Guest Denis Loubet Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181607322.623131.144640@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > On 12 Jun, 00:56, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1181603668.494011.312460@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... >> >> > On 12 Jun, 00:09, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >>news:1181598999.112030.3470@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 22:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >>news:1181593524.600437.247290@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >>news:1181583039.890628.118980@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 18:23, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181581549.652693.254210@q66g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 16:43, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181517234.889369.239710@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 00:05, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181514806.543814.218460@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 10 Jun, 20:36, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:FNednZ5aMcoN3PHbnZ2dnUVZ_tmknZ2d@io.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >news:1181471104.632034.40450@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On 10 Jun, 03:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>>news:1181440301.918077.327620@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > On 10 Jun, 02:15, "Denis Loubet" >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>news:1181417934.359700.133760@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > On 9 Jun, 08:25, "Denis Loubet" >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (snipped some of the older stuff) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Can you understand the following: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 1) The behaviour of M is explained by >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > physics >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > reference requiring knowledge of whether >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > has >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Let's see, can I explain the behavior of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> my >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> knowing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> has >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank or not by the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> physics? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Yes, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explain >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> both >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behaviors, and one of them will be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> correct. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Therefore >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > M, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Well, personally I think gas in the tank >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> radically >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> affects >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> my car. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > else the explanation of behaviour could >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without P(A) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> The behavior of my car with gas in the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> tank >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explainable >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> by >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> physics, as is the behavior of my car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> But >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> somehow I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> only get places I need to get to in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> air-conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> comfort >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank. That's very different >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> from >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> isn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Gosh! How very odd! It seems your point 2 >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> completely >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> wrong >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> on >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> such >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> basic level that it's hard to comprehend >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> how >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> function >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> society >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> at >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> all. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I take it you don't own a car? Please tell >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> me >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> don't. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > You can substitute whatever physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > entity >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > strictly >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > follows >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > known laws of physics for M, and any >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > property >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > which >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > where >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > (1) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > would be true. If (1) is true, then so >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> My car says you're just plain stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Your reponses have a certain entertainment >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > value >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > guess. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Let me put it another way: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> No, why don't you address it the way you put >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> it? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> And the way I answered it? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you too stupid or afraid to? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you a moron, a coward, or both? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M refers to the physical entity in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> It gets me to my destination in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> air-conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Gas in the tank! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > requiring >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car employs the laws of physics to get me >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> my >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> destination >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> air-conditioned comfort! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > else >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Oddly, that doesn't match reality at all! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> When >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> there's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> my car, I DON'T get to my destination in air >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> just sits there following the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Bummer! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if (1) is true, then so is (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car still says you're just plain stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> How can my car, getting somewhere in air >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank all be the same thing? That's just >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > To give you an example, just to make sure >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > excuses >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretending you can't grasp the point, and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > misunderstanding >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > it: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = a car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = its serial number >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Which means: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explained >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > by >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > physics without requiring knowledge of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > whether >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > has a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > serial >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > number >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > does >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > parked >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > with its engine running, else the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explanation >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > could >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > be the same with or without a serial >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > number. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> But if the situation is: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = my car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = gas in the tank >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Then suddenly your formula fails! Once the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> runs >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> out, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> longer >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> has a running engine. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Since (1) is true, so is (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Not if there's no gas in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > So though I have tried to plug up the holes >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > where >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > might >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > try >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretend to misunderstand, your ability to, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > still >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > does >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > give >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > some >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > artistic scope for disingenuity, which I'm >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > sure >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > will >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > use >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > able. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> You're so stupid, my car is embarrassed for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> you. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > I pointed out: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > To which you replied: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > How can my car, getting somewhere in air >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > comfort, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in the tank all be the same thing? That's just >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > I assume this was just another example of your >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > disingenious >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > creativity. M isn't the same as B(M) which >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > isn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > as >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > It >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > that M mentioned in (1) is the same as M >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned in (1) is the same as B(M) mentioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in (1) is the same as P mentioned in (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > If you can now understand this, you can see if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > wasn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > because there was no gas in the tank, then (1) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > been >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, as it getting you to your destination in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > air >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > explained without gas in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > You'll notice it also gets through your usual >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > well >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > polished >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > deception >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in that it applies to and physical entity that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > strictly >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > follows >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > laws of physics, and doesn't require a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > comparison >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > entity. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > So here it is again, and hopefully you won't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > grasping >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > at >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ways to misinterpret what is being said, but >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > actually >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > face >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > reason >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > once. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> My car. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> It's sitting there inert. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Gas in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > requiring >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> The car sits there inert, according to the laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Doesn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> matter >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> if there's gas in the tank or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > else >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is exactly >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> as >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to buy >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> again! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> can >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> drive >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> around >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> with or without gas. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Yup, your example sure matches reality. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Note that the above sentence is an admitted lie. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > It follows that if (1) is true, then so is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Nope. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> sitting >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> inert, so (2) would be true. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Until the key is turned in the ignition. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > false. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Look, are you trying, in your own stupid and inept >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> way, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> get >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> me >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> say >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that there are properties that have no effect on the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> thing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> they're a property of? Well that's a big yes! Of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> COURSE >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> properties >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that have no effect on behavior. Your example of the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> serial >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> number, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> example. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So what? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Are you dishonestly trying to equate the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> irrelevant-to-behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> aspect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> serial number to the crucial-to-behavior aspect of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you were honest, your examples would be either the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> car's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> elecrtical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> system >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> compared to subjective experience, or a serial >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> number >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> compared >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> tattoo. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> The effects of subjective experience on behavior are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subtle, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> do >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conceptually map to the irrelevancy of a serial >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> number. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I think that subjective experience is the action of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> matter >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical brains following the laws of physics. The >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not apart from that physical action. Subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Experience >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> name >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> we apply to a certain catagory of physical actions >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> found >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brains. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> It >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subset, not an "extra thing", somehow apart from the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> normal >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> operation >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brain. It IS the normal operation of the brain. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If you remove it from the operation of the brain, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> expect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> radically >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> different behavior, just like you would expect if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ripped >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> out >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> crucial >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subroutines from a computer program. Without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> human brain is no longer operating normally, even >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> though >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> still, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> course, operating according to the laws of physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I know it was pointless of me to type >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Subjective experiences are a label to what you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > actually >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > consciously >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experience. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Which is matter in the brain operating according to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> law. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > That the brain is directly responsible for them is an >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assertion. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No, it's a conclusion based on evidence. If you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physically >> >> >> >> >> >> >> manipulate >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brain, you manipulate consciousness. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I can't say it is an explanation, as there could be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explanation from your perspective why any physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > activity >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjectively experienced, or why it wasn't just >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > fluctuations >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > colour green for example, the brightness dependent on >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > amount >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > neurons firing. Nothing in your perspective would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > know >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > what >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > neuron >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > state represented. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> That's where your ability to communicate breaks down >> >> >> >> >> >> >> entirely. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> fuck >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are you babbling about? "Fluctuations of the color >> >> >> >> >> >> >> green"? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> on >> >> >> >> >> >> >> drugs? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The point was that even if you wanted to believe in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > story >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > we >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > were simply biological mechanisms, and that our >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > were an emergent property of the brain. The emergent >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > property >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be said to be influential in behaviour due to: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I was right, you're going to ignore what I post and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> write >> >> >> >> >> >> >> your >> >> >> >> >> >> >> fucking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> formula again. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (1) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (2), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > requiring >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Then P and/or B has to be pretty fucking trivial. Like >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> serial >> >> >> >> >> >> >> number, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> being inert. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > influence/affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > B(M), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > else >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Yeah, you can concoct a scenario that fulfills these >> >> >> >> >> >> >> criteria. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Big >> >> >> >> >> >> >> deal. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Suppose I agree. So what? This little formula cannot be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> applied >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> non-trivial properties and behaviors. If the property >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> non-trivial, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> then >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it will affect behavior, and your formula cannot be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> applied. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So, how DO you deal with properties that DO affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Do >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> just >> >> >> >> >> >> >> pretend they don't exist? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The story that our subjective experiences have no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > influence >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > on >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour is implausible, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> From my perspective, you've been arguing against that. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> think >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective experience influences our behavior. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > even though you bet your soul on it, unable >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to see through the deception, and still cling to it, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > even >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to disingeniously misunderstand. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> You have not demonstrated that. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > That you can't face that you were >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrong, and that you are shown to be so through >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > reason, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > appears >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > me >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > as pathetic. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Or perhaps it's you that's completely wrong. Have you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> even >> >> >> >> >> >> >> considered >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> possibility? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm guessing not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > It is implausible that we simply are a biological >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> >> >> >> > following the laws of physics. For that reason alone I >> >> >> >> >> >> > could >> >> >> >> >> >> > know >> >> >> >> >> >> > I >> >> >> >> >> >> > wasn't wrong. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So you determine if you're right about something based on >> >> >> >> >> >> nothing >> >> >> >> >> >> but >> >> >> >> >> >> arbitrary feelings? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> That explains a lot. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > It is implausible, because it would require our >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour, >> >> >> >> >> >> > including >> >> >> >> >> >> > even questioning whether a robot had subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> > uninfluenced by us having subjective experiences. This >> >> >> >> >> >> > is >> >> >> >> >> >> > shown >> >> >> >> >> >> > by: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No, it's influenced by subjective experience. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in >> >> >> >> >> >> > (1) >> >> >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> > (2), >> >> >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without >> >> >> >> >> >> > requiring >> >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect >> >> >> >> >> >> > B(M), >> >> >> >> >> >> > else >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or >> >> >> >> >> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Lets see if we can apply this stupidity to something that >> >> >> >> >> >> affects >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior. >> >> >> >> >> >> Can you apply it to reflexes? Oops, no, there's a >> >> >> >> >> >> difference >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> if >> >> >> >> >> >> you have reflexes compared to you not having reflexes. If >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> can't >> >> >> >> >> >> apply >> >> >> >> >> >> your little formula to reflexes, what makes you think you >> >> >> >> >> >> can >> >> >> >> >> >> apply >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Without the assertion that we were a biological >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> >> >> >> > following the laws of physics, there would be no reason >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> > assume >> >> >> >> >> >> > anything following the laws of physics subjectively >> >> >> >> >> >> > experienced, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm a biological mechanism simply following the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> physics >> >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> >> subjectively experience, therefore I conclude that >> >> >> >> >> >> biological >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms >> >> >> >> >> >> following the laws of can subjectively experience. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > therefore what reason would the biological mechanism (if >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> > assertion >> >> >> >> >> >> > were made) have for considering such a thing >> >> >> >> >> >> > uninfluenced >> >> >> >> >> >> > by >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> > having >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective experiences. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> This one doesn't. This one observes that it's subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences >> >> >> >> >> >> influence its behavior. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > You were wrong get used to it. Stop being so pathetic >> >> >> >> >> >> > about >> >> >> >> >> >> > it. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> You're not stating my position. Why would your criticizism >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> position >> >> >> >> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> >> do not hold show that I am wrong? >> >> >> >> >> >> > If you changed the property to one that behaviour couldn't >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> > explained without knowledge of, then (1) wouldn't be true. >> >> >> >> >> >> Which means you can't apply your formula to reflexes, right? >> >> >> >> >> >> So why do you think you can apply it to consciousness? The >> >> >> >> >> behaviors >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> conscious and unconscious things, in real life, is pretty >> >> >> >> >> fucking >> >> >> >> >> different. >> >> >> >> >> The unconscious ones lie inert while the conscious ones run >> >> >> >> >> about. >> >> >> >> >> According >> >> >> >> >> to (1) of your formula, you can't apply it to consciousness. >> >> >> >> >> >> > You have already admitted that though you could know the >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> > the robot (and therefore be able to explain its behaviour) >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> > wouldn't have knowledge of whether it has subjective >> >> >> >> >> > experiences >> >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> > not. I asked you before: >> >> >> >> >> >> Is this an argument about my state of ignorance concerning if >> >> >> >> >> something >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> conscious or not? >> >> >> >> >> >> That has fuck-all to do with anything. My state of ignorance >> >> >> >> >> has >> >> >> >> >> nothing >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> do with whether something is conscious or not, or what the >> >> >> >> >> source >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> consciousnsess is. >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> >> > Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, >> >> >> >> >> > one >> >> >> >> >> > thing >> >> >> >> >> > you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective >> >> >> >> >> > experiences >> >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> > not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in >> >> >> >> >> > your >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact. >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> >> >> > To which you replied: >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> >> > I fucking understand that you twit. >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> >> >> > The question is can you face the truth, or are you going to >> >> >> >> >> > continue >> >> >> >> >> > to grasp at straws, hoping that they will enable you to >> >> >> >> >> > avoid >> >> >> >> >> > it, >> >> >> >> >> > instead of making you look more and more pathetic. >> >> >> >> >> >> The truth would be that if it acts like it's conscious, I'll >> >> >> >> >> call >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> conscious. That's my prerogative. >> >> >> >> >> > The point was outlined in the reason, you are unable to face: >> >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> > (2), >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), >> >> >> >> > else >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without >> >> >> >> > P. >> >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> >> >> >> > So with the robot, since it's behaviour can be explained >> >> >> >> > without >> >> >> >> > requiring knowledge of whether it is conscious or not, >> >> >> >> >> Ok, you asked for it. >> >> >> >> >> B(M) is not same for conscious vs unconscious robots. >> >> >> >> >> So your formula does not apply. >> >> >> >> >> If you have a robot that you say is not conscious, yet in all >> >> >> >> respects >> >> >> >> acts >> >> >> >> as if it is, then there is consciousness involved. The mechanism >> >> >> >> doesn't >> >> >> >> matter. >> >> >> >> >> Consider, if the robot is just a clever tape recorder >> >> >> >> specifically >> >> >> >> programmed to answer my likely questions, then some conscious >> >> >> >> entity >> >> >> >> had >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> program it and record the responses. THAT'S the conscious entity >> >> >> >> I'm >> >> >> >> talking >> >> >> >> to via the robot. The robot is only the middle-man between me >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> another >> >> >> >> consciousness. I may confuse the robot for the conscious entity, >> >> >> >> but >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> doesn't mean I'm not talking to another consciousness. >> >> >> >> >> It's the same with any elaborate Eliza program you might want to >> >> >> >> construct. >> >> >> >> I'm talking to the programmer through the robot, even though the >> >> >> >> programmer >> >> >> >> may be long dead. >> >> >> >> >> And if you arrive at the robot through no artifice, meaning that >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> constructed by unconscious nature with no intent, then by what >> >> >> >> authority >> >> >> >> do >> >> >> >> you declare it non-conscious if it acts like it is? >> >> >> >> >> > whether it is >> >> >> >> > or not couldn't be influencing its behaviour, >> >> >> >> >> But since it is influencing its behavior, your formula does not >> >> >> >> apply. >> >> >> >> >> > no more than it could >> >> >> >> > influence ours, if we were simply a biological mechanism >> >> >> >> > following >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> > laws of physics... >> >> >> >> >> ...with consciousness as part of that biological mechanism >> >> >> >> influencing >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> behavior. >> >> >> >> >> > It is implausible that we are, for reasons given to >> >> >> >> > you before. >> >> >> >> >> And your formula is as inapplicable as before. >> >> >> >> >> > You can choose to be totally illogical if you like, and to not >> >> >> >> > face >> >> >> >> > reason. Though you won't be experiencing the physical world >> >> >> >> > forever, >> >> >> >> > and you'll regret your choice. >> >> >> >> >> And if you're wrong, which is always possible, your continued >> >> >> >> insistence >> >> >> >> that this is the case is nothing more than your arrogant >> >> >> >> self-absorption >> >> >> >> talking. >> >> >> >> > The formula doesn't require a comparitive entity. It can be used >> >> >> > in >> >> >> > regards to any physical entity. >> >> >> >> Any physical entity? >> >> >> >> Let's try it: >> >> >> >> M = A man >> >> >> B(M) = Walking around >> >> >> P = Legs >> >> >> >> How the fuck do you: >> >> >> >> "1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> >> >> knowledge >> >> >> of >> >> >> whether it has P or not." >> >> >> >> I don't know about you, but if I'm going to explain how a guy walks >> >> >> around, >> >> >> I'm gonna have to know if he has legs or not. >> >> >> >> "2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else >> >> >> the >> >> >> explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P." >> >> >> >> I would think legs have something to do with walking around, and I >> >> >> don't >> >> >> think it's gonna be the same with or without them. >> >> >> >> Please explain how your formula applies. With the values I've >> >> >> plugged >> >> >> in, >> >> >> it >> >> >> doesn't make any sense. >> >> >> >> > You keep trying to talk about two >> >> >> > different mechanisms, and say well they act differently, but that >> >> >> > is >> >> >> > like talking about a car and a toaster, and saying well the car >> >> >> > has >> >> >> > a >> >> >> > numberplate, and they act differently so the number plate is >> >> >> > influential. You need to face that the formula is true, and can >> >> >> > be >> >> >> > shown to be so, when you stop trying to make B(M) or P different >> >> >> > between (1) and (2). Basically it cuts through the deception that >> >> >> > you >> >> >> > were fooled by. >> >> >> >> Apply your formula to the entities I provided above. >> >> >> > Er... you really are having trouble understanding this aren't you. >> >> >> Either that, or you're really bad at making others understand you. >> >> >> > Is >> >> > it the complexity of it, or is it that for it to be correct would >> >> > mean >> >> > that you were wrong, and your ego won't let you face that you were >> >> > wrong? >> >> >> Gosh, no thought whatsoever that maybe the problem lies with you. >> >> >> > In your example (1) would not be true, you couldn't explain the man >> >> > walking around, without knowledge of whether he had legs or not. >> >> >> So your formula CANNOT be applied to "any physical entity". >> >> >> Were you lying when you said it could? "The formula doesn't require a >> >> comparitive entity. It can be used in regards to any physical entity." >> >> >> Perhaps you're suggesting that legs aren't physical. Or could this be >> >> another example of your mastery of the language that makes it so easy >> >> for >> >> others to understand you? >> >> > Yes it can be applied to any physical entity. The point is that only >> > when (1) is true, (2) is true. Obviously where (1) is false as in your >> > example then (2) would also be false. The point was never that (1) is >> > always true. Can you understand it now? You can ask for clarification >> > on it if you like, after all it would be silly of you to be stating >> > that it wasn't true, if it was just a case of you not understanding >> > it. >> >> I see now, you relegated the IF THEN statement to a tiny sentence at the >> end, without a number, that didn't appear to be part of the formula. >> Understood now. >> >> Excellent. Just like the leg example, since the behavior of a person >> walking >> around cannot be explained by the laws of physics without knowledge of >> whether he's conscious or not, (2) is not true. >> >> I mean, to explain the behavior of a person walking around, I have to >> know >> if the person is conscious or unconscious. I know how conscious and >> unconscious people behave, and it's not similar at all. >> >> Cool! We're done! >> > > Not quite. The point in contention is that we are not simply a > biological mechanism following the laws of physics, because if we were > then it wouldn't be influential. You have a strange definition of influential. Are you saying there would be no such thing as influence if the universe were clockwork? Tell me how legs are not influential to walking around. Then tell me why consciousness is not influential to walking around. You require them both to walk around. > So if you were contesting this, then with knowledge of how the > biological mechanism operated, its behaviour could be explained simply > in terms of the biological mechanism following the laws of physics. Like how a man with no legs can't walk around. Like how a man who's unconscious can't walk around. > Which would require no knowledge of whether it were subjectively > experiencing or not, any more than it would be required to explain the > way a robot were behaving. I've changed my mind. You need to know if the person is conscious or not to explain his behavior. See, I'm not as dogmatic as you think I am. It you that is as dogmatic as you think I am. > So (1) would be true, No. It fails (1) for the same reason the leg example failed. You need to know if the person is conscious or unconscious. > and so would (2). Nope. (1) fails so (2) is not true! Your formula is actually working pretty well now. > It > is an implausible story though, but for it not to be true, would > require the assumption that we were simply a biological mechanism > strictly following the laws of physics. That's what your formula seems to be supporting. > Just to remind you, you acknowledged that subjective experiences are a > property in their own right, Just like legs. > and that the property may be present in a > robot or not, Just like legs. > in that you can have knowledge of the other properties > such as the mechanism, but not of whether the property of subjective > experiences had emerged, was acknowledge by you in response to where I > said: How does that work with the legs/no legs scenario? > Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, one thing > you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective experiences or > not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in > your knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact. If I can't see the guy, I can't see if he has any legs. Check. > To which you replied: > ------------ > I fucking understand that you twit. > ------------ > > Don't you reflect yourself on the straws you grasp at, or is it that > you are just desperate to avoid facing you were wrong? M = A man B(M) = Walking around P = Consciousness (1) fails utterly. (For the same reason as the legs example.) (2) Isn't true. (Presence of consciousness affects B(M)) I agree. -- Denis Loubet dloubet@io.com http://www.io.com/~dloubet http://www.ashenempires.com Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181594307.325774.225710@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > It points out that if a robot following the known laws of physics was > regarded by some as acting in a way that might suggest to them that it > has subjective experiences, that whether it does or not, couldn't be > influencing its behaviour. You limit the thought experiement to a contrived situation and then make assertions without proof. [snip arguments from ungrounded assertion] > Therefore it is shown that the assertion that we are simply a > biological mechanism following the laws of physics is implausible. > Something the atheists thought would never happen, because they didn't > realise they had been fooled by deceptive reasoning, which can and has > been shown to be so. Some atheists here are having a problem taking in > that they have been shown to be wrong beyond reasonable doubt. You > would think that if they had been led away from God by what they > thought was reason, they could be led back again,] Not possible .. the proposition of a god is unreasonable. And you have done NOTHING to lead anyone back anywhere .. you've not even presented a logical argument., >but there is the > problem of them getting over the hurdle of their ego, they would > rather deny a reasoned truth, than face that they were wrong. Yet who > did they ever think they were to say that they knew God didn't exist? > Beings with big egos that's for sure, which as said, is why they are > having such a problem comprehending they were wrong and it is has been > shown. You're showing your true nutter side. I thought you wanted to argue rationally? Quote
Guest Fred Stone Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 someone2 wrote: > On 11 Jun, 22:37, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> innews:1181594965.007188.174010@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:52, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> innews:1181593745.206175.160780@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein >> >> > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> >> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> [snip] >> >> >> >> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?: >> >> >> >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and >> >> >> >(2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> >> >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else >> >> >> >the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or >> >> >> >without P. >> >> >> >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true >> >> >> >> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a >> >> >> class of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But that >> >> >> is a minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that (1) >> >> >> reasonably captures a physical understanding of human behavior and >> >> >> subjective experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see >> >> >> take the existence of SE as a given and work to explain that >> >> >> existence. So, while I think your argument here is wrong, I think >> >> >> the argument itself does not meaningfully relate to a physicalist >> >> >> (not scientism) theory of the mind. >> >> >> > It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to >> >> > point out why it isn't. >> >> >> You have avoided seeing every attempt to point out why it isn't. >> >> >> > Yes you are right that subjective experiences do >> >> > influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to consider >> >> > whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion (which is >> >> > shown to be implausible) >> >> >> You keep repeating that assertion, but you are assuming your >> >> conclusion. >> >> > Where has it been pointed out where it isn't correct. Attempts where >> > you change either B(M) or P between (1) and (2) obviously don't count, >> > as it only applies where B(M) and P are the same between (1) and (2). >> >> But every example you offer, Glenn, you also change B or B(M) or P >> yourself. You just offer us trivial changes that don't make a difference >> to the behavior B(M) whereas we all know that subjective experience DOES >> make a difference to behavior. You then assume your conclusion when you >> state that under materialism that subjective experience could not >> possibly affect behavior. >> >> > Attempts so far have been shown to be deceptively attempting to do >> > this. Perhaps you'd care to give an example where it wouldn't be true. >> >> I have already offered you several examples, all as straighforward and >> truthful as yours. >> > > Well I can show you a few examples here, and you can see that I don't > change B(M) or P between (1) and (2) for any given example. Obviously > they are different in different examples. > > Example 1: > ---------- > > M = a car > B(M) = parked with its engine running > P = its serial number > > Which means: > > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a serial number > or not. > You changed B. > As (1) is true, so is: > (1) is not true. B is different. > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not affect the car > parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour > could not be the same with or without a serial number. > Irrelevant conclusion. > > Example 2: > ---------- > > M = a television > B(M) = television showing a broadcast television program > P = a chalk mark on the side > > Which means (1) would be: > > 1) A television showing a broadcast television program is explained by > the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a > chalk mark on the side or not. > > As (1) is true, so is: > Again, you changed B. > 2) Presence of a chalk mark on the side, or lack of, does not affect > the television showing a broadcast television program, else the > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without a chalk > mark on the side. > > > Example 3: > ---------- > > M = a car > B(M) = parked with its engine running > P = petrol in the tank > > Which means (1) would be: > > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has petrol in the > tank or not. > > Which is false, so (2) would also be false: > > 2) Presence of petrol in the tank, or lack of, does not affect the car > parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour > could not be the same with or without a petrol in the tank. > > As you can see, in examples 1 and 2 in which (1) is true in both cases > have B(M) and P the same in both (1) and (2) within the given example. > Example 3 is just an example of where (1) is false, there was no need > to include (2), but did so just to show that if it was included B(M) > and P would be the same in both (1) and (2). > > So now it is your turn, I've given three examples, you only need to > give one. Here are my predictions, either: > And again you changed B. > a) you won't give an example > b) you will change B(M) or P between (1) and (2) of your example. > c) you will give an example which does have knowledge of P in (1), > even if it is worded deceptively so as not to be immediately obvious. > d) you will give an example which highlights what I have been saying. You merely highlighted exactly what I was saying by repeating the same trivial examples in which the change of B made no difference to the behavior B(M), and you expect us to fall for your switcheroo when you change Humans from having subjective experience to NOT having subjective experience. -- Fred Stone aa# 1369 "When they put out that deadline, people realized that we were going to lose," said an aide to an anti-war lawmaker. "Everything after that seemed like posturing." Quote
Guest Richo Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 someone2 wrote: > On 11 Jun, 12:47, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > On Jun 7, 10:05 am, someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 6 Jun, 22:53, "min...@media.mit.edu" <min...@media.mit.edu> wrote: > > > > > > On Jun 5, 11:30 pm, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:> On Jun 6, 12:34 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 6 Jun, 03:29, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On Jun 5, 1:18 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > Evidently some people maintain that "subjective experience" can never > > > > be explained > > > > in terms of physical processes. They offer reasons for this opinion, > > > > but none of those > > > > make much sense to me. In the last chapter of "The Emotion Machine," > > > > I suggest some > > > > possible reasons why people find feelings so hard to describe, and > > > > suggest a few > > > > explanations of this, some of which might turn out to be wrong. > > > > > > However, it might be a good lesson to consider the way that "life" or > > > > "living" was once > > > > considered to be so inexplicable that perople felt they had to assume > > > > that there must > > > > exist a (nonphysical) "vital force" or "spirit," etc. But today, now > > > > that we know how > > > > complex a living cell is, no serious scientist see any basic mystery. > > > > Insted, now that we understand how complex a cell is, we know that we > > > > "simply" need to answer a few thousand > > > > hand -- but not unsolvable -- questions. > > > > > > It is exactly the same situation, it seems to me, with the subject of > > > > subjective experience. > > > > Too many philosophers have started with assumptions like "The > > > > sensation of Redness is > > > > basic, simple, and irreducible -- and therefore it is inexplicable." > > > > However, we can assume, > > > > instead, that when a brain sees something Red, this initiates an > > > > extremely complicated > > > > set of processes, and that these eventually cause certain parts of > > > > that brain to make > > > > very simplistic descriptions of what they observe in the rest of that > > > > brain. > > > > > > Then, because those descriptions don't lead anywhere, yet other parts > > > > of the brain > > > > construct those useless dualistic descriptions, because they don't > > > > have adequate ways > > > > to explain why they can't understand what is happening. > > > > > You've written a book on the subject? > > > > You honestly have not heard of Marvin Minsky? > > Wow! > > > > http://web.media.mit.edu/~minsky/ > > > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marvin_Minsky > > > > No I hadn't. Though they must feel a bit silly writing a book on the > subject, then being shown they were wrong. You haven't "shown" that they were wrong. You are delusional. Bye, Mark. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181601365.782001.291660@q69g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > Well let's say for arguments sake, there was a robot, following the > known laws of physics, driven by a neural network which had a million > more nodes than you have neurons in your brain. Each node wrote out to > a log the messages it received, and the messages it sent out, and the > message contained information such as time sent, time received, source > node, destination node (which might be the same as the source node for > feedback messages), the message etc. Then after an hour converstation > with it, a bank of computers could go through the logs confirming that > no unexplained messages appeared, and that each node followed the laws > of physics as expected, giving the outputs expected given the inputs. > If necessary even if it took a thousand years, the behaviour of the > robot could be explained All perfectly true up until there > without knowledge of whether it had any > subjective experiences or not. Simply in terms of the configuration of > the nodes, and the inputs they received, and how the nodes worked. And it is those nodes and imput and how they work that encode the subjective experiences. You are assuming that subjective experiences cannot be encoded in physical things and machanisms that are governed by the laws of physics. > The only assertion is yours, that we are a biological mechanism > strictly following the laws of physics. There is very good evidence for that assertion. We ARE biological mechanisms, and we DO follow the laws of physics. You've shown no reason to have a contrary assertion. > You are just having problems > accepting that it is shown that this is implausible, No .. it is not. > as without the > subjective experiences influencing our behaviour, it could only be > coincidental that the human we experience being was perhaps talking > about them or wondering whether the robot had similar experiences or > not. But you have not shown that there are no subjective experiences. That's the whole problem with your argument. You are making assumptions. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181606154.582220.239610@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > I have provided reason: > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > P refers to the a property in question. > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > If it wasn't true, then why can't you or anyone else provide an > example of where it wouldn't be? Same old copy and paste .. make your argument for Pete's sake !! Quote
Guest Lisbeth Andersson Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in news:1181473049.903786.211810@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com: > On 10 Jun, 03:46, Lisbeth Andersson <lis...@bredband.net> wrote: >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> innews:1181415772.483273.54580@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 9 Jun, 06:46, Lisbeth Andersson <lis...@bredband.net> >> > wrote: >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> innews:1181353677.705831.281300@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> > On 8 Jun, 18:57, Lisbeth Andersson <lis...@bredband.net> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> >> innews:1181311994.969146.270290 @q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.co >> >> >> m: >> >> >> >> <....> >> >> >> >> > I think it is better for you to understand the >> >> >> > implausibility of the story that we are simply a >> >> >> > biological mechanism following the known laws of >> >> >> > physics, before discussing the retreated to position >> >> >> > that maybe the configuration or complexity freed it from >> >> >> > the known laws of physics, but that there were still >> >> >> > only a physical mechanism. >> >> >> >> I'm more interested in how the unknown laws of physics fit >> >> >> into your worldwiev. >> >> >> > What makes you think there are any unknown laws of physics >> >> > which have any noticable influence on behaviour other than >> >> > at the subatomic or cosmic scale? >> >> >> Why should I exclude those? What makes you think that the >> >> subatomic laws doesn't affect behaviour. And whatever laws >> >> (if any) that governs consciousness and awareness seems >> >> somewhat missing. >> >> >> When was the last time we found >> >> >> > anything that didn't follow the known laws of physics? >> >> >> Mercury orbit? No, it's probably been some discoveries after >> >> that. I heard a rumour a few weeks back about nerve cells >> >> using some form of tunneling, it was from a very unreliable >> >> source though. >> >> >> > I'm more interested whether you understood the point that >> >> > was made (and you snipped), or is it a secret? >> >> >> I think your "point" was of the form: since we don't want to >> >> think our behaviour is deterministic (?), there has to be >> >> something that prevents it, I'm not sure if you are going for >> >> free will, the soul or god, or any combinations of it. If you >> >> ever get the basic assumptions sorted out, I might take a >> >> closer look at the rest of your argument. >> >> > It had nothing to do with determinism. >> >> > The reasoning is summarised below, but was outlined in more >> > depth in the part of the post you snipped. >> >> I don't see any reason to go through any argument when I don't >> agreee with the premises. >> >> > 1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics >> > without requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not. >> >> P(A)? >> >> > Therefore >> >> > 2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not influence the >> > behaviour of M, else the explanation of behaviour could not be >> > the same with or without P(A) >> >> > You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly >> > follows the known laws of physics for M, and any property for >> > P(A) where (1) would be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2). >> >> Balls dipped in catnip follow exactly the same laws of physics >> as balls not dipped in catnip. Howerver, the ball dipped in >> catnip is bouncing all over the room, while the ball not dipped >> in catnip is just laying there. Which properties of the cat in >> the room is not needed for the explanation? >> > > Let me put it another way, I didn't notice you were still on a > different wording of it, one which has caused other similar > misunderstandings of what is being said, so I accept some > responsibility for not making it clear. > > Using the following wording: > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > P refers to the a property in question. > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and > (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > Good, you have dropped the KNOWN laws of physics. This is progress indeed. > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else > the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or > without P. > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > Hopefully now it is reworded, you can see why your example wasn't > appropriate. > Well, you only want to discuss properties that do not affect behaviour in any way, so of course my example does not fit in. Lisbeth. ---- The day I don't learn anything new is the day I die. What we know is not nearly as interesting as how we know it. -- Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 On 12 Jun, 01:55, Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 15:56:38 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > <1181602598.637285.269...@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >On 11 Jun, 22:37, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: > >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote innews:1181594965.007188.174010@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com: > > >> > On 11 Jun, 20:52, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: > >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > >> >> innews:1181593745.206175.160780@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com: > > >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein > >> >> > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> >> >> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > >> >> >> [snip] > > >> >> >> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?: > > >> >> >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> >> >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> >> >> >P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and > >> >> >> >(2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> >> >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > >> >> >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else > >> >> >> >the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or > >> >> >> >without P. > > >> >> >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true > > >> >> >> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a > >> >> >> class of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But that > >> >> >> is a minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that (1) > >> >> >> reasonably captures a physical understanding of human behavior and > >> >> >> subjective experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see > >> >> >> take the existence of SE as a given and work to explain that > >> >> >> existence. So, while I think your argument here is wrong, I think > >> >> >> the argument itself does not meaningfully relate to a physicalist > >> >> >> (not scientism) theory of the mind. > > >> >> > It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to > >> >> > point out why it isn't. > > >> >> You have avoided seeing every attempt to point out why it isn't. > > >> >> > Yes you are right that subjective experiences do > >> >> > influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to consider > >> >> > whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion (which is > >> >> > shown to be implausible) > > >> >> You keep repeating that assertion, but you are assuming your > >> >> conclusion. > > >> > Where has it been pointed out where it isn't correct. Attempts where > >> > you change either B(M) or P between (1) and (2) obviously don't count, > >> > as it only applies where B(M) and P are the same between (1) and (2). > > >> But every example you offer, Glenn, you also change B or B(M) or P > >> yourself. You just offer us trivial changes that don't make a difference > >> to the behavior B(M) whereas we all know that subjective experience DOES > >> make a difference to behavior. You then assume your conclusion when you > >> state that under materialism that subjective experience could not > >> possibly affect behavior. > > >> > Attempts so far have been shown to be deceptively attempting to do > >> > this. Perhaps you'd care to give an example where it wouldn't be true. > > >> I have already offered you several examples, all as straighforward and > >> truthful as yours. > > >Well I can show you a few examples here, and you can see that I don't > >change B(M) or P between (1) and (2) for any given example. Obviously > >they are different in different examples. > > >Example 1: > >---------- > > >M = a car > >B(M) = parked with its engine running > >P = its serial number > > >Which means: > > >1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of > >physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a serial number > >or not. > > >As (1) is true, so is: > > >2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not affect the car > >parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour > >could not be the same with or without a serial number. > > I think you have missed the point. No one, AFAICT, disagrees that your > (2) is a reformulation of your (1). It is really just a version of > parsimony. The question is whether or not the abstract (1) hold true > for humans. That is, we assert that it is not true that we can develop > an explanation of humans that ignores subjective experience. > Furthermore we are asserting that it sure looks like we will be able > to develop a physical explanation of humans, including explaining > subjective experience. > > [snip] > It's not simply a reformulation. (1) is about knowledge of the property, and explanation. (2) is about whether the property is influential. If (1) wasn't true for humans, then humans can't be simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics (else their behaviour could be explained in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics), which is the point I am getting at. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 On 12 Jun, 02:00, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181607322.623131.144640@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > > > On 12 Jun, 00:56, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >>news:1181603668.494011.312460@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > > >> > On 12 Jun, 00:09, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >>news:1181598999.112030.3470@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> > On 11 Jun, 22:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >>news:1181593524.600437.247290@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >>news:1181583039.890628.118980@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 18:23, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >> >>news:1181581549.652693.254210@q66g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 16:43, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181517234.889369.239710@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 00:05, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181514806.543814.218460@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 10 Jun, 20:36, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:FNednZ5aMcoN3PHbnZ2dnUVZ_tmknZ2d@io.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > message > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >news:1181471104.632034.40450@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On 10 Jun, 03:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>>news:1181440301.918077.327620@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > On 10 Jun, 02:15, "Denis Loubet" > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> wrote > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>news:1181417934.359700.133760@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > On 9 Jun, 08:25, "Denis Loubet" > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> wrote > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (snipped some of the older stuff) > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Can you understand the following: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 1) The behaviour of M is explained by > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > physics > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > reference requiring knowledge of whether > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > has > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Let's see, can I explain the behavior of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> my > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> knowing > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> if > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> has > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank or not by the laws of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> physics? > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Yes, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explain > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> both > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behaviors, and one of them will be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> correct. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Therefore > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > affect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > behaviour > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > M, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Well, personally I think gas in the tank > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> radically > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> affects > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> my car. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > else the explanation of behaviour could > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without P(A) > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> The behavior of my car with gas in the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> tank > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explainable > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> by > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> physics, as is the behavior of my car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> tank. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> But > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> somehow I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> only get places I need to get to in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> air-conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> comfort > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank. That's very different > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> from > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> isn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Gosh! How very odd! It seems your point 2 > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> completely > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> wrong > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> on > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> such > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> basic level that it's hard to comprehend > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> how > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> function > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> society > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> at > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> all. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I take it you don't own a car? Please tell > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> me > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> don't. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > You can substitute whatever physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > entity > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > strictly > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > follows > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > known laws of physics for M, and any > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > property > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > for > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > which > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > where > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > (1) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > would be true. If (1) is true, then so > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> My car says you're just plain stupid. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Your reponses have a certain entertainment > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > value > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > guess. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Let me put it another way: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> No, why don't you address it the way you put > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> it? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> And the way I answered it? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you too stupid or afraid to? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you a moron, a coward, or both? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M refers to the physical entity in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car! > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> It gets me to my destination in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> air-conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort! > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Gas in the tank! > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > requiring > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car employs the laws of physics to get me > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> my > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> destination > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> air-conditioned comfort! > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > affect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M), > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > else > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Oddly, that doesn't match reality at all! > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> When > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> there's > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> my car, I DON'T get to my destination in air > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort! > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> just sits there following the laws of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> physics. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Bummer! > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if (1) is true, then so is (2) > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car still says you're just plain stupid. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > (2) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> How can my car, getting somewhere in air > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank all be the same thing? That's just > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> stupid. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > To give you an example, just to make sure > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > have > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > no > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > excuses > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > for > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretending you can't grasp the point, and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > misunderstanding > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > it: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = a car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = its serial number > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Which means: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explained > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > by > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > physics without requiring knowledge of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > whether > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > has a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > serial > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > number > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > does > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > parked > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > with its engine running, else the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explanation > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > behaviour > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > could > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > be the same with or without a serial > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > number. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> But if the situation is: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = my car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = gas in the tank > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Then suddenly your formula fails! Once the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> runs > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> out, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> longer > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> has a running engine. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Since (1) is true, so is (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Not if there's no gas in the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > So though I have tried to plug up the holes > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > where > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > might > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > try > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretend to misunderstand, your ability to, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > still > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > does > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > give > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > some > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > artistic scope for disingenuity, which I'm > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > sure > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > will > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > use > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > able. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> You're so stupid, my car is embarrassed for > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> you. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > I pointed out: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > To which you replied: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > How can my car, getting somewhere in air > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > conditioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > comfort, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in the tank all be the same thing? That's just > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > stupid. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > I assume this was just another example of your > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > disingenious > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > creativity. M isn't the same as B(M) which > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > isn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > as > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > It > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > that M mentioned in (1) is the same as M > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2), > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned in (1) is the same as B(M) mentioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2), > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in (1) is the same as P mentioned in (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > If you can now understand this, you can see if > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > wasn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > because there was no gas in the tank, then (1) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > couldn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > have > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > been > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, as it getting you to your destination in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > air > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > couldn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > explained without gas in the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > You'll notice it also gets through your usual > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > well > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > polished > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > deception > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in that it applies to and physical entity that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > strictly > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > follows > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > laws of physics, and doesn't require a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > comparison > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > entity. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > So here it is again, and hopefully you won't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > simply > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > grasping > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > at > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ways to misinterpret what is being said, but > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > actually > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > face > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > reason > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > for > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > once. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> My car. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> It's sitting there inert. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Gas in the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > requiring > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> The car sits there inert, according to the laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> physics. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Doesn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> matter > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> if there's gas in the tank or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not affect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M), > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > else > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is exactly > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> as > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> in the tank. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to buy > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> gas > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> again! > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> can > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> drive > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> around > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> with or without gas. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Yup, your example sure matches reality. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Note that the above sentence is an admitted lie. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > It follows that if (1) is true, then so is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Nope. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> car > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> sitting > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> there > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> inert, so (2) would be true. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Until the key is turned in the ignition. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > false. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Look, are you trying, in your own stupid and inept > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> way, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> get > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> me > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> say > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that there are properties that have no effect on the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> thing > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> they're a property of? Well that's a big yes! Of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> COURSE > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> there > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> properties > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that have no effect on behavior. Your example of the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> serial > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> number, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> for > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> example. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So what? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Are you dishonestly trying to equate the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> irrelevant-to-behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> aspect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> serial number to the crucial-to-behavior aspect of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience? > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you were honest, your examples would be either the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> car's > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> elecrtical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> system > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> compared to subjective experience, or a serial > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> number > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> compared > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> tattoo. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> The effects of subjective experience on behavior are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subtle, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> do > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conceptually map to the irrelevancy of a serial > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> number. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I think that subjective experience is the action of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> matter > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical brains following the laws of physics. The > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not apart from that physical action. Subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Experience > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> name > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> we apply to a certain catagory of physical actions > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> found > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brains. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> It > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subset, not an "extra thing", somehow apart from the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> normal > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> operation > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brain. It IS the normal operation of the brain. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If you remove it from the operation of the brain, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> expect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> radically > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> different behavior, just like you would expect if > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ripped > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> out > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> crucial > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subroutines from a computer program. Without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> human brain is no longer operating normally, even > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> though > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> still, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> course, operating according to the laws of physics. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I know it was pointless of me to type > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Subjective experiences are a label to what you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > actually > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > consciously > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experience. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Which is matter in the brain operating according to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> law. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > That the brain is directly responsible for them is an > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assertion. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No, it's a conclusion based on evidence. If you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physically > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> manipulate > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brain, you manipulate consciousness. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I can't say it is an explanation, as there could be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > no > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explanation from your perspective why any physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > activity > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjectively experienced, or why it wasn't just > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > fluctuations > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > colour green for example, the brightness dependent on > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > amount > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > neurons firing. Nothing in your perspective would > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > know > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > what > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > neuron > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > state represented. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> That's where your ability to communicate breaks down > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> entirely. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> fuck > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are you babbling about? "Fluctuations of the color > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> green"? > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> on > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> drugs? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The point was that even if you wanted to believe in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > story > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > we > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > were simply biological mechanisms, and that our > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > were an emergent property of the brain. The emergent > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > property > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > couldn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be said to be influential in behaviour due to: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I was right, you're going to ignore what I post and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> write > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> your > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> fucking > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> formula again. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (1) > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (2), > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > requiring > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Then P and/or B has to be pretty fucking trivial. Like > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> serial > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> number, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> or > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> being inert. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > influence/affect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > B(M), > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > else > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > P. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Yeah, you can concoct a scenario that fulfills these > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> criteria. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Big > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> deal. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Suppose I agree. So what? This little formula cannot be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> applied > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> non-trivial properties and behaviors. If the property > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> non-trivial, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> then > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it will affect behavior, and your formula cannot be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> applied. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So, how DO you deal with properties that DO affect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior? > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Do > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> just > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> pretend they don't exist? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The story that our subjective experiences have no > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > influence > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > on > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour is implausible, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> From my perspective, you've been arguing against that. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> think > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective experience influences our behavior. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > even though you bet your soul on it, unable > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to see through the deception, and still cling to it, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > even > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to disingeniously misunderstand. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> You have not demonstrated that. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > That you can't face that you were > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrong, and that you are shown to be so through > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > reason, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > appears > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > me > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > as pathetic. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Or perhaps it's you that's completely wrong. Have you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> even > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> considered > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> possibility? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm guessing not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > It is implausible that we simply are a biological > >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply > >> >> >> >> >> >> > following the laws of physics. For that reason alone I > >> >> >> >> >> >> > could > >> >> >> >> >> >> > know > >> >> >> >> >> >> > I > >> >> >> >> >> >> > wasn't wrong. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> So you determine if you're right about something based on > >> >> >> >> >> >> nothing > >> >> >> >> >> >> but > >> >> >> >> >> >> arbitrary feelings? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> That explains a lot. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > It is implausible, because it would require our > >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour, > >> >> >> >> >> >> > including > >> >> >> >> >> >> > even questioning whether a robot had subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences, > >> >> >> >> >> >> > would > >> >> >> >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> > uninfluenced by us having subjective experiences. This > >> >> >> >> >> >> > is > >> >> >> >> >> >> > shown > >> >> >> >> >> >> > by: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> No, it's influenced by subjective experience. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> >> >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> >> >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in > >> >> >> >> >> >> > (1) > >> >> >> >> >> >> > and > >> >> >> >> >> >> > (2), > >> >> >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without > >> >> >> >> >> >> > requiring > >> >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect > >> >> >> >> >> >> > B(M), > >> >> >> >> >> >> > else > >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or > >> >> >> >> >> >> > without > >> >> >> >> >> >> > P. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> Lets see if we can apply this stupidity to something that > >> >> >> >> >> >> affects > >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior. > >> >> >> >> >> >> Can you apply it to reflexes? Oops, no, there's a > >> >> >> >> >> >> difference > >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> if > >> >> >> >> >> >> you have reflexes compared to you not having reflexes. If > >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> can't > >> >> >> >> >> >> apply > >> >> >> >> >> >> your little formula to reflexes, what makes you think you > >> >> >> >> >> >> can > >> >> >> >> >> >> apply > >> >> >> >> >> >> it > >> >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > Without the assertion that we were a biological > >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply > >> >> >> >> >> >> > following the laws of physics, there would be no reason > >> >> >> >> >> >> > to > >> >> >> >> >> >> > assume > >> >> >> >> >> >> > anything following the laws of physics subjectively > >> >> >> >> >> >> > experienced, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm a biological mechanism simply following the laws of > >> >> >> >> >> >> physics > >> >> >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >> I > >> >> >> >> >> >> subjectively experience, therefore I conclude that > >> >> >> >> >> >> biological > >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms > >> >> >> >> >> >> following the laws of can subjectively experience. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > therefore what reason would the biological mechanism (if > >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> > assertion > >> >> >> >> >> >> > were made) have for considering such a thing > >> >> >> >> >> >> > uninfluenced > >> >> >> >> >> >> > by > >> >> >> >> >> >> > it > >> >> >> >> >> >> > having > >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective experiences. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> This one doesn't. This one observes that it's subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences > >> >> >> >> >> >> influence its behavior. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > You were wrong get used to it. Stop being so pathetic > >> >> >> >> >> >> > about > >> >> >> >> >> >> > it. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> You're not stating my position. Why would your criticizism > >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> position > >> >> >> >> >> >> I > >> >> >> >> >> >> do not hold show that I am wrong? > > >> >> >> >> >> > If you changed the property to one that behaviour couldn't > >> >> >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> >> > explained without knowledge of, then (1) wouldn't be true. > > >> >> >> >> >> Which means you can't apply your formula to reflexes, right? > > >> >> >> >> >> So why do you think you can apply it to consciousness? The > >> >> >> >> >> behaviors > >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> conscious and unconscious things, in real life, is pretty > >> >> >> >> >> fucking > >> >> >> >> >> different. > >> >> >> >> >> The unconscious ones lie inert while the conscious ones run > >> >> >> >> >> about. > >> >> >> >> >> According > >> >> >> >> >> to (1) of your formula, you can't apply it to consciousness. > > >> >> >> >> >> > You have already admitted that though you could know the > >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> > the robot (and therefore be able to explain its behaviour) > >> >> >> >> >> > you > >> >> >> >> >> > wouldn't have knowledge of whether it has subjective > >> >> >> >> >> > experiences > >> >> >> >> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> > not. I asked you before: > > >> >> >> >> >> Is this an argument about my state of ignorance concerning if > >> >> >> >> >> something > >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> conscious or not? > > >> >> >> >> >> That has fuck-all to do with anything. My state of ignorance > >> >> >> >> >> has > >> >> >> >> >> nothing > >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> do with whether something is conscious or not, or what the > >> >> >> >> >> source > >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> >> consciousnsess is. > > >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ > >> >> >> >> >> > Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, > >> >> >> >> >> > one > >> >> >> >> >> > thing > >> >> >> >> >> > you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective > >> >> >> >> >> > experiences > >> >> >> >> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> > not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in > >> >> >> >> >> > your > >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact. > >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ > > >> >> >> >> >> > To which you replied: > >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ > >> >> >> >> >> > I fucking understand that you twit. > >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ > > >> >> >> >> >> > The question is can you face the truth, or are you going to > >> >> >> >> >> > continue > >> >> >> >> >> > to grasp at straws, hoping that they will enable you to > >> >> >> >> >> > avoid > >> >> >> >> >> > it, > >> >> >> >> >> > instead of making you look more and more pathetic. > > >> >> >> >> >> The truth would be that if it acts like it's conscious, I'll > >> >> >> >> >> call > >> >> >> >> >> it > >> >> >> >> >> conscious. That's my prerogative. > > >> >> >> >> > The point was outlined in the reason, you are unable to face: > > >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) > >> >> >> >> > and > >> >> >> >> > (2), > >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), > >> >> >> >> > else > >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without > >> >> >> >> > P. > > >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > >> >> >> >> > So with the robot, since it's behaviour can be explained > >> >> >> >> > without > >> >> >> >> > requiring knowledge of whether it is conscious or not, > > >> >> >> >> Ok, you asked for it. > > >> >> >> >> B(M) is not same for conscious vs unconscious robots. > > >> >> >> >> So your formula does not apply. > > >> >> >> >> If you have a robot that you say is not conscious, yet in all > >> >> >> >> respects > >> >> >> >> acts > >> >> >> >> as if it is, then there is consciousness involved. The mechanism > >> >> >> >> doesn't > >> >> >> >> matter. > > >> >> >> >> Consider, if the robot is just a clever tape recorder > >> >> >> >> specifically > >> >> >> >> programmed to answer my likely questions, then some conscious > >> >> >> >> entity > >> >> >> >> had > >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> program it and record the responses. THAT'S the conscious entity > >> >> >> >> I'm > >> >> >> >> talking > >> >> >> >> to via the robot. The robot is only the middle-man between me > >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> another > >> >> >> >> consciousness. I may confuse the robot for the conscious entity, > >> >> >> >> but > >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> doesn't mean I'm not talking to another consciousness. > > >> >> >> >> It's the same with any elaborate Eliza program you might want to > >> >> >> >> construct. > >> >> >> >> I'm talking to the programmer through the robot, even though the > >> >> >> >> programmer > >> >> >> >> may be long dead. > > >> >> >> >> And if you arrive at the robot through no artifice, meaning that > >> >> >> >> it > >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> constructed by unconscious nature with no intent, then by what > >> >> >> >> authority > >> >> >> >> do > >> >> >> >> you declare it non-conscious if it acts like it is? > > >> >> >> >> > whether it is > >> >> >> >> > or not couldn't be influencing its behaviour, > > >> >> >> >> But since it is influencing its behavior, your formula does not > >> >> >> >> apply. > > >> >> >> >> > no more than it could > >> >> >> >> > influence ours, if we were simply a biological mechanism > >> >> >> >> > following > >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> > laws of physics... > > >> >> >> >> ...with consciousness as part of that biological mechanism > >> >> >> >> influencing > >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> behavior. > > >> >> >> >> > It is implausible that we are, for reasons given to > >> >> >> >> > you before. > > >> >> >> >> And your formula is as inapplicable as before. > > >> >> >> >> > You can choose to be totally illogical if you like, and to not > >> >> >> >> > face > >> >> >> >> > reason. Though you won't be experiencing the physical world > >> >> >> >> > forever, > >> >> >> >> > and you'll regret your choice. > > >> >> >> >> And if you're wrong, which is always possible, your continued > >> >> >> >> insistence > >> >> >> >> that this is the case is nothing more than your arrogant > >> >> >> >> self-absorption > >> >> >> >> talking. > > >> >> >> > The formula doesn't require a comparitive entity. It can be used > >> >> >> > in > >> >> >> > regards to any physical entity. > > >> >> >> Any physical entity? > > >> >> >> Let's try it: > > >> >> >> M = A man > >> >> >> B(M) = Walking around > >> >> >> P = Legs > > >> >> >> How the fuck do you: > > >> >> >> "1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > >> >> >> knowledge > >> >> >> of > >> >> >> whether it has P or not." > > >> >> >> I don't know about you, but if I'm going to explain how a guy walks > >> >> >> around, > >> >> >> I'm gonna have to know if he has legs or not. > > >> >> >> "2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else > >> >> >> the > >> >> >> explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P." > > >> >> >> I would think legs have something to do with walking around, and I > >> >> >> don't > >> >> >> think it's gonna be the same with or without them. > > >> >> >> Please explain how your formula applies. With the values I've > >> >> >> plugged > >> >> >> in, > >> >> >> it > >> >> >> doesn't make any sense. > > >> >> >> > You keep trying to talk about two > >> >> >> > different mechanisms, and say well they act differently, but that > >> >> >> > is > >> >> >> > like talking about a car and a toaster, and saying well the car > >> >> >> > has > >> >> >> > a > >> >> >> > numberplate, and they act differently so the number plate is > >> >> >> > influential. You need to face that the formula is true, and can > >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> > shown to be so, when you stop trying to make B(M) or P different > >> >> >> > between (1) and (2). Basically it cuts through the deception that > >> >> >> > you > >> >> >> > were fooled by. > > >> >> >> Apply your formula to the entities I provided above. > > >> >> > Er... you really are having trouble understanding this aren't you. > > >> >> Either that, or you're really bad at making others understand you. > > >> >> > Is > >> >> > it the complexity of it, or is it that for it to be correct would > >> >> > mean > >> >> > that you were wrong, and your ego won't let you face that you were > >> >> > wrong? > > >> >> Gosh, no thought whatsoever that maybe the problem lies with you. > > >> >> > In your example (1) would not be true, you couldn't explain the man > >> >> > walking around, without knowledge of whether he had legs or not. > > >> >> So your formula CANNOT be applied to "any physical entity". > > >> >> Were you lying when you said it could? "The formula doesn't require a > >> >> comparitive entity. It can be used in regards to any physical entity." > > >> >> Perhaps you're suggesting that legs aren't physical. Or could this be > >> >> another example of your mastery of the language that makes it so easy > >> >> for > >> >> others to understand you? > > >> > Yes it can be applied to any physical entity. The point is that only > >> > when (1) is true, (2) is true. Obviously where (1) is false as in your > >> > example then (2) would also be false. The point was never that (1) is > >> > always true. Can you understand it now? You can ask for clarification > >> > on it if you like, after all it would be silly of you to be stating > >> > that it wasn't true, if it was just a case of you not understanding > >> > it. > > >> I see now, you relegated the IF THEN statement to a tiny sentence at the > >> end, without a number, that didn't appear to be part of the formula. > >> Understood now. > > >> Excellent. Just like the leg example, since the behavior of a person > >> walking > >> around cannot be explained by the laws of physics without knowledge of > >> whether he's conscious or not, (2) is not true. > > >> I mean, to explain the behavior of a person walking around, I have to > >> know > >> if the person is conscious or unconscious. I know how conscious and > >> unconscious people behave, and it's not similar at all. > > >> Cool! We're done! > > > Not quite. The point in contention is that we are not simply a > > biological mechanism following the laws of physics, because if we were > > then it wouldn't be influential. > > You have a strange definition of influential. Are you saying there would be > no such thing as influence if the universe were clockwork? > > Tell me how legs are not influential to walking around. > > Then tell me why consciousness is not influential to walking around. > > You require them both to walk around. > > > So if you were contesting this, then with knowledge of how the > > biological mechanism operated, its behaviour could be explained simply > > in terms of the biological mechanism following the laws of physics. > > Like how a man with no legs can't walk around. > > Like how a man who's unconscious can't walk around. > > > Which would require no knowledge of whether it were subjectively > > experiencing or not, any more than it would be required to explain the > > way a robot were behaving. > > I've changed my mind. You need to know if the person is conscious or not to > explain his behavior. > > See, I'm not as dogmatic as you think I am. It you that is as dogmatic as > you think I am. > > > So (1) would be true, > > No. It fails (1) for the same reason the leg example failed. You need to > know if the person is conscious or unconscious. > > > and so would (2). > > Nope. (1) fails so (2) is not true! Your formula is actually working pretty > well now. > > > It > > is an implausible story though, but for it not to be true, would > > require the assumption that we were simply a biological mechanism > > strictly following the laws of physics. > > That's what your formula seems to be supporting. > > > Just to remind you, you acknowledged that subjective experiences are a > > property in their own right, > > Just like legs. > > > and that the property may be present in a > > robot or not, > > Just like legs. > > > in that you can have knowledge of the other properties > > such as the mechanism, but not of whether the property of subjective > > experiences had emerged, was acknowledge by you in response to where I > > said: > > How does that work with the legs/no legs scenario? > > > Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, one thing > > you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective experiences or > > not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in > > your knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact. > > If I can't see the guy, I can't see if he has any legs. Check. > > > To which you replied: > > ------------ > > I fucking understand that you twit. > > ------------ > > > Don't you reflect yourself on the straws you grasp at, or is it that > > you are just desperate to avoid facing you were wrong? > > M = A man > B(M) = Walking around > P = Consciousness > > (1) fails utterly. (For the same reason as the legs example.) > (2) Isn't true. (Presence of consciousness affects B(M)) > > I agree. > When you say: ------ I've changed my mind. You need to know if the person is conscious or not to explain his behavior. ------ Do you mean whether the person has subjective experiences or not? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 On 12 Jun, 02:36, Fred Stone <N...@Biznez.net> wrote: > someone2 wrote: > > On 11 Jun, 22:37, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: > >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > >> innews:1181594965.007188.174010@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com: > > >> > On 11 Jun, 20:52, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: > >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > >> >> innews:1181593745.206175.160780@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com: > > >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein > >> >> > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> >> >> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > >> >> >> [snip] > > >> >> >> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?: > > >> >> >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> >> >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> >> >> >P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and > >> >> >> >(2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> >> >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > >> >> >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else > >> >> >> >the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or > >> >> >> >without P. > > >> >> >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true > > >> >> >> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a > >> >> >> class of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But that > >> >> >> is a minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that (1) > >> >> >> reasonably captures a physical understanding of human behavior and > >> >> >> subjective experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see > >> >> >> take the existence of SE as a given and work to explain that > >> >> >> existence. So, while I think your argument here is wrong, I think > >> >> >> the argument itself does not meaningfully relate to a physicalist > >> >> >> (not scientism) theory of the mind. > > >> >> > It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to > >> >> > point out why it isn't. > > >> >> You have avoided seeing every attempt to point out why it isn't. > > >> >> > Yes you are right that subjective experiences do > >> >> > influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to consider > >> >> > whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion (which is > >> >> > shown to be implausible) > > >> >> You keep repeating that assertion, but you are assuming your > >> >> conclusion. > > >> > Where has it been pointed out where it isn't correct. Attempts where > >> > you change either B(M) or P between (1) and (2) obviously don't count, > >> > as it only applies where B(M) and P are the same between (1) and (2). > > >> But every example you offer, Glenn, you also change B or B(M) or P > >> yourself. You just offer us trivial changes that don't make a difference > >> to the behavior B(M) whereas we all know that subjective experience DOES > >> make a difference to behavior. You then assume your conclusion when you > >> state that under materialism that subjective experience could not > >> possibly affect behavior. > > >> > Attempts so far have been shown to be deceptively attempting to do > >> > this. Perhaps you'd care to give an example where it wouldn't be true. > > >> I have already offered you several examples, all as straighforward and > >> truthful as yours. > > > Well I can show you a few examples here, and you can see that I don't > > change B(M) or P between (1) and (2) for any given example. Obviously > > they are different in different examples. > > > Example 1: > > ---------- > > > M = a car > > B(M) = parked with its engine running > > P = its serial number > > > Which means: > > > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a serial number > > or not. > > You changed B. > > > As (1) is true, so is: > > (1) is not true. B is different. > > > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not affect the car > > parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour > > could not be the same with or without a serial number. > > Irrelevant conclusion. > > > > > > > > > Example 2: > > ---------- > > > M = a television > > B(M) = television showing a broadcast television program > > P = a chalk mark on the side > > > Which means (1) would be: > > > 1) A television showing a broadcast television program is explained by > > the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a > > chalk mark on the side or not. > > > As (1) is true, so is: > > Again, you changed B. > > > > > > > 2) Presence of a chalk mark on the side, or lack of, does not affect > > the television showing a broadcast television program, else the > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without a chalk > > mark on the side. > > > Example 3: > > ---------- > > > M = a car > > B(M) = parked with its engine running > > P = petrol in the tank > > > Which means (1) would be: > > > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has petrol in the > > tank or not. > > > Which is false, so (2) would also be false: > > > 2) Presence of petrol in the tank, or lack of, does not affect the car > > parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour > > could not be the same with or without a petrol in the tank. > > > As you can see, in examples 1 and 2 in which (1) is true in both cases > > have B(M) and P the same in both (1) and (2) within the given example. > > Example 3 is just an example of where (1) is false, there was no need > > to include (2), but did so just to show that if it was included B(M) > > and P would be the same in both (1) and (2). > > > So now it is your turn, I've given three examples, you only need to > > give one. Here are my predictions, either: > > And again you changed B. > > > a) you won't give an example > > b) you will change B(M) or P between (1) and (2) of your example. > > c) you will give an example which does have knowledge of P in (1), > > even if it is worded deceptively so as not to be immediately obvious. > > d) you will give an example which highlights what I have been saying. > > You merely highlighted exactly what I was saying by repeating the same > trivial examples in which the change of B made no difference to the > behavior B(M), and you expect us to fall for your switcheroo when you > change Humans from having subjective experience to NOT having subjective > experience. > I had said: ------------------- Example 1: ---------- M = a car B(M) = parked with its engine running P = its serial number Which means: 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a serial number or not. ------------------- To which you replied: ------------------- You changed B. ------------------- LOL, where did I, and also I'm not sure what you mean by B as opposed to B(M)? As for my predictions, I see you went for (a). Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 On 12 Jun, 10:09, Lisbeth Andersson <lis...@bredband.net> wrote: > someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote innews:1181473049.903786.211810@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com: > > > > > > > On 10 Jun, 03:46, Lisbeth Andersson <lis...@bredband.net> wrote: > >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > >> innews:1181415772.483273.54580@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com: > > >> > On 9 Jun, 06:46, Lisbeth Andersson <lis...@bredband.net> > >> > wrote: > >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > >> >> innews:1181353677.705831.281300@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com: > > >> >> > On 8 Jun, 18:57, Lisbeth Andersson <lis...@bredband.net> > >> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > >> >> >> innews:1181311994.969146.270290 > > @q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.co > > > > > > >> >> >> m: > > >> >> >> <....> > > >> >> >> > I think it is better for you to understand the > >> >> >> > implausibility of the story that we are simply a > >> >> >> > biological mechanism following the known laws of > >> >> >> > physics, before discussing the retreated to position > >> >> >> > that maybe the configuration or complexity freed it from > >> >> >> > the known laws of physics, but that there were still > >> >> >> > only a physical mechanism. > > >> >> >> I'm more interested in how the unknown laws of physics fit > >> >> >> into your worldwiev. > > >> >> > What makes you think there are any unknown laws of physics > >> >> > which have any noticable influence on behaviour other than > >> >> > at the subatomic or cosmic scale? > > >> >> Why should I exclude those? What makes you think that the > >> >> subatomic laws doesn't affect behaviour. And whatever laws > >> >> (if any) that governs consciousness and awareness seems > >> >> somewhat missing. > > >> >> When was the last time we found > > >> >> > anything that didn't follow the known laws of physics? > > >> >> Mercury orbit? No, it's probably been some discoveries after > >> >> that. I heard a rumour a few weeks back about nerve cells > >> >> using some form of tunneling, it was from a very unreliable > >> >> source though. > > >> >> > I'm more interested whether you understood the point that > >> >> > was made (and you snipped), or is it a secret? > > >> >> I think your "point" was of the form: since we don't want to > >> >> think our behaviour is deterministic (?), there has to be > >> >> something that prevents it, I'm not sure if you are going for > >> >> free will, the soul or god, or any combinations of it. If you > >> >> ever get the basic assumptions sorted out, I might take a > >> >> closer look at the rest of your argument. > > >> > It had nothing to do with determinism. > > >> > The reasoning is summarised below, but was outlined in more > >> > depth in the part of the post you snipped. > > >> I don't see any reason to go through any argument when I don't > >> agreee with the premises. > > >> > 1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics > >> > without requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not. > > >> P(A)? > > >> > Therefore > > >> > 2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not influence the > >> > behaviour of M, else the explanation of behaviour could not be > >> > the same with or without P(A) > > >> > You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly > >> > follows the known laws of physics for M, and any property for > >> > P(A) where (1) would be true. If (1) is true, then so is (2). > > >> Balls dipped in catnip follow exactly the same laws of physics > >> as balls not dipped in catnip. Howerver, the ball dipped in > >> catnip is bouncing all over the room, while the ball not dipped > >> in catnip is just laying there. Which properties of the cat in > >> the room is not needed for the explanation? > > > Let me put it another way, I didn't notice you were still on a > > different wording of it, one which has caused other similar > > misunderstandings of what is being said, so I accept some > > responsibility for not making it clear. > > > Using the following wording: > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and > > (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > Good, you have dropped the KNOWN laws of physics. This is progress > indeed. > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else > > the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or > > without P. > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > Hopefully now it is reworded, you can see why your example wasn't > > appropriate. > > Well, you only want to discuss properties that do not affect > behaviour in any way, so of course my example does not fit in. > (1) is about properties that you have no knowledge of and aren't required to explain the behaviour. Like whether M was a robot, B(M) was acting in a fashion that you might consider it to have subjective experiences, and P was whether it did have subjective experiences or not. (2) shows that in the above example of the robot, that whether it had subjective expeirences or not couldn't be influencing its behaviour. Can you understand what the implications would be if we were simply a biological mechanism explainable by the laws of physics, and why this is implausible? Quote
Guest Fred Stone Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 someone2 wrote: > On 12 Jun, 02:36, Fred Stone <N...@Biznez.net> wrote: >> someone2 wrote: >> > On 11 Jun, 22:37, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> innews:1181594965.007188.174010@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:52, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> >> innews:1181593745.206175.160780@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein >> >> >> > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> >> >> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> [snip] >> >> >> >> >> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?: >> >> >> >> >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> >P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and >> >> >> >> >(2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >> >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> >> >> >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), >> >> >> >> >else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or >> >> >> >> >without P. >> >> >> >> >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true >> >> >> >> >> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a >> >> >> >> class of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But >> >> >> >> that is a minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that >> >> >> >> (1) reasonably captures a physical understanding of human >> >> >> >> behavior and subjective experience (SE). All of the physical >> >> >> >> analysis I see take the existence of SE as a given and work to >> >> >> >> explain that existence. So, while I think your argument here is >> >> >> >> wrong, I think the argument itself does not meaningfully relate >> >> >> >> to a physicalist (not scientism) theory of the mind. >> >> >> >> > It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to >> >> >> > point out why it isn't. >> >> >> >> You have avoided seeing every attempt to point out why it isn't. >> >> >> >> > Yes you are right that subjective experiences do >> >> >> > influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to >> >> >> > consider whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion >> >> >> > (which is shown to be implausible) >> >> >> >> You keep repeating that assertion, but you are assuming your >> >> >> conclusion. >> >> >> > Where has it been pointed out where it isn't correct. Attempts where >> >> > you change either B(M) or P between (1) and (2) obviously don't >> >> > count, as it only applies where B(M) and P are the same between (1) >> >> > and (2). >> >> >> But every example you offer, Glenn, you also change B or B(M) or P >> >> yourself. You just offer us trivial changes that don't make a >> >> difference to the behavior B(M) whereas we all know that subjective >> >> experience DOES make a difference to behavior. You then assume your >> >> conclusion when you state that under materialism that subjective >> >> experience could not possibly affect behavior. >> >> >> > Attempts so far have been shown to be deceptively attempting to do >> >> > this. Perhaps you'd care to give an example where it wouldn't be >> >> > true. >> >> >> I have already offered you several examples, all as straighforward and >> >> truthful as yours. >> >> > Well I can show you a few examples here, and you can see that I don't >> > change B(M) or P between (1) and (2) for any given example. Obviously >> > they are different in different examples. >> >> > Example 1: >> > ---------- >> >> > M = a car >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running >> > P = its serial number >> >> > Which means: >> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of >> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a serial number >> > or not. >> >> You changed B. >> >> > As (1) is true, so is: >> >> (1) is not true. B is different. >> >> > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not affect the car >> > parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour >> > could not be the same with or without a serial number. >> >> Irrelevant conclusion. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Example 2: >> > ---------- >> >> > M = a television >> > B(M) = television showing a broadcast television program >> > P = a chalk mark on the side >> >> > Which means (1) would be: >> >> > 1) A television showing a broadcast television program is explained by >> > the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a >> > chalk mark on the side or not. >> >> > As (1) is true, so is: >> >> Again, you changed B. >> >> >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of a chalk mark on the side, or lack of, does not affect >> > the television showing a broadcast television program, else the >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without a chalk >> > mark on the side. >> >> > Example 3: >> > ---------- >> >> > M = a car >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running >> > P = petrol in the tank >> >> > Which means (1) would be: >> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of >> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has petrol in the >> > tank or not. >> >> > Which is false, so (2) would also be false: >> >> > 2) Presence of petrol in the tank, or lack of, does not affect the car >> > parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour >> > could not be the same with or without a petrol in the tank. >> >> > As you can see, in examples 1 and 2 in which (1) is true in both cases >> > have B(M) and P the same in both (1) and (2) within the given example. >> > Example 3 is just an example of where (1) is false, there was no need >> > to include (2), but did so just to show that if it was included B(M) >> > and P would be the same in both (1) and (2). >> >> > So now it is your turn, I've given three examples, you only need to >> > give one. Here are my predictions, either: >> >> And again you changed B. >> >> > a) you won't give an example >> > b) you will change B(M) or P between (1) and (2) of your example. >> > c) you will give an example which does have knowledge of P in (1), >> > even if it is worded deceptively so as not to be immediately obvious. >> > d) you will give an example which highlights what I have been saying. >> >> You merely highlighted exactly what I was saying by repeating the same >> trivial examples in which the change of B made no difference to the >> behavior B(M), and you expect us to fall for your switcheroo when you >> change Humans from having subjective experience to NOT having >> subjective experience. >> > > I had said: > ------------------- > > Example 1: > ---------- > > M = a car > B(M) = parked with its engine running > P = its serial number > > Which means: > > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a serial number > or not. > > ------------------- > > To which you replied: > ------------------- > You changed B. > ------------------- > > LOL, where did I, and also I'm not sure what you mean by B as opposed > to B(M)? > You removed the serial number. You now have two different cars. One with and one without serial numbers. The lack of a serial number has no effect on the operation of a car. That is a given. You are trying to make it a given that the lack of subjective experience has no effect on behavior. That is NOT a given. That is what you are trying to prove, Glenn, and I'm not going to let you get away with assuming your conclusion. > As for my predictions, I see you went for (a). I see that you still tried to get away with your Stupid Logic. -- Fred Stone aa# 1369 "When they put out that deadline, people realized that we were going to lose," said an aide to an anti-war lawmaker. "Everything after that seemed like posturing." Quote
Guest Fred Stone Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 someone2 wrote: > It's not simply a reformulation. > > (1) is about knowledge of the property, and explanation. > (2) is about whether the property is influential. > It's about assuming your conclusion. > If (1) wasn't true for humans, then humans can't be simply a > biological mechanism following the laws of physics (else their > behaviour could be explained in terms of the mechanism following the > laws of physics), which is the point I am getting at. (1) is simply a restatement of the definition of "subjective", Glenn. Now quit play Stupid Logic with us. We're onto your game. -- Fred Stone aa# 1369 "When they put out that deadline, people realized that we were going to lose," said an aide to an anti-war lawmaker. "Everything after that seemed like posturing." Quote
Guest Fred Stone Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 jientho@aol.com wrote: > He has shown that if we are such mechanisms fully explained by the > laws of physics, then any subjective experiences we have are non- > influential of our behavior -- they (SE) are simply side-effects, > outputs, coincidental. And their "effects" on the physical world are > illusory -- our subjective selves are just observers here. Serious > materialists have made much the same point. > He has not shown anything. He is employing fallacies of circular reasoning and semantic dodges around the definition of "subjective". -- Fred Stone aa# 1369 "When they put out that deadline, people realized that we were going to lose," said an aide to an anti-war lawmaker. "Everything after that seemed like posturing." Quote
Guest Richo Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 On Jun 12, 7:36 am, jien...@aol.com wrote: > On Jun 11, 5:08 pm, Matt Silberstein > > > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 13:29:05 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > <1181593745.206175.160...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > >On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein > > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > >> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > >> [snip] > > > >> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?: > > > >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. > > >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > >> >P refers to the a property in question. > > > >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > >> >and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > >> >explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true > > > >> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a class > > >> of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But that is a > > >> minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that (1) reasonably > > >> captures a physical understanding of human behavior and subjective > > >> experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see take the existence > > >> of SE as a given and work to explain that existence. So, while I think > > >> your argument here is wrong, I think the argument itself does not > > >> meaningfully relate to a physicalist (not scientism) theory of the > > >> mind. > > > >It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to point > > >out why it isn't. Yes you are right that subjective experiences do > > >influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to consider > > >whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion (which is shown > > >to be implausible) that we are simply a biological mechanism following > > >the laws of physics, then you would have no reason to think that any > > >physical mechanism following the laws of physics had subjective > > >experiences. > > > Ok, Jientho, Glenn is just assuming the conclusion here. You have not > > shown it implausible that we are "just" biological mechanisms. > > He has shown that if we are such mechanisms fully explained by the > laws of physics, then any subjective experiences we have are non- > influential of our behavior -- they (SE) are simply side-effects, > outputs, coincidental. He has not "shown" it - he has asserted it in various forms including in the form of a question. People are just seeing straight through such tactics. > And their "effects" on the physical world are > illusory -- our subjective selves are just observers here. Serious > materialists have made much the same point. > "Serious materialists" - speaking of rhetorical tricks! Too much sparing with Skeptic old friend - you have lost some of your old edge. Mark. Quote
Guest Jim07D7 Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 someone3 <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> said: >On 6 Jun, 18:06, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: >> I'll save this and reply later, if the subject is still ongoing. >> >> Cheers, >> Jim >> >> someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: >> >> >> >> >On 6 Jun, 17:19, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: >> >> >"someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >news:1181140233.468267.124680@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> Well I'm obviously not going to respond to your points regarding the >> >> >> 'Philosphy Talk' program Jim07D7 was talking about, as my point was >> >> >> what they were saying was poorly reasoned. >> >> >> The reasoning had to do with epistemology, not ontology. If we >> >> conclude based on an interaction with something not physically before >> >> us (like a usenet poster) that it has subjective experiences, why >> >> would physical examination of it change that? We know so little of how >> >> subjective experience occurs in our meatware (at least, in mine it >> >> does ;-)), why should finding the usenet poster to be hardware, >> >> matter? >> >> >Well getting back to what you had said and my response, where the >> >implausibility of us being simply biological mechanisms is made (and >> >without that assertion, you have no reason to consider anything >> >following the known laws of physics to be subjectively experiencing) >> >> >Posted by you: >> >------------- >> >I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program >> >"Philosophy Talk". >> >> >Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy >> >communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to look >> >at it, and there are two scenarios: >> >> >1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft >> >organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and >> >information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a >> >brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does >> >what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's >> >happening, more or less. >> >> >2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard >> >inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and >> >information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a >> >computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how >> >it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where >> >it's happening, more or less. >> >> >Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is >> >conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? >> >After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. >> >The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering >> >something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on >> >communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in >> >changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we >> >have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves >> >consciousness? >> >------------- >> >> >To which I pointed out, that if I made a robot that acted as though it >> >has subjective experiences, and you thought it did, but actually after >> >you had made your decision, I explained to you that it behaved the way >> >it did simply because of the physical mechanism following the known >> >laws of physics, then on what basis would you continue to think that >> >it was acting the way it did because it had subjective experiences? >> >> >Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any >> >difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism >> >following the known laws of physics. So its behaviour, if you still >> >chose to consider it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be >> >said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same >> >even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective >> >experiences. >> >> >Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following >> >the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way >> >we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. They in >> >themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it >> >would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective >> >experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the >> >behaviour). The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. > >Sure, hopefully you'll be able to remove your preconceptions, and >evaluate the plausability of the assertion that you have bet your soul >on, without bias. I have no idea what you are talking about. I am discussing the issues involved in deciding that something is conscious (has subjective experiences). What does that have to do with betting my soul? Quote
Guest Jim07D7 Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 someone3 <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> said: >Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following >the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way >we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. They in >themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it >would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective >experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the >behaviour). The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. I think you are running too fast to the exit of the laboratory. It can be taken as a fact that we have subjective experiences which appear to play a role in our decisions. Therefore, science has the task of explaining the role, if any, of subjective experiences, or showing they have no role. Rather than throw up our hands and say that we are not "simply biological mechanisms", the task is to apply science to the problem. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 On 12 Jun, 12:50, Fred Stone <N...@Biznez.net> wrote: > someone2 wrote: > > On 12 Jun, 02:36, Fred Stone <N...@Biznez.net> wrote: > >> someone2 wrote: > >> > On 11 Jun, 22:37, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: > >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > >> >> innews:1181594965.007188.174010@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com: > > >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:52, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: > >> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > >> >> >> innews:1181593745.206175.160780@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com: > > >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein > >> >> >> > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> >> >> >> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > >> >> >> >> [snip] > > >> >> >> >> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?: > > >> >> >> >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. > >> >> >> >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > >> >> >> >> >P refers to the a property in question. > > >> >> >> >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and > >> >> >> >> >(2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > >> >> >> >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > >> >> >> >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > >> >> >> >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), > >> >> >> >> >else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or > >> >> >> >> >without P. > > >> >> >> >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true > > >> >> >> >> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a > >> >> >> >> class of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But > >> >> >> >> that is a minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that > >> >> >> >> (1) reasonably captures a physical understanding of human > >> >> >> >> behavior and subjective experience (SE). All of the physical > >> >> >> >> analysis I see take the existence of SE as a given and work to > >> >> >> >> explain that existence. So, while I think your argument here is > >> >> >> >> wrong, I think the argument itself does not meaningfully relate > >> >> >> >> to a physicalist (not scientism) theory of the mind. > > >> >> >> > It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to > >> >> >> > point out why it isn't. > > >> >> >> You have avoided seeing every attempt to point out why it isn't. > > >> >> >> > Yes you are right that subjective experiences do > >> >> >> > influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to > >> >> >> > consider whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion > >> >> >> > (which is shown to be implausible) > > >> >> >> You keep repeating that assertion, but you are assuming your > >> >> >> conclusion. > > >> >> > Where has it been pointed out where it isn't correct. Attempts where > >> >> > you change either B(M) or P between (1) and (2) obviously don't > >> >> > count, as it only applies where B(M) and P are the same between (1) > >> >> > and (2). > > >> >> But every example you offer, Glenn, you also change B or B(M) or P > >> >> yourself. You just offer us trivial changes that don't make a > >> >> difference to the behavior B(M) whereas we all know that subjective > >> >> experience DOES make a difference to behavior. You then assume your > >> >> conclusion when you state that under materialism that subjective > >> >> experience could not possibly affect behavior. > > >> >> > Attempts so far have been shown to be deceptively attempting to do > >> >> > this. Perhaps you'd care to give an example where it wouldn't be > >> >> > true. > > >> >> I have already offered you several examples, all as straighforward and > >> >> truthful as yours. > > >> > Well I can show you a few examples here, and you can see that I don't > >> > change B(M) or P between (1) and (2) for any given example. Obviously > >> > they are different in different examples. > > >> > Example 1: > >> > ---------- > > >> > M = a car > >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running > >> > P = its serial number > > >> > Which means: > > >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of > >> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a serial number > >> > or not. > > >> You changed B. > > >> > As (1) is true, so is: > > >> (1) is not true. B is different. > > >> > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not affect the car > >> > parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour > >> > could not be the same with or without a serial number. > > >> Irrelevant conclusion. > > >> > Example 2: > >> > ---------- > > >> > M = a television > >> > B(M) = television showing a broadcast television program > >> > P = a chalk mark on the side > > >> > Which means (1) would be: > > >> > 1) A television showing a broadcast television program is explained by > >> > the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a > >> > chalk mark on the side or not. > > >> > As (1) is true, so is: > > >> Again, you changed B. > > >> > 2) Presence of a chalk mark on the side, or lack of, does not affect > >> > the television showing a broadcast television program, else the > >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without a chalk > >> > mark on the side. > > >> > Example 3: > >> > ---------- > > >> > M = a car > >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running > >> > P = petrol in the tank > > >> > Which means (1) would be: > > >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of > >> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has petrol in the > >> > tank or not. > > >> > Which is false, so (2) would also be false: > > >> > 2) Presence of petrol in the tank, or lack of, does not affect the car > >> > parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour > >> > could not be the same with or without a petrol in the tank. > > >> > As you can see, in examples 1 and 2 in which (1) is true in both cases > >> > have B(M) and P the same in both (1) and (2) within the given example. > >> > Example 3 is just an example of where (1) is false, there was no need > >> > to include (2), but did so just to show that if it was included B(M) > >> > and P would be the same in both (1) and (2). > > >> > So now it is your turn, I've given three examples, you only need to > >> > give one. Here are my predictions, either: > > >> And again you changed B. > > >> > a) you won't give an example > >> > b) you will change B(M) or P between (1) and (2) of your example. > >> > c) you will give an example which does have knowledge of P in (1), > >> > even if it is worded deceptively so as not to be immediately obvious. > >> > d) you will give an example which highlights what I have been saying. > > >> You merely highlighted exactly what I was saying by repeating the same > >> trivial examples in which the change of B made no difference to the > >> behavior B(M), and you expect us to fall for your switcheroo when you > >> change Humans from having subjective experience to NOT having > >> subjective experience. > > > I had said: > > ------------------- > > > Example 1: > > ---------- > > > M = a car > > B(M) = parked with its engine running > > P = its serial number > > > Which means: > > > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a serial number > > or not. > > > ------------------- > > > To which you replied: > > ------------------- > > You changed B. > > ------------------- > > > LOL, where did I, and also I'm not sure what you mean by B as opposed > > to B(M)? > > You removed the serial number. You now have two different cars. One with and > one without serial numbers. The lack of a serial number has no effect on > the operation of a car. That is a given. You are trying to make it a given > that the lack of subjective experience has no effect on behavior. That is > NOT a given. That is what you are trying to prove, Glenn, and I'm not > going to let you get away with assuming your conclusion. > > > As for my predictions, I see you went for (a). > > I see that you still tried to get away with your Stupid Logic. > No Fred, there is no adding or removing the serial number, there is just one car, of which you have no knowledge of whether it had a serial number or not. P was the same in both (1) and (2) within each example (though I see you snipped the other examples). Can you now understand it, or more importantly can you face it? You are more than welcome to attempt to give an example where it wouldn't be true, my predictions are that you will either: a) you won't give an example b) you will change B(M) or P between (1) and (2) of your example. c) you will give an example which does have knowledge of P in (1), even if it is worded deceptively so as not to be immediately obvious. d) you will give an example which highlights what I have been saying. e) understand it last time you went for (a), I've added the (e) option for you now, but you'd have to get over your ego first. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 On 12 Jun, 13:49, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > On Jun 12, 7:36 am, jien...@aol.com wrote: > > > > > > > On Jun 11, 5:08 pm, Matt Silberstein > > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 13:29:05 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > <1181593745.206175.160...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > >On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein > > > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > >> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > >> [snip] > > > > >> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?: > > > > >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > >> >P refers to the a property in question. > > > > >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > >> >and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > >> >explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true > > > > >> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a class > > > >> of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But that is a > > > >> minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that (1) reasonably > > > >> captures a physical understanding of human behavior and subjective > > > >> experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see take the existence > > > >> of SE as a given and work to explain that existence. So, while I think > > > >> your argument here is wrong, I think the argument itself does not > > > >> meaningfully relate to a physicalist (not scientism) theory of the > > > >> mind. > > > > >It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to point > > > >out why it isn't. Yes you are right that subjective experiences do > > > >influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to consider > > > >whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion (which is shown > > > >to be implausible) that we are simply a biological mechanism following > > > >the laws of physics, then you would have no reason to think that any > > > >physical mechanism following the laws of physics had subjective > > > >experiences. > > > > Ok, Jientho, Glenn is just assuming the conclusion here. You have not > > > shown it implausible that we are "just" biological mechanisms. > > > He has shown that if we are such mechanisms fully explained by the > > laws of physics, then any subjective experiences we have are non- > > influential of our behavior -- they (SE) are simply side-effects, > > outputs, coincidental. > > He has not "shown" it - he has asserted it in various forms including > in the form of a question. > People are just seeing straight through such tactics. > > > And their "effects" on the physical world are > > illusory -- our subjective selves are just observers here. Serious > > materialists have made much the same point. > > "Serious materialists" - speaking of rhetorical tricks! > Too much sparing with Skeptic old friend - you have lost some of your > old edge. > Jeff understands it, whereas you still don't understand that where: M refers to the physical entity in question. B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. P refers to the a property in question. and where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has P or not. 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. If (1) is true, then (2) is true. As you don't understand it, you don't think it is shown, but you will never until the day you are no longer being presented with the physical world be able to give an example where it isn't true. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 On 12 Jun, 15:34, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: > > >Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following > >the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > >we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. They in > >themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it > >would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective > >experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the > >behaviour). The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. > > I think you are running too fast to the exit of the laboratory. It can > be taken as a fact that we have subjective experiences which appear > to play a role in our decisions. Therefore, science has the task of > explaining the role, if any, of subjective experiences, or showing > they have no role. Rather than throw up our hands and say that we are > not "simply biological mechanisms", the task is to apply science to > the problem. Can you understand the following, where: M refers to the physical entity in question. B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. P refers to the a property in question. Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has P or not. 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. If (1) is true, then (2) is true. Quote
Guest jientho@aol.com Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 On Jun 12, 8:49 am, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > On Jun 12, 7:36 am, jien...@aol.com wrote: > > > On Jun 11, 5:08 pm, Matt Silberstein > > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 13:29:05 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > <1181593745.206175.160...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > >On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein > > > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > >> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > >> [snip] > > > > >> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?: > > > > >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > >> >P refers to the a property in question. > > > > >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > >> >and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > >> >explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true > > > > >> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a class > > > >> of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But that is a > > > >> minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that (1) reasonably > > > >> captures a physical understanding of human behavior and subjective > > > >> experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see take the existence > > > >> of SE as a given and work to explain that existence. So, while I think > > > >> your argument here is wrong, I think the argument itself does not > > > >> meaningfully relate to a physicalist (not scientism) theory of the > > > >> mind. > > > > >It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to point > > > >out why it isn't. Yes you are right that subjective experiences do > > > >influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to consider > > > >whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion (which is shown > > > >to be implausible) that we are simply a biological mechanism following > > > >the laws of physics, then you would have no reason to think that any > > > >physical mechanism following the laws of physics had subjective > > > >experiences. > > > > Ok, Jientho, Glenn is just assuming the conclusion here. You have not > > > shown it implausible that we are "just" biological mechanisms. > > > He has shown that if we are such mechanisms fully explained by the > > laws of physics, then any subjective experiences we have are non- > > influential of our behavior -- they (SE) are simply side-effects, > > outputs, coincidental. > > He has not "shown" it - he has asserted it in various forms including > in the form of a question. He has elaborated an argument at least. > People are just seeing straight through such tactics. People are missing the argument. Either missing the forest for the trees, or else being severely blinkered by prior hidden assumptions. > > And their "effects" on the physical world are > > illusory -- our subjective selves are just observers here. Serious > > materialists have made much the same point. > > "Serious materialists" - speaking of rhetorical tricks! There certainly isn't much seriousness (carefulness) being shown in here (alt.atheism). And I meant to refer to the "heavyweights" doing the "heavy lifting" (publishing) in the field (pardon the mixed metaphors :-). Why do you think this is a trick? (I didn't mean "all serious materialists" and I didn't mean it exclusively.) > Too much spar[r]ing with S[k]eptic old friend - you have lost some of your > old edge. Heh. Argument _ad_hominem_ won't help your case. :-) (To other readers, do not flame me on this "inside" joke.) Did you notice that I have finally <plonk>ed dear <cough> old Septic? Only my fourth <plonk>ee. (And I never open my "killfile", just so you know.) Jeff Quote
Deathbringer Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 On 12 Jun, 13:49, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > On Jun 12, 7:36 am, jien...@aol.com wrote: > > > > > > > On Jun 11, 5:08 pm, Matt Silberstein > > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 13:29:05 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > <1181593745.206175.160...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > >On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein > > > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > >> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > >> [snip] > > > > >> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?: > > > > >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > >> >P refers to the a property in question. > > > > >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > >> >and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > >> >explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true > > > > >> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a class > > > >> of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But that is a > > > >> minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that (1) reasonably > > > >> captures a physical understanding of human behavior and subjective > > > >> experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see take the existence > > > >> of SE as a given and work to explain that existence. So, while I think > > > >> your argument here is wrong, I think the argument itself does not > > > >> meaningfully relate to a physicalist (not scientism) theory of the > > > >> mind. > > > > >It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to point > > > >out why it isn't. Yes you are right that subjective experiences do > > > >influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to consider > > > >whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion (which is shown > > > >to be implausible) that we are simply a biological mechanism following > > > >the laws of physics, then you would have no reason to think that any > > > >physical mechanism following the laws of physics had subjective > > > >experiences. > > > > Ok, Jientho, Glenn is just assuming the conclusion here. You have not > > > shown it implausible that we are "just" biological mechanisms. > > > He has shown that if we are such mechanisms fully explained by the > > laws of physics, then any subjective experiences we have are non- > > influential of our behavior -- they (SE) are simply side-effects, > > outputs, coincidental. > > He has not "shown" it - he has asserted it in various forms including > in the form of a question. > People are just seeing straight through such tactics. > > > And their "effects" on the physical world are > > illusory -- our subjective selves are just observers here. Serious > > materialists have made much the same point. > > "Serious materialists" - speaking of rhetorical tricks! > Too much sparing with Skeptic old friend - you have lost some of your > old edge. > Jeff understands it, whereas you still don't understand that where: M refers to the physical entity in question. B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. P refers to the a property in question. and where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has P or not. 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. If (1) is true, then (2) is true. As you don't understand it, you don't think it is shown, but you will never until the day you are no longer being presented with the physical world be able to give an example where it isn't true. It is perfectly logical so far, but its incomplete. Now, explain to me how P not effecting B(M) translates into humans having souls. Assume I'm stupid. Put it in simplest possible terms. Quote
Guest Fred Stone Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in news:1181660806.879163.32060@d30g2000prg.googlegroups.com: > On 12 Jun, 12:50, Fred Stone <N...@Biznez.net> wrote: >> someone2 wrote: >> > On 12 Jun, 02:36, Fred Stone <N...@Biznez.net> wrote: >> >> someone2 wrote: >> >> > On 11 Jun, 22:37, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> >> innews:1181594965.007188.174010@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:52, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> >> >> innews:1181593745.206175.160780 @q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein >> >> >> >> > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , >> >> >> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> >> >> >> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> >> >> >> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> [snip] >> >> >> >> >> >> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?: >> >> >> >> >> >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> >> >P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in >> >> >> >> >> >(1) and (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without >> >> >> >> >> >requiring knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect >> >> >> >> >> >B(M), else the explanation of behaviour could not be the >> >> >> >> >> >same with or without P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true >> >> >> >> >> >> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could >> >> >> >> >> identify a class of phenomena, C, of which P is one >> >> >> >> >> possible member. But that is a minor point. My major >> >> >> >> >> point is in (1). I disagree that (1) reasonably captures >> >> >> >> >> a physical understanding of human behavior and subjective >> >> >> >> >> experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see take >> >> >> >> >> the existence of SE as a given and work to >> >> >> >> >> explain that existence. So, while I think your argument >> >> >> >> >> here is wrong, I think the argument itself does not >> >> >> >> >> meaningfully relate to a physicalist (not scientism) >> >> >> >> >> theory of the mind. >> >> >> >> >> > It is always true, and you have just avoided even >> >> >> >> > attempting to point out why it isn't. >> >> >> >> >> You have avoided seeing every attempt to point out why it >> >> >> >> isn't. >> >> >> >> >> > Yes you are right that subjective experiences do >> >> >> >> > influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to >> >> >> >> > consider whether a robot is? Once you take away your >> >> >> >> > assertion (which is shown to be implausible) >> >> >> >> >> You keep repeating that assertion, but you are assuming your >> >> >> >> conclusion. >> >> >> >> > Where has it been pointed out where it isn't correct. >> >> >> > Attempts where you change either B(M) or P between (1) and >> >> >> > (2) obviously don't count, as it only applies where B(M) and >> >> >> > P are the same between (1) and (2). >> >> >> >> But every example you offer, Glenn, you also change B or B(M) >> >> >> or P yourself. You just offer us trivial changes that don't >> >> >> make a difference to the behavior B(M) whereas we all know that >> >> >> subjective experience DOES make a difference to behavior. You >> >> >> then assume your conclusion when you state that under >> >> >> materialism that subjective experience could not possibly >> >> >> affect behavior. >> >> >> >> > Attempts so far have been shown to be deceptively attempting >> >> >> > to do this. Perhaps you'd care to give an example where it >> >> >> > wouldn't be true. >> >> >> >> I have already offered you several examples, all as >> >> >> straighforward and truthful as yours. >> >> >> > Well I can show you a few examples here, and you can see that I >> >> > don't change B(M) or P between (1) and (2) for any given >> >> > example. Obviously they are different in different examples. >> >> >> > Example 1: >> >> > ---------- >> >> >> > M = a car >> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running >> >> > P = its serial number >> >> >> > Which means: >> >> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws >> >> > of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a >> >> > serial number or not. >> >> >> You changed B. >> >> >> > As (1) is true, so is: >> >> >> (1) is not true. B is different. >> >> >> > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not affect the >> >> > car parked with its engine running, else the explanation of >> >> > behaviour could not be the same with or without a serial number. >> >> >> Irrelevant conclusion. >> >> >> > Example 2: >> >> > ---------- >> >> >> > M = a television >> >> > B(M) = television showing a broadcast television program >> >> > P = a chalk mark on the side >> >> >> > Which means (1) would be: >> >> >> > 1) A television showing a broadcast television program is >> >> > explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of >> >> > whether it has a chalk mark on the side or not. >> >> >> > As (1) is true, so is: >> >> >> Again, you changed B. >> >> >> > 2) Presence of a chalk mark on the side, or lack of, does not >> >> > affect the television showing a broadcast television program, >> >> > else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or >> >> > without a chalk mark on the side. >> >> >> > Example 3: >> >> > ---------- >> >> >> > M = a car >> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running >> >> > P = petrol in the tank >> >> >> > Which means (1) would be: >> >> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws >> >> > of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has petrol >> >> > in the tank or not. >> >> >> > Which is false, so (2) would also be false: >> >> >> > 2) Presence of petrol in the tank, or lack of, does not affect >> >> > the car parked with its engine running, else the explanation of >> >> > behaviour could not be the same with or without a petrol in the >> >> > tank. >> >> >> > As you can see, in examples 1 and 2 in which (1) is true in both >> >> > cases have B(M) and P the same in both (1) and (2) within the >> >> > given example. Example 3 is just an example of where (1) is >> >> > false, there was no need to include (2), but did so just to show >> >> > that if it was included B(M) and P would be the same in both (1) >> >> > and (2). >> >> >> > So now it is your turn, I've given three examples, you only need >> >> > to give one. Here are my predictions, either: >> >> >> And again you changed B. >> >> >> > a) you won't give an example >> >> > b) you will change B(M) or P between (1) and (2) of your >> >> > example. c) you will give an example which does have knowledge >> >> > of P in (1), even if it is worded deceptively so as not to be >> >> > immediately obvious. d) you will give an example which >> >> > highlights what I have been saying. >> >> >> You merely highlighted exactly what I was saying by repeating >> >> the same trivial examples in which the change of B made no >> >> difference to the behavior B(M), and you expect us to fall for >> >> your switcheroo when you change Humans from having subjective >> >> experience to NOT having subjective experience. >> >> > I had said: >> > ------------------- >> >> > Example 1: >> > ---------- >> >> > M = a car >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running >> > P = its serial number >> >> > Which means: >> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of >> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a serial >> > number or not. >> >> > ------------------- >> >> > To which you replied: >> > ------------------- >> > You changed B. >> > ------------------- >> >> > LOL, where did I, and also I'm not sure what you mean by B as >> > opposed to B(M)? >> >> You removed the serial number. You now have two different cars. One >> with and one without serial numbers. The lack of a serial number has >> no effect on the operation of a car. That is a given. You are trying >> to make it a given that the lack of subjective experience has no >> effect on behavior. That is NOT a given. That is what you are >> trying to prove, Glenn, and I'm not going to let you get away with >> assuming your conclusion. >> >> > As for my predictions, I see you went for (a). >> >> I see that you still tried to get away with your Stupid Logic. >> > No Fred, there is no adding or removing the serial number, there is > just one car, of which you have no knowledge of whether it had a > serial number or not. P was the same in both (1) and (2) within each > example (though I see you snipped the other examples). > Now you're switching between knowledge of the fact and the fact itself. I snipped for size, Glenn, something that you don't seem to be capable of doing either. The thread is still right there in the archives. > Can you now understand it, or more importantly can you face it? > I'm waiting for you to face the fact that your "logic" is nothing but fallacies and hot air. > You are more than welcome to attempt to give an example where it > wouldn't be true, my predictions are that you will either: > > a) you won't give an example I've given examples, all of which fit your rules the way you play them. But you play by different rules than you expect me to play by. > b) you will change B(M) or P between (1) and (2) of your example. B(M) necessarily changes when you make B "behaving as if having subjective experience". > c) you will give an example which does have knowledge of P in (1), > even if it is worded deceptively so as not to be immediately obvious. It is not possible for an external observer to have knowledge of another person's subjective experience. That is the definition of "subjective experience". That is true whether the other person is a human being with a meat brain or a computer with an electronic brain. That in no way precludes a complete explanation of the behavior of a brain according to the laws of physics. > d) you will give an example which highlights what I have been saying. > e) understand it > > last time you went for (a), I've added the (e) option for you now, but > you'd have to get over your ego first. > I choose (f) Glenn will continue to repeat his fallacies, insisting that they are not fallacies. -- Fred Stone aa# 1369 "When they put out that deadline, people realized that we were going to lose," said an aide to an anti-war lawmaker. "Everything after that seemed like posturing." -- Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com Quote
Guest Denis Loubet Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181643629.665515.215790@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > On 12 Jun, 02:00, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1181607322.623131.144640@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> >> > On 12 Jun, 00:56, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >>news:1181603668.494011.312460@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> > On 12 Jun, 00:09, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >>news:1181598999.112030.3470@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 22:34, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >>news:1181593524.600437.247290@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 20:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181583039.890628.118980@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 18:23, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181581549.652693.254210@q66g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 16:43, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181517234.889369.239710@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 11 Jun, 00:05, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181514806.543814.218460@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 10 Jun, 20:36, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:FNednZ5aMcoN3PHbnZ2dnUVZ_tmknZ2d@io.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >news:1181471104.632034.40450@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On 10 Jun, 03:34, "Denis Loubet" >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>>news:1181440301.918077.327620@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > On 10 Jun, 02:15, "Denis Loubet" >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>news:1181417934.359700.133760@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > On 9 Jun, 08:25, "Denis Loubet" >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> "someone2" >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (snipped some of the older stuff) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Can you understand the following: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 1) The behaviour of M is explained by >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > physics >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > reference requiring knowledge of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > whether >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > has >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Let's see, can I explain the behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> my >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> knowing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> has >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank or not by the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> physics? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Yes, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explain >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> both >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behaviors, and one of them will be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> correct. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > Therefore >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > 2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > M, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Well, personally I think gas in the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> tank >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> radically >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> affects >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> my car. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > else the explanation of behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > could >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > without P(A) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> The behavior of my car with gas in the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> tank >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> explainable >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> by >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> physics, as is the behavior of my car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> But >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> somehow I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> only get places I need to get to in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> air-conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> comfort >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas in the tank. That's very different >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> from >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> when >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> isn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> Gosh! How very odd! It seems your point >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> 2 >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> completely >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> wrong >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> on >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> such >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> basic level that it's hard to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> comprehend >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> how >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> can >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> function >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> society >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> at >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> all. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> I take it you don't own a car? Please >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> tell >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> me >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> don't. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > You can substitute whatever physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > entity >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > strictly >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > follows >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > known laws of physics for M, and any >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > property >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > which >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > P(A) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > where >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > (1) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > would be true. If (1) is true, then >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > so >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> > (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> My car says you're just plain stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Your reponses have a certain >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > entertainment >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > value >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > guess. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Let me put it another way: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> No, why don't you address it the way you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> put >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> it? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> And the way I answered it? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you too stupid or afraid to? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Are you a moron, a coward, or both? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M refers to the physical entity in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> It gets me to my destination in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> air-conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Gas in the tank! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > physics >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > requiring >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car employs the laws of physics to get >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> me >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> my >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> destination >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> air-conditioned comfort! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > else >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Oddly, that doesn't match reality at all! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> When >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> there's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> my car, I DON'T get to my destination in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> air >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> just sits there following the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Bummer! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if (1) is true, then so is (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> My car still says you're just plain >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> How can my car, getting somewhere in air >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> comfort, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> tank all be the same thing? That's just >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > To give you an example, just to make >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > sure >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > excuses >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretending you can't grasp the point, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > misunderstanding >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > it: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = a car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = its serial number >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Which means: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 1) A car parked with its engine running >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explained >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > by >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > physics without requiring knowledge of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > whether >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > has a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > serial >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > number >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > of, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > does >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > parked >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > with its engine running, else the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > explanation >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > could >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > be the same with or without a serial >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > number. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> But if the situation is: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > M = my car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > B(M) = parked with its engine running >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > P = gas in the tank >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Then suddenly your formula fails! Once the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> runs >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> out, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> longer >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> has a running engine. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > Since (1) is true, so is (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> Not if there's no gas in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > So though I have tried to plug up the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > holes >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > where >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > might >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > try >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > pretend to misunderstand, your ability >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > to, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > still >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > does >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > give >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > some >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > artistic scope for disingenuity, which >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > I'm >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > sure >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > will >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > use >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > able. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> You're so stupid, my car is embarrassed >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> you. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > I pointed out: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > To which you replied: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > How can my car, getting somewhere in air >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > conditioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > comfort, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in the tank all be the same thing? That's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > just >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > I assume this was just another example of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > your >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > disingenious >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > creativity. M isn't the same as B(M) which >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > isn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > as >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > It >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > that M mentioned in (1) is the same as M >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned in (1) is the same as B(M) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > mentioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in (1) is the same as P mentioned in (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > If you can now understand this, you can see >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > wasn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > because there was no gas in the tank, then >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (1) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > been >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > true, as it getting you to your destination >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > air >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > explained without gas in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > You'll notice it also gets through your >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > usual >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > well >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > polished >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > deception >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > in that it applies to and physical entity >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > strictly >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > follows >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > laws of physics, and doesn't require a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > comparison >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > entity. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > So here it is again, and hopefully you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > won't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > grasping >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > at >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > ways to misinterpret what is being said, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > but >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > actually >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > face >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > reason >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > once. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > M refers to the physical entity in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> My car. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> It's sitting there inert. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Gas in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > requiring >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> The car sits there inert, according to the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Doesn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> matter >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> if there's gas in the tank or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > B(M), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > else >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > explanation of behaviour could not be the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Right. A car with no gas in the tank is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> exactly >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> as >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> in the tank. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Excellent! Thank you! Now I never have to buy >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> gas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> again! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> can >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> drive >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> around >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> with or without gas. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Yup, your example sure matches reality. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > Notice the M, B(M) and P in both (1) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Note that the above sentence is an admitted >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> lie. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > It follows that if (1) is true, then so is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Nope. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Presence of gas in the tank doesn't influence >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> car >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> sitting >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> inert, so (2) would be true. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Until the key is turned in the ignition. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > If there's gas in the tank, then it's suddenly >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > false. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Look, are you trying, in your own stupid and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> inept >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> way, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> get >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> me >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> say >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that there are properties that have no effect on >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> thing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> they're a property of? Well that's a big yes! Of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> COURSE >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> properties >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that have no effect on behavior. Your example of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> serial >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> number, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> example. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So what? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Are you dishonestly trying to equate the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> irrelevant-to-behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> aspect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> serial number to the crucial-to-behavior aspect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you were honest, your examples would be either >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> car's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> elecrtical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> system >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> compared to subjective experience, or a serial >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> number >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> compared >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> tattoo. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> The effects of subjective experience on behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subtle, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> do >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conceptually map to the irrelevancy of a serial >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> number. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I think that subjective experience is the action >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> matter >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical brains following the laws of physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> The >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not apart from that physical action. Subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Experience >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> name >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> we apply to a certain catagory of physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> actions >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> found >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brains. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> It >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subset, not an "extra thing", somehow apart from >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> normal >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> operation >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brain. It IS the normal operation of the brain. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If you remove it from the operation of the brain, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> expect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> radically >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> different behavior, just like you would expect if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ripped >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> out >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> crucial >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subroutines from a computer program. Without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> human brain is no longer operating normally, even >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> though >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> still, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> course, operating according to the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I know it was pointless of me to type >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Subjective experiences are a label to what you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > actually >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > consciously >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experience. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Which is matter in the brain operating according to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> law. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > That the brain is directly responsible for them is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > an >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assertion. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No, it's a conclusion based on evidence. If you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physically >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> manipulate >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brain, you manipulate consciousness. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I can't say it is an explanation, as there could >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explanation from your perspective why any physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > activity >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjectively experienced, or why it wasn't just >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > fluctuations >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > colour green for example, the brightness dependent >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > on >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > amount >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > neurons firing. Nothing in your perspective would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > know >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > what >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > neuron >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > state represented. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> That's where your ability to communicate breaks down >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> entirely. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> fuck >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are you babbling about? "Fluctuations of the color >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> green"? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> on >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> drugs? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The point was that even if you wanted to believe >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > story >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > we >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > were simply biological mechanisms, and that our >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > were an emergent property of the brain. The >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > emergent >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > property >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be said to be influential in behaviour due to: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I was right, you're going to ignore what I post and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> write >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> your >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> fucking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> formula again. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (1) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (2), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > requiring >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Then P and/or B has to be pretty fucking trivial. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Like >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> serial >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> number, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> being inert. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > influence/affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > B(M), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > else >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Yeah, you can concoct a scenario that fulfills these >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> criteria. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Big >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> deal. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Suppose I agree. So what? This little formula cannot >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> applied >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> non-trivial properties and behaviors. If the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> property >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> non-trivial, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> then >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it will affect behavior, and your formula cannot be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> applied. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So, how DO you deal with properties that DO affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Do >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> just >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> pretend they don't exist? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The story that our subjective experiences have no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > influence >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > on >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour is implausible, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> From my perspective, you've been arguing against >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> think >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective experience influences our behavior. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > even though you bet your soul on it, unable >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to see through the deception, and still cling to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > even >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to disingeniously misunderstand. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> You have not demonstrated that. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > That you can't face that you were >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrong, and that you are shown to be so through >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > reason, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > appears >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > me >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > as pathetic. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Or perhaps it's you that's completely wrong. Have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> even >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> considered >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> possibility? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm guessing not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > It is implausible that we simply are a biological >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following the laws of physics. For that reason alone >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > know >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wasn't wrong. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So you determine if you're right about something based >> >> >> >> >> >> >> on >> >> >> >> >> >> >> nothing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> but >> >> >> >> >> >> >> arbitrary feelings? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> That explains a lot. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > It is implausible, because it would require our >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > including >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > even questioning whether a robot had subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > uninfluenced by us having subjective experiences. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > This >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > shown >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > by: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No, it's influenced by subjective experience. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (1) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (2), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > requiring >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > influence/affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > B(M), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > else >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Lets see if we can apply this stupidity to something >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> affects >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Can you apply it to reflexes? Oops, no, there's a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> difference >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you have reflexes compared to you not having reflexes. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> can't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> apply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> your little formula to reflexes, what makes you think >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> can >> >> >> >> >> >> >> apply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Without the assertion that we were a biological >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following the laws of physics, there would be no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > reason >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assume >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > anything following the laws of physics subjectively >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experienced, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm a biological mechanism simply following the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjectively experience, therefore I conclude that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> biological >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> following the laws of can subjectively experience. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > therefore what reason would the biological mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assertion >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > were made) have for considering such a thing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > uninfluenced >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > by >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > having >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective experiences. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> This one doesn't. This one observes that it's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences >> >> >> >> >> >> >> influence its behavior. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > You were wrong get used to it. Stop being so pathetic >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > about >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> You're not stating my position. Why would your >> >> >> >> >> >> >> criticizism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> position >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> do not hold show that I am wrong? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > If you changed the property to one that behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> > explained without knowledge of, then (1) wouldn't be >> >> >> >> >> >> > true. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Which means you can't apply your formula to reflexes, >> >> >> >> >> >> right? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So why do you think you can apply it to consciousness? The >> >> >> >> >> >> behaviors >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious and unconscious things, in real life, is pretty >> >> >> >> >> >> fucking >> >> >> >> >> >> different. >> >> >> >> >> >> The unconscious ones lie inert while the conscious ones >> >> >> >> >> >> run >> >> >> >> >> >> about. >> >> >> >> >> >> According >> >> >> >> >> >> to (1) of your formula, you can't apply it to >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > You have already admitted that though you could know the >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> > the robot (and therefore be able to explain its >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour) >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> > wouldn't have knowledge of whether it has subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences >> >> >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> > not. I asked you before: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Is this an argument about my state of ignorance concerning >> >> >> >> >> >> if >> >> >> >> >> >> something >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious or not? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> That has fuck-all to do with anything. My state of >> >> >> >> >> >> ignorance >> >> >> >> >> >> has >> >> >> >> >> >> nothing >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> do with whether something is conscious or not, or what the >> >> >> >> >> >> source >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousnsess is. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> >> >> > Can you see that there is a seperation in your >> >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge, >> >> >> >> >> >> > one >> >> >> >> >> >> > thing >> >> >> >> >> >> > you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences >> >> >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> > not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation >> >> >> >> >> >> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> > your >> >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact. >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > To which you replied: >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> >> >> > I fucking understand that you twit. >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The question is can you face the truth, or are you going >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> > continue >> >> >> >> >> >> > to grasp at straws, hoping that they will enable you to >> >> >> >> >> >> > avoid >> >> >> >> >> >> > it, >> >> >> >> >> >> > instead of making you look more and more pathetic. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> The truth would be that if it acts like it's conscious, >> >> >> >> >> >> I'll >> >> >> >> >> >> call >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious. That's my prerogative. >> >> >> >> >> >> > The point was outlined in the reason, you are unable to >> >> >> >> >> > face: >> >> >> >> >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> >> >> >> >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> >> >> >> >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> >> >> >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) >> >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> > (2), >> >> >> >> >> > and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> >> >> >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without >> >> >> >> >> > requiring >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> >> >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect >> >> >> >> >> > B(M), >> >> >> >> >> > else >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or >> >> >> >> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> > P. >> >> >> >> >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> >> >> >> >> > So with the robot, since it's behaviour can be explained >> >> >> >> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> > requiring knowledge of whether it is conscious or not, >> >> >> >> >> >> Ok, you asked for it. >> >> >> >> >> >> B(M) is not same for conscious vs unconscious robots. >> >> >> >> >> >> So your formula does not apply. >> >> >> >> >> >> If you have a robot that you say is not conscious, yet in all >> >> >> >> >> respects >> >> >> >> >> acts >> >> >> >> >> as if it is, then there is consciousness involved. The >> >> >> >> >> mechanism >> >> >> >> >> doesn't >> >> >> >> >> matter. >> >> >> >> >> >> Consider, if the robot is just a clever tape recorder >> >> >> >> >> specifically >> >> >> >> >> programmed to answer my likely questions, then some conscious >> >> >> >> >> entity >> >> >> >> >> had >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> program it and record the responses. THAT'S the conscious >> >> >> >> >> entity >> >> >> >> >> I'm >> >> >> >> >> talking >> >> >> >> >> to via the robot. The robot is only the middle-man between me >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> another >> >> >> >> >> consciousness. I may confuse the robot for the conscious >> >> >> >> >> entity, >> >> >> >> >> but >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> doesn't mean I'm not talking to another consciousness. >> >> >> >> >> >> It's the same with any elaborate Eliza program you might want >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> construct. >> >> >> >> >> I'm talking to the programmer through the robot, even though >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> programmer >> >> >> >> >> may be long dead. >> >> >> >> >> >> And if you arrive at the robot through no artifice, meaning >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> constructed by unconscious nature with no intent, then by >> >> >> >> >> what >> >> >> >> >> authority >> >> >> >> >> do >> >> >> >> >> you declare it non-conscious if it acts like it is? >> >> >> >> >> >> > whether it is >> >> >> >> >> > or not couldn't be influencing its behaviour, >> >> >> >> >> >> But since it is influencing its behavior, your formula does >> >> >> >> >> not >> >> >> >> >> apply. >> >> >> >> >> >> > no more than it could >> >> >> >> >> > influence ours, if we were simply a biological mechanism >> >> >> >> >> > following >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> > laws of physics... >> >> >> >> >> >> ...with consciousness as part of that biological mechanism >> >> >> >> >> influencing >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> behavior. >> >> >> >> >> >> > It is implausible that we are, for reasons given to >> >> >> >> >> > you before. >> >> >> >> >> >> And your formula is as inapplicable as before. >> >> >> >> >> >> > You can choose to be totally illogical if you like, and to >> >> >> >> >> > not >> >> >> >> >> > face >> >> >> >> >> > reason. Though you won't be experiencing the physical world >> >> >> >> >> > forever, >> >> >> >> >> > and you'll regret your choice. >> >> >> >> >> >> And if you're wrong, which is always possible, your continued >> >> >> >> >> insistence >> >> >> >> >> that this is the case is nothing more than your arrogant >> >> >> >> >> self-absorption >> >> >> >> >> talking. >> >> >> >> >> > The formula doesn't require a comparitive entity. It can be >> >> >> >> > used >> >> >> >> > in >> >> >> >> > regards to any physical entity. >> >> >> >> >> Any physical entity? >> >> >> >> >> Let's try it: >> >> >> >> >> M = A man >> >> >> >> B(M) = Walking around >> >> >> >> P = Legs >> >> >> >> >> How the fuck do you: >> >> >> >> >> "1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> >> >> >> knowledge >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> whether it has P or not." >> >> >> >> >> I don't know about you, but if I'm going to explain how a guy >> >> >> >> walks >> >> >> >> around, >> >> >> >> I'm gonna have to know if he has legs or not. >> >> >> >> >> "2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), >> >> >> >> else >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without >> >> >> >> P." >> >> >> >> >> I would think legs have something to do with walking around, and >> >> >> >> I >> >> >> >> don't >> >> >> >> think it's gonna be the same with or without them. >> >> >> >> >> Please explain how your formula applies. With the values I've >> >> >> >> plugged >> >> >> >> in, >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> doesn't make any sense. >> >> >> >> >> > You keep trying to talk about two >> >> >> >> > different mechanisms, and say well they act differently, but >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> > is >> >> >> >> > like talking about a car and a toaster, and saying well the >> >> >> >> > car >> >> >> >> > has >> >> >> >> > a >> >> >> >> > numberplate, and they act differently so the number plate is >> >> >> >> > influential. You need to face that the formula is true, and >> >> >> >> > can >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> > shown to be so, when you stop trying to make B(M) or P >> >> >> >> > different >> >> >> >> > between (1) and (2). Basically it cuts through the deception >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> > were fooled by. >> >> >> >> >> Apply your formula to the entities I provided above. >> >> >> >> > Er... you really are having trouble understanding this aren't >> >> >> > you. >> >> >> >> Either that, or you're really bad at making others understand you. >> >> >> >> > Is >> >> >> > it the complexity of it, or is it that for it to be correct would >> >> >> > mean >> >> >> > that you were wrong, and your ego won't let you face that you >> >> >> > were >> >> >> > wrong? >> >> >> >> Gosh, no thought whatsoever that maybe the problem lies with you. >> >> >> >> > In your example (1) would not be true, you couldn't explain the >> >> >> > man >> >> >> > walking around, without knowledge of whether he had legs or not. >> >> >> >> So your formula CANNOT be applied to "any physical entity". >> >> >> >> Were you lying when you said it could? "The formula doesn't require >> >> >> a >> >> >> comparitive entity. It can be used in regards to any physical >> >> >> entity." >> >> >> >> Perhaps you're suggesting that legs aren't physical. Or could this >> >> >> be >> >> >> another example of your mastery of the language that makes it so >> >> >> easy >> >> >> for >> >> >> others to understand you? >> >> >> > Yes it can be applied to any physical entity. The point is that only >> >> > when (1) is true, (2) is true. Obviously where (1) is false as in >> >> > your >> >> > example then (2) would also be false. The point was never that (1) >> >> > is >> >> > always true. Can you understand it now? You can ask for >> >> > clarification >> >> > on it if you like, after all it would be silly of you to be stating >> >> > that it wasn't true, if it was just a case of you not understanding >> >> > it. >> >> >> I see now, you relegated the IF THEN statement to a tiny sentence at >> >> the >> >> end, without a number, that didn't appear to be part of the formula. >> >> Understood now. >> >> >> Excellent. Just like the leg example, since the behavior of a person >> >> walking >> >> around cannot be explained by the laws of physics without knowledge of >> >> whether he's conscious or not, (2) is not true. >> >> >> I mean, to explain the behavior of a person walking around, I have to >> >> know >> >> if the person is conscious or unconscious. I know how conscious and >> >> unconscious people behave, and it's not similar at all. >> >> >> Cool! We're done! >> >> > Not quite. The point in contention is that we are not simply a >> > biological mechanism following the laws of physics, because if we were >> > then it wouldn't be influential. >> >> You have a strange definition of influential. Are you saying there would >> be >> no such thing as influence if the universe were clockwork? >> >> Tell me how legs are not influential to walking around. >> >> Then tell me why consciousness is not influential to walking around. >> >> You require them both to walk around. >> >> > So if you were contesting this, then with knowledge of how the >> > biological mechanism operated, its behaviour could be explained simply >> > in terms of the biological mechanism following the laws of physics. >> >> Like how a man with no legs can't walk around. >> >> Like how a man who's unconscious can't walk around. >> >> > Which would require no knowledge of whether it were subjectively >> > experiencing or not, any more than it would be required to explain the >> > way a robot were behaving. >> >> I've changed my mind. You need to know if the person is conscious or not >> to >> explain his behavior. >> >> See, I'm not as dogmatic as you think I am. It you that is as dogmatic as >> you think I am. >> >> > So (1) would be true, >> >> No. It fails (1) for the same reason the leg example failed. You need to >> know if the person is conscious or unconscious. >> >> > and so would (2). >> >> Nope. (1) fails so (2) is not true! Your formula is actually working >> pretty >> well now. >> >> > It >> > is an implausible story though, but for it not to be true, would >> > require the assumption that we were simply a biological mechanism >> > strictly following the laws of physics. >> >> That's what your formula seems to be supporting. >> >> > Just to remind you, you acknowledged that subjective experiences are a >> > property in their own right, >> >> Just like legs. >> >> > and that the property may be present in a >> > robot or not, >> >> Just like legs. >> >> > in that you can have knowledge of the other properties >> > such as the mechanism, but not of whether the property of subjective >> > experiences had emerged, was acknowledge by you in response to where I >> > said: >> >> How does that work with the legs/no legs scenario? >> >> > Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, one thing >> > you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective experiences or >> > not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in >> > your knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact. >> >> If I can't see the guy, I can't see if he has any legs. Check. >> >> > To which you replied: >> > ------------ >> > I fucking understand that you twit. >> > ------------ >> >> > Don't you reflect yourself on the straws you grasp at, or is it that >> > you are just desperate to avoid facing you were wrong? >> >> M = A man >> B(M) = Walking around >> P = Consciousness >> >> (1) fails utterly. (For the same reason as the legs example.) >> (2) Isn't true. (Presence of consciousness affects B(M)) >> >> I agree. >> > > When you say: > ------ > I've changed my mind. You need to know if the person is conscious or > not to > explain his behavior. > ------ > > Do you mean whether the person has subjective experiences or not? Oh, so NOW you feel you have to draw some distinction between the two terms that up until now you've been using interchangably. Gee, I wonder why? I meant exactly what I wrote. Consciousness. Will you agree there's a difference between the behavior of a conscious person and the behavior of an unconscious person? -- Denis Loubet dloubet@io.com http//www.io.com/~dloubet Quote
Guest Lisbeth Andersson Posted June 12, 2007 Posted June 12, 2007 someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in news:1181644332.673740.169420@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com: > On 12 Jun, 10:09, Lisbeth Andersson <lis...@bredband.net> wrote: >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> innews:1181473049.903786.211810@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 10 Jun, 03:46, Lisbeth Andersson <lis...@bredband.net> >> > wrote: >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> innews:1181415772.483273.54580@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> > On 9 Jun, 06:46, Lisbeth Andersson <lis...@bredband.net> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> >> innews:1181353677.705831.281300 @q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.co >> >> >> m: >> >> >> >> > On 8 Jun, 18:57, Lisbeth Andersson <lis...@bredband.net> >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> >> >> innews:1181311994.969146.270290 >> >> @q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.co >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> m: >> >> >> >> >> <....> >> >> >> >> >> > I think it is better for you to understand the >> >> >> >> > implausibility of the story that we are simply a >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism following the known laws of >> >> >> >> > physics, before discussing the retreated to position >> >> >> >> > that maybe the configuration or complexity freed it >> >> >> >> > from the known laws of physics, but that there were >> >> >> >> > still only a physical mechanism. >> >> >> >> >> I'm more interested in how the unknown laws of physics >> >> >> >> fit into your worldwiev. >> >> >> >> > What makes you think there are any unknown laws of >> >> >> > physics which have any noticable influence on behaviour >> >> >> > other than at the subatomic or cosmic scale? >> >> >> >> Why should I exclude those? What makes you think that the >> >> >> subatomic laws doesn't affect behaviour. And whatever laws >> >> >> (if any) that governs consciousness and awareness seems >> >> >> somewhat missing. >> >> >> >> When was the last time we found >> >> >> >> > anything that didn't follow the known laws of physics? >> >> >> >> Mercury orbit? No, it's probably been some discoveries >> >> >> after that. I heard a rumour a few weeks back about nerve >> >> >> cells using some form of tunneling, it was from a very >> >> >> unreliable source though. >> >> >> >> > I'm more interested whether you understood the point >> >> >> > that was made (and you snipped), or is it a secret? >> >> >> >> I think your "point" was of the form: since we don't want >> >> >> to think our behaviour is deterministic (?), there has to >> >> >> be something that prevents it, I'm not sure if you are >> >> >> going for free will, the soul or god, or any combinations >> >> >> of it. If you ever get the basic assumptions sorted out, I >> >> >> might take a closer look at the rest of your argument. >> >> >> > It had nothing to do with determinism. >> >> >> > The reasoning is summarised below, but was outlined in more >> >> > depth in the part of the post you snipped. >> >> >> I don't see any reason to go through any argument when I >> >> don't agreee with the premises. >> >> >> > 1) The behaviour of M is explained by the laws of physics >> >> > without requiring knowledge of whether it has P(A) or not. >> >> >> P(A)? >> >> >> > Therefore >> >> >> > 2) Presence of P(A) or lack of, does not influence the >> >> > behaviour of M, else the explanation of behaviour could not >> >> > be the same with or without P(A) >> >> >> > You can substitute whatever physical entity that strictly >> >> > follows the known laws of physics for M, and any property >> >> > for P(A) where (1) would be true. If (1) is true, then so >> >> > is (2). >> >> >> Balls dipped in catnip follow exactly the same laws of >> >> physics as balls not dipped in catnip. Howerver, the ball >> >> dipped in catnip is bouncing all over the room, while the >> >> ball not dipped in catnip is just laying there. Which >> >> properties of the cat in the room is not needed for the >> >> explanation? >> >> > Let me put it another way, I didn't notice you were still on a >> > different wording of it, one which has caused other similar >> > misunderstandings of what is being said, so I accept some >> > responsibility for not making it clear. >> >> > Using the following wording: >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) >> > and (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> Good, you have dropped the KNOWN laws of physics. This is >> progress indeed. >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), >> > else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with >> > or without P. >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> > Hopefully now it is reworded, you can see why your example >> > wasn't appropriate. >> >> Well, you only want to discuss properties that do not affect >> behaviour in any way, so of course my example does not fit in. >> > > (1) is about properties that you have no knowledge of and aren't > required to explain the behaviour. Like whether M was a robot, > B(M) was acting in a fashion that you might consider it to have > subjective experiences, and P was whether it did have subjective > experiences or not. > If you ever find a robot that acts as if it has subjective experiences (?) let me know. Until then, let's stick to cats. BTW I just read your definition of "subjective experiences" in another post, and although it is possible that Matt understands what you mean, I find it totally incomprehensible. "By subjective experiences, I every experience you or anybody else has had, without any assumption that the human you experience being is essentially you. In the sense that you don't subjectively experience brain activity which may be labelled subconsious, or what an individual white blood cell is doing etc. Do you think you understand what I am referring to?" > (2) shows that in the above example of the robot, that whether it > had subjective expeirences or not couldn't be influencing its > behaviour. > > Can you understand what the implications would be if we were > simply a biological mechanism explainable by the laws of physics, > and why this is implausible? > Implications? I wont turn in an application to become a valkyrie, and you don't have to worry about being re"born" as a Gymnocalycium bruchii. We can forget about getting helpers for the spirit journey to the land of the dead, and becoming clear is not going to get rid of the Thetans. In short: no. However I would like to know what implications you think it would have. Implausible? Implausible things happens all the time. It's very implausible that anything can live in boiling water near volcanoes, that time depends on how fast stuff is moving, or that people actually believe that pure water can cure illness. The argument from personal incredibility really shouldn't work on people who has lived through a significant part of the 20th century. I find it veird that you actually spelled out that you are using it. The argument from pejorative vocabulary doesn't help either. "simply a biological mechanism". That's two derisive words in a four word construct. Some of the most fascinating stuff found are biological organisms. I won't bother with making a list of them, but the above mentioned volcano dwellers would be somewhere in the top 100 positions. Lisbeth. ---- The day I don't learn anything new is the day I die. What we know is not nearly as interesting as how we know it. -- Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com Quote
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