Guest someone2 Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 On 12 Jun, 23:15, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: > someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote innews:1181685844.308030.63760@z28g2000prd.googlegroups.com: > > > You have still failed to give one example which didn't have deceptions > > in it Fred, in that the reasoning wasn't appropriately used, therefore > > didn't show the reasoning to be incorrect. Tet I have given three > > which adhered to how the reasoning applies. > > Those three examples of yours are deceptive, since your "reasoning" does > not apply to the case of "subjective experience". > > > Again you refused to give > > an example. If you could give one you would, you wouldn't waste your > > time trying to hide behind deception. The point is you can't, but you > > can't face it either because of your ego. You appear to me pathetic. > > You're a troll. > You say it doesn't, but give no reason, and admitted yourself, that a robots behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether it was subjectively experiencing or not. Also again you failed to give one example, after claiming it wasn't a problem for you. You surely must have known this was a lie when you said it. You would think that if seeming reason led you away from God, then reason could lead you back again, but it seems your ego won't let you face reason. Your choices so far in this discussion have been disingenious, cowardly and pathetic. Quote
Guest Fred Stone Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in news:1181698366.089545.9210@q19g2000prn.googlegroups.com: > On 12 Jun, 23:15, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> innews:1181685844.308030.63760@z28g2000prd.googlegroups.com: >> >> > You have still failed to give one example which didn't have >> > deceptions in it Fred, in that the reasoning wasn't appropriately >> > used, therefore didn't show the reasoning to be incorrect. Tet I >> > have given three which adhered to how the reasoning applies. >> >> Those three examples of yours are deceptive, since your "reasoning" >> does not apply to the case of "subjective experience". >> >> > Again you refused to give >> > an example. If you could give one you would, you wouldn't waste >> > your time trying to hide behind deception. The point is you can't, >> > but you can't face it either because of your ego. You appear to me >> > pathetic. >> >> You're a troll. >> > > You say it doesn't, but give no reason, and admitted yourself, that a > robots behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether it > was subjectively experiencing or not. > It's not possible to know whether a thing is subjectively experiencing or not. That is the definition of subjective experience. That is true whether materialism holds or not. > Also again you failed to give one example, after claiming it wasn't a > problem for you. You surely must have known this was a lie when you > said it. > > You would think that if seeming reason led you away from God, then > reason could lead you back again, but it seems your ego won't let you > face reason. > > Your choices so far in this discussion have been disingenious, > cowardly and pathetic. > You're a troll. -- Fred Stone aa# 1369 "When they put out that deadline, people realized that we were going to lose," said an aide to an anti-war lawmaker. "Everything after that seemed like posturing." -- Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 On 13 Jun, 00:32, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181688451.564321.144300@z28g2000prd.googlegroups.com... > > > On 12 Jun, 23:14, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >>news:1181683182.108501.293290@z28g2000prd.googlegroups.com... > > >> > On 12 Jun, 16:59, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >>news:1181643629.665515.215790@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> > On 12 Jun, 02:00, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >>news:1181607322.623131.144640@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> > On 12 Jun, 00:56, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >>news:1181603668.494011.312460@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > (snipped older material) > > >> >> >> >> > Yes it can be applied to any physical entity. The point is > >> >> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> > only > >> >> >> >> > when (1) is true, (2) is true. Obviously where (1) is false as > >> >> >> >> > in > >> >> >> >> > your > >> >> >> >> > example then (2) would also be false. The point was never that > >> >> >> >> > (1) > >> >> >> >> > is > >> >> >> >> > always true. Can you understand it now? You can ask for > >> >> >> >> > clarification > >> >> >> >> > on it if you like, after all it would be silly of you to be > >> >> >> >> > stating > >> >> >> >> > that it wasn't true, if it was just a case of you not > >> >> >> >> > understanding > >> >> >> >> > it. > > >> >> >> >> I see now, you relegated the IF THEN statement to a tiny > >> >> >> >> sentence > >> >> >> >> at > >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> end, without a number, that didn't appear to be part of the > >> >> >> >> formula. > >> >> >> >> Understood now. > > >> >> >> >> Excellent. Just like the leg example, since the behavior of a > >> >> >> >> person > >> >> >> >> walking > >> >> >> >> around cannot be explained by the laws of physics without > >> >> >> >> knowledge > >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> whether he's conscious or not, (2) is not true. > > >> >> >> >> I mean, to explain the behavior of a person walking around, I > >> >> >> >> have > >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> know > >> >> >> >> if the person is conscious or unconscious. I know how conscious > >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> unconscious people behave, and it's not similar at all. > > >> >> >> >> Cool! We're done! > > >> >> >> > Not quite. The point in contention is that we are not simply a > >> >> >> > biological mechanism following the laws of physics, because if we > >> >> >> > were > >> >> >> > then it wouldn't be influential. > > >> >> >> You have a strange definition of influential. Are you saying there > >> >> >> would > >> >> >> be > >> >> >> no such thing as influence if the universe were clockwork? > > >> >> >> Tell me how legs are not influential to walking around. > > >> >> >> Then tell me why consciousness is not influential to walking > >> >> >> around. > > >> >> >> You require them both to walk around. > > >> >> >> > So if you were contesting this, then with knowledge of how the > >> >> >> > biological mechanism operated, its behaviour could be explained > >> >> >> > simply > >> >> >> > in terms of the biological mechanism following the laws of > >> >> >> > physics. > > >> >> >> Like how a man with no legs can't walk around. > > >> >> >> Like how a man who's unconscious can't walk around. > > >> >> >> > Which would require no knowledge of whether it were subjectively > >> >> >> > experiencing or not, any more than it would be required to > >> >> >> > explain > >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> > way a robot were behaving. > > >> >> >> I've changed my mind. You need to know if the person is conscious > >> >> >> or > >> >> >> not > >> >> >> to > >> >> >> explain his behavior. > > >> >> >> See, I'm not as dogmatic as you think I am. It you that is as > >> >> >> dogmatic > >> >> >> as > >> >> >> you think I am. > > >> >> >> > So (1) would be true, > > >> >> >> No. It fails (1) for the same reason the leg example failed. You > >> >> >> need > >> >> >> to > >> >> >> know if the person is conscious or unconscious. > > >> >> >> > and so would (2). > > >> >> >> Nope. (1) fails so (2) is not true! Your formula is actually > >> >> >> working > >> >> >> pretty > >> >> >> well now. > > >> >> >> > It > >> >> >> > is an implausible story though, but for it not to be true, would > >> >> >> > require the assumption that we were simply a biological mechanism > >> >> >> > strictly following the laws of physics. > > >> >> >> That's what your formula seems to be supporting. > > >> >> >> > Just to remind you, you acknowledged that subjective experiences > >> >> >> > are > >> >> >> > a > >> >> >> > property in their own right, > > >> >> >> Just like legs. > > >> >> >> > and that the property may be present in a > >> >> >> > robot or not, > > >> >> >> Just like legs. > > >> >> >> > in that you can have knowledge of the other properties > >> >> >> > such as the mechanism, but not of whether the property of > >> >> >> > subjective > >> >> >> > experiences had emerged, was acknowledge by you in response to > >> >> >> > where > >> >> >> > I > >> >> >> > said: > > >> >> >> How does that work with the legs/no legs scenario? > > >> >> >> > Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, one > >> >> >> > thing > >> >> >> > you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective > >> >> >> > experiences > >> >> >> > or > >> >> >> > not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in > >> >> >> > your knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact. > > >> >> >> If I can't see the guy, I can't see if he has any legs. Check. > > >> >> >> > To which you replied: > >> >> >> > ------------ > >> >> >> > I fucking understand that you twit. > >> >> >> > ------------ > > >> >> >> > Don't you reflect yourself on the straws you grasp at, or is it > >> >> >> > that > >> >> >> > you are just desperate to avoid facing you were wrong? > > >> >> >> M = A man > >> >> >> B(M) = Walking around > >> >> >> P = Consciousness > > >> >> >> (1) fails utterly. (For the same reason as the legs example.) > >> >> >> (2) Isn't true. (Presence of consciousness affects B(M)) > > >> >> >> I agree. > > >> >> > When you say: > >> >> > ------ > >> >> > I've changed my mind. You need to know if the person is conscious or > >> >> > not to > >> >> > explain his behavior. > >> >> > ------ > > >> >> > Do you mean whether the person has subjective experiences or not? > > >> >> Oh, so NOW you feel you have to draw some distinction between the two > >> >> terms > >> >> that up until now you've been using interchangably. Gee, I wonder why? > > >> >> I meant exactly what I wrote. Consciousness. Will you agree there's a > >> >> difference between the behavior of a conscious person and the behavior > >> >> of > >> >> an > >> >> unconscious person? > > >> > Well I was just checking as you seem to be using it in the sense that > >> > refers to a behaviour such as in the context of "I walked in, and > >> > there he was in the middle of the room unconscious". Obviously it > >> > wouldn't make sense to use it in this context as you have stated that > >> > the behaviour was that he was walking around. > > >> Why didn't you bring up this objection with the legs example? The context > >> is > >> precisely the same. Without legs he can't be walking around either. > > >> This is, in fact, precisely the context in which I'm using Consciousness. > > >> > In the context of it being meant as whether the man had any conscious > >> > experiences or not, > > >> Do you think conscious experiences are unnecessary for consciousness? I > >> think they're required, pretty much by definition. > > >> > I refer you two what I said earlier regarding the > >> > point that the reasoning shows we are not simply a biological > >> > mechanism following the laws of physics, because if we were then it > >> > wouldn't be influential: > > >> > --------- > >> > So if you were contesting this, then with knowledge of how the > >> > biological mechanism operated, its behaviour could be explained simply > >> > in terms of the biological mechanism following the laws of physics. > >> > --------- > > >> > In other words like a robot without knowledge of whether it had > >> > subjective experiences or not. > > >> > Your reply was: > >> > --------- > >> > Like how a man with no legs can't walk around. > > >> > Like how a man who's unconscious can't walk around. > >> > --------- > > >> > Which you can see while it was a reply, it wasn't one that addressed > >> > the point I had made. > > >> It's too bad you couldn't make the conceptual leap. The comparisons are > >> pretty clear. > > >> "Can I explain how a person walks around without knowledge of whether he > >> has > >> legs or not?" conceptually maps to, "Can I explain how a person walks > >> around > >> without knowledge of whether he's conscious or not." perfectly. > > >> Your formula handles it perfectly, (1) fails utterly making (2) not true. > > >> Just like it did with the leg example. > > >> For some reason, you're offering objections to the consciousness example > >> that you're not offereing to the leg example. I'd like to know why. > > >> > Can you comprehend that if we were simply a > >> > biological mechanism following the laws of physics, then any behaviour > >> > could be explained without knowledge of whether it was subjectively > >> > experiencing/was conscious or not, perhaps by an alien robot for > >> > example, just as the behaviour of the alien robot could be explained > >> > by us without knowledge of whether it was subjectively experiencing/ > >> > was conscious or not. > > >> WTF? ALIEN ROBOT??? What depths of your colon did you pull THAT out > >> of? > > >> We are biological mechanisms following the laws of physics. Consciousness > >> is > >> an operational part of that mechanism. Thus, if you explain the behavior, > >> you are including the operation of consciousness -- if it's present -- in > >> your explanation, whether you like it or not. > > >> Just like if you explain how a guy's walking around, you are including > >> the > >> fact that he must have legs in your explanation, whether you like it or > >> not, > >> whether you mention it or not. > > > The alien robot was just a device to help you see the point. > > Unfortunately the point went 'over your head' as the expression goes. > > No, I get the purpose. I just find it amusing that you can't help but pull > more idiotic shit straight out of your ass. > > > You chose to mock the idea of the alien robot, rather than face the > > issue. I wonder whether you would have had such problems if the > > reasoning had been in favour of atheism? > > I faced it fine. I even explained why, "if you explain the behavior, you are > including the operation of consciousness -- if it's present -- in your > explanation, whether you like it or not." > > But that apparently went "over your head" as the expression goes. > > You chose to deliberately ignore that idea, rather than face the issue. I > wonder whether you would have had such problems if the > reasoning had been in favour of your childish god concept. > > > You couldn't explain the guy walking around without knowledge of the > > property of whether he had legs or not. > > And you can't explain the guy walking around without knowledge of his state > of consciousness. > > > You could explain the behaviour, of any robot without knowledge of > > whether it had subjective experiences or not. As in response to: > > And the point you continue to run screaming from is that if it had > subjective experiences, then that would be part of the explanation whether > you knew it or not. > > If I know nothing about gravity, I can still describe the behavior of a > dropped ball in terms of the laws of physics I am left with. I can say it's > moving at 32 feet per second per second towards the center of the earth > without knowledge of gravity. I've described its behavior without knowledge > of gravity, yet in doing so, I also necessarily described the > behavior-modifying ability of gravity. > > In the same way, I can describe the behavior of the robot by the laws of > physics, and it will include the behavior modifying ability of consciousness > in exactly the same way. > You would be explaining it with no knowledge of the property of subjective experiences. It is a seperate property as you have claimed to have understood, in that you could know the other properties of a mechanism and yet not know that one. If humans were simply a biological mechanism, they could be explained without knowledge of whether they were consciously experiencing or not. It is implausible they are though, and the reasoning was given. You can't state one example where it wouldn't be true. If you try to use consciousness as the behaviour, then what is the property you are talking about, if you try to use consciousness in reference to subjective experiences, then why couldn't the behaviour be explained without knowledge of whether they had them or not, just like a robot. With the gravity scenario, you wouldn't be explaining why it fell to the ground, you would just be describing it falling to the ground. So you wouldn't be explaining its behaviour without knowledge of the gravity property of mass. If you wanted to have the property as being "a property of falling to the ground, reason unexplained", then again you couldn't explain it without this property. With the robot, it is not a case of reason unexplained as to why it should have any subjective experiences that is the issue, or what would know what a portion of the system represented, it is that it would be behaving as you would expect without it having subjective experiences, which is why you would require no knowledge of whether it had any subjective experiences any more than you would to explain the behaviour of a mobile phone or television set. You desperately grasping at straws rather than face you were wrong and were shown to be so is quite sad, but it might serve as a lesson to any others how silly they were to of ever listened to people like yourself, given they must be able to see how desperately those like yourself are grasping at illogical straws in the hope that anyone would consider them anything other than egotistical, illogical, disingenious cowards. It is like the story of the Emporer's New Clothes, that the intelligent claimed they could see, and yet there was nothing there to see, the story wasn't even plausible. Quote
Guest Fred Stone Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in news:1181701375.158168.75320@o11g2000prd.googlegroups.com: > On 13 Jun, 03:09, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: >> someone2 wrote: >> > On 12 Jun, 00:41, Matt Silberstein >> > > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 15:05:09 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> >> <snip> >> >> > > >I'm not even bringing into the converstation at the moment what >> > > >reality actually is, I am just pointing out the implausibility >> > > >of the story that we are simply a biological mechanism strictly >> > > >following the laws of physics. >> >> > > You haven't started to do that. >> >> > > >As for your point about that P might not be a property of M, >> > > >well yes, you could rewrite it as F (a factor), such as wind in >> > > >the behaviour of a flying kite for example (where (1) would not >> > > >be true) as opposed to whether I was in fact the person that ate >> > > >all the pies in Mrs Miggins pie shop (where (1) would be true, >> > > >and so would (2) ). It still doesn't seem to have sunk in yet, >> > > >that it is not that our experience is a deception, we do >> > > >influence the behaviour of the human we experience being. It is >> > > >that it is implausible that we can be explained as being simply >> > > >a biological mechanism following the laws of physics. >> >> > > So you keep asserting, but you have yet to provide an actual >> > > argument. You give a supposition and you give a conclusion, but >> > > no logical steps from accepted givens to results. >> >> > I have provided reason: >> >> > M refers to the physical entity in question. >> > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> > P refers to the a property in question. >> >> > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and >> > (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> > knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else >> > the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without >> > P. >> >> > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. >> >> What reason have you to suppose that (1) IS TRUE? >> Also: >> What exactly do you mean by "explained" in sentence 1? >> This is VERY important. >> >> Do you mean completely accurately specified to any arbitrary level of >> detail? >> The reason I ask is (as I have explained before - although you didn't >> seem to understand its importance) - some systems are inherently >> complex and chaotic so as to be "computationally infeasible" to >> predict future behavior. For example : the weather . We have physical >> models of the behaviour of the earths atmosphere - all in terms of >> known laws of physics. The modelling of the earth's atmosphere in the >> worlds most powerful super computers using the best data sets >> available can give reasonable "forecasts" of what the weather will be >> in two or three days time and make general predictions about climate. >> These forecasts are always incomplete/imperfect - probabilistic. >> IN PRINCIPLE you could model the worlds weather in very great detail, >> you could have temperature pressure velocity and moisture content >> readings for every cubic meter of earths atmosphere to a height off >> 30 kilometers But it may require a computer larger than the earth >> itself running for many thousands of years to tell you what the >> weather will be in 2 days time. >> >> So we could say that "the earths weather acts in ways not explainable >> by the known laws of physics" >> - if we specify "explained" to mean we can tell the temperature in a >> particular location in California in 2035 to within a tenth of a >> degree and the wind velocity to within 1% from a few measurements >> taken today. >> So we could conclude "Physical law cannot explain the weather in >> California". >> Do you see? >> >> The complexity of the system needed to "explain" another complex >> system grows very rapidly depending on the level of detail and >> accuracy you require the modeling system to reach. >> >> Our inability to model/predict/explain a system does not mean that >> there are new laws of physics to be discovered. >> It may simply be a practical limitation - finite amount of time/ >> energy/ memory for example. >> IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE WEATHER IS CAUSED BY SUPERNATURAL FORCES. >> Do you understand this point? >> >> So it may be (1) is "true" in some sense - related to the finiteness >> of the human brain for example and NOT because of some more >> fundamental logical or ontological necessity. >> >> Or (of course) it may be that (1) is simply not true. >> >> We currently just don't know. >> >> Declaring it to be impossible to understand when we (the human >> species) have barely begun trying to understand these things is >> foolish. >> > > Where you say: > ------------ > What reason have you to suppose that (1) IS TRUE? > Also: > What exactly do you mean by "explained" in sentence 1? > This is VERY important. > ------------ > > Whether (1) is true or not, depends what is being said. Though surely > you understand that the behaviour of a mobile phone can be explained > in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics. > In particular, Glenn, M is a human and B is the behavior of "acting like one is having subjective experiences". P is the property of having subjective experiences. M is not a ball or a car or a mobile phone. It is not possible for an external observer to know P. That is the definition of "subjective". That holds whether materialism is true or false. Regardless of that fact, it is entirely possible to explain B using nothing more than the laws of physics. M is still a purely material being which does nothing more than follow the laws of physics and B still implies P. You have never proved otherwise. You have never done anything but make blanket assertions that have no basis in fact. It's not my job to provide counterexamples, or to play your silly semantic games, Glenn. The burden of proof is on YOU , and YOU alone. I have indulged your petulant whining and your childish outbursts, Glenn, and if you don't like the implications of your fallacies, that's your problem, not mine. -- Fred Stone aa# 1369 "When they put out that deadline, people realized that we were going to lose," said an aide to an anti-war lawmaker. "Everything after that seemed like posturing." -- Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 On 13 Jun, 01:08, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > On Jun 13, 1:10 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 12 Jun, 13:49, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > On Jun 12, 7:36 am, jien...@aol.com wrote: > > > > > On Jun 11, 5:08 pm, Matt Silberstein > > > > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > > > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 13:29:05 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > <1181593745.206175.160...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > > >On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein > > > > > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > > > >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > > > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > >> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > > > >> [snip] > > > > > > >> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?: > > > > > > >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > >> >P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > >> >and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > >> >explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true > > > > > > >> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a class > > > > > >> of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But that is a > > > > > >> minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that (1) reasonably > > > > > >> captures a physical understanding of human behavior and subjective > > > > > >> experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see take the existence > > > > > >> of SE as a given and work to explain that existence. So, while I think > > > > > >> your argument here is wrong, I think the argument itself does not > > > > > >> meaningfully relate to a physicalist (not scientism) theory of the > > > > > >> mind. > > > > > > >It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to point > > > > > >out why it isn't. Yes you are right that subjective experiences do > > > > > >influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to consider > > > > > >whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion (which is shown > > > > > >to be implausible) that we are simply a biological mechanism following > > > > > >the laws of physics, then you would have no reason to think that any > > > > > >physical mechanism following the laws of physics had subjective > > > > > >experiences. > > > > > > Ok, Jientho, Glenn is just assuming the conclusion here. You have not > > > > > shown it implausible that we are "just" biological mechanisms. > > > > > He has shown that if we are such mechanisms fully explained by the > > > > laws of physics, then any subjective experiences we have are non- > > > > influential of our behavior -- they (SE) are simply side-effects, > > > > outputs, coincidental. > > > > He has not "shown" it - he has asserted it in various forms including > > > in the form of a question. > > > People are just seeing straight through such tactics. > > > > > And their "effects" on the physical world are > > > > illusory -- our subjective selves are just observers here. Serious > > > > materialists have made much the same point. > > > > "Serious materialists" - speaking of rhetorical tricks! > > > Too much sparing with Skeptic old friend - you have lost some of your > > > old edge. > > > Jeff understands it, whereas you still don't understand that where: > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > and where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and > > (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > What is your evidence that I don't understand this? > ( I am not claiming that I do or do not understand it - I have never > actually commented on it.) > > > As you don't understand it <snip> > > What is your evidence that I don't understand it? > Have I ever commented upon it? > You are making unsupported assertions AGAIN. > Do you understand that applied to a robot, that was behaving in a way that some might decide to use their 'powers' to imbue it with consciousness, that if it did have subjective experiences they couldn't be said to influence its behaviour? M refers to the robot B(M) refers to the robot, behaving in such a manner that some might think it had subjective experiences. P refers to subjective experiences 1) The robot, behaving in such a manner that some might think it had subjective experiences, is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has subjective experiences or not. Which would mean 2) Presence of subjective experiences or lack of, does not influence/ affect the robot, behaving in such a manner that some think it had subjective experiences, else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without subjective experiences. Do you understand that the same would apply to us if we were simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics? So philosphers couldn't be discussing qualia because of their existance, nor could people talking about anything the subjectively experienced because of the experience, nor could we be even having this discussion because conscious experiences existed. The existance of them would have to be coincidental to behaviour. It is the required coincidence that makes the story of us being simply biological mechanisms implausible. Without the assertion that we are simply biological mechanisms, there would be no reason to suggest that any mechanism following the known laws of physics had any subjective experiences, nor could they explain how or why they should have. Furthermore, if people still wished to still try to cling to the possibility that it was simply the coincidence, what reason would the biological mechanism have for even trying to explain subjective experiences (its own subjective experiences couldn't have influenced its behaviour), and what reason would it have to consider whether other things such as robots might also have, when there could be no other reason than the subjective experiences were influencing its behaviour (which if this were the reason, would show it couldn't be a biological mechanism strictly following the known laws of physics). It shouldn't be hard to understand, unless you have a problem facing reason, and are therefore strangely unable to follow it, when you don't like what it shows, because it shows that you were wrong. So do you understand it? Quote
Guest Richo Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 someone2 wrote: > On 12 Jun, 00:41, Matt Silberstein > > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 15:05:09 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> <snip> > > > > >I'm not even bringing into the converstation at the moment what > > >reality actually is, I am just pointing out the implausibility of the > > >story that we are simply a biological mechanism strictly following the > > >laws of physics. > > > > You haven't started to do that. > > > > >As for your point about that P might not be a property of M, well yes, > > >you could rewrite it as F (a factor), such as wind in the behaviour of > > >a flying kite for example (where (1) would not be true) as opposed to > > >whether I was in fact the person that ate all the pies in Mrs Miggins > > >pie shop (where (1) would be true, and so would (2) ). > > >It still doesn't seem to have sunk in yet, that it is not that our > > >experience is a deception, we do influence the behaviour of the human > > >we experience being. It is that it is implausible that we can be > > >explained as being simply a biological mechanism following the laws of > > >physics. > > > > So you keep asserting, but you have yet to provide an actual argument. > > You give a supposition and you give a conclusion, but no logical steps > > from accepted givens to results. > > > > I have provided reason: > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > P refers to the a property in question. > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > What reason have you to suppose that (1) IS TRUE? Also: What exactly do you mean by "explained" in sentence 1? This is VERY important. Do you mean completely accurately specified to any arbitrary level of detail? The reason I ask is (as I have explained before - although you didn't seem to understand its importance) - some systems are inherently complex and chaotic so as to be "computationally infeasible" to predict future behavior. For example : the weather . We have physical models of the behaviour of the earths atmosphere - all in terms of known laws of physics. The modelling of the earth's atmosphere in the worlds most powerful super computers using the best data sets available can give reasonable "forecasts" of what the weather will be in two or three days time and make general predictions about climate. These forecasts are always incomplete/imperfect - probabilistic. IN PRINCIPLE you could model the worlds weather in very great detail, you could have temperature pressure velocity and moisture content readings for every cubic meter of earths atmosphere to a height off 30 kilometers But it may require a computer larger than the earth itself running for many thousands of years to tell you what the weather will be in 2 days time. So we could say that "the earths weather acts in ways not explainable by the known laws of physics" - if we specify "explained" to mean we can tell the temperature in a particular location in California in 2035 to within a tenth of a degree and the wind velocity to within 1% from a few measurements taken today. So we could conclude "Physical law cannot explain the weather in California". Do you see? The complexity of the system needed to "explain" another complex system grows very rapidly depending on the level of detail and accuracy you require the modeling system to reach. Our inability to model/predict/explain a system does not mean that there are new laws of physics to be discovered. It may simply be a practical limitation - finite amount of time/ energy/ memory for example. IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE WEATHER IS CAUSED BY SUPERNATURAL FORCES. Do you understand this point? So it may be (1) is "true" in some sense - related to the finiteness of the human brain for example and NOT because of some more fundamental logical or ontological necessity. Or (of course) it may be that (1) is simply not true. We currently just don't know. Declaring it to be impossible to understand when we (the human species) have barely begun trying to understand these things is foolish. Mark. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 On 13 Jun, 03:09, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > someone2 wrote: > > On 12 Jun, 00:41, Matt Silberstein > > > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 15:05:09 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> > <snip> > > > > >I'm not even bringing into the converstation at the moment what > > > >reality actually is, I am just pointing out the implausibility of the > > > >story that we are simply a biological mechanism strictly following the > > > >laws of physics. > > > > You haven't started to do that. > > > > >As for your point about that P might not be a property of M, well yes, > > > >you could rewrite it as F (a factor), such as wind in the behaviour of > > > >a flying kite for example (where (1) would not be true) as opposed to > > > >whether I was in fact the person that ate all the pies in Mrs Miggins > > > >pie shop (where (1) would be true, and so would (2) ). > > > >It still doesn't seem to have sunk in yet, that it is not that our > > > >experience is a deception, we do influence the behaviour of the human > > > >we experience being. It is that it is implausible that we can be > > > >explained as being simply a biological mechanism following the laws of > > > >physics. > > > > So you keep asserting, but you have yet to provide an actual argument. > > > You give a supposition and you give a conclusion, but no logical steps > > > from accepted givens to results. > > > I have provided reason: > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > What reason have you to suppose that (1) IS TRUE? > Also: > What exactly do you mean by "explained" in sentence 1? > This is VERY important. > > Do you mean completely accurately specified to any arbitrary level of > detail? > The reason I ask is (as I have explained before - although you didn't > seem to understand its importance) - some systems are inherently > complex and chaotic so as to be "computationally infeasible" to > predict future behavior. For example : the weather . We have physical > models of the behaviour of the earths atmosphere - all in terms of > known laws of physics. The modelling of the earth's atmosphere in the > worlds most powerful super computers using the best data sets > available can give reasonable "forecasts" of what the weather will be > in two or three days time and make general predictions about climate. > These forecasts are always incomplete/imperfect - probabilistic. > IN PRINCIPLE you could model the worlds weather in very great detail, > you could have temperature pressure velocity and moisture content > readings for every cubic meter of earths atmosphere to a height off 30 > kilometers But it may require a computer larger than the earth itself > running for many thousands of years to tell you what the weather will > be in 2 days time. > > So we could say that "the earths weather acts in ways not explainable > by the known laws of physics" > - if we specify "explained" to mean we can tell the temperature in a > particular location in California in 2035 to within a tenth of a > degree and the wind velocity to within 1% from a few measurements > taken today. > So we could conclude "Physical law cannot explain the weather in > California". > Do you see? > > The complexity of the system needed to "explain" another complex > system grows very rapidly depending on the level of detail and > accuracy you require the modeling system to reach. > > Our inability to model/predict/explain a system does not mean that > there are new laws of physics to be discovered. > It may simply be a practical limitation - finite amount of time/ > energy/ memory for example. > IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE WEATHER IS CAUSED BY SUPERNATURAL FORCES. > Do you understand this point? > > So it may be (1) is "true" in some sense - related to the finiteness > of the human brain for example and NOT because of some more > fundamental logical or ontological necessity. > > Or (of course) it may be that (1) is simply not true. > > We currently just don't know. > > Declaring it to be impossible to understand when we (the human > species) have barely begun trying to understand these things is > foolish. > Where you say: ------------ What reason have you to suppose that (1) IS TRUE? Also: What exactly do you mean by "explained" in sentence 1? This is VERY important. ------------ Whether (1) is true or not, depends what is being said. Though surely you understand that the behaviour of a mobile phone can be explained in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics. Regarding your weather scenario, you could extend "explained" to "explained in principle" if that helps. Though there is a difference between asserting you can explain something in principle, and actually being able to. With regards to us, you can, even not believing that we are explainable as a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, plug in the assertion, and see the implications, which is the point. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 On 13 Jun, 02:44, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: > someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote innews:1181698366.089545.9210@q19g2000prn.googlegroups.com: > > > > > > > On 12 Jun, 23:15, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: > >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > >> innews:1181685844.308030.63760@z28g2000prd.googlegroups.com: > > >> > You have still failed to give one example which didn't have > >> > deceptions in it Fred, in that the reasoning wasn't appropriately > >> > used, therefore didn't show the reasoning to be incorrect. Tet I > >> > have given three which adhered to how the reasoning applies. > > >> Those three examples of yours are deceptive, since your "reasoning" > >> does not apply to the case of "subjective experience". > > >> > Again you refused to give > >> > an example. If you could give one you would, you wouldn't waste > >> > your time trying to hide behind deception. The point is you can't, > >> > but you can't face it either because of your ego. You appear to me > >> > pathetic. > > >> You're a troll. > > > You say it doesn't, but give no reason, and admitted yourself, that a > > robots behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether it > > was subjectively experiencing or not. > > It's not possible to know whether a thing is subjectively experiencing > or not. That is the definition of subjective experience. That is true > whether materialism holds or not. > > > Also again you failed to give one example, after claiming it wasn't a > > problem for you. You surely must have known this was a lie when you > > said it. > > > You would think that if seeming reason led you away from God, then > > reason could lead you back again, but it seems your ego won't let you > > face reason. > > > Your choices so far in this discussion have been disingenious, > > cowardly and pathetic. > > You're a troll. > I think you are missing the point that whether the robot, car, mobile phone, or biological mechanism (if it strictly followed the laws of physics) did or didn't have the property of subjective experiences, the property in itself couldn't be influencing behaviour. Shown by: M refers to the physical entity in question. B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. P refers to the a property in question. Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has P or not. 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. If (1) is true, then (2) is true The above is true, which is why you can't give one example where it wouldn't be. The problem is you can't accept that you were deceived that we were simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, as you claimed you saw and understood it, and that it made sense (as did some others that were regarded as 'intelligent'). To remain an atheist you have to abandon reason. Quote
Guest Richo Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 On Jun 13, 12:08 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 13 Jun, 01:08, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > On Jun 13, 1:10 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 12 Jun, 13:49, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > On Jun 12, 7:36 am, jien...@aol.com wrote: > > > > > > On Jun 11, 5:08 pm, Matt Silberstein > > > > > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > > > > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 13:29:05 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > > <1181593745.206175.160...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > > > >On 11 Jun, 20:47, Matt Silberstein > > > > > > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > > > > >> On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 12:29:57 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > > > > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > > >> <1181590197.482419.50...@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > > > > >> [snip] > > > > > > > >> >Anyway, did you manage to understand the following?: > > > > > > > >> >M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > >> >B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > >> >P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > >> >Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > > >> >and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > >> >1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > >> >knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > >> >2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > > >> >explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > > >> >If (1) is true, then (2) is true > > > > > > > >> I disagree that (2) is true if (1) is true. I could identify a class > > > > > > >> of phenomena, C, of which P is one possible member. But that is a > > > > > > >> minor point. My major point is in (1). I disagree that (1) reasonably > > > > > > >> captures a physical understanding of human behavior and subjective > > > > > > >> experience (SE). All of the physical analysis I see take the existence > > > > > > >> of SE as a given and work to explain that existence. So, while I think > > > > > > >> your argument here is wrong, I think the argument itself does not > > > > > > >> meaningfully relate to a physicalist (not scientism) theory of the > > > > > > >> mind. > > > > > > > >It is always true, and you have just avoided even attempting to point > > > > > > >out why it isn't. Yes you are right that subjective experiences do > > > > > > >influence our behaviour, else what reason would we have to consider > > > > > > >whether a robot is? Once you take away your assertion (which is shown > > > > > > >to be implausible) that we are simply a biological mechanism following > > > > > > >the laws of physics, then you would have no reason to think that any > > > > > > >physical mechanism following the laws of physics had subjective > > > > > > >experiences. > > > > > > > Ok, Jientho, Glenn is just assuming the conclusion here. You have not > > > > > > shown it implausible that we are "just" biological mechanisms. > > > > > > He has shown that if we are such mechanisms fully explained by the > > > > > laws of physics, then any subjective experiences we have are non- > > > > > influential of our behavior -- they (SE) are simply side-effects, > > > > > outputs, coincidental. > > > > > He has not "shown" it - he has asserted it in various forms including > > > > in the form of a question. > > > > People are just seeing straight through such tactics. > > > > > > And their "effects" on the physical world are > > > > > illusory -- our subjective selves are just observers here. Serious > > > > > materialists have made much the same point. > > > > > "Serious materialists" - speaking of rhetorical tricks! > > > > Too much sparing with Skeptic old friend - you have lost some of your > > > > old edge. > > > > Jeff understands it, whereas you still don't understand that where: > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > and where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and > > > (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > What is your evidence that I don't understand this? > > ( I am not claiming that I do or do not understand it - I have never > > actually commented on it.) > > > > As you don't understand it <snip> > > > What is your evidence that I don't understand it? > > Have I ever commented upon it? > > You are making unsupported assertions AGAIN. > > Do you understand that applied to a robot, that was behaving in a way > that some might decide to use their 'powers' to imbue it with > consciousness, that if it did have subjective experiences they > couldn't be said to influence its behaviour? > I understand the meaning of your assertion - I do not know that it is true. You do not know that it is true. > M refers to the robot > B(M) refers to the robot, behaving in such a manner that some might > think it had subjective experiences. > P refers to subjective experiences > > 1) The robot, behaving in such a manner that some might think it had > subjective experiences, is explained by the laws of physics without > requiring knowledge of whether it has subjective experiences or not. > Explained? - to what level of accuracy to what level of detail? Explained completely? or Partially? Perfect accuracy? Perfect Detail? > Which would mean > > 2) Presence of subjective experiences or lack of, does not influence/ > affect the robot, behaving in such a manner that some think it had > subjective experiences, else the > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without > subjective experiences. > > Do you understand that the same would apply to us if we were simply a > biological mechanism following the laws of physics? > Yes - IF it were true that my decisions, feelings, behaviors could be completely explained and predicted from cradle to grave without any reference to my feelings. THEN my behavior could be explained/predicted perfectly without reference to my feelings. IF the weather in California in 2035 could be predicted WITH PERFECT fidelity and arbitrary degree of accuracy WITHOUT knowing anything about the temperature and wind velocity in Nevada THEN the weather in California in 2035 could be predicted with perfect fidelity without reference to the the conditions prevailing in Nevada. etc. etc. > So philosphers couldn't be discussing qualia because of their > existance, nor could people talking about anything the subjectively > experienced because of the experience, nor could we be even having > this discussion because conscious experiences existed. The existance > of them would have to be coincidental to behaviour. It is the required > coincidence that makes the story of us being simply biological > mechanisms implausible. > > Without the assertion that we are simply biological mechanisms, there > would be no reason to suggest that any mechanism following the known > laws of physics had any subjective experiences, nor could they explain > how or why they should have. > > Furthermore, if people still wished to still try to cling to the > possibility that it was simply the coincidence, what reason would the > biological mechanism have for even trying to explain subjective > experiences (its own subjective experiences couldn't have influenced > its behaviour), and what reason would it have to consider whether > other things such as robots might also have, when there could be no > other reason than the subjective experiences were influencing its > behaviour (which if this were the reason, would show it couldn't be a > biological mechanism strictly following the known laws of physics). > > It shouldn't be hard to understand, unless you have a problem facing > reason, and are therefore strangely unable to follow it, when you > don't like what it shows, because it shows that you were wrong. > > So do you understand it? Yes. Why do you think its true? Mark. Quote
Guest Richo Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 someone2 wrote: > On 13 Jun, 03:09, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > someone2 wrote: > > > On 12 Jun, 00:41, Matt Silberstein > > > > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 15:05:09 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> > > <snip> > > > > > > >I'm not even bringing into the converstation at the moment what > > > > >reality actually is, I am just pointing out the implausibility of the > > > > >story that we are simply a biological mechanism strictly following the > > > > >laws of physics. > > > > > > You haven't started to do that. > > > > > > >As for your point about that P might not be a property of M, well yes, > > > > >you could rewrite it as F (a factor), such as wind in the behaviour of > > > > >a flying kite for example (where (1) would not be true) as opposed to > > > > >whether I was in fact the person that ate all the pies in Mrs Miggins > > > > >pie shop (where (1) would be true, and so would (2) ). > > > > >It still doesn't seem to have sunk in yet, that it is not that our > > > > >experience is a deception, we do influence the behaviour of the human > > > > >we experience being. It is that it is implausible that we can be > > > > >explained as being simply a biological mechanism following the laws of > > > > >physics. > > > > > > So you keep asserting, but you have yet to provide an actual argument. > > > > You give a supposition and you give a conclusion, but no logical steps > > > > from accepted givens to results. > > > > > I have provided reason: > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > What reason have you to suppose that (1) IS TRUE? > > Also: > > What exactly do you mean by "explained" in sentence 1? > > This is VERY important. > > > > Do you mean completely accurately specified to any arbitrary level of > > detail? > > The reason I ask is (as I have explained before - although you didn't > > seem to understand its importance) - some systems are inherently > > complex and chaotic so as to be "computationally infeasible" to > > predict future behavior. For example : the weather . We have physical > > models of the behaviour of the earths atmosphere - all in terms of > > known laws of physics. The modelling of the earth's atmosphere in the > > worlds most powerful super computers using the best data sets > > available can give reasonable "forecasts" of what the weather will be > > in two or three days time and make general predictions about climate. > > These forecasts are always incomplete/imperfect - probabilistic. > > IN PRINCIPLE you could model the worlds weather in very great detail, > > you could have temperature pressure velocity and moisture content > > readings for every cubic meter of earths atmosphere to a height off 30 > > kilometers But it may require a computer larger than the earth itself > > running for many thousands of years to tell you what the weather will > > be in 2 days time. > > > > So we could say that "the earths weather acts in ways not explainable > > by the known laws of physics" > > - if we specify "explained" to mean we can tell the temperature in a > > particular location in California in 2035 to within a tenth of a > > degree and the wind velocity to within 1% from a few measurements > > taken today. > > So we could conclude "Physical law cannot explain the weather in > > California". > > Do you see? > > > > The complexity of the system needed to "explain" another complex > > system grows very rapidly depending on the level of detail and > > accuracy you require the modeling system to reach. > > > > Our inability to model/predict/explain a system does not mean that > > there are new laws of physics to be discovered. > > It may simply be a practical limitation - finite amount of time/ > > energy/ memory for example. > > IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE WEATHER IS CAUSED BY SUPERNATURAL FORCES. > > Do you understand this point? > > > > So it may be (1) is "true" in some sense - related to the finiteness > > of the human brain for example and NOT because of some more > > fundamental logical or ontological necessity. > > > > Or (of course) it may be that (1) is simply not true. > > > > We currently just don't know. > > > > Declaring it to be impossible to understand when we (the human > > species) have barely begun trying to understand these things is > > foolish. > > > > Where you say: > ------------ > What reason have you to suppose that (1) IS TRUE? > Also: > What exactly do you mean by "explained" in sentence 1? > This is VERY important. > ------------ > > Whether (1) is true or not, depends what is being said. We know what is being said. Is it true? Mark. Quote
Guest Richo Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 On Jun 13, 12:22 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 13 Jun, 03:09, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > someone2 wrote: > > > On 12 Jun, 00:41, Matt Silberstein > > > > On Mon, 11 Jun 2007 15:05:09 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> > > <snip> > > > > > >I'm not even bringing into the converstation at the moment what > > > > >reality actually is, I am just pointing out the implausibility of the > > > > >story that we are simply a biological mechanism strictly following the > > > > >laws of physics. > > > > > You haven't started to do that. > > > > > >As for your point about that P might not be a property of M, well yes, > > > > >you could rewrite it as F (a factor), such as wind in the behaviour of > > > > >a flying kite for example (where (1) would not be true) as opposed to > > > > >whether I was in fact the person that ate all the pies in Mrs Miggins > > > > >pie shop (where (1) would be true, and so would (2) ). > > > > >It still doesn't seem to have sunk in yet, that it is not that our > > > > >experience is a deception, we do influence the behaviour of the human > > > > >we experience being. It is that it is implausible that we can be > > > > >explained as being simply a biological mechanism following the laws of > > > > >physics. > > > > > So you keep asserting, but you have yet to provide an actual argument. > > > > You give a supposition and you give a conclusion, but no logical steps > > > > from accepted givens to results. > > > > I have provided reason: > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > What reason have you to suppose that (1) IS TRUE? > > Also: > > What exactly do you mean by "explained" in sentence 1? > > This is VERY important. > > > Do you mean completely accurately specified to any arbitrary level of > > detail? > > The reason I ask is (as I have explained before - although you didn't > > seem to understand its importance) - some systems are inherently > > complex and chaotic so as to be "computationally infeasible" to > > predict future behavior. For example : the weather . We have physical > > models of the behaviour of the earths atmosphere - all in terms of > > known laws of physics. The modelling of the earth's atmosphere in the > > worlds most powerful super computers using the best data sets > > available can give reasonable "forecasts" of what the weather will be > > in two or three days time and make general predictions about climate. > > These forecasts are always incomplete/imperfect - probabilistic. > > IN PRINCIPLE you could model the worlds weather in very great detail, > > you could have temperature pressure velocity and moisture content > > readings for every cubic meter of earths atmosphere to a height off 30 > > kilometers But it may require a computer larger than the earth itself > > running for many thousands of years to tell you what the weather will > > be in 2 days time. > > > So we could say that "the earths weather acts in ways not explainable > > by the known laws of physics" > > - if we specify "explained" to mean we can tell the temperature in a > > particular location in California in 2035 to within a tenth of a > > degree and the wind velocity to within 1% from a few measurements > > taken today. > > So we could conclude "Physical law cannot explain the weather in > > California". > > Do you see? > > > The complexity of the system needed to "explain" another complex > > system grows very rapidly depending on the level of detail and > > accuracy you require the modeling system to reach. > > > Our inability to model/predict/explain a system does not mean that > > there are new laws of physics to be discovered. > > It may simply be a practical limitation - finite amount of time/ > > energy/ memory for example. > > IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE WEATHER IS CAUSED BY SUPERNATURAL FORCES. > > Do you understand this point? > > > So it may be (1) is "true" in some sense - related to the finiteness > > of the human brain for example and NOT because of some more > > fundamental logical or ontological necessity. > > > Or (of course) it may be that (1) is simply not true. > > > We currently just don't know. > > > Declaring it to be impossible to understand when we (the human > > species) have barely begun trying to understand these things is > > foolish. > > Where you say: > ------------ > What reason have you to suppose that (1) IS TRUE? > Also: > What exactly do you mean by "explained" in sentence 1? > This is VERY important. > ------------ > > Whether (1) is true or not, depends what is being said. You don't even know what you are saying????? It would be very helpful if in future you could simply remember what it is you are saying without having to ask me what you are saying. > Though surely > you understand that the behaviour of a mobile phone can be explained > in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics. > Yes. Although the number of people who could actually explain the behaviour of a Mobile phone would be very small and ellite group. Even Inside Nokia - the Engineers who designed the radio frequency front end wouldn't know the details of the operating system/user interface. The programmers who designed the operating system/user interface wouldn't know the details of the construction of the power management system - they would know that send this signal to go to sleep mode - and let the engineers decide how to implement that... So again "explain" could be anything from a detailed knowledge of how its engineered to "its done with electricity". I can see why you are keen to keep the meaning of that word vague. Still not everyone assumes that something they don't understand works by magic. Thank no god. Mark. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 On Jun 13, 1:10 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: >> M refers to the physical entity in question. >> B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. >> P refers to the a property in question. >> >> and where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and >> (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). >> >> 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring >> knowledge of whether it has P or not. >> >> 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the >> explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. >> >> If (1) is true, then (2) is true. For a given M and P, if this is true for all behaviours B, then what does it say about property P? Does it mean M does not have property P? Does property P have no relevance or influence wrt M? Does it mean we can ignore property P when considering M and treat it as if it didn't exist? How about you actually address some of the points and questions I have raised? Quote
Guest Denis Loubet Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181699581.955172.37760@x35g2000prf.googlegroups.com... > On 13 Jun, 00:32, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1181688451.564321.144300@z28g2000prd.googlegroups.com... >> >> > On 12 Jun, 23:14, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >>news:1181683182.108501.293290@z28g2000prd.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> > On 12 Jun, 16:59, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >>news:1181643629.665515.215790@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> > On 12 Jun, 02:00, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >>news:1181607322.623131.144640@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> > On 12 Jun, 00:56, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181603668.494011.312460@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... >> > > (snipped older material) > >> >> >> >> >> >> > Yes it can be applied to any physical entity. The point is >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> > only >> >> >> >> >> > when (1) is true, (2) is true. Obviously where (1) is false >> >> >> >> >> > as >> >> >> >> >> > in >> >> >> >> >> > your >> >> >> >> >> > example then (2) would also be false. The point was never >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> > (1) >> >> >> >> >> > is >> >> >> >> >> > always true. Can you understand it now? You can ask for >> >> >> >> >> > clarification >> >> >> >> >> > on it if you like, after all it would be silly of you to be >> >> >> >> >> > stating >> >> >> >> >> > that it wasn't true, if it was just a case of you not >> >> >> >> >> > understanding >> >> >> >> >> > it. >> >> >> >> >> >> I see now, you relegated the IF THEN statement to a tiny >> >> >> >> >> sentence >> >> >> >> >> at >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> end, without a number, that didn't appear to be part of the >> >> >> >> >> formula. >> >> >> >> >> Understood now. >> >> >> >> >> >> Excellent. Just like the leg example, since the behavior of a >> >> >> >> >> person >> >> >> >> >> walking >> >> >> >> >> around cannot be explained by the laws of physics without >> >> >> >> >> knowledge >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> whether he's conscious or not, (2) is not true. >> >> >> >> >> >> I mean, to explain the behavior of a person walking around, I >> >> >> >> >> have >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> know >> >> >> >> >> if the person is conscious or unconscious. I know how >> >> >> >> >> conscious >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> unconscious people behave, and it's not similar at all. >> >> >> >> >> >> Cool! We're done! >> >> >> >> >> > Not quite. The point in contention is that we are not simply a >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism following the laws of physics, because if >> >> >> >> > we >> >> >> >> > were >> >> >> >> > then it wouldn't be influential. >> >> >> >> >> You have a strange definition of influential. Are you saying >> >> >> >> there >> >> >> >> would >> >> >> >> be >> >> >> >> no such thing as influence if the universe were clockwork? >> >> >> >> >> Tell me how legs are not influential to walking around. >> >> >> >> >> Then tell me why consciousness is not influential to walking >> >> >> >> around. >> >> >> >> >> You require them both to walk around. >> >> >> >> >> > So if you were contesting this, then with knowledge of how the >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism operated, its behaviour could be >> >> >> >> > explained >> >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> >> > in terms of the biological mechanism following the laws of >> >> >> >> > physics. >> >> >> >> >> Like how a man with no legs can't walk around. >> >> >> >> >> Like how a man who's unconscious can't walk around. >> >> >> >> >> > Which would require no knowledge of whether it were >> >> >> >> > subjectively >> >> >> >> > experiencing or not, any more than it would be required to >> >> >> >> > explain >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> > way a robot were behaving. >> >> >> >> >> I've changed my mind. You need to know if the person is >> >> >> >> conscious >> >> >> >> or >> >> >> >> not >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> explain his behavior. >> >> >> >> >> See, I'm not as dogmatic as you think I am. It you that is as >> >> >> >> dogmatic >> >> >> >> as >> >> >> >> you think I am. >> >> >> >> >> > So (1) would be true, >> >> >> >> >> No. It fails (1) for the same reason the leg example failed. You >> >> >> >> need >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> know if the person is conscious or unconscious. >> >> >> >> >> > and so would (2). >> >> >> >> >> Nope. (1) fails so (2) is not true! Your formula is actually >> >> >> >> working >> >> >> >> pretty >> >> >> >> well now. >> >> >> >> >> > It >> >> >> >> > is an implausible story though, but for it not to be true, >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> > require the assumption that we were simply a biological >> >> >> >> > mechanism >> >> >> >> > strictly following the laws of physics. >> >> >> >> >> That's what your formula seems to be supporting. >> >> >> >> >> > Just to remind you, you acknowledged that subjective >> >> >> >> > experiences >> >> >> >> > are >> >> >> >> > a >> >> >> >> > property in their own right, >> >> >> >> >> Just like legs. >> >> >> >> >> > and that the property may be present in a >> >> >> >> > robot or not, >> >> >> >> >> Just like legs. >> >> >> >> >> > in that you can have knowledge of the other properties >> >> >> >> > such as the mechanism, but not of whether the property of >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> > experiences had emerged, was acknowledge by you in response to >> >> >> >> > where >> >> >> >> > I >> >> >> >> > said: >> >> >> >> >> How does that work with the legs/no legs scenario? >> >> >> >> >> > Can you see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, one >> >> >> >> > thing >> >> >> >> > you know, the mechanism, but whether it has subjective >> >> >> >> > experiences >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> > not isn't known to you, so there is a natural seperation in >> >> >> >> > your knowledge, you can deny it if you like, but its a fact. >> >> >> >> >> If I can't see the guy, I can't see if he has any legs. Check. >> >> >> >> >> > To which you replied: >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> > I fucking understand that you twit. >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> >> > Don't you reflect yourself on the straws you grasp at, or is >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> > you are just desperate to avoid facing you were wrong? >> >> >> >> >> M = A man >> >> >> >> B(M) = Walking around >> >> >> >> P = Consciousness >> >> >> >> >> (1) fails utterly. (For the same reason as the legs example.) >> >> >> >> (2) Isn't true. (Presence of consciousness affects B(M)) >> >> >> >> >> I agree. >> >> >> >> > When you say: >> >> >> > ------ >> >> >> > I've changed my mind. You need to know if the person is conscious >> >> >> > or >> >> >> > not to >> >> >> > explain his behavior. >> >> >> > ------ >> >> >> >> > Do you mean whether the person has subjective experiences or not? >> >> >> >> Oh, so NOW you feel you have to draw some distinction between the >> >> >> two >> >> >> terms >> >> >> that up until now you've been using interchangably. Gee, I wonder >> >> >> why? >> >> >> >> I meant exactly what I wrote. Consciousness. Will you agree there's >> >> >> a >> >> >> difference between the behavior of a conscious person and the >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> of >> >> >> an >> >> >> unconscious person? >> >> >> > Well I was just checking as you seem to be using it in the sense >> >> > that >> >> > refers to a behaviour such as in the context of "I walked in, and >> >> > there he was in the middle of the room unconscious". Obviously it >> >> > wouldn't make sense to use it in this context as you have stated >> >> > that >> >> > the behaviour was that he was walking around. >> >> >> Why didn't you bring up this objection with the legs example? The >> >> context >> >> is >> >> precisely the same. Without legs he can't be walking around either. >> >> >> This is, in fact, precisely the context in which I'm using >> >> Consciousness. >> >> >> > In the context of it being meant as whether the man had any >> >> > conscious >> >> > experiences or not, >> >> >> Do you think conscious experiences are unnecessary for consciousness? >> >> I >> >> think they're required, pretty much by definition. >> >> >> > I refer you two what I said earlier regarding the >> >> > point that the reasoning shows we are not simply a biological >> >> > mechanism following the laws of physics, because if we were then it >> >> > wouldn't be influential: >> >> >> > --------- >> >> > So if you were contesting this, then with knowledge of how the >> >> > biological mechanism operated, its behaviour could be explained >> >> > simply >> >> > in terms of the biological mechanism following the laws of physics. >> >> > --------- >> >> >> > In other words like a robot without knowledge of whether it had >> >> > subjective experiences or not. >> >> >> > Your reply was: >> >> > --------- >> >> > Like how a man with no legs can't walk around. >> >> >> > Like how a man who's unconscious can't walk around. >> >> > --------- >> >> >> > Which you can see while it was a reply, it wasn't one that addressed >> >> > the point I had made. >> >> >> It's too bad you couldn't make the conceptual leap. The comparisons >> >> are >> >> pretty clear. >> >> >> "Can I explain how a person walks around without knowledge of whether >> >> he >> >> has >> >> legs or not?" conceptually maps to, "Can I explain how a person walks >> >> around >> >> without knowledge of whether he's conscious or not." perfectly. >> >> >> Your formula handles it perfectly, (1) fails utterly making (2) not >> >> true. >> >> >> Just like it did with the leg example. >> >> >> For some reason, you're offering objections to the consciousness >> >> example >> >> that you're not offereing to the leg example. I'd like to know why. >> >> >> > Can you comprehend that if we were simply a >> >> > biological mechanism following the laws of physics, then any >> >> > behaviour >> >> > could be explained without knowledge of whether it was subjectively >> >> > experiencing/was conscious or not, perhaps by an alien robot for >> >> > example, just as the behaviour of the alien robot could be explained >> >> > by us without knowledge of whether it was subjectively experiencing/ >> >> > was conscious or not. >> >> >> WTF? ALIEN ROBOT??? What depths of your colon did you pull THAT >> >> out >> >> of? >> >> >> We are biological mechanisms following the laws of physics. >> >> Consciousness >> >> is >> >> an operational part of that mechanism. Thus, if you explain the >> >> behavior, >> >> you are including the operation of consciousness -- if it's present -- >> >> in >> >> your explanation, whether you like it or not. >> >> >> Just like if you explain how a guy's walking around, you are including >> >> the >> >> fact that he must have legs in your explanation, whether you like it >> >> or >> >> not, >> >> whether you mention it or not. >> >> > The alien robot was just a device to help you see the point. >> > Unfortunately the point went 'over your head' as the expression goes. >> >> No, I get the purpose. I just find it amusing that you can't help but >> pull >> more idiotic shit straight out of your ass. >> >> > You chose to mock the idea of the alien robot, rather than face the >> > issue. I wonder whether you would have had such problems if the >> > reasoning had been in favour of atheism? >> >> I faced it fine. I even explained why, "if you explain the behavior, you >> are >> including the operation of consciousness -- if it's present -- in your >> explanation, whether you like it or not." >> >> But that apparently went "over your head" as the expression goes. >> >> You chose to deliberately ignore that idea, rather than face the issue. I >> wonder whether you would have had such problems if the >> reasoning had been in favour of your childish god concept. >> >> > You couldn't explain the guy walking around without knowledge of the >> > property of whether he had legs or not. >> >> And you can't explain the guy walking around without knowledge of his >> state >> of consciousness. >> >> > You could explain the behaviour, of any robot without knowledge of >> > whether it had subjective experiences or not. As in response to: >> >> And the point you continue to run screaming from is that if it had >> subjective experiences, then that would be part of the explanation >> whether >> you knew it or not. >> >> If I know nothing about gravity, I can still describe the behavior of a >> dropped ball in terms of the laws of physics I am left with. I can say >> it's >> moving at 32 feet per second per second towards the center of the earth >> without knowledge of gravity. I've described its behavior without >> knowledge >> of gravity, yet in doing so, I also necessarily described the >> behavior-modifying ability of gravity. >> >> In the same way, I can describe the behavior of the robot by the laws of >> physics, and it will include the behavior modifying ability of >> consciousness >> in exactly the same way. >> > > You would be explaining it with no knowledge of the property of > subjective experiences. Snip Answer this question: (A) Is the behavior of a conscious human the same as the behavior of an unconscious human? Yes or no. (I am using the common, everyday definition of conscious.) Then answer this: (B) Is subjective experience necessary for consciousness. If you answer yes to A, then this discussion is at an end. If you answer no to A, and yes to B, then obviously consciousness and subjective experience affect behavior, and may actually be the same thing. If you answer no to B, then please explain how that would work. -- Denis Loubet dloubet@io.com http://www.io.com/~dloubet http://www.ashenempires.com Quote
Guest Denis Loubet Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181690938.206797.134380@x35g2000prf.googlegroups.com... > On 12 Jun, 23:17, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1181415885.741369.130790@q66g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> >> > On 9 Jun, 08:06, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >>news:1181352490.810453.248960@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> > On 8 Jun, 17:24, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >>news:1181307535.236792.214630@q69g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> > On 8 Jun, 04:59, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >>news:1181267542.569449.176200@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> > On 7 Jun, 20:48, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181237528.194193.258590@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 7 Jun, 17:06, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181228437.648038.234610@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 7 Jun, 07:55, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181195570.815424.258260@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 7 Jun, 06:19, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181176912.356609.204180@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 7 Jun, 01:11, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181170991.844972.128670@i13g2000prf.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 6 Jun, 18:52, "Denis Loubet" >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1181119352.279318.274890@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 6 Jun, 09:10, "Denis Loubet" >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > [snipped older correspondance] >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > It seems you can't read. There were >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > initially >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > two >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > universes, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > robot in each, and it remained so. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Now you're just lying. Anyone can see that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> first >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brought >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> up >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> universe >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> argument on the 4th at 11:25 AM. Robots >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> weren't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mentioned >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> until >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> 3 >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> exchanges >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> later with your 5:47 AM post on the 5th. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> And >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> didn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mention >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> second >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> robot until 2 exchanges later on the 5th at >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> 7:05 >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> PM. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Go on, read your posts. I'll wait. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Can I expect an apology, or at least an >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> admission >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> made >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mistake? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > It also seems you are unable to follow >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > points >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > being >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > made, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > avoided the questions. For example where >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > said: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > To which I pointed out (though tidied up >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > bit >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > here >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > clarity), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I made a robot that acted as though it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > has >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you thought it did, but actually after >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > had >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > made >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > your >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > decision, I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explained to you that it behaved the way >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > because >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physical mechanism following the known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > then >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > on >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > what >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > basis would you continue to think that it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > was >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > acting >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > way >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > because it had subjective experiences? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > To which you replied: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I would have to be assured that the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > operation >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > robot, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following known laws of physics, didn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > actually >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > constitute >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > consciousness. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Yes? And? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Avoiding totally stating on what basis >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > continue >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > think >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that it was acting the way it did because >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > had >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Why do you have a question mark at the end >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> declarative >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> sentence? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I would continue to think it was acting in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> response >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences because apparently that's what >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> looks >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> like >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> doing. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> And >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> your word alone isn't enough to dissuade >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> me. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> You >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> show >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> me >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it's acting in what I would consider a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> non-conscious >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> manner. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > You also were seemingly unable to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > comprehend >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > even >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > were >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > regard it as having subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > still >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaving >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > as it would be expected to without the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > was. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Only if the non-conscious version was >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> designed >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mimic >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> version. Note that the conscious version >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wouldn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> need >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> bit >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> programming. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Regarding the post on the 4th (and I don't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > know >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > why >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > cut and pasted these instead of me having to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > do >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > stated: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Hey, they're YOUR posts. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ---------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > object >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would be forbidden to even contemplate it, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > was >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > an >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > alternative >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > universe, which followed the same known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > but >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > were no subjective experiences associated >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > act >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > same. The objection that if it followed the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, then it would automatically be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjectively >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experienced, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > as >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics don't reference subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > thus >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > conceptually possible to consider to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanisms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > both >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > same laws of physics as known to us, but >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > one >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > having >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences and one not, without the need >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > any >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of physics to be altered. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ---------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Here mechanisms are mentioned being in each >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > universe, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > but >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > correct, in that I didn't specifically >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mention >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > robots. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Thank you. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So, are you willing to admit that I CAN read? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Though for each >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism, it would be existing twice, once >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > each >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > universe >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (thus >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > "...both following the same laws of physics >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > as >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > us, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > but >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > one having subjective experiences and one >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > not"). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On the post on the 5th: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ---------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > You aren't adhering to logic, you are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > refusing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > look >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > at >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > reasonably. It isn't as though it couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > done, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > example >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > robot behaved as though it might have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > i.e. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > talked about them etc, you could surely >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > conceive >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > either >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (a) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did have, or (b) it didn't have. In one >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > universe >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > conceive >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it having subjective experiences, in the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > other >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > didn't. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > In >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > either though it would be acting just the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > same, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > as >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > both >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply just be a mechanism following the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > same would apply to humans if you were to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > consider >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > them >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > biological mechanisms following the known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > even >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > run from logic and reason, when it goes >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > against >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > your >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > unfounded >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > bias. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ---------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > There are two universe, and a robot is in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > each, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > obviously >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > robot isn't existing in both simultaneously. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> That's not obvious at all. The entire quote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> can >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> interpreted >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> as >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> referencing one robot being compared in two >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> different >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> universes. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Perhaps a command of the language is more >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> important >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> than >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> seem >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> think >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it is. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I'm not sure if this is what you are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > referring >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (as >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > time >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > stamps >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I see are different) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Yes, that's exactly the post I'm referencing. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ---------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Regarding the thought experiment, the robots >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > both >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the same known laws of physics. So perhaps >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explain >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > why >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > suggest they would act differently. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ---------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Again, there are two robots. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No, that's the FIRST time you unambiguously >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> refer >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> two >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> robots. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > If it was different bits you were referring >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > then >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > suggest >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you cut and paste them yourself, so there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > can >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > confusion. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No, you're using the correct quotes. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Anyway, back to the real issue, regarding >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > where >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > said: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Well, I suppose an admission of a slight >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mistake >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> as >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> opposed >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> an >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> apology >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> for unjustly slandering my reading ability is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> all >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> can >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> expect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> from >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> one >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> as >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> dishonest as you. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ---------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Avoiding totally stating on what basis would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > continue >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > think >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that it was acting the way it did because it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > had >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ---------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > You replied >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ---------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Why do you have a question mark at the end >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > declarative >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > sentence? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I would continue to think it was acting in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > response >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences because apparently that's what >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > looks >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > like >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > doing. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > And your word alone isn't enough to dissuade >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > me. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > You >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > show me that it's acting in what I would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > consider >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > non-conscious >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > manner. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ---------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So you would base your belief that it was >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > acting >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > response >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective experiences, even though it was >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaving >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > exactly >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > as >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would be expected to, without the added >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > was >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjectively experiencing? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No. In your scenario you've already got me >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> agreeing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> The >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> basis for that conclusion is that it's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behaving >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> way >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> take >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> congruent with subjective experience. It's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> responding >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> context >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> my >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> questions and such, for example. Then, in your >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> scenario, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> tell >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> me >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not conscious. The reason I do not immediately >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> agree >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> robot is, I presume, still acting like it's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Until >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> can >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> show >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> me >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that it's not conscious, I'll continue to act >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> under >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> assumption >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> my >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusion that it is conscious is correct and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> disbelieve >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> That's what I meant by: "I would continue to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> think >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> was >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> acting >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> response >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to subjective experiences because apparently >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> what >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> looks >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> like >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> doing." I can't imagine how you misinterpreted >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > If so, what influence would you consider the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be having, given that it is behaving as it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > expected >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > without the assumption that it had any >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Given that your interpretation of my response >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> was >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> incorrect, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> this >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> question >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is meaningless. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If you had two robots, one with a brain >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> capable >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and one with a sophisticated tape-recorder >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> played >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> back >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> responses >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> designed to fool me into thinking it's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> they >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> supposedly >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behave the same, and I would mistakenly grant >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> both >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> were >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Both >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would be acting according to physical law to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> get >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> effect, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> but >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> workings would be very different. For the tape >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> recorder >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> robot >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> succeed, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> has to have the right phrases recorded to fool >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> me, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> just >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> like >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> robot has to have subjective experiences or I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> won't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> think >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I've snipped the older correspondence, though >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > sure >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I've >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > made >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > such >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > a good job of it, it would be easier if we >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > responded >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > at >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > end >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > what each other post, but I guess you'd object, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > so >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > are a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > few >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > imbedded pieces of text still remaining from >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > older >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > stuff. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> That's fine. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Assuming you aren't trying to be disingenious, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > seem >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > got >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > lost on the scenario. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No. Did I say that was your scenario? No? Then >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> there's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> reason >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> think >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I've presented my own scenario since yours >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> doesn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> seem >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> going >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> anywhere. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> This one-sided interrogation gets a little >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> tiresome, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> so >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> thought >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I'd >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> try >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> provide my own illustrative scenario. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Figures you would ignore it. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > No where are you told it isn't conscious. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Whether it is or isn't is unknown. You know >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > follows >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known laws of physics, and you know that it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaved >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > as >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > something >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > might have thought as conscious, if for example >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > had >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > been >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > communicating with it over the internet. Yes I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > just >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > added >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > clarification, but you appeared to be confused >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > claiming >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > incorrectly >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that you were told it wasn't conscious. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> That's fine. It wasn't your scenario. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > As it follows the known laws of physics, its >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > can >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explained without the added assumption that it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > has >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > any >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> The subjective experience is part of the physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> It's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ALL >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical. What is your damn problem? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > as any mechanism following the laws of physics >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > require >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > such claims to explain behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Except the mechanisms that do. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (restating to help you follow, this >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > doesn't mean that it couldn't have subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Irrelevant. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So if you were to regard the robotic mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws of physics to be having subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > what >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > influence >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would you consider the subjective experiences >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > having, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > given >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it is behaving as it would be expected to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it had any subjective experiences? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> The fucking subjective experiences are part of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> fucking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> activity >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that's following the fucking laws of physics. It >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> doesn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> fucking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> get >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> any >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> fucking simpler than that. Subjective experiences >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ARE >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> matter >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> fucking laws of physics. You can't fucking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> separate >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> from >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> other >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> fucking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical activity, no matter how much you fucking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> want >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Why can't you fucking understand that? How many >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> times >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> do I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> fucking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> respond the same fucking question with the same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> fucking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> answer >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> before >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> fucking get it? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (Is the question clear enough for you, or is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > any >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > clarification >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you require about what is being asked?) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I think I understand you perfectly, but you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> refuse >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> listen >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> my >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> replies. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Here's another vain analogy to try to get through >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> You >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> two >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> identical computers that run a program. But one >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> program >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> has a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subroutine >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> called Subjective Experience that drastically >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> affects >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> output, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> other doesn't. Both act according to the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> expect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> them to behave the same given that one program >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> has a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subroutine >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> other doesn't? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I wouldn't. Why do you? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I had stated trying to help you as you seemed lost >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > by >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > stating >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > (emphasis for clarity): >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > NO WHERE ARE YOU TOLD IT ISN'T CONSCIOUS. WHETHER >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > IT >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > IS >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > OR >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ISN'T >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > IS >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > UNKNOWN. You know that it follows the known laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > know that it behaved as something you might have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > thought >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > as >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > conscious, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if for example you had been communicating with it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > over >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > internet. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Yes I have just added that clarification, but you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > appeared >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > confused claiming incorrectly >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that you were told it wasn't conscious. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > To which you replied >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > That's fine. It wasn't your scenario. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Yes...?And...? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > You did falsely claim though that in my scenario >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > were >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > told >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wasn't conscious, the text is still above, you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > state: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Then, in your scenario, you tell me it's not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > conscious. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Even if you made a simple mistake and thought I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > was >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > referencing a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > scenario put forward by you, the claim you made >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > was >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > still >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > blantantly >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > false. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Did you, or did you not, say: "To which I pointed >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> out >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> (though >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> tidied >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> up a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> bit here for clarity), that I made a robot that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> acted >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> as >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> though >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> has >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective experiences, and you thought it did, but >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> actually >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> after >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> had >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> made your decision, I explained to you that it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behaved >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> way >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> did >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply because of the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical mechanism following the known laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> then >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> on >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> what >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> basis would you continue to think that it was acting >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> way >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> did >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> because >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it had subjective experiences?" >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Blatantly false my ass. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Also with regards to the question: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ----------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So if you were to regard the robotic mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws of physics to be having subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > what >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > influence >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would you consider the subjective experiences to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > having, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > given >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it is behaving as it would be expected to without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it had any subjective experiences? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ----------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > You replied: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ----------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The fucking subjective experiences are part of the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > fucking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > activity that's following the fucking laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > It >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > doesn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > fucking get any fucking simpler than that. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ARE >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > matter following the fucking laws of physics. You >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > can't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > fucking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > separate it from other fucking physical activity, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > matter >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > how >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > much >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you fucking want to. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Why can't you fucking understand that? How many >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > times >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > do >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > fucking respond the same fucking question with the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > same >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > fucking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > answer >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > before you fucking get it? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------------ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Well you know the mechanism of the robot follows >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Everything follows the fucking laws of physics! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > and you know it how it behaves, how did you gain >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > your >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > self-proclaimed >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > infalibility of whether it had subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > not? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm not fucking saying it's conscious, I'm saying if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> was, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> its >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness is matter obeying physical law. The >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> status >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> fucking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> robot in the scenario is irrelevant to my reply. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Can you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > see that there is a seperation in your knowledge, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > one >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > thing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > know, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the mechanism, but whether it has subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > isn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known to you, so there is a natural seperation in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > your >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > can deny it if you like, but its a fact. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I fucking understand that you twit. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Given that, perhaps you'd >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > care to try again, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > and face answering (and the resultant crumbling of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > your world perspective through reason that you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > know >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > will >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > come >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > do, which I suspect is why you are throwing your >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > dummy >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > out >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > your >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > pram): >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm throwing the dummy out of the pram as a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> deliberate >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiment >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> see >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you respond differently. Any variation would be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> welcome. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Sadly it didn't work. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > If you were to regard the robotic mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of physics to be having subjective experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > what >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > influence >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you consider the subjective experiences to be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > having, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > given >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaving as it would be expected to without the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > had >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > any subjective experiences? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Since any subjective experience would be physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> matter >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of physics, your question is meaningless. If it had >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> then those experiences would be the mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics. Since gravity can affect it's behavior, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> then >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> as just another example of physical matter following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> could affect its behavior too. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I note you did not respond to my computer example. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> afraid >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> resultant crumbling of your world perspective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> through >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> reason >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> know >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> will come if you do? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Good grief. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > With regards to where I referenced your blantantly >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > false >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > accusation >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that I claimed the mechanism wasn't conscious: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > --------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Then, in your scenario, you tell me it's not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > conscious. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > --------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > You highlighted a piece where I had said: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > --------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ..., I explained to you that it behaved the way it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > because >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of the physical mechanism following the known laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > --------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Are you suggesting that because the behaviour was >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explained >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > terms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of the physical mechanism following the known laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > this suggested to you that it couldn't be conscious? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > How >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > so, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > considering you think "Everything follows the fucking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics", and can therefore be explained in terms of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism following the laws of physics, which >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > presumably >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > includes >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > things that are conscious. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Ah. I misread your quote and I apologise. I somehow >> >> >> >> >> >> >> inserted >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> idea >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the explanation in the scenario asserted that the robot >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wasn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> those exact words. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> See? I can admit mistakes, and apologise. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> You, on the other hand... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > In response to the question: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > --------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > If you were to regard the robotic mechanism following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of physics to be having subjective experiences, what >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > influence >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you consider the subjective experiences to be having, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > given >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaving as it would be expected to without the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > had >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > any subjective experiences? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > --------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > You replied: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > --------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Since any subjective experience would be physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > matter >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws of physics, your question is meaningless. If it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > had >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences, then those experiences would be the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the known laws of physics. Since gravity can affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behavior, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > then subjective experience, as just another example >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > matter >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following the laws of physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could affect its behavior too. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ---------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The question isn't meaningless, though I'll put it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > another >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > way >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you, as a series of statements, and you can state >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > whether >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > agree >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with the statements, and where if you disagree, the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > statements >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > false. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> At least this is different! >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > A) The mechanism might or might not be subjectively >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experienced, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > don't know (you agreed this above). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> You meant to say the mechanism might or might not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjectively >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience >> >> >> >> >> >> >> things, not be subjectively experienced. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Agreed. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > B) The mechanisms behaviour is explainable in terms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following the laws of physics, without requiring >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > knowledge >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > whether >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it is subjectively experienced. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Agreed. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > C) Whether the mechanism were being subjectively >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experienced >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > not, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > doesn't influence the behaviour, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Yes it does. Of course it does. Subjective experience >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> process >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that affects behavior. A mechanism that has it should >> >> >> >> >> >> >> act >> >> >> >> >> >> >> differently >> >> >> >> >> >> >> from >> >> >> >> >> >> >> one that doesn't. Just like a mechanism that has wheels >> >> >> >> >> >> >> will >> >> >> >> >> >> >> move >> >> >> >> >> >> >> differently from one with legs. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > else the explanation for the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour couldn't be the same in either case. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> It isn't the same in either case. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If the mechanism subjectively experiences things, it's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> built >> >> >> >> >> >> >> one >> >> >> >> >> >> >> way, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> doesn't subjectively experience things, it's built >> >> >> >> >> >> >> another >> >> >> >> >> >> >> way. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Explaining >> >> >> >> >> >> >> how mechanisms that are different might behave >> >> >> >> >> >> >> differently >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> no >> >> >> >> >> >> >> way >> >> >> >> >> >> >> contradicts the fact that both are operating according >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> law. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So in © how can you claim that is could be behaving >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> > way >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> > is >> >> >> >> >> >> > because it is subjectively experiencing, when it might >> >> >> >> >> >> > not >> >> >> >> >> >> > be? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I didn't say it is. The phrase "Yes it does. Of course it >> >> >> >> >> >> does." >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> response to your assertion: "Whether the mechanism were >> >> >> >> >> >> being >> >> >> >> >> >> subjectively >> >> >> >> >> >> experienced or not, doesn't influence the behaviour" >> >> >> >> >> >> Meaning >> >> >> >> >> >> it >> >> >> >> >> >> DOES >> >> >> >> >> >> affect >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior whether the mechanism is experiencing things >> >> >> >> >> >> subjectively >> >> >> >> >> >> or >> >> >> >> >> >> not, >> >> >> >> >> >> not that it IS experiencing things subjectively. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> The context of a reply is important. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > To try to help you with the mistake you are making, an >> >> >> >> >> >> > analogy >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> > be that there is a ball, which may be black or white, >> >> >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> > question >> >> >> >> >> >> > was whether if it was black or white would influence the >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > A) The ball might be black or white, you don't know. >> >> >> >> >> >> > B) The way the ball bounces is explained by the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics >> >> >> >> >> >> > without requiring knowledge of whether it is black or >> >> >> >> >> >> > white. >> >> >> >> >> >> > C) Whether the ball were black or white doesn't affect >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour, >> >> >> >> >> >> > else >> >> >> >> >> >> > the behaviour couldn't be the same in either case. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If the ball is black, then it's made of ebony. If the ball >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> white >> >> >> >> >> >> then >> >> >> >> >> >> it's made of margarine. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Both follow the laws of physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Do you expect them to act the same? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Do you think it is correct to reason that a black ball >> >> >> >> >> >> > is >> >> >> >> >> >> > different >> >> >> >> >> >> > from a white ball, and that if it was white, it was >> >> >> >> >> >> > because >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> > was >> >> >> >> >> >> > white that it bounced the way it did? Do you see, you >> >> >> >> >> >> > can't >> >> >> >> >> >> > claim >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> > it bounced the way it did because it was white, when >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> > might >> >> >> >> >> >> > not >> >> >> >> >> >> > be. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I can claim that one is easier to see in a black room. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Now address this point, unless you're too afraid to: "If >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> subjectively experiences things, it's built one way, if it >> >> >> >> >> >> doesn't >> >> >> >> >> >> subjectively experience things, it's built another way. >> >> >> >> >> >> Explaining >> >> >> >> >> >> how >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms that are different might behave differently in >> >> >> >> >> >> no >> >> >> >> >> >> way >> >> >> >> >> >> contradicts >> >> >> >> >> >> the fact that both are operating according to physical >> >> >> >> >> >> law." >> >> >> >> >> >> > (I've posted a response similar to this, but it doesn't >> >> >> >> >> > seem >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> > come through, so I have retyped it out (which was >> >> >> >> >> > annoying), >> >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> > reposted. There might be slight differences, but >> >> >> >> >> > essentially >> >> >> >> >> > they >> >> >> >> >> > are >> >> >> >> >> > the same, you can answer either one) >> >> >> >> >> >> > I'll put the issue over another way taking your point into >> >> >> >> >> > account. >> >> >> >> >> >> > Hypothetically, supposing in the future space travels of >> >> >> >> >> > humanity >> >> >> >> >> > they >> >> >> >> >> > came across a planet with a similar atmosphere to ours, on >> >> >> >> >> > which >> >> >> >> >> > there >> >> >> >> >> > were found to be orbs. There were two types of orbs, though >> >> >> >> >> > both >> >> >> >> >> > had >> >> >> >> >> > an outer shell of a 10cm thickness. Though one type was of >> >> >> >> >> > a >> >> >> >> >> > substance >> >> >> >> >> > which reflected light (white orbs), and the other was of a >> >> >> >> >> > type >> >> >> >> >> > with >> >> >> >> >> > absorbed light (black orbs). Both the light reflective >> >> >> >> >> > (white) >> >> >> >> >> > substance and the light absorbing (black) substance were of >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> > same >> >> >> >> >> > density, and both types of orb were filled with helium. The >> >> >> >> >> > white >> >> >> >> >> > orbs >> >> >> >> >> > were 10m in diameter, while the black orbs where 1km in >> >> >> >> >> > diameter. >> >> >> >> >> > The >> >> >> >> >> > black orbs were found higher in the atmosphere, and this >> >> >> >> >> > was >> >> >> >> >> > explained >> >> >> >> >> > by the laws of physics, and the explanation had no >> >> >> >> >> > reference >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> > whether the orbs were black or white, but to do with the >> >> >> >> >> > average >> >> >> >> >> > density of the orb. >> >> >> >> >> >> Why? >> >> >> >> >> >> > There were two groups of people. One was the colour >> >> >> >> >> > influentialists, >> >> >> >> >> > who claimed that colour of the orbs influenced the >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour, >> >> >> >> >> > as >> >> >> >> >> > black >> >> >> >> >> > orbs behaved differently from white orbs, and that if they >> >> >> >> >> > were >> >> >> >> >> > white, >> >> >> >> >> > they had one type of outer shell, and that if they were >> >> >> >> >> > black, >> >> >> >> >> > they >> >> >> >> >> > had another type of outer shell. The other group were the >> >> >> >> >> > colour >> >> >> >> >> > non- >> >> >> >> >> > influentialists who pointed out that the explanation of >> >> >> >> >> > where >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> > orbs >> >> >> >> >> > were found in the atmosphere didn't mention whether the >> >> >> >> >> > orbs >> >> >> >> >> > were >> >> >> >> >> > black or white, and would remain the same in either case. >> >> >> >> >> >> > Now supposing another similar planet were to be spotted >> >> >> >> >> > where >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> > was >> >> >> >> >> > suspected that helium filled orbs with either light >> >> >> >> >> > reflective >> >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> > light absorbing shells may again be found. The colour non- >> >> >> >> >> > influentialists pointed out to the colour influentialists >> >> >> >> >> > regarding >> >> >> >> >> > the position of any such orb in the atmosphere: >> >> >> >> >> >> > A) The orb might be black or white, you don't know. >> >> >> >> >> >> Sigh. Very well. >> >> >> >> >> >> > B) The height it is found at in the atmosphere is explained >> >> >> >> >> > by >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> > laws of physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> Sigh. Just as one would expect. >> >> >> >> >> >> > C) Whether the orb is black or white doesn't affect the >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour >> >> >> >> >> > doesn't influence the behaviour, else the behaviour >> >> >> >> >> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> > same in either case. >> >> >> >> >> >> No. Clearly, since the albedo of the orbs are completely >> >> >> >> >> different, >> >> >> >> >> one >> >> >> >> >> reflecting light and the other absorbing it, there should >> >> >> >> >> exist >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> marked >> >> >> >> >> difference in temperature, and thus density of the gas >> >> >> >> >> inside, >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> thus >> >> >> >> >> bouancy. Add to this the immensely greater heat-gathering >> >> >> >> >> surface >> >> >> >> >> area >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> the black orbs and you should expect radically different >> >> >> >> >> behaviors. >> >> >> >> >> >> > Do you think that the reasoning of the colour >> >> >> >> >> > non-influentialists >> >> >> >> >> > was >> >> >> >> >> > logical, or do you think that the reasoning of the colour >> >> >> >> >> > influentialists was? >> >> >> >> >> >> The non-color influentalists are a bunch of idiots who know >> >> >> >> >> nothing >> >> >> >> >> about >> >> >> >> >> physics. >> >> >> >> >> > Well supposing it was explained to you that the orbs formed >> >> >> >> > under >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> > planet surface and seemed to have been released in plate >> >> >> >> > movements. >> >> >> >> > The density of the helium inside both was the same, the slight >> >> >> >> > heat >> >> >> >> > difference only resulted in a slight difference in internal >> >> >> >> > pressure, >> >> >> >> > not density, and thus not bouancy. >> >> >> >> >> No. You made your elaborate foot and placed it square in your >> >> >> >> dishonest >> >> >> >> mouth. And I'm going to laugh at your pathetic and transparent >> >> >> >> attempt >> >> >> >> at >> >> >> >> an >> >> >> >> ad-hoc rescue of your own scenario. A scenario that shows that >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> are >> >> >> >> obviously wrong, and clearly demonstrates that you have been >> >> >> >> wrong >> >> >> >> all >> >> >> >> along, and with this pitiable attempt at a fix, shows that you >> >> >> >> fully >> >> >> >> intend >> >> >> >> to remain wrong in the future. You are a testament to willful >> >> >> >> ignorance. >> >> >> >> >> Anyone with a scrap of intellectual integrity would at LEAST >> >> >> >> follow >> >> >> >> where >> >> >> >> their OWN examples lead. But not you. If you don't find YOUR OWN >> >> >> >> arguments >> >> >> >> convincing, why on earth do you think they'll convince anyone >> >> >> >> else? >> >> >> >> >> You have no concept of logic, and as your scenario shows, you >> >> >> >> are >> >> >> >> completely >> >> >> >> ignorant of the physical laws you pretend knowledge of. I can't >> >> >> >> even >> >> >> >> imagine >> >> >> >> what you thought your latest rationalization was supposed to >> >> >> >> accomplish. >> >> >> >> You're a complete and total idiot. >> >> >> >> >> I am going to treat your scenario as your admission that you are >> >> >> >> wrong, >> >> >> >> because that's what it is. You have successfully torpedoed your >> >> >> >> own >> >> >> >> argument. You tried to show one thing, but ended up showing >> >> >> >> something >> >> >> >> exactly the opposite. If you were honest, you would admit that, >> >> >> >> so >> >> >> >> I'm >> >> >> >> actually giving you the benefit of the doubt, even though your >> >> >> >> ad-hoc >> >> >> >> nonsense shows that you don't deserve it. >> >> >> >> >> Don't bother replaying unless you're admitting that your point >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> dead. >> >> >> >> > You'll notice that there was never a mention of the helium >> >> >> > density >> >> >> > being different within the orbs. >> >> >> > You just invented that to avoid the >> >> >> > issue. >> >> >> >> I see now that you don't deserve the benefit of the doubt. You >> >> >> remain, >> >> >> as >> >> >> always, a dishonest twat. >> >> >> >> Very well, in the spirit of compassion for the retarded, I shall >> >> >> respond. >> >> >> >> (I'm SUCH a softy.) >> >> >> >> The helium density in the orbs is a direct result of the >> >> >> temperature >> >> >> of >> >> >> the >> >> >> heluim which is a direct result of the absorption of heat from the >> >> >> sun >> >> >> by >> >> >> the orbs. The black orbs, according to the laws of physics that YOU >> >> >> INSIST >> >> >> THEY ADHERE TO, absorb more heat and thus will be hotter than the >> >> >> white >> >> >> orbs >> >> >> BECAUSE THEY ARE BLACK, and so their helium density will be >> >> >> different, >> >> >> as >> >> >> will their behavior. Think I'm making this shit up? Examine >> >> >> this:http://www.eurocosm.com/Application/Products/Toys-that-fly/solar-airs.... >> >> >> I >> >> >> would direct you at the wikipedia articles on boyancy and albedo >> >> >> and >> >> >> such, >> >> >> but they would only confuse you. I figure a toy is something you >> >> >> might >> >> >> have >> >> >> a chance to understand. >> >> >> >> Listening to you try to discuss scientific and philosophical issues >> >> >> is >> >> >> like >> >> >> watching a monkey wear clothes, it's amusing at first but quickly >> >> >> gets >> >> >> stale. >> >> >> > You really are disingenious. You snipped the post, and above it had >> >> > already been explained to you: >> >> >> I snipped text that addressed neither the problems with your scenario, >> >> nor >> >> your abject defeat. >> >> >> You said I should trim. >> >> >> > Well supposing it was explained to you that the orbs formed under >> >> > the >> >> > planet surface and seemed to have been released in plate movements. >> >> > The density of the helium inside both was the same, the slight heat >> >> > difference only resulted in a slight difference in internal >> >> > pressure, >> >> > not density, and thus not bouancy. >> >> >> That's all irrelevant since you already presented your scenario and it >> >> proved the opposite of what you wanted it to. Thus I win. Attempting >> >> to >> >> offer a feeble ad-hoc patch is just embarrassing. Especially one that >> >> doesn't even address any of the basic problems with your scenario. >> >> >> > That I even had to write that, just so that you could face the >> >> > scenario is enough to make me embarrassed for you. That you didn't >> >> > and >> >> > tried to avoid it, and are doing so again is pathetic. >> >> >> I faced your scenario, it was an elegant disproof of your point. Well >> >> done. >> >> Nothing more need be said. >> >> >> Except that you're an utter moron. >> >> > Well if the helium is at the same density within both, as explained >> > above, then on what basis do you support the colour influentialists? >> >> Because the laws of physics decree that the helium density will not the >> same. >> >> The color non-influentialists are a bunch of raving fucktards who know >> nothing about physics. >> > > As it was pointed out to you, if the helium density was the same when > they were formed under the planet surface, the temperature difference > once they were above and exposed to light, wouldn't cause as > difference in density (as this would have required helium to of > actually escaped), it would just have caused a difference in internal > pressure. It seems that you are just grasping at straws to avoid > reason. So you're saying that pressure has nothing to do with density? You sound just like a color non-influentialist. -- Denis Loubet dloubet@io.com http://www.io.com/~dloubet http://www.ashenempires.com Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181702734.261395.272890@a26g2000pre.googlegroups.com... For a given M and P, if this is true for all behaviours B, then what does it say about property P? Does it mean M does not have property P? Does property P have no relevance or influence wrt M? Does it mean we can ignore property P when considering M and treat it as if it didn't exist? Can you please make your entire argument in one single posts .. instead of spamming the newsgroup with multiple posts of the same non-arguments? How about you actually address some of the points and questions I have raised? Quote
Guest DuhIdiot Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 On Jun 13, 1:51 am, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: <massive, merciful snip> > So you're saying that pressure has nothing to do with density? It agonizes me to encourage this guy, Denis, but he's right on this one. If the orbs are rigid and do not expand with the increase in pressure, and if no helium enters or escapes them, then density is just mass/volume, regardless of pressure. Perhaps you're assuming the orbs are elastic and Glenn is assuming they're rigid. Off to the showers with me. Anybody got any lye soap? > > You sound just like a color non-influentialist. > > -- > Denis Loubet > dlou...@io.comhttp://www.io.com/~dloubethttp://www.ashenempires.com Quote
Guest Fred Stone Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in news:1181702734.261395.272890@a26g2000pre.googlegroups.com: > On 13 Jun, 02:44, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> innews:1181698366.089545.9210@q19g2000prn.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 12 Jun, 23:15, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> innews:1181685844.308030.63760@z28g2000prd.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> > You have still failed to give one example which didn't have >> >> > deceptions in it Fred, in that the reasoning wasn't >> >> > appropriately used, therefore didn't show the reasoning to be >> >> > incorrect. Tet I have given three which adhered to how the >> >> > reasoning applies. >> >> >> Those three examples of yours are deceptive, since your >> >> "reasoning" does not apply to the case of "subjective experience". >> >> >> > Again you refused to give >> >> > an example. If you could give one you would, you wouldn't waste >> >> > your time trying to hide behind deception. The point is you >> >> > can't, but you can't face it either because of your ego. You >> >> > appear to me pathetic. >> >> >> You're a troll. >> >> > You say it doesn't, but give no reason, and admitted yourself, that >> > a robots behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether >> > it was subjectively experiencing or not. >> >> It's not possible to know whether a thing is subjectively >> experiencing or not. That is the definition of subjective >> experience. That is true whether materialism holds or not. >> >> > Also again you failed to give one example, after claiming it wasn't >> > a problem for you. You surely must have known this was a lie when >> > you said it. >> >> > You would think that if seeming reason led you away from God, then >> > reason could lead you back again, but it seems your ego won't let >> > you face reason. >> >> > Your choices so far in this discussion have been disingenious, >> > cowardly and pathetic. >> >> You're a troll. >> > > I think you are missing the point that whether the robot, car, mobile > phone, or biological mechanism (if it strictly followed the laws of > physics) did or didn't have the property of subjective experiences, > the property in itself couldn't be influencing behaviour. > <snip repasted material> We've been over that, Glenn. You're assuming your conclusion. > The problem is you can't accept that you were deceived > that we were simply a biological mechanism following the laws of > physics, as you claimed you saw and understood it, and that it made > sense (as did some others that were regarded as 'intelligent'). To > remain an atheist you have to abandon reason. > To be a theist I would have to abandon reason. -- Fred Stone aa# 1369 "When they put out that deadline, people realized that we were going to lose," said an aide to an anti-war lawmaker. "Everything after that seemed like posturing." -- Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com Quote
Guest Matt Silberstein Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 On Tue, 12 Jun 2007 14:43:54 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> in <1181684634.682393.86600@i38g2000prf.googlegroups.com> wrote: >On 12 Jun, 17:24, Matt Silberstein ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: BTW, you need to learn to quote the same way as the rest of us, it would make communication clearer. >When you asked: >----------- >I think you are going to have to tell me what you mean by "subjective >experience" because the above just does not make sense to me. >----------- > >I replied: >----------- >By subjective experiences, I every experience you or anybody else has >had, without any assumption that the human you experience being is >essentially you. >----------- > >You then remarked: >----------- >That is not sufficient for me to understand you. What I am having >trouble with is the bit about (subjective) experience influencing >behavior. I think that you mean will , not experience, here. >----------- > >Well first of all did you understand what I was referring to by >subjective experiences. There was no mention of them there > influencing behaviour, so I am not sure how it was the bit about > influencing behaviour that you didn't get in the explanation. Your (2) explicitly discusses influencing behavior. Stripped of the unnecessary abstraction I think you have argued: (1')The behavior of humans is described/explained by science without requiring knowledge of whether or not humans have subjective experience. (2') Presence or lack of subjective experience does not influence/affect human behavior, else the explanation would not be complete without knowledge of whether or not humans have subjective experience. My position is that (1') is not factually correct. That is, in order to provide a naturalistic physical account of human behavior we will need to discuss and account for subjective experience. At issue at the moment is that I don't see that (regarding your statement 2) how subjective experience influences human behavior, at least not directly. I would think that you would prefer to discuss "will", not subjective experience. Perhaps you have a reason for that, but I don't know it. >Also when I went onto say: >----------- >In the sense that you don't subjectively experience brain activity >which may be labelled subconsious, >----------- > >You replied: >----------- >But "I" may well be that brain activity. I don't directly >experience that electro-chemical activity, but it is an empirical >----------- > >Where you did seem to grasp that you don't experience subconscious >brain activity, and therefore understood what I meant by experiencing. I have a reasonable idea of what you mean, but your language is either imprecise or sufficiently far from what I am used to that I have difficultly understanding the details. It is not that I have no idea what "experience" or "subjective" means, it is that some of your usage differs from what I think occurs. >People have in the past questioned as to whether robots in the future >might be made which also were conscious, or subjectively experiencing, >have you never understood what they were talking about, or is it that >you are hiding behind the difficulty of actually defining it, rather >than understanding it through what you yourself experience, and not >regarding a mobile phone to have such experiences. I am not sure your question here, but I am of the view that it is quite likely that we will someday, and in my lifetime even, make "machines" that have as valid a self and consciousness as a human. I have no problem accepting that such a thing can occur nor do I wish to hide those views. It is no more distressing to me that we can (someday) make robots that think than that we can make babies that think. Both are physical processes. >To illustrate the >point, most people don't consider smashing a mobile phone to be >inflicting any pain on the mobile phone. Are you different in this >regard, or just being disingenious? I don't think a mobile phone is conscious any more than I think that a sliver of my skin or a sweet potato is conscious. Not all mechanical things are alike. (As an aside, and relating to a discussion in another thread, I suspect that you suffer (and I do mean suffer) from an Idealist/Realist ((in the older sense of the term)) metaphysics. I seem to remember that from the past, but I am not sure. But it sure looks that way here. ) >When I said: >----------- >You can see in the example, it isn't just an assertion, because we can >explain how the mechanism works, we don't require any knowledge of >whether it was subjectively experiencing or not. >----------- > >You replied: >----------- >No, I don't see that. It may well be, and I suspect it will be, that >if we have such a sufficiently complex "thinking" robot then our >explanation of the mechanism will also include the subjective >experience. I don't see the robot/human distinction you assert and I >don't think I can sufficiently understanding either without also >producing a theory of the mind which will, of necessity, deal with >subjective experience (and "will", if that is what you mean) >----------- > >I had already pointed out to you, using an example of a neural network >with a million more nodes than you have neurons, that its behaviour >could be explained simply in terms of the configuration of the nodes, But you have not shown that such an explanation does not, of necessity, include an explanation of subjective experience. >and the inputs they received and how the nodes worked, which doesn't >include any knowledge of whether it had subjectively experiences or >not. As I had said: > >----------- >How could you or anyone else contest that the the robot in the >examples behaviour could be explained simply in terms of the >configuration of the nodes, and the inputs they received, and how the >nodes worked? >----------- > >To which you gave a response that distracted from the issue, talking >in terms of how convenient explanations could be terms of >understanding, which had nothing to do with the point. No, you missed the point. I counter your example with the claim that we might well be able to provide an explanation of human behavior on an atomic level as well. You simply assert, absent actual support, that such an explanation can't occur. You assert a robot/human distinction, but I see no reason to maintain that distinction. >----------- >Because we have a better grasp of what it means to "understand". That >your PC. It is possible to explain a PC in terms of the actions of >quarks. But that explanation won't say a thing about your newsreader. >The very low level explanation won't tell the person reading it >everything they might want to know about higher level processes >----------- I am sorry that you don't understand the point here. I will try again. I can, conceptually at least, provide an explanation of my PC on a quark level. This explanation would simply have the rules for quark interactions and information about the specifics of the quarks in the PC. Such an explanation would be complete in a sense, it would allow for a full prediction of the behavior of the PC and explain any action it took. But the explanation would not have a section titled "Software" or "Newsreader", nor would it have a section titled "CPU" or "Graphics Processor". Explanations at some levels do not necessarily provide explanations at other levels. Douglas Hofstadter worked very hard to explain this concept in _Godel, Escher, Bach_, for this very purpose as it happens. It is a fun, if potentially difficult, book to read. This is not a distraction, this goes directly to the question you present. To my mind it answers the problem sufficiently for me to move the question from the "fundamental difficult question" category to the "difficult, but a solution clearly exists" category. -- Matt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" Quote
Guest Denis Loubet Posted June 13, 2007 Posted June 13, 2007 "DuhIdiot" <jmashburn@alltel.net> wrote in message news:1181742260.943272.245910@a26g2000pre.googlegroups.com... > On Jun 13, 1:51 am, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > > <massive, merciful snip> > >> So you're saying that pressure has nothing to do with density? > > It agonizes me to encourage this guy, Denis, but he's right on this > one. If the orbs are rigid and do not expand with the increase in > pressure, and if no helium enters or escapes them, then density is > just mass/volume, regardless of pressure. Perhaps you're assuming the > orbs are elastic and Glenn is assuming they're rigid. > > Off to the showers with me. Anybody got any lye soap? I know what you mean. :-( But regarding the orb scenrio, I don't think there IS a material that would not expand with heat in that situation. Concrete expands with heat, hence expansion joints in bridges. This idiot is talking about a sphere a KILOMETER in diameter. It's going to expand. Now of course, he can propose an impossibly rigid material for the purposes of his thought experiment, but then we're not talking about things that obey the laws of physics, and obeying the laws of physics is an integral part of the thought experiment. -- Denis Loubet dloubet@io.com http//www.io.com/~dloubet Quote
Guest pbamvv@worldonline.nl Posted June 14, 2007 Posted June 14, 2007 On 12 jun, 23:49, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 12 Jun, 17:31, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > wrote: > > > > > > > On 11 jun, 18:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > wrote: > > > > > I think you understand Fred and me. > > > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to > > > avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to > > > you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post. > > > Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the > > > answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable > > > of doing it yourself. > > > > I had asked: > > > ---------- > > > Do you see that the following is always true: > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > ---------- > > > > You replied: > > > ---------- > > > Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true > > > > If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it > > > does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead > > > (or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M). > > > > A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can > > > influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may > > > use the state of synapses that constitutes P. > > > > To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on > > > it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong > > > balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may > > > even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then > > > black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its > > > bouncing. > > > > Nevertheless its composition is. > > > > M = a ball > > > B(M) = the bouncing of the ball. > > > P = a property of the ball > > > If P = the colour, your assessment is right. > > > If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong. > > > ---------- > > > > To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive > > > as: > > > ---------- > > > So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property > > > of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property > > > isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true, > > > and so is (2). > > > > With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the > > > ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not > > > be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true. > > > ---------- > > > > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > > > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > > > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > > > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > > > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as > > > above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be > > > thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that > > > particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the > > > biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was > > > correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2). > > > > If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves, > > > which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without, > > > then (1) would not be true. > > > > You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is > > > presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world > > > perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit, > > > that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and > > > thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same? > > > You keep on assuming that subjective experiences do not have physical > > properties. > > However they do. Subjective experiences are memories (either temporary > > or lasting) > > These memories do influence our behaviour as you very well know. > > Although I do not know how memories are actually "stored" in cortex, > > we have ample proof that they are. Of course we can theoretically > > explain our conduct mechanically without realizing that the synapse > > behaviour we are describing is actually the act of "remembering" but > > that does not change the fact, that without the information coming > > from our memory our behaviour would change drastically. > > > In my previous example of my computer program > > you can explain the working by the hexadecimal machine code (a mix of > > numbers and the letters A,B,C,D, E and F) and totally ignore what they > > mean, > > but that does not mean that the fact that the employee is a female > > does not matter! > > > Likewise you can explain human behaviour by the chemical working of > > synapses, > > but that does not mean in doesn't matter whether I thought I saw > > Ashley or Kate. > > > Humans are actually using subjective experiences to guide their > > behaviour. > > > I started re-reading "consciousness explained" by Daniel C. Dennett, > > and found out his idea of consciousness goes one step further than I > > thought. He thinks consciousness is caused by ideas in our head, that > > make us think in a conscious way. Ideas that we have mostly learned > > from other people. > > I am not sure that is correct. To me everything we can theoretically > > remember and theoretically communicate about, is a subjective > > experience and is or has been part of our consciousness. > > But the fact that almost nobody can remember much of his/her early > > childhood, might mean that Dennett is right. > > But it would be a good thing to read to book anyway. (did you read it > > already?) > > I can understand that you have been deceived by Dennet's explanation. > I can show it to be a deception. > > Step 1. > > Do you understand that if there was a robot, no matter how it behaved, > as long as it followed the known laws of physics, and therefore its > behaviour could be explained to you in these terms, you wouldn't know > whether it actually had any subjective experiences or not. This isn't > about what your guess would be, it is about the truth about what you > know. Nor is it a statement that the robot couldn't be subjectively > experiencing by the way, in case you were going to disingeniously > suggest that it was.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - If the Robot could make deduction from its data and its memory and report them, I would have to assume it had a subjective experience. What else is a subjective experience, but an experience that is "coloured" by previous acquired information? The robot - for instance - could have been imprinted with the idea "someone is an idiot" and then, after reading your post, conclude that the best way to react was to answer: "You are definitely an idiot". The only difference between the robot and me as far as this event is concerned, is that my memory contains the postulate "other people who post on the NG have a brain similar to mine", which causes me to continue trying to communicate even if the communication is very difficult because you an me seem to have a different opinion on what we think a "Subjective experience" is. Interesting to see you consider yourself able to disprove a man with the capabilities of Daniel C Dennet! The fact that I cannot even take this first step with you may show you, that is not such an easy thing to do. Someone2's Postulate : We cannot tell if entity R has subjective experiences. Peter van Velzen's postulate: If entity R can be shown to make a report on an experience that is influenced by previous information, this means entity R has an subjective experience. (Especially if the previous information may not be true) Peter van Velzen June 2007 Amstelveen The Netherlands Quote
Guest Richard Smol Posted June 14, 2007 Posted June 14, 2007 On Jun 11, 12:08 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 10 Jun, 13:32, Richard Smol <richard.s...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > On Jun 10, 12:57 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > Using the following wording: > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > Yes. Everything follows the laws of physcis, no matter what behavior > > is shown and no matter if the base of that behavior is biological of > > not. > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > That totally depends on the property, the entity it applies to and the > > behavior we see. In other words: you need a lot more information to > > tell whether a certain property affects the behavior of something. > > > This is also totally unrelated to the original question how to > > determine whether something exhibits consciousness . The answer to > > that question can only be derived from an object's behavior, > > unrelated to the question of what properties caused that behavior in > > the first place. Maybe consciousness could arise if you just tie a lot > > of shoelaces together. Why would it matter? > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > Not at all all. Your conclusion is a non sequitur. > > > > Hopefully now it is reworded, you can see why your example wasn't > > > appropriate. > > > Coming from someone who is so inept at logic, that's quite an ironic > > remark. > > Can you understand the following is always true: > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > P refers to the a property in question. > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. Are you dense? I just told you why your argumentation is flawed. Pay attention next time. RS Quote
Guest t268934@safe-mail.net Posted June 15, 2007 Posted June 15, 2007 On Jun 6, 11:53 pm, "minsky...@media.mit.edu" <min...@media.mit.edu> wrote: "Evidently some people maintain that "subjective experience" can never be explained in terms of physical processes. They offer reasons for this opinion, but none of those make much sense to me." You have put forward one reason in your (superb) essay Matter, Mind and Models - in the passage about primitives. You end that argument with the sentence: "The primitive notions of physics, or even of neurophysiology, will be far too remote to be useful in commonsense explanations of the mental events of everyday life." But I would argue there are no explanations that are 1) not commonsense and 2) valid. How can you call an explanation something that does not make sense to you - in any common way? With those that make common sense I can make inferences, I can be inspired, and so on. The other alleged explanations could only be allusions, and stand on a par with religious accounts. Anotherwords, an explanation which is suggested, whose basic framework is outlined, but at the same time is not actualised in the sense of being internalised, is not an actual explanation. Otherwise, a person can assume that some meaningless string of words uttered by c.f. a priest, is an explanation - just because the general social context provides indications that it is reasonable. And in that case it may be that no one internalises all that stuff, and because of that no one tries to find out an explanation! Voila, I seem to have just outlined the reason why there are no more bold theories in psychology. I have often been in situations where everyone agrees that some good thing is possible in principle, but no one ever does anything about it. People need some unlogical incentives. As Nancy Cartwright (the philosopher of science) says, thinking functions in conflict of ideas. > Then, because those descriptions don't lead anywhere, yet other parts > of the brain > construct those useless dualistic descriptions, because they don't > have adequate ways > to explain why they can't understand what is happening. Dualism does not need to be Cartesian. To speak more precisely, there really does seem to be a conceptual gulf between the physical and the mental domains; though this gulf is not necessarily a real one in Descartes' sense. Also, dualistic descriptions are often very useful in the preliminary stages of examinations. See The Society of Mind, 11.9. ------- I myself think that the both sides in this dispute are lacking in pragmatism. The claims that "experience cannot be explained in physical terms", and the other, that it is ultimately explainable, do not feature as opposites of an extreme kind. Each of these claims does not produce invariably the same effect in every brain/mind, in every situation. Would it not be useful to study these effects in the world, and then modify our expressions accordingly? ---------- "However, it might be a good lesson to consider the way that "life" or "living" was once considered to be so inexplicable that people felt they had to assume that there must exist a (non-physical) "vital force" or "spirit," etc." That is a compact description, but it is also pretty rough and can be misleading. Good sources on that subject I'd suggest are this Open University course unit http://human-nature.com/rmyoung/papers/paper45h.html and the standard introductory "Evolution: the history of an idea" (Bowler 1984). "But today, now that we know how complex a living cell is, no serious scientist see any basic mystery. Instead, now that we understand how complex a cell is, we know that we "simply" need to answer a few thousand hand -- but not unsolvable -- questions." Well, some prominent - perhaps serious - scientists still say they are trying to answer about what life is. Be that as it may, I think questions of "life" aren't limited to what happens inside the living organism, they have to encompass the environment as well. And this circumstance is exactly what might have historically given rise to concepts like vital force, spirit and soul - these may have been conceived not as hiding in some nanospace, but stretching indefinitely throughout the organism's environment. But generally these last quoted sentences are very much true; what is said in them just misses some critics' points. -- Ivan Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 15, 2007 Posted June 15, 2007 On 14 Jun, 20:50, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> wrote: > On 12 jun, 23:49, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 12 Jun, 17:31, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > wrote: > > > > On 11 jun, 18:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > I think you understand Fred and me. > > > > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to > > > > avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to > > > > you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post. > > > > Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the > > > > answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable > > > > of doing it yourself. > > > > > I had asked: > > > > ---------- > > > > Do you see that the following is always true: > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > ---------- > > > > > You replied: > > > > ---------- > > > > Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true > > > > > If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it > > > > does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead > > > > (or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M). > > > > > A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can > > > > influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may > > > > use the state of synapses that constitutes P. > > > > > To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on > > > > it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong > > > > balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may > > > > even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then > > > > black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its > > > > bouncing. > > > > > Nevertheless its composition is. > > > > > M = a ball > > > > B(M) = the bouncing of the ball. > > > > P = a property of the ball > > > > If P = the colour, your assessment is right. > > > > If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong. > > > > ---------- > > > > > To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive > > > > as: > > > > ---------- > > > > So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property > > > > of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property > > > > isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true, > > > > and so is (2). > > > > > With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the > > > > ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not > > > > be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true. > > > > ---------- > > > > > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > > > > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > > > > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > > > > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > > > > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as > > > > above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be > > > > thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that > > > > particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the > > > > biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was > > > > correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2). > > > > > If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves, > > > > which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without, > > > > then (1) would not be true. > > > > > You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is > > > > presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world > > > > perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit, > > > > that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and > > > > thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same? > > > > You keep on assuming that subjective experiences do not have physical > > > properties. > > > However they do. Subjective experiences are memories (either temporary > > > or lasting) > > > These memories do influence our behaviour as you very well know. > > > Although I do not know how memories are actually "stored" in cortex, > > > we have ample proof that they are. Of course we can theoretically > > > explain our conduct mechanically without realizing that the synapse > > > behaviour we are describing is actually the act of "remembering" but > > > that does not change the fact, that without the information coming > > > from our memory our behaviour would change drastically. > > > > In my previous example of my computer program > > > you can explain the working by the hexadecimal machine code (a mix of > > > numbers and the letters A,B,C,D, E and F) and totally ignore what they > > > mean, > > > but that does not mean that the fact that the employee is a female > > > does not matter! > > > > Likewise you can explain human behaviour by the chemical working of > > > synapses, > > > but that does not mean in doesn't matter whether I thought I saw > > > Ashley or Kate. > > > > Humans are actually using subjective experiences to guide their > > > behaviour. > > > > I started re-reading "consciousness explained" by Daniel C. Dennett, > > > and found out his idea of consciousness goes one step further than I > > > thought. He thinks consciousness is caused by ideas in our head, that > > > make us think in a conscious way. Ideas that we have mostly learned > > > from other people. > > > I am not sure that is correct. To me everything we can theoretically > > > remember and theoretically communicate about, is a subjective > > > experience and is or has been part of our consciousness. > > > But the fact that almost nobody can remember much of his/her early > > > childhood, might mean that Dennett is right. > > > But it would be a good thing to read to book anyway. (did you read it > > > already?) > > > I can understand that you have been deceived by Dennet's explanation. > > I can show it to be a deception. > > > Step 1. > > > Do you understand that if there was a robot, no matter how it behaved, > > as long as it followed the known laws of physics, and therefore its > > behaviour could be explained to you in these terms, you wouldn't know > > whether it actually had any subjective experiences or not. This isn't > > about what your guess would be, it is about the truth about what you > > know. Nor is it a statement that the robot couldn't be subjectively > > experiencing by the way, in case you were going to disingeniously > > suggest that it was.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > If the Robot could make deduction from its data and its memory and > report them, I would have to assume it had a subjective experience. > What else is a subjective experience, but an experience that is > "coloured" by previous acquired information? > > The robot - for instance - could have been imprinted with the idea > "someone is an idiot" and then, after reading your post, conclude that > the best way to react was to answer: "You are definitely an idiot". > > The only difference between the robot and me as far as this event is > concerned, is that my memory contains the postulate "other people who > post on the NG have a brain similar to mine", which causes me to > continue trying to communicate even if the communication is very > difficult because you an me seem to have a different opinion on what > we think a "Subjective experience" is. > > Interesting to see you consider yourself able to disprove a man with > the capabilities of Daniel C Dennet! > > The fact that I cannot even take this first step with you may show > you, that is not such an easy thing to do. > > Someone2's Postulate : > We cannot tell if entity R has subjective experiences. > > Peter van Velzen's postulate: > If entity R can be shown to make a report on an experience that is > influenced by previous information, this means entity R has an > subjective experience. > (Especially if the previous information may not be true) > If you could get Daniel Dennet, or any other person who has encouraged people away from God, to come onto this group, and enter a debate (maybe you could tell him how highly you regard him or whatever, and ask for his help, and inform him that someone is saying he reasoning is implausible, and that he is too cowardly to enter into an open debate on the internet, or whatever), then I will show you how silly he is. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 15, 2007 Posted June 15, 2007 On 15 Jun, 18:40, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 14 Jun, 20:50, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > wrote: > > > > > > > On 12 jun, 23:49, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 12 Jun, 17:31, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > wrote: > > > > > On 11 jun, 18:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > I think you understand Fred and me. > > > > > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to > > > > > avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to > > > > > you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post. > > > > > Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the > > > > > answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable > > > > > of doing it yourself. > > > > > > I had asked: > > > > > ---------- > > > > > Do you see that the following is always true: > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > You replied: > > > > > ---------- > > > > > Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true > > > > > > If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it > > > > > does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead > > > > > (or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M). > > > > > > A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can > > > > > influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may > > > > > use the state of synapses that constitutes P. > > > > > > To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on > > > > > it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong > > > > > balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may > > > > > even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then > > > > > black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its > > > > > bouncing. > > > > > > Nevertheless its composition is. > > > > > > M = a ball > > > > > B(M) = the bouncing of the ball. > > > > > P = a property of the ball > > > > > If P = the colour, your assessment is right. > > > > > If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong. > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive > > > > > as: > > > > > ---------- > > > > > So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property > > > > > of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property > > > > > isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true, > > > > > and so is (2). > > > > > > With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the > > > > > ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not > > > > > be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true. > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > > > > > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > > > > > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > > > > > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > > > > > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as > > > > > above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be > > > > > thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that > > > > > particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the > > > > > biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was > > > > > correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2). > > > > > > If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves, > > > > > which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without, > > > > > then (1) would not be true. > > > > > > You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is > > > > > presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world > > > > > perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit, > > > > > that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and > > > > > thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same? > > > > > You keep on assuming that subjective experiences do not have physical > > > > properties. > > > > However they do. Subjective experiences are memories (either temporary > > > > or lasting) > > > > These memories do influence our behaviour as you very well know. > > > > Although I do not know how memories are actually "stored" in cortex, > > > > we have ample proof that they are. Of course we can theoretically > > > > explain our conduct mechanically without realizing that the synapse > > > > behaviour we are describing is actually the act of "remembering" but > > > > that does not change the fact, that without the information coming > > > > from our memory our behaviour would change drastically. > > > > > In my previous example of my computer program > > > > you can explain the working by the hexadecimal machine code (a mix of > > > > numbers and the letters A,B,C,D, E and F) and totally ignore what they > > > > mean, > > > > but that does not mean that the fact that the employee is a female > > > > does not matter! > > > > > Likewise you can explain human behaviour by the chemical working of > > > > synapses, > > > > but that does not mean in doesn't matter whether I thought I saw > > > > Ashley or Kate. > > > > > Humans are actually using subjective experiences to guide their > > > > behaviour. > > > > > I started re-reading "consciousness explained" by Daniel C. Dennett, > > > > and found out his idea of consciousness goes one step further than I > > > > thought. He thinks consciousness is caused by ideas in our head, that > > > > make us think in a conscious way. Ideas that we have mostly learned > > > > from other people. > > > > I am not sure that is correct. To me everything we can theoretically > > > > remember and theoretically communicate about, is a subjective > > > > experience and is or has been part of our consciousness. > > > > But the fact that almost nobody can remember much of his/her early > > > > childhood, might mean that Dennett is right. > > > > But it would be a good thing to read to book anyway. (did you read it > > > > already?) > > > > I can understand that you have been deceived by Dennet's explanation. > > > I can show it to be a deception. > > > > Step 1. > > > > Do you understand that if there was a robot, no matter how it behaved, > > > as long as it followed the known laws of physics, and therefore its > > > behaviour could be explained to you in these terms, you wouldn't know > > > whether it actually had any subjective experiences or not. This isn't > > > about what your guess would be, it is about the truth about what you > > > know. Nor is it a statement that the robot couldn't be subjectively > > > experiencing by the way, in case you were going to disingeniously > > > suggest that it was.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > If the Robot could make deduction from its data and its memory and > > report them, I would have to assume it had a subjective experience. > > What else is a subjective experience, but an experience that is > > "coloured" by previous acquired information? > > > The robot - for instance - could have been imprinted with the idea > > "someone is an idiot" and then, after reading your post, conclude that > > the best way to react was to answer: "You are definitely an idiot". > > > The only difference between the robot and me as far as this event is > > concerned, is that my memory contains the postulate "other people who > > post on the NG have a brain similar to mine", which causes me to > > continue trying to communicate even if the communication is very > > difficult because you an me seem to have a different opinion on what > > we think a "Subjective experience" is. > > > Interesting to see you consider yourself able to disprove a man with > > the capabilities of Daniel C Dennet! > > > The fact that I cannot even take this first step with you may show > > you, that is not such an easy thing to do. > > > Someone2's Postulate : > > We cannot tell if entity R has subjective experiences. > > > Peter van Velzen's postulate: > > If entity R can be shown to make a report on an experience that is > > influenced by previous information, this means entity R has an > > subjective experience. > > (Especially if the previous information may not be true) > > If you could get Daniel Dennet, or any other person who has encouraged > people away from God, to come onto this group, and enter a debate > (maybe you could tell him how highly you regard him or whatever, and > ask for his help, and inform him that someone is saying he reasoning > is implausible, and that he is too cowardly to enter into an open > debate on the internet, or whatever), then I will show you how silly > he is. > When I say any other person, I mean someone who has a highly publicised publication, like maybe Dawkins etc. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 16, 2007 Posted June 16, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181929218.157969.203040@o61g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > If you could get Daniel Dennet, or any other person who has encouraged > people away from God, to come onto this group, and enter a debate > (maybe you could tell him how highly you regard him or whatever, and > ask for his help, and inform him that someone is saying he reasoning > is implausible, and that he is too cowardly to enter into an open > debate on the internet, or whatever), then I will show you how silly > he is. You've done a good job of showing how silly you are already. So .. you still have failed to actually make your actual argument in one single post. Too chicken to do so are you? Quote
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