Guest Matt Silberstein Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 13:29:05 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> in <1181593745.206175.160780@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: >On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> [snip] >> >> >> >> >> >> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?: >> >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), >> >and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the >> >explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. >> >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true >> >> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a class >> of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But that is a >> minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that (1) reasonably >> captures a physical understanding of human behavior and subjective >> experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see take the existence >> of SE as a given and work to explain that existence. So, while I think >> your argument here is wrong, I think the argument itself does not >> meaningfully relate to a physicalist (not scientism) theory of the >> mind. >> > >It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to point >out why it isn't. Yes you are right that subjective experiences do >influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to consider >whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion (which is shown >to be implausible) that we are simply a biological mechanism following >the laws of physics, then you would have no reason to think that any >physical mechanism following the laws of physics had subjective >experiences. Ok, Jientho, Glenn is just assuming the conclusion here. You have not shown it implausible that we are "just" biological mechanisms. That is not a logical a priori, it is an empirical claim to explore. All that I see in the world leads to me to conclude that we sure seem to be "just" biological entities. How else do you explain the various internal changes that come from external events? From strokes to tumors to the simply fact that my sense of self is affected by when and what I have eaten? -- Matt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" Quote
Guest jientho@aol.com Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 On Jun 11, 4:38 pm, Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 09:35:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com > > in <1181579719.193969.12...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >On Jun 11, 10:43 am, Matt Silberstein > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> On Sat, 09 Jun 2007 12:02:52 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> <1181415772.483273.54...@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > >> [snip] > > >> >It had nothing to do with determinism. > > >> >The reasoning is summarised below, but was outlined in more depth in > >> >the part of the post you snipped. > > >> >1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics without > >> >requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not. > > >> >Therefore > > >> >2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not influence the behaviour of M, > >> >else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or > >> >without P(A) > > >> >You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly follows the > >> >known laws of physics for M, and any property for P(A) where (1) would > >> >be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2). > > >> But the counter argument is that P(A) is an aspect of the behavior to > >> explain. > > >Then you have simply rejected premise (1) of the argument -- > >explanation of the behavior of M requires knowledge of whether it has > >P(A). > > Not quite. I would say that AFAICT I would include SE as part of my > discussion of the behavior. Any behavior? Like the behavior of your PC, say? You do realize the argument is a general one for any mechanism whose operation is fully explained by the laws of physics, right? I guess the question is, what are you talking about now? What behavior? (It seems that you might be trying to slip in an unwarranted exception for certain types of subjectively-judged behavior here.) > I would end up describing the SE as > internal state and processes. So I don't need a priori knowledge that > the SE exists, but it does seem sufficiently important to the > individual that no description of behavior would work without taking > it into account. The criterion (of whether to try to explain SE) is how important it seems to an individual?? What individual? How do you know how important SE seems to an individual (like e.g. your PC)? And could you possibly have anything more unscientific/unverifiable as a criterion? > (Note that the related question of the behavior of groups does not > require knowledge of the SE of the individual.) > > >> More to the point I would argue that we can't explain M > >> without having P(A) as part of the description and the explanation. > > >The counter to your counter would go: what evidence have you that > >subjective experience is found anywhere in the laws of physics? Are > >you relying on a Schroedinger's Cat thought-experiment (which is not > >evidence by itself btw) or something? > > I rely on the large number of experiences we have with physical > actions affecting internal states. I rely on the enormous number of > neurological experiments showing physical actions affect subjective > experience. That is evidence only for physical influence _on_ SE, not evidence at all that SE _is_ a part of the laws of physics. (Again, we are talking about explanations/influences _on_ physical behavior, not physical influences on subjective experience.) Jeff Quote
Guest Fred Stone Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in news:1181594307.325774.225710@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com: > On 11 Jun, 20:31, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote >> innews:eKydnQPc-fgs7_DbnZ2dnUVZ_hKdnZ2d@io.com: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >news:1181516565.111157.262690@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >>I snipped the lot, as it had got so long had to download it as >> >>html, >> >> to even read your response. >> >> >> Your last response was: >> >> --------- >> >> What? Driving is not part of the behavior of a car? >> >> >> I'll have to remember that. >> >> --------- >> >> >> Again what I was saying went over your head. Given the following. >> >> >> M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and >> >> (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> >> knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else >> >> the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without >> >> P. >> >> >> If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> >> You had suggested an example written over 2 parts: >> >> ---------- >> >> The car sits there inert, according to the laws of physics. >> >> Doesn't matter if there's gas in the tank or not. >> >> ---------- >> >> ---------- >> >> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is exactly the same as a car >> >> with gas in the tank. Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to >> >> buy gas again! I can drive around with or without gas. Yup, your >> >> example sure matches reality. Not. >> >> ---------- >> >> >> To which I pointed out: >> >> ---------- >> >> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence the car sitting >> >> there inert, so (2) would be true. >> >> ---------- >> >> >> To which you replied: >> >> ---------- >> >> Until the key is turned in the ignition. >> >> If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly false. >> >> ---------- >> >> >> To which I explained: >> >> ---------- >> >> Then you would have changed B(M) and so (1) would no longer be >> >> true, as you couldn't explain the behaviour without knowledge of >> >> gas being in the tank. >> >> ---------- >> >> >> To which in your last reply you wrote: >> >> ---------- >> >> What? Driving is not part of the behavior of a car? >> >> >> I'll have to remember that. >> >> ---------- >> >> >> It has nothing to do with driving, it is to do with you changed >> >> B(M). The engine running, when you turn the ignition, is not >> >> explainable without knowledge of whether there is petrol in the >> >> tank, therefore (1) wouldn't be true, and then neither would (2). >> >> You keep trying to either change M, B(M) or P so that they are not >> >> the same in both (1) and (2). Which is pointless, as the whole >> >> point is that if (1) is true, then (2) is true, when M is the same >> >> in both (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in both (1) and (2), and P >> >> is the same in both (1) and (2). Are you having problems facing >> >> it? >> >> > So your little formula cannot be applied to the property of gas in >> > the tank and the behavior following the turn of the ignition key. >> >> > That's a pretty lame formula. What good is it? >> >> It's good for confusing the issue and for convincing people who are >> as stupid as Glenn is. >> > > It points out that if a robot following the known laws of physics was > regarded by some as acting in a way that might suggest to them that it > has subjective experiences, that whether it does or not, couldn't be > influencing its behaviour. No, it does not point that out. It only points out what we already know, that you are incapable of constructing a decently challenging logical paradox. > The same would apply to us if we were > simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, as it > would mean that if it was fully known how the biological mechanism > worked, it could be explained without knowledge of whether we were > subjectively experiencing or not (i.e. (1) would be true). If we were not subjectively experiencing we would not be the same organism as if we were, therefore (1) would not be true, therefore your alleged demonstration is, once again, shown to be faulty. > Therefore > (2) would be true, and it would mean that our behaviour would be > uninfluenced by our subjective experiences. It obviously is as why > else would the biological mechanism question whether the robot might > have subjective experiences or not. > > Therefore it is shown that the assertion that we are simply a > biological mechanism following the laws of physics is implausible. Therefore you are still wasting all our time here. > Something the atheists thought would never happen, because they didn't > realise they had been fooled by deceptive reasoning, which can and has > been shown to be so. We're not fooled by your deceptive reasoning, Glenn. > Some atheists here are having a problem taking in > that they have been shown to be wrong beyond reasonable doubt. We're not having any problem showing that you are wrong beyond any shadow of a doubt. > You > would think that if they had been led away from God by what they > thought was reason, they could be led back again, but there is the > problem of them getting over the hurdle of their ego, they would > rather deny a reasoned truth, than face that they were wrong. Yet who > did they ever think they were to say that they knew God didn't exist? > Beings with big egos that's for sure, which as said, is why they are > having such a problem comprehending they were wrong and it is has been > shown. > Talk about big egos, you got it bad, Glenn, to think that you've managed to prove something with your pitifully bad logic. -- Fred Stone aa# 1369 "When they put out that deadline, people realized that we were going to lose," said an aide to an anti-war lawmaker. "Everything after that seemed like posturing." -- Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com Quote
Guest Denis Loubet Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181593524.600437.247290@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > On 11 Jun, 20:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1181583039.890628.118980@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> > On 11 Jun, 18:23, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >>news:1181581549.652693.254210@q66g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 16:43, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >>news:1181517234.889369.239710@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 00:05, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >>news:1181514806.543814.218460@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> > On 10 Jun, 20:36, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >>news:FNednZ5aMcoN3PHbnZ2dnUVZ_tmknZ2d@io.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >news:1181471104.632034.40450@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> On 10 Jun, 03:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >>> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >>>news:1181440301.918077.327620@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > On 10 Jun, 02:15, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>news:1181417934.359700.133760@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > On 9 Jun, 08:25, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> > (snipped some of the older stuff) >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Can you understand the following: >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > physics >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > reference requiring knowledge of whether it has >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A) >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Let's see, can I explain the behavior of my car >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> without >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> knowing >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> if >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> has >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank or not by the laws of physics? Yes, >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explain >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> both >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behaviors, and one of them will be correct. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Therefore >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not affect >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > M, >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Well, personally I think gas in the tank radically >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> affects >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> my car. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > else the explanation of behaviour could not be >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > same >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > with >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without P(A) >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> The behavior of my car with gas in the tank is >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explainable >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> by >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> laws >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> physics, as is the behavior of my car without gas >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> tank. >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> But >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> somehow I >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> only get places I need to get to in air-conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> comfort >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank. That's very different behavior >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> from >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> isn't >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Gosh! How very odd! It seems your point 2 is >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> completely >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> wrong >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> on >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> such >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> basic level that it's hard to comprehend how you >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> function >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> society >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> at >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> all. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I take it you don't own a car? Please tell me you >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> don't. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > You can substitute whatever physical entity that >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > strictly >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > follows >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > known laws of physics for M, and any property for >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > which >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A) >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > where >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > (1) >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > would be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> My car says you're just plain stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Your reponses have a certain entertainment value I >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > guess. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Let me put it another way: >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> No, why don't you address it the way you put it? >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> And the way I answered it? >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you too stupid or afraid to? >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you a moron, a coward, or both? >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car! >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> It gets me to my destination in air-conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort! >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Gas in the tank! >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > requiring >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car employs the laws of physics to get me to my >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> destination >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> air-conditioned comfort! >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect B(M), >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > else >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Oddly, that doesn't match reality at all! When there's >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> my car, I DON'T get to my destination in air >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort! >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> just sits there following the laws of physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Bummer! >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if (1) is true, then so is (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car still says you're just plain stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > same >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> How can my car, getting somewhere in air conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort, >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > To give you an example, just to make sure you have >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > no >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > excuses >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretending you can't grasp the point, and are >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > misunderstanding >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > it: >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = a car >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = its serial number >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Which means: >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > by >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > has a >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > serial >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > number >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > car >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > parked >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > with its engine running, else the explanation of >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > could >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > not >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > be the same with or without a serial number. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> But if the situation is: >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = my car >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = gas in the tank >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Then suddenly your formula fails! Once the gas runs >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> out, >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> longer >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> has a running engine. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Since (1) is true, so is (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Not if there's no gas in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > So though I have tried to plug up the holes where >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > might >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > try >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretend to misunderstand, your ability to, still >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > does >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > give >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > some >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > artistic scope for disingenuity, which I'm sure you >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > will >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > use >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > able. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> You're so stupid, my car is embarrassed for you. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > I pointed out: >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same >> >> >> >> >> >>> > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > To which you replied: >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >>> > How can my car, getting somewhere in air conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >>> > comfort, >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and >> >> >> >> >> >>> > gas >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in the tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > I assume this was just another example of your >> >> >> >> >> >>> > disingenious >> >> >> >> >> >>> > creativity. M isn't the same as B(M) which isn't the >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same >> >> >> >> >> >>> > as >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >>> > It >> >> >> >> >> >>> > is >> >> >> >> >> >>> > that M mentioned in (1) is the same as M mentioned in >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2), >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned in (1) is the same as B(M) mentioned in (2), >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in (1) is the same as P mentioned in (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > If you can now understand this, you can see if (2) >> >> >> >> >> >>> > wasn't >> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, >> >> >> >> >> >>> > because there was no gas in the tank, then (1) couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >>> > have >> >> >> >> >> >>> > been >> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, as it getting you to your destination in air >> >> >> >> >> >>> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >>> > be >> >> >> >> >> >>> > explained without gas in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > You'll notice it also gets through your usual well >> >> >> >> >> >>> > polished >> >> >> >> >> >>> > deception >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in that it applies to and physical entity that strictly >> >> >> >> >> >>> > follows >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >>> > laws of physics, and doesn't require a comparison >> >> >> >> >> >>> > entity. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > So here it is again, and hopefully you won't simply be >> >> >> >> >> >>> > grasping >> >> >> >> >> >>> > at >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ways to misinterpret what is being said, but actually >> >> >> >> >> >>> > face >> >> >> >> >> >>> > reason >> >> >> >> >> >>> > for >> >> >> >> >> >>> > once. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> My car. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> It's sitting there inert. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Gas in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without >> >> >> >> >> >>> > requiring >> >> >> >> >> >>> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> The car sits there inert, according to the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >>> physics. >> >> >> >> >> >>> Doesn't >> >> >> >> >> >>> matter >> >> >> >> >> >>> if there's gas in the tank or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect B(M), else >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >>> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or >> >> >> >> >> >>> > without >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is exactly the same >> >> >> >> >> >>> as >> >> >> >> >> >>> a >> >> >> >> >> >>> car >> >> >> >> >> >>> with >> >> >> >> >> >>> gas >> >> >> >> >> >>> in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to buy gas again! >> >> >> >> >> >>> I >> >> >> >> >> >>> can >> >> >> >> >> >>> drive >> >> >> >> >> >>> around >> >> >> >> >> >>> with or without gas. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Yup, your example sure matches reality. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same >> >> >> >> >> >>> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Note that the above sentence is an admitted lie. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > It follows that if (1) is true, then so is (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Nope. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence the car >> >> >> >> >> >> sitting >> >> >> >> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >> inert, so (2) would be true. >> >> >> >> >> >> > Until the key is turned in the ignition. >> >> >> >> >> >> > If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly false. >> >> >> >> >> >> Look, are you trying, in your own stupid and inept way, to >> >> >> >> >> get >> >> >> >> >> me >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> say >> >> >> >> >> that there are properties that have no effect on the behavior >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> thing >> >> >> >> >> they're a property of? Well that's a big yes! Of COURSE there >> >> >> >> >> are >> >> >> >> >> properties >> >> >> >> >> that have no effect on behavior. Your example of the serial >> >> >> >> >> number, >> >> >> >> >> for >> >> >> >> >> example. >> >> >> >> >> >> So what? >> >> >> >> >> >> Are you dishonestly trying to equate the >> >> >> >> >> irrelevant-to-behavior >> >> >> >> >> aspect >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> serial number to the crucial-to-behavior aspect of subjective >> >> >> >> >> experience? >> >> >> >> >> If >> >> >> >> >> you were honest, your examples would be either the car's >> >> >> >> >> elecrtical >> >> >> >> >> system >> >> >> >> >> compared to subjective experience, or a serial number >> >> >> >> >> compared >> >> >> >> >> to a >> >> >> >> >> tattoo. >> >> >> >> >> The effects of subjective experience on behavior are not >> >> >> >> >> subtle, >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> do >> >> >> >> >> not >> >> >> >> >> conceptually map to the irrelevancy of a serial number. >> >> >> >> >> >> I think that subjective experience is the action of physical >> >> >> >> >> matter >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> physical brains following the laws of physics. The subjective >> >> >> >> >> experience >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> not apart from that physical action. Subjective Experience is >> >> >> >> >> simply a >> >> >> >> >> name >> >> >> >> >> we apply to a certain catagory of physical actions found in >> >> >> >> >> brains. >> >> >> >> >> It >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> subset, not an "extra thing", somehow apart from the normal >> >> >> >> >> operation >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> brain. It IS the normal operation of the brain. >> >> >> >> >> >> If you remove it from the operation of the brain, you would >> >> >> >> >> expect >> >> >> >> >> radically >> >> >> >> >> different behavior, just like you would expect if you ripped >> >> >> >> >> out >> >> >> >> >> crucial >> >> >> >> >> subroutines from a computer program. Without subjective >> >> >> >> >> experience, >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> human brain is no longer operating normally, even though it >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> still, >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> course, operating according to the laws of physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> I know it was pointless of me to type >> >> >> >> >> > Subjective experiences are a label to what you actually >> >> >> >> > consciously >> >> >> >> > experience. >> >> >> >> >> Which is matter in the brain operating according to physical >> >> >> >> law. >> >> >> >> >> > That the brain is directly responsible for them is an >> >> >> >> > assertion. >> >> >> >> >> No, it's a conclusion based on evidence. If you physically >> >> >> >> manipulate >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> brain, you manipulate consciousness. >> >> >> >> >> > I can't say it is an explanation, as there could be no >> >> >> >> > explanation from your perspective why any physical activity >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> > subjectively experienced, or why it wasn't just fluctuations >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> > colour green for example, the brightness dependent on the >> >> >> >> > amount >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> > neurons firing. Nothing in your perspective would know what >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> > neuron >> >> >> >> > state represented. >> >> >> >> >> That's where your ability to communicate breaks down entirely. >> >> >> >> What >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> fuck >> >> >> >> are you babbling about? "Fluctuations of the color green"? Are >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> on >> >> >> >> drugs? >> >> >> >> >> > The point was that even if you wanted to believe in the story >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> > we >> >> >> >> > were simply biological mechanisms, and that our subjective >> >> >> >> > experiences >> >> >> >> > were an emergent property of the brain. The emergent property >> >> >> >> > couldn't >> >> >> >> > be said to be influential in behaviour due to: >> >> >> >> >> I was right, you're going to ignore what I post and write your >> >> >> >> fucking >> >> >> >> formula again. >> >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> > (2), >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> Then P and/or B has to be pretty fucking trivial. Like a serial >> >> >> >> number, >> >> >> >> or >> >> >> >> being inert. >> >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), >> >> >> >> > else >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without >> >> >> >> > P. >> >> >> >> >> Yeah, you can concoct a scenario that fulfills these criteria. >> >> >> >> Big >> >> >> >> deal. >> >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> >> >> >> Suppose I agree. So what? This little formula cannot be applied >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> non-trivial properties and behaviors. If the property is >> >> >> >> non-trivial, >> >> >> >> then >> >> >> >> it will affect behavior, and your formula cannot be applied. >> >> >> >> >> So, how DO you deal with properties that DO affect behavior? Do >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> just >> >> >> >> pretend they don't exist? >> >> >> >> >> > The story that our subjective experiences have no influence on >> >> >> >> > our >> >> >> >> > behaviour is implausible, >> >> >> >> >> From my perspective, you've been arguing against that. I think >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> subjective experience influences our behavior. >> >> >> >> >> > even though you bet your soul on it, unable >> >> >> >> > to see through the deception, and still cling to it, even if >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> > have >> >> >> >> > to disingeniously misunderstand. >> >> >> >> >> You have not demonstrated that. >> >> >> >> >> > That you can't face that you were >> >> >> >> > wrong, and that you are shown to be so through reason, appears >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> > me >> >> >> >> > as pathetic. >> >> >> >> >> Or perhaps it's you that's completely wrong. Have you even >> >> >> >> considered >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> possibility? >> >> >> >> >> I'm guessing not. >> >> >> >> > It is implausible that we simply are a biological mechanism >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> > following the laws of physics. For that reason alone I could know >> >> >> > I >> >> >> > wasn't wrong. >> >> >> >> So you determine if you're right about something based on nothing >> >> >> but >> >> >> arbitrary feelings? >> >> >> >> That explains a lot. >> >> >> >> > It is implausible, because it would require our behaviour, >> >> >> > including >> >> >> > even questioning whether a robot had subjective experiences, >> >> >> > would >> >> >> > be >> >> >> > uninfluenced by us having subjective experiences. This is shown >> >> >> > by: >> >> >> >> No, it's influenced by subjective experience. >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and >> >> >> > (2), >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else >> >> >> > the >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> >> >> Lets see if we can apply this stupidity to something that affects >> >> >> behavior. >> >> >> Can you apply it to reflexes? Oops, no, there's a difference in >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> if >> >> >> you have reflexes compared to you not having reflexes. If you can't >> >> >> apply >> >> >> your little formula to reflexes, what makes you think you can apply >> >> >> it >> >> >> to >> >> >> consciousness? >> >> >> >> > Without the assertion that we were a biological mechanism simply >> >> >> > following the laws of physics, there would be no reason to assume >> >> >> > anything following the laws of physics subjectively experienced, >> >> >> >> I'm a biological mechanism simply following the laws of physics and >> >> >> I >> >> >> subjectively experience, therefore I conclude that biological >> >> >> mechanisms >> >> >> following the laws of can subjectively experience. >> >> >> >> > therefore what reason would the biological mechanism (if the >> >> >> > assertion >> >> >> > were made) have for considering such a thing uninfluenced by it >> >> >> > having >> >> >> > subjective experiences. >> >> >> >> This one doesn't. This one observes that it's subjective >> >> >> experiences >> >> >> influence its behavior. >> >> >> >> > You were wrong get used to it. Stop being so pathetic about it. >> >> >> >> You're not stating my position. Why would your criticizism of a >> >> >> position >> >> >> I >> >> >> do not hold show that I am wrong? >> >> >> > If you changed the property to one that behaviour couldn't be >> >> > explained without knowledge of, then (1) wouldn't be true. >> >> >> Which means you can't apply your formula to reflexes, right? >> >> >> So why do you think you can apply it to consciousness? The behaviors >> >> of >> >> conscious and unconscious things, in real life, is pretty fucking >> >> different. >> >> The unconscious ones lie inert while the conscious ones run about. >> >> According >> >> to (1) of your formula, you can't apply it to consciousness. >> >> >> > You have already admitted that though you could know the mechanism >> >> > of >> >> > the robot (and therefore be able to explain its behaviour) you >> >> > wouldn't have knowledge of whether it has subjective experiences or >> >> > not. I asked you before: >> >> >> Is this an argument about my state of ignorance concerning if >> >> something >> >> is >> >> conscious or not? >> >> >> That has fuck-all to do with anything. My state of ignorance has >> >> nothing >> >> to >> >> do with whether something is conscious or not, or what the source of >> >> that >> >> consciousnsess is. >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> > Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, one thing >> >> > you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective experiences >> >> > or >> >> > not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in your >> >> > knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact. >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> > To which you replied: >> >> > ------------ >> >> > I fucking understand that you twit. >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> > The question is can you face the truth, or are you going to continue >> >> > to grasp at straws, hoping that they will enable you to avoid it, >> >> > instead of making you look more and more pathetic. >> >> >> The truth would be that if it acts like it's conscious, I'll call it >> >> conscious. That's my prerogative. >> >> > The point was outlined in the reason, you are unable to face: >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> > So with the robot, since it's behaviour can be explained without >> > requiring knowledge of whether it is conscious or not, >> >> Ok, you asked for it. >> >> B(M) is not same for conscious vs unconscious robots. >> >> So your formula does not apply. >> >> If you have a robot that you say is not conscious, yet in all respects >> acts >> as if it is, then there is consciousness involved. The mechanism doesn't >> matter. >> >> Consider, if the robot is just a clever tape recorder specifically >> programmed to answer my likely questions, then some conscious entity had >> to >> program it and record the responses. THAT'S the conscious entity I'm >> talking >> to via the robot. The robot is only the middle-man between me and another >> consciousness. I may confuse the robot for the conscious entity, but that >> doesn't mean I'm not talking to another consciousness. >> >> It's the same with any elaborate Eliza program you might want to >> construct. >> I'm talking to the programmer through the robot, even though the >> programmer >> may be long dead. >> >> And if you arrive at the robot through no artifice, meaning that it is >> constructed by unconscious nature with no intent, then by what authority >> do >> you declare it non-conscious if it acts like it is? >> >> > whether it is >> > or not couldn't be influencing its behaviour, >> >> But since it is influencing its behavior, your formula does not apply. >> >> > no more than it could >> > influence ours, if we were simply a biological mechanism following the >> > laws of physics... >> >> ...with consciousness as part of that biological mechanism influencing >> the >> behavior. >> >> > It is implausible that we are, for reasons given to >> > you before. >> >> And your formula is as inapplicable as before. >> >> > You can choose to be totally illogical if you like, and to not face >> > reason. Though you won't be experiencing the physical world forever, >> > and you'll regret your choice. >> >> And if you're wrong, which is always possible, your continued insistence >> that this is the case is nothing more than your arrogant self-absorption >> talking. >> > > The formula doesn't require a comparitive entity. It can be used in > regards to any physical entity. Any physical entity? Let's try it: M = A man B(M) = Walking around P = Legs How the fuck do you: "1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has P or not." I don't know about you, but if I'm going to explain how a guy walks around, I'm gonna have to know if he has legs or not. "2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P." I would think legs have something to do with walking around, and I don't think it's gonna be the same with or without them. Please explain how your formula applies. With the values I've plugged in, it doesn't make any sense. > You keep trying to talk about two > different mechanisms, and say well they act differently, but that is > like talking about a car and a toaster, and saying well the car has a > numberplate, and they act differently so the number plate is > influential. You need to face that the formula is true, and can be > shown to be so, when you stop trying to make B(M) or P different > between (1) and (2). Basically it cuts through the deception that you > were fooled by. Apply your formula to the entities I provided above. -- Denis Loubet dloubet@io.com http//www.io.com/~dloubet Quote
Guest jientho@aol.com Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 On Jun 11, 5:08 pm, Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 13:29:05 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > <1181593745.206175.160...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > >> [snip] > > >> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?: > > >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> >P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > >> >and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > >> >explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true > > >> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a class > >> of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But that is a > >> minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that (1) reasonably > >> captures a physical understanding of human behavior and subjective > >> experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see take the existence > >> of SE as a given and work to explain that existence. So, while I think > >> your argument here is wrong, I think the argument itself does not > >> meaningfully relate to a physicalist (not scientism) theory of the > >> mind. > > >It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to point > >out why it isn't. Yes you are right that subjective experiences do > >influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to consider > >whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion (which is shown > >to be implausible) that we are simply a biological mechanism following > >the laws of physics, then you would have no reason to think that any > >physical mechanism following the laws of physics had subjective > >experiences. > > Ok, Jientho, Glenn is just assuming the conclusion here. You have not > shown it implausible that we are "just" biological mechanisms. He has shown that if we are such mechanisms fully explained by the laws of physics, then any subjective experiences we have are non- influential of our behavior -- they (SE) are simply side-effects, outputs, coincidental. And their "effects" on the physical world are illusory -- our subjective selves are just observers here. Serious materialists have made much the same point. Jeff Quote
Guest Fred Stone Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in news:1181594965.007188.174010@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com: > On 11 Jun, 20:52, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> innews:1181593745.206175.160780@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein >> > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> >> [snip] >> >> >> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?: >> >> >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and >> >> >(2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else >> >> >the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or >> >> >without P. >> >> >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true >> >> >> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a >> >> class of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But that >> >> is a minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that (1) >> >> reasonably captures a physical understanding of human behavior and >> >> subjective experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see >> >> take the existence of SE as a given and work to explain that >> >> existence. So, while I think your argument here is wrong, I think >> >> the argument itself does not meaningfully relate to a physicalist >> >> (not scientism) theory of the mind. >> >> > It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to >> > point out why it isn't. >> >> You have avoided seeing every attempt to point out why it isn't. >> >> > Yes you are right that subjective experiences do >> > influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to consider >> > whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion (which is >> > shown to be implausible) >> >> You keep repeating that assertion, but you are assuming your >> conclusion. >> > > Where has it been pointed out where it isn't correct. Attempts where > you change either B(M) or P between (1) and (2) obviously don't count, > as it only applies where B(M) and P are the same between (1) and (2). But every example you offer, Glenn, you also change B or B(M) or P yourself. You just offer us trivial changes that don't make a difference to the behavior B(M) whereas we all know that subjective experience DOES make a difference to behavior. You then assume your conclusion when you state that under materialism that subjective experience could not possibly affect behavior. > Attempts so far have been shown to be deceptively attempting to do > this. Perhaps you'd care to give an example where it wouldn't be true. > I have already offered you several examples, all as straighforward and truthful as yours. -- Fred Stone aa# 1369 "When they put out that deadline, people realized that we were going to lose," said an aide to an anti-war lawmaker. "Everything after that seemed like posturing." -- Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 On 11 Jun, 22:04, Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 13:46:24 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > <1181594784.494509.169...@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >On 11 Jun, 21:38, Matt Silberstein > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 09:35:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com > > >> in <1181579719.193969.12...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> >On Jun 11, 10:43 am, Matt Silberstein > >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> >> On Sat, 09 Jun 2007 12:02:52 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> >> <1181415772.483273.54...@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > >> >> [snip] > > >> >> >It had nothing to do with determinism. > > >> >> >The reasoning is summarised below, but was outlined in more depth in > >> >> >the part of the post you snipped. > > >> >> >1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics without > >> >> >requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not. > > >> >> >Therefore > > >> >> >2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not influence the behaviour of M, > >> >> >else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or > >> >> >without P(A) > > >> >> >You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly follows the > >> >> >known laws of physics for M, and any property for P(A) where (1) would > >> >> >be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2). > > >> >> But the counter argument is that P(A) is an aspect of the behavior to > >> >> explain. > > >> >Then you have simply rejected premise (1) of the argument -- > >> >explanation of the behavior of M requires knowledge of whether it has > >> >P(A). > > >> Not quite. I would say that AFAICT I would include SE as part of my > >> discussion of the behavior. I would end up describing the SE as > >> internal state and processes. So I don't need a priori knowledge that > >> the SE exists, but it does seem sufficiently important to the > >> individual that no description of behavior would work without taking > >> it into account. > > >> (Note that the related question of the behavior of groups does not > >> require knowledge of the SE of the individual.) > > >> >> More to the point I would argue that we can't explain M > >> >> without having P(A) as part of the description and the explanation. > > >> >The counter to your counter would go: what evidence have you that > >> >subjective experience is found anywhere in the laws of physics? Are > >> >you relying on a Schroedinger's Cat thought-experiment (which is not > >> >evidence by itself btw) or something? > > >> I rely on the large number of experiences we have with physical > >> actions affecting internal states. I rely on the enormous number of > >> neurological experiments showing physical actions affect subjective > >> experience. > > >With a robot though you can surely see that its behaviour could be > >explained without knowledge of whether it had subjective experiences > >or not, > > I don't see why. My claim, in fact, is that if a robot acts > sufficiently human for me to think it has subjective experience then > it probably does have subjective experience. Why don't you tell me why > you know that we can explain the robot behavior without referring to > SE. > > >and therefore, as shown, whether it did or didn't that > >particular property couldn't be said to be influential. Is it that you > >were sure that you would never be shown to be wrong causing you a > >problem in facing that it has happened? > > No. Well because we can simply just explain how the mechanism of the robot works, same as we could explain how a car or mobile phone works. We don't require knowledge of whether it was subjectively experiencing or not. Quote
Guest Matt Silberstein Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 14:23:10 -0700, in alt.atheism , jientho@aol.com in <1181596990.691238.117920@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote: >On Jun 11, 4:38 pm, Matt Silberstein ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 09:35:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com >> >> in <1181579719.193969.12...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >On Jun 11, 10:43 am, Matt Silberstein >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> On Sat, 09 Jun 2007 12:02:52 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> <1181415772.483273.54...@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> >> [snip] >> >> >> >It had nothing to do with determinism. >> >> >> >The reasoning is summarised below, but was outlined in more depth in >> >> >the part of the post you snipped. >> >> >> >1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics without >> >> >requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not. >> >> >> >Therefore >> >> >> >2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not influence the behaviour of M, >> >> >else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or >> >> >without P(A) >> >> >> >You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly follows the >> >> >known laws of physics for M, and any property for P(A) where (1) would >> >> >be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2). >> >> >> But the counter argument is that P(A) is an aspect of the behavior to >> >> explain. >> >> >Then you have simply rejected premise (1) of the argument -- >> >explanation of the behavior of M requires knowledge of whether it has >> >P(A). >> >> Not quite. I would say that AFAICT I would include SE as part of my >> discussion of the behavior. > >Any behavior? Like the behavior of your PC, say? No, the topic was behavior of people, not any behavior at all. > You do realize the >argument is a general one for any mechanism whose operation is fully >explained by the laws of physics, right? And I was discussing how it was not an appropriate claim in this case. >I guess the question is, what are you talking about now? What >behavior? (It seems that you might be trying to slip in an >unwarranted exception for certain types of subjectively-judged >behavior here.) No, I am saying that the claim (1) does not apply when we put in the issues here. Let us look at one again: 1) The behavior of M is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not. That would apply in some cases and not in others. That is, if we have some thing M and some property P, sometimes P is a property of M and sometimes not. That is an empirical question, not a logical one. >> I would end up describing the SE as >> internal state and processes. So I don't need a priori knowledge that >> the SE exists, but it does seem sufficiently important to the >> individual that no description of behavior would work without taking >> it into account. > >The criterion (of whether to try to explain SE) is how important it >seems to an individual?? What individual? You mis-read that sentence so let me reword it: Subjective experience seems sufficiently significant an aspect of human behavior that I doubt that we can provide a physical description/analysis without also explaining/accounting for SE. >How do you know how >important SE seems to an individual (like e.g. your PC)? And could >you possibly have anything more unscientific/unverifiable as a >criterion? In this case "important" is a short hand for a large amount of information about the necessity to account for human internal states when discussing human behavior. In order to properly describe and predict human actions we need to have some "theory of the mind" that models the SE. >> (Note that the related question of the behavior of groups does not >> require knowledge of the SE of the individual.) >> >> >> More to the point I would argue that we can't explain M >> >> without having P(A) as part of the description and the explanation. >> >> >The counter to your counter would go: what evidence have you that >> >subjective experience is found anywhere in the laws of physics? Are >> >you relying on a Schroedinger's Cat thought-experiment (which is not >> >evidence by itself btw) or something? >> >> I rely on the large number of experiences we have with physical >> actions affecting internal states. I rely on the enormous number of >> neurological experiments showing physical actions affect subjective >> experience. > >That is evidence only for physical influence _on_ SE, not evidence at >all that SE _is_ a part of the laws of physics. (Again, we are >talking about explanations/influences _on_ physical behavior, not >physical influences on subjective experience.) SE is not part of the laws of physics any more than the Moon is part of the laws of physics. And you are now hand waving about some magical process that is somehow not physical but affected by wide range of physical things. Show me some examples of SE that does not have a physical instantiation. -- Matt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 On 11 Jun, 22:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181593524.600437.247290@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > > On 11 Jun, 20:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >>news:1181583039.890628.118980@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > >> > On 11 Jun, 18:23, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >>news:1181581549.652693.254210@q66g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> > On 11 Jun, 16:43, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >>news:1181517234.889369.239710@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 00:05, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >>news:1181514806.543814.218460@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> > On 10 Jun, 20:36, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >> >>news:FNednZ5aMcoN3PHbnZ2dnUVZ_tmknZ2d@io.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > >> >> >> >> >> >news:1181471104.632034.40450@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > >> >> >> >> >> >> On 10 Jun, 03:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in > >> >> >> >> >> >>> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >>>news:1181440301.918077.327620@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > On 10 Jun, 02:15, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>news:1181417934.359700.133760@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > On 9 Jun, 08:25, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> message > > >> >> >> >> > (snipped some of the older stuff) > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Can you understand the following: > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > physics > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > reference requiring knowledge of whether it has > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A) > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Let's see, can I explain the behavior of my car > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> without > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> knowing > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> if > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> it > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> has > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank or not by the laws of physics? Yes, > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explain > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> both > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behaviors, and one of them will be correct. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Therefore > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not affect > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > behaviour > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > M, > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Well, personally I think gas in the tank radically > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> affects > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> my car. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > else the explanation of behaviour could not be > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > with > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without P(A) > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> The behavior of my car with gas in the tank is > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explainable > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> by > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> laws > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> physics, as is the behavior of my car without gas > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> tank. > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> But > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> somehow I > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> only get places I need to get to in air-conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> comfort > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank. That's very different behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> from > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> isn't > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Gosh! How very odd! It seems your point 2 is > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> completely > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> wrong > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> on > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> such > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> basic level that it's hard to comprehend how you > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> function > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> society > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> at > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> all. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I take it you don't own a car? Please tell me you > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> don't. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > You can substitute whatever physical entity that > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > strictly > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > follows > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > known laws of physics for M, and any property for > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > which > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A) > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > where > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > (1) > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > would be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> My car says you're just plain stupid. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Your reponses have a certain entertainment value I > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > guess. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Let me put it another way: > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> No, why don't you address it the way you put it? > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> And the way I answered it? > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you too stupid or afraid to? > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you a moron, a coward, or both? > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car! > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> It gets me to my destination in air-conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort! > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Gas in the tank! > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > requiring > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car employs the laws of physics to get me to my > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> destination > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> air-conditioned comfort! > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect B(M), > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > else > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Oddly, that doesn't match reality at all! When there's > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> my car, I DON'T get to my destination in air > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort! > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> just sits there following the laws of physics. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Bummer! > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if (1) is true, then so is (2) > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car still says you're just plain stupid. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> How can my car, getting somewhere in air conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort, > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > To give you an example, just to make sure you have > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > no > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > excuses > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > for > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretending you can't grasp the point, and are > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > misunderstanding > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > it: > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = a car > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = its serial number > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Which means: > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > by > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > has a > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > serial > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > number > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > car > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > parked > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > with its engine running, else the explanation of > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > behaviour > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > could > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > not > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > be the same with or without a serial number. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> But if the situation is: > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = my car > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = gas in the tank > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Then suddenly your formula fails! Once the gas runs > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> out, > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> longer > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> has a running engine. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Since (1) is true, so is (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Not if there's no gas in the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > So though I have tried to plug up the holes where > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > might > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > try > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > to > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretend to misunderstand, your ability to, still > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > does > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > give > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > some > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > artistic scope for disingenuity, which I'm sure you > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > will > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > use > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > able. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> You're so stupid, my car is embarrassed for you. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > I pointed out: > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > To which you replied: > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > How can my car, getting somewhere in air conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > comfort, > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > gas > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in the tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid. > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > I assume this was just another example of your > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > disingenious > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > creativity. M isn't the same as B(M) which isn't the > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > as > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P. > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > It > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > is > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > that M mentioned in (1) is the same as M mentioned in > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2), > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned in (1) is the same as B(M) mentioned in (2), > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in (1) is the same as P mentioned in (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > If you can now understand this, you can see if (2) > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > wasn't > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > because there was no gas in the tank, then (1) couldn't > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > have > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > been > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, as it getting you to your destination in air > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > couldn't > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > explained without gas in the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > You'll notice it also gets through your usual well > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > polished > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > deception > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in that it applies to and physical entity that strictly > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > follows > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > laws of physics, and doesn't require a comparison > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > entity. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > So here it is again, and hopefully you won't simply be > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > grasping > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > at > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ways to misinterpret what is being said, but actually > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > face > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > reason > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > for > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > once. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> My car. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> It's sitting there inert. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> Gas in the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > requiring > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> The car sits there inert, according to the laws of > >> >> >> >> >> >>> physics. > >> >> >> >> >> >>> Doesn't > >> >> >> >> >> >>> matter > >> >> >> >> >> >>> if there's gas in the tank or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect B(M), else > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is exactly the same > >> >> >> >> >> >>> as > >> >> >> >> >> >>> a > >> >> >> >> >> >>> car > >> >> >> >> >> >>> with > >> >> >> >> >> >>> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >>> in the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to buy gas again! > >> >> >> >> >> >>> I > >> >> >> >> >> >>> can > >> >> >> >> >> >>> drive > >> >> >> >> >> >>> around > >> >> >> >> >> >>> with or without gas. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> Yup, your example sure matches reality. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> Not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> Note that the above sentence is an admitted lie. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> > It follows that if (1) is true, then so is (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> Nope. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence the car > >> >> >> >> >> >> sitting > >> >> >> >> >> >> there > >> >> >> >> >> >> inert, so (2) would be true. > > >> >> >> >> >> > Until the key is turned in the ignition. > > >> >> >> >> >> > If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly false. > > >> >> >> >> >> Look, are you trying, in your own stupid and inept way, to > >> >> >> >> >> get > >> >> >> >> >> me > >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> say > >> >> >> >> >> that there are properties that have no effect on the behavior > >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> thing > >> >> >> >> >> they're a property of? Well that's a big yes! Of COURSE there > >> >> >> >> >> are > >> >> >> >> >> properties > >> >> >> >> >> that have no effect on behavior. Your example of the serial > >> >> >> >> >> number, > >> >> >> >> >> for > >> >> >> >> >> example. > > >> >> >> >> >> So what? > > >> >> >> >> >> Are you dishonestly trying to equate the > >> >> >> >> >> irrelevant-to-behavior > >> >> >> >> >> aspect > >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> serial number to the crucial-to-behavior aspect of subjective > >> >> >> >> >> experience? > >> >> >> >> >> If > >> >> >> >> >> you were honest, your examples would be either the car's > >> >> >> >> >> elecrtical > >> >> >> >> >> system > >> >> >> >> >> compared to subjective experience, or a serial number > >> >> >> >> >> compared > >> >> >> >> >> to a > >> >> >> >> >> tattoo. > >> >> >> >> >> The effects of subjective experience on behavior are not > >> >> >> >> >> subtle, > >> >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> do > >> >> >> >> >> not > >> >> >> >> >> conceptually map to the irrelevancy of a serial number. > > >> >> >> >> >> I think that subjective experience is the action of physical > >> >> >> >> >> matter > >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> physical brains following the laws of physics. The subjective > >> >> >> >> >> experience > >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> not apart from that physical action. Subjective Experience is > >> >> >> >> >> simply a > >> >> >> >> >> name > >> >> >> >> >> we apply to a certain catagory of physical actions found in > >> >> >> >> >> brains. > >> >> >> >> >> It > >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> subset, not an "extra thing", somehow apart from the normal > >> >> >> >> >> operation > >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> brain. It IS the normal operation of the brain. > > >> >> >> >> >> If you remove it from the operation of the brain, you would > >> >> >> >> >> expect > >> >> >> >> >> radically > >> >> >> >> >> different behavior, just like you would expect if you ripped > >> >> >> >> >> out > >> >> >> >> >> crucial > >> >> >> >> >> subroutines from a computer program. Without subjective > >> >> >> >> >> experience, > >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> human brain is no longer operating normally, even though it > >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> still, > >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> course, operating according to the laws of physics. > > >> >> >> >> >> I know it was pointless of me to type > > >> >> >> >> > Subjective experiences are a label to what you actually > >> >> >> >> > consciously > >> >> >> >> > experience. > > >> >> >> >> Which is matter in the brain operating according to physical > >> >> >> >> law. > > >> >> >> >> > That the brain is directly responsible for them is an > >> >> >> >> > assertion. > > >> >> >> >> No, it's a conclusion based on evidence. If you physically > >> >> >> >> manipulate > >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> brain, you manipulate consciousness. > > >> >> >> >> > I can't say it is an explanation, as there could be no > >> >> >> >> > explanation from your perspective why any physical activity > >> >> >> >> > would > >> >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> > subjectively experienced, or why it wasn't just fluctuations > >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> > colour green for example, the brightness dependent on the > >> >> >> >> > amount > >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> > neurons firing. Nothing in your perspective would know what > >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> > neuron > >> >> >> >> > state represented. > > >> >> >> >> That's where your ability to communicate breaks down entirely. > >> >> >> >> What > >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> fuck > >> >> >> >> are you babbling about? "Fluctuations of the color green"? Are > >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> on > >> >> >> >> drugs? > > >> >> >> >> > The point was that even if you wanted to believe in the story > >> >> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> > we > >> >> >> >> > were simply biological mechanisms, and that our subjective > >> >> >> >> > experiences > >> >> >> >> > were an emergent property of the brain. The emergent property > >> >> >> >> > couldn't > >> >> >> >> > be said to be influential in behaviour due to: > > >> >> >> >> I was right, you're going to ignore what I post and write your > >> >> >> >> fucking > >> >> >> >> formula again. > > >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) > >> >> >> >> > and > >> >> >> >> > (2), > >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >> Then P and/or B has to be pretty fucking trivial. Like a serial > >> >> >> >> number, > >> >> >> >> or > >> >> >> >> being inert. > > >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), > >> >> >> >> > else > >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without > >> >> >> >> > P. > > >> >> >> >> Yeah, you can concoct a scenario that fulfills these criteria. > >> >> >> >> Big > >> >> >> >> deal. > > >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > >> >> >> >> Suppose I agree. So what? This little formula cannot be applied > >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> non-trivial properties and behaviors. If the property is > >> >> >> >> non-trivial, > >> >> >> >> then > >> >> >> >> it will affect behavior, and your formula cannot be applied. > > >> >> >> >> So, how DO you deal with properties that DO affect behavior? Do > >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> just > >> >> >> >> pretend they don't exist? > > >> >> >> >> > The story that our subjective experiences have no influence on > >> >> >> >> > our > >> >> >> >> > behaviour is implausible, > > >> >> >> >> From my perspective, you've been arguing against that. I think > >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> subjective experience influences our behavior. > > >> >> >> >> > even though you bet your soul on it, unable > >> >> >> >> > to see through the deception, and still cling to it, even if > >> >> >> >> > you > >> >> >> >> > have > >> >> >> >> > to disingeniously misunderstand. > > >> >> >> >> You have not demonstrated that. > > >> >> >> >> > That you can't face that you were > >> >> >> >> > wrong, and that you are shown to be so through reason, appears > >> >> >> >> > to > >> >> >> >> > me > >> >> >> >> > as pathetic. > > >> >> >> >> Or perhaps it's you that's completely wrong. Have you even > >> >> >> >> considered > >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> possibility? > > >> >> >> >> I'm guessing not. > > >> >> >> > It is implausible that we simply are a biological mechanism > >> >> >> > simply > >> >> >> > following the laws of physics. For that reason alone I could know > >> >> >> > I > >> >> >> > wasn't wrong. > > >> >> >> So you determine if you're right about something based on nothing > >> >> >> but > >> >> >> arbitrary feelings? > > >> >> >> That explains a lot. > > >> >> >> > It is implausible, because it would require our behaviour, > >> >> >> > including > >> >> >> > even questioning whether a robot had subjective experiences, > >> >> >> > would > >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> > uninfluenced by us having subjective experiences. This is shown > >> >> >> > by: > > >> >> >> No, it's influenced by subjective experience. > > >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and > >> >> >> > (2), > >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else > >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > >> >> >> Lets see if we can apply this stupidity to something that affects > >> >> >> behavior. > >> >> >> Can you apply it to reflexes? Oops, no, there's a difference in > >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> if > >> >> >> you have reflexes compared to you not having reflexes. If you can't > >> >> >> apply > >> >> >> your little formula to reflexes, what makes you think you can apply > >> >> >> it > >> >> >> to > >> >> >> consciousness? > > >> >> >> > Without the assertion that we were a biological mechanism simply > >> >> >> > following the laws of physics, there would be no reason to assume > >> >> >> > anything following the laws of physics subjectively experienced, > > >> >> >> I'm a biological mechanism simply following the laws of physics and > >> >> >> I > >> >> >> subjectively experience, therefore I conclude that biological > >> >> >> mechanisms > >> >> >> following the laws of can subjectively experience. > > >> >> >> > therefore what reason would the biological mechanism (if the > >> >> >> > assertion > >> >> >> > were made) have for considering such a thing uninfluenced by it > >> >> >> > having > >> >> >> > subjective experiences. > > >> >> >> This one doesn't. This one observes that it's subjective > >> >> >> experiences > >> >> >> influence its behavior. > > >> >> >> > You were wrong get used to it. Stop being so pathetic about it. > > >> >> >> You're not stating my position. Why would your criticizism of a > >> >> >> position > >> >> >> I > >> >> >> do not hold show that I am wrong? > > >> >> > If you changed the property to one that behaviour couldn't be > >> >> > explained without knowledge of, then (1) wouldn't be true. > > >> >> Which means you can't apply your formula to reflexes, right? > > >> >> So why do you think you can apply it to consciousness? The behaviors > >> >> of > >> >> conscious and unconscious things, in real life, is pretty fucking > >> >> different. > >> >> The unconscious ones lie inert while the conscious ones run about. > >> >> According > >> >> to (1) of your formula, you can't apply it to consciousness. > > >> >> > You have already admitted that though you could know the mechanism > >> >> > of > >> >> > the robot (and therefore be able to explain its behaviour) you > >> >> > wouldn't have knowledge of whether it has subjective experiences or > >> >> > not. I asked you before: > > >> >> Is this an argument about my state of ignorance concerning if > >> >> something > >> >> is > >> >> conscious or not? > > >> >> That has fuck-all to do with anything. My state of ignorance has > >> >> nothing > >> >> to > >> >> do with whether something is conscious or not, or what the source of > >> >> that > >> >> consciousnsess is. > > >> >> > ------------ > >> >> > Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, one thing > >> >> > you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective experiences > >> >> > or > >> >> > not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in your > >> >> > knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact. > >> >> > ------------ > > >> >> > To which you replied: > >> >> > ------------ > >> >> > I fucking understand that you twit. > >> >> > ------------ > > >> >> > The question is can you face the truth, or are you going to continue > >> >> > to grasp at straws, hoping that they will enable you to avoid it, > >> >> > instead of making you look more and more pathetic. > > >> >> The truth would be that if it acts like it's conscious, I'll call it > >> >> conscious. That's my prerogative. > > >> > The point was outlined in the reason, you are unable to face: > > >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > >> > So with the robot, since it's behaviour can be explained without > >> > requiring knowledge of whether it is conscious or not, > > >> Ok, you asked for it. > > >> B(M) is not same for conscious vs unconscious robots. > > >> So your formula does not apply. > > >> If you have a robot that you say is not conscious, yet in all respects > >> acts > >> as if it is, then there is consciousness involved. The mechanism doesn't > >> matter. > > >> Consider, if the robot is just a clever tape recorder specifically > >> programmed to answer my likely questions, then some conscious entity had > >> to > >> program it and record the responses. THAT'S the conscious entity I'm > >> talking > >> to via the robot. The robot is only the middle-man between me and another > >> consciousness. I may confuse the robot for the conscious entity, but that > >> doesn't mean I'm not talking to another consciousness. > > >> It's the same with any elaborate Eliza program you might want to > >> construct. > >> I'm talking to the programmer through the robot, even though the > >> programmer > >> may be long dead. > > >> And if you arrive at the robot through no artifice, meaning that it is > >> constructed by unconscious nature with no intent, then by what authority > >> do > >> you declare it non-conscious if it acts like it is? > > >> > whether it is > >> > or not couldn't be influencing its behaviour, > > >> But since it is influencing its behavior, your formula does not apply. > > >> > no more than it could > >> > influence ours, if we were simply a biological mechanism following the > >> > laws of physics... > > >> ...with consciousness as part of that biological mechanism influencing > >> the > >> behavior. > > >> > It is implausible that we are, for reasons given to > >> > you before. > > >> And your formula is as inapplicable as before. > > >> > You can choose to be totally illogical if you like, and to not face > >> > reason. Though you won't be experiencing the physical world forever, > >> > and you'll regret your choice. > > >> And if you're wrong, which is always possible, your continued insistence > >> that this is the case is nothing more than your arrogant self-absorption > >> talking. > > > The formula doesn't require a comparitive entity. It can be used in > > regards to any physical entity. > > Any physical entity? > > Let's try it: > > M = A man > B(M) = Walking around > P = Legs > > How the fuck do you: > > "1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of > whether it has P or not." > > I don't know about you, but if I'm going to explain how a guy walks around, > I'm gonna have to know if he has legs or not. > > "2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P." > > I would think legs have something to do with walking around, and I don't > think it's gonna be the same with or without them. > > Please explain how your formula applies. With the values I've plugged in, it > doesn't make any sense. > > > You keep trying to talk about two > > different mechanisms, and say well they act differently, but that is > > like talking about a car and a toaster, and saying well the car has a > > numberplate, and they act differently so the number plate is > > influential. You need to face that the formula is true, and can be > > shown to be so, when you stop trying to make B(M) or P different > > between (1) and (2). Basically it cuts through the deception that you > > were fooled by. > > Apply your formula to the entities I provided above. > Er... you really are having trouble understanding this aren't you. Is it the complexity of it, or is it that for it to be correct would mean that you were wrong, and your ego won't let you face that you were wrong? In your example (1) would not be true, you couldn't explain the man walking around, without knowledge of whether he had legs or not. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 On 11 Jun, 22:51, Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 14:23:10 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com > > > > > > in <1181596990.691238.117...@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >On Jun 11, 4:38 pm, Matt Silberstein > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 09:35:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com > > >> in <1181579719.193969.12...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> >On Jun 11, 10:43 am, Matt Silberstein > >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> >> On Sat, 09 Jun 2007 12:02:52 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> >> <1181415772.483273.54...@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > >> >> [snip] > > >> >> >It had nothing to do with determinism. > > >> >> >The reasoning is summarised below, but was outlined in more depth in > >> >> >the part of the post you snipped. > > >> >> >1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics without > >> >> >requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not. > > >> >> >Therefore > > >> >> >2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not influence the behaviour of M, > >> >> >else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or > >> >> >without P(A) > > >> >> >You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly follows the > >> >> >known laws of physics for M, and any property for P(A) where (1) would > >> >> >be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2). > > >> >> But the counter argument is that P(A) is an aspect of the behavior to > >> >> explain. > > >> >Then you have simply rejected premise (1) of the argument -- > >> >explanation of the behavior of M requires knowledge of whether it has > >> >P(A). > > >> Not quite. I would say that AFAICT I would include SE as part of my > >> discussion of the behavior. > > >Any behavior? Like the behavior of your PC, say? > > No, the topic was behavior of people, not any behavior at all. > > > You do realize the > >argument is a general one for any mechanism whose operation is fully > >explained by the laws of physics, right? > > And I was discussing how it was not an appropriate claim in this case. > > >I guess the question is, what are you talking about now? What > >behavior? (It seems that you might be trying to slip in an > >unwarranted exception for certain types of subjectively-judged > >behavior here.) > > No, I am saying that the claim (1) does not apply when we put in the > issues here. Let us look at one again: > > 1) The behavior of M is explained by the laws of physics without > requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not. > > That would apply in some cases and not in others. That is, if we have > some thing M and some property P, sometimes P is a property of M and > sometimes not. That is an empirical question, not a logical one. > > >> I would end up describing the SE as > >> internal state and processes. So I don't need a priori knowledge that > >> the SE exists, but it does seem sufficiently important to the > >> individual that no description of behavior would work without taking > >> it into account. > > >The criterion (of whether to try to explain SE) is how important it > >seems to an individual?? What individual? > > You mis-read that sentence so let me reword it: Subjective experience > seems sufficiently significant an aspect of human behavior that I > doubt that we can provide a physical description/analysis without also > explaining/accounting for SE. > > >How do you know how > >important SE seems to an individual (like e.g. your PC)? And could > >you possibly have anything more unscientific/unverifiable as a > >criterion? > > In this case "important" is a short hand for a large amount of > information about the necessity to account for human internal states > when discussing human behavior. In order to properly describe and > predict human actions we need to have some "theory of the mind" that > models the SE. > > > > > > >> (Note that the related question of the behavior of groups does not > >> require knowledge of the SE of the individual.) > > >> >> More to the point I would argue that we can't explain M > >> >> without having P(A) as part of the description and the explanation. > > >> >The counter to your counter would go: what evidence have you that > >> >subjective experience is found anywhere in the laws of physics? Are > >> >you relying on a Schroedinger's Cat thought-experiment (which is not > >> >evidence by itself btw) or something? > > >> I rely on the large number of experiences we have with physical > >> actions affecting internal states. I rely on the enormous number of > >> neurological experiments showing physical actions affect subjective > >> experience. > > >That is evidence only for physical influence _on_ SE, not evidence at > >all that SE _is_ a part of the laws of physics. (Again, we are > >talking about explanations/influences _on_ physical behavior, not > >physical influences on subjective experience.) > > SE is not part of the laws of physics any more than the Moon is part > of the laws of physics. And you are now hand waving about some magical > process that is somehow not physical but affected by wide range of > physical things. Show me some examples of SE that does not have a > physical instantiation. > I'm not even bringing into the converstation at the moment what reality actually is, I am just pointing out the implausibility of the story that we are simply a biological mechanism strictly following the laws of physics. As for your point about that P might not be a property of M, well yes, you could rewrite it as F (a factor), such as wind in the behaviour of a flying kite for example (where (1) would not be true) as opposed to whether I was in fact the person that ate all the pies in Mrs Miggins pie shop (where (1) would be true, and so would (2) ). It still doesn't seem to have sunk in yet, that it is not that our experience is a deception, we do influence the behaviour of the human we experience being. It is that it is implausible that we can be explained as being simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics. Quote
Guest Matt Silberstein Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 14:48:54 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> in <1181598534.195254.186090@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com> wrote: >On 11 Jun, 22:04, Matt Silberstein ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 13:46:24 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> >> >> >> <1181594784.494509.169...@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >On 11 Jun, 21:38, Matt Silberstein >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 09:35:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com >> >> >> in <1181579719.193969.12...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> >On Jun 11, 10:43 am, Matt Silberstein >> >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> >> On Sat, 09 Jun 2007 12:02:52 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> >> <1181415772.483273.54...@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> [snip] >> >> >> >> >It had nothing to do with determinism. >> >> >> >> >The reasoning is summarised below, but was outlined in more depth in >> >> >> >the part of the post you snipped. >> >> >> >> >1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics without >> >> >> >requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not. >> >> >> >> >Therefore >> >> >> >> >2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not influence the behaviour of M, >> >> >> >else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or >> >> >> >without P(A) >> >> >> >> >You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly follows the >> >> >> >known laws of physics for M, and any property for P(A) where (1) would >> >> >> >be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2). >> >> >> >> But the counter argument is that P(A) is an aspect of the behavior to >> >> >> explain. >> >> >> >Then you have simply rejected premise (1) of the argument -- >> >> >explanation of the behavior of M requires knowledge of whether it has >> >> >P(A). >> >> >> Not quite. I would say that AFAICT I would include SE as part of my >> >> discussion of the behavior. I would end up describing the SE as >> >> internal state and processes. So I don't need a priori knowledge that >> >> the SE exists, but it does seem sufficiently important to the >> >> individual that no description of behavior would work without taking >> >> it into account. >> >> >> (Note that the related question of the behavior of groups does not >> >> require knowledge of the SE of the individual.) >> >> >> >> More to the point I would argue that we can't explain M >> >> >> without having P(A) as part of the description and the explanation. >> >> >> >The counter to your counter would go: what evidence have you that >> >> >subjective experience is found anywhere in the laws of physics? Are >> >> >you relying on a Schroedinger's Cat thought-experiment (which is not >> >> >evidence by itself btw) or something? >> >> >> I rely on the large number of experiences we have with physical >> >> actions affecting internal states. I rely on the enormous number of >> >> neurological experiments showing physical actions affect subjective >> >> experience. >> >> >With a robot though you can surely see that its behaviour could be >> >explained without knowledge of whether it had subjective experiences >> >or not, >> >> I don't see why. My claim, in fact, is that if a robot acts >> sufficiently human for me to think it has subjective experience then >> it probably does have subjective experience. Why don't you tell me why >> you know that we can explain the robot behavior without referring to >> SE. >> >> >and therefore, as shown, whether it did or didn't that >> >particular property couldn't be said to be influential. Is it that you >> >were sure that you would never be shown to be wrong causing you a >> >problem in facing that it has happened? >> >> No. > >Well because we can simply just explain how the mechanism of the robot >works, same as we could explain how a car or mobile phone works. We >don't require knowledge of whether it was subjectively experiencing or >not. That is just an assertion. Sorry, but this is not a logical construct, it requires some empirical work. Have you read the work on the Turing Test or even the Chinese Room? Those help set some of the philosophical boundaries here, but you still have to do the work. If we have a robot that seem to have some large set of human like qualities you don't know that we can explain it without explaining and/or describing something very much like subjective experience. -- Matt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 On 11 Jun, 23:16, Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 14:48:54 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > <1181598534.195254.186...@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >On 11 Jun, 22:04, Matt Silberstein > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 13:46:24 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> <1181594784.494509.169...@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> >On 11 Jun, 21:38, Matt Silberstein > >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 09:35:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com > > >> >> in <1181579719.193969.12...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> >> >On Jun 11, 10:43 am, Matt Silberstein > >> >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On Sat, 09 Jun 2007 12:02:52 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> >> >> <1181415772.483273.54...@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > >> >> >> [snip] > > >> >> >> >It had nothing to do with determinism. > > >> >> >> >The reasoning is summarised below, but was outlined in more depth in > >> >> >> >the part of the post you snipped. > > >> >> >> >1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics without > >> >> >> >requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not. > > >> >> >> >Therefore > > >> >> >> >2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not influence the behaviour of M, > >> >> >> >else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or > >> >> >> >without P(A) > > >> >> >> >You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly follows the > >> >> >> >known laws of physics for M, and any property for P(A) where (1) would > >> >> >> >be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2). > > >> >> >> But the counter argument is that P(A) is an aspect of the behavior to > >> >> >> explain. > > >> >> >Then you have simply rejected premise (1) of the argument -- > >> >> >explanation of the behavior of M requires knowledge of whether it has > >> >> >P(A). > > >> >> Not quite. I would say that AFAICT I would include SE as part of my > >> >> discussion of the behavior. I would end up describing the SE as > >> >> internal state and processes. So I don't need a priori knowledge that > >> >> the SE exists, but it does seem sufficiently important to the > >> >> individual that no description of behavior would work without taking > >> >> it into account. > > >> >> (Note that the related question of the behavior of groups does not > >> >> require knowledge of the SE of the individual.) > > >> >> >> More to the point I would argue that we can't explain M > >> >> >> without having P(A) as part of the description and the explanation. > > >> >> >The counter to your counter would go: what evidence have you that > >> >> >subjective experience is found anywhere in the laws of physics? Are > >> >> >you relying on a Schroedinger's Cat thought-experiment (which is not > >> >> >evidence by itself btw) or something? > > >> >> I rely on the large number of experiences we have with physical > >> >> actions affecting internal states. I rely on the enormous number of > >> >> neurological experiments showing physical actions affect subjective > >> >> experience. > > >> >With a robot though you can surely see that its behaviour could be > >> >explained without knowledge of whether it had subjective experiences > >> >or not, > > >> I don't see why. My claim, in fact, is that if a robot acts > >> sufficiently human for me to think it has subjective experience then > >> it probably does have subjective experience. Why don't you tell me why > >> you know that we can explain the robot behavior without referring to > >> SE. > > >> >and therefore, as shown, whether it did or didn't that > >> >particular property couldn't be said to be influential. Is it that you > >> >were sure that you would never be shown to be wrong causing you a > >> >problem in facing that it has happened? > > >> No. > > >Well because we can simply just explain how the mechanism of the robot > >works, same as we could explain how a car or mobile phone works. We > >don't require knowledge of whether it was subjectively experiencing or > >not. > > That is just an assertion. Sorry, but this is not a logical construct, > it requires some empirical work. Have you read the work on the Turing > Test or even the Chinese Room? Those help set some of the > philosophical boundaries here, but you still have to do the work. If > we have a robot that seem to have some large set of human like > qualities you don't know that we can explain it without explaining > and/or describing something very much like subjective experience. > Well let's say for arguments sake, there was a robot, following the known laws of physics, driven by a neural network which had a million more nodes than you have neurons in your brain. Each node wrote out to a log the messages it received, and the messages it sent out, and the message contained information such as time sent, time received, source node, destination node (which might be the same as the source node for feedback messages), the message etc. Then after an hour converstation with it, a bank of computers could go through the logs confirming that no unexplained messages appeared, and that each node followed the laws of physics as expected, giving the outputs expected given the inputs. If necessary even if it took a thousand years, the behaviour of the robot could be explained without knowledge of whether it had any subjective experiences or not. Simply in terms of the configuration of the nodes, and the inputs they received, and how the nodes worked. The only assertion is yours, that we are a biological mechanism strictly following the laws of physics. You are just having problems accepting that it is shown that this is implausible, as without the subjective experiences influencing our behaviour, it could only be coincidental that the human we experience being was perhaps talking about them or wondering whether the robot had similar experiences or not. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 On 11 Jun, 22:37, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: > someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote innews:1181594965.007188.174010@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com: > > > > > > > On 11 Jun, 20:52, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: > >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > >> innews:1181593745.206175.160780@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com: > > >> > On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein > >> > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> >> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > >> >> [snip] > > >> >> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?: > > >> >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> >> >P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and > >> >> >(2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > >> >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else > >> >> >the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or > >> >> >without P. > > >> >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true > > >> >> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a > >> >> class of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But that > >> >> is a minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that (1) > >> >> reasonably captures a physical understanding of human behavior and > >> >> subjective experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see > >> >> take the existence of SE as a given and work to explain that > >> >> existence. So, while I think your argument here is wrong, I think > >> >> the argument itself does not meaningfully relate to a physicalist > >> >> (not scientism) theory of the mind. > > >> > It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to > >> > point out why it isn't. > > >> You have avoided seeing every attempt to point out why it isn't. > > >> > Yes you are right that subjective experiences do > >> > influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to consider > >> > whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion (which is > >> > shown to be implausible) > > >> You keep repeating that assertion, but you are assuming your > >> conclusion. > > > Where has it been pointed out where it isn't correct. Attempts where > > you change either B(M) or P between (1) and (2) obviously don't count, > > as it only applies where B(M) and P are the same between (1) and (2). > > But every example you offer, Glenn, you also change B or B(M) or P > yourself. You just offer us trivial changes that don't make a difference > to the behavior B(M) whereas we all know that subjective experience DOES > make a difference to behavior. You then assume your conclusion when you > state that under materialism that subjective experience could not > possibly affect behavior. > > > Attempts so far have been shown to be deceptively attempting to do > > this. Perhaps you'd care to give an example where it wouldn't be true. > > I have already offered you several examples, all as straighforward and > truthful as yours. > Well I can show you a few examples here, and you can see that I don't change B(M) or P between (1) and (2) for any given example. Obviously they are different in different examples. Example 1: ---------- M = a car B(M) = parked with its engine running P = its serial number Which means: 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a serial number or not. As (1) is true, so is: 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not affect the car parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without a serial number. Example 2: ---------- M = a television B(M) = television showing a broadcast television program P = a chalk mark on the side Which means (1) would be: 1) A television showing a broadcast television program is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a chalk mark on the side or not. As (1) is true, so is: 2) Presence of a chalk mark on the side, or lack of, does not affect the television showing a broadcast television program, else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without a chalk mark on the side. Example 3: ---------- M = a car B(M) = parked with its engine running P = petrol in the tank Which means (1) would be: 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has petrol in the tank or not. Which is false, so (2) would also be false: 2) Presence of petrol in the tank, or lack of, does not affect the car parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without a petrol in the tank. As you can see, in examples 1 and 2 in which (1) is true in both cases have B(M) and P the same in both (1) and (2) within the given example. Example 3 is just an example of where (1) is false, there was no need to include (2), but did so just to show that if it was included B(M) and P would be the same in both (1) and (2). So now it is your turn, I've given three examples, you only need to give one. Here are my predictions, either: a) you won't give an example b) you will change B(M) or P between (1) and (2) of your example. c) you will give an example which does have knowledge of P in (1), even if it is worded deceptively so as not to be immediately obvious. d) you will give an example which highlights what I have been saying. Quote
Guest Denis Loubet Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181598999.112030.3470@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > On 11 Jun, 22:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1181593524.600437.247290@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >>news:1181583039.890628.118980@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 18:23, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >>news:1181581549.652693.254210@q66g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 16:43, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >>news:1181517234.889369.239710@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 00:05, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181514806.543814.218460@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 10 Jun, 20:36, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:FNednZ5aMcoN3PHbnZ2dnUVZ_tmknZ2d@io.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >> > message >> >> >> >> >> >> >news:1181471104.632034.40450@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On 10 Jun, 03:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>>news:1181440301.918077.327620@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > On 10 Jun, 02:15, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>news:1181417934.359700.133760@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > On 9 Jun, 08:25, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> > (snipped some of the older stuff) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Can you understand the following: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > physics >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > reference requiring knowledge of whether it >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > has >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A) >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Let's see, can I explain the behavior of my car >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> without >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> knowing >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> if >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> has >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank or not by the laws of physics? >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Yes, >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explain >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> both >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behaviors, and one of them will be correct. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Therefore >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > M, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Well, personally I think gas in the tank >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> radically >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> affects >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> my car. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > else the explanation of behaviour could not be >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > with >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without P(A) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> The behavior of my car with gas in the tank is >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explainable >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> by >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> physics, as is the behavior of my car without >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> But >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> somehow I >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> only get places I need to get to in >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> air-conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> comfort >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank. That's very different behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> from >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> isn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Gosh! How very odd! It seems your point 2 is >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> completely >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> wrong >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> on >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> such >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> basic level that it's hard to comprehend how you >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> function >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> society >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> at >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> all. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I take it you don't own a car? Please tell me >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> don't. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > You can substitute whatever physical entity >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > strictly >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > follows >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > known laws of physics for M, and any property >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > which >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A) >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > where >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > (1) >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > would be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> My car says you're just plain stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Your reponses have a certain entertainment value >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > I >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > guess. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Let me put it another way: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> No, why don't you address it the way you put it? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> And the way I answered it? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you too stupid or afraid to? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you a moron, a coward, or both? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> It gets me to my destination in air-conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Gas in the tank! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > requiring >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car employs the laws of physics to get me to my >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> destination >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> air-conditioned comfort! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M), >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > else >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > with >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Oddly, that doesn't match reality at all! When >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> there's >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> my car, I DON'T get to my destination in air >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort! >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> just sits there following the laws of physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Bummer! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if (1) is true, then so is (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car still says you're just plain stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > are >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> How can my car, getting somewhere in air >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort, >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > To give you an example, just to make sure you >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > no >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > excuses >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretending you can't grasp the point, and are >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > misunderstanding >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > it: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = a car >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = its serial number >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Which means: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explained >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > by >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > has a >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > serial >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > number >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > not >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > car >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > parked >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > with its engine running, else the explanation of >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > could >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > not >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > be the same with or without a serial number. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> But if the situation is: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = my car >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = gas in the tank >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Then suddenly your formula fails! Once the gas runs >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> out, >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> longer >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> has a running engine. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Since (1) is true, so is (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Not if there's no gas in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > So though I have tried to plug up the holes where >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > might >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > try >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretend to misunderstand, your ability to, still >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > does >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > give >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > some >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > artistic scope for disingenuity, which I'm sure >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > will >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > use >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > able. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> You're so stupid, my car is embarrassed for you. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > I pointed out: >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > To which you replied: >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > How can my car, getting somewhere in air conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > comfort, >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in the tank all be the same thing? That's just >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > I assume this was just another example of your >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > disingenious >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > creativity. M isn't the same as B(M) which isn't the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > as >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > It >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > is >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > that M mentioned in (1) is the same as M mentioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2), >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned in (1) is the same as B(M) mentioned in >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2), >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in (1) is the same as P mentioned in (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > If you can now understand this, you can see if (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > wasn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > because there was no gas in the tank, then (1) >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > been >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, as it getting you to your destination in air >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > explained without gas in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > You'll notice it also gets through your usual well >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > polished >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > deception >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in that it applies to and physical entity that >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > strictly >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > follows >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > laws of physics, and doesn't require a comparison >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > entity. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > So here it is again, and hopefully you won't simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > grasping >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > at >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ways to misinterpret what is being said, but >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > actually >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > face >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > reason >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > once. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> My car. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> It's sitting there inert. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Gas in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > requiring >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> The car sits there inert, according to the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Doesn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> matter >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> if there's gas in the tank or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect B(M), >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > else >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is exactly the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> same >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> as >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> car >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> with >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to buy gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> again! >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> I >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> can >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> drive >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> around >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> with or without gas. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Yup, your example sure matches reality. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Note that the above sentence is an admitted lie. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > It follows that if (1) is true, then so is (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Nope. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence the car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> sitting >> >> >> >> >> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> inert, so (2) would be true. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Until the key is turned in the ignition. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly false. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Look, are you trying, in your own stupid and inept way, to >> >> >> >> >> >> get >> >> >> >> >> >> me >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> say >> >> >> >> >> >> that there are properties that have no effect on the >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> thing >> >> >> >> >> >> they're a property of? Well that's a big yes! Of COURSE >> >> >> >> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >> are >> >> >> >> >> >> properties >> >> >> >> >> >> that have no effect on behavior. Your example of the >> >> >> >> >> >> serial >> >> >> >> >> >> number, >> >> >> >> >> >> for >> >> >> >> >> >> example. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So what? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Are you dishonestly trying to equate the >> >> >> >> >> >> irrelevant-to-behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> aspect >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> serial number to the crucial-to-behavior aspect of >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> experience? >> >> >> >> >> >> If >> >> >> >> >> >> you were honest, your examples would be either the car's >> >> >> >> >> >> elecrtical >> >> >> >> >> >> system >> >> >> >> >> >> compared to subjective experience, or a serial number >> >> >> >> >> >> compared >> >> >> >> >> >> to a >> >> >> >> >> >> tattoo. >> >> >> >> >> >> The effects of subjective experience on behavior are not >> >> >> >> >> >> subtle, >> >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> do >> >> >> >> >> >> not >> >> >> >> >> >> conceptually map to the irrelevancy of a serial number. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I think that subjective experience is the action of >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> matter >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> physical brains following the laws of physics. The >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> experience >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> not apart from that physical action. Subjective Experience >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> simply a >> >> >> >> >> >> name >> >> >> >> >> >> we apply to a certain catagory of physical actions found >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> brains. >> >> >> >> >> >> It >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> subset, not an "extra thing", somehow apart from the >> >> >> >> >> >> normal >> >> >> >> >> >> operation >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> brain. It IS the normal operation of the brain. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If you remove it from the operation of the brain, you >> >> >> >> >> >> would >> >> >> >> >> >> expect >> >> >> >> >> >> radically >> >> >> >> >> >> different behavior, just like you would expect if you >> >> >> >> >> >> ripped >> >> >> >> >> >> out >> >> >> >> >> >> crucial >> >> >> >> >> >> subroutines from a computer program. Without subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> human brain is no longer operating normally, even though >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> still, >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> course, operating according to the laws of physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I know it was pointless of me to type >> >> >> >> >> >> > Subjective experiences are a label to what you actually >> >> >> >> >> > consciously >> >> >> >> >> > experience. >> >> >> >> >> >> Which is matter in the brain operating according to physical >> >> >> >> >> law. >> >> >> >> >> >> > That the brain is directly responsible for them is an >> >> >> >> >> > assertion. >> >> >> >> >> >> No, it's a conclusion based on evidence. If you physically >> >> >> >> >> manipulate >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> brain, you manipulate consciousness. >> >> >> >> >> >> > I can't say it is an explanation, as there could be no >> >> >> >> >> > explanation from your perspective why any physical activity >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> > subjectively experienced, or why it wasn't just >> >> >> >> >> > fluctuations >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> > colour green for example, the brightness dependent on the >> >> >> >> >> > amount >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> > neurons firing. Nothing in your perspective would know what >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> > neuron >> >> >> >> >> > state represented. >> >> >> >> >> >> That's where your ability to communicate breaks down >> >> >> >> >> entirely. >> >> >> >> >> What >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> fuck >> >> >> >> >> are you babbling about? "Fluctuations of the color green"? >> >> >> >> >> Are >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> on >> >> >> >> >> drugs? >> >> >> >> >> >> > The point was that even if you wanted to believe in the >> >> >> >> >> > story >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> > we >> >> >> >> >> > were simply biological mechanisms, and that our subjective >> >> >> >> >> > experiences >> >> >> >> >> > were an emergent property of the brain. The emergent >> >> >> >> >> > property >> >> >> >> >> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> > be said to be influential in behaviour due to: >> >> >> >> >> >> I was right, you're going to ignore what I post and write >> >> >> >> >> your >> >> >> >> >> fucking >> >> >> >> >> formula again. >> >> >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) >> >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> > (2), >> >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without >> >> >> >> >> > requiring >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> Then P and/or B has to be pretty fucking trivial. Like a >> >> >> >> >> serial >> >> >> >> >> number, >> >> >> >> >> or >> >> >> >> >> being inert. >> >> >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect >> >> >> >> >> > B(M), >> >> >> >> >> > else >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or >> >> >> >> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> Yeah, you can concoct a scenario that fulfills these >> >> >> >> >> criteria. >> >> >> >> >> Big >> >> >> >> >> deal. >> >> >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> >> >> >> >> Suppose I agree. So what? This little formula cannot be >> >> >> >> >> applied >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> non-trivial properties and behaviors. If the property is >> >> >> >> >> non-trivial, >> >> >> >> >> then >> >> >> >> >> it will affect behavior, and your formula cannot be applied. >> >> >> >> >> >> So, how DO you deal with properties that DO affect behavior? >> >> >> >> >> Do >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> just >> >> >> >> >> pretend they don't exist? >> >> >> >> >> >> > The story that our subjective experiences have no influence >> >> >> >> >> > on >> >> >> >> >> > our >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour is implausible, >> >> >> >> >> >> From my perspective, you've been arguing against that. I >> >> >> >> >> think >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> subjective experience influences our behavior. >> >> >> >> >> >> > even though you bet your soul on it, unable >> >> >> >> >> > to see through the deception, and still cling to it, even >> >> >> >> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> > to disingeniously misunderstand. >> >> >> >> >> >> You have not demonstrated that. >> >> >> >> >> >> > That you can't face that you were >> >> >> >> >> > wrong, and that you are shown to be so through reason, >> >> >> >> >> > appears >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> > me >> >> >> >> >> > as pathetic. >> >> >> >> >> >> Or perhaps it's you that's completely wrong. Have you even >> >> >> >> >> considered >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> possibility? >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm guessing not. >> >> >> >> >> > It is implausible that we simply are a biological mechanism >> >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> >> > following the laws of physics. For that reason alone I could >> >> >> >> > know >> >> >> >> > I >> >> >> >> > wasn't wrong. >> >> >> >> >> So you determine if you're right about something based on >> >> >> >> nothing >> >> >> >> but >> >> >> >> arbitrary feelings? >> >> >> >> >> That explains a lot. >> >> >> >> >> > It is implausible, because it would require our behaviour, >> >> >> >> > including >> >> >> >> > even questioning whether a robot had subjective experiences, >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> > uninfluenced by us having subjective experiences. This is >> >> >> >> > shown >> >> >> >> > by: >> >> >> >> >> No, it's influenced by subjective experience. >> >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> > (2), >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), >> >> >> >> > else >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without >> >> >> >> > P. >> >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> >> >> >> Lets see if we can apply this stupidity to something that >> >> >> >> affects >> >> >> >> behavior. >> >> >> >> Can you apply it to reflexes? Oops, no, there's a difference in >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> if >> >> >> >> you have reflexes compared to you not having reflexes. If you >> >> >> >> can't >> >> >> >> apply >> >> >> >> your little formula to reflexes, what makes you think you can >> >> >> >> apply >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> consciousness? >> >> >> >> >> > Without the assertion that we were a biological mechanism >> >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> >> > following the laws of physics, there would be no reason to >> >> >> >> > assume >> >> >> >> > anything following the laws of physics subjectively >> >> >> >> > experienced, >> >> >> >> >> I'm a biological mechanism simply following the laws of physics >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> I >> >> >> >> subjectively experience, therefore I conclude that biological >> >> >> >> mechanisms >> >> >> >> following the laws of can subjectively experience. >> >> >> >> >> > therefore what reason would the biological mechanism (if the >> >> >> >> > assertion >> >> >> >> > were made) have for considering such a thing uninfluenced by >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> > having >> >> >> >> > subjective experiences. >> >> >> >> >> This one doesn't. This one observes that it's subjective >> >> >> >> experiences >> >> >> >> influence its behavior. >> >> >> >> >> > You were wrong get used to it. Stop being so pathetic about >> >> >> >> > it. >> >> >> >> >> You're not stating my position. Why would your criticizism of a >> >> >> >> position >> >> >> >> I >> >> >> >> do not hold show that I am wrong? >> >> >> >> > If you changed the property to one that behaviour couldn't be >> >> >> > explained without knowledge of, then (1) wouldn't be true. >> >> >> >> Which means you can't apply your formula to reflexes, right? >> >> >> >> So why do you think you can apply it to consciousness? The >> >> >> behaviors >> >> >> of >> >> >> conscious and unconscious things, in real life, is pretty fucking >> >> >> different. >> >> >> The unconscious ones lie inert while the conscious ones run about. >> >> >> According >> >> >> to (1) of your formula, you can't apply it to consciousness. >> >> >> >> > You have already admitted that though you could know the >> >> >> > mechanism >> >> >> > of >> >> >> > the robot (and therefore be able to explain its behaviour) you >> >> >> > wouldn't have knowledge of whether it has subjective experiences >> >> >> > or >> >> >> > not. I asked you before: >> >> >> >> Is this an argument about my state of ignorance concerning if >> >> >> something >> >> >> is >> >> >> conscious or not? >> >> >> >> That has fuck-all to do with anything. My state of ignorance has >> >> >> nothing >> >> >> to >> >> >> do with whether something is conscious or not, or what the source >> >> >> of >> >> >> that >> >> >> consciousnsess is. >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> > Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, one >> >> >> > thing >> >> >> > you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective >> >> >> > experiences >> >> >> > or >> >> >> > not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in your >> >> >> > knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact. >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> > To which you replied: >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> > I fucking understand that you twit. >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> > The question is can you face the truth, or are you going to >> >> >> > continue >> >> >> > to grasp at straws, hoping that they will enable you to avoid it, >> >> >> > instead of making you look more and more pathetic. >> >> >> >> The truth would be that if it acts like it's conscious, I'll call >> >> >> it >> >> >> conscious. That's my prerogative. >> >> >> > The point was outlined in the reason, you are unable to face: >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else >> >> > the >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> >> > So with the robot, since it's behaviour can be explained without >> >> > requiring knowledge of whether it is conscious or not, >> >> >> Ok, you asked for it. >> >> >> B(M) is not same for conscious vs unconscious robots. >> >> >> So your formula does not apply. >> >> >> If you have a robot that you say is not conscious, yet in all respects >> >> acts >> >> as if it is, then there is consciousness involved. The mechanism >> >> doesn't >> >> matter. >> >> >> Consider, if the robot is just a clever tape recorder specifically >> >> programmed to answer my likely questions, then some conscious entity >> >> had >> >> to >> >> program it and record the responses. THAT'S the conscious entity I'm >> >> talking >> >> to via the robot. The robot is only the middle-man between me and >> >> another >> >> consciousness. I may confuse the robot for the conscious entity, but >> >> that >> >> doesn't mean I'm not talking to another consciousness. >> >> >> It's the same with any elaborate Eliza program you might want to >> >> construct. >> >> I'm talking to the programmer through the robot, even though the >> >> programmer >> >> may be long dead. >> >> >> And if you arrive at the robot through no artifice, meaning that it is >> >> constructed by unconscious nature with no intent, then by what >> >> authority >> >> do >> >> you declare it non-conscious if it acts like it is? >> >> >> > whether it is >> >> > or not couldn't be influencing its behaviour, >> >> >> But since it is influencing its behavior, your formula does not apply. >> >> >> > no more than it could >> >> > influence ours, if we were simply a biological mechanism following >> >> > the >> >> > laws of physics... >> >> >> ...with consciousness as part of that biological mechanism influencing >> >> the >> >> behavior. >> >> >> > It is implausible that we are, for reasons given to >> >> > you before. >> >> >> And your formula is as inapplicable as before. >> >> >> > You can choose to be totally illogical if you like, and to not face >> >> > reason. Though you won't be experiencing the physical world forever, >> >> > and you'll regret your choice. >> >> >> And if you're wrong, which is always possible, your continued >> >> insistence >> >> that this is the case is nothing more than your arrogant >> >> self-absorption >> >> talking. >> >> > The formula doesn't require a comparitive entity. It can be used in >> > regards to any physical entity. >> >> Any physical entity? >> >> Let's try it: >> >> M = A man >> B(M) = Walking around >> P = Legs >> >> How the fuck do you: >> >> "1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge >> of >> whether it has P or not." >> >> I don't know about you, but if I'm going to explain how a guy walks >> around, >> I'm gonna have to know if he has legs or not. >> >> "2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the >> explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P." >> >> I would think legs have something to do with walking around, and I don't >> think it's gonna be the same with or without them. >> >> Please explain how your formula applies. With the values I've plugged in, >> it >> doesn't make any sense. >> >> > You keep trying to talk about two >> > different mechanisms, and say well they act differently, but that is >> > like talking about a car and a toaster, and saying well the car has a >> > numberplate, and they act differently so the number plate is >> > influential. You need to face that the formula is true, and can be >> > shown to be so, when you stop trying to make B(M) or P different >> > between (1) and (2). Basically it cuts through the deception that you >> > were fooled by. >> >> Apply your formula to the entities I provided above. >> > > Er... you really are having trouble understanding this aren't you. Either that, or you're really bad at making others understand you. > Is > it the complexity of it, or is it that for it to be correct would mean > that you were wrong, and your ego won't let you face that you were > wrong? Gosh, no thought whatsoever that maybe the problem lies with you. > In your example (1) would not be true, you couldn't explain the man > walking around, without knowledge of whether he had legs or not. So your formula CANNOT be applied to "any physical entity". Were you lying when you said it could? "The formula doesn't require a comparitive entity. It can be used in regards to any physical entity." Perhaps you're suggesting that legs aren't physical. Or could this be another example of your mastery of the language that makes it so easy for others to understand you? -- Denis Loubet dloubet@io.com http//www.io.com/~dloubet Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 On 12 Jun, 00:09, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181598999.112030.3470@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > > On 11 Jun, 22:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >>news:1181593524.600437.247290@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> > On 11 Jun, 20:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >>news:1181583039.890628.118980@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> > On 11 Jun, 18:23, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >>news:1181581549.652693.254210@q66g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 16:43, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >>news:1181517234.889369.239710@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 00:05, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >> >>news:1181514806.543814.218460@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> > On 10 Jun, 20:36, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >> >> >>news:FNednZ5aMcoN3PHbnZ2dnUVZ_tmknZ2d@io.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in > >> >> >> >> >> >> > message > >> >> >> >> >> >> >news:1181471104.632034.40450@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On 10 Jun, 03:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>>news:1181440301.918077.327620@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > On 10 Jun, 02:15, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>news:1181417934.359700.133760@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > On 9 Jun, 08:25, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> > (snipped some of the older stuff) > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Can you understand the following: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > physics > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > reference requiring knowledge of whether it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > has > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Let's see, can I explain the behavior of my car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> knowing > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> if > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> has > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank or not by the laws of physics? > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Yes, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explain > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> both > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behaviors, and one of them will be correct. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Therefore > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > affect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > behaviour > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > M, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Well, personally I think gas in the tank > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> radically > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> affects > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> my car. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > else the explanation of behaviour could not be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without P(A) > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> The behavior of my car with gas in the tank is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explainable > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> by > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> physics, as is the behavior of my car without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> tank. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> But > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> somehow I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> only get places I need to get to in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> air-conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> comfort > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank. That's very different behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> from > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> isn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Gosh! How very odd! It seems your point 2 is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> completely > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> wrong > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> on > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> such > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> basic level that it's hard to comprehend how you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> function > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> society > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> at > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> all. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I take it you don't own a car? Please tell me > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> don't. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > You can substitute whatever physical entity > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > strictly > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > follows > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > known laws of physics for M, and any property > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > for > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > which > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > where > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > (1) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > would be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> My car says you're just plain stupid. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Your reponses have a certain entertainment value > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > guess. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Let me put it another way: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> No, why don't you address it the way you put it? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> And the way I answered it? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you too stupid or afraid to? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you a moron, a coward, or both? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car! > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> It gets me to my destination in air-conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort! > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Gas in the tank! > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > requiring > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car employs the laws of physics to get me to my > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> destination > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> air-conditioned comfort! > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M), > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > else > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Oddly, that doesn't match reality at all! When > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> there's > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> my car, I DON'T get to my destination in air > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort! > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> just sits there following the laws of physics. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Bummer! > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if (1) is true, then so is (2) > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car still says you're just plain stupid. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> How can my car, getting somewhere in air > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > To give you an example, just to make sure you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > have > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > no > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > excuses > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > for > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretending you can't grasp the point, and are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > misunderstanding > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > it: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = a car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = its serial number > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Which means: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explained > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > by > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > has a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > serial > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > number > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > parked > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > with its engine running, else the explanation of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > behaviour > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > could > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > be the same with or without a serial number. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> But if the situation is: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = my car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = gas in the tank > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Then suddenly your formula fails! Once the gas runs > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> out, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> longer > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> has a running engine. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Since (1) is true, so is (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Not if there's no gas in the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > So though I have tried to plug up the holes where > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > might > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > try > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretend to misunderstand, your ability to, still > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > does > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > give > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > some > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > artistic scope for disingenuity, which I'm sure > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > will > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > use > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > able. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> You're so stupid, my car is embarrassed for you. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > I pointed out: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > To which you replied: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > How can my car, getting somewhere in air conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > comfort, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in the tank all be the same thing? That's just > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > stupid. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > I assume this was just another example of your > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > disingenious > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > creativity. M isn't the same as B(M) which isn't the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > as > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > It > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > that M mentioned in (1) is the same as M mentioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2), > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned in (1) is the same as B(M) mentioned in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2), > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in (1) is the same as P mentioned in (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > If you can now understand this, you can see if (2) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > wasn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > because there was no gas in the tank, then (1) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > couldn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > have > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > been > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, as it getting you to your destination in air > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > couldn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > explained without gas in the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > You'll notice it also gets through your usual well > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > polished > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > deception > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in that it applies to and physical entity that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > strictly > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > follows > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > laws of physics, and doesn't require a comparison > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > entity. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > So here it is again, and hopefully you won't simply > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > grasping > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > at > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ways to misinterpret what is being said, but > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > actually > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > face > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > reason > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > for > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > once. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> My car. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> It's sitting there inert. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Gas in the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > requiring > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> The car sits there inert, according to the laws of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> physics. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Doesn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> matter > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> if there's gas in the tank or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect B(M), > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > else > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is exactly the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> as > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> in the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to buy gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> again! > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> can > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> drive > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> around > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> with or without gas. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Yup, your example sure matches reality. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Note that the above sentence is an admitted lie. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > It follows that if (1) is true, then so is (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Nope. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence the car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> sitting > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> there > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> inert, so (2) would be true. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > Until the key is turned in the ignition. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly false. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> Look, are you trying, in your own stupid and inept way, to > >> >> >> >> >> >> get > >> >> >> >> >> >> me > >> >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> >> say > >> >> >> >> >> >> that there are properties that have no effect on the > >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> thing > >> >> >> >> >> >> they're a property of? Well that's a big yes! Of COURSE > >> >> >> >> >> >> there > >> >> >> >> >> >> are > >> >> >> >> >> >> properties > >> >> >> >> >> >> that have no effect on behavior. Your example of the > >> >> >> >> >> >> serial > >> >> >> >> >> >> number, > >> >> >> >> >> >> for > >> >> >> >> >> >> example. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> So what? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> Are you dishonestly trying to equate the > >> >> >> >> >> >> irrelevant-to-behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> aspect > >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> serial number to the crucial-to-behavior aspect of > >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> experience? > >> >> >> >> >> >> If > >> >> >> >> >> >> you were honest, your examples would be either the car's > >> >> >> >> >> >> elecrtical > >> >> >> >> >> >> system > >> >> >> >> >> >> compared to subjective experience, or a serial number > >> >> >> >> >> >> compared > >> >> >> >> >> >> to a > >> >> >> >> >> >> tattoo. > >> >> >> >> >> >> The effects of subjective experience on behavior are not > >> >> >> >> >> >> subtle, > >> >> >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >> do > >> >> >> >> >> >> not > >> >> >> >> >> >> conceptually map to the irrelevancy of a serial number. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> I think that subjective experience is the action of > >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> matter > >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> physical brains following the laws of physics. The > >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> experience > >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> not apart from that physical action. Subjective Experience > >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> simply a > >> >> >> >> >> >> name > >> >> >> >> >> >> we apply to a certain catagory of physical actions found > >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> brains. > >> >> >> >> >> >> It > >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> subset, not an "extra thing", somehow apart from the > >> >> >> >> >> >> normal > >> >> >> >> >> >> operation > >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> brain. It IS the normal operation of the brain. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> If you remove it from the operation of the brain, you > >> >> >> >> >> >> would > >> >> >> >> >> >> expect > >> >> >> >> >> >> radically > >> >> >> >> >> >> different behavior, just like you would expect if you > >> >> >> >> >> >> ripped > >> >> >> >> >> >> out > >> >> >> >> >> >> crucial > >> >> >> >> >> >> subroutines from a computer program. Without subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, > >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> human brain is no longer operating normally, even though > >> >> >> >> >> >> it > >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> still, > >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> course, operating according to the laws of physics. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> I know it was pointless of me to type > > >> >> >> >> >> > Subjective experiences are a label to what you actually > >> >> >> >> >> > consciously > >> >> >> >> >> > experience. > > >> >> >> >> >> Which is matter in the brain operating according to physical > >> >> >> >> >> law. > > >> >> >> >> >> > That the brain is directly responsible for them is an > >> >> >> >> >> > assertion. > > >> >> >> >> >> No, it's a conclusion based on evidence. If you physically > >> >> >> >> >> manipulate > >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> brain, you manipulate consciousness. > > >> >> >> >> >> > I can't say it is an explanation, as there could be no > >> >> >> >> >> > explanation from your perspective why any physical activity > >> >> >> >> >> > would > >> >> >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> >> > subjectively experienced, or why it wasn't just > >> >> >> >> >> > fluctuations > >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> > colour green for example, the brightness dependent on the > >> >> >> >> >> > amount > >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> > neurons firing. Nothing in your perspective would know what > >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> > neuron > >> >> >> >> >> > state represented. > > >> >> >> >> >> That's where your ability to communicate breaks down > >> >> >> >> >> entirely. > >> >> >> >> >> What > >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> fuck > >> >> >> >> >> are you babbling about? "Fluctuations of the color green"? > >> >> >> >> >> Are > >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> on > >> >> >> >> >> drugs? > > >> >> >> >> >> > The point was that even if you wanted to believe in the > >> >> >> >> >> > story > >> >> >> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> >> > we > >> >> >> >> >> > were simply biological mechanisms, and that our subjective > >> >> >> >> >> > experiences > >> >> >> >> >> > were an emergent property of the brain. The emergent > >> >> >> >> >> > property > >> >> >> >> >> > couldn't > >> >> >> >> >> > be said to be influential in behaviour due to: > > >> >> >> >> >> I was right, you're going to ignore what I post and write > >> >> >> >> >> your > >> >> >> >> >> fucking > >> >> >> >> >> formula again. > > >> >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) > >> >> >> >> >> > and > >> >> >> >> >> > (2), > >> >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without > >> >> >> >> >> > requiring > >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> Then P and/or B has to be pretty fucking trivial. Like a > >> >> >> >> >> serial > >> >> >> >> >> number, > >> >> >> >> >> or > >> >> >> >> >> being inert. > > >> >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect > >> >> >> >> >> > B(M), > >> >> >> >> >> > else > >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or > >> >> >> >> >> > without > >> >> >> >> >> > P. > > >> >> >> >> >> Yeah, you can concoct a scenario that fulfills these > >> >> >> >> >> criteria. > >> >> >> >> >> Big > >> >> >> >> >> deal. > > >> >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > >> >> >> >> >> Suppose I agree. So what? This little formula cannot be > >> >> >> >> >> applied > >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> non-trivial properties and behaviors. If the property is > >> >> >> >> >> non-trivial, > >> >> >> >> >> then > >> >> >> >> >> it will affect behavior, and your formula cannot be applied. > > >> >> >> >> >> So, how DO you deal with properties that DO affect behavior? > >> >> >> >> >> Do > >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> just > >> >> >> >> >> pretend they don't exist? > > >> >> >> >> >> > The story that our subjective experiences have no influence > >> >> >> >> >> > on > >> >> >> >> >> > our > >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour is implausible, > > >> >> >> >> >> From my perspective, you've been arguing against that. I > >> >> >> >> >> think > >> >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> >> subjective experience influences our behavior. > > >> >> >> >> >> > even though you bet your soul on it, unable > >> >> >> >> >> > to see through the deception, and still cling to it, even > >> >> >> >> >> > if > >> >> >> >> >> > you > >> >> >> >> >> > have > >> >> >> >> >> > to disingeniously misunderstand. > > >> >> >> >> >> You have not demonstrated that. > > >> >> >> >> >> > That you can't face that you were > >> >> >> >> >> > wrong, and that you are shown to be so through reason, > >> >> >> >> >> > appears > >> >> >> >> >> > to > >> >> >> >> >> > me > >> >> >> >> >> > as pathetic. > > >> >> >> >> >> Or perhaps it's you that's completely wrong. Have you even > >> >> >> >> >> considered > >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> possibility? > > >> >> >> >> >> I'm guessing not. > > >> >> >> >> > It is implausible that we simply are a biological mechanism > >> >> >> >> > simply > >> >> >> >> > following the laws of physics. For that reason alone I could > >> >> >> >> > know > >> >> >> >> > I > >> >> >> >> > wasn't wrong. > > >> >> >> >> So you determine if you're right about something based on > >> >> >> >> nothing > >> >> >> >> but > >> >> >> >> arbitrary feelings? > > >> >> >> >> That explains a lot. > > >> >> >> >> > It is implausible, because it would require our behaviour, > >> >> >> >> > including > >> >> >> >> > even questioning whether a robot had subjective experiences, > >> >> >> >> > would > >> >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> > uninfluenced by us having subjective experiences. This is > >> >> >> >> > shown > >> >> >> >> > by: > > >> >> >> >> No, it's influenced by subjective experience. > > >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) > >> >> >> >> > and > >> >> >> >> > (2), > >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), > >> >> >> >> > else > >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without > >> >> >> >> > P. > > >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > >> >> >> >> Lets see if we can apply this stupidity to something that > >> >> >> >> affects > >> >> >> >> behavior. > >> >> >> >> Can you apply it to reflexes? Oops, no, there's a difference in > >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> if > >> >> >> >> you have reflexes compared to you not having reflexes. If you > >> >> >> >> can't > >> >> >> >> apply > >> >> >> >> your little formula to reflexes, what makes you think you can > >> >> >> >> apply > >> >> >> >> it > >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> consciousness? > > >> >> >> >> > Without the assertion that we were a biological mechanism > >> >> >> >> > simply > >> >> >> >> > following the laws of physics, there would be no reason to > >> >> >> >> > assume > >> >> >> >> > anything following the laws of physics subjectively > >> >> >> >> > experienced, > > >> >> >> >> I'm a biological mechanism simply following the laws of physics > >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> I > >> >> >> >> subjectively experience, therefore I conclude that biological > >> >> >> >> mechanisms > >> >> >> >> following the laws of can subjectively experience. > > >> >> >> >> > therefore what reason would the biological mechanism (if the > >> >> >> >> > assertion > >> >> >> >> > were made) have for considering such a thing uninfluenced by > >> >> >> >> > it > >> >> >> >> > having > >> >> >> >> > subjective experiences. > > >> >> >> >> This one doesn't. This one observes that it's subjective > >> >> >> >> experiences > >> >> >> >> influence its behavior. > > >> >> >> >> > You were wrong get used to it. Stop being so pathetic about > >> >> >> >> > it. > > >> >> >> >> You're not stating my position. Why would your criticizism of a > >> >> >> >> position > >> >> >> >> I > >> >> >> >> do not hold show that I am wrong? > > >> >> >> > If you changed the property to one that behaviour couldn't be > >> >> >> > explained without knowledge of, then (1) wouldn't be true. > > >> >> >> Which means you can't apply your formula to reflexes, right? > > >> >> >> So why do you think you can apply it to consciousness? The > >> >> >> behaviors > >> >> >> of > >> >> >> conscious and unconscious things, in real life, is pretty fucking > >> >> >> different. > >> >> >> The unconscious ones lie inert while the conscious ones run about. > >> >> >> According > >> >> >> to (1) of your formula, you can't apply it to consciousness. > > >> >> >> > You have already admitted that though you could know the > >> >> >> > mechanism > >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> > the robot (and therefore be able to explain its behaviour) you > >> >> >> > wouldn't have knowledge of whether it has subjective experiences > >> >> >> > or > >> >> >> > not. I asked you before: > > >> >> >> Is this an argument about my state of ignorance concerning if > >> >> >> something > >> >> >> is > >> >> >> conscious or not? > > >> >> >> That has fuck-all to do with anything. My state of ignorance has > >> >> >> nothing > >> >> >> to > >> >> >> do with whether something is conscious or not, or what the source > >> >> >> of > >> >> >> that > >> >> >> consciousnsess is. > > >> >> >> > ------------ > >> >> >> > Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, one > >> >> >> > thing > >> >> >> > you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective > >> >> >> > experiences > >> >> >> > or > >> >> >> > not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in your > >> >> >> > knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact. > >> >> >> > ------------ > > >> >> >> > To which you replied: > >> >> >> > ------------ > >> >> >> > I fucking understand that you twit. > >> >> >> > ------------ > > >> >> >> > The question is can you face the truth, or are you going to > >> >> >> > continue > >> >> >> > to grasp at straws, hoping that they will enable you to avoid it, > >> >> >> > instead of making you look more and more pathetic. > > >> >> >> The truth would be that if it acts like it's conscious, I'll call > >> >> >> it > >> >> >> conscious. That's my prerogative. > > >> >> > The point was outlined in the reason, you are unable to face: > > >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else > >> >> > the > >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > >> >> > So with the robot, since it's behaviour can be explained without > >> >> > requiring knowledge of whether it is conscious or not, > > >> >> Ok, you asked for it. > > >> >> B(M) is not same for conscious vs unconscious robots. > > >> >> So your formula does not apply. > > >> >> If you have a robot that you say is not conscious, yet in all respects > >> >> acts > >> >> as if it is, then there is consciousness involved. The mechanism > >> >> doesn't > >> >> matter. > > >> >> Consider, if the robot is just a clever tape recorder specifically > >> >> programmed to answer my likely questions, then some conscious entity > >> >> had > >> >> to > >> >> program it and record the responses. THAT'S the conscious entity I'm > >> >> talking > >> >> to via the robot. The robot is only the middle-man between me and > >> >> another > >> >> consciousness. I may confuse the robot for the conscious entity, but > >> >> that > >> >> doesn't mean I'm not talking to another consciousness. > > >> >> It's the same with any elaborate Eliza program you might want to > >> >> construct. > >> >> I'm talking to the programmer through the robot, even though the > >> >> programmer > >> >> may be long dead. > > >> >> And if you arrive at the robot through no artifice, meaning that it is > >> >> constructed by unconscious nature with no intent, then by what > >> >> authority > >> >> do > >> >> you declare it non-conscious if it acts like it is? > > >> >> > whether it is > >> >> > or not couldn't be influencing its behaviour, > > >> >> But since it is influencing its behavior, your formula does not apply. > > >> >> > no more than it could > >> >> > influence ours, if we were simply a biological mechanism following > >> >> > the > >> >> > laws of physics... > > >> >> ...with consciousness as part of that biological mechanism influencing > >> >> the > >> >> behavior. > > >> >> > It is implausible that we are, for reasons given to > >> >> > you before. > > >> >> And your formula is as inapplicable as before. > > >> >> > You can choose to be totally illogical if you like, and to not face > >> >> > reason. Though you won't be experiencing the physical world forever, > >> >> > and you'll regret your choice. > > >> >> And if you're wrong, which is always possible, your continued > >> >> insistence > >> >> that this is the case is nothing more than your arrogant > >> >> self-absorption > >> >> talking. > > >> > The formula doesn't require a comparitive entity. It can be used in > >> > regards to any physical entity. > > >> Any physical entity? > > >> Let's try it: > > >> M = A man > >> B(M) = Walking around > >> P = Legs > > >> How the fuck do you: > > >> "1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge > >> of > >> whether it has P or not." > > >> I don't know about you, but if I'm going to explain how a guy walks > >> around, > >> I'm gonna have to know if he has legs or not. > > >> "2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > >> explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P." > > >> I would think legs have something to do with walking around, and I don't > >> think it's gonna be the same with or without them. > > >> Please explain how your formula applies. With the values I've plugged in, > >> it > >> doesn't make any sense. > > >> > You keep trying to talk about two > >> > different mechanisms, and say well they act differently, but that is > >> > like talking about a car and a toaster, and saying well the car has a > >> > numberplate, and they act differently so the number plate is > >> > influential. You need to face that the formula is true, and can be > >> > shown to be so, when you stop trying to make B(M) or P different > >> > between (1) and (2). Basically it cuts through the deception that you > >> > were fooled by. > > >> Apply your formula to the entities I provided above. > > > Er... you really are having trouble understanding this aren't you. > > Either that, or you're really bad at making others understand you. > > > Is > > it the complexity of it, or is it that for it to be correct would mean > > that you were wrong, and your ego won't let you face that you were > > wrong? > > Gosh, no thought whatsoever that maybe the problem lies with you. > > > In your example (1) would not be true, you couldn't explain the man > > walking around, without knowledge of whether he had legs or not. > > So your formula CANNOT be applied to "any physical entity". > > Were you lying when you said it could? "The formula doesn't require a > comparitive entity. It can be used in regards to any physical entity." > > Perhaps you're suggesting that legs aren't physical. Or could this be > another example of your mastery of the language that makes it so easy for > others to understand you? > Yes it can be applied to any physical entity. The point is that only when (1) is true, (2) is true. Obviously where (1) is false as in your example then (2) would also be false. The point was never that (1) is always true. Can you understand it now? You can ask for clarification on it if you like, after all it would be silly of you to be stating that it wasn't true, if it was just a case of you not understanding it. Quote
Guest Matt Silberstein Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 15:36:05 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> in <1181601365.782001.291660@q69g2000hsb.googlegroups.com> wrote: >On 11 Jun, 23:16, Matt Silberstein ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 14:48:54 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> >> >> >> <1181598534.195254.186...@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >On 11 Jun, 22:04, Matt Silberstein >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 13:46:24 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> <1181594784.494509.169...@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> >On 11 Jun, 21:38, Matt Silberstein >> >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 09:35:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com >> >> >> >> in <1181579719.193969.12...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> >> >On Jun 11, 10:43 am, Matt Silberstein >> >> >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sat, 09 Jun 2007 12:02:52 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> >> >> <1181415772.483273.54...@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> [snip] >> >> >> >> >> >It had nothing to do with determinism. >> >> >> >> >> >The reasoning is summarised below, but was outlined in more depth in >> >> >> >> >the part of the post you snipped. >> >> >> >> >> >1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics without >> >> >> >> >requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not. >> >> >> >> >> >Therefore >> >> >> >> >> >2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not influence the behaviour of M, >> >> >> >> >else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or >> >> >> >> >without P(A) >> >> >> >> >> >You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly follows the >> >> >> >> >known laws of physics for M, and any property for P(A) where (1) would >> >> >> >> >be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2). >> >> >> >> >> But the counter argument is that P(A) is an aspect of the behavior to >> >> >> >> explain. >> >> >> >> >Then you have simply rejected premise (1) of the argument -- >> >> >> >explanation of the behavior of M requires knowledge of whether it has >> >> >> >P(A). >> >> >> >> Not quite. I would say that AFAICT I would include SE as part of my >> >> >> discussion of the behavior. I would end up describing the SE as >> >> >> internal state and processes. So I don't need a priori knowledge that >> >> >> the SE exists, but it does seem sufficiently important to the >> >> >> individual that no description of behavior would work without taking >> >> >> it into account. >> >> >> >> (Note that the related question of the behavior of groups does not >> >> >> require knowledge of the SE of the individual.) >> >> >> >> >> More to the point I would argue that we can't explain M >> >> >> >> without having P(A) as part of the description and the explanation. >> >> >> >> >The counter to your counter would go: what evidence have you that >> >> >> >subjective experience is found anywhere in the laws of physics? Are >> >> >> >you relying on a Schroedinger's Cat thought-experiment (which is not >> >> >> >evidence by itself btw) or something? >> >> >> >> I rely on the large number of experiences we have with physical >> >> >> actions affecting internal states. I rely on the enormous number of >> >> >> neurological experiments showing physical actions affect subjective >> >> >> experience. >> >> >> >With a robot though you can surely see that its behaviour could be >> >> >explained without knowledge of whether it had subjective experiences >> >> >or not, >> >> >> I don't see why. My claim, in fact, is that if a robot acts >> >> sufficiently human for me to think it has subjective experience then >> >> it probably does have subjective experience. Why don't you tell me why >> >> you know that we can explain the robot behavior without referring to >> >> SE. >> >> >> >and therefore, as shown, whether it did or didn't that >> >> >particular property couldn't be said to be influential. Is it that you >> >> >were sure that you would never be shown to be wrong causing you a >> >> >problem in facing that it has happened? >> >> >> No. >> >> >Well because we can simply just explain how the mechanism of the robot >> >works, same as we could explain how a car or mobile phone works. We >> >don't require knowledge of whether it was subjectively experiencing or >> >not. >> >> That is just an assertion. Sorry, but this is not a logical construct, >> it requires some empirical work. Have you read the work on the Turing >> Test or even the Chinese Room? Those help set some of the >> philosophical boundaries here, but you still have to do the work. If >> we have a robot that seem to have some large set of human like >> qualities you don't know that we can explain it without explaining >> and/or describing something very much like subjective experience. >> > >Well let's say for arguments sake, there was a robot, following the >known laws of physics, driven by a neural network which had a million >more nodes than you have neurons in your brain. Each node wrote out to >a log the messages it received, and the messages it sent out, and the >message contained information such as time sent, time received, source >node, destination node (which might be the same as the source node for >feedback messages), the message etc. Then after an hour converstation >with it, a bank of computers could go through the logs confirming that >no unexplained messages appeared, and that each node followed the laws >of physics as expected, giving the outputs expected given the inputs. >If necessary even if it took a thousand years, the behaviour of the >robot could be explained without knowledge of whether it had any >subjective experiences or not. Simply in terms of the configuration of >the nodes, and the inputs they received, and how the nodes worked. Ok, so lets suppose this. >The only assertion is yours, that we are a biological mechanism >strictly following the laws of physics. You are just having problems >accepting that it is shown that this is implausible, Excuse me, somehow you went from the "suppose" to a conclusion. You did not offer an argument, you just went from supposing some situation about robots, and then concluded something about people. That is not even a bad argument, it is no argument at all. You did not show anything, you just gave a preliminary supposition. I could point out some problems with the supposition, but why bother since you don't build on the supposition, you just assert it. >as without the >subjective experiences influencing our behaviour, it could only be >coincidental that the human we experience being was perhaps talking >about them or wondering whether the robot had similar experiences or >not. I think you are going to have to tell me what you mean by "subjective experience" because the above just does not make sense to me. -- Matt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" Quote
Guest Matt Silberstein Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 15:05:09 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> in <1181599509.977306.20560@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: >On 11 Jun, 22:51, Matt Silberstein ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 14:23:10 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com >> >> >> >> >> >> in <1181596990.691238.117...@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >On Jun 11, 4:38 pm, Matt Silberstein >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 09:35:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com >> >> >> in <1181579719.193969.12...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> >On Jun 11, 10:43 am, Matt Silberstein >> >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> >> On Sat, 09 Jun 2007 12:02:52 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> >> <1181415772.483273.54...@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> [snip] >> >> >> >> >It had nothing to do with determinism. >> >> >> >> >The reasoning is summarised below, but was outlined in more depth in >> >> >> >the part of the post you snipped. >> >> >> >> >1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics without >> >> >> >requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not. >> >> >> >> >Therefore >> >> >> >> >2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not influence the behaviour of M, >> >> >> >else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or >> >> >> >without P(A) >> >> >> >> >You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly follows the >> >> >> >known laws of physics for M, and any property for P(A) where (1) would >> >> >> >be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2). >> >> >> >> But the counter argument is that P(A) is an aspect of the behavior to >> >> >> explain. >> >> >> >Then you have simply rejected premise (1) of the argument -- >> >> >explanation of the behavior of M requires knowledge of whether it has >> >> >P(A). >> >> >> Not quite. I would say that AFAICT I would include SE as part of my >> >> discussion of the behavior. >> >> >Any behavior? Like the behavior of your PC, say? >> >> No, the topic was behavior of people, not any behavior at all. >> >> > You do realize the >> >argument is a general one for any mechanism whose operation is fully >> >explained by the laws of physics, right? >> >> And I was discussing how it was not an appropriate claim in this case. >> >> >I guess the question is, what are you talking about now? What >> >behavior? (It seems that you might be trying to slip in an >> >unwarranted exception for certain types of subjectively-judged >> >behavior here.) >> >> No, I am saying that the claim (1) does not apply when we put in the >> issues here. Let us look at one again: >> >> 1) The behavior of M is explained by the laws of physics without >> requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not. >> >> That would apply in some cases and not in others. That is, if we have >> some thing M and some property P, sometimes P is a property of M and >> sometimes not. That is an empirical question, not a logical one. >> >> >> I would end up describing the SE as >> >> internal state and processes. So I don't need a priori knowledge that >> >> the SE exists, but it does seem sufficiently important to the >> >> individual that no description of behavior would work without taking >> >> it into account. >> >> >The criterion (of whether to try to explain SE) is how important it >> >seems to an individual?? What individual? >> >> You mis-read that sentence so let me reword it: Subjective experience >> seems sufficiently significant an aspect of human behavior that I >> doubt that we can provide a physical description/analysis without also >> explaining/accounting for SE. >> >> >How do you know how >> >important SE seems to an individual (like e.g. your PC)? And could >> >you possibly have anything more unscientific/unverifiable as a >> >criterion? >> >> In this case "important" is a short hand for a large amount of >> information about the necessity to account for human internal states >> when discussing human behavior. In order to properly describe and >> predict human actions we need to have some "theory of the mind" that >> models the SE. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> (Note that the related question of the behavior of groups does not >> >> require knowledge of the SE of the individual.) >> >> >> >> More to the point I would argue that we can't explain M >> >> >> without having P(A) as part of the description and the explanation. >> >> >> >The counter to your counter would go: what evidence have you that >> >> >subjective experience is found anywhere in the laws of physics? Are >> >> >you relying on a Schroedinger's Cat thought-experiment (which is not >> >> >evidence by itself btw) or something? >> >> >> I rely on the large number of experiences we have with physical >> >> actions affecting internal states. I rely on the enormous number of >> >> neurological experiments showing physical actions affect subjective >> >> experience. >> >> >That is evidence only for physical influence _on_ SE, not evidence at >> >all that SE _is_ a part of the laws of physics. (Again, we are >> >talking about explanations/influences _on_ physical behavior, not >> >physical influences on subjective experience.) >> >> SE is not part of the laws of physics any more than the Moon is part >> of the laws of physics. And you are now hand waving about some magical >> process that is somehow not physical but affected by wide range of >> physical things. Show me some examples of SE that does not have a >> physical instantiation. >> > >I'm not even bringing into the converstation at the moment what >reality actually is, I am just pointing out the implausibility of the >story that we are simply a biological mechanism strictly following the >laws of physics. You haven't started to do that. >As for your point about that P might not be a property of M, well yes, >you could rewrite it as F (a factor), such as wind in the behaviour of >a flying kite for example (where (1) would not be true) as opposed to >whether I was in fact the person that ate all the pies in Mrs Miggins >pie shop (where (1) would be true, and so would (2) ). >It still doesn't seem to have sunk in yet, that it is not that our >experience is a deception, we do influence the behaviour of the human >we experience being. It is that it is implausible that we can be >explained as being simply a biological mechanism following the laws of >physics. So you keep asserting, but you have yet to provide an actual argument. You give a supposition and you give a conclusion, but no logical steps from accepted givens to results. -- Matt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 On 12 Jun, 00:40, Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 15:36:05 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > <1181601365.782001.291...@q69g2000hsb.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >On 11 Jun, 23:16, Matt Silberstein > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 14:48:54 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> <1181598534.195254.186...@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> >On 11 Jun, 22:04, Matt Silberstein > >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 13:46:24 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> >> <1181594784.494509.169...@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> >> >On 11 Jun, 21:38, Matt Silberstein > >> >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 09:35:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com > > >> >> >> in <1181579719.193969.12...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >On Jun 11, 10:43 am, Matt Silberstein > >> >> >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> On Sat, 09 Jun 2007 12:02:52 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> >> >> >> <1181415772.483273.54...@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > >> >> >> >> [snip] > > >> >> >> >> >It had nothing to do with determinism. > > >> >> >> >> >The reasoning is summarised below, but was outlined in more depth in > >> >> >> >> >the part of the post you snipped. > > >> >> >> >> >1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics without > >> >> >> >> >requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not. > > >> >> >> >> >Therefore > > >> >> >> >> >2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not influence the behaviour of M, > >> >> >> >> >else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or > >> >> >> >> >without P(A) > > >> >> >> >> >You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly follows the > >> >> >> >> >known laws of physics for M, and any property for P(A) where (1) would > >> >> >> >> >be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2). > > >> >> >> >> But the counter argument is that P(A) is an aspect of the behavior to > >> >> >> >> explain. > > >> >> >> >Then you have simply rejected premise (1) of the argument -- > >> >> >> >explanation of the behavior of M requires knowledge of whether it has > >> >> >> >P(A). > > >> >> >> Not quite. I would say that AFAICT I would include SE as part of my > >> >> >> discussion of the behavior. I would end up describing the SE as > >> >> >> internal state and processes. So I don't need a priori knowledge that > >> >> >> the SE exists, but it does seem sufficiently important to the > >> >> >> individual that no description of behavior would work without taking > >> >> >> it into account. > > >> >> >> (Note that the related question of the behavior of groups does not > >> >> >> require knowledge of the SE of the individual.) > > >> >> >> >> More to the point I would argue that we can't explain M > >> >> >> >> without having P(A) as part of the description and the explanation. > > >> >> >> >The counter to your counter would go: what evidence have you that > >> >> >> >subjective experience is found anywhere in the laws of physics? Are > >> >> >> >you relying on a Schroedinger's Cat thought-experiment (which is not > >> >> >> >evidence by itself btw) or something? > > >> >> >> I rely on the large number of experiences we have with physical > >> >> >> actions affecting internal states. I rely on the enormous number of > >> >> >> neurological experiments showing physical actions affect subjective > >> >> >> experience. > > >> >> >With a robot though you can surely see that its behaviour could be > >> >> >explained without knowledge of whether it had subjective experiences > >> >> >or not, > > >> >> I don't see why. My claim, in fact, is that if a robot acts > >> >> sufficiently human for me to think it has subjective experience then > >> >> it probably does have subjective experience. Why don't you tell me why > >> >> you know that we can explain the robot behavior without referring to > >> >> SE. > > >> >> >and therefore, as shown, whether it did or didn't that > >> >> >particular property couldn't be said to be influential. Is it that you > >> >> >were sure that you would never be shown to be wrong causing you a > >> >> >problem in facing that it has happened? > > >> >> No. > > >> >Well because we can simply just explain how the mechanism of the robot > >> >works, same as we could explain how a car or mobile phone works. We > >> >don't require knowledge of whether it was subjectively experiencing or > >> >not. > > >> That is just an assertion. Sorry, but this is not a logical construct, > >> it requires some empirical work. Have you read the work on the Turing > >> Test or even the Chinese Room? Those help set some of the > >> philosophical boundaries here, but you still have to do the work. If > >> we have a robot that seem to have some large set of human like > >> qualities you don't know that we can explain it without explaining > >> and/or describing something very much like subjective experience. > > >Well let's say for arguments sake, there was a robot, following the > >known laws of physics, driven by a neural network which had a million > >more nodes than you have neurons in your brain. Each node wrote out to > >a log the messages it received, and the messages it sent out, and the > >message contained information such as time sent, time received, source > >node, destination node (which might be the same as the source node for > >feedback messages), the message etc. Then after an hour converstation > >with it, a bank of computers could go through the logs confirming that > >no unexplained messages appeared, and that each node followed the laws > >of physics as expected, giving the outputs expected given the inputs. > >If necessary even if it took a thousand years, the behaviour of the > >robot could be explained without knowledge of whether it had any > >subjective experiences or not. Simply in terms of the configuration of > >the nodes, and the inputs they received, and how the nodes worked. > > Ok, so lets suppose this. > > >The only assertion is yours, that we are a biological mechanism > >strictly following the laws of physics. You are just having problems > >accepting that it is shown that this is implausible, > > Excuse me, somehow you went from the "suppose" to a conclusion. You > did not offer an argument, you just went from supposing some situation > about robots, and then concluded something about people. That is not > even a bad argument, it is no argument at all. You did not show > anything, you just gave a preliminary supposition. I could point out > some problems with the supposition, but why bother since you don't > build on the supposition, you just assert it. > > >as without the > >subjective experiences influencing our behaviour, it could only be > >coincidental that the human we experience being was perhaps talking > >about them or wondering whether the robot had similar experiences or > >not. > > I think you are going to have to tell me what you mean by "subjective > experience" because the above just does not make sense to me. > By subjective experiences, I every experience you or anybody else has had, without any assumption that the human you experience being is essentially you. In the sense that you don't subjectively experience brain activity which may be labelled subconsious, or what an individual white blood cell is doing etc. Do you think you understand what I am referring to? The example was just an illustration of if you it was possible that a robot following the known laws of physics ever had subjective experiences, that the they in themselves could not be influential. Though mainly it addressed your response to where I said: ---------- Well because we can simply just explain how the mechanism of the robot works, same as we could explain how a car or mobile phone works. We don't require knowledge of whether it was subjectively experiencing or not. ---------- And you replied: ---------- That is just an assertion. Sorry, but this is not a logical construct, it requires some empirical work. ---------- You can see in the example, it isn't just an assertion, because we can explain how the mechanism works, we don't require any knowledge of whether it was subjectively experiencing or not. How could you or anyone else contest that the the robot in the examples behaviour could be explained simply in terms of the configuration of the nodes, and the inputs they received, and how the nodes worked? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 On 12 Jun, 00:41, Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 15:05:09 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > <1181599509.977306.20...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >On 11 Jun, 22:51, Matt Silberstein > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 14:23:10 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com > > >> in <1181596990.691238.117...@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> >On Jun 11, 4:38 pm, Matt Silberstein > >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 09:35:19 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com > > >> >> in <1181579719.193969.12...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> >> >On Jun 11, 10:43 am, Matt Silberstein > >> >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On Sat, 09 Jun 2007 12:02:52 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> >> >> <1181415772.483273.54...@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > >> >> >> [snip] > > >> >> >> >It had nothing to do with determinism. > > >> >> >> >The reasoning is summarised below, but was outlined in more depth in > >> >> >> >the part of the post you snipped. > > >> >> >> >1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics without > >> >> >> >requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not. > > >> >> >> >Therefore > > >> >> >> >2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not influence the behaviour of M, > >> >> >> >else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or > >> >> >> >without P(A) > > >> >> >> >You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly follows the > >> >> >> >known laws of physics for M, and any property for P(A) where (1) would > >> >> >> >be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2). > > >> >> >> But the counter argument is that P(A) is an aspect of the behavior to > >> >> >> explain. > > >> >> >Then you have simply rejected premise (1) of the argument -- > >> >> >explanation of the behavior of M requires knowledge of whether it has > >> >> >P(A). > > >> >> Not quite. I would say that AFAICT I would include SE as part of my > >> >> discussion of the behavior. > > >> >Any behavior? Like the behavior of your PC, say? > > >> No, the topic was behavior of people, not any behavior at all. > > >> > You do realize the > >> >argument is a general one for any mechanism whose operation is fully > >> >explained by the laws of physics, right? > > >> And I was discussing how it was not an appropriate claim in this case. > > >> >I guess the question is, what are you talking about now? What > >> >behavior? (It seems that you might be trying to slip in an > >> >unwarranted exception for certain types of subjectively-judged > >> >behavior here.) > > >> No, I am saying that the claim (1) does not apply when we put in the > >> issues here. Let us look at one again: > > >> 1) The behavior of M is explained by the laws of physics without > >> requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not. > > >> That would apply in some cases and not in others. That is, if we have > >> some thing M and some property P, sometimes P is a property of M and > >> sometimes not. That is an empirical question, not a logical one. > > >> >> I would end up describing the SE as > >> >> internal state and processes. So I don't need a priori knowledge that > >> >> the SE exists, but it does seem sufficiently important to the > >> >> individual that no description of behavior would work without taking > >> >> it into account. > > >> >The criterion (of whether to try to explain SE) is how important it > >> >seems to an individual?? What individual? > > >> You mis-read that sentence so let me reword it: Subjective experience > >> seems sufficiently significant an aspect of human behavior that I > >> doubt that we can provide a physical description/analysis without also > >> explaining/accounting for SE. > > >> >How do you know how > >> >important SE seems to an individual (like e.g. your PC)? And could > >> >you possibly have anything more unscientific/unverifiable as a > >> >criterion? > > >> In this case "important" is a short hand for a large amount of > >> information about the necessity to account for human internal states > >> when discussing human behavior. In order to properly describe and > >> predict human actions we need to have some "theory of the mind" that > >> models the SE. > > >> >> (Note that the related question of the behavior of groups does not > >> >> require knowledge of the SE of the individual.) > > >> >> >> More to the point I would argue that we can't explain M > >> >> >> without having P(A) as part of the description and the explanation. > > >> >> >The counter to your counter would go: what evidence have you that > >> >> >subjective experience is found anywhere in the laws of physics? Are > >> >> >you relying on a Schroedinger's Cat thought-experiment (which is not > >> >> >evidence by itself btw) or something? > > >> >> I rely on the large number of experiences we have with physical > >> >> actions affecting internal states. I rely on the enormous number of > >> >> neurological experiments showing physical actions affect subjective > >> >> experience. > > >> >That is evidence only for physical influence _on_ SE, not evidence at > >> >all that SE _is_ a part of the laws of physics. (Again, we are > >> >talking about explanations/influences _on_ physical behavior, not > >> >physical influences on subjective experience.) > > >> SE is not part of the laws of physics any more than the Moon is part > >> of the laws of physics. And you are now hand waving about some magical > >> process that is somehow not physical but affected by wide range of > >> physical things. Show me some examples of SE that does not have a > >> physical instantiation. > > >I'm not even bringing into the converstation at the moment what > >reality actually is, I am just pointing out the implausibility of the > >story that we are simply a biological mechanism strictly following the > >laws of physics. > > You haven't started to do that. > > >As for your point about that P might not be a property of M, well yes, > >you could rewrite it as F (a factor), such as wind in the behaviour of > >a flying kite for example (where (1) would not be true) as opposed to > >whether I was in fact the person that ate all the pies in Mrs Miggins > >pie shop (where (1) would be true, and so would (2) ). > >It still doesn't seem to have sunk in yet, that it is not that our > >experience is a deception, we do influence the behaviour of the human > >we experience being. It is that it is implausible that we can be > >explained as being simply a biological mechanism following the laws of > >physics. > > So you keep asserting, but you have yet to provide an actual argument. > You give a supposition and you give a conclusion, but no logical steps > from accepted givens to results. > I have provided reason: M refers to the physical entity in question. B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. P refers to the a property in question. Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has P or not. 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. If (1) is true, then (2) is true. If it wasn't true, then why can't you or anyone else provide an example of where it wouldn't be? Quote
Guest Denis Loubet Posted June 11, 2007 Posted June 11, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181603668.494011.312460@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > On 12 Jun, 00:09, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1181598999.112030.3470@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> > On 11 Jun, 22:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >>news:1181593524.600437.247290@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >>news:1181583039.890628.118980@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 18:23, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >>news:1181581549.652693.254210@q66g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 16:43, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181517234.889369.239710@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 00:05, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181514806.543814.218460@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 10 Jun, 20:36, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:FNednZ5aMcoN3PHbnZ2dnUVZ_tmknZ2d@io.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >news:1181471104.632034.40450@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On 10 Jun, 03:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>>news:1181440301.918077.327620@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > On 10 Jun, 02:15, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>news:1181417934.359700.133760@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > On 9 Jun, 08:25, "Denis Loubet" >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (snipped some of the older stuff) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Can you understand the following: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 1) The behaviour of M is explained by the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > physics >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > reference requiring knowledge of whether it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > has >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Let's see, can I explain the behavior of my >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> knowing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> has >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank or not by the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> physics? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Yes, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explain >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> both >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behaviors, and one of them will be correct. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Therefore >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > M, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Well, personally I think gas in the tank >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> radically >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> affects >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> my car. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > else the explanation of behaviour could not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without P(A) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> The behavior of my car with gas in the tank >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explainable >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> by >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> physics, as is the behavior of my car without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> But >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> somehow I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> only get places I need to get to in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> air-conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> comfort >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank. That's very different >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> from >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> isn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Gosh! How very odd! It seems your point 2 is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> completely >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> wrong >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> on >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> such >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> basic level that it's hard to comprehend how >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> function >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> society >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> at >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> all. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I take it you don't own a car? Please tell me >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> don't. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > You can substitute whatever physical entity >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > strictly >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > follows >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > known laws of physics for M, and any >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > property >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > which >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > where >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > (1) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > would be true. If (1) is true, then so is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> My car says you're just plain stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Your reponses have a certain entertainment >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > value >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > guess. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Let me put it another way: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> No, why don't you address it the way you put it? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> And the way I answered it? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you too stupid or afraid to? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you a moron, a coward, or both? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> It gets me to my destination in air-conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Gas in the tank! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > requiring >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car employs the laws of physics to get me to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> my >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> destination >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> air-conditioned comfort! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > else >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Oddly, that doesn't match reality at all! When >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> there's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> my car, I DON'T get to my destination in air >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> just sits there following the laws of physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Bummer! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if (1) is true, then so is (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car still says you're just plain stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> How can my car, getting somewhere in air >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > To give you an example, just to make sure you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > excuses >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretending you can't grasp the point, and are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > misunderstanding >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > it: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = a car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = its serial number >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Which means: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explained >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > by >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > has a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > serial >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > number >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > does >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > parked >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > with its engine running, else the explanation >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > could >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > be the same with or without a serial number. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> But if the situation is: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = my car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = gas in the tank >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Then suddenly your formula fails! Once the gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> runs >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> out, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> longer >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> has a running engine. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Since (1) is true, so is (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Not if there's no gas in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > So though I have tried to plug up the holes >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > where >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > might >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > try >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretend to misunderstand, your ability to, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > still >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > does >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > give >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > some >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > artistic scope for disingenuity, which I'm >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > sure >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > will >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > use >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > able. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> You're so stupid, my car is embarrassed for you. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > I pointed out: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > To which you replied: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > How can my car, getting somewhere in air >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > comfort, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in the tank all be the same thing? That's just >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > I assume this was just another example of your >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > disingenious >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > creativity. M isn't the same as B(M) which isn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > as >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > It >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > that M mentioned in (1) is the same as M >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned in (1) is the same as B(M) mentioned in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in (1) is the same as P mentioned in (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > If you can now understand this, you can see if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > wasn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > because there was no gas in the tank, then (1) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > been >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, as it getting you to your destination in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > air >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > explained without gas in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > You'll notice it also gets through your usual >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > well >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > polished >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > deception >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in that it applies to and physical entity that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > strictly >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > follows >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > laws of physics, and doesn't require a comparison >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > entity. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > So here it is again, and hopefully you won't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > grasping >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > at >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ways to misinterpret what is being said, but >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > actually >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > face >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > reason >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > once. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> My car. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> It's sitting there inert. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Gas in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > requiring >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> The car sits there inert, according to the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Doesn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> matter >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> if there's gas in the tank or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > else >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is exactly the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> as >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to buy gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> again! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> can >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> drive >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> around >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> with or without gas. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Yup, your example sure matches reality. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Note that the above sentence is an admitted lie. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > It follows that if (1) is true, then so is (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Nope. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> sitting >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> inert, so (2) would be true. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Until the key is turned in the ignition. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly false. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Look, are you trying, in your own stupid and inept way, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> get >> >> >> >> >> >> >> me >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> say >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that there are properties that have no effect on the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> thing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> they're a property of? Well that's a big yes! Of COURSE >> >> >> >> >> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> properties >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that have no effect on behavior. Your example of the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> serial >> >> >> >> >> >> >> number, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> example. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So what? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Are you dishonestly trying to equate the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> irrelevant-to-behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> aspect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> serial number to the crucial-to-behavior aspect of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you were honest, your examples would be either the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> car's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> elecrtical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> system >> >> >> >> >> >> >> compared to subjective experience, or a serial number >> >> >> >> >> >> >> compared >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> tattoo. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> The effects of subjective experience on behavior are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subtle, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> do >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conceptually map to the irrelevancy of a serial number. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I think that subjective experience is the action of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> matter >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical brains following the laws of physics. The >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not apart from that physical action. Subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Experience >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> name >> >> >> >> >> >> >> we apply to a certain catagory of physical actions >> >> >> >> >> >> >> found >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brains. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> It >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subset, not an "extra thing", somehow apart from the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> normal >> >> >> >> >> >> >> operation >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brain. It IS the normal operation of the brain. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If you remove it from the operation of the brain, you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> expect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> radically >> >> >> >> >> >> >> different behavior, just like you would expect if you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ripped >> >> >> >> >> >> >> out >> >> >> >> >> >> >> crucial >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subroutines from a computer program. Without subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> human brain is no longer operating normally, even >> >> >> >> >> >> >> though >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> still, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> course, operating according to the laws of physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I know it was pointless of me to type >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Subjective experiences are a label to what you actually >> >> >> >> >> >> > consciously >> >> >> >> >> >> > experience. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Which is matter in the brain operating according to >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> law. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > That the brain is directly responsible for them is an >> >> >> >> >> >> > assertion. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No, it's a conclusion based on evidence. If you >> >> >> >> >> >> physically >> >> >> >> >> >> manipulate >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> brain, you manipulate consciousness. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I can't say it is an explanation, as there could be no >> >> >> >> >> >> > explanation from your perspective why any physical >> >> >> >> >> >> > activity >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjectively experienced, or why it wasn't just >> >> >> >> >> >> > fluctuations >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> > colour green for example, the brightness dependent on >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> > amount >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> > neurons firing. Nothing in your perspective would know >> >> >> >> >> >> > what >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> > neuron >> >> >> >> >> >> > state represented. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> That's where your ability to communicate breaks down >> >> >> >> >> >> entirely. >> >> >> >> >> >> What >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> fuck >> >> >> >> >> >> are you babbling about? "Fluctuations of the color green"? >> >> >> >> >> >> Are >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> on >> >> >> >> >> >> drugs? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The point was that even if you wanted to believe in the >> >> >> >> >> >> > story >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> > we >> >> >> >> >> >> > were simply biological mechanisms, and that our >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences >> >> >> >> >> >> > were an emergent property of the brain. The emergent >> >> >> >> >> >> > property >> >> >> >> >> >> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >> > be said to be influential in behaviour due to: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I was right, you're going to ignore what I post and write >> >> >> >> >> >> your >> >> >> >> >> >> fucking >> >> >> >> >> >> formula again. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in >> >> >> >> >> >> > (1) >> >> >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> > (2), >> >> >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without >> >> >> >> >> >> > requiring >> >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Then P and/or B has to be pretty fucking trivial. Like a >> >> >> >> >> >> serial >> >> >> >> >> >> number, >> >> >> >> >> >> or >> >> >> >> >> >> being inert. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect >> >> >> >> >> >> > B(M), >> >> >> >> >> >> > else >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or >> >> >> >> >> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Yeah, you can concoct a scenario that fulfills these >> >> >> >> >> >> criteria. >> >> >> >> >> >> Big >> >> >> >> >> >> deal. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Suppose I agree. So what? This little formula cannot be >> >> >> >> >> >> applied >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> non-trivial properties and behaviors. If the property is >> >> >> >> >> >> non-trivial, >> >> >> >> >> >> then >> >> >> >> >> >> it will affect behavior, and your formula cannot be >> >> >> >> >> >> applied. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So, how DO you deal with properties that DO affect >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior? >> >> >> >> >> >> Do >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> just >> >> >> >> >> >> pretend they don't exist? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The story that our subjective experiences have no >> >> >> >> >> >> > influence >> >> >> >> >> >> > on >> >> >> >> >> >> > our >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour is implausible, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> From my perspective, you've been arguing against that. I >> >> >> >> >> >> think >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective experience influences our behavior. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > even though you bet your soul on it, unable >> >> >> >> >> >> > to see through the deception, and still cling to it, >> >> >> >> >> >> > even >> >> >> >> >> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> > to disingeniously misunderstand. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> You have not demonstrated that. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > That you can't face that you were >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrong, and that you are shown to be so through reason, >> >> >> >> >> >> > appears >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> > me >> >> >> >> >> >> > as pathetic. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Or perhaps it's you that's completely wrong. Have you even >> >> >> >> >> >> considered >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> possibility? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm guessing not. >> >> >> >> >> >> > It is implausible that we simply are a biological mechanism >> >> >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> >> >> > following the laws of physics. For that reason alone I >> >> >> >> >> > could >> >> >> >> >> > know >> >> >> >> >> > I >> >> >> >> >> > wasn't wrong. >> >> >> >> >> >> So you determine if you're right about something based on >> >> >> >> >> nothing >> >> >> >> >> but >> >> >> >> >> arbitrary feelings? >> >> >> >> >> >> That explains a lot. >> >> >> >> >> >> > It is implausible, because it would require our behaviour, >> >> >> >> >> > including >> >> >> >> >> > even questioning whether a robot had subjective >> >> >> >> >> > experiences, >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> > uninfluenced by us having subjective experiences. This is >> >> >> >> >> > shown >> >> >> >> >> > by: >> >> >> >> >> >> No, it's influenced by subjective experience. >> >> >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) >> >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> > (2), >> >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without >> >> >> >> >> > requiring >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect >> >> >> >> >> > B(M), >> >> >> >> >> > else >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or >> >> >> >> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> >> >> >> >> Lets see if we can apply this stupidity to something that >> >> >> >> >> affects >> >> >> >> >> behavior. >> >> >> >> >> Can you apply it to reflexes? Oops, no, there's a difference >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> if >> >> >> >> >> you have reflexes compared to you not having reflexes. If you >> >> >> >> >> can't >> >> >> >> >> apply >> >> >> >> >> your little formula to reflexes, what makes you think you can >> >> >> >> >> apply >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> consciousness? >> >> >> >> >> >> > Without the assertion that we were a biological mechanism >> >> >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> >> >> > following the laws of physics, there would be no reason to >> >> >> >> >> > assume >> >> >> >> >> > anything following the laws of physics subjectively >> >> >> >> >> > experienced, >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm a biological mechanism simply following the laws of >> >> >> >> >> physics >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> subjectively experience, therefore I conclude that biological >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms >> >> >> >> >> following the laws of can subjectively experience. >> >> >> >> >> >> > therefore what reason would the biological mechanism (if >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> > assertion >> >> >> >> >> > were made) have for considering such a thing uninfluenced >> >> >> >> >> > by >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> > having >> >> >> >> >> > subjective experiences. >> >> >> >> >> >> This one doesn't. This one observes that it's subjective >> >> >> >> >> experiences >> >> >> >> >> influence its behavior. >> >> >> >> >> >> > You were wrong get used to it. Stop being so pathetic about >> >> >> >> >> > it. >> >> >> >> >> >> You're not stating my position. Why would your criticizism of >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> position >> >> >> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> do not hold show that I am wrong? >> >> >> >> >> > If you changed the property to one that behaviour couldn't be >> >> >> >> > explained without knowledge of, then (1) wouldn't be true. >> >> >> >> >> Which means you can't apply your formula to reflexes, right? >> >> >> >> >> So why do you think you can apply it to consciousness? The >> >> >> >> behaviors >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> conscious and unconscious things, in real life, is pretty >> >> >> >> fucking >> >> >> >> different. >> >> >> >> The unconscious ones lie inert while the conscious ones run >> >> >> >> about. >> >> >> >> According >> >> >> >> to (1) of your formula, you can't apply it to consciousness. >> >> >> >> >> > You have already admitted that though you could know the >> >> >> >> > mechanism >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> > the robot (and therefore be able to explain its behaviour) you >> >> >> >> > wouldn't have knowledge of whether it has subjective >> >> >> >> > experiences >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> > not. I asked you before: >> >> >> >> >> Is this an argument about my state of ignorance concerning if >> >> >> >> something >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> conscious or not? >> >> >> >> >> That has fuck-all to do with anything. My state of ignorance has >> >> >> >> nothing >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> do with whether something is conscious or not, or what the >> >> >> >> source >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> consciousnsess is. >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> > Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, one >> >> >> >> > thing >> >> >> >> > you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective >> >> >> >> > experiences >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> > not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in >> >> >> >> > your >> >> >> >> > knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact. >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> >> > To which you replied: >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> > I fucking understand that you twit. >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> >> > The question is can you face the truth, or are you going to >> >> >> >> > continue >> >> >> >> > to grasp at straws, hoping that they will enable you to avoid >> >> >> >> > it, >> >> >> >> > instead of making you look more and more pathetic. >> >> >> >> >> The truth would be that if it acts like it's conscious, I'll >> >> >> >> call >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> conscious. That's my prerogative. >> >> >> >> > The point was outlined in the reason, you are unable to face: >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and >> >> >> > (2), >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else >> >> >> > the >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> >> >> > So with the robot, since it's behaviour can be explained without >> >> >> > requiring knowledge of whether it is conscious or not, >> >> >> >> Ok, you asked for it. >> >> >> >> B(M) is not same for conscious vs unconscious robots. >> >> >> >> So your formula does not apply. >> >> >> >> If you have a robot that you say is not conscious, yet in all >> >> >> respects >> >> >> acts >> >> >> as if it is, then there is consciousness involved. The mechanism >> >> >> doesn't >> >> >> matter. >> >> >> >> Consider, if the robot is just a clever tape recorder specifically >> >> >> programmed to answer my likely questions, then some conscious >> >> >> entity >> >> >> had >> >> >> to >> >> >> program it and record the responses. THAT'S the conscious entity >> >> >> I'm >> >> >> talking >> >> >> to via the robot. The robot is only the middle-man between me and >> >> >> another >> >> >> consciousness. I may confuse the robot for the conscious entity, >> >> >> but >> >> >> that >> >> >> doesn't mean I'm not talking to another consciousness. >> >> >> >> It's the same with any elaborate Eliza program you might want to >> >> >> construct. >> >> >> I'm talking to the programmer through the robot, even though the >> >> >> programmer >> >> >> may be long dead. >> >> >> >> And if you arrive at the robot through no artifice, meaning that it >> >> >> is >> >> >> constructed by unconscious nature with no intent, then by what >> >> >> authority >> >> >> do >> >> >> you declare it non-conscious if it acts like it is? >> >> >> >> > whether it is >> >> >> > or not couldn't be influencing its behaviour, >> >> >> >> But since it is influencing its behavior, your formula does not >> >> >> apply. >> >> >> >> > no more than it could >> >> >> > influence ours, if we were simply a biological mechanism >> >> >> > following >> >> >> > the >> >> >> > laws of physics... >> >> >> >> ...with consciousness as part of that biological mechanism >> >> >> influencing >> >> >> the >> >> >> behavior. >> >> >> >> > It is implausible that we are, for reasons given to >> >> >> > you before. >> >> >> >> And your formula is as inapplicable as before. >> >> >> >> > You can choose to be totally illogical if you like, and to not >> >> >> > face >> >> >> > reason. Though you won't be experiencing the physical world >> >> >> > forever, >> >> >> > and you'll regret your choice. >> >> >> >> And if you're wrong, which is always possible, your continued >> >> >> insistence >> >> >> that this is the case is nothing more than your arrogant >> >> >> self-absorption >> >> >> talking. >> >> >> > The formula doesn't require a comparitive entity. It can be used in >> >> > regards to any physical entity. >> >> >> Any physical entity? >> >> >> Let's try it: >> >> >> M = A man >> >> B(M) = Walking around >> >> P = Legs >> >> >> How the fuck do you: >> >> >> "1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> >> knowledge >> >> of >> >> whether it has P or not." >> >> >> I don't know about you, but if I'm going to explain how a guy walks >> >> around, >> >> I'm gonna have to know if he has legs or not. >> >> >> "2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the >> >> explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P." >> >> >> I would think legs have something to do with walking around, and I >> >> don't >> >> think it's gonna be the same with or without them. >> >> >> Please explain how your formula applies. With the values I've plugged >> >> in, >> >> it >> >> doesn't make any sense. >> >> >> > You keep trying to talk about two >> >> > different mechanisms, and say well they act differently, but that is >> >> > like talking about a car and a toaster, and saying well the car has >> >> > a >> >> > numberplate, and they act differently so the number plate is >> >> > influential. You need to face that the formula is true, and can be >> >> > shown to be so, when you stop trying to make B(M) or P different >> >> > between (1) and (2). Basically it cuts through the deception that >> >> > you >> >> > were fooled by. >> >> >> Apply your formula to the entities I provided above. >> >> > Er... you really are having trouble understanding this aren't you. >> >> Either that, or you're really bad at making others understand you. >> >> > Is >> > it the complexity of it, or is it that for it to be correct would mean >> > that you were wrong, and your ego won't let you face that you were >> > wrong? >> >> Gosh, no thought whatsoever that maybe the problem lies with you. >> >> > In your example (1) would not be true, you couldn't explain the man >> > walking around, without knowledge of whether he had legs or not. >> >> So your formula CANNOT be applied to "any physical entity". >> >> Were you lying when you said it could? "The formula doesn't require a >> comparitive entity. It can be used in regards to any physical entity." >> >> Perhaps you're suggesting that legs aren't physical. Or could this be >> another example of your mastery of the language that makes it so easy for >> others to understand you? >> > > Yes it can be applied to any physical entity. The point is that only > when (1) is true, (2) is true. Obviously where (1) is false as in your > example then (2) would also be false. The point was never that (1) is > always true. Can you understand it now? You can ask for clarification > on it if you like, after all it would be silly of you to be stating > that it wasn't true, if it was just a case of you not understanding > it. I see now, you relegated the IF THEN statement to a tiny sentence at the end, without a number, that didn't appear to be part of the formula. Understood now. Excellent. Just like the leg example, since the behavior of a person walking around cannot be explained by the laws of physics without knowledge of whether he's conscious or not, (2) is not true. I mean, to explain the behavior of a person walking around, I have to know if the person is conscious or unconscious. I know how conscious and unconscious people behave, and it's not similar at all. Cool! We're done! -- Denis Loubet dloubet@io.com http//www.io.com/~dloubet Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 On 12 Jun, 00:56, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181603668.494011.312460@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > > > On 12 Jun, 00:09, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >>news:1181598999.112030.3470@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > >> > On 11 Jun, 22:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >>news:1181593524.600437.247290@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >>news:1181583039.890628.118980@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 18:23, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >>news:1181581549.652693.254210@q66g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 16:43, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >> >>news:1181517234.889369.239710@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 00:05, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181514806.543814.218460@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 10 Jun, 20:36, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:FNednZ5aMcoN3PHbnZ2dnUVZ_tmknZ2d@io.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > message > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >news:1181471104.632034.40450@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On 10 Jun, 03:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>>news:1181440301.918077.327620@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > On 10 Jun, 02:15, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>news:1181417934.359700.133760@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > On 9 Jun, 08:25, "Denis Loubet" > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> wrote > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > (snipped some of the older stuff) > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Can you understand the following: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 1) The behaviour of M is explained by the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > physics > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > reference requiring knowledge of whether it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > has > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Let's see, can I explain the behavior of my > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> knowing > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> if > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> has > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank or not by the laws of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> physics? > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Yes, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explain > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> both > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behaviors, and one of them will be correct. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Therefore > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > affect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > behaviour > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > M, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Well, personally I think gas in the tank > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> radically > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> affects > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> my car. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > else the explanation of behaviour could not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without P(A) > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> The behavior of my car with gas in the tank > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explainable > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> by > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> physics, as is the behavior of my car without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> tank. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> But > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> somehow I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> only get places I need to get to in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> air-conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> comfort > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank. That's very different > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> from > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> isn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Gosh! How very odd! It seems your point 2 is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> completely > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> wrong > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> on > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> such > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> basic level that it's hard to comprehend how > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> function > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> society > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> at > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> all. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I take it you don't own a car? Please tell me > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> don't. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > You can substitute whatever physical entity > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > strictly > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > follows > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > known laws of physics for M, and any > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > property > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > for > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > which > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > where > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > (1) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > would be true. If (1) is true, then so is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> My car says you're just plain stupid. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Your reponses have a certain entertainment > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > value > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > guess. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Let me put it another way: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> No, why don't you address it the way you put it? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> And the way I answered it? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you too stupid or afraid to? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you a moron, a coward, or both? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car! > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> It gets me to my destination in air-conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort! > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Gas in the tank! > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > requiring > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car employs the laws of physics to get me to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> my > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> destination > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> air-conditioned comfort! > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M), > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > else > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Oddly, that doesn't match reality at all! When > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> there's > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> my car, I DON'T get to my destination in air > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort! > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> just sits there following the laws of physics. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Bummer! > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if (1) is true, then so is (2) > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car still says you're just plain stupid. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > (2) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> How can my car, getting somewhere in air > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank all be the same thing? That's just stupid. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > To give you an example, just to make sure you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > have > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > no > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > excuses > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > for > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretending you can't grasp the point, and are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > misunderstanding > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > it: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = a car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = its serial number > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Which means: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explained > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > by > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > has a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > serial > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > number > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > does > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > parked > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > with its engine running, else the explanation > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > behaviour > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > could > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > be the same with or without a serial number. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> But if the situation is: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = my car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = gas in the tank > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Then suddenly your formula fails! Once the gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> runs > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> out, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> longer > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> has a running engine. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Since (1) is true, so is (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Not if there's no gas in the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > So though I have tried to plug up the holes > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > where > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > might > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > try > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretend to misunderstand, your ability to, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > still > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > does > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > give > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > some > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > artistic scope for disingenuity, which I'm > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > sure > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > will > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > use > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > able. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> You're so stupid, my car is embarrassed for you. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > I pointed out: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > To which you replied: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > How can my car, getting somewhere in air > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > comfort, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in the tank all be the same thing? That's just > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > stupid. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > I assume this was just another example of your > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > disingenious > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > creativity. M isn't the same as B(M) which isn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > as > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > It > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > that M mentioned in (1) is the same as M > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2), > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned in (1) is the same as B(M) mentioned in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2), > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in (1) is the same as P mentioned in (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > If you can now understand this, you can see if > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > wasn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > because there was no gas in the tank, then (1) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > couldn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > have > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > been > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, as it getting you to your destination in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > air > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > couldn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > explained without gas in the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > You'll notice it also gets through your usual > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > well > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > polished > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > deception > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in that it applies to and physical entity that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > strictly > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > follows > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > laws of physics, and doesn't require a comparison > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > entity. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > So here it is again, and hopefully you won't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > simply > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > grasping > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > at > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ways to misinterpret what is being said, but > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > actually > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > face > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > reason > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > for > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > once. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> My car. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> It's sitting there inert. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Gas in the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > requiring > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> The car sits there inert, according to the laws of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> physics. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Doesn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> matter > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> if there's gas in the tank or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M), > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > else > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is exactly the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> as > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> in the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to buy gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> again! > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> can > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> drive > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> around > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> with or without gas. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Yup, your example sure matches reality. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and (2) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Note that the above sentence is an admitted lie. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > It follows that if (1) is true, then so is (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Nope. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> sitting > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> there > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> inert, so (2) would be true. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Until the key is turned in the ignition. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly false. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Look, are you trying, in your own stupid and inept way, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> get > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> me > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> say > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that there are properties that have no effect on the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> thing > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> they're a property of? Well that's a big yes! Of COURSE > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> there > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> properties > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that have no effect on behavior. Your example of the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> serial > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> number, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> for > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> example. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So what? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Are you dishonestly trying to equate the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> irrelevant-to-behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> aspect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> serial number to the crucial-to-behavior aspect of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience? > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you were honest, your examples would be either the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> car's > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> elecrtical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> system > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> compared to subjective experience, or a serial number > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> compared > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> tattoo. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> The effects of subjective experience on behavior are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subtle, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> do > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conceptually map to the irrelevancy of a serial number. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I think that subjective experience is the action of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> matter > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical brains following the laws of physics. The > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not apart from that physical action. Subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Experience > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> name > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> we apply to a certain catagory of physical actions > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> found > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brains. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> It > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subset, not an "extra thing", somehow apart from the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> normal > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> operation > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brain. It IS the normal operation of the brain. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If you remove it from the operation of the brain, you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> expect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> radically > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> different behavior, just like you would expect if you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ripped > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> out > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> crucial > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subroutines from a computer program. Without subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> human brain is no longer operating normally, even > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> though > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> still, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> course, operating according to the laws of physics. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I know it was pointless of me to type > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > Subjective experiences are a label to what you actually > >> >> >> >> >> >> > consciously > >> >> >> >> >> >> > experience. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> Which is matter in the brain operating according to > >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> law. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > That the brain is directly responsible for them is an > >> >> >> >> >> >> > assertion. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> No, it's a conclusion based on evidence. If you > >> >> >> >> >> >> physically > >> >> >> >> >> >> manipulate > >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> brain, you manipulate consciousness. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > I can't say it is an explanation, as there could be no > >> >> >> >> >> >> > explanation from your perspective why any physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> > activity > >> >> >> >> >> >> > would > >> >> >> >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjectively experienced, or why it wasn't just > >> >> >> >> >> >> > fluctuations > >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> > colour green for example, the brightness dependent on > >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> > amount > >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> > neurons firing. Nothing in your perspective would know > >> >> >> >> >> >> > what > >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> > neuron > >> >> >> >> >> >> > state represented. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> That's where your ability to communicate breaks down > >> >> >> >> >> >> entirely. > >> >> >> >> >> >> What > >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> fuck > >> >> >> >> >> >> are you babbling about? "Fluctuations of the color green"? > >> >> >> >> >> >> Are > >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> on > >> >> >> >> >> >> drugs? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > The point was that even if you wanted to believe in the > >> >> >> >> >> >> > story > >> >> >> >> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> >> >> > we > >> >> >> >> >> >> > were simply biological mechanisms, and that our > >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences > >> >> >> >> >> >> > were an emergent property of the brain. The emergent > >> >> >> >> >> >> > property > >> >> >> >> >> >> > couldn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> > be said to be influential in behaviour due to: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> I was right, you're going to ignore what I post and write > >> >> >> >> >> >> your > >> >> >> >> >> >> fucking > >> >> >> >> >> >> formula again. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> >> >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> >> >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in > >> >> >> >> >> >> > (1) > >> >> >> >> >> >> > and > >> >> >> >> >> >> > (2), > >> >> >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without > >> >> >> >> >> >> > requiring > >> >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> Then P and/or B has to be pretty fucking trivial. Like a > >> >> >> >> >> >> serial > >> >> >> >> >> >> number, > >> >> >> >> >> >> or > >> >> >> >> >> >> being inert. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect > >> >> >> >> >> >> > B(M), > >> >> >> >> >> >> > else > >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or > >> >> >> >> >> >> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >> > P. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> Yeah, you can concoct a scenario that fulfills these > >> >> >> >> >> >> criteria. > >> >> >> >> >> >> Big > >> >> >> >> >> >> deal. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> Suppose I agree. So what? This little formula cannot be > >> >> >> >> >> >> applied > >> >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> >> non-trivial properties and behaviors. If the property is > >> >> >> >> >> >> non-trivial, > >> >> >> >> >> >> then > >> >> >> >> >> >> it will affect behavior, and your formula cannot be > >> >> >> >> >> >> applied. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> So, how DO you deal with properties that DO affect > >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior? > >> >> >> >> >> >> Do > >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> just > >> >> >> >> >> >> pretend they don't exist? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > The story that our subjective experiences have no > >> >> >> >> >> >> > influence > >> >> >> >> >> >> > on > >> >> >> >> >> >> > our > >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour is implausible, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> From my perspective, you've been arguing against that. I > >> >> >> >> >> >> think > >> >> >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective experience influences our behavior. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > even though you bet your soul on it, unable > >> >> >> >> >> >> > to see through the deception, and still cling to it, > >> >> >> >> >> >> > even > >> >> >> >> >> >> > if > >> >> >> >> >> >> > you > >> >> >> >> >> >> > have > >> >> >> >> >> >> > to disingeniously misunderstand. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> You have not demonstrated that. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > That you can't face that you were > >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrong, and that you are shown to be so through reason, > >> >> >> >> >> >> > appears > >> >> >> >> >> >> > to > >> >> >> >> >> >> > me > >> >> >> >> >> >> > as pathetic. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> Or perhaps it's you that's completely wrong. Have you even > >> >> >> >> >> >> considered > >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> possibility? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm guessing not. > > >> >> >> >> >> > It is implausible that we simply are a biological mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> > simply > >> >> >> >> >> > following the laws of physics. For that reason alone I > >> >> >> >> >> > could > >> >> >> >> >> > know > >> >> >> >> >> > I > >> >> >> >> >> > wasn't wrong. > > >> >> >> >> >> So you determine if you're right about something based on > >> >> >> >> >> nothing > >> >> >> >> >> but > >> >> >> >> >> arbitrary feelings? > > >> >> >> >> >> That explains a lot. > > >> >> >> >> >> > It is implausible, because it would require our behaviour, > >> >> >> >> >> > including > >> >> >> >> >> > even questioning whether a robot had subjective > >> >> >> >> >> > experiences, > >> >> >> >> >> > would > >> >> >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> >> > uninfluenced by us having subjective experiences. This is > >> >> >> >> >> > shown > >> >> >> >> >> > by: > > >> >> >> >> >> No, it's influenced by subjective experience. > > >> >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) > >> >> >> >> >> > and > >> >> >> >> >> > (2), > >> >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without > >> >> >> >> >> > requiring > >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect > >> >> >> >> >> > B(M), > >> >> >> >> >> > else > >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or > >> >> >> >> >> > without > >> >> >> >> >> > P. > > >> >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > >> >> >> >> >> Lets see if we can apply this stupidity to something that > >> >> >> >> >> affects > >> >> >> >> >> behavior. > >> >> >> >> >> Can you apply it to reflexes? Oops, no, there's a difference > >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> if > >> >> >> >> >> you have reflexes compared to you not having reflexes. If you > >> >> >> >> >> can't > >> >> >> >> >> apply > >> >> >> >> >> your little formula to reflexes, what makes you think you can > >> >> >> >> >> apply > >> >> >> >> >> it > >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> consciousness? > > >> >> >> >> >> > Without the assertion that we were a biological mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> > simply > >> >> >> >> >> > following the laws of physics, there would be no reason to > >> >> >> >> >> > assume > >> >> >> >> >> > anything following the laws of physics subjectively > >> >> >> >> >> > experienced, > > >> >> >> >> >> I'm a biological mechanism simply following the laws of > >> >> >> >> >> physics > >> >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> I > >> >> >> >> >> subjectively experience, therefore I conclude that biological > >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms > >> >> >> >> >> following the laws of can subjectively experience. > > >> >> >> >> >> > therefore what reason would the biological mechanism (if > >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> > assertion > >> >> >> >> >> > were made) have for considering such a thing uninfluenced > >> >> >> >> >> > by > >> >> >> >> >> > it > >> >> >> >> >> > having > >> >> >> >> >> > subjective experiences. > > >> >> >> >> >> This one doesn't. This one observes that it's subjective > >> >> >> >> >> experiences > >> >> >> >> >> influence its behavior. > > >> >> >> >> >> > You were wrong get used to it. Stop being so pathetic about > >> >> >> >> >> > it. > > >> >> >> >> >> You're not stating my position. Why would your criticizism of > >> >> >> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> position > >> >> >> >> >> I > >> >> >> >> >> do not hold show that I am wrong? > > >> >> >> >> > If you changed the property to one that behaviour couldn't be > >> >> >> >> > explained without knowledge of, then (1) wouldn't be true. > > >> >> >> >> Which means you can't apply your formula to reflexes, right? > > >> >> >> >> So why do you think you can apply it to consciousness? The > >> >> >> >> behaviors > >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> conscious and unconscious things, in real life, is pretty > >> >> >> >> fucking > >> >> >> >> different. > >> >> >> >> The unconscious ones lie inert while the conscious ones run > >> >> >> >> about. > >> >> >> >> According > >> >> >> >> to (1) of your formula, you can't apply it to consciousness. > > >> >> >> >> > You have already admitted that though you could know the > >> >> >> >> > mechanism > >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> > the robot (and therefore be able to explain its behaviour) you > >> >> >> >> > wouldn't have knowledge of whether it has subjective > >> >> >> >> > experiences > >> >> >> >> > or > >> >> >> >> > not. I asked you before: > > >> >> >> >> Is this an argument about my state of ignorance concerning if > >> >> >> >> something > >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> conscious or not? > > >> >> >> >> That has fuck-all to do with anything. My state of ignorance has > >> >> >> >> nothing > >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> do with whether something is conscious or not, or what the > >> >> >> >> source > >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> consciousnsess is. > > >> >> >> >> > ------------ > >> >> >> >> > Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, one > >> >> >> >> > thing > >> >> >> >> > you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective > >> >> >> >> > experiences > >> >> >> >> > or > >> >> >> >> > not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in > >> >> >> >> > your > >> >> >> >> > knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact. > >> >> >> >> > ------------ > > >> >> >> >> > To which you replied: > >> >> >> >> > ------------ > >> >> >> >> > I fucking understand that you twit. > >> >> >> >> > ------------ > > >> >> >> >> > The question is can you face the truth, or are you going to > >> >> >> >> > continue > >> >> >> >> > to grasp at straws, hoping that they will enable you to avoid > >> >> >> >> > it, > >> >> >> >> > instead of making you look more and more pathetic. > > >> >> >> >> The truth would be that if it acts like it's conscious, I'll > >> >> >> >> call > >> >> >> >> it > >> >> >> >> conscious. That's my prerogative. > > >> >> >> > The point was outlined in the reason, you are unable to face: > > >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and > >> >> >> > (2), > >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else > >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > >> >> >> > So with the robot, since it's behaviour can be explained without > >> >> >> > requiring knowledge of whether it is conscious or not, > > >> >> >> Ok, you asked for it. > > >> >> >> B(M) is not same for conscious vs unconscious robots. > > >> >> >> So your formula does not apply. > > >> >> >> If you have a robot that you say is not conscious, yet in all > >> >> >> respects > >> >> >> acts > >> >> >> as if it is, then there is consciousness involved. The mechanism > >> >> >> doesn't > >> >> >> matter. > > >> >> >> Consider, if the robot is just a clever tape recorder specifically > >> >> >> programmed to answer my likely questions, then some conscious > >> >> >> entity > >> >> >> had > >> >> >> to > >> >> >> program it and record the responses. THAT'S the conscious entity > >> >> >> I'm > >> >> >> talking > >> >> >> to via the robot. The robot is only the middle-man between me and > >> >> >> another > >> >> >> consciousness. I may confuse the robot for the conscious entity, > >> >> >> but > >> >> >> that > >> >> >> doesn't mean I'm not talking to another consciousness. > > >> >> >> It's the same with any elaborate Eliza program you might want to > >> >> >> construct. > >> >> >> I'm talking to the programmer through the robot, even though the > >> >> >> programmer > >> >> >> may be long dead. > > >> >> >> And if you arrive at the robot through no artifice, meaning that it > >> >> >> is > >> >> >> constructed by unconscious nature with no intent, then by what > >> >> >> authority > >> >> >> do > >> >> >> you declare it non-conscious if it acts like it is? > > >> >> >> > whether it is > >> >> >> > or not couldn't be influencing its behaviour, > > >> >> >> But since it is influencing its behavior, your formula does not > >> >> >> apply. > > >> >> >> > no more than it could > >> >> >> > influence ours, if we were simply a biological mechanism > >> >> >> > following > >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> > laws of physics... > > >> >> >> ...with consciousness as part of that biological mechanism > >> >> >> influencing > >> >> >> the > >> >> >> behavior. > > >> >> >> > It is implausible that we are, for reasons given to > >> >> >> > you before. > > >> >> >> And your formula is as inapplicable as before. > > >> >> >> > You can choose to be totally illogical if you like, and to not > >> >> >> > face > >> >> >> > reason. Though you won't be experiencing the physical world > >> >> >> > forever, > >> >> >> > and you'll regret your choice. > > >> >> >> And if you're wrong, which is always possible, your continued > >> >> >> insistence > >> >> >> that this is the case is nothing more than your arrogant > >> >> >> self-absorption > >> >> >> talking. > > >> >> > The formula doesn't require a comparitive entity. It can be used in > >> >> > regards to any physical entity. > > >> >> Any physical entity? > > >> >> Let's try it: > > >> >> M = A man > >> >> B(M) = Walking around > >> >> P = Legs > > >> >> How the fuck do you: > > >> >> "1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > >> >> knowledge > >> >> of > >> >> whether it has P or not." > > >> >> I don't know about you, but if I'm going to explain how a guy walks > >> >> around, > >> >> I'm gonna have to know if he has legs or not. > > >> >> "2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > >> >> explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P." > > >> >> I would think legs have something to do with walking around, and I > >> >> don't > >> >> think it's gonna be the same with or without them. > > >> >> Please explain how your formula applies. With the values I've plugged > >> >> in, > >> >> it > >> >> doesn't make any sense. > > >> >> > You keep trying to talk about two > >> >> > different mechanisms, and say well they act differently, but that is > >> >> > like talking about a car and a toaster, and saying well the car has > >> >> > a > >> >> > numberplate, and they act differently so the number plate is > >> >> > influential. You need to face that the formula is true, and can be > >> >> > shown to be so, when you stop trying to make B(M) or P different > >> >> > between (1) and (2). Basically it cuts through the deception that > >> >> > you > >> >> > were fooled by. > > >> >> Apply your formula to the entities I provided above. > > >> > Er... you really are having trouble understanding this aren't you. > > >> Either that, or you're really bad at making others understand you. > > >> > Is > >> > it the complexity of it, or is it that for it to be correct would mean > >> > that you were wrong, and your ego won't let you face that you were > >> > wrong? > > >> Gosh, no thought whatsoever that maybe the problem lies with you. > > >> > In your example (1) would not be true, you couldn't explain the man > >> > walking around, without knowledge of whether he had legs or not. > > >> So your formula CANNOT be applied to "any physical entity". > > >> Were you lying when you said it could? "The formula doesn't require a > >> comparitive entity. It can be used in regards to any physical entity." > > >> Perhaps you're suggesting that legs aren't physical. Or could this be > >> another example of your mastery of the language that makes it so easy for > >> others to understand you? > > > Yes it can be applied to any physical entity. The point is that only > > when (1) is true, (2) is true. Obviously where (1) is false as in your > > example then (2) would also be false. The point was never that (1) is > > always true. Can you understand it now? You can ask for clarification > > on it if you like, after all it would be silly of you to be stating > > that it wasn't true, if it was just a case of you not understanding > > it. > > I see now, you relegated the IF THEN statement to a tiny sentence at the > end, without a number, that didn't appear to be part of the formula. > Understood now. > > Excellent. Just like the leg example, since the behavior of a person walking > around cannot be explained by the laws of physics without knowledge of > whether he's conscious or not, (2) is not true. > > I mean, to explain the behavior of a person walking around, I have to know > if the person is conscious or unconscious. I know how conscious and > unconscious people behave, and it's not similar at all. > > Cool! We're done! > Not quite. The point in contention is that we are not simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, because if we were then it wouldn't be influential. So if you were contesting this, then with knowledge of how the biological mechanism operated, its behaviour could be explained simply in terms of the biological mechanism following the laws of physics. Which would require no knowledge of whether it were subjectively experiencing or not, any more than it would be required to explain the way a robot were behaving. So (1) would be true, and so would (2). It is an implausible story though, but for it not to be true, would require the assumption that we were simply a biological mechanism strictly following the laws of physics. Just to remind you, you acknowledged that subjective experiences are a property in their own right, and that the property may be present in a robot or not, in that you can have knowledge of the other properties such as the mechanism, but not of whether the property of subjective experiences had emerged, was acknowledge by you in response to where I said: ------------ Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, one thing you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective experiences or not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in your knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact. ------------ To which you replied: ------------ I fucking understand that you twit. ------------ Don't you reflect yourself on the straws you grasp at, or is it that you are just desperate to avoid facing you were wrong? Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181558571.566915.292060@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > On 11 Jun, 03:32, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1181513315.844514.222860@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> > Can you understand the following is always true: >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> I have no problem with that .. but you have yet to show that that applies >> for all M and all B(M) when P is "subjective experience". >> Ie .. you've not proven your point. > It doesn't matter what M or B(M) or P are. Why would you suggest it > does? Whether 1 and 2 are true depends on M, B(M), P .. they are not always true Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181580162.431415.253570@q69g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > wrote: >> I think you understand Fred and me. > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws We're waiting for you to actually make an argument .. you've not made any as yet.. Get to the point. [snip same old copy and paste] > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > following the known laws of physics. > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. If subjective experiences are stored and processed in the brain (and there is good evidence that they are), then they form part of the biological mechanism, and so any consideration of that mechanism included the subjective experience stored within it. [snip argument from unsupported assertion] Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181581549.652693.254210@q66g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > On 11 Jun, 16:43, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > The question is can you face the truth, or are you going to continue > to grasp at straws, hoping that they will enable you to avoid it, > instead of making you look more and more pathetic. That is what you're doing .. not the rest of us. Come on .. just make your argument in one concise post. It appears you are either trying to either 1) prove subjective experience doesn't exists . 2) prove subjective experience doesn't have any effects on reality 3) do some reduction to the absurd to show that the above is not the case So far you've not succeeded with any of the above. Quote
Guest Matt Silberstein Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 15:56:38 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> in <1181602598.637285.269680@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote: >On 11 Jun, 22:37, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote innews:1181594965.007188.174010@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:52, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> innews:1181593745.206175.160780@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein >> >> > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> >> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> [snip] >> >> >> >> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?: >> >> >> >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and >> >> >> >(2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> >> >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else >> >> >> >the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or >> >> >> >without P. >> >> >> >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true >> >> >> >> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a >> >> >> class of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But that >> >> >> is a minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that (1) >> >> >> reasonably captures a physical understanding of human behavior and >> >> >> subjective experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see >> >> >> take the existence of SE as a given and work to explain that >> >> >> existence. So, while I think your argument here is wrong, I think >> >> >> the argument itself does not meaningfully relate to a physicalist >> >> >> (not scientism) theory of the mind. >> >> >> > It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to >> >> > point out why it isn't. >> >> >> You have avoided seeing every attempt to point out why it isn't. >> >> >> > Yes you are right that subjective experiences do >> >> > influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to consider >> >> > whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion (which is >> >> > shown to be implausible) >> >> >> You keep repeating that assertion, but you are assuming your >> >> conclusion. >> >> > Where has it been pointed out where it isn't correct. Attempts where >> > you change either B(M) or P between (1) and (2) obviously don't count, >> > as it only applies where B(M) and P are the same between (1) and (2). >> >> But every example you offer, Glenn, you also change B or B(M) or P >> yourself. You just offer us trivial changes that don't make a difference >> to the behavior B(M) whereas we all know that subjective experience DOES >> make a difference to behavior. You then assume your conclusion when you >> state that under materialism that subjective experience could not >> possibly affect behavior. >> >> > Attempts so far have been shown to be deceptively attempting to do >> > this. Perhaps you'd care to give an example where it wouldn't be true. >> >> I have already offered you several examples, all as straighforward and >> truthful as yours. >> > >Well I can show you a few examples here, and you can see that I don't >change B(M) or P between (1) and (2) for any given example. Obviously >they are different in different examples. > >Example 1: >---------- > >M = a car >B(M) = parked with its engine running >P = its serial number > >Which means: > >1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of >physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a serial number >or not. > >As (1) is true, so is: > >2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not affect the car >parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour >could not be the same with or without a serial number. > I think you have missed the point. No one, AFAICT, disagrees that your (2) is a reformulation of your (1). It is really just a version of parsimony. The question is whether or not the abstract (1) hold true for humans. That is, we assert that it is not true that we can develop an explanation of humans that ignores subjective experience. Furthermore we are asserting that it sure looks like we will be able to develop a physical explanation of humans, including explaining subjective experience. [snip] -- Matt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" Quote
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