Implausibility of Materialism

June 20, 2007

On 20 Jun, 09:01, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:

> On Jun 20, 11:40 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > On 20 Jun, 02:26, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:

>

> > > On Jun 20, 11:21 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > > On 20 Jun, 02:05, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:

>

> > > > > On Jun 20, 9:27 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

> > > > > <snip>

>

> > > > > > Could you put forward for clarity, if it isn't too much effort, where

> > > > > > you think the following isn't reasoned:

>

> > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question.

> > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

> > > > > > P refers to the a property in question.

>

> > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

> > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>

> > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

> > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>

> > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>

> > > > > You still do not seem to understand that people in general have no

> > > > > problem with this scheme.

> > > > > What we have difficulty is the truth of (1).

> > > > > IF (1) is false then it matters not that a true (1) is equivalent to

> > > > > (2) being true.

> > > > > You do understand that do you not?

>

> > > > > Have you any reason for believing (1) to be true?

> > > > > (By "reason" I do not mean a personal subjective conviction of its

> > > > > truth.)

>

> > > > Well obviously if the (1) put forward was false, then (2) would be

> > > > false. Whether (1) is false or not depends on the substitutions for M,

> > > > B(M), and P.

>

> > > > Are you ok with the following example:

>

> > > > M = a car

> > > > B(M) = parked with its engine running

> > > > P = its serial number

>

> > > > Which means:

>

> > > > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of

> > > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a serial number

> > > > or not.

>

> > > > As (1) is true, so is:

>

> > > > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not affect the car

> > > > parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour

> > > > could not be the same with or without a serial number.

>

> > > Yes.

>

> > > Can you answer my question with a yes or a no.

>

> > > Do you understand that I (and others) are disagreeing with (or have

> > > no belief in the truth of ) your statement (1)?

>

> > Which statement (1) are you talking about?

>

> Your statement (1) of course!

> You are being deliberately obtuse.

>

> > Do you understand that M,

> > B(M), and P are to be substituted, as in the example that you have

> > just said you were ok with.

>

> Of course.

> Now answer the question in relation to your original assertion about

> the hypothetical robot.

> Yes or no?

>

Well if you say you disagree with it, then I can understand that you

disagree it. Though not in the sense that I understand your

disagreement, as you haven't told me what your disagreement is. You

have agreed the reasoning is true, and have stated that it would be

the substituted assertion (1) that you would disagree with.

So with the substitutions:

M refers to the robot

B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question

whether it had conscious/subjective experiences.

P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences

would give:

1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it

had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of

physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/

subjective experiences or not.

So you disagreeing that the robot could be explained in terms of its

components strictly following the laws of physics, in the same way in

which we can explain the behaviour of a mobile phone. Perhaps you

could put forward why it couldn't be explained in such terms?

June 20, 2007

On 20 Jun, 09:13, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote:

> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> news:1182312689.929729.237280@o61g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...

>

> > On 20 Jun, 04:53, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote:

> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> >>news:1182295662.490660.300870@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> >> > So the configuration of the neurons, causes the experience of

> >> > memories?

>

> >> Strawman .. I didn't say it CAUSED them. I said that is where they are

> >> stored / encoded.

>

> >> [snip same old stuff that I have already addressed .. please .. stop you

> >> copy paste spamming]

>

> > Why when you keep posting, was it too much effort to have responded?

>

> I have already responded to it

>

> > Is it that you can't?

>

> It is that I already have. No point in encouraging your spamming.

>

> > So are the memories stored by means of the configuration and state of

> > the neurons? Maybe in a similar way to memory on a computer is based

> > on the configuration and state of the chips.

>

> That seems most likely .. yes. Do you have a problem with that idea?

Well what is the theory? Is there any examples of how a memory could

theoretically be encoded in neuron states? I understand the way an

artificial neural network can have its decision making affected by

input weightings to nodes, and node configuration. With memory though,

a computer stores information in terms of flags for either 1 or 0. Is

this encoding you refer to along the same lines, that neurons are in a

permanent 1 or 0 state type of thing?

June 20, 2007

On Wed, 20 Jun 2007 07:09:26 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

<glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> in

<1182348566.367597.187830@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>On 20 Jun, 06:00, Matt Silberstein

><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

>> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 18:03:47 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

>> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>>

>> <1182301427.374104.279...@o61g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>> >On 20 Jun, 01:53, Matt Silberstein

>> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

>> >> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 17:38:10 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

>> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>>

>> >> <1182299890.499350.8...@u2g2000hsc.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>>

>> >> [snip]

>>

>> >> >Regarding the explanation of the robots behaviour, are you saying that

>> >> >it couldn't be explained in terms of the system components following

>> >> >the known laws of physics? For if it could , then it would have been

>> >> >explained without reference to any subjective experiences, as the

>> >> >known laws of physics don't refer to subjective experiences, that is a

>> >> >FACT. This isn't about whether you would consider it to be a useful

>> >> >explanation or not.

>>

>> >> I am only talking about useful explanations, there are an infinite

>> >> number of non-useful explanations. And you keep asserting that the

>> >> laws of physics don't refer to subjective experience, but that is the

>> >> question. That is, can those laws explain that experience. As I keep

>> >> asserting: that is an empirical question, not a logical one. The laws

>> >> of physics do not (directly) reference photosynthesis, yet we can

>> >> provide a natural explanation for it. It is my assertion that we

>> >> likely explain humans/robots by having a theory of the mind, a model

>> >> (explanation) of the internal views/actions involved. One more time,

>> >> you really should read some of the material on this subject. Read

>> >> _Godel, Escher, Bach_ or _The Man Who Mistook His Wife For A Hat_.

>> >> Using science we have learned quite a bit about thinking that we could

>> >> not learn by introspection alone.

>>

>> >So you accept, that though it might not be useful, the behaviour of

>> >the robot could be explained simply in terms of the components

>> >following the known laws of physics, without reference to whether it

>> >has any subjective experiences, or what they may be like? The same as

>> >the behaviour of a car or mobile phone is explained.

>>

>> In the same sense I can explain my PC in terms of quarks, without

>> reference to whether or not it has a newsreader program.

>>

>> >You just don't

>> >think such an explanation would be useful.

>>

>> That was a separate issue. "My computer is infested with demons" is an

>> explanation for its behavior. Not a useful one, but it is an

>> explanation.

>>

>

>How would your computer being infested with demons explain its

>behaviour, when its behaviour can be shown to be strictly following

>the laws of physics? It would be false.

How do you know it is false? It is not a useful (predictive)

explanation, but it is an explanation. Here is one problem, Glenn. You

want to discuss these issues as philosophy, but you really don't seem

to have a background in philosophy. There is a large body of work

behind determining what is and is not a useful explanation and an

exploration of how that relates to something being true.

As a side issue, I ask you how you can distinguish "infested with

demons" and "run by God".

>Do you accept that the way a mobile phone's behaviour is explained, in

>terms of its components following the laws of physics is both

>demonstrably true,

For some notion of "true", yes, for others, no.

> and useful, so much so, that it is that

>understanding that allowed the mobile phone to be built, and that this

>would be the same with the robot?

Again you want to turn an empirical question about the world into a

simplistic semantic and/or logical question. I have answered this

question so many times so far. I think it is as true that I can

explain this (sufficiently complex) robot by the laws of physics as I

can explain humans by the laws of physics. I can, conceptually at

least, explain my PC in terms of quarks. When I do so my newsreader

may not be a recognizable part of that explanation. Similarly we can,

I predict, explain human behavior (and we certainly can do an

astounding job at this today thanks to science) in terms of quarks

(i.e. laws of physic and such). Our subjective experience may or many

not be recognizable in that quark level explanation, but since

subjective experience exists the explanation will account for it. Your

answer is there, asking the question again will not change it.

--

Matt Silberstein

Do something today about the Darfur Genocide

http://www.beawitness.org

http://www.darfurgenocide.org

http://www.savedarfur.org

"Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop"

June 20, 2007

On 20 Jun, 16:50, Matt Silberstein

<RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> On Wed, 20 Jun 2007 07:09:26 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> <1182348566.367597.187...@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> >On 20 Jun, 06:00, Matt Silberstein

> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> >> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 18:03:47 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> >> <1182301427.374104.279...@o61g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> >> >On 20 Jun, 01:53, Matt Silberstein

> >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> >> >> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 17:38:10 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> >> >> <1182299890.499350.8...@u2g2000hsc.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>

> >> >> [snip]

>

> >> >> >Regarding the explanation of the robots behaviour, are you saying that

> >> >> >it couldn't be explained in terms of the system components following

> >> >> >the known laws of physics? For if it could , then it would have been

> >> >> >explained without reference to any subjective experiences, as the

> >> >> >known laws of physics don't refer to subjective experiences, that is a

> >> >> >FACT. This isn't about whether you would consider it to be a useful

> >> >> >explanation or not.

>

> >> >> I am only talking about useful explanations, there are an infinite

> >> >> number of non-useful explanations. And you keep asserting that the

> >> >> laws of physics don't refer to subjective experience, but that is the

> >> >> question. That is, can those laws explain that experience. As I keep

> >> >> asserting: that is an empirical question, not a logical one. The laws

> >> >> of physics do not (directly) reference photosynthesis, yet we can

> >> >> provide a natural explanation for it. It is my assertion that we

> >> >> likely explain humans/robots by having a theory of the mind, a model

> >> >> (explanation) of the internal views/actions involved. One more time,

> >> >> you really should read some of the material on this subject. Read

> >> >> _Godel, Escher, Bach_ or _The Man Who Mistook His Wife For A Hat_.

> >> >> Using science we have learned quite a bit about thinking that we could

> >> >> not learn by introspection alone.

>

> >> >So you accept, that though it might not be useful, the behaviour of

> >> >the robot could be explained simply in terms of the components

> >> >following the known laws of physics, without reference to whether it

> >> >has any subjective experiences, or what they may be like? The same as

> >> >the behaviour of a car or mobile phone is explained.

>

> >> In the same sense I can explain my PC in terms of quarks, without

> >> reference to whether or not it has a newsreader program.

>

> >> >You just don't

> >> >think such an explanation would be useful.

>

> >> That was a separate issue. "My computer is infested with demons" is an

> >> explanation for its behavior. Not a useful one, but it is an

> >> explanation.

>

> >How would your computer being infested with demons explain its

> >behaviour, when its behaviour can be shown to be strictly following

> >the laws of physics? It would be false.

>

> How do you know it is false? It is not a useful (predictive)

> explanation, but it is an explanation. Here is one problem, Glenn. You

> want to discuss these issues as philosophy, but you really don't seem

> to have a background in philosophy. There is a large body of work

> behind determining what is and is not a useful explanation and an

> exploration of how that relates to something being true.

>

> As a side issue, I ask you how you can distinguish "infested with

> demons" and "run by God".

>

> >Do you accept that the way a mobile phone's behaviour is explained, in

> >terms of its components following the laws of physics is both

> >demonstrably true,

>

> For some notion of "true", yes, for others, no.

>

> > and useful, so much so, that it is that

> >understanding that allowed the mobile phone to be built, and that this

> >would be the same with the robot?

>

> Again you want to turn an empirical question about the world into a

> simplistic semantic and/or logical question. I have answered this

> question so many times so far. I think it is as true that I can

> explain this (sufficiently complex) robot by the laws of physics as I

> can explain humans by the laws of physics. I can, conceptually at

> least, explain my PC in terms of quarks. When I do so my newsreader

> may not be a recognizable part of that explanation. Similarly we can,

> I predict, explain human behavior (and we certainly can do an

> astounding job at this today thanks to science) in terms of quarks

> (i.e. laws of physic and such). Our subjective experience may or many

> not be recognizable in that quark level explanation, but since

> subjective experience exists the explanation will account for it. Your

> answer is there, asking the question again will not change it.

>

Philosophy is simply reason. It is just on a certain topic.

The explanation of the computer behaviour, being caused by an

infestation of demons could be shown to be false as an explanation,

because the computer is behaving exactly as it would be be expected to

if it wasn't infested by demons, as it can be shown to be following

rules of physics that can be demonstrated again and again. So while it

may not be able to proven that the computer wasn't infested by demons,

it could be shown that they aren't influencing the way the computer

behaves, and so couldn't be influencing it.

With regards to how it is different to 'run by God', you would have to

understand what reality is, because you are trying to put it in a

context of looking at reality upside down. I'd rather come back to

this, to avoid being distracted from showing you why your perspective

of reality is implausible. Once we run through it, by all means, you

can attempt to do the same to mine.

This has nothing to do with an empirical question being turned into a

logical one, if you mean empirical in the sense of:

1. derived from or guided by experience or experiment.

2. depending upon experience or observation alone, without using

scientific method or theory, esp. as in medicine.

3. provable or verifiable by experience or experiment.

So you accept that the robot could simply be explained in the same

terms as we explain the behaviour of a mobile phone, or PC, and that

such an explanation would have no reference to subjective experiences.

The next question is do you accept that you would not know whether

the robot actually had any conscious experiences or not, and the

explanation requires no such knowledge?

June 20, 2007

"someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1182349024.090381.241030@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

> So with the substitutions:

>

> M refers to the robot

> B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question

> whether it had conscious/subjective experiences.

> P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences

>

> would give:

> 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it

> had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of

> physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/

> subjective experiences or not.

That is what you assert .. you have not shown that to be true. You make the

assumption that subjective experiences cannot be part of the mechanism and

are not part of what the physics is explaining .. you are assuming your own

conclusion.

Another problem with your 1 and 2 is that you consider P as indivisible ..

you must either consider it as a whole, or not at all. Eg. in a computer

you can explain how a computer handles the individual electrical impulses

that represent a binary number, without knowing what that number is. That

the bits even represent a number (they might represent something else) does

not need to be known in order to explain the behaviour of the circuits.

June 20, 2007

"someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1182350105.901389.239840@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com...

> On 20 Jun, 09:13, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote:

>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> news:1182312689.929729.237280@o61g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> > On 20 Jun, 04:53, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote:

>> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> >>news:1182295662.490660.300870@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> >> > So the configuration of the neurons, causes the experience of

>> >> > memories?

>>

>> >> Strawman .. I didn't say it CAUSED them. I said that is where they

>> >> are

>> >> stored / encoded.

>>

>> >> [snip same old stuff that I have already addressed .. please .. stop

>> >> you

>> >> copy paste spamming]

>>

>> > Why when you keep posting, was it too much effort to have responded?

>>

>> I have already responded to it

>>

>> > Is it that you can't?

>>

>> It is that I already have. No point in encouraging your spamming.

>>

>> > So are the memories stored by means of the configuration and state of

>> > the neurons? Maybe in a similar way to memory on a computer is based

>> > on the configuration and state of the chips.

>>

>> That seems most likely .. yes. Do you have a problem with that idea?

>

> Well what is the theory? Is there any examples of how a memory could

> theoretically be encoded in neuron states? I understand the way an

> artificial neural network can have its decision making affected by

> input weightings to nodes, and node configuration. With memory though,

> a computer stores information in terms of flags for either 1 or 0. Is

> this encoding you refer to along the same lines, that neurons are in a

> permanent 1 or 0 state type of thing?

So are you saying that our brains do not encode out memories .. utter

nonsense. Of course there are theories of how memory works.

June 20, 2007

jientho@aol.com wrote:

>

> Did you notice that I have finally <plonk>ed Skeptic?

>

No doubt because Jeffie is pissed off because none but the most gullible

will buy into Jeffie's lame old if/then argument for God (I think it's

#667 at <http://preview.tinyurl.com/iom3>):

---

http://tinylink.com/?zyEHKYPjgI

Jeffie's lame if/then argument for God:

Newsgroups: alt.atheism

Date: 1999/10/28

From: Jeffrey A. Young (jyoung@ultra0.rdrc.rpi.edu)

Subject: If you're atheist, God exists.

Premises:

P1. Atheism is lack of belief in all gods (including God).

P2. Assertions with equal amounts of empirical evidence must be

treated equally as regards their truth.

P3. There is no empirical evidence that God exists.

Lemma:

L1. There can be no empirical evidence that anyone lacks any given

belief. (Argued conclusively by Sinister et al.)

Conclusion:

C. The assertion "God exists" must be treated equally with

"I am atheist" as regards their truth.

Or, less formally, if you're atheist, then God exists.

Q.E.D.

June 21, 2007

On 20 Jun, 23:51, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote:

> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> news:1182349024.090381.241030@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> > So with the substitutions:

>

> > M refers to the robot

> > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question

> > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences.

> > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences

>

> > would give:

> > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it

> > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of

> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/

> > subjective experiences or not.

>

> That is what you assert .. you have not shown that to be true. You make the

> assumption that subjective experiences cannot be part of the mechanism and

> are not part of what the physics is explaining .. you are assuming your own

> conclusion.

>

> Another problem with your 1 and 2 is that you consider P as indivisible ..

> you must either consider it as a whole, or not at all. Eg. in a computer

> you can explain how a computer handles the individual electrical impulses

> that represent a binary number, without knowing what that number is. That

> the bits even represent a number (they might represent something else) does

> not need to be known in order to explain the behaviour of the circuits.

Obviously any robot that follows the known laws of physics can be

explained in terms of the known laws of physics. No knowledge of

whether anything is experiencing or not is required in any explanation

in terms of physics, due to the known laws of physics not mentioning

the subject. So it isn't an assertion, it is a FACT.

Furthermore, any explanation in these terms is quite useful, all our

technology relies on such explanations. When are you going to face

FACTS?

June 21, 2007

On Jun 21, 12:17 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

> On 20 Jun, 09:01, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:

>

> > On Jun 20, 11:40 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > On 20 Jun, 02:26, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:

>

> > > > On Jun 20, 11:21 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > > > On 20 Jun, 02:05, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:

>

> > > > > > On Jun 20, 9:27 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

> > > > > > <snip>

>

> > > > > > > Could you put forward for clarity, if it isn't too much effort, where

> > > > > > > you think the following isn't reasoned:

>

> > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question.

> > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

> > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question.

>

> > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

> > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>

> > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

> > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>

> > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>

> > > > > > You still do not seem to understand that people in general have no

> > > > > > problem with this scheme.

> > > > > > What we have difficulty is the truth of (1).

> > > > > > IF (1) is false then it matters not that a true (1) is equivalent to

> > > > > > (2) being true.

> > > > > > You do understand that do you not?

>

> > > > > > Have you any reason for believing (1) to be true?

> > > > > > (By "reason" I do not mean a personal subjective conviction of its

> > > > > > truth.)

>

> > > > > Well obviously if the (1) put forward was false, then (2) would be

> > > > > false. Whether (1) is false or not depends on the substitutions for M,

> > > > > B(M), and P.

>

> > > > > Are you ok with the following example:

>

> > > > > M = a car

> > > > > B(M) = parked with its engine running

> > > > > P = its serial number

>

> > > > > Which means:

>

> > > > > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of

> > > > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a serial number

> > > > > or not.

>

> > > > > As (1) is true, so is:

>

> > > > > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not affect the car

> > > > > parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour

> > > > > could not be the same with or without a serial number.

>

> > > > Yes.

>

> > > > Can you answer my question with a yes or a no.

>

> > > > Do you understand that I (and others) are disagreeing with (or have

> > > > no belief in the truth of ) your statement (1)?

>

> > > Which statement (1) are you talking about?

>

> > Your statement (1) of course!

> > You are being deliberately obtuse.

>

> > > Do you understand that M,

> > > B(M), and P are to be substituted, as in the example that you have

> > > just said you were ok with.

>

> > Of course.

> > Now answer the question in relation to your original assertion about

> > the hypothetical robot.

> > Yes or no?

>

> Well if you say you disagree with it, then I can understand that you

> disagree it. Though not in the sense that I understand your

> disagreement, as you haven't told me what your disagreement is. You

> have agreed the reasoning is true, and have stated that it would be

> the substituted assertion (1) that you would disagree with.

>

> So with the substitutions:

>

> M refers to the robot

> B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question

> whether it had conscious/subjective experiences.

> P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences

>

> would give:

> 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it

> had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of

> physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/

> subjective experiences or not.

>

> So you disagreeing that the robot could be explained in terms of its

> components strictly following the laws of physics, in the same way in

> which we can explain the behaviour of a mobile phone. Perhaps you

> could put forward why it couldn't be explained in such terms?

My position is that we do not currently know how to fully explain

conciousness and subjective experience.

Therefore I cannot know (and you cannot know) whether or not the known

laws of physics can fully explain the behavior of a being without

reference to the being having subjective experience.

What I believe is the case is that subjective experience are

ultimately the result of physical processes in my physical brain.

If this is true then it follows that any explanation of me that

failed to account for and take into account my subjective

experiences would be incomplete.

Now an incomplete explanation is still an explanation - and it still

may be a correct explanation as far as it goes.

Your standard reply that "the laws of physics do not reference

subjective experience" is an irrelevancy.

That the laws of physics to not talk about vanilla icecream has no

bearing on whether or not all of vanilla icecreams properties are

fully explained by the laws of physics.

Furthermore I am still having trouble with "explained by" .

This is why.

My computer is currently running a piece of software - Firefox - and

another piece of software Windows 2000.

The electrical switching - the voltage levels and the currents flowing

through the computers wiring is, I am quite certain, Ultimately the

cause (the explanation?) of the behavior of the computer - but to

explain some detail of the high level behavior of Windows in terms of

voltage levels and switching of MOSFETs would be a ridiculous and

pointless exercise - it would convey no useful information to a human.

(A meaningful explanation of a particular behavior would be in terms

of software - a bug in the C++ module that was responsible for the

behavior - for example)

The reason is that the behavior of interest to a human - that the

computer is displaying text and images etc is very far removed from

the switching of transistors and currents running through wires - even

though physically that is all that is going on.

There are many layers of interpretation and abstraction between the

physical activity and the gross observable behavior.

Any "explanation" of the computer behavior in these low level terms

would look - to a human observer - indistinguishable whether the

computer was running Windows or Linux or running a spreadsheet or a

web browser.

I believe ultimately that all that is happening when I experience the

color red or the taste of honey or feel sad is physical processes

happening in my physical brain.

However listing a moment by moment configuration of my neuronal

activity for every neuron in my cerebral cortex would be as

meaningless to a human observer as listing all the transistors inside

my CPU and all their states - it would be a staggeringly huge list of

data which would be meaningless on a human scale.

So in one sense the explanation is "neurons are firing" "transistors

are switching" and in another sense - in the sense of an explanation

that is meaningful to or understandable to a human mind it is no

explanation at all.

So the question you must ask yourself is what do you mean by

"explained"?

Mark.

June 21, 2007

On Jun 21, 2:30?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

> On 20 Jun, 23:51, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote:

>

> > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> >news:1182349024.090381.241030@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> > > So with the substitutions:

>

> > > M refers to the robot

> > > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question

> > > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences.

> > > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences

>

> > > would give:

> > > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it

> > > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of

> > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/

> > > subjective experiences or not.

>

> > That is what you assert .. you have not shown that to be true. You make the

> > assumption that subjective experiences cannot be part of the mechanism and

> > are not part of what the physics is explaining .. you are assuming your own

> > conclusion.

>

> > Another problem with your 1 and 2 is that you consider P as indivisible ..

> > you must either consider it as a whole, or not at all. Eg. in a computer

> > you can explain how a computer handles the individual electrical impulses

> > that represent a binary number, without knowing what that number is. That

> > the bits even represent a number (they might represent something else) does

> > not need to be known in order to explain the behaviour of the circuits.

>

> Obviously any robot that follows the known laws of physics can be

> explained in terms of the known laws of physics. No knowledge of

> whether anything is experiencing or not is required in any explanation

> in terms of physics, due to the known laws of physics not mentioning

> the subject. So it isn't an assertion, it is a FACT.

>

> Furthermore, any explanation in these terms is quite useful, all our

> technology relies on such explanations. When are you going to face

> FACTS?- Hide quoted text -

>

> - Show quoted text -

Evolution has endowed us human 'biological mechanisms' with the

ability to understand physical reality with our brains, using the

information provided by our senses. This evolved because awareness of

reality is a useful survival trait for an organism, allowing it to

make rational decisions about its life in the natural environment.

Awareness is an inherited trait, and it has developed, along with

brains and the associated sense organs, over billions of generations

of continuous evolution, from tiny creatures with minuscule awareness

of light and dark, hot and cold, and so on, to our full-blown human

'we understand everything' awareness of reality.

A newly-manufactured robot mechanism has no ancestors, so it has no

evolved consciousness. Its sense organs (eg television cameras and

microphones) and methods of understanding information (eg computer

memory and programs), have not been designed to be at all useful or

relevant to any conscious understanding of reality, they are just bits

of metal and plastic arranged (by humans) to perform a rather

aribitrary mathematical calculation (ie the running program). A robot

is no more likely to be conscious than an abacus, or a piece of

paper.

June 21, 2007

On Jun 21, 11:30 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> Obviously any robot that follows the known laws of physics can be

> explained in terms of the known laws of physics.

The explanation of the operation of the device in terms of physics

might be correct but incomplete.

Perhaps the explanation of conciousness and subjective experience lies

in the higher abstractions of the physical system.

For example perhaps conciousness is a matter of a "voting" system

between competing/cooperating mental agents.

We don't know so we cant say - but the answer is most likely something

along those lines.

>No knowledge of

> whether anything is experiencing or not is required in any explanation

> in terms of physics

Well an explanation that did not mention the subjective experiences

would not be a complete explanation but it may be true and correct in

everything that it does mention.

Perhaps the explanation does not involve the laws of physics directly

at all but merely requires them as a background.

We shall not know until we have the explanation - and if we (the human

race) listens to you, we shall never have the explanation!

> Furthermore, any explanation in these terms is quite useful, all our

> technology relies on such explanations.

All of our current technology lacks concious experience so how is that

observation relavent?

If some future technology had conscious experience then a low level

physical explanation would then be incomplete.

Mark.

June 21, 2007

On Jun 21, 7:08?am, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:

> On Jun 21, 11:30 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > Obviously any robot that follows the known laws of physics can be

> > explained in terms of the known laws of physics.

>

> The explanation of the operation of the device in terms of physics

> might be correct but incomplete.

> Perhaps the explanation of conciousness and subjective experience lies

> in the higher abstractions of the physical system.

> For example perhaps conciousness is a matter of a "voting" system

> between competing/cooperating mental agents.

> We don't know so we cant say - but the answer is most likely something

> along those lines.

>

> >No knowledge of

> > whether anything is experiencing or not is required in any explanation

> > in terms of physics

>

> Well an explanation that did not mention the subjective experiences

> would not be a complete explanation but it may be true and correct in

> everything that it does mention.

> Perhaps the explanation does not involve the laws of physics directly

> at all but merely requires them as a background.

>

> We shall not know until we have the explanation - and if we (the human

> race) listens to you, we shall never have the explanation!

>

> > Furthermore, any explanation in these terms is quite useful, all our

> > technology relies on such explanations.

>

> All of our current technology lacks concious experience so how is that

> observation relavent?

> If some future technology had conscious experience then a low level

> physical explanation would then be incomplete.

>

> Mark.

I have to say that your insightful and well-written remarks about this

complex topic really impressed me. Your have restored my faith in

usenet newsgroups as a medium for meaningful discussions between

intelligent human beings. Well done!

============================================

"If one doesn't clean the windows, the cat will be perplexed!"

Albert Einstein

http://archetype.com/macro_001.html

===========================================

June 21, 2007

"someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1182389414.480334.251540@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...

> On 20 Jun, 23:51, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote:

>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>>

>> news:1182349024.090381.241030@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>>

>> > So with the substitutions:

>>

>> > M refers to the robot

>> > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question

>> > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences.

>> > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences

>>

>> > would give:

>> > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it

>> > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of

>> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/

>> > subjective experiences or not.

>>

>> That is what you assert .. you have not shown that to be true. You make

>> the

>> assumption that subjective experiences cannot be part of the mechanism

>> and

>> are not part of what the physics is explaining .. you are assuming your

>> own

>> conclusion.

>>

>> Another problem with your 1 and 2 is that you consider P as indivisible

>> ..

>> you must either consider it as a whole, or not at all. Eg. in a computer

>> you can explain how a computer handles the individual electrical impulses

>> that represent a binary number, without knowing what that number is.

>> That

>> the bits even represent a number (they might represent something else)

>> does

>> not need to be known in order to explain the behaviour of the circuits.

I note you were completely unable to refute my counter example above

> Obviously any robot that follows the known laws of physics can be

> explained in terms of the known laws of physics.

Yes. That does not mean it does not have subjective experiences .. only

that those experiences can be explained by the laws of physics

> No knowledge of

> whether anything is experiencing or not is required in any explanation

> in terms of physics, due to the known laws of physics not mentioning

> the subject. So it isn't an assertion, it is a FACT.

>

> Furthermore, any explanation in these terms is quite useful, all our

> technology relies on such explanations. When are you going to face

> FACTS?

When are you going to present an actual ARGUMENT?

June 21, 2007

"James Norris" <JimNorris01@aol.com> wrote in message

news:1182406400.968714.178100@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

> I have to say

Fuck off troll

June 21, 2007

On 21 Jun, 04:45, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:

> On Jun 21, 12:17 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > On 20 Jun, 09:01, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:

>

> > > On Jun 20, 11:40 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > > On 20 Jun, 02:26, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:

>

> > > > > On Jun 20, 11:21 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > > > > On 20 Jun, 02:05, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote:

>

> > > > > > > On Jun 20, 9:27 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

> > > > > > > <snip>

>

> > > > > > > > Could you put forward for clarity, if it isn't too much effort, where

> > > > > > > > you think the following isn't reasoned:

>

> > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question.

> > > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

> > > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question.

>

> > > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

> > > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2).

>

> > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

> > > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not.

>

> > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

> > > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

>

> > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

>

> > > > > > > You still do not seem to understand that people in general have no

> > > > > > > problem with this scheme.

> > > > > > > What we have difficulty is the truth of (1).

> > > > > > > IF (1) is false then it matters not that a true (1) is equivalent to

> > > > > > > (2) being true.

> > > > > > > You do understand that do you not?

>

> > > > > > > Have you any reason for believing (1) to be true?

> > > > > > > (By "reason" I do not mean a personal subjective conviction of its

> > > > > > > truth.)

>

> > > > > > Well obviously if the (1) put forward was false, then (2) would be

> > > > > > false. Whether (1) is false or not depends on the substitutions for M,

> > > > > > B(M), and P.

>

> > > > > > Are you ok with the following example:

>

> > > > > > M = a car

> > > > > > B(M) = parked with its engine running

> > > > > > P = its serial number

>

> > > > > > Which means:

>

> > > > > > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of

> > > > > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a serial number

> > > > > > or not.

>

> > > > > > As (1) is true, so is:

>

> > > > > > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not affect the car

> > > > > > parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour

> > > > > > could not be the same with or without a serial number.

>

> > > > > Yes.

>

> > > > > Can you answer my question with a yes or a no.

>

> > > > > Do you understand that I (and others) are disagreeing with (or have

> > > > > no belief in the truth of ) your statement (1)?

>

> > > > Which statement (1) are you talking about?

>

> > > Your statement (1) of course!

> > > You are being deliberately obtuse.

>

> > > > Do you understand that M,

> > > > B(M), and P are to be substituted, as in the example that you have

> > > > just said you were ok with.

>

> > > Of course.

> > > Now answer the question in relation to your original assertion about

> > > the hypothetical robot.

> > > Yes or no?

>

> > Well if you say you disagree with it, then I can understand that you

> > disagree it. Though not in the sense that I understand your

> > disagreement, as you haven't told me what your disagreement is. You

> > have agreed the reasoning is true, and have stated that it would be

> > the substituted assertion (1) that you would disagree with.

>

> > So with the substitutions:

>

> > M refers to the robot

> > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question

> > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences.

> > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences

>

> > would give:

> > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it

> > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of

> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/

> > subjective experiences or not.

>

> > So you disagreeing that the robot could be explained in terms of its

> > components strictly following the laws of physics, in the same way in

> > which we can explain the behaviour of a mobile phone. Perhaps you

> > could put forward why it couldn't be explained in such terms?

>

> My position is that we do not currently know how to fully explain

> conciousness and subjective experience.

> Therefore I cannot know (and you cannot know) whether or not the known

> laws of physics can fully explain the behavior of a being without

> reference to the being having subjective experience.

>

> What I believe is the case is that subjective experience are

> ultimately the result of physical processes in my physical brain.

> If this is true then it follows that any explanation of me that

> failed to account for and take into account my subjective

> experiences would be incomplete.

>

> Now an incomplete explanation is still an explanation - and it still

> may be a correct explanation as far as it goes.

>

> Your standard reply that "the laws of physics do not reference

> subjective experience" is an irrelevancy.

> That the laws of physics to not talk about vanilla icecream has no

> bearing on whether or not all of vanilla icecreams properties are

> fully explained by the laws of physics.

>

> Furthermore I am still having trouble with "explained by" .

> This is why.

> My computer is currently running a piece of software - Firefox - and

> another piece of software Windows 2000.

> The electrical switching - the voltage levels and the currents flowing

> through the computers wiring is, I am quite certain, Ultimately the

> cause (the explanation?) of the behavior of the computer - but to

> explain some detail of the high level behavior of Windows in terms of

> voltage levels and switching of MOSFETs would be a ridiculous and

> pointless exercise - it would convey no useful information to a human.

> (A meaningful explanation of a particular behavior would be in terms

> of software - a bug in the C++ module that was responsible for the

> behavior - for example)

> The reason is that the behavior of interest to a human - that the

> computer is displaying text and images etc is very far removed from

> the switching of transistors and currents running through wires - even

> though physically that is all that is going on.

> There are many layers of interpretation and abstraction between the

> physical activity and the gross observable behavior.

> Any "explanation" of the computer behavior in these low level terms

> would look - to a human observer - indistinguishable whether the

> computer was running Windows or Linux or running a spreadsheet or a

> web browser.

>

> I believe ultimately that all that is happening when I experience the

> color red or the taste of honey or feel sad is physical processes

> happening in my physical brain.

> However listing a moment by moment configuration of my neuronal

> activity for every neuron in my cerebral cortex would be as

> meaningless to a human observer as listing all the transistors inside

> my CPU and all their states - it would be a staggeringly huge list of

> data which would be meaningless on a human scale.

> So in one sense the explanation is "neurons are firing" "transistors

> are switching" and in another sense - in the sense of an explanation

> that is meaningful to or understandable to a human mind it is no

> explanation at all.

>

> So the question you must ask yourself is what do you mean by

> "explained"?

>

I mean explained in the sense that a mobile phone and the PC are built

based on the explanation.

So back to reality. Do you understand that:

1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it

had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of

physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/

subjective experiences or not.

June 21, 2007

On 21 Jun, 04:55, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote:

> On Jun 21, 2:30?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > On 20 Jun, 23:51, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote:

>

> > > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> > >news:1182349024.090381.241030@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> > > > So with the substitutions:

>

> > > > M refers to the robot

> > > > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question

> > > > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences.

> > > > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences

>

> > > > would give:

> > > > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it

> > > > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of

> > > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/

> > > > subjective experiences or not.

>

> > > That is what you assert .. you have not shown that to be true. You make the

> > > assumption that subjective experiences cannot be part of the mechanism and

> > > are not part of what the physics is explaining .. you are assuming your own

> > > conclusion.

>

> > > Another problem with your 1 and 2 is that you consider P as indivisible ..

> > > you must either consider it as a whole, or not at all. Eg. in a computer

> > > you can explain how a computer handles the individual electrical impulses

> > > that represent a binary number, without knowing what that number is. That

> > > the bits even represent a number (they might represent something else) does

> > > not need to be known in order to explain the behaviour of the circuits.

>

> > Obviously any robot that follows the known laws of physics can be

> > explained in terms of the known laws of physics. No knowledge of

> > whether anything is experiencing or not is required in any explanation

> > in terms of physics, due to the known laws of physics not mentioning

> > the subject. So it isn't an assertion, it is a FACT.

>

> > Furthermore, any explanation in these terms is quite useful, all our

> > technology relies on such explanations. When are you going to face

> > FACTS?- Hide quoted text -

>

> > - Show quoted text -

>

> Evolution has endowed us human 'biological mechanisms' with the

> ability to understand physical reality with our brains, using the

> information provided by our senses. This evolved because awareness of

> reality is a useful survival trait for an organism, allowing it to

> make rational decisions about its life in the natural environment.

> Awareness is an inherited trait, and it has developed, along with

> brains and the associated sense organs, over billions of generations

> of continuous evolution, from tiny creatures with minuscule awareness

> of light and dark, hot and cold, and so on, to our full-blown human

> 'we understand everything' awareness of reality.

>

> A newly-manufactured robot mechanism has no ancestors, so it has no

> evolved consciousness. Its sense organs (eg television cameras and

> microphones) and methods of understanding information (eg computer

> memory and programs), have not been designed to be at all useful or

> relevant to any conscious understanding of reality, they are just bits

> of metal and plastic arranged (by humans) to perform a rather

> aribitrary mathematical calculation (ie the running program). A robot

> is no more likely to be conscious than an abacus, or a piece of

> paper.

>

I assume you consider the human 'biological mechanisms' to follow the

laws of physics? If so what evolutionary advantage would it be to

consciously experience? Consider an evolutionary mutation that caused

the biological mechanism to be changed in a certain way. Consider how

the change of the mechanism might be advantageous. Now state what

difference it makes whether the mechanistic change is consciously

experienced or not.

Can you understand the following reason btw:

M refers to the physical entity in question.

B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question.

P refers to the a property in question.

Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2),

and P is the same in (1) and (2).

1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring

knowledge of whether it has P or not.

2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the

explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P.

If (1) is true, then (2) is true.

Example 1:

----------

M = a car

B(M) = parked with its engine running

P = its serial number

Which means:

1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of

physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a serial number

or not.

As (1) is true, so is:

2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not affect the car

parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour

could not be the same with or without a serial number.

Example 2:

----------

M = a television

B(M) = television showing a broadcast television program

P = a chalk mark on the side

Which means (1) would be:

1) A television showing a broadcast television program is explained by

the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a

chalk mark on the side or not.

As (1) is true, so is:

2) Presence of a chalk mark on the side, or lack of, does not affect

the television showing a broadcast television program, else the

explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without a chalk

mark on the side.

Example 3:

----------

M = a car

B(M) = parked with its engine running

P = petrol in the tank

Which means (1) would be:

1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of

physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has petrol in the

tank or not.

Which is false, so (2) would also be false:

2) Presence of petrol in the tank, or lack of, does not affect the car

parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour

could not be the same with or without a petrol in the tank.

As you can see, in examples 1 and 2 in which (1) is true in both cases

have B(M) and P the same in both (1) and (2) within the given example.

Example 3 is just an example of where (1) is false, there was no need

to include (2), but did so just to show that if it was included B(M)

and P would be the same in both (1) and (2).

June 21, 2007

On 21 Jun, 09:00, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote:

> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> news:1182389414.480334.251540@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...

>

> > On 20 Jun, 23:51, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote:

> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> >>news:1182349024.090381.241030@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> >> > So with the substitutions:

>

> >> > M refers to the robot

> >> > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question

> >> > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences.

> >> > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences

>

> >> > would give:

> >> > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it

> >> > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of

> >> > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/

> >> > subjective experiences or not.

>

> >> That is what you assert .. you have not shown that to be true. You make

> >> the

> >> assumption that subjective experiences cannot be part of the mechanism

> >> and

> >> are not part of what the physics is explaining .. you are assuming your

> >> own

> >> conclusion.

>

> >> Another problem with your 1 and 2 is that you consider P as indivisible

> >> ..

> >> you must either consider it as a whole, or not at all. Eg. in a computer

> >> you can explain how a computer handles the individual electrical impulses

> >> that represent a binary number, without knowing what that number is.

> >> That

> >> the bits even represent a number (they might represent something else)

> >> does

> >> not need to be known in order to explain the behaviour of the circuits.

>

> I note you were completely unable to refute my counter example above

>

> > Obviously any robot that follows the known laws of physics can be

> > explained in terms of the known laws of physics.

>

> Yes. That does not mean it does not have subjective experiences .. only

> that those experiences can be explained by the laws of physics

>

> > No knowledge of

> > whether anything is experiencing or not is required in any explanation

> > in terms of physics, due to the known laws of physics not mentioning

> > the subject. So it isn't an assertion, it is a FACT.

>

> > Furthermore, any explanation in these terms is quite useful, all our

> > technology relies on such explanations. When are you going to face

> > FACTS?

>

> When are you going to present an actual ARGUMENT?

You've been presented with arguments again and again, you are deaf to

them.

As for your computer example, that brings us onto a point which I had

given you earlier, but went over your head. I'll go into it later,

once you manage to follow some basic points.

Did you see that:

1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it

had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of

physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/

subjective experiences or not.

wasn't an assertion (as you claimed), but a FACT, and that there is no

assumption in it that conscious/subjective experiences are not part of

the mechanism (as you claimed).

June 21, 2007

On Jun 21, 1:17?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

> On 21 Jun, 04:55, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote:

>

> > On Jun 21, 2:30?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > On 20 Jun, 23:51, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote:

>

> > > > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> > > >news:1182349024.090381.241030@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> > > > > So with the substitutions:

>

> > > > > M refers to the robot

> > > > > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question

> > > > > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences.

> > > > > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences

>

> > > > > would give:

> > > > > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it

> > > > > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of

> > > > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/

> > > > > subjective experiences or not.

>

> > > > That is what you assert .. you have not shown that to be true. You make the

> > > > assumption that subjective experiences cannot be part of the mechanism and

> > > > are not part of what the physics is explaining .. you are assuming your own

> > > > conclusion.

>

> > > > Another problem with your 1 and 2 is that you consider P as indivisible ..

> > > > you must either consider it as a whole, or not at all. Eg. in a computer

> > > > you can explain how a computer handles the individual electrical impulses

> > > > that represent a binary number, without knowing what that number is. That

> > > > the bits even represent a number (they might represent something else) does

> > > > not need to be known in order to explain the behaviour of the circuits.

>

> > > Obviously any robot that follows the known laws of physics can be

> > > explained in terms of the known laws of physics. No knowledge of

> > > whether anything is experiencing or not is required in any explanation

> > > in terms of physics, due to the known laws of physics not mentioning

> > > the subject. So it isn't an assertion, it is a FACT.

>

> > > Furthermore, any explanation in these terms is quite useful, all our

> > > technology relies on such explanations. When are you going to face

> > > FACTS?- Hide quoted text -

>

> > > - Show quoted text -

>

> > Evolution has endowed us human 'biological mechanisms' with the

> > ability to understand physical reality with our brains, using the

> > information provided by our senses. This evolved because awareness of

> > reality is a useful survival trait for an organism, allowing it to

> > make rational decisions about its life in the natural environment.

> > Awareness is an inherited trait, and it has developed, along with

> > brains and the associated sense organs, over billions of generations

> > of continuous evolution, from tiny creatures with minuscule awareness

> > of light and dark, hot and cold, and so on, to our full-blown human

> > 'we understand everything' awareness of reality.

>

> > A newly-manufactured robot mechanism has no ancestors, so it has no

> > evolved consciousness. Its sense organs (eg television cameras and

> > microphones) and methods of understanding information (eg computer

> > memory and programs), have not been designed to be at all useful or

> > relevant to any conscious understanding of reality, they are just bits

> > of metal and plastic arranged (by humans) to perform a rather

> > aribitrary mathematical calculation (ie the running program). A robot

> > is no more likely to be conscious than an abacus, or a piece of

> > paper.

>

> I assume you consider the human 'biological mechanisms' to follow the

> laws of physics? If so what evolutionary advantage would it be to

> consciously experience? Consider an evolutionary mutation that caused

> the biological mechanism to be changed in a certain way. Consider how

> the change of the mechanism might be advantageous. Now state what

> difference it makes whether the mechanistic change is consciously

> experienced or not.

Biological senses have evolved to sense reality, which is obviously a

useful evolutionary trait (the sense of smell smells real food, not

imaginary food, or it would be useless) otherwise they would not have

evolved. We are aware of our senses => our senses are aware of

reality => we are aware of reality (ie we are conscious).

June 21, 2007

On 21 Jun, 14:36, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote:

> On Jun 21, 1:17?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > On 21 Jun, 04:55, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote:

>

> > > On Jun 21, 2:30?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > > On 20 Jun, 23:51, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote:

>

> > > > > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> > > > >news:1182349024.090381.241030@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> > > > > > So with the substitutions:

>

> > > > > > M refers to the robot

> > > > > > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question

> > > > > > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences.

> > > > > > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences

>

> > > > > > would give:

> > > > > > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it

> > > > > > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of

> > > > > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/

> > > > > > subjective experiences or not.

>

> > > > > That is what you assert .. you have not shown that to be true. You make the

> > > > > assumption that subjective experiences cannot be part of the mechanism and

> > > > > are not part of what the physics is explaining .. you are assuming your own

> > > > > conclusion.

>

> > > > > Another problem with your 1 and 2 is that you consider P as indivisible ..

> > > > > you must either consider it as a whole, or not at all. Eg. in a computer

> > > > > you can explain how a computer handles the individual electrical impulses

> > > > > that represent a binary number, without knowing what that number is. That

> > > > > the bits even represent a number (they might represent something else) does

> > > > > not need to be known in order to explain the behaviour of the circuits.

>

> > > > Obviously any robot that follows the known laws of physics can be

> > > > explained in terms of the known laws of physics. No knowledge of

> > > > whether anything is experiencing or not is required in any explanation

> > > > in terms of physics, due to the known laws of physics not mentioning

> > > > the subject. So it isn't an assertion, it is a FACT.

>

> > > > Furthermore, any explanation in these terms is quite useful, all our

> > > > technology relies on such explanations. When are you going to face

> > > > FACTS?- Hide quoted text -

>

> > > > - Show quoted text -

>

> > > Evolution has endowed us human 'biological mechanisms' with the

> > > ability to understand physical reality with our brains, using the

> > > information provided by our senses. This evolved because awareness of

> > > reality is a useful survival trait for an organism, allowing it to

> > > make rational decisions about its life in the natural environment.

> > > Awareness is an inherited trait, and it has developed, along with

> > > brains and the associated sense organs, over billions of generations

> > > of continuous evolution, from tiny creatures with minuscule awareness

> > > of light and dark, hot and cold, and so on, to our full-blown human

> > > 'we understand everything' awareness of reality.

>

> > > A newly-manufactured robot mechanism has no ancestors, so it has no

> > > evolved consciousness. Its sense organs (eg television cameras and

> > > microphones) and methods of understanding information (eg computer

> > > memory and programs), have not been designed to be at all useful or

> > > relevant to any conscious understanding of reality, they are just bits

> > > of metal and plastic arranged (by humans) to perform a rather

> > > aribitrary mathematical calculation (ie the running program). A robot

> > > is no more likely to be conscious than an abacus, or a piece of

> > > paper.

>

> > I assume you consider the human 'biological mechanisms' to follow the

> > laws of physics? If so what evolutionary advantage would it be to

> > consciously experience? Consider an evolutionary mutation that caused

> > the biological mechanism to be changed in a certain way. Consider how

> > the change of the mechanism might be advantageous. Now state what

> > difference it makes whether the mechanistic change is consciously

> > experienced or not.

>

> Biological senses have evolved to sense reality, which is obviously a

> useful evolutionary trait (the sense of smell smells real food, not

> imaginary food, or it would be useless) otherwise they would not have

> evolved. We are aware of our senses => our senses are aware of

> reality => we are aware of reality (ie we are conscious).

>

Yeah, yeah, I know your story, I asked you a question, which you

avoided answering, or maybe didn't understand. What difference would

it make whether the evolved mechanism which detects properties of its

environment, as in detecting chemical compounds in the air etc, was

consciously experienced as smell? What difference would it make to the

way the mechanism behaves, considering that way it behaves would be

simply governed by the rules of physics, in a similar way to a robot.

June 21, 2007

On 21 Jun, 16:24, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

> On 21 Jun, 14:36, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote:

>

> > On Jun 21, 1:17?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > On 21 Jun, 04:55, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote:

>

> > > > On Jun 21, 2:30?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > > > On 20 Jun, 23:51, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote:

>

> > > > > > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

>

> > > > > >news:1182349024.090381.241030@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com...

>

> > > > > > > So with the substitutions:

>

> > > > > > > M refers to the robot

> > > > > > > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question

> > > > > > > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences.

> > > > > > > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences

>

> > > > > > > would give:

> > > > > > > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it

> > > > > > > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of

> > > > > > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/

> > > > > > > subjective experiences or not.

>

> > > > > > That is what you assert .. you have not shown that to be true. You make the

> > > > > > assumption that subjective experiences cannot be part of the mechanism and

> > > > > > are not part of what the physics is explaining .. you are assuming your own

> > > > > > conclusion.

>

> > > > > > Another problem with your 1 and 2 is that you consider P as indivisible ..

> > > > > > you must either consider it as a whole, or not at all. Eg. in a computer

> > > > > > you can explain how a computer handles the individual electrical impulses

> > > > > > that represent a binary number, without knowing what that number is. That

> > > > > > the bits even represent a number (they might represent something else) does

> > > > > > not need to be known in order to explain the behaviour of the circuits.

>

> > > > > Obviously any robot that follows the known laws of physics can be

> > > > > explained in terms of the known laws of physics. No knowledge of

> > > > > whether anything is experiencing or not is required in any explanation

> > > > > in terms of physics, due to the known laws of physics not mentioning

> > > > > the subject. So it isn't an assertion, it is a FACT.

>

> > > > > Furthermore, any explanation in these terms is quite useful, all our

> > > > > technology relies on such explanations. When are you going to face

> > > > > FACTS?- Hide quoted text -

>

> > > > > - Show quoted text -

>

> > > > Evolution has endowed us human 'biological mechanisms' with the

> > > > ability to understand physical reality with our brains, using the

> > > > information provided by our senses. This evolved because awareness of

> > > > reality is a useful survival trait for an organism, allowing it to

> > > > make rational decisions about its life in the natural environment.

> > > > Awareness is an inherited trait, and it has developed, along with

> > > > brains and the associated sense organs, over billions of generations

> > > > of continuous evolution, from tiny creatures with minuscule awareness

> > > > of light and dark, hot and cold, and so on, to our full-blown human

> > > > 'we understand everything' awareness of reality.

>

> > > > A newly-manufactured robot mechanism has no ancestors, so it has no

> > > > evolved consciousness. Its sense organs (eg television cameras and

> > > > microphones) and methods of understanding information (eg computer

> > > > memory and programs), have not been designed to be at all useful or

> > > > relevant to any conscious understanding of reality, they are just bits

> > > > of metal and plastic arranged (by humans) to perform a rather

> > > > aribitrary mathematical calculation (ie the running program). A robot

> > > > is no more likely to be conscious than an abacus, or a piece of

> > > > paper.

>

> > > I assume you consider the human 'biological mechanisms' to follow the

> > > laws of physics? If so what evolutionary advantage would it be to

> > > consciously experience? Consider an evolutionary mutation that caused

> > > the biological mechanism to be changed in a certain way. Consider how

> > > the change of the mechanism might be advantageous. Now state what

> > > difference it makes whether the mechanistic change is consciously

> > > experienced or not.

>

> > Biological senses have evolved to sense reality, which is obviously a

> > useful evolutionary trait (the sense of smell smells real food, not

> > imaginary food, or it would be useless) otherwise they would not have

> > evolved. We are aware of our senses => our senses are aware of

> > reality => we are aware of reality (ie we are conscious).

>

(Just reposted and cleared up for ease of understanding)

Yeah, yeah, I know your story, I asked you a question, which you

avoided answering, or maybe didn't understand. What difference would

it make whether the evolved mechanism which detects properties of its

environment, as in detecting chemical compounds in the air etc,

consciously experienced what was detected as smell? The way the

organism detected the chemicals, and the way it responded to any

detection would be simply governed by the rules of physics, in a

similar way to a robot. When you can grasp this, you will understand

that the idea that consciously experiencing anything would be any

evolutionary advantage (as you claimed) is a deception.

June 21, 2007

On Jun 21, 4:24?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: