

>> >> >>> >> It gets me to my destination in air-conditioned comfort!

>>

>> >> >>> >> > P refers to the a property in question.

>>

>> >> >>> >> Gas in the tank!

>>

>> >> >>> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

>> >> >>> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>>

>> >> >>> >> My car employs the laws of physics to get me to my destination

>> >> >>> >> in

>> >> >>> >> air-conditioned comfort!

>>

>> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect B(M), else the

>> >> >>> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or

>> >> >>> >> > without

>> >> >>> >> > P.

>>

>> >> >>> >> Oddly, that doesn't match reality at all! When there's no gas

>> >> >>> >> in

>> >> >>> >> the

>> >> >>> >> tank

>> >> >>> >> of

>> >> >>> >> my car, I DON'T get to my destination in air conditioned

>> >> >>> >> comfort!

>> >> >>> >> My

>> >> >>> >> car

>> >> >>> >> just sits there following the laws of physics.

>>

>> >> >>> >> Bummer!

>>

>> >> >>> >> > if (1) is true, then so is (2)

>>

>> >> >>> >> My car still says you're just plain stupid.

>>

>> >> >>> >> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are the same

>> >> >>> >> >

>>

>> >> >>> >> How can my car, getting somewhere in air conditioned comfort,

>> >> >>> >> and

>> >> >>> >> gas

>> >> >>> >> in

>> >> >>> >> the

>> >> >>> >> tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid.

>>

>> >> >>> >> > To give you an example, just to make sure you have no excuses

>> >> >>> >> > for

>> >> >>> >> > pretending you can't grasp the point, and are

>> >> >>> >> > misunderstanding

>> >> >>> >> > it:

>>

>> >> >>> >> > M = a car

>> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running

>> >> >>> >> > P = its serial number

>>

>> >> >>> >> > Which means:

>>

>> >> >>> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the

>> >> >>> >> > laws

>> >> >>> >> > of

>> >> >>> >> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a

>> >> >>> >> > serial

>> >> >>> >> > number

>> >> >>> >> > or not.

>>

>> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not the car

>> >> >>> >> > parked

>> >> >>> >> > with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour

>> >> >>> >> > could

>> >> >>> >> > not

>> >> >>> >> > be the same with or without a serial number.

>>

>> >> >>> >> But if the situation is:

>>

>> >> >>> >> > M = my car

>> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running

>> >> >>> >> > P = gas in the tank

>>

>> >> >>> >> Then suddenly your formula fails! Once the gas runs out, the

>> >> >>> >> car

>> >> >>> >> no

>> >> >>> >> longer

>> >> >>> >> has a running engine.

>>

>> >> >>> >> > Since (1) is true, so is (2).

>>

>> >> >>> >> Not if there's no gas in the tank.

>>

>> >> >>> >> > So though I have tried to plug up the holes where you might

>> >> >>> >> > try

>> >> >>> >> > to

>> >> >>> >> > pretend to misunderstand, your ability to, still does give

>> >> >>> >> > you

>> >> >>> >> > some

>> >> >>> >> > artistic scope for disingenuity, which I'm sure you will use

>> >> >>> >> > if

>> >> >>> >> > able.

>>

>> >> >>> >> You're so stupid, my car is embarrassed for you.

>>

>> >> >>> > I pointed out:

>> >> >>> > -------------

>> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are the same

>> >> >>> >

>> >> >>> > -------------

>>

>> >> >>> > To which you replied:

>> >> >>> > -------------

>> >> >>> > How can my car, getting somewhere in air conditioned comfort,

>> >> >>> > and

>> >> >>> > gas

>> >> >>> > in the tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid.

>> >> >>> > -------------

>>

>> >> >>> > I assume this was just another example of your disingenious

>> >> >>> > creativity. M isn't the same as B(M) which isn't the same as P.

>> >> >>> > It

>> >> >>> > is

>> >> >>> > that M mentioned in (1) is the same as M mentioned in (2), and

>> >> >>> > B(M)

>> >> >>> > mentioned in (1) is the same as B(M) mentioned in (2), and P

>> >> >>> > mentioned

>> >> >>> > in (1) is the same as P mentioned in (2).

>>

>> >> >>> > If you can now understand this, you can see if (2) wasn't true,

>> >> >>> > because there was no gas in the tank, then (1) couldn't have

>> >> >>> > been

>> >> >>> > true, as it getting you to your destination in air couldn't be

>> >> >>> > explained without gas in the tank.

>>

>> >> >>> > You'll notice it also gets through your usual well polished

>> >> >>> > deception

>> >> >>> > in that it applies to and physical entity that strictly follows

>> >> >>> > the

>> >> >>> > laws of physics, and doesn't require a comparison entity.

>>

>> >> >>> > So here it is again, and hopefully you won't simply be grasping

>> >> >>> > at

>> >> >>> > ways to misinterpret what is being said, but actually face

>> >> >>> > reason

>> >> >>> > for

>> >> >>> > once.

>>

>> >> >>> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

>>

>> >> >>> My car.

>>

>> >> >>> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>>

>> >> >>> It's sitting there inert.

>>

>> >> >>> > P refers to the a property in question.

>>

>> >> >>> Gas in the tank.

>>

>> >> >>> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

>> >> >>> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>>

>> >> >>> The car sits there inert, according to the laws of physics.

>> >> >>> Doesn't

>> >> >>> matter

>> >> >>> if there's gas in the tank or not.

>>

>> >> >>> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect B(M), else the

>> >> >>> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without

>> >> >>> > P.

>>

>> >> >>> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is exactly the same as a car

>> >> >>> with

>> >> >>> gas

>> >> >>> in the tank.

>>

>> >> >>> Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to buy gas again! I can

>> >> >>> drive

>> >> >>> around

>> >> >>> with or without gas.

>>

>> >> >>> Yup, your example sure matches reality.

>>

>> >> >>> Not.

>>

>> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are the same

>> >> >>> >

>>

>> >> >>> Note that the above sentence is an admitted lie.

>>

>> >> >>> > It follows that if (1) is true, then so is (2).

>>

>> >> >>> Nope.

>>

>> >> >> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence the car sitting there

>> >> >> inert, so (2) would be true.

>>

>> >> > Until the key is turned in the ignition.

>>

>> >> > If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly false.

>>

>> >> Look, are you trying, in your own stupid and inept way, to get me to

>> >> say

>> >> that there are properties that have no effect on the behavior of the

>> >> thing

>> >> they're a property of? Well that's a big yes! Of COURSE there are

>> >> properties

>> >> that have no effect on behavior. Your example of the serial number,

>> >> for

>> >> example.

>>

>> >> So what?

>>

>> >> Are you dishonestly trying to equate the irrelevant-to-behavior aspect

>> >> of

>> >> a

>> >> serial number to the crucial-to-behavior aspect of subjective

>> >> experience?

>> >> If

>> >> you were honest, your examples would be either the car's elecrtical

>> >> system

>> >> compared to subjective experience, or a serial number compared to a

>> >> tattoo.

>> >> The effects of subjective experience on behavior are not subtle, and

>> >> do

>> >> not

>> >> conceptually map to the irrelevancy of a serial number.

>>

>> >> I think that subjective experience is the action of physical matter in

>> >> physical brains following the laws of physics. The subjective

>> >> experience

>> >> is

>> >> not apart from that physical action. Subjective Experience is simply a

>> >> name

>> >> we apply to a certain catagory of physical actions found in brains. It

>> >> is

>> >> a

>> >> subset, not an "extra thing", somehow apart from the normal operation

>> >> of

>> >> the

>> >> brain. It IS the normal operation of the brain.

>>

>> >> If you remove it from the operation of the brain, you would expect

>> >> radically

>> >> different behavior, just like you would expect if you ripped out

>> >> crucial

>> >> subroutines from a computer program. Without subjective experience,

>> >> the

>> >> human brain is no longer operating normally, even though it is still,

>> >> of

>> >> course, operating according to the laws of physics.

>>

>> >> I know it was pointless of me to type

>>

>> > Subjective experiences are a label to what you actually consciously

>> > experience.

>>

>> Which is matter in the brain operating according to physical law.

>>

>> > That the brain is directly responsible for them is an

>> > assertion.

>>

>> No, it's a conclusion based on evidence. If you physically manipulate

>> the

>> brain, you manipulate consciousness.

>>

>> > I can't say it is an explanation, as there could be no

>> > explanation from your perspective why any physical activity would be

>> > subjectively experienced, or why it wasn't just fluctuations of the

>> > colour green for example, the brightness dependent on the amount of

>> > neurons firing. Nothing in your perspective would know what the neuron

>> > state represented.

>>

>> That's where your ability to communicate breaks down entirely. What the

>> fuck

>> are you babbling about? "Fluctuations of the color green"? Are you on

>> drugs?

>>

>> > The point was that even if you wanted to believe in the story that we

>> > were simply biological mechanisms, and that our subjective experiences

>> > were an emergent property of the brain. The emergent property couldn't

>> > be said to be influential in behaviour due to:

>>

>> I was right, you're going to ignore what I post and write your fucking

>> formula again.

>>

>> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

>> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>> > P refers to the a property in question.

>>

>> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

>> > and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>>

>> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

>> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>>

>> Then P and/or B has to be pretty fucking trivial. Like a serial number,

>> or

>> being inert.

>>

>> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

>> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>>

>> Yeah, you can concoct a scenario that fulfills these criteria. Big deal.

>>

>> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>>

>> Suppose I agree. So what? This little formula cannot be applied to

>> non-trivial properties and behaviors. If the property is non-trivial,

>> then

>> it will affect behavior, and your formula cannot be applied.

>>

>> So, how DO you deal with properties that DO affect behavior? Do you just

>> pretend they don't exist?

>>

>> > The story that our subjective experiences have no influence on our

>> > behaviour is implausible,

>>

>> From my perspective, you've been arguing against that. I think that

>> subjective experience influences our behavior.

>>

>> > even though you bet your soul on it, unable

>> > to see through the deception, and still cling to it, even if you have

>> > to disingeniously misunderstand.

>>

>> You have not demonstrated that.

>>

>> > That you can't face that you were

>> > wrong, and that you are shown to be so through reason, appears to me

>> > as pathetic.

>>

>> Or perhaps it's you that's completely wrong. Have you even considered the

>> possibility?

>>

>> I'm guessing not.

>>

>

> It is implausible that we simply are a biological mechanism simply

> following the laws of physics. For that reason alone I could know I

> wasn't wrong.

 

So you determine if you're right about something based on nothing but

arbitrary feelings?

 

That explains a lot.

> It is implausible, because it would require our behaviour, including

> even questioning whether a robot had subjective experiences, would be

> uninfluenced by us having subjective experiences. This is shown by:

 

No, it's influenced by subjective experience.

> M refers to the physical entity in question.

> B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

> P refers to the a property in question.

>

> Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

> and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>

> 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

> explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>

> If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

 

Lets see if we can apply this stupidity to something that affects behavior.

Can you apply it to reflexes? Oops, no, there's a difference in behavior if

you have reflexes compared to you not having reflexes. If you can't apply

your little formula to reflexes, what makes you think you can apply it to

consciousness?

> Without the assertion that we were a biological mechanism simply

> following the laws of physics, there would be no reason to assume

> anything following the laws of physics subjectively experienced,

 

I'm a biological mechanism simply following the laws of physics and I

subjectively experience, therefore I conclude that biological mechanisms

following the laws of can subjectively experience.

> therefore what reason would the biological mechanism (if the assertion

> were made) have for considering such a thing uninfluenced by it having

> subjective experiences.

 

This one doesn't. This one observes that it's subjective experiences

influence its behavior.

> You were wrong get used to it. Stop being so pathetic about it.

 

You're not stating my position. Why would your criticizism of a position I

do not hold show that I am wrong?

 

 

--

Denis Loubet

dloubet@io.com

http//www.io.com/~dloubet

Guest Denis Loubet
Posted

"someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1181516565.111157.262690@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...

>I snipped the lot, as it had got so long had to download it as html,

> to even read your response.

>

> Your last response was:

> ---------

> What? Driving is not part of the behavior of a car?

>

> I'll have to remember that.

> ---------

>

> Again what I was saying went over your head. Given the following.

>

> M refers to the physical entity in question.

> B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

> P refers to the a property in question.

>

> Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

> and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>

> 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

> explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>

> If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>

> You had suggested an example written over 2 parts:

> ----------

> The car sits there inert, according to the laws of physics. Doesn't

> matter if there's gas in the tank or not.

> ----------

> ----------

> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is exactly the same as a car with

> gas in the tank. Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to buy gas

> again! I can drive around with or without gas. Yup, your example sure

> matches reality. Not.

> ----------

>

> To which I pointed out:

> ----------

> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence the car sitting there

> inert, so (2) would be true.

> ----------

>

> To which you replied:

> ----------

> Until the key is turned in the ignition.

> If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly false.

> ----------

>

> To which I explained:

> ----------

> Then you would have changed B(M) and so (1) would no longer be true,

> as you couldn't explain the behaviour without knowledge of gas being

> in the tank.

> ----------

>

> To which in your last reply you wrote:

> ----------

> What? Driving is not part of the behavior of a car?

>

> I'll have to remember that.

> ----------

>

> It has nothing to do with driving, it is to do with you changed B(M).

> The engine running, when you turn the ignition, is not explainable

> without knowledge of whether there is petrol in the tank, therefore

> (1) wouldn't be true, and then neither would (2). You keep trying to

> either change M, B(M) or P so that they are not the same in both (1)

> and (2). Which is pointless, as the whole point is that if (1) is

> true, then (2) is true, when M is the same in both (1) and (2), B(M)

> is the same in both (1) and (2), and P is the same in both (1) and

> (2). Are you having problems facing it?

 

So your little formula cannot be applied to the property of gas in the tank

and the behavior following the turn of the ignition key.

 

That's a pretty lame formula. What good is it?

 

--

Denis Loubet

dloubet@io.com

http//www.io.com/~dloubet

Guest someone2
Posted

On 11 Jun, 12:47, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:

> On Jun 7, 10:05 am, someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

>

>

>

>

> > On 6 Jun, 22:53, "min...@media.mit.edu" <min...@media.mit.edu> wrote:

>

> > > On Jun 5, 11:30 pm, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:> On Jun 6, 12:34 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > > > On 6 Jun, 03:29, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:

>

> > > > > > On Jun 5, 1:18 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > Evidently some people maintain that "subjective experience" can never

> > > be explained

> > > in terms of physical processes. They offer reasons for this opinion,

> > > but none of those

> > > make much sense to me. In the last chapter of "The Emotion Machine,"

> > > I suggest some

> > > possible reasons why people find feelings so hard to describe, and

> > > suggest a few

> > > explanations of this, some of which might turn out to be wrong.

>

> > > However, it might be a good lesson to consider the way that "life" or

> > > "living" was once

> > > considered to be so inexplicable that perople felt they had to assume

> > > that there must

> > > exist a (nonphysical) "vital force" or "spirit," etc. But today, now

> > > that we know how

> > > complex a living cell is, no serious scientist see any basic mystery.

> > > Insted, now that we understand how complex a cell is, we know that we

> > > "simply" need to answer a few thousand

> > > hand -- but not unsolvable -- questions.

>

> > > It is exactly the same situation, it seems to me, with the subject of

> > > subjective experience.

> > > Too many philosophers have started with assumptions like "The

> > > sensation of Redness is

> > > basic, simple, and irreducible -- and therefore it is inexplicable."

> > > However, we can assume,

> > > instead, that when a brain sees something Red, this initiates an

> > > extremely complicated

> > > set of processes, and that these eventually cause certain parts of

> > > that brain to make

> > > very simplistic descriptions of what they observe in the rest of that

> > > brain.

>

> > > Then, because those descriptions don't lead anywhere, yet other parts

> > > of the brain

> > > construct those useless dualistic descriptions, because they don't

> > > have adequate ways

> > > to explain why they can't understand what is happening.

>

> > You've written a book on the subject?

>

> You honestly have not heard of Marvin Minsky?

> Wow!

>

> http://web.media.mit.edu/~minsky/

>

> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marvin_Minsky

>

 

No I hadn't. Though they must feel a bit silly writing a book on the

subject, then being shown they were wrong.

Guest someone2
Posted

On 11 Jun, 15:40, Matt Silberstein

<RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> On Fri, 08 Jun 2007 18:47:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

>

>

>

>

> <1181353677.705831.281...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> >On 8 Jun, 18:57, Lisbeth Andersson <lis...@bredband.net> wrote:

> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote innews:1181311994.969146.270290@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com:

>

> >> <....>

>

> >> > I think it is better for you to understand the implausibility of

> >> > the story that we are simply a biological mechanism following the

> >> > known laws of physics, before discussing the retreated to

> >> > position that maybe the configuration or complexity freed it from

> >> > the known laws of physics, but that there were still only a

> >> > physical mechanism.

>

> >> I'm more interested in how the unknown laws of physics fit into your

> >> worldwiev.

>

> >What makes you think there are any unknown laws of physics which have

> >any noticable influence on behaviour other than at the subatomic or

> >cosmic scale? When was the last time we found anything that didn't

> >follow the known laws of physics?

>

> I would say Dark Matter and Dark Energy are the latest.

>

> >I'm more interested whether you understood the point that was made

> >(and you snipped), or is it a secret?

>

 

Are they cases of something not following the laws of physics, or

things which the of are noticed, but that there is no explanation to

what is causing the effects?

Guest someone2
Posted

On 11 Jun, 15:43, Matt Silberstein

<RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> On Sat, 09 Jun 2007 12:02:52 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> <1181415772.483273.54...@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>

> [snip]

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

> >It had nothing to do with determinism.

>

> >The reasoning is summarised below, but was outlined in more depth in

> >the part of the post you snipped.

>

> >1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics without

> >requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not.

>

> >Therefore

>

> >2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not influence the behaviour of M,

> >else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or

> >without P(A)

>

> >You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly follows the

> >known laws of physics for M, and any property for P(A) where (1) would

> >be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2).

>

> But the counter argument is that P(A) is an aspect of the behavior to

> explain. More to the point I would argue that we can't explain M

> without having P(A) as part of the description and the explanation.

>

 

Well the above had been re-written since as:

 

M refers to the physical entity in question.

B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

P refers to the a property in question.

 

Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

and P is the same in (1) and (2).

 

1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

knowledge of whether it has P or not.

 

2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

 

If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

 

There you can see the behaviour being explained B(M) would be clearly

defined. So your counter argument doesn't work.

Guest jientho@aol.com
Posted

On Jun 11, 10:43 am, Matt Silberstein

<RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> On Sat, 09 Jun 2007 12:02:52 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> <1181415772.483273.54...@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>

> [snip]

>

> >It had nothing to do with determinism.

>

> >The reasoning is summarised below, but was outlined in more depth in

> >the part of the post you snipped.

>

> >1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics without

> >requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not.

>

> >Therefore

>

> >2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not influence the behaviour of M,

> >else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or

> >without P(A)

>

> >You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly follows the

> >known laws of physics for M, and any property for P(A) where (1) would

> >be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2).

>

> But the counter argument is that P(A) is an aspect of the behavior to

> explain.

 

Then you have simply rejected premise (1) of the argument --

explanation of the behavior of M requires knowledge of whether it has

P(A).

> More to the point I would argue that we can't explain M

> without having P(A) as part of the description and the explanation.

 

The counter to your counter would go: what evidence have you that

subjective experience is found anywhere in the laws of physics? Are

you relying on a Schroedinger's Cat thought-experiment (which is not

evidence by itself btw) or something?

 

Jeff

Guest someone2
Posted

On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl>

wrote:

> I think you understand Fred and me.

 

I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to

avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to

you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post.

Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the

answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable

of doing it yourself.

 

I had asked:

----------

Do you see that the following is always true:

 

M refers to the physical entity in question.

B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

P refers to the a property in question.

 

Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

and P is the same in (1) and (2).

 

1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

knowledge of whether it has P or not.

 

2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

 

If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

----------

 

You replied:

----------

Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true

 

If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it

does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead

(or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M).

 

A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can

influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may

use the state of synapses that constitutes P.

 

To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on

it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong

balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may

even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then

black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its

bouncing.

 

Nevertheless its composition is.

 

M = a ball

B(M) = the bouncing of the ball.

P = a property of the ball

If P = the colour, your assessment is right.

If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong.

----------

 

To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive

as:

----------

So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property

of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property

isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true,

and so is (2).

 

With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the

ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not

be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true.

----------

 

You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you

how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective

experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism

following the known laws of physics.

 

If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism

worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether

the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as

above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be

thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that

particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the

biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was

correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2).

 

If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves,

which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without,

then (1) would not be true.

 

You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is

presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world

perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit,

that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and

thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same?

Guest someone2
Posted

On 11 Jun, 16:43, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> news:1181517234.889369.239710@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> > On 11 Jun, 00:05, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> >>news:1181514806.543814.218460@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> >> > On 10 Jun, 20:36, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> >> "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote in message

>

> >> >>news:FNednZ5aMcoN3PHbnZ2dnUVZ_tmknZ2d@io.com...

>

> >> >> > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

> >> >> >news:1181471104.632034.40450@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...

> >> >> >> On 10 Jun, 03:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> >> >>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> >> >> >>>news:1181440301.918077.327620@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...

>

> >> >> >>> > On 10 Jun, 02:15, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> >> >>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> >> >> >>> >>news:1181417934.359700.133760@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> >> >> >>> >> > On 9 Jun, 08:25, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> >> >>> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> >> > (snipped some of the older stuff)

>

> >> >> >>> >> >> > Can you understand the following:

>

> >> >> >>> >> >> > 1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics

> >> >> >>> >> >> > without

> >> >> >>> >> >> > reference requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or

> >> >> >>> >> >> > not.

>

> >> >> >>> >> >> Let's see, can I explain the behavior of my car without

> >> >> >>> >> >> knowing

> >> >> >>> >> >> if

> >> >> >>> >> >> it

> >> >> >>> >> >> has

> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank or not by the laws of physics? Yes, I can

> >> >> >>> >> >> explain

> >> >> >>> >> >> both

> >> >> >>> >> >> behaviors, and one of them will be correct.

>

> >> >> >>> >> >> > Therefore

>

> >> >> >>> >> >> > 2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not affect the

> >> >> >>> >> >> > behaviour

> >> >> >>> >> >> > of

> >> >> >>> >> >> > M,

>

> >> >> >>> >> >> Well, personally I think gas in the tank radically affects

> >> >> >>> >> >> the

> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior

> >> >> >>> >> >> of

> >> >> >>> >> >> my car.

>

> >> >> >>> >> >> > else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same

> >> >> >>> >> >> > with

> >> >> >>> >> >> > or

> >> >> >>> >> >> > without P(A)

>

> >> >> >>> >> >> The behavior of my car with gas in the tank is explainable

> >> >> >>> >> >> by

> >> >> >>> >> >> the

> >> >> >>> >> >> laws

> >> >> >>> >> >> of

> >> >> >>> >> >> physics, as is the behavior of my car without gas in the

> >> >> >>> >> >> tank.

> >> >> >>> >> >> But

> >> >> >>> >> >> somehow I

> >> >> >>> >> >> only get places I need to get to in air-conditioned comfort

> >> >> >>> >> >> when

> >> >> >>> >> >> there

> >> >> >>> >> >> is

> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank. That's very different behavior from when

> >> >> >>> >> >> there

> >> >> >>> >> >> isn't

> >> >> >>> >> >> gas

> >> >> >>> >> >> in

> >> >> >>> >> >> the tank.

>

> >> >> >>> >> >> Gosh! How very odd! It seems your point 2 is completely

> >> >> >>> >> >> wrong

> >> >> >>> >> >> on

> >> >> >>> >> >> such

> >> >> >>> >> >> a

> >> >> >>> >> >> basic level that it's hard to comprehend how you can

> >> >> >>> >> >> function

> >> >> >>> >> >> in

> >> >> >>> >> >> society

> >> >> >>> >> >> at

> >> >> >>> >> >> all.

>

> >> >> >>> >> >> I take it you don't own a car? Please tell me you don't.

>

> >> >> >>> >> >> > You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly

> >> >> >>> >> >> > follows

> >> >> >>> >> >> > the

> >> >> >>> >> >> > known laws of physics for M, and any property for which

> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A)

> >> >> >>> >> >> > where

> >> >> >>> >> >> > (1)

> >> >> >>> >> >> > would be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2).

>

> >> >> >>> >> >> My car says you're just plain stupid.

>

> >> >> >>> >> > Your reponses have a certain entertainment value I guess.

>

> >> >> >>> >> > Let me put it another way:

>

> >> >> >>> >> No, why don't you address it the way you put it?

>

> >> >> >>> >> And the way I answered it?

>

> >> >> >>> >> Are you too stupid or afraid to?

>

> >> >> >>> >> Are you a moron, a coward, or both?

>

> >> >> >>> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

>

> >> >> >>> >> My car!

>

> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>

> >> >> >>> >> It gets me to my destination in air-conditioned comfort!

>

> >> >> >>> >> > P refers to the a property in question.

>

> >> >> >>> >> Gas in the tank!

>

> >> >> >>> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> >> >> >>> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> >> >> >>> >> My car employs the laws of physics to get me to my destination

> >> >> >>> >> in

> >> >> >>> >> air-conditioned comfort!

>

> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect B(M), else the

> >> >> >>> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or

> >> >> >>> >> > without

> >> >> >>> >> > P.

>

> >> >> >>> >> Oddly, that doesn't match reality at all! When there's no gas

> >> >> >>> >> in

> >> >> >>> >> the

> >> >> >>> >> tank

> >> >> >>> >> of

> >> >> >>> >> my car, I DON'T get to my destination in air conditioned

> >> >> >>> >> comfort!

> >> >> >>> >> My

> >> >> >>> >> car

> >> >> >>> >> just sits there following the laws of physics.

>

> >> >> >>> >> Bummer!

>

> >> >> >>> >> > if (1) is true, then so is (2)

>

> >> >> >>> >> My car still says you're just plain stupid.

>

> >> >> >>> >> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are the same

> >> >> >>> >> >

>

> >> >> >>> >> How can my car, getting somewhere in air conditioned comfort,

> >> >> >>> >> and

> >> >> >>> >> gas

> >> >> >>> >> in

> >> >> >>> >> the

> >> >> >>> >> tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid.

>

> >> >> >>> >> > To give you an example, just to make sure you have no excuses

> >> >> >>> >> > for

> >> >> >>> >> > pretending you can't grasp the point, and are

> >> >> >>> >> > misunderstanding

> >> >> >>> >> > it:

>

> >> >> >>> >> > M = a car

> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running

> >> >> >>> >> > P = its serial number

>

> >> >> >>> >> > Which means:

>

> >> >> >>> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the

> >> >> >>> >> > laws

> >> >> >>> >> > of

> >> >> >>> >> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a

> >> >> >>> >> > serial

> >> >> >>> >> > number

> >> >> >>> >> > or not.

>

> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not the car

> >> >> >>> >> > parked

> >> >> >>> >> > with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour

> >> >> >>> >> > could

> >> >> >>> >> > not

> >> >> >>> >> > be the same with or without a serial number.

>

> >> >> >>> >> But if the situation is:

>

> >> >> >>> >> > M = my car

> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running

> >> >> >>> >> > P = gas in the tank

>

> >> >> >>> >> Then suddenly your formula fails! Once the gas runs out, the

> >> >> >>> >> car

> >> >> >>> >> no

> >> >> >>> >> longer

> >> >> >>> >> has a running engine.

>

> >> >> >>> >> > Since (1) is true, so is (2).

>

> >> >> >>> >> Not if there's no gas in the tank.

>

> >> >> >>> >> > So though I have tried to plug up the holes where you might

> >> >> >>> >> > try

> >> >> >>> >> > to

> >> >> >>> >> > pretend to misunderstand, your ability to, still does give

> >> >> >>> >> > you

> >> >> >>> >> > some

> >> >> >>> >> > artistic scope for disingenuity, which I'm sure you will use

> >> >> >>> >> > if

> >> >> >>> >> > able.

>

> >> >> >>> >> You're so stupid, my car is embarrassed for you.

>

> >> >> >>> > I pointed out:

> >> >> >>> > -------------

> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are the same

> >> >> >>> >

> >> >> >>> > -------------

>

> >> >> >>> > To which you replied:

> >> >> >>> > -------------

> >> >> >>> > How can my car, getting somewhere in air conditioned comfort,

> >> >> >>> > and

> >> >> >>> > gas

> >> >> >>> > in the tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid.

> >> >> >>> > -------------

>

> >> >> >>> > I assume this was just another example of your disingenious

> >> >> >>> > creativity. M isn't the same as B(M) which isn't the same as P.

> >> >> >>> > It

> >> >> >>> > is

> >> >> >>> > that M mentioned in (1) is the same as M mentioned in (2), and

> >> >> >>> > B(M)

> >> >> >>> > mentioned in (1) is the same as B(M) mentioned in (2), and P

> >> >> >>> > mentioned

> >> >> >>> > in (1) is the same as P mentioned in (2).

>

> >> >> >>> > If you can now understand this, you can see if (2) wasn't true,

> >> >> >>> > because there was no gas in the tank, then (1) couldn't have

> >> >> >>> > been

> >> >> >>> > true, as it getting you to your destination in air couldn't be

> >> >> >>> > explained without gas in the tank.

>

> >> >> >>> > You'll notice it also gets through your usual well polished

> >> >> >>> > deception

> >> >> >>> > in that it applies to and physical entity that strictly follows

> >> >> >>> > the

> >> >> >>> > laws of physics, and doesn't require a comparison entity.

>

> >> >> >>> > So here it is again, and hopefully you won't simply be grasping

> >> >> >>> > at

> >> >> >>> > ways to misinterpret what is being said, but actually face

> >> >> >>> > reason

> >> >> >>> > for

> >> >> >>> > once.

>

> >> >> >>> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

>

> >> >> >>> My car.

>

> >> >> >>> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>

> >> >> >>> It's sitting there inert.

>

> >> >> >>> > P refers to the a property in question.

>

> >> >> >>> Gas in the tank.

>

> >> >> >>> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> >> >> >>> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> >> >> >>> The car sits there inert, according to the laws of physics.

> >> >> >>> Doesn't

> >> >> >>> matter

> >> >> >>> if there's gas in the tank or not.

>

> >> >> >>> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect B(M), else the

> >> >> >>> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without

> >> >> >>> > P.

>

> >> >> >>> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is exactly the same as a car

> >> >> >>> with

> >> >> >>> gas

> >> >> >>> in the tank.

>

> >> >> >>> Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to buy gas again! I can

> >> >> >>> drive

> >> >> >>> around

> >> >> >>> with or without gas.

>

> >> >> >>> Yup, your example sure matches reality.

>

> >> >> >>> Not.

>

> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are the same

> >> >> >>> >

>

> >> >> >>> Note that the above sentence is an admitted lie.

>

> >> >> >>> > It follows that if (1) is true, then so is (2).

>

> >> >> >>> Nope.

>

> >> >> >> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence the car sitting there

> >> >> >> inert, so (2) would be true.

>

> >> >> > Until the key is turned in the ignition.

>

> >> >> > If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly false.

>

> >> >> Look, are you trying, in your own stupid and inept way, to get me to

> >> >> say

> >> >> that there are properties that have no effect on the behavior of the

> >> >> thing

> >> >> they're a property of? Well that's a big yes! Of COURSE there are

> >> >> properties

> >> >> that have no effect on behavior. Your example of the serial number,

> >> >> for

> >> >> example.

>

> >> >> So what?

>

> >> >> Are you dishonestly trying to equate the irrelevant-to-behavior aspect

> >> >> of

> >> >> a

> >> >> serial number to the crucial-to-behavior aspect of subjective

> >> >> experience?

> >> >> If

> >> >> you were honest, your examples would be either the car's elecrtical

> >> >> system

> >> >> compared to subjective experience, or a serial number compared to a

> >> >> tattoo.

> >> >> The effects of subjective experience on behavior are not subtle, and

> >> >> do

> >> >> not

> >> >> conceptually map to the irrelevancy of a serial number.

>

> >> >> I think that subjective experience is the action of physical matter in

> >> >> physical brains following the laws of physics. The subjective

> >> >> experience

> >> >> is

> >> >> not apart from that physical action. Subjective Experience is simply a

> >> >> name

> >> >> we apply to a certain catagory of physical actions found in brains. It

> >> >> is

> >> >> a

> >> >> subset, not an "extra thing", somehow apart from the normal operation

> >> >> of

> >> >> the

> >> >> brain. It IS the normal operation of the brain.

>

> >> >> If you remove it from the operation of the brain, you would expect

> >> >> radically

> >> >> different behavior, just like you would expect if you ripped out

> >> >> crucial

> >> >> subroutines from a computer program. Without subjective experience,

> >> >> the

> >> >> human brain is no longer operating normally, even though it is still,

> >> >> of

> >> >> course, operating according to the laws of physics.

>

> >> >> I know it was pointless of me to type

>

> >> > Subjective experiences are a label to what you actually consciously

> >> > experience.

>

> >> Which is matter in the brain operating according to physical law.

>

> >> > That the brain is directly responsible for them is an

> >> > assertion.

>

> >> No, it's a conclusion based on evidence. If you physically manipulate

> >> the

> >> brain, you manipulate consciousness.

>

> >> > I can't say it is an explanation, as there could be no

> >> > explanation from your perspective why any physical activity would be

> >> > subjectively experienced, or why it wasn't just fluctuations of the

> >> > colour green for example, the brightness dependent on the amount of

> >> > neurons firing. Nothing in your perspective would know what the neuron

> >> > state represented.

>

> >> That's where your ability to communicate breaks down entirely. What the

> >> fuck

> >> are you babbling about? "Fluctuations of the color green"? Are you on

> >> drugs?

>

> >> > The point was that even if you wanted to believe in the story that we

> >> > were simply biological mechanisms, and that our subjective experiences

> >> > were an emergent property of the brain. The emergent property couldn't

> >> > be said to be influential in behaviour due to:

>

> >> I was right, you're going to ignore what I post and write your fucking

> >> formula again.

>

> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

> >> > P refers to the a property in question.

>

> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>

> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> >> Then P and/or B has to be pretty fucking trivial. Like a serial number,

> >> or

> >> being inert.

>

> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>

> >> Yeah, you can concoct a scenario that fulfills these criteria. Big deal.

>

> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>

> >> Suppose I agree. So what? This little formula cannot be applied to

> >> non-trivial properties and behaviors. If the property is non-trivial,

> >> then

> >> it will affect behavior, and your formula cannot be applied.

>

> >> So, how DO you deal with properties that DO affect behavior? Do you just

> >> pretend they don't exist?

>

> >> > The story that our subjective experiences have no influence on our

> >> > behaviour is implausible,

>

> >> From my perspective, you've been arguing against that. I think that

> >> subjective experience influences our behavior.

>

> >> > even though you bet your soul on it, unable

> >> > to see through the deception, and still cling to it, even if you have

> >> > to disingeniously misunderstand.

>

> >> You have not demonstrated that.

>

> >> > That you can't face that you were

> >> > wrong, and that you are shown to be so through reason, appears to me

> >> > as pathetic.

>

> >> Or perhaps it's you that's completely wrong. Have you even considered the

> >> possibility?

>

> >> I'm guessing not.

>

> > It is implausible that we simply are a biological mechanism simply

> > following the laws of physics. For that reason alone I could know I

> > wasn't wrong.

>

> So you determine if you're right about something based on nothing but

> arbitrary feelings?

>

> That explains a lot.

>

> > It is implausible, because it would require our behaviour, including

> > even questioning whether a robot had subjective experiences, would be

> > uninfluenced by us having subjective experiences. This is shown by:

>

> No, it's influenced by subjective experience.

>

> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

> > P refers to the a property in question.

>

> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

> > and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>

> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>

> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>

> Lets see if we can apply this stupidity to something that affects behavior.

> Can you apply it to reflexes? Oops, no, there's a difference in behavior if

> you have reflexes compared to you not having reflexes. If you can't apply

> your little formula to reflexes, what makes you think you can apply it to

> consciousness?

>

> > Without the assertion that we were a biological mechanism simply

> > following the laws of physics, there would be no reason to assume

> > anything following the laws of physics subjectively experienced,

>

> I'm a biological mechanism simply following the laws of physics and I

> subjectively experience, therefore I conclude that biological mechanisms

> following the laws of can subjectively experience.

>

> > therefore what reason would the biological mechanism (if the assertion

> > were made) have for considering such a thing uninfluenced by it having

> > subjective experiences.

>

> This one doesn't. This one observes that it's subjective experiences

> influence its behavior.

>

> > You were wrong get used to it. Stop being so pathetic about it.

>

> You're not stating my position. Why would your criticizism of a position I

> do not hold show that I am wrong?

>

 

If you changed the property to one that behaviour couldn't be

explained without knowledge of, then (1) wouldn't be true.

 

You have already admitted that though you could know the mechanism of

the robot (and therefore be able to explain its behaviour) you

wouldn't have knowledge of whether it has subjective experiences or

not. I asked you before:

------------

Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, one thing

you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective experiences or

not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in your

knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact.

------------

 

To which you replied:

------------

I fucking understand that you twit.

------------

 

The question is can you face the truth, or are you going to continue

to grasp at straws, hoping that they will enable you to avoid it,

instead of making you look more and more pathetic.

Guest Denis Loubet
Posted

"someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1181581549.652693.254210@q66g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...

> On 11 Jun, 16:43, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> news:1181517234.889369.239710@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> > On 11 Jun, 00:05, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> >>news:1181514806.543814.218460@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> > On 10 Jun, 20:36, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> >> "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote in message

>>

>> >> >>news:FNednZ5aMcoN3PHbnZ2dnUVZ_tmknZ2d@io.com...

>>

>> >> >> > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>> >> >> >news:1181471104.632034.40450@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...

>> >> >> >> On 10 Jun, 03:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> >> >>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> >> >> >>>news:1181440301.918077.327620@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> >> >>> > On 10 Jun, 02:15, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> >> >>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> >> >> >>> >>news:1181417934.359700.133760@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> > On 9 Jun, 08:25, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> >> >>> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in

>> >> >> >>> >> >> message

>>

>> >> > (snipped some of the older stuff)

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > Can you understand the following:

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > 1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > physics

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > without

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > reference requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > not.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> >> Let's see, can I explain the behavior of my car without

>> >> >> >>> >> >> knowing

>> >> >> >>> >> >> if

>> >> >> >>> >> >> it

>> >> >> >>> >> >> has

>> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank or not by the laws of physics? Yes, I can

>> >> >> >>> >> >> explain

>> >> >> >>> >> >> both

>> >> >> >>> >> >> behaviors, and one of them will be correct.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > Therefore

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > 2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not affect the

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > behaviour

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > of

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > M,

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> >> Well, personally I think gas in the tank radically

>> >> >> >>> >> >> affects

>> >> >> >>> >> >> the

>> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior

>> >> >> >>> >> >> of

>> >> >> >>> >> >> my car.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > with

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > or

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > without P(A)

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> >> The behavior of my car with gas in the tank is

>> >> >> >>> >> >> explainable

>> >> >> >>> >> >> by

>> >> >> >>> >> >> the

>> >> >> >>> >> >> laws

>> >> >> >>> >> >> of

>> >> >> >>> >> >> physics, as is the behavior of my car without gas in the

>> >> >> >>> >> >> tank.

>> >> >> >>> >> >> But

>> >> >> >>> >> >> somehow I

>> >> >> >>> >> >> only get places I need to get to in air-conditioned

>> >> >> >>> >> >> comfort

>> >> >> >>> >> >> when

>> >> >> >>> >> >> there

>> >> >> >>> >> >> is

>> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank. That's very different behavior from when

>> >> >> >>> >> >> there

>> >> >> >>> >> >> isn't

>> >> >> >>> >> >> gas

>> >> >> >>> >> >> in

>> >> >> >>> >> >> the tank.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> >> Gosh! How very odd! It seems your point 2 is completely

>> >> >> >>> >> >> wrong

>> >> >> >>> >> >> on

>> >> >> >>> >> >> such

>> >> >> >>> >> >> a

>> >> >> >>> >> >> basic level that it's hard to comprehend how you can

>> >> >> >>> >> >> function

>> >> >> >>> >> >> in

>> >> >> >>> >> >> society

>> >> >> >>> >> >> at

>> >> >> >>> >> >> all.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> >> I take it you don't own a car? Please tell me you don't.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > You can substitute whatever physical entity that

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > strictly

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > follows

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > the

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > known laws of physics for M, and any property for which

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A)

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > where

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > (1)

>> >> >> >>> >> >> > would be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2).

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> >> My car says you're just plain stupid.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> > Your reponses have a certain entertainment value I guess.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> > Let me put it another way:

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> No, why don't you address it the way you put it?

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> And the way I answered it?

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> Are you too stupid or afraid to?

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> Are you a moron, a coward, or both?

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> My car!

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> It gets me to my destination in air-conditioned comfort!

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> > P refers to the a property in question.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> Gas in the tank!

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without

>> >> >> >>> >> > requiring

>> >> >> >>> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> My car employs the laws of physics to get me to my

>> >> >> >>> >> destination

>> >> >> >>> >> in

>> >> >> >>> >> air-conditioned comfort!

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect B(M), else

>> >> >> >>> >> > the

>> >> >> >>> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or

>> >> >> >>> >> > without

>> >> >> >>> >> > P.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> Oddly, that doesn't match reality at all! When there's no

>> >> >> >>> >> gas

>> >> >> >>> >> in

>> >> >> >>> >> the

>> >> >> >>> >> tank

>> >> >> >>> >> of

>> >> >> >>> >> my car, I DON'T get to my destination in air conditioned

>> >> >> >>> >> comfort!

>> >> >> >>> >> My

>> >> >> >>> >> car

>> >> >> >>> >> just sits there following the laws of physics.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> Bummer!

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> > if (1) is true, then so is (2)

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> My car still says you're just plain stupid.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are the

>> >> >> >>> >> > same

>> >> >> >>> >> >

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> How can my car, getting somewhere in air conditioned

>> >> >> >>> >> comfort,

>> >> >> >>> >> and

>> >> >> >>> >> gas

>> >> >> >>> >> in

>> >> >> >>> >> the

>> >> >> >>> >> tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> > To give you an example, just to make sure you have no

>> >> >> >>> >> > excuses

>> >> >> >>> >> > for

>> >> >> >>> >> > pretending you can't grasp the point, and are

>> >> >> >>> >> > misunderstanding

>> >> >> >>> >> > it:

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> > M = a car

>> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running

>> >> >> >>> >> > P = its serial number

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> > Which means:

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by

>> >> >> >>> >> > the

>> >> >> >>> >> > laws

>> >> >> >>> >> > of

>> >> >> >>> >> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a

>> >> >> >>> >> > serial

>> >> >> >>> >> > number

>> >> >> >>> >> > or not.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not the

>> >> >> >>> >> > car

>> >> >> >>> >> > parked

>> >> >> >>> >> > with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour

>> >> >> >>> >> > could

>> >> >> >>> >> > not

>> >> >> >>> >> > be the same with or without a serial number.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> But if the situation is:

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> > M = my car

>> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running

>> >> >> >>> >> > P = gas in the tank

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> Then suddenly your formula fails! Once the gas runs out, the

>> >> >> >>> >> car

>> >> >> >>> >> no

>> >> >> >>> >> longer

>> >> >> >>> >> has a running engine.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> > Since (1) is true, so is (2).

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> Not if there's no gas in the tank.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> > So though I have tried to plug up the holes where you

>> >> >> >>> >> > might

>> >> >> >>> >> > try

>> >> >> >>> >> > to

>> >> >> >>> >> > pretend to misunderstand, your ability to, still does give

>> >> >> >>> >> > you

>> >> >> >>> >> > some

>> >> >> >>> >> > artistic scope for disingenuity, which I'm sure you will

>> >> >> >>> >> > use

>> >> >> >>> >> > if

>> >> >> >>> >> > able.

>>

>> >> >> >>> >> You're so stupid, my car is embarrassed for you.

>>

>> >> >> >>> > I pointed out:

>> >> >> >>> > -------------

>> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are the same

>> >> >> >>> >

>> >> >> >>> > -------------

>>

>> >> >> >>> > To which you replied:

>> >> >> >>> > -------------

>> >> >> >>> > How can my car, getting somewhere in air conditioned comfort,

>> >> >> >>> > and

>> >> >> >>> > gas

>> >> >> >>> > in the tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid.

>> >> >> >>> > -------------

>>

>> >> >> >>> > I assume this was just another example of your disingenious

>> >> >> >>> > creativity. M isn't the same as B(M) which isn't the same as

>> >> >> >>> > P.

>> >> >> >>> > It

>> >> >> >>> > is

>> >> >> >>> > that M mentioned in (1) is the same as M mentioned in (2),

>> >> >> >>> > and

>> >> >> >>> > B(M)

>> >> >> >>> > mentioned in (1) is the same as B(M) mentioned in (2), and P

>> >> >> >>> > mentioned

>> >> >> >>> > in (1) is the same as P mentioned in (2).

>>

>> >> >> >>> > If you can now understand this, you can see if (2) wasn't

>> >> >> >>> > true,

>> >> >> >>> > because there was no gas in the tank, then (1) couldn't have

>> >> >> >>> > been

>> >> >> >>> > true, as it getting you to your destination in air couldn't

>> >> >> >>> > be

>> >> >> >>> > explained without gas in the tank.

>>

>> >> >> >>> > You'll notice it also gets through your usual well polished

>> >> >> >>> > deception

>> >> >> >>> > in that it applies to and physical entity that strictly

>> >> >> >>> > follows

>> >> >> >>> > the

>> >> >> >>> > laws of physics, and doesn't require a comparison entity.

>>

>> >> >> >>> > So here it is again, and hopefully you won't simply be

>> >> >> >>> > grasping

>> >> >> >>> > at

>> >> >> >>> > ways to misinterpret what is being said, but actually face

>> >> >> >>> > reason

>> >> >> >>> > for

>> >> >> >>> > once.

>>

>> >> >> >>> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

>>

>> >> >> >>> My car.

>>

>> >> >> >>> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>>

>> >> >> >>> It's sitting there inert.

>>

>> >> >> >>> > P refers to the a property in question.

>>

>> >> >> >>> Gas in the tank.

>>

>> >> >> >>> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

>> >> >> >>> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>>

>> >> >> >>> The car sits there inert, according to the laws of physics.

>> >> >> >>> Doesn't

>> >> >> >>> matter

>> >> >> >>> if there's gas in the tank or not.

>>

>> >> >> >>> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect B(M), else the

>> >> >> >>> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or

>> >> >> >>> > without

>> >> >> >>> > P.

>>

>> >> >> >>> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is exactly the same as a

>> >> >> >>> car

>> >> >> >>> with

>> >> >> >>> gas

>> >> >> >>> in the tank.

>>

>> >> >> >>> Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to buy gas again! I can

>> >> >> >>> drive

>> >> >> >>> around

>> >> >> >>> with or without gas.

>>

>> >> >> >>> Yup, your example sure matches reality.

>>

>> >> >> >>> Not.

>>

>> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are the same

>> >> >> >>> >

>>

>> >> >> >>> Note that the above sentence is an admitted lie.

>>

>> >> >> >>> > It follows that if (1) is true, then so is (2).

>>

>> >> >> >>> Nope.

>>

>> >> >> >> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence the car sitting

>> >> >> >> there

>> >> >> >> inert, so (2) would be true.

>>

>> >> >> > Until the key is turned in the ignition.

>>

>> >> >> > If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly false.

>>

>> >> >> Look, are you trying, in your own stupid and inept way, to get me

>> >> >> to

>> >> >> say

>> >> >> that there are properties that have no effect on the behavior of

>> >> >> the

>> >> >> thing

>> >> >> they're a property of? Well that's a big yes! Of COURSE there are

>> >> >> properties

>> >> >> that have no effect on behavior. Your example of the serial number,

>> >> >> for

>> >> >> example.

>>

>> >> >> So what?

>>

>> >> >> Are you dishonestly trying to equate the irrelevant-to-behavior

>> >> >> aspect

>> >> >> of

>> >> >> a

>> >> >> serial number to the crucial-to-behavior aspect of subjective

>> >> >> experience?

>> >> >> If

>> >> >> you were honest, your examples would be either the car's elecrtical

>> >> >> system

>> >> >> compared to subjective experience, or a serial number compared to a

>> >> >> tattoo.

>> >> >> The effects of subjective experience on behavior are not subtle,

>> >> >> and

>> >> >> do

>> >> >> not

>> >> >> conceptually map to the irrelevancy of a serial number.

>>

>> >> >> I think that subjective experience is the action of physical matter

>> >> >> in

>> >> >> physical brains following the laws of physics. The subjective

>> >> >> experience

>> >> >> is

>> >> >> not apart from that physical action. Subjective Experience is

>> >> >> simply a

>> >> >> name

>> >> >> we apply to a certain catagory of physical actions found in brains.

>> >> >> It

>> >> >> is

>> >> >> a

>> >> >> subset, not an "extra thing", somehow apart from the normal

>> >> >> operation

>> >> >> of

>> >> >> the

>> >> >> brain. It IS the normal operation of the brain.

>>

>> >> >> If you remove it from the operation of the brain, you would expect

>> >> >> radically

>> >> >> different behavior, just like you would expect if you ripped out

>> >> >> crucial

>> >> >> subroutines from a computer program. Without subjective experience,

>> >> >> the

>> >> >> human brain is no longer operating normally, even though it is

>> >> >> still,

>> >> >> of

>> >> >> course, operating according to the laws of physics.

>>

>> >> >> I know it was pointless of me to type

>>

>> >> > Subjective experiences are a label to what you actually consciously

>> >> > experience.

>>

>> >> Which is matter in the brain operating according to physical law.

>>

>> >> > That the brain is directly responsible for them is an

>> >> > assertion.

>>

>> >> No, it's a conclusion based on evidence. If you physically manipulate

>> >> the

>> >> brain, you manipulate consciousness.

>>

>> >> > I can't say it is an explanation, as there could be no

>> >> > explanation from your perspective why any physical activity would be

>> >> > subjectively experienced, or why it wasn't just fluctuations of the

>> >> > colour green for example, the brightness dependent on the amount of

>> >> > neurons firing. Nothing in your perspective would know what the

>> >> > neuron

>> >> > state represented.

>>

>> >> That's where your ability to communicate breaks down entirely. What

>> >> the

>> >> fuck

>> >> are you babbling about? "Fluctuations of the color green"? Are you on

>> >> drugs?

>>

>> >> > The point was that even if you wanted to believe in the story that

>> >> > we

>> >> > were simply biological mechanisms, and that our subjective

>> >> > experiences

>> >> > were an emergent property of the brain. The emergent property

>> >> > couldn't

>> >> > be said to be influential in behaviour due to:

>>

>> >> I was right, you're going to ignore what I post and write your fucking

>> >> formula again.

>>

>> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

>> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>> >> > P refers to the a property in question.

>>

>> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

>> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>>

>> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

>> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>>

>> >> Then P and/or B has to be pretty fucking trivial. Like a serial

>> >> number,

>> >> or

>> >> being inert.

>>

>> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else

>> >> > the

>> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>>

>> >> Yeah, you can concoct a scenario that fulfills these criteria. Big

>> >> deal.

>>

>> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>>

>> >> Suppose I agree. So what? This little formula cannot be applied to

>> >> non-trivial properties and behaviors. If the property is non-trivial,

>> >> then

>> >> it will affect behavior, and your formula cannot be applied.

>>

>> >> So, how DO you deal with properties that DO affect behavior? Do you

>> >> just

>> >> pretend they don't exist?

>>

>> >> > The story that our subjective experiences have no influence on our

>> >> > behaviour is implausible,

>>

>> >> From my perspective, you've been arguing against that. I think that

>> >> subjective experience influences our behavior.

>>

>> >> > even though you bet your soul on it, unable

>> >> > to see through the deception, and still cling to it, even if you

>> >> > have

>> >> > to disingeniously misunderstand.

>>

>> >> You have not demonstrated that.

>>

>> >> > That you can't face that you were

>> >> > wrong, and that you are shown to be so through reason, appears to me

>> >> > as pathetic.

>>

>> >> Or perhaps it's you that's completely wrong. Have you even considered

>> >> the

>> >> possibility?

>>

>> >> I'm guessing not.

>>

>> > It is implausible that we simply are a biological mechanism simply

>> > following the laws of physics. For that reason alone I could know I

>> > wasn't wrong.

>>

>> So you determine if you're right about something based on nothing but

>> arbitrary feelings?

>>

>> That explains a lot.

>>

>> > It is implausible, because it would require our behaviour, including

>> > even questioning whether a robot had subjective experiences, would be

>> > uninfluenced by us having subjective experiences. This is shown by:

>>

>> No, it's influenced by subjective experience.

>>

>> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

>> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>> > P refers to the a property in question.

>>

>> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

>> > and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>>

>> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

>> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>>

>> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

>> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>>

>> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>>

>> Lets see if we can apply this stupidity to something that affects

>> behavior.

>> Can you apply it to reflexes? Oops, no, there's a difference in behavior

>> if

>> you have reflexes compared to you not having reflexes. If you can't apply

>> your little formula to reflexes, what makes you think you can apply it to

>> consciousness?

>>

>> > Without the assertion that we were a biological mechanism simply

>> > following the laws of physics, there would be no reason to assume

>> > anything following the laws of physics subjectively experienced,

>>

>> I'm a biological mechanism simply following the laws of physics and I

>> subjectively experience, therefore I conclude that biological mechanisms

>> following the laws of can subjectively experience.

>>

>> > therefore what reason would the biological mechanism (if the assertion

>> > were made) have for considering such a thing uninfluenced by it having

>> > subjective experiences.

>>

>> This one doesn't. This one observes that it's subjective experiences

>> influence its behavior.

>>

>> > You were wrong get used to it. Stop being so pathetic about it.

>>

>> You're not stating my position. Why would your criticizism of a position

>> I

>> do not hold show that I am wrong?

>>

>

> If you changed the property to one that behaviour couldn't be

> explained without knowledge of, then (1) wouldn't be true.

 

Which means you can't apply your formula to reflexes, right?

 

So why do you think you can apply it to consciousness? The behaviors of

conscious and unconscious things, in real life, is pretty fucking different.

The unconscious ones lie inert while the conscious ones run about. According

to (1) of your formula, you can't apply it to consciousness.

> You have already admitted that though you could know the mechanism of

> the robot (and therefore be able to explain its behaviour) you

> wouldn't have knowledge of whether it has subjective experiences or

> not. I asked you before:

 

Is this an argument about my state of ignorance concerning if something is

conscious or not?

 

That has fuck-all to do with anything. My state of ignorance has nothing to

do with whether something is conscious or not, or what the source of that

consciousnsess is.

> ------------

> Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, one thing

> you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective experiences or

> not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in your

> knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact.

> ------------

>

> To which you replied:

> ------------

> I fucking understand that you twit.

> ------------

>

> The question is can you face the truth, or are you going to continue

> to grasp at straws, hoping that they will enable you to avoid it,

> instead of making you look more and more pathetic.

 

The truth would be that if it acts like it's conscious, I'll call it

conscious. That's my prerogative.

 

 

--

Denis Loubet

dloubet@io.com

http//www.io.com/~dloubet

Guest someone2
Posted

On 11 Jun, 18:23, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> news:1181581549.652693.254210@q66g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...

>

> > On 11 Jun, 16:43, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> >>news:1181517234.889369.239710@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> >> > On 11 Jun, 00:05, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> >> >>news:1181514806.543814.218460@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> >> >> > On 10 Jun, 20:36, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> >> >> "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote in message

>

> >> >> >>news:FNednZ5aMcoN3PHbnZ2dnUVZ_tmknZ2d@io.com...

>

> >> >> >> > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

> >> >> >> >news:1181471104.632034.40450@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...

> >> >> >> >> On 10 Jun, 03:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> >> >> >>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> >> >> >> >>>news:1181440301.918077.327620@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...

>

> >> >> >> >>> > On 10 Jun, 02:15, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> >> >> >>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> >> >> >> >>> >>news:1181417934.359700.133760@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> > On 9 Jun, 08:25, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> message

>

> >> >> > (snipped some of the older stuff)

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Can you understand the following:

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > physics

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > reference requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > not.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Let's see, can I explain the behavior of my car without

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> knowing

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> if

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> it

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> has

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank or not by the laws of physics? Yes, I can

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explain

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> both

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behaviors, and one of them will be correct.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Therefore

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not affect the

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > behaviour

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > M,

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Well, personally I think gas in the tank radically

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> affects

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> my car.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > with

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without P(A)

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> The behavior of my car with gas in the tank is

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explainable

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> by

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> laws

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> physics, as is the behavior of my car without gas in the

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> tank.

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> But

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> somehow I

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> only get places I need to get to in air-conditioned

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> comfort

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank. That's very different behavior from when

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> isn't

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the tank.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Gosh! How very odd! It seems your point 2 is completely

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> wrong

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> on

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> such

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> a

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> basic level that it's hard to comprehend how you can

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> function

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> society

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> at

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> all.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I take it you don't own a car? Please tell me you don't.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > You can substitute whatever physical entity that

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > strictly

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > follows

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > known laws of physics for M, and any property for which

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A)

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > where

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > (1)

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > would be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2).

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> >> My car says you're just plain stupid.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> > Your reponses have a certain entertainment value I guess.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> > Let me put it another way:

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> No, why don't you address it the way you put it?

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> And the way I answered it?

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you too stupid or afraid to?

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you a moron, a coward, or both?

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> My car!

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> It gets me to my destination in air-conditioned comfort!

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> > P refers to the a property in question.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> Gas in the tank!

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without

> >> >> >> >>> >> > requiring

> >> >> >> >>> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> My car employs the laws of physics to get me to my

> >> >> >> >>> >> destination

> >> >> >> >>> >> in

> >> >> >> >>> >> air-conditioned comfort!

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect B(M), else

> >> >> >> >>> >> > the

> >> >> >> >>> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or

> >> >> >> >>> >> > without

> >> >> >> >>> >> > P.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> Oddly, that doesn't match reality at all! When there's no

> >> >> >> >>> >> gas

> >> >> >> >>> >> in

> >> >> >> >>> >> the

> >> >> >> >>> >> tank

> >> >> >> >>> >> of

> >> >> >> >>> >> my car, I DON'T get to my destination in air conditioned

> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort!

> >> >> >> >>> >> My

> >> >> >> >>> >> car

> >> >> >> >>> >> just sits there following the laws of physics.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> Bummer!

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> > if (1) is true, then so is (2)

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> My car still says you're just plain stupid.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are the

> >> >> >> >>> >> > same

> >> >> >> >>> >> >

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> How can my car, getting somewhere in air conditioned

> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort,

> >> >> >> >>> >> and

> >> >> >> >>> >> gas

> >> >> >> >>> >> in

> >> >> >> >>> >> the

> >> >> >> >>> >> tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> > To give you an example, just to make sure you have no

> >> >> >> >>> >> > excuses

> >> >> >> >>> >> > for

> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretending you can't grasp the point, and are

> >> >> >> >>> >> > misunderstanding

> >> >> >> >>> >> > it:

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = a car

> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running

> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = its serial number

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> > Which means:

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by

> >> >> >> >>> >> > the

> >> >> >> >>> >> > laws

> >> >> >> >>> >> > of

> >> >> >> >>> >> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a

> >> >> >> >>> >> > serial

> >> >> >> >>> >> > number

> >> >> >> >>> >> > or not.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not the

> >> >> >> >>> >> > car

> >> >> >> >>> >> > parked

> >> >> >> >>> >> > with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour

> >> >> >> >>> >> > could

> >> >> >> >>> >> > not

> >> >> >> >>> >> > be the same with or without a serial number.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> But if the situation is:

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = my car

> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running

> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = gas in the tank

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> Then suddenly your formula fails! Once the gas runs out, the

> >> >> >> >>> >> car

> >> >> >> >>> >> no

> >> >> >> >>> >> longer

> >> >> >> >>> >> has a running engine.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> > Since (1) is true, so is (2).

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> Not if there's no gas in the tank.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> > So though I have tried to plug up the holes where you

> >> >> >> >>> >> > might

> >> >> >> >>> >> > try

> >> >> >> >>> >> > to

> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretend to misunderstand, your ability to, still does give

> >> >> >> >>> >> > you

> >> >> >> >>> >> > some

> >> >> >> >>> >> > artistic scope for disingenuity, which I'm sure you will

> >> >> >> >>> >> > use

> >> >> >> >>> >> > if

> >> >> >> >>> >> > able.

>

> >> >> >> >>> >> You're so stupid, my car is embarrassed for you.

>

> >> >> >> >>> > I pointed out:

> >> >> >> >>> > -------------

> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are the same

> >> >> >> >>> >

> >> >> >> >>> > -------------

>

> >> >> >> >>> > To which you replied:

> >> >> >> >>> > -------------

> >> >> >> >>> > How can my car, getting somewhere in air conditioned comfort,

> >> >> >> >>> > and

> >> >> >> >>> > gas

> >> >> >> >>> > in the tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid.

> >> >> >> >>> > -------------

>

> >> >> >> >>> > I assume this was just another example of your disingenious

> >> >> >> >>> > creativity. M isn't the same as B(M) which isn't the same as

> >> >> >> >>> > P.

> >> >> >> >>> > It

> >> >> >> >>> > is

> >> >> >> >>> > that M mentioned in (1) is the same as M mentioned in (2),

> >> >> >> >>> > and

> >> >> >> >>> > B(M)

> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned in (1) is the same as B(M) mentioned in (2), and P

> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned

> >> >> >> >>> > in (1) is the same as P mentioned in (2).

>

> >> >> >> >>> > If you can now understand this, you can see if (2) wasn't

> >> >> >> >>> > true,

> >> >> >> >>> > because there was no gas in the tank, then (1) couldn't have

> >> >> >> >>> > been

> >> >> >> >>> > true, as it getting you to your destination in air couldn't

> >> >> >> >>> > be

> >> >> >> >>> > explained without gas in the tank.

>

> >> >> >> >>> > You'll notice it also gets through your usual well polished

> >> >> >> >>> > deception

> >> >> >> >>> > in that it applies to and physical entity that strictly

> >> >> >> >>> > follows

> >> >> >> >>> > the

> >> >> >> >>> > laws of physics, and doesn't require a comparison entity.

>

> >> >> >> >>> > So here it is again, and hopefully you won't simply be

> >> >> >> >>> > grasping

> >> >> >> >>> > at

> >> >> >> >>> > ways to misinterpret what is being said, but actually face

> >> >> >> >>> > reason

> >> >> >> >>> > for

> >> >> >> >>> > once.

>

> >> >> >> >>> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

>

> >> >> >> >>> My car.

>

> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>

> >> >> >> >>> It's sitting there inert.

>

> >> >> >> >>> > P refers to the a property in question.

>

> >> >> >> >>> Gas in the tank.

>

> >> >> >> >>> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> >> >> >> >>> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> >> >> >> >>> The car sits there inert, according to the laws of physics.

> >> >> >> >>> Doesn't

> >> >> >> >>> matter

> >> >> >> >>> if there's gas in the tank or not.

>

> >> >> >> >>> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect B(M), else the

> >> >> >> >>> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or

> >> >> >> >>> > without

> >> >> >> >>> > P.

>

> >> >> >> >>> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is exactly the same as a

> >> >> >> >>> car

> >> >> >> >>> with

> >> >> >> >>> gas

> >> >> >> >>> in the tank.

>

> >> >> >> >>> Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to buy gas again! I can

> >> >> >> >>> drive

> >> >> >> >>> around

> >> >> >> >>> with or without gas.

>

> >> >> >> >>> Yup, your example sure matches reality.

>

> >> >> >> >>> Not.

>

> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are the same

> >> >> >> >>> >

>

> >> >> >> >>> Note that the above sentence is an admitted lie.

>

> >> >> >> >>> > It follows that if (1) is true, then so is (2).

>

> >> >> >> >>> Nope.

>

> >> >> >> >> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence the car sitting

> >> >> >> >> there

> >> >> >> >> inert, so (2) would be true.

>

> >> >> >> > Until the key is turned in the ignition.

>

> >> >> >> > If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly false.

>

> >> >> >> Look, are you trying, in your own stupid and inept way, to get me

> >> >> >> to

> >> >> >> say

> >> >> >> that there are properties that have no effect on the behavior of

> >> >> >> the

> >> >> >> thing

> >> >> >> they're a property of? Well that's a big yes! Of COURSE there are

> >> >> >> properties

> >> >> >> that have no effect on behavior. Your example of the serial number,

> >> >> >> for

> >> >> >> example.

>

> >> >> >> So what?

>

> >> >> >> Are you dishonestly trying to equate the irrelevant-to-behavior

> >> >> >> aspect

> >> >> >> of

> >> >> >> a

> >> >> >> serial number to the crucial-to-behavior aspect of subjective

> >> >> >> experience?

> >> >> >> If

> >> >> >> you were honest, your examples would be either the car's elecrtical

> >> >> >> system

> >> >> >> compared to subjective experience, or a serial number compared to a

> >> >> >> tattoo.

> >> >> >> The effects of subjective experience on behavior are not subtle,

> >> >> >> and

> >> >> >> do

> >> >> >> not

> >> >> >> conceptually map to the irrelevancy of a serial number.

>

> >> >> >> I think that subjective experience is the action of physical matter

> >> >> >> in

> >> >> >> physical brains following the laws of physics. The subjective

> >> >> >> experience

> >> >> >> is

> >> >> >> not apart from that physical action. Subjective Experience is

> >> >> >> simply a

> >> >> >> name

> >> >> >> we apply to a certain catagory of physical actions found in brains.

> >> >> >> It

> >> >> >> is

> >> >> >> a

> >> >> >> subset, not an "extra thing", somehow apart from the normal

> >> >> >> operation

> >> >> >> of

> >> >> >> the

> >> >> >> brain. It IS the normal operation of the brain.

>

> >> >> >> If you remove it from the operation of the brain, you would expect

> >> >> >> radically

> >> >> >> different behavior, just like you would expect if you ripped out

> >> >> >> crucial

> >> >> >> subroutines from a computer program. Without subjective experience,

> >> >> >> the

> >> >> >> human brain is no longer operating normally, even though it is

> >> >> >> still,

> >> >> >> of

> >> >> >> course, operating according to the laws of physics.

>

> >> >> >> I know it was pointless of me to type

>

> >> >> > Subjective experiences are a label to what you actually consciously

> >> >> > experience.

>

> >> >> Which is matter in the brain operating according to physical law.

>

> >> >> > That the brain is directly responsible for them is an

> >> >> > assertion.

>

> >> >> No, it's a conclusion based on evidence. If you physically manipulate

> >> >> the

> >> >> brain, you manipulate consciousness.

>

> >> >> > I can't say it is an explanation, as there could be no

> >> >> > explanation from your perspective why any physical activity would be

> >> >> > subjectively experienced, or why it wasn't just fluctuations of the

> >> >> > colour green for example, the brightness dependent on the amount of

> >> >> > neurons firing. Nothing in your perspective would know what the

> >> >> > neuron

> >> >> > state represented.

>

> >> >> That's where your ability to communicate breaks down entirely. What

> >> >> the

> >> >> fuck

> >> >> are you babbling about? "Fluctuations of the color green"? Are you on

> >> >> drugs?

>

> >> >> > The point was that even if you wanted to believe in the story that

> >> >> > we

> >> >> > were simply biological mechanisms, and that our subjective

> >> >> > experiences

> >> >> > were an emergent property of the brain. The emergent property

> >> >> > couldn't

> >> >> > be said to be influential in behaviour due to:

>

> >> >> I was right, you're going to ignore what I post and write your fucking

> >> >> formula again.

>

> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question.

>

> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>

> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> >> >> Then P and/or B has to be pretty fucking trivial. Like a serial

> >> >> number,

> >> >> or

> >> >> being inert.

>

> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else

> >> >> > the

> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>

> >> >> Yeah, you can concoct a scenario that fulfills these criteria. Big

> >> >> deal.

>

> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>

> >> >> Suppose I agree. So what? This little formula cannot be applied to

> >> >> non-trivial properties and behaviors. If the property is non-trivial,

> >> >> then

> >> >> it will affect behavior, and your formula cannot be applied.

>

> >> >> So, how DO you deal with properties that DO affect behavior? Do you

> >> >> just

> >> >> pretend they don't exist?

>

> >> >> > The story that our subjective experiences have no influence on our

> >> >> > behaviour is implausible,

>

> >> >> From my perspective, you've been arguing against that. I think that

> >> >> subjective experience influences our behavior.

>

> >> >> > even though you bet your soul on it, unable

> >> >> > to see through the deception, and still cling to it, even if you

> >> >> > have

> >> >> > to disingeniously misunderstand.

>

> >> >> You have not demonstrated that.

>

> >> >> > That you can't face that you were

> >> >> > wrong, and that you are shown to be so through reason, appears to me

> >> >> > as pathetic.

>

> >> >> Or perhaps it's you that's completely wrong. Have you even considered

> >> >> the

> >> >> possibility?

>

> >> >> I'm guessing not.

>

> >> > It is implausible that we simply are a biological mechanism simply

> >> > following the laws of physics. For that reason alone I could know I

> >> > wasn't wrong.

>

> >> So you determine if you're right about something based on nothing but

> >> arbitrary feelings?

>

> >> That explains a lot.

>

> >> > It is implausible, because it would require our behaviour, including

> >> > even questioning whether a robot had subjective experiences, would be

> >> > uninfluenced by us having subjective experiences. This is shown by:

>

> >> No, it's influenced by subjective experience.

>

> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

> >> > P refers to the a property in question.

>

> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>

> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>

> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>

> >> Lets see if we can apply this stupidity to something that affects

> >> behavior.

> >> Can you apply it to reflexes? Oops, no, there's a difference in behavior

> >> if

> >> you have reflexes compared to you not having reflexes. If you can't apply

> >> your little formula to reflexes, what makes you think you can apply it to

> >> consciousness?

>

> >> > Without the assertion that we were a biological mechanism simply

> >> > following the laws of physics, there would be no reason to assume

> >> > anything following the laws of physics subjectively experienced,

>

> >> I'm a biological mechanism simply following the laws of physics and I

> >> subjectively experience, therefore I conclude that biological mechanisms

> >> following the laws of can subjectively experience.

>

> >> > therefore what reason would the biological mechanism (if the assertion

> >> > were made) have for considering such a thing uninfluenced by it having

> >> > subjective experiences.

>

> >> This one doesn't. This one observes that it's subjective experiences

> >> influence its behavior.

>

> >> > You were wrong get used to it. Stop being so pathetic about it.

>

> >> You're not stating my position. Why would your criticizism of a position

> >> I

> >> do not hold show that I am wrong?

>

> > If you changed the property to one that behaviour couldn't be

> > explained without knowledge of, then (1) wouldn't be true.

>

> Which means you can't apply your formula to reflexes, right?

>

> So why do you think you can apply it to consciousness? The behaviors of

> conscious and unconscious things, in real life, is pretty fucking different.

> The unconscious ones lie inert while the conscious ones run about. According

> to (1) of your formula, you can't apply it to consciousness.

>

> > You have already admitted that though you could know the mechanism of

> > the robot (and therefore be able to explain its behaviour) you

> > wouldn't have knowledge of whether it has subjective experiences or

> > not. I asked you before:

>

> Is this an argument about my state of ignorance concerning if something is

> conscious or not?

>

> That has fuck-all to do with anything. My state of ignorance has nothing to

> do with whether something is conscious or not, or what the source of that

> consciousnsess is.

>

> > ------------

> > Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, one thing

> > you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective experiences or

> > not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in your

> > knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact.

> > ------------

>

> > To which you replied:

> > ------------

> > I fucking understand that you twit.

> > ------------

>

> > The question is can you face the truth, or are you going to continue

> > to grasp at straws, hoping that they will enable you to avoid it,

> > instead of making you look more and more pathetic.

>

> The truth would be that if it acts like it's conscious, I'll call it

> conscious. That's my prerogative.

>

 

The point was outlined in the reason, you are unable to face:

 

M refers to the physical entity in question.

B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

P refers to the a property in question.

 

Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

and P is the same in (1) and (2).

 

1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

knowledge of whether it has P or not.

 

2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

 

If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

 

So with the robot, since it's behaviour can be explained without

requiring knowledge of whether it is conscious or not, whether it is

or not couldn't be influencing its behaviour, no more than it could

influence ours, if we were simply a biological mechanism following the

laws of physics. It is implausible that we are, for reasons given to

you before.

 

You can choose to be totally illogical if you like, and to not face

reason. Though you won't be experiencing the physical world forever,

and you'll regret your choice.

Guest Matt Silberstein
Posted

On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 09:25:37 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

<glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> in

<1181579137.739488.112960@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>On 11 Jun, 15:40, Matt Silberstein

><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

>> On Fri, 08 Jun 2007 18:47:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

>> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>>

>>

>>

>>

>>

>> <1181353677.705831.281...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>> >On 8 Jun, 18:57, Lisbeth Andersson <lis...@bredband.net> wrote:

>> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote innews:1181311994.969146.270290@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com:

>>

>> >> <....>

>>

>> >> > I think it is better for you to understand the implausibility of

>> >> > the story that we are simply a biological mechanism following the

>> >> > known laws of physics, before discussing the retreated to

>> >> > position that maybe the configuration or complexity freed it from

>> >> > the known laws of physics, but that there were still only a

>> >> > physical mechanism.

>>

>> >> I'm more interested in how the unknown laws of physics fit into your

>> >> worldwiev.

>>

>> >What makes you think there are any unknown laws of physics which have

>> >any noticable influence on behaviour other than at the subatomic or

>> >cosmic scale? When was the last time we found anything that didn't

>> >follow the known laws of physics?

>>

>> I would say Dark Matter and Dark Energy are the latest.

>>

>> >I'm more interested whether you understood the point that was made

>> >(and you snipped), or is it a secret?

>>

>

>Are they cases of something not following the laws of physics, or

>things which the of are noticed, but that there is no explanation to

>what is causing the effects?

 

They were things that did not follow the laws of physics as we knew

them .

 

--

Matt Silberstein

 

Do something today about the Darfur Genocide

 

http://www.beawitness.org

http://www.darfurgenocide.org

http://www.savedarfur.org

 

"Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop"

Guest someone2
Posted

On 11 Jun, 19:16, Matt Silberstein

<RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 09:25:37 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

>

>

>

>

> <1181579137.739488.112...@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> >On 11 Jun, 15:40, Matt Silberstein

> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> >> On Fri, 08 Jun 2007 18:47:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> >> <1181353677.705831.281...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> >> >On 8 Jun, 18:57, Lisbeth Andersson <lis...@bredband.net> wrote:

> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote innews:1181311994.969146.270290@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com:

>

> >> >> <....>

>

> >> >> > I think it is better for you to understand the implausibility of

> >> >> > the story that we are simply a biological mechanism following the

> >> >> > known laws of physics, before discussing the retreated to

> >> >> > position that maybe the configuration or complexity freed it from

> >> >> > the known laws of physics, but that there were still only a

> >> >> > physical mechanism.

>

> >> >> I'm more interested in how the unknown laws of physics fit into your

> >> >> worldwiev.

>

> >> >What makes you think there are any unknown laws of physics which have

> >> >any noticable influence on behaviour other than at the subatomic or

> >> >cosmic scale? When was the last time we found anything that didn't

> >> >follow the known laws of physics?

>

> >> I would say Dark Matter and Dark Energy are the latest.

>

> >> >I'm more interested whether you understood the point that was made

> >> >(and you snipped), or is it a secret?

>

> >Are they cases of something not following the laws of physics, or

> >things which the of are noticed, but that there is no explanation to

> >what is causing the effects?

>

> They were things that did not follow the laws of physics as we knew

> them .

>

 

Ah ok, what new laws of physics did we find?

 

Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?:

 

M refers to the physical entity in question.

B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

P refers to the a property in question.

 

Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

and P is the same in (1) and (2).

 

1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

knowledge of whether it has P or not.

 

2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

 

If (1) is true, then (2) is true

Guest Fred Stone
Posted

"Denis Loubet" <dloubet@io.com> wrote in

news:eKydnQPc-fgs7_DbnZ2dnUVZ_hKdnZ2d@io.com:

>

> "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message

> news:1181516565.111157.262690@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...

>>I snipped the lot, as it had got so long had to download it as html,

>> to even read your response.

>>

>> Your last response was:

>> ---------

>> What? Driving is not part of the behavior of a car?

>>

>> I'll have to remember that.

>> ---------

>>

>> Again what I was saying went over your head. Given the following.

>>

>> M refers to the physical entity in question.

>> B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>> P refers to the a property in question.

>>

>> Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

>> and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>>

>> 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

>> knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>>

>> 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

>> explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>>

>> If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>>

>> You had suggested an example written over 2 parts:

>> ----------

>> The car sits there inert, according to the laws of physics. Doesn't

>> matter if there's gas in the tank or not.

>> ----------

>> ----------

>> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is exactly the same as a car

>> with gas in the tank. Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to buy

>> gas again! I can drive around with or without gas. Yup, your example

>> sure matches reality. Not.

>> ----------

>>

>> To which I pointed out:

>> ----------

>> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence the car sitting there

>> inert, so (2) would be true.

>> ----------

>>

>> To which you replied:

>> ----------

>> Until the key is turned in the ignition.

>> If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly false.

>> ----------

>>

>> To which I explained:

>> ----------

>> Then you would have changed B(M) and so (1) would no longer be true,

>> as you couldn't explain the behaviour without knowledge of gas being

>> in the tank.

>> ----------

>>

>> To which in your last reply you wrote:

>> ----------

>> What? Driving is not part of the behavior of a car?

>>

>> I'll have to remember that.

>> ----------

>>

>> It has nothing to do with driving, it is to do with you changed B(M).

>> The engine running, when you turn the ignition, is not explainable

>> without knowledge of whether there is petrol in the tank, therefore

>> (1) wouldn't be true, and then neither would (2). You keep trying to

>> either change M, B(M) or P so that they are not the same in both (1)

>> and (2). Which is pointless, as the whole point is that if (1) is

>> true, then (2) is true, when M is the same in both (1) and (2), B(M)

>> is the same in both (1) and (2), and P is the same in both (1) and

>> (2). Are you having problems facing it?

>

> So your little formula cannot be applied to the property of gas in the

> tank and the behavior following the turn of the ignition key.

>

> That's a pretty lame formula. What good is it?

>

 

It's good for confusing the issue and for convincing people who are as

stupid as Glenn is.

 

--

Fred Stone

aa# 1369

"When they put out that deadline, people realized that we were going to

lose," said an aide to an anti-war lawmaker. "Everything after that

seemed like posturing."

 

--

Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com

Guest Denis Loubet
Posted

"someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1181583039.890628.118980@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...

> On 11 Jun, 18:23, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> news:1181581549.652693.254210@q66g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> > On 11 Jun, 16:43, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> >>news:1181517234.889369.239710@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> > On 11 Jun, 00:05, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> >> >>news:1181514806.543814.218460@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> >> > On 10 Jun, 20:36, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> >> >> "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote in message

>>

>> >> >> >>news:FNednZ5aMcoN3PHbnZ2dnUVZ_tmknZ2d@io.com...

>>

>> >> >> >> > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>> >> >> >> >news:1181471104.632034.40450@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...

>> >> >> >> >> On 10 Jun, 03:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> >> >> >>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> >> >> >> >>>news:1181440301.918077.327620@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> > On 10 Jun, 02:15, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> >> >> >>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in

>> >> >> >> >>> >> message

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >>news:1181417934.359700.133760@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > On 9 Jun, 08:25, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> message

>>

>> >> >> > (snipped some of the older stuff)

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Can you understand the following:

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > physics

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > reference requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A)

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > not.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Let's see, can I explain the behavior of my car

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> without

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> knowing

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> if

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> it

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> has

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank or not by the laws of physics? Yes, I

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explain

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> both

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behaviors, and one of them will be correct.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Therefore

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not affect the

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > behaviour

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > M,

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Well, personally I think gas in the tank radically

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> affects

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> my car.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > else the explanation of behaviour could not be the

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > same

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > with

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without P(A)

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> The behavior of my car with gas in the tank is

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explainable

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> by

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> laws

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> physics, as is the behavior of my car without gas in

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> tank.

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> But

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> somehow I

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> only get places I need to get to in air-conditioned

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> comfort

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank. That's very different behavior from

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> isn't

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the tank.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Gosh! How very odd! It seems your point 2 is

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> completely

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> wrong

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> on

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> such

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> a

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> basic level that it's hard to comprehend how you can

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> function

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> society

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> at

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> all.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I take it you don't own a car? Please tell me you

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> don't.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > You can substitute whatever physical entity that

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > strictly

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > follows

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > known laws of physics for M, and any property for

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > which

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A)

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > where

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > (1)

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > would be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2).

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> My car says you're just plain stupid.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > Your reponses have a certain entertainment value I

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > guess.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > Let me put it another way:

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> No, why don't you address it the way you put it?

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> And the way I answered it?

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you too stupid or afraid to?

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you a moron, a coward, or both?

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> My car!

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> It gets me to my destination in air-conditioned comfort!

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > P refers to the a property in question.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> Gas in the tank!

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > requiring

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> My car employs the laws of physics to get me to my

>> >> >> >> >>> >> destination

>> >> >> >> >>> >> in

>> >> >> >> >>> >> air-conditioned comfort!

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect B(M), else

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > the

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > without

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > P.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> Oddly, that doesn't match reality at all! When there's no

>> >> >> >> >>> >> gas

>> >> >> >> >>> >> in

>> >> >> >> >>> >> the

>> >> >> >> >>> >> tank

>> >> >> >> >>> >> of

>> >> >> >> >>> >> my car, I DON'T get to my destination in air conditioned

>> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort!

>> >> >> >> >>> >> My

>> >> >> >> >>> >> car

>> >> >> >> >>> >> just sits there following the laws of physics.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> Bummer!

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > if (1) is true, then so is (2)

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> My car still says you're just plain stupid.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > the

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > same

>> >> >> >> >>> >> >

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> How can my car, getting somewhere in air conditioned

>> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort,

>> >> >> >> >>> >> and

>> >> >> >> >>> >> gas

>> >> >> >> >>> >> in

>> >> >> >> >>> >> the

>> >> >> >> >>> >> tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > To give you an example, just to make sure you have no

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > excuses

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > for

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretending you can't grasp the point, and are

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > misunderstanding

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > it:

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = a car

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = its serial number

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > Which means:

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > the

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > laws

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > of

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > serial

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > number

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > or not.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > the

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > car

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > parked

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > with its engine running, else the explanation of

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > behaviour

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > could

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > not

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > be the same with or without a serial number.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> But if the situation is:

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = my car

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = gas in the tank

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> Then suddenly your formula fails! Once the gas runs out,

>> >> >> >> >>> >> the

>> >> >> >> >>> >> car

>> >> >> >> >>> >> no

>> >> >> >> >>> >> longer

>> >> >> >> >>> >> has a running engine.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > Since (1) is true, so is (2).

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> Not if there's no gas in the tank.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > So though I have tried to plug up the holes where you

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > might

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > try

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > to

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretend to misunderstand, your ability to, still does

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > give

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > you

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > some

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > artistic scope for disingenuity, which I'm sure you

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > will

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > use

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > if

>> >> >> >> >>> >> > able.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> >> You're so stupid, my car is embarrassed for you.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> > I pointed out:

>> >> >> >> >>> > -------------

>> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are the

>> >> >> >> >>> > same

>> >> >> >> >>> >

>> >> >> >> >>> > -------------

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> > To which you replied:

>> >> >> >> >>> > -------------

>> >> >> >> >>> > How can my car, getting somewhere in air conditioned

>> >> >> >> >>> > comfort,

>> >> >> >> >>> > and

>> >> >> >> >>> > gas

>> >> >> >> >>> > in the tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid.

>> >> >> >> >>> > -------------

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> > I assume this was just another example of your

>> >> >> >> >>> > disingenious

>> >> >> >> >>> > creativity. M isn't the same as B(M) which isn't the same

>> >> >> >> >>> > as

>> >> >> >> >>> > P.

>> >> >> >> >>> > It

>> >> >> >> >>> > is

>> >> >> >> >>> > that M mentioned in (1) is the same as M mentioned in (2),

>> >> >> >> >>> > and

>> >> >> >> >>> > B(M)

>> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned in (1) is the same as B(M) mentioned in (2), and

>> >> >> >> >>> > P

>> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned

>> >> >> >> >>> > in (1) is the same as P mentioned in (2).

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> > If you can now understand this, you can see if (2) wasn't

>> >> >> >> >>> > true,

>> >> >> >> >>> > because there was no gas in the tank, then (1) couldn't

>> >> >> >> >>> > have

>> >> >> >> >>> > been

>> >> >> >> >>> > true, as it getting you to your destination in air

>> >> >> >> >>> > couldn't

>> >> >> >> >>> > be

>> >> >> >> >>> > explained without gas in the tank.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> > You'll notice it also gets through your usual well

>> >> >> >> >>> > polished

>> >> >> >> >>> > deception

>> >> >> >> >>> > in that it applies to and physical entity that strictly

>> >> >> >> >>> > follows

>> >> >> >> >>> > the

>> >> >> >> >>> > laws of physics, and doesn't require a comparison entity.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> > So here it is again, and hopefully you won't simply be

>> >> >> >> >>> > grasping

>> >> >> >> >>> > at

>> >> >> >> >>> > ways to misinterpret what is being said, but actually face

>> >> >> >> >>> > reason

>> >> >> >> >>> > for

>> >> >> >> >>> > once.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> My car.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> It's sitting there inert.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> > P refers to the a property in question.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> Gas in the tank.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without

>> >> >> >> >>> > requiring

>> >> >> >> >>> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> The car sits there inert, according to the laws of physics.

>> >> >> >> >>> Doesn't

>> >> >> >> >>> matter

>> >> >> >> >>> if there's gas in the tank or not.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect B(M), else

>> >> >> >> >>> > the

>> >> >> >> >>> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or

>> >> >> >> >>> > without

>> >> >> >> >>> > P.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is exactly the same as

>> >> >> >> >>> a

>> >> >> >> >>> car

>> >> >> >> >>> with

>> >> >> >> >>> gas

>> >> >> >> >>> in the tank.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to buy gas again! I

>> >> >> >> >>> can

>> >> >> >> >>> drive

>> >> >> >> >>> around

>> >> >> >> >>> with or without gas.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> Yup, your example sure matches reality.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> Not.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are the

>> >> >> >> >>> > same

>> >> >> >> >>> >

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> Note that the above sentence is an admitted lie.

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> > It follows that if (1) is true, then so is (2).

>>

>> >> >> >> >>> Nope.

>>

>> >> >> >> >> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence the car sitting

>> >> >> >> >> there

>> >> >> >> >> inert, so (2) would be true.

>>

>> >> >> >> > Until the key is turned in the ignition.

>>

>> >> >> >> > If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly false.

>>

>> >> >> >> Look, are you trying, in your own stupid and inept way, to get

>> >> >> >> me

>> >> >> >> to

>> >> >> >> say

>> >> >> >> that there are properties that have no effect on the behavior of

>> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> thing

>> >> >> >> they're a property of? Well that's a big yes! Of COURSE there

>> >> >> >> are

>> >> >> >> properties

>> >> >> >> that have no effect on behavior. Your example of the serial

>> >> >> >> number,

>> >> >> >> for

>> >> >> >> example.

>>

>> >> >> >> So what?

>>

>> >> >> >> Are you dishonestly trying to equate the irrelevant-to-behavior

>> >> >> >> aspect

>> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> a

>> >> >> >> serial number to the crucial-to-behavior aspect of subjective

>> >> >> >> experience?

>> >> >> >> If

>> >> >> >> you were honest, your examples would be either the car's

>> >> >> >> elecrtical

>> >> >> >> system

>> >> >> >> compared to subjective experience, or a serial number compared

>> >> >> >> to a

>> >> >> >> tattoo.

>> >> >> >> The effects of subjective experience on behavior are not subtle,

>> >> >> >> and

>> >> >> >> do

>> >> >> >> not

>> >> >> >> conceptually map to the irrelevancy of a serial number.

>>

>> >> >> >> I think that subjective experience is the action of physical

>> >> >> >> matter

>> >> >> >> in

>> >> >> >> physical brains following the laws of physics. The subjective

>> >> >> >> experience

>> >> >> >> is

>> >> >> >> not apart from that physical action. Subjective Experience is

>> >> >> >> simply a

>> >> >> >> name

>> >> >> >> we apply to a certain catagory of physical actions found in

>> >> >> >> brains.

>> >> >> >> It

>> >> >> >> is

>> >> >> >> a

>> >> >> >> subset, not an "extra thing", somehow apart from the normal

>> >> >> >> operation

>> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> brain. It IS the normal operation of the brain.

>>

>> >> >> >> If you remove it from the operation of the brain, you would

>> >> >> >> expect

>> >> >> >> radically

>> >> >> >> different behavior, just like you would expect if you ripped out

>> >> >> >> crucial

>> >> >> >> subroutines from a computer program. Without subjective

>> >> >> >> experience,

>> >> >> >> the

>> >> >> >> human brain is no longer operating normally, even though it is

>> >> >> >> still,

>> >> >> >> of

>> >> >> >> course, operating according to the laws of physics.

>>

>> >> >> >> I know it was pointless of me to type

>>

>> >> >> > Subjective experiences are a label to what you actually

>> >> >> > consciously

>> >> >> > experience.

>>

>> >> >> Which is matter in the brain operating according to physical law.

>>

>> >> >> > That the brain is directly responsible for them is an

>> >> >> > assertion.

>>

>> >> >> No, it's a conclusion based on evidence. If you physically

>> >> >> manipulate

>> >> >> the

>> >> >> brain, you manipulate consciousness.

>>

>> >> >> > I can't say it is an explanation, as there could be no

>> >> >> > explanation from your perspective why any physical activity would

>> >> >> > be

>> >> >> > subjectively experienced, or why it wasn't just fluctuations of

>> >> >> > the

>> >> >> > colour green for example, the brightness dependent on the amount

>> >> >> > of

>> >> >> > neurons firing. Nothing in your perspective would know what the

>> >> >> > neuron

>> >> >> > state represented.

>>

>> >> >> That's where your ability to communicate breaks down entirely. What

>> >> >> the

>> >> >> fuck

>> >> >> are you babbling about? "Fluctuations of the color green"? Are you

>> >> >> on

>> >> >> drugs?

>>

>> >> >> > The point was that even if you wanted to believe in the story

>> >> >> > that

>> >> >> > we

>> >> >> > were simply biological mechanisms, and that our subjective

>> >> >> > experiences

>> >> >> > were an emergent property of the brain. The emergent property

>> >> >> > couldn't

>> >> >> > be said to be influential in behaviour due to:

>>

>> >> >> I was right, you're going to ignore what I post and write your

>> >> >> fucking

>> >> >> formula again.

>>

>> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

>> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question.

>>

>> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and

>> >> >> > (2),

>> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>>

>> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

>> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>>

>> >> >> Then P and/or B has to be pretty fucking trivial. Like a serial

>> >> >> number,

>> >> >> or

>> >> >> being inert.

>>

>> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else

>> >> >> > the

>> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>>

>> >> >> Yeah, you can concoct a scenario that fulfills these criteria. Big

>> >> >> deal.

>>

>> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>>

>> >> >> Suppose I agree. So what? This little formula cannot be applied to

>> >> >> non-trivial properties and behaviors. If the property is

>> >> >> non-trivial,

>> >> >> then

>> >> >> it will affect behavior, and your formula cannot be applied.

>>

>> >> >> So, how DO you deal with properties that DO affect behavior? Do you

>> >> >> just

>> >> >> pretend they don't exist?

>>

>> >> >> > The story that our subjective experiences have no influence on

>> >> >> > our

>> >> >> > behaviour is implausible,

>>

>> >> >> From my perspective, you've been arguing against that. I think that

>> >> >> subjective experience influences our behavior.

>>

>> >> >> > even though you bet your soul on it, unable

>> >> >> > to see through the deception, and still cling to it, even if you

>> >> >> > have

>> >> >> > to disingeniously misunderstand.

>>

>> >> >> You have not demonstrated that.

>>

>> >> >> > That you can't face that you were

>> >> >> > wrong, and that you are shown to be so through reason, appears to

>> >> >> > me

>> >> >> > as pathetic.

>>

>> >> >> Or perhaps it's you that's completely wrong. Have you even

>> >> >> considered

>> >> >> the

>> >> >> possibility?

>>

>> >> >> I'm guessing not.

>>

>> >> > It is implausible that we simply are a biological mechanism simply

>> >> > following the laws of physics. For that reason alone I could know I

>> >> > wasn't wrong.

>>

>> >> So you determine if you're right about something based on nothing but

>> >> arbitrary feelings?

>>

>> >> That explains a lot.

>>

>> >> > It is implausible, because it would require our behaviour, including

>> >> > even questioning whether a robot had subjective experiences, would

>> >> > be

>> >> > uninfluenced by us having subjective experiences. This is shown by:

>>

>> >> No, it's influenced by subjective experience.

>>

>> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

>> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>> >> > P refers to the a property in question.

>>

>> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

>> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>>

>> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

>> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>>

>> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else

>> >> > the

>> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>>

>> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>>

>> >> Lets see if we can apply this stupidity to something that affects

>> >> behavior.

>> >> Can you apply it to reflexes? Oops, no, there's a difference in

>> >> behavior

>> >> if

>> >> you have reflexes compared to you not having reflexes. If you can't

>> >> apply

>> >> your little formula to reflexes, what makes you think you can apply it

>> >> to

>> >> consciousness?

>>

>> >> > Without the assertion that we were a biological mechanism simply

>> >> > following the laws of physics, there would be no reason to assume

>> >> > anything following the laws of physics subjectively experienced,

>>

>> >> I'm a biological mechanism simply following the laws of physics and I

>> >> subjectively experience, therefore I conclude that biological

>> >> mechanisms

>> >> following the laws of can subjectively experience.

>>

>> >> > therefore what reason would the biological mechanism (if the

>> >> > assertion

>> >> > were made) have for considering such a thing uninfluenced by it

>> >> > having

>> >> > subjective experiences.

>>

>> >> This one doesn't. This one observes that it's subjective experiences

>> >> influence its behavior.

>>

>> >> > You were wrong get used to it. Stop being so pathetic about it.

>>

>> >> You're not stating my position. Why would your criticizism of a

>> >> position

>> >> I

>> >> do not hold show that I am wrong?

>>

>> > If you changed the property to one that behaviour couldn't be

>> > explained without knowledge of, then (1) wouldn't be true.

>>

>> Which means you can't apply your formula to reflexes, right?

>>

>> So why do you think you can apply it to consciousness? The behaviors of

>> conscious and unconscious things, in real life, is pretty fucking

>> different.

>> The unconscious ones lie inert while the conscious ones run about.

>> According

>> to (1) of your formula, you can't apply it to consciousness.

>>

>> > You have already admitted that though you could know the mechanism of

>> > the robot (and therefore be able to explain its behaviour) you

>> > wouldn't have knowledge of whether it has subjective experiences or

>> > not. I asked you before:

>>

>> Is this an argument about my state of ignorance concerning if something

>> is

>> conscious or not?

>>

>> That has fuck-all to do with anything. My state of ignorance has nothing

>> to

>> do with whether something is conscious or not, or what the source of that

>> consciousnsess is.

>>

>> > ------------

>> > Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, one thing

>> > you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective experiences or

>> > not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in your

>> > knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact.

>> > ------------

>>

>> > To which you replied:

>> > ------------

>> > I fucking understand that you twit.

>> > ------------

>>

>> > The question is can you face the truth, or are you going to continue

>> > to grasp at straws, hoping that they will enable you to avoid it,

>> > instead of making you look more and more pathetic.

>>

>> The truth would be that if it acts like it's conscious, I'll call it

>> conscious. That's my prerogative.

>>

>

> The point was outlined in the reason, you are unable to face:

>

> M refers to the physical entity in question.

> B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

> P refers to the a property in question.

>

> Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

> and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>

> 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

> explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>

> If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>

> So with the robot, since it's behaviour can be explained without

> requiring knowledge of whether it is conscious or not,

 

Ok, you asked for it.

 

B(M) is not same for conscious vs unconscious robots.

 

So your formula does not apply.

 

If you have a robot that you say is not conscious, yet in all respects acts

as if it is, then there is consciousness involved. The mechanism doesn't

matter.

 

Consider, if the robot is just a clever tape recorder specifically

programmed to answer my likely questions, then some conscious entity had to

program it and record the responses. THAT'S the conscious entity I'm talking

to via the robot. The robot is only the middle-man between me and another

consciousness. I may confuse the robot for the conscious entity, but that

doesn't mean I'm not talking to another consciousness.

 

It's the same with any elaborate Eliza program you might want to construct.

I'm talking to the programmer through the robot, even though the programmer

may be long dead.

 

And if you arrive at the robot through no artifice, meaning that it is

constructed by unconscious nature with no intent, then by what authority do

you declare it non-conscious if it acts like it is?

> whether it is

> or not couldn't be influencing its behaviour,

 

But since it is influencing its behavior, your formula does not apply.

> no more than it could

> influence ours, if we were simply a biological mechanism following the

> laws of physics...

 

....with consciousness as part of that biological mechanism influencing the

behavior.

> It is implausible that we are, for reasons given to

> you before.

 

And your formula is as inapplicable as before.

> You can choose to be totally illogical if you like, and to not face

> reason. Though you won't be experiencing the physical world forever,

> and you'll regret your choice.

 

And if you're wrong, which is always possible, your continued insistence

that this is the case is nothing more than your arrogant self-absorption

talking.

 

 

--

Denis Loubet

dloubet@io.com

http//www.io.com/~dloubet

Guest Matt Silberstein
Posted

On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

<glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> in

<1181590197.482419.50740@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote:

 

[snip]

>Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?:

>

>M refers to the physical entity in question.

>B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>P refers to the a property in question.

>

>Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

>and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>

>1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

>knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

>2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

>explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>

>If (1) is true, then (2) is true

 

I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a class

of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But that is a

minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that (1) reasonably

captures a physical understanding of human behavior and subjective

experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see take the existence

of SE as a given and work to explain that existence. So, while I think

your argument here is wrong, I think the argument itself does not

meaningfully relate to a physicalist (not scientism) theory of the

mind.

 

--

Matt Silberstein

 

Do something today about the Darfur Genocide

 

http://www.beawitness.org

http://www.darfurgenocide.org

http://www.savedarfur.org

 

"Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop"

Guest Fred Stone
Posted

someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in

news:1181593745.206175.160780@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com:

> On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein

> <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

>> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

>> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>>

>> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>>

>> [snip]

>>

>>

>>

>>

>>

>> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?:

>>

>> >M refers to the physical entity in question.

>> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>> >P refers to the a property in question.

>>

>> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

>> >and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>>

>> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

>> >knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>>

>> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else

>> >the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without

>> >P.

>>

>> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true

>>

>> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a class

>> of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But that is a

>> minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that (1) reasonably

>> captures a physical understanding of human behavior and subjective

>> experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see take the

>> existence of SE as a given and work to explain that existence. So,

>> while I think your argument here is wrong, I think the argument

>> itself does not meaningfully relate to a physicalist (not scientism)

>> theory of the mind.

>>

>

> It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to point

> out why it isn't.

 

You have avoided seeing every attempt to point out why it isn't.

> Yes you are right that subjective experiences do

> influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to consider

> whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion (which is shown

> to be implausible)

 

You keep repeating that assertion, but you are assuming your conclusion.

 

--

Fred Stone

aa# 1369

"When they put out that deadline, people realized that we were going to

lose," said an aide to an anti-war lawmaker. "Everything after that

seemed like posturing."

 

--

Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com

Guest someone2
Posted

On 11 Jun, 20:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> news:1181583039.890628.118980@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...

>

> > On 11 Jun, 18:23, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> >>news:1181581549.652693.254210@q66g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...

>

> >> > On 11 Jun, 16:43, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> >> >>news:1181517234.889369.239710@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 00:05, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> >> >> >>news:1181514806.543814.218460@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> >> >> >> > On 10 Jun, 20:36, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> >> >> >> "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote in message

>

> >> >> >> >>news:FNednZ5aMcoN3PHbnZ2dnUVZ_tmknZ2d@io.com...

>

> >> >> >> >> > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

> >> >> >> >> >news:1181471104.632034.40450@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...

> >> >> >> >> >> On 10 Jun, 03:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> >> >> >> >>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> >> >> >> >> >>>news:1181440301.918077.327620@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> > On 10 Jun, 02:15, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> message

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >>news:1181417934.359700.133760@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > On 9 Jun, 08:25, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> message

>

> >> >> >> > (snipped some of the older stuff)

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Can you understand the following:

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > physics

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > reference requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A)

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > not.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Let's see, can I explain the behavior of my car

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> without

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> knowing

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> if

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> it

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> has

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank or not by the laws of physics? Yes, I

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explain

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> both

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behaviors, and one of them will be correct.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Therefore

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not affect the

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > behaviour

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > M,

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Well, personally I think gas in the tank radically

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> affects

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> my car.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > else the explanation of behaviour could not be the

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > same

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > with

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without P(A)

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> The behavior of my car with gas in the tank is

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explainable

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> by

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> laws

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> physics, as is the behavior of my car without gas in

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> tank.

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> But

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> somehow I

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> only get places I need to get to in air-conditioned

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> comfort

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank. That's very different behavior from

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> isn't

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the tank.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Gosh! How very odd! It seems your point 2 is

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> completely

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> wrong

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> on

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> such

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> a

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> basic level that it's hard to comprehend how you can

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> function

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> society

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> at

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> all.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I take it you don't own a car? Please tell me you

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> don't.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > You can substitute whatever physical entity that

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > strictly

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > follows

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > known laws of physics for M, and any property for

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > which

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A)

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > where

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > (1)

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > would be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2).

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> My car says you're just plain stupid.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Your reponses have a certain entertainment value I

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > guess.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Let me put it another way:

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> No, why don't you address it the way you put it?

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> And the way I answered it?

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you too stupid or afraid to?

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you a moron, a coward, or both?

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car!

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> It gets me to my destination in air-conditioned comfort!

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P refers to the a property in question.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Gas in the tank!

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > requiring

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car employs the laws of physics to get me to my

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> destination

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> air-conditioned comfort!

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect B(M), else

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > without

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Oddly, that doesn't match reality at all! When there's no

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> of

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> my car, I DON'T get to my destination in air conditioned

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort!

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> just sits there following the laws of physics.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Bummer!

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if (1) is true, then so is (2)

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car still says you're just plain stupid.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > same

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> How can my car, getting somewhere in air conditioned

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort,

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> and

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > To give you an example, just to make sure you have no

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > excuses

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > for

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretending you can't grasp the point, and are

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > misunderstanding

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > it:

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = a car

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = its serial number

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Which means:

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > laws

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > of

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > serial

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > number

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or not.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > car

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > parked

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > with its engine running, else the explanation of

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > behaviour

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > could

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > not

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > be the same with or without a serial number.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> But if the situation is:

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = my car

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = gas in the tank

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Then suddenly your formula fails! Once the gas runs out,

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> longer

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> has a running engine.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Since (1) is true, so is (2).

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Not if there's no gas in the tank.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > So though I have tried to plug up the holes where you

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > might

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > try

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > to

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretend to misunderstand, your ability to, still does

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > give

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > some

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > artistic scope for disingenuity, which I'm sure you

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > will

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > use

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > able.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> >> You're so stupid, my car is embarrassed for you.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> > I pointed out:

> >> >> >> >> >>> > -------------

> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are the

> >> >> >> >> >>> > same

> >> >> >> >> >>> >

> >> >> >> >> >>> > -------------

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> > To which you replied:

> >> >> >> >> >>> > -------------

> >> >> >> >> >>> > How can my car, getting somewhere in air conditioned

> >> >> >> >> >>> > comfort,

> >> >> >> >> >>> > and

> >> >> >> >> >>> > gas

> >> >> >> >> >>> > in the tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid.

> >> >> >> >> >>> > -------------

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> > I assume this was just another example of your

> >> >> >> >> >>> > disingenious

> >> >> >> >> >>> > creativity. M isn't the same as B(M) which isn't the same

> >> >> >> >> >>> > as

> >> >> >> >> >>> > P.

> >> >> >> >> >>> > It

> >> >> >> >> >>> > is

> >> >> >> >> >>> > that M mentioned in (1) is the same as M mentioned in (2),

> >> >> >> >> >>> > and

> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M)

> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned in (1) is the same as B(M) mentioned in (2), and

> >> >> >> >> >>> > P

> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned

> >> >> >> >> >>> > in (1) is the same as P mentioned in (2).

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> > If you can now understand this, you can see if (2) wasn't

> >> >> >> >> >>> > true,

> >> >> >> >> >>> > because there was no gas in the tank, then (1) couldn't

> >> >> >> >> >>> > have

> >> >> >> >> >>> > been

> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, as it getting you to your destination in air

> >> >> >> >> >>> > couldn't

> >> >> >> >> >>> > be

> >> >> >> >> >>> > explained without gas in the tank.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> > You'll notice it also gets through your usual well

> >> >> >> >> >>> > polished

> >> >> >> >> >>> > deception

> >> >> >> >> >>> > in that it applies to and physical entity that strictly

> >> >> >> >> >>> > follows

> >> >> >> >> >>> > the

> >> >> >> >> >>> > laws of physics, and doesn't require a comparison entity.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> > So here it is again, and hopefully you won't simply be

> >> >> >> >> >>> > grasping

> >> >> >> >> >>> > at

> >> >> >> >> >>> > ways to misinterpret what is being said, but actually face

> >> >> >> >> >>> > reason

> >> >> >> >> >>> > for

> >> >> >> >> >>> > once.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> My car.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> It's sitting there inert.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> > P refers to the a property in question.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> Gas in the tank.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without

> >> >> >> >> >>> > requiring

> >> >> >> >> >>> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> The car sits there inert, according to the laws of physics.

> >> >> >> >> >>> Doesn't

> >> >> >> >> >>> matter

> >> >> >> >> >>> if there's gas in the tank or not.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect B(M), else

> >> >> >> >> >>> > the

> >> >> >> >> >>> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or

> >> >> >> >> >>> > without

> >> >> >> >> >>> > P.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is exactly the same as

> >> >> >> >> >>> a

> >> >> >> >> >>> car

> >> >> >> >> >>> with

> >> >> >> >> >>> gas

> >> >> >> >> >>> in the tank.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to buy gas again! I

> >> >> >> >> >>> can

> >> >> >> >> >>> drive

> >> >> >> >> >>> around

> >> >> >> >> >>> with or without gas.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> Yup, your example sure matches reality.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> Not.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are the

> >> >> >> >> >>> > same

> >> >> >> >> >>> >

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> Note that the above sentence is an admitted lie.

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> > It follows that if (1) is true, then so is (2).

>

> >> >> >> >> >>> Nope.

>

> >> >> >> >> >> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence the car sitting

> >> >> >> >> >> there

> >> >> >> >> >> inert, so (2) would be true.

>

> >> >> >> >> > Until the key is turned in the ignition.

>

> >> >> >> >> > If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly false.

>

> >> >> >> >> Look, are you trying, in your own stupid and inept way, to get

> >> >> >> >> me

> >> >> >> >> to

> >> >> >> >> say

> >> >> >> >> that there are properties that have no effect on the behavior of

> >> >> >> >> the

> >> >> >> >> thing

> >> >> >> >> they're a property of? Well that's a big yes! Of COURSE there

> >> >> >> >> are

> >> >> >> >> properties

> >> >> >> >> that have no effect on behavior. Your example of the serial

> >> >> >> >> number,

> >> >> >> >> for

> >> >> >> >> example.

>

> >> >> >> >> So what?

>

> >> >> >> >> Are you dishonestly trying to equate the irrelevant-to-behavior

> >> >> >> >> aspect

> >> >> >> >> of

> >> >> >> >> a

> >> >> >> >> serial number to the crucial-to-behavior aspect of subjective

> >> >> >> >> experience?

> >> >> >> >> If

> >> >> >> >> you were honest, your examples would be either the car's

> >> >> >> >> elecrtical

> >> >> >> >> system

> >> >> >> >> compared to subjective experience, or a serial number compared

> >> >> >> >> to a

> >> >> >> >> tattoo.

> >> >> >> >> The effects of subjective experience on behavior are not subtle,

> >> >> >> >> and

> >> >> >> >> do

> >> >> >> >> not

> >> >> >> >> conceptually map to the irrelevancy of a serial number.

>

> >> >> >> >> I think that subjective experience is the action of physical

> >> >> >> >> matter

> >> >> >> >> in

> >> >> >> >> physical brains following the laws of physics. The subjective

> >> >> >> >> experience

> >> >> >> >> is

> >> >> >> >> not apart from that physical action. Subjective Experience is

> >> >> >> >> simply a

> >> >> >> >> name

> >> >> >> >> we apply to a certain catagory of physical actions found in

> >> >> >> >> brains.

> >> >> >> >> It

> >> >> >> >> is

> >> >> >> >> a

> >> >> >> >> subset, not an "extra thing", somehow apart from the normal

> >> >> >> >> operation

> >> >> >> >> of

> >> >> >> >> the

> >> >> >> >> brain. It IS the normal operation of the brain.

>

> >> >> >> >> If you remove it from the operation of the brain, you would

> >> >> >> >> expect

> >> >> >> >> radically

> >> >> >> >> different behavior, just like you would expect if you ripped out

> >> >> >> >> crucial

> >> >> >> >> subroutines from a computer program. Without subjective

> >> >> >> >> experience,

> >> >> >> >> the

> >> >> >> >> human brain is no longer operating normally, even though it is

> >> >> >> >> still,

> >> >> >> >> of

> >> >> >> >> course, operating according to the laws of physics.

>

> >> >> >> >> I know it was pointless of me to type

>

> >> >> >> > Subjective experiences are a label to what you actually

> >> >> >> > consciously

> >> >> >> > experience.

>

> >> >> >> Which is matter in the brain operating according to physical law.

>

> >> >> >> > That the brain is directly responsible for them is an

> >> >> >> > assertion.

>

> >> >> >> No, it's a conclusion based on evidence. If you physically

> >> >> >> manipulate

> >> >> >> the

> >> >> >> brain, you manipulate consciousness.

>

> >> >> >> > I can't say it is an explanation, as there could be no

> >> >> >> > explanation from your perspective why any physical activity would

> >> >> >> > be

> >> >> >> > subjectively experienced, or why it wasn't just fluctuations of

> >> >> >> > the

> >> >> >> > colour green for example, the brightness dependent on the amount

> >> >> >> > of

> >> >> >> > neurons firing. Nothing in your perspective would know what the

> >> >> >> > neuron

> >> >> >> > state represented.

>

> >> >> >> That's where your ability to communicate breaks down entirely. What

> >> >> >> the

> >> >> >> fuck

> >> >> >> are you babbling about? "Fluctuations of the color green"? Are you

> >> >> >> on

> >> >> >> drugs?

>

> >> >> >> > The point was that even if you wanted to believe in the story

> >> >> >> > that

> >> >> >> > we

> >> >> >> > were simply biological mechanisms, and that our subjective

> >> >> >> > experiences

> >> >> >> > were an emergent property of the brain. The emergent property

> >> >> >> > couldn't

> >> >> >> > be said to be influential in behaviour due to:

>

> >> >> >> I was right, you're going to ignore what I post and write your

> >> >> >> fucking

> >> >> >> formula again.

>

> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question.

>

> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and

> >> >> >> > (2),

> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>

> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> >> >> >> Then P and/or B has to be pretty fucking trivial. Like a serial

> >> >> >> number,

> >> >> >> or

> >> >> >> being inert.

>

> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else

> >> >> >> > the

> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>

> >> >> >> Yeah, you can concoct a scenario that fulfills these criteria. Big

> >> >> >> deal.

>

> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>

> >> >> >> Suppose I agree. So what? This little formula cannot be applied to

> >> >> >> non-trivial properties and behaviors. If the property is

> >> >> >> non-trivial,

> >> >> >> then

> >> >> >> it will affect behavior, and your formula cannot be applied.

>

> >> >> >> So, how DO you deal with properties that DO affect behavior? Do you

> >> >> >> just

> >> >> >> pretend they don't exist?

>

> >> >> >> > The story that our subjective experiences have no influence on

> >> >> >> > our

> >> >> >> > behaviour is implausible,

>

> >> >> >> From my perspective, you've been arguing against that. I think that

> >> >> >> subjective experience influences our behavior.

>

> >> >> >> > even though you bet your soul on it, unable

> >> >> >> > to see through the deception, and still cling to it, even if you

> >> >> >> > have

> >> >> >> > to disingeniously misunderstand.

>

> >> >> >> You have not demonstrated that.

>

> >> >> >> > That you can't face that you were

> >> >> >> > wrong, and that you are shown to be so through reason, appears to

> >> >> >> > me

> >> >> >> > as pathetic.

>

> >> >> >> Or perhaps it's you that's completely wrong. Have you even

> >> >> >> considered

> >> >> >> the

> >> >> >> possibility?

>

> >> >> >> I'm guessing not.

>

> >> >> > It is implausible that we simply are a biological mechanism simply

> >> >> > following the laws of physics. For that reason alone I could know I

> >> >> > wasn't wrong.

>

> >> >> So you determine if you're right about something based on nothing but

> >> >> arbitrary feelings?

>

> >> >> That explains a lot.

>

> >> >> > It is implausible, because it would require our behaviour, including

> >> >> > even questioning whether a robot had subjective experiences, would

> >> >> > be

> >> >> > uninfluenced by us having subjective experiences. This is shown by:

>

> >> >> No, it's influenced by subjective experience.

>

> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question.

>

> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>

> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else

> >> >> > the

> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>

> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>

> >> >> Lets see if we can apply this stupidity to something that affects

> >> >> behavior.

> >> >> Can you apply it to reflexes? Oops, no, there's a difference in

> >> >> behavior

> >> >> if

> >> >> you have reflexes compared to you not having reflexes. If you can't

> >> >> apply

> >> >> your little formula to reflexes, what makes you think you can apply it

> >> >> to

> >> >> consciousness?

>

> >> >> > Without the assertion that we were a biological mechanism simply

> >> >> > following the laws of physics, there would be no reason to assume

> >> >> > anything following the laws of physics subjectively experienced,

>

> >> >> I'm a biological mechanism simply following the laws of physics and I

> >> >> subjectively experience, therefore I conclude that biological

> >> >> mechanisms

> >> >> following the laws of can subjectively experience.

>

> >> >> > therefore what reason would the biological mechanism (if the

> >> >> > assertion

> >> >> > were made) have for considering such a thing uninfluenced by it

> >> >> > having

> >> >> > subjective experiences.

>

> >> >> This one doesn't. This one observes that it's subjective experiences

> >> >> influence its behavior.

>

> >> >> > You were wrong get used to it. Stop being so pathetic about it.

>

> >> >> You're not stating my position. Why would your criticizism of a

> >> >> position

> >> >> I

> >> >> do not hold show that I am wrong?

>

> >> > If you changed the property to one that behaviour couldn't be

> >> > explained without knowledge of, then (1) wouldn't be true.

>

> >> Which means you can't apply your formula to reflexes, right?

>

> >> So why do you think you can apply it to consciousness? The behaviors of

> >> conscious and unconscious things, in real life, is pretty fucking

> >> different.

> >> The unconscious ones lie inert while the conscious ones run about.

> >> According

> >> to (1) of your formula, you can't apply it to consciousness.

>

> >> > You have already admitted that though you could know the mechanism of

> >> > the robot (and therefore be able to explain its behaviour) you

> >> > wouldn't have knowledge of whether it has subjective experiences or

> >> > not. I asked you before:

>

> >> Is this an argument about my state of ignorance concerning if something

> >> is

> >> conscious or not?

>

> >> That has fuck-all to do with anything. My state of ignorance has nothing

> >> to

> >> do with whether something is conscious or not, or what the source of that

> >> consciousnsess is.

>

> >> > ------------

> >> > Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, one thing

> >> > you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective experiences or

> >> > not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in your

> >> > knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact.

> >> > ------------

>

> >> > To which you replied:

> >> > ------------

> >> > I fucking understand that you twit.

> >> > ------------

>

> >> > The question is can you face the truth, or are you going to continue

> >> > to grasp at straws, hoping that they will enable you to avoid it,

> >> > instead of making you look more and more pathetic.

>

> >> The truth would be that if it acts like it's conscious, I'll call it

> >> conscious. That's my prerogative.

>

> > The point was outlined in the reason, you are unable to face:

>

> > M refers to the physical entity in question.

> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

> > P refers to the a property in question.

>

> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

> > and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>

> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>

> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>

> > So with the robot, since it's behaviour can be explained without

> > requiring knowledge of whether it is conscious or not,

>

> Ok, you asked for it.

>

> B(M) is not same for conscious vs unconscious robots.

>

> So your formula does not apply.

>

> If you have a robot that you say is not conscious, yet in all respects acts

> as if it is, then there is consciousness involved. The mechanism doesn't

> matter.

>

> Consider, if the robot is just a clever tape recorder specifically

> programmed to answer my likely questions, then some conscious entity had to

> program it and record the responses. THAT'S the conscious entity I'm talking

> to via the robot. The robot is only the middle-man between me and another

> consciousness. I may confuse the robot for the conscious entity, but that

> doesn't mean I'm not talking to another consciousness.

>

> It's the same with any elaborate Eliza program you might want to construct.

> I'm talking to the programmer through the robot, even though the programmer

> may be long dead.

>

> And if you arrive at the robot through no artifice, meaning that it is

> constructed by unconscious nature with no intent, then by what authority do

> you declare it non-conscious if it acts like it is?

>

> > whether it is

> > or not couldn't be influencing its behaviour,

>

> But since it is influencing its behavior, your formula does not apply.

>

> > no more than it could

> > influence ours, if we were simply a biological mechanism following the

> > laws of physics...

>

> ...with consciousness as part of that biological mechanism influencing the

> behavior.

>

> > It is implausible that we are, for reasons given to

> > you before.

>

> And your formula is as inapplicable as before.

>

> > You can choose to be totally illogical if you like, and to not face

> > reason. Though you won't be experiencing the physical world forever,

> > and you'll regret your choice.

>

> And if you're wrong, which is always possible, your continued insistence

> that this is the case is nothing more than your arrogant self-absorption

> talking.

>

 

The formula doesn't require a comparitive entity. It can be used in

regards to any physical entity. You keep trying to talk about two

different mechanisms, and say well they act differently, but that is

like talking about a car and a toaster, and saying well the car has a

numberplate, and they act differently so the number plate is

influential. You need to face that the formula is true, and can be

shown to be so, when you stop trying to make B(M) or P different

between (1) and (2). Basically it cuts through the deception that you

were fooled by.

Guest someone2
Posted

On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein

<RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>

> [snip]

>

>

>

>

>

> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?:

>

> >M refers to the physical entity in question.

> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

> >P refers to the a property in question.

>

> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

> >and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>

> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> >knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

> >explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>

> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true

>

> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a class

> of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But that is a

> minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that (1) reasonably

> captures a physical understanding of human behavior and subjective

> experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see take the existence

> of SE as a given and work to explain that existence. So, while I think

> your argument here is wrong, I think the argument itself does not

> meaningfully relate to a physicalist (not scientism) theory of the

> mind.

>

 

It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to point

out why it isn't. Yes you are right that subjective experiences do

influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to consider

whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion (which is shown

to be implausible) that we are simply a biological mechanism following

the laws of physics, then you would have no reason to think that any

physical mechanism following the laws of physics had subjective

experiences.

Guest someone2
Posted

On 11 Jun, 20:31, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote:

> "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote innews:eKydnQPc-fgs7_DbnZ2dnUVZ_hKdnZ2d@io.com:

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

> > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

> >news:1181516565.111157.262690@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...

> >>I snipped the lot, as it had got so long had to download it as html,

> >> to even read your response.

>

> >> Your last response was:

> >> ---------

> >> What? Driving is not part of the behavior of a car?

>

> >> I'll have to remember that.

> >> ---------

>

> >> Again what I was saying went over your head. Given the following.

>

> >> M refers to the physical entity in question.

> >> B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

> >> P refers to the a property in question.

>

> >> Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

> >> and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>

> >> 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> >> knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> >> 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

> >> explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>

> >> If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>

> >> You had suggested an example written over 2 parts:

> >> ----------

> >> The car sits there inert, according to the laws of physics. Doesn't

> >> matter if there's gas in the tank or not.

> >> ----------

> >> ----------

> >> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is exactly the same as a car

> >> with gas in the tank. Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to buy

> >> gas again! I can drive around with or without gas. Yup, your example

> >> sure matches reality. Not.

> >> ----------

>

> >> To which I pointed out:

> >> ----------

> >> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence the car sitting there

> >> inert, so (2) would be true.

> >> ----------

>

> >> To which you replied:

> >> ----------

> >> Until the key is turned in the ignition.

> >> If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly false.

> >> ----------

>

> >> To which I explained:

> >> ----------

> >> Then you would have changed B(M) and so (1) would no longer be true,

> >> as you couldn't explain the behaviour without knowledge of gas being

> >> in the tank.

> >> ----------

>

> >> To which in your last reply you wrote:

> >> ----------

> >> What? Driving is not part of the behavior of a car?

>

> >> I'll have to remember that.

> >> ----------

>

> >> It has nothing to do with driving, it is to do with you changed B(M).

> >> The engine running, when you turn the ignition, is not explainable

> >> without knowledge of whether there is petrol in the tank, therefore

> >> (1) wouldn't be true, and then neither would (2). You keep trying to

> >> either change M, B(M) or P so that they are not the same in both (1)

> >> and (2). Which is pointless, as the whole point is that if (1) is

> >> true, then (2) is true, when M is the same in both (1) and (2), B(M)

> >> is the same in both (1) and (2), and P is the same in both (1) and

> >> (2). Are you having problems facing it?

>

> > So your little formula cannot be applied to the property of gas in the

> > tank and the behavior following the turn of the ignition key.

>

> > That's a pretty lame formula. What good is it?

>

> It's good for confusing the issue and for convincing people who are as

> stupid as Glenn is.

>

 

It points out that if a robot following the known laws of physics was

regarded by some as acting in a way that might suggest to them that it

has subjective experiences, that whether it does or not, couldn't be

influencing its behaviour. The same would apply to us if we were

simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, as it

would mean that if it was fully known how the biological mechanism

worked, it could be explained without knowledge of whether we were

subjectively experiencing or not (i.e. (1) would be true). Therefore

(2) would be true, and it would mean that our behaviour would be

uninfluenced by our subjective experiences. It obviously is as why

else would the biological mechanism question whether the robot might

have subjective experiences or not.

 

Therefore it is shown that the assertion that we are simply a

biological mechanism following the laws of physics is implausible.

Something the atheists thought would never happen, because they didn't

realise they had been fooled by deceptive reasoning, which can and has

been shown to be so. Some atheists here are having a problem taking in

that they have been shown to be wrong beyond reasonable doubt. You

would think that if they had been led away from God by what they

thought was reason, they could be led back again, but there is the

problem of them getting over the hurdle of their ego, they would

rather deny a reasoned truth, than face that they were wrong. Yet who

did they ever think they were to say that they knew God didn't exist?

Beings with big egos that's for sure, which as said, is why they are

having such a problem comprehending they were wrong and it is has been

shown.

Guest Matt Silberstein
Posted

On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 09:35:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , jientho@aol.com

in <1181579719.193969.12530@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>On Jun 11, 10:43 am, Matt Silberstein

><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

>> On Sat, 09 Jun 2007 12:02:52 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

>> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>>

>> <1181415772.483273.54...@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>>

>> [snip]

>>

>> >It had nothing to do with determinism.

>>

>> >The reasoning is summarised below, but was outlined in more depth in

>> >the part of the post you snipped.

>>

>> >1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics without

>> >requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not.

>>

>> >Therefore

>>

>> >2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not influence the behaviour of M,

>> >else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or

>> >without P(A)

>>

>> >You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly follows the

>> >known laws of physics for M, and any property for P(A) where (1) would

>> >be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2).

>>

>> But the counter argument is that P(A) is an aspect of the behavior to

>> explain.

>

>Then you have simply rejected premise (1) of the argument --

>explanation of the behavior of M requires knowledge of whether it has

>P(A).

 

Not quite. I would say that AFAICT I would include SE as part of my

discussion of the behavior. I would end up describing the SE as

internal state and processes. So I don't need a priori knowledge that

the SE exists, but it does seem sufficiently important to the

individual that no description of behavior would work without taking

it into account.

 

(Note that the related question of the behavior of groups does not

require knowledge of the SE of the individual.)

 

>

>> More to the point I would argue that we can't explain M

>> without having P(A) as part of the description and the explanation.

>

>The counter to your counter would go: what evidence have you that

>subjective experience is found anywhere in the laws of physics? Are

>you relying on a Schroedinger's Cat thought-experiment (which is not

>evidence by itself btw) or something?

 

I rely on the large number of experiences we have with physical

actions affecting internal states. I rely on the enormous number of

neurological experiments showing physical actions affect subjective

experience.

 

--

Matt Silberstein

 

Do something today about the Darfur Genocide

 

http://www.beawitness.org

http://www.darfurgenocide.org

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Guest someone2
Posted

On 11 Jun, 21:38, Matt Silberstein

<RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 09:35:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com

>

>

>

>

>

> in <1181579719.193969.12...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> >On Jun 11, 10:43 am, Matt Silberstein

> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> >> On Sat, 09 Jun 2007 12:02:52 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> >> <1181415772.483273.54...@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>

> >> [snip]

>

> >> >It had nothing to do with determinism.

>

> >> >The reasoning is summarised below, but was outlined in more depth in

> >> >the part of the post you snipped.

>

> >> >1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics without

> >> >requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not.

>

> >> >Therefore

>

> >> >2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not influence the behaviour of M,

> >> >else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or

> >> >without P(A)

>

> >> >You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly follows the

> >> >known laws of physics for M, and any property for P(A) where (1) would

> >> >be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2).

>

> >> But the counter argument is that P(A) is an aspect of the behavior to

> >> explain.

>

> >Then you have simply rejected premise (1) of the argument --

> >explanation of the behavior of M requires knowledge of whether it has

> >P(A).

>

> Not quite. I would say that AFAICT I would include SE as part of my

> discussion of the behavior. I would end up describing the SE as

> internal state and processes. So I don't need a priori knowledge that

> the SE exists, but it does seem sufficiently important to the

> individual that no description of behavior would work without taking

> it into account.

>

> (Note that the related question of the behavior of groups does not

> require knowledge of the SE of the individual.)

>

>

>

> >> More to the point I would argue that we can't explain M

> >> without having P(A) as part of the description and the explanation.

>

> >The counter to your counter would go: what evidence have you that

> >subjective experience is found anywhere in the laws of physics? Are

> >you relying on a Schroedinger's Cat thought-experiment (which is not

> >evidence by itself btw) or something?

>

> I rely on the large number of experiences we have with physical

> actions affecting internal states. I rely on the enormous number of

> neurological experiments showing physical actions affect subjective

> experience.

>

 

With a robot though you can surely see that its behaviour could be

explained without knowledge of whether it had subjective experiences

or not, and therefore, as shown, whether it did or didn't that

particular property couldn't be said to be influential. Is it that you

were sure that you would never be shown to be wrong causing you a

problem in facing that it has happened?

Guest someone2
Posted

On 11 Jun, 20:52, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote:

> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote innews:1181593745.206175.160780@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com:

>

>

>

>

>

> > On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein

> > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> >> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>

> >> [snip]

>

> >> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?:

>

> >> >M refers to the physical entity in question.

> >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

> >> >P refers to the a property in question.

>

> >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

> >> >and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>

> >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else

> >> >the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without

> >> >P.

>

> >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true

>

> >> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a class

> >> of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But that is a

> >> minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that (1) reasonably

> >> captures a physical understanding of human behavior and subjective

> >> experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see take the

> >> existence of SE as a given and work to explain that existence. So,

> >> while I think your argument here is wrong, I think the argument

> >> itself does not meaningfully relate to a physicalist (not scientism)

> >> theory of the mind.

>

> > It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to point

> > out why it isn't.

>

> You have avoided seeing every attempt to point out why it isn't.

>

> > Yes you are right that subjective experiences do

> > influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to consider

> > whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion (which is shown

> > to be implausible)

>

> You keep repeating that assertion, but you are assuming your conclusion.

>

 

Where has it been pointed out where it isn't correct. Attempts where

you change either B(M) or P between (1) and (2) obviously don't count,

as it only applies where B(M) and P are the same between (1) and (2).

Attempts so far have been shown to be deceptively attempting to do

this. Perhaps you'd care to give an example where it wouldn't be true.

Guest Matt Silberstein
Posted

On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 13:46:24 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

<glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> in

<1181594784.494509.169550@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>On 11 Jun, 21:38, Matt Silberstein

><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

>> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 09:35:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com

>>

>>

>>

>>

>>

>> in <1181579719.193969.12...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>> >On Jun 11, 10:43 am, Matt Silberstein

>> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

>> >> On Sat, 09 Jun 2007 12:02:52 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

>> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>>

>> >> <1181415772.483273.54...@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>>

>> >> [snip]

>>

>> >> >It had nothing to do with determinism.

>>

>> >> >The reasoning is summarised below, but was outlined in more depth in

>> >> >the part of the post you snipped.

>>

>> >> >1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics without

>> >> >requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not.

>>

>> >> >Therefore

>>

>> >> >2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not influence the behaviour of M,

>> >> >else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or

>> >> >without P(A)

>>

>> >> >You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly follows the

>> >> >known laws of physics for M, and any property for P(A) where (1) would

>> >> >be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2).

>>

>> >> But the counter argument is that P(A) is an aspect of the behavior to

>> >> explain.

>>

>> >Then you have simply rejected premise (1) of the argument --

>> >explanation of the behavior of M requires knowledge of whether it has

>> >P(A).

>>

>> Not quite. I would say that AFAICT I would include SE as part of my

>> discussion of the behavior. I would end up describing the SE as

>> internal state and processes. So I don't need a priori knowledge that

>> the SE exists, but it does seem sufficiently important to the

>> individual that no description of behavior would work without taking

>> it into account.

>>

>> (Note that the related question of the behavior of groups does not

>> require knowledge of the SE of the individual.)

>>

>>

>>

>> >> More to the point I would argue that we can't explain M

>> >> without having P(A) as part of the description and the explanation.

>>

>> >The counter to your counter would go: what evidence have you that

>> >subjective experience is found anywhere in the laws of physics? Are

>> >you relying on a Schroedinger's Cat thought-experiment (which is not

>> >evidence by itself btw) or something?

>>

>> I rely on the large number of experiences we have with physical

>> actions affecting internal states. I rely on the enormous number of

>> neurological experiments showing physical actions affect subjective

>> experience.

>>

>

>With a robot though you can surely see that its behaviour could be

>explained without knowledge of whether it had subjective experiences

>or not,

 

I don't see why. My claim, in fact, is that if a robot acts

sufficiently human for me to think it has subjective experience then

it probably does have subjective experience. Why don't you tell me why

you know that we can explain the robot behavior without referring to

SE.

>and therefore, as shown, whether it did or didn't that

>particular property couldn't be said to be influential. Is it that you

>were sure that you would never be shown to be wrong causing you a

>problem in facing that it has happened?

 

No.

--

Matt Silberstein

 

Do something today about the Darfur Genocide

 

http://www.beawitness.org

http://www.darfurgenocide.org

http://www.savedarfur.org

 

"Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop"

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