Guest Jeckyl Posted June 22, 2007 Posted June 22, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1182428656.910092.289300@q69g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > You've been presented with arguments again and again, you are deaf to > them. No .. I've not been .. only with assertion, and partial arguments based on them Please .. one consise post with your argument presented is all I'm asking for .. you seem incapable of that. > As for your computer example, that brings us onto a point which I had > given you earlier, but went over your head. I'll go into it later, No .. do it now .. none of this "later" nonsense.. that's the thing .. you give a couple of assertions, half and agument and then say you'll finish it off later .. it appears you don't acutalyl HAVE a complete argument to make. > once you manage to follow some basic points. In other words, you want me to agree to your argument before you make it. > Did you see that: > > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/ > subjective experiences or not. > > wasn't an assertion (as you claimed), but a FACT, and that there is no > assumption in it that conscious/subjective experiences are not part of > the mechanism (as you claimed). Yes .. but your 2 does not hold from 1. You statements 2 and 1 imply that the property is atomic. It also does not mean that a correct explanation does not exist that DOES include subjective experiences .. which then means they ARE influential. You make too many unwritten assumptions here. Now .. step up to the plate .. PUT YOUR ENTIRE ARUGMENT FORWARD IN ONE POST. Can you do it? Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 22, 2007 Posted June 22, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1182439494.389731.70330@u2g2000hsc.googlegroups.com... > Yeah, yeah, I know your story, I asked you a question, which you > avoided answering, or maybe didn't understand. Like you being asked to post your argument in one posts .. you just avoid doing it. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 22, 2007 Posted June 22, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1182453032.123453.129740@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > What difference would it make whether the evolved mechanism which > detects properties of its environment, as in detecting chemical > compounds in the air etc, consciously experienced what was detected as > smell? First .. you explain the difference between detecting compounds in the air and consciously experiencing them. Then we can address which would be more advantageous. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 22, 2007 Posted June 22, 2007 "James Norris" <JimNorris01@aol.com> wrote in message news:1182452461.779571.226640@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > In answer to your question, there would not be much difference in > behaviour, if you look at a concious being or a non-conscious robot > performing the same activity. Indeed .. his M, B(M), P argument has many flaws. That a robot pushed off a cliff falls down, and a human with subjective experiences pushed off a cliff also falls down, does not imply that humans have no subjective experience. Or that a human and a robot can both identically perform the behaviour of pouring a glass of milk does not mean that the reason for the human performing that behaviour is subjective experience (it likes milk and wants a drink) .. it depends on the completeness of the explanation. For it to be somehow relevant we would have to know that For ALL POSSIBLE B(M), that it is the case that NO explanation of B(M) includes P (nor any component that constitutes P, nor any other property Q that IS influenced by P etc) .. THEN we could say that P has no influence on the behaviours of M. But someone2 hasn't been able to do that. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 22, 2007 Posted June 22, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1182462508.650418.192760@u2g2000hsc.googlegroups.com... > On 21 Jun, 22:02, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > No, that isn't what I was getting to. It was the point that there > would be no actual advantage to the conscious experience of smell. The > way the mechanism detects the chemicals in the air, and responds to > them, is simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of > physics And how is that different to cousciously experiencing the smell? > Though, if your story was correct, and conceptually the system was > copied to a man made robotic system, like you suggested, whether that > system had any conscious experiences or not (possibly conscious > experiences only being found in biological systems), wouldn't > influence the way it behaved i.e. it'd behave just the same. That same as what? The same as the biological system? Then yes .. so if the biological system had conssios experiences, then so would the robotic system .. if it didn't it would not be a copy of the biological system. Of course, if you made it a copy of the biological system, it too would be a biological system .. if it wasn't, it wouldn't be a copy, would it? Quote
Guest James Norris Posted June 22, 2007 Posted June 22, 2007 On Jun 21, 10:48?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 21 Jun, 22:02, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > On Jun 21, 8:10?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > On 21 Jun, 20:03, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > On Jun 21, 5:36?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 21 Jun, 16:24, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 14:36, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On Jun 21, 1:17?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 04:55, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On Jun 21, 2:30?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 20 Jun, 23:51, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > > > > > > > > > >news:1182349024.090381.241030@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > > > > > > > > > > > > So with the substitutions: > > > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the robot > > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question > > > > > > > > > > > > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > > > > > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences > > > > > > > > > > > > > would give: > > > > > > > > > > > > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it > > > > > > > > > > > > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of > > > > > > > > > > > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/ > > > > > > > > > > > > subjective experiences or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > That is what you assert .. you have not shown that to be true. You make the > > > > > > > > > > > assumption that subjective experiences cannot be part of the mechanism and > > > > > > > > > > > are not part of what the physics is explaining .. you are assuming your own > > > > > > > > > > > conclusion. > > > > > > > > > > > > Another problem with your 1 and 2 is that you consider P as indivisible .. > > > > > > > > > > > you must either consider it as a whole, or not at all. Eg. in a computer > > > > > > > > > > > you can explain how a computer handles the individual electrical impulses > > > > > > > > > > > that represent a binary number, without knowing what that number is. That > > > > > > > > > > > the bits even represent a number (they might represent something else) does > > > > > > > > > > > not need to be known in order to explain the behaviour of the circuits. > > > > > > > > > > > Obviously any robot that follows the known laws of physics can be > > > > > > > > > > explained in terms of the known laws of physics. No knowledge of > > > > > > > > > > whether anything is experiencing or not is required in any explanation > > > > > > > > > > in terms of physics, due to the known laws of physics not mentioning > > > > > > > > > > the subject. So it isn't an assertion, it is a FACT. > > > > > > > > > > > Furthermore, any explanation in these terms is quite useful, all our > > > > > > > > > > technology relies on such explanations. When are you going to face > > > > > > > > > > FACTS?- Hide quoted text - > > > > > > > > > > > - Show quoted text - > > > > > > > > > > Evolution has endowed us human 'biological mechanisms' with the > > > > > > > > > ability to understand physical reality with our brains, using the > > > > > > > > > information provided by our senses. This evolved because awareness of > > > > > > > > > reality is a useful survival trait for an organism, allowing it to > > > > > > > > > make rational decisions about its life in the natural environment. > > > > > > > > > Awareness is an inherited trait, and it has developed, along with > > > > > > > > > brains and the associated sense organs, over billions of generations > > > > > > > > > of continuous evolution, from tiny creatures with minuscule awareness > > > > > > > > > of light and dark, hot and cold, and so on, to our full-blown human > > > > > > > > > 'we understand everything' awareness of reality. > > > > > > > > > > A newly-manufactured robot mechanism has no ancestors, so it has no > > > > > > > > > evolved consciousness. Its sense organs (eg television cameras and > > > > > > > > > microphones) and methods of understanding information (eg computer > > > > > > > > > memory and programs), have not been designed to be at all useful or > > > > > > > > > relevant to any conscious understanding of reality, they are just bits > > > > > > > > > of metal and plastic arranged (by humans) to perform a rather > > > > > > > > > aribitrary mathematical calculation (ie the running program). A robot > > > > > > > > > is no more likely to be conscious than an abacus, or a piece of > > > > > > > > > paper. > > > > > > > > > I assume you consider the human 'biological mechanisms' to follow the > > > > > > > > laws of physics? If so what evolutionary advantage would it be to > > > > > > > > consciously experience? Consider an evolutionary mutation that caused > > > > > > > > the biological mechanism to be changed in a certain way. Consider how > > > > > > > > the change of the mechanism might be advantageous. Now state what > > > > > > > > difference it makes whether the mechanistic change is consciously > > > > > > > > experienced or not. > > > > > > > > Biological senses have evolved to sense reality, which is obviously a > > > > > > > useful evolutionary trait (the sense of smell smells real food, not > > > > > > > imaginary food, or it would be useless) otherwise they would not have > > > > > > > evolved. We are aware of our senses => our senses are aware of > > > > > > > reality => we are aware of reality (ie we are conscious). > > > > > > (Just reposted and cleared up for ease of understanding) > > > > > > Yeah, yeah, I know your story, I asked you a question, which you > > > > > avoided answering, or maybe didn't understand. What difference would > > > > > it make whether the evolved mechanism which detects properties of its > > > > > environment, as in detecting chemical compounds in the air etc, > > > > > consciously experienced what was detected as smell? The way the > > > > > organism detected the chemicals, and the way it responded to any > > > > > detection would be simply governed by the rules of physics, in a > > > > > similar way to a robot. When you can grasp this, you will understand > > > > > that the idea that consciously experiencing anything would be any > > > > > evolutionary advantage (as you claimed) is a deception. > > > > > Now you're starting to sound like a madman. Who's trying to deceive > > > > anyone with the idea that consciousness gives an evolutionary > > > > advantage? I'm more conscious than a plant, that's why I eat plants > > > > and plants don't eat me! > > > > > You seem to think that consciousness it not governed by the laws of > > > > physics, but it is. There is no doubt that biological organisms ARE > > > > conscious (ie aware of reality) because evolution has evolved > > > > organisms to be aware of their surroundings (ie conscious). A robot > > > > would be extremely unlikely to be aware of anything at all, but an > > > > evolved biological organism would be aware that it is smelling > > > > something, for example, because that is what the sense of smell is. > > > > > In answer to your question, there would not be much difference in > > > > behaviour, if you look at a concious being or a non-conscious robot > > > > performing the same activity. > > > > Well I saw in your response the ad-hominid attack, and the restatement > > > of your story, but where was the answer to the question: > > > > What difference would it make whether the evolved mechanism which > > > detects properties of its environment, as in detecting chemical > > > compounds in the air etc, consciously experienced what was detected as > > > smell? > > > The difference would be that a biological mechanism which consciously > > experienced smells would be conscious, and a robot mechanism which > > could not experience (have awareness of) them would not be conscious. > > What's your point? > > > Perhaps you are saying that the behavior (of the evolved organism) > > might be the same whether or not it was conscious? It might be, but > > if you build a robot to imitate a conscious organism, the behavior > > would be (look) the same, but the robot would not be conscious. > > > The awareness of a smell is represented by the arrangement of > > (bioelectrically) active neurons in the conscious organism's brain. > > You seem to be gradually getting round to arguing that if you isolated > > this arrangement of neurons, and transferred it into a system of > > electric wires and batteries, logically it would be 'the same as' a > > conscious awareness of the particular smell, in some way. You could > > isolate lots of similar subjective experiences, and perhaps plug them > > all together to end up with a conscious robot? Is that what you mean? > > No, that isn't what I was getting to. It was the point that there > would be no actual advantage to the conscious experience of smell. The > way the mechanism detects the chemicals in the air, and responds to > them, is simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of > physics, and isn't influenced by whether it was consciously > experienced or not. I disagree with you there, as I tried to explain in my first posting to your thread: > > > > > > > > > information provided by our senses. This evolved because awareness of > > > > > > > > > reality is a useful survival trait for an organism, allowing it to > > > > > > > > > make rational decisions about its life in the natural environment. The conscious awareness of reality, which allows the organism to think about a situation, using its brain, and then decide on a course of action, has in fact evolved, so it must have an evolutionary benefit. Presumably, rational (ie thought about, rather than automatic) decisions have an edge over purely automatic ones, in some species at least. The organism decides what to do about the smell because of neuronal activity based on its previous subjective and personal experiences, rather than 'automatically' reacting biochemically with the molecules of the smell directly, like plantlife. > Though, if your story was correct, and conceptually the system was > copied to a man made robotic system, like you suggested, whether that > system had any conscious experiences or not (possibly conscious > experiences only being found in biological systems), wouldn't > influence the way it behaved i.e. it'd behave just the same. That's > correct isn't it. I'm not sure whether you are correct there. What you call copying [patterns of neuronal bioelectrical activity corresponding to conscious awareness of a smell] to a robotic system wouldn't result in consciousness in the robot, but the robot's behaviour might be arranged by the manufacturers so it copied the original behaviour corresponding to the consciousness. You wouldn't be resurrecting a dead person's awareness of talking if you built a robot that copied the persons speech while they were alive, so why would the robot with the copied smell patterns be any different? - the patterns are only copies, like a photograph perhaps, and not the real thing. If you copied patterns of neuronal activity from one brain to another conscious brain, that is quite likely to have the same influence on the behavior of the 'receiving' brain as it did on the original 'thinker'. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 22, 2007 Posted June 22, 2007 On 22 Jun, 04:07, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > On Jun 21, 10:48?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > On 21 Jun, 22:02, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > On Jun 21, 8:10?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 21 Jun, 20:03, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > On Jun 21, 5:36?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 16:24, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 14:36, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On Jun 21, 1:17?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 04:55, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On Jun 21, 2:30?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On 20 Jun, 23:51, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > > > > > > > > > > >news:1182349024.090381.241030@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > > > > > > > > > > > > > So with the substitutions: > > > > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the robot > > > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question > > > > > > > > > > > > > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > > > > > > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences > > > > > > > > > > > > > > would give: > > > > > > > > > > > > > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it > > > > > > > > > > > > > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of > > > > > > > > > > > > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > subjective experiences or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > That is what you assert .. you have not shown that to be true. You make the > > > > > > > > > > > > assumption that subjective experiences cannot be part of the mechanism and > > > > > > > > > > > > are not part of what the physics is explaining .. you are assuming your own > > > > > > > > > > > > conclusion. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Another problem with your 1 and 2 is that you consider P as indivisible .. > > > > > > > > > > > > you must either consider it as a whole, or not at all. Eg. in a computer > > > > > > > > > > > > you can explain how a computer handles the individual electrical impulses > > > > > > > > > > > > that represent a binary number, without knowing what that number is. That > > > > > > > > > > > > the bits even represent a number (they might represent something else) does > > > > > > > > > > > > not need to be known in order to explain the behaviour of the circuits. > > > > > > > > > > > > Obviously any robot that follows the known laws of physics can be > > > > > > > > > > > explained in terms of the known laws of physics. No knowledge of > > > > > > > > > > > whether anything is experiencing or not is required in any explanation > > > > > > > > > > > in terms of physics, due to the known laws of physics not mentioning > > > > > > > > > > > the subject. So it isn't an assertion, it is a FACT. > > > > > > > > > > > > Furthermore, any explanation in these terms is quite useful, all our > > > > > > > > > > > technology relies on such explanations. When are you going to face > > > > > > > > > > > FACTS?- Hide quoted text - > > > > > > > > > > > > - Show quoted text - > > > > > > > > > > > Evolution has endowed us human 'biological mechanisms' with the > > > > > > > > > > ability to understand physical reality with our brains, using the > > > > > > > > > > information provided by our senses. This evolved because awareness of > > > > > > > > > > reality is a useful survival trait for an organism, allowing it to > > > > > > > > > > make rational decisions about its life in the natural environment. > > > > > > > > > > Awareness is an inherited trait, and it has developed, along with > > > > > > > > > > brains and the associated sense organs, over billions of generations > > > > > > > > > > of continuous evolution, from tiny creatures with minuscule awareness > > > > > > > > > > of light and dark, hot and cold, and so on, to our full-blown human > > > > > > > > > > 'we understand everything' awareness of reality. > > > > > > > > > > > A newly-manufactured robot mechanism has no ancestors, so it has no > > > > > > > > > > evolved consciousness. Its sense organs (eg television cameras and > > > > > > > > > > microphones) and methods of understanding information (eg computer > > > > > > > > > > memory and programs), have not been designed to be at all useful or > > > > > > > > > > relevant to any conscious understanding of reality, they are just bits > > > > > > > > > > of metal and plastic arranged (by humans) to perform a rather > > > > > > > > > > aribitrary mathematical calculation (ie the running program). A robot > > > > > > > > > > is no more likely to be conscious than an abacus, or a piece of > > > > > > > > > > paper. > > > > > > > > > > I assume you consider the human 'biological mechanisms' to follow the > > > > > > > > > laws of physics? If so what evolutionary advantage would it be to > > > > > > > > > consciously experience? Consider an evolutionary mutation that caused > > > > > > > > > the biological mechanism to be changed in a certain way. Consider how > > > > > > > > > the change of the mechanism might be advantageous. Now state what > > > > > > > > > difference it makes whether the mechanistic change is consciously > > > > > > > > > experienced or not. > > > > > > > > > Biological senses have evolved to sense reality, which is obviously a > > > > > > > > useful evolutionary trait (the sense of smell smells real food, not > > > > > > > > imaginary food, or it would be useless) otherwise they would not have > > > > > > > > evolved. We are aware of our senses => our senses are aware of > > > > > > > > reality => we are aware of reality (ie we are conscious). > > > > > > > (Just reposted and cleared up for ease of understanding) > > > > > > > Yeah, yeah, I know your story, I asked you a question, which you > > > > > > avoided answering, or maybe didn't understand. What difference would > > > > > > it make whether the evolved mechanism which detects properties of its > > > > > > environment, as in detecting chemical compounds in the air etc, > > > > > > consciously experienced what was detected as smell? The way the > > > > > > organism detected the chemicals, and the way it responded to any > > > > > > detection would be simply governed by the rules of physics, in a > > > > > > similar way to a robot. When you can grasp this, you will understand > > > > > > that the idea that consciously experiencing anything would be any > > > > > > evolutionary advantage (as you claimed) is a deception. > > > > > > Now you're starting to sound like a madman. Who's trying to deceive > > > > > anyone with the idea that consciousness gives an evolutionary > > > > > advantage? I'm more conscious than a plant, that's why I eat plants > > > > > and plants don't eat me! > > > > > > You seem to think that consciousness it not governed by the laws of > > > > > physics, but it is. There is no doubt that biological organisms ARE > > > > > conscious (ie aware of reality) because evolution has evolved > > > > > organisms to be aware of their surroundings (ie conscious). A robot > > > > > would be extremely unlikely to be aware of anything at all, but an > > > > > evolved biological organism would be aware that it is smelling > > > > > something, for example, because that is what the sense of smell is. > > > > > > In answer to your question, there would not be much difference in > > > > > behaviour, if you look at a concious being or a non-conscious robot > > > > > performing the same activity. > > > > > Well I saw in your response the ad-hominid attack, and the restatement > > > > of your story, but where was the answer to the question: > > > > > What difference would it make whether the evolved mechanism which > > > > detects properties of its environment, as in detecting chemical > > > > compounds in the air etc, consciously experienced what was detected as > > > > smell? > > > > The difference would be that a biological mechanism which consciously > > > experienced smells would be conscious, and a robot mechanism which > > > could not experience (have awareness of) them would not be conscious. > > > What's your point? > > > > Perhaps you are saying that the behavior (of the evolved organism) > > > might be the same whether or not it was conscious? It might be, but > > > if you build a robot to imitate a conscious organism, the behavior > > > would be (look) the same, but the robot would not be conscious. > > > > The awareness of a smell is represented by the arrangement of > > > (bioelectrically) active neurons in the conscious organism's brain. > > > You seem to be gradually getting round to arguing that if you isolated > > > this arrangement of neurons, and transferred it into a system of > > > electric wires and batteries, logically it would be 'the same as' a > > > conscious awareness of the particular smell, in some way. You could > > > isolate lots of similar subjective experiences, and perhaps plug them > > > all together to end up with a conscious robot? Is that what you mean? > > > No, that isn't what I was getting to. It was the point that there > > would be no actual advantage to the conscious experience of smell. The > > way the mechanism detects the chemicals in the air, and responds to > > them, is simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of > > physics, and isn't influenced by whether it was consciously > > experienced or not. > > I disagree with you there, as I tried to explain in my first posting > to your thread: > > > > > > > > > > > information provided by our senses. This evolved because awareness of > > > > > > > > > > reality is a useful survival trait for an organism, allowing it to > > > > > > > > > > make rational decisions about its life in the natural environment. > > The conscious awareness of reality, which allows the organism to think > about a situation, using its brain, and then decide on a course of > action, has in fact evolved, so it must have an evolutionary benefit. > Presumably, rational (ie thought about, rather than automatic) > decisions have an edge over purely automatic ones, in some species at > least. The organism decides what to do about the smell because of > neuronal activity based on its previous subjective and personal > experiences, rather than 'automatically' reacting biochemically with > the molecules of the smell directly, like plantlife. > > > Though, if your story was correct, and conceptually the system was > > copied to a man made robotic system, like you suggested, whether that > > system had any conscious experiences or not (possibly conscious > > experiences only being found in biological systems), wouldn't > > influence the way it behaved i.e. it'd behave just the same. That's > > correct isn't it. > > I'm not sure whether you are correct there. What you call copying > [patterns of neuronal bioelectrical activity corresponding to > conscious awareness of a smell] to a robotic system wouldn't result in > consciousness in the robot, but the robot's behaviour might be > arranged by the manufacturers so it copied the original behaviour > corresponding to the consciousness. You wouldn't be resurrecting a > dead person's awareness of talking if you built a robot that copied > the persons speech while they were alive, so why would the robot with > the copied smell patterns be any different? - the patterns are only > copies, like a photograph perhaps, and not the real thing. If you > copied patterns of neuronal activity from one brain to another > conscious brain, that is quite likely to have the same influence on > the behavior of the 'receiving' brain as it did on the original > 'thinker'. Your reasoning is fluffy to say the least. The mechanism is copied in the conceptual scenario, that you brought up. How couldn't it cause the same behaviour if there were no conscious experiences? Surely in both cases, the behaviour would simply be the result of the mechanism following the laws of physics. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 22, 2007 Posted June 22, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1182512129.128101.48550@u2g2000hsc.googlegroups.com... > Your reasoning is fluffy to say the least. The mechanism is copied > in the conceptual scenario, that you brought up. How couldn't it cause > the same behaviour if there were no conscious experiences? Surely in > both cases, the behaviour would simply be the result of the mechanism > following the laws of physics. And that mechanism, and its subjective experiences, follow the laws of physics. You have yet to show that subjective experiences, and the mechanisms that encode them, do not follow the laws of physics. Do you know of any behaviour in human beings (which we know have subjective experiences) that is outside the laws of physics? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 22, 2007 Posted June 22, 2007 On 22 Jun, 15:06, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1182512129.128101.48550@u2g2000hsc.googlegroups.com... > > > Your reasoning is fluffy to say the least. The mechanism is copied > > in the conceptual scenario, that you brought up. How couldn't it cause > > the same behaviour if there were no conscious experiences? Surely in > > both cases, the behaviour would simply be the result of the mechanism > > following the laws of physics. > > And that mechanism, and its subjective experiences, follow the laws of > physics. > > You have yet to show that subjective experiences, and the mechanisms that > encode them, do not follow the laws of physics. > > Do you know of any behaviour in human beings (which we know have subjective > experiences) that is outside the laws of physics? You just avoided addressing the point made. If the story that we were simply a biological mechanism strictly following the laws of physics were true, then surely that would mean that at some future time, if we knew how the whole mechanism worked, the whole mechanism could be emulated in a robot. If the signals sent to the subjects (that the robot was based on) brain were recorded for an hour, and once the robot brain were built, the robot brain should behave the same, if the same signals were sent. Any differences being explained in terms of chaos theory due to differences in the subjects brain, and the robotic simulation of it. Though as this is only a conceptual question, these can be ignored, and it be assumed that the robotic simulation accurately simulated the brain. This would be the case, if the story you believe in were true, wouldn't it. No I don't know of any observed behaviour in humans at the cellular level that is outside the laws of physics. That doesn't mean there isn't any. Quote
Guest Sippuddin Posted June 22, 2007 Posted June 22, 2007 Jeckyl wrote: > > ... That a robot pushed off a > cliff falls down, and a human with subjective experiences pushed off a cliff > also falls down, does not imply that humans have no subjective experience. It's not the falling that hurts, it's the sudden impact with the ground at the end of the experience that does. 'experience' usually means events gone through wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn Are you saying that the one will have gone through destruction at the bottom of the cliff but the other will not?? That would be a pretty stout robot! If you just mean the experience of falling through space, then why can't we provide the robot with the same sort of motion-sensing equipment, including visual apparatus the human has so that the perceptions of both are equal? If not, then what's your operational definition of 'experience'? operational definition: a description of something in terms of how it is actually observed and measured. http://preview.tinyurl.com/248ept Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 22, 2007 Posted June 22, 2007 On 22 Jun, 17:14, Sippuddin <s...@macrosoft.net> wrote: > Jeckyl wrote: > > > ... That a robot pushed off a > > cliff falls down, and a human with subjective experiences pushed off a cliff > > also falls down, does not imply that humans have no subjective experience. > > > It's not the falling that hurts, it's the sudden impact with the ground > at the end of the experience that does. > > 'experience' usually means events gone through > wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn > > Are you saying that the one will have gone through destruction at the > bottom of the cliff but the other will not?? That would be a pretty > stout robot! > > If you just mean the experience of falling through space, then why can't > we provide the robot with the same sort of motion-sensing equipment, > including visual apparatus the human has so that the perceptions of both > are equal? > > If not, then what's your operational definition of 'experience'? > > operational definition: a description of something in terms of how it is > actually observed and measured. > > http://preview.tinyurl.com/248ept What label would you apply to the subjective/conscious experiences that you have, or do you deny that you have any? An example of one might be the experience of pain. Quote
Guest Fred Stone Posted June 22, 2007 Posted June 22, 2007 someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in news:1182522821.352916.189690@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com: > On 22 Jun, 15:06, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1182512129.128101.48550@u2g2000hsc.googlegroups.com... >> >> > Your reasoning is fluffy to say the least. The mechanism is >> > copied in the conceptual scenario, that you brought up. How >> > couldn't it cause the same behaviour if there were no conscious >> > experiences? Surely in both cases, the behaviour would simply be >> > the result of the mechanism following the laws of physics. >> >> And that mechanism, and its subjective experiences, follow the laws >> of physics. >> >> You have yet to show that subjective experiences, and the mechanisms >> that encode them, do not follow the laws of physics. >> >> Do you know of any behaviour in human beings (which we know have >> subjective experiences) that is outside the laws of physics? > > You just avoided addressing the point made. If the story that we were > simply a biological mechanism strictly following the laws of physics > were true, then surely that would mean that at some future time, if we > knew how the whole mechanism worked, the whole mechanism could be > emulated in a robot. If the signals sent to the subjects (that the > robot was based on) brain were recorded for an hour, and once the > robot brain were built, the robot brain should behave the same, if the > same signals were sent. Any differences being explained in terms of > chaos theory due to differences in the subjects brain, and the robotic > simulation of it. Though as this is only a conceptual question, these > can be ignored, and it be assumed that the robotic simulation > accurately simulated the brain. This would be the case, if the story > you believe in were true, wouldn't it. > Where are you going with this, Glenn? How about you just go there and skip all the preliminaries? > No I don't know of any observed behaviour in humans at the cellular > level that is outside the laws of physics. That doesn't mean there > isn't any. > When you come up with some concrete evidence, let us know. -- Fred Stone aa# 1369 "When they put out that deadline, people realized that we were going to lose," said an aide to an anti-war lawmaker. "Everything after that seemed like posturing." Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 23, 2007 Posted June 23, 2007 "Sippuddin" <sipp@macrosoft.net> wrote in message news:_q-dnWeKNLTKaObbnZ2dnUVZ_vKunZ2d@comcast.com... > Jeckyl wrote: > >> >> ... That a robot pushed off a cliff falls down, and a human with >> subjective experiences pushed off a cliff also falls down, does not imply >> that humans have no subjective experience. > > It's not the falling that hurts, it's the sudden impact with the ground at > the end of the experience that does. Just like whales and flowers that suddenly appear from nowhere above a planet > 'experience' usually means events gone through > wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn eh? > Are you saying that the one will have gone through destruction at the > bottom of the cliff but the other will not?? That would be a pretty stout > robot! > If you just mean the experience of falling through space, then why can't > we provide the robot with the same sort of motion-sensing equipment, > including visual apparatus the human has so that the perceptions of both > are equal? > > If not, then what's your operational definition of 'experience'? > > > operational definition: a description of something in terms of how it is > actually observed and measured. > > http://preview.tinyurl.com/248ept As usual, you have the whole question backwards The point is whether it is a robot, or a human with subjective experiences, it still falls the same way following the laws of physics. Others here (someone2) argues that that must mean that subjective experiences do not have any influence on behaviour .. or else humans do NOT follow the laws of physics .. and he seems to be saying that as we know subjective experience has an effect, that means humans don't follow the laws of physics. However, he has yet to actually put his entire argument forward .. just the odd assertion here and partial argument there .. so one cannot tell really what (if anything) his point is. We can only guess. NOTE: I've been asking someone2 for a definition of subjective experience as well. he doesn't seem to have one, but still presents argument that would require it. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 23, 2007 Posted June 23, 2007 "Fred Stone" <fstone69@earthling.com> wrote in message news:Xns99578BA125096freddybear@216.151.153.41... > Where are you going with this, Glenn? How about you just go there and > skip all the preliminaries? That's what I've been asking .. along with others .. still no go. I don't think he acutally has a complete argument and a point to make. If he had, then he'd have done so by now. Quote
Guest Fred Stone Posted June 23, 2007 Posted June 23, 2007 "Jeckyl" <noone@nowhere.com> wrote in news:467d05ca$0$1187$61c65585@un- 2park-reader-01.sydney.pipenetworks.com.au: > "Fred Stone" <fstone69@earthling.com> wrote in message > news:Xns99578BA125096freddybear@216.151.153.41... >> Where are you going with this, Glenn? How about you just go there and >> skip all the preliminaries? > > That's what I've been asking .. along with others .. still no go. > > I don't think he acutally has a complete argument and a point to make. > > If he had, then he'd have done so by now. > I know, he comes around here every few months with a similar line of doubletalk. His favorite trick is arguing from trivially false analogies. -- Fred Stone aa# 1369 "When they put out that deadline, people realized that we were going to lose," said an aide to an anti-war lawmaker. "Everything after that seemed like posturing." Quote
Guest Elf M. Sternberg Posted June 23, 2007 Posted June 23, 2007 James Norris <JimNorris01@aol.com> writes: > The difference would be that a biological mechanism which consciously > experienced smells would be conscious, and a robot mechanism which > could not experience (have awareness of) them would not be > conscious. That's a pretty strong and outrageous thing to say. What privileges meat to have "consciousness," over metal? Elf -- Elf M. Sternberg, Immanentizing the Eschaton since 1988 http://www.pendorwright.com/ "You know how some people treat their body like a temple? I treat mine like issa amusement park!" - Kei -- Elf M. Sternberg, Immanentizing the Eschaton since 1988 http://www.pendorwright.com/ "You know how some people treat their body like a temple? I treat mine like issa amusement park!" - Kei Quote
Guest James Norris Posted June 23, 2007 Posted June 23, 2007 On Jun 22, 12:35?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 22 Jun, 04:07, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > On Jun 21, 10:48?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 21 Jun, 22:02, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > On Jun 21, 8:10?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 21 Jun, 20:03, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > On Jun 21, 5:36?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 16:24, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 14:36, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On Jun 21, 1:17?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 04:55, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On Jun 21, 2:30?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On 20 Jun, 23:51, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > > > > > > > > > > > >news:1182349024.090381.241030@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > So with the substitutions: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the robot > > > > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question > > > > > > > > > > > > > > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > would give: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it > > > > > > > > > > > > > > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of > > > > > > > > > > > > > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > subjective experiences or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > That is what you assert .. you have not shown that to be true. You make the > > > > > > > > > > > > > assumption that subjective experiences cannot be part of the mechanism and > > > > > > > > > > > > > are not part of what the physics is explaining .. you are assuming your own > > > > > > > > > > > > > conclusion. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Another problem with your 1 and 2 is that you consider P as indivisible .. > > > > > > > > > > > > > you must either consider it as a whole, or not at all. Eg. in a computer > > > > > > > > > > > > > you can explain how a computer handles the individual electrical impulses > > > > > > > > > > > > > that represent a binary number, without knowing what that number is. That > > > > > > > > > > > > > the bits even represent a number (they might represent something else) does > > > > > > > > > > > > > not need to be known in order to explain the behaviour of the circuits. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Obviously any robot that follows the known laws of physics can be > > > > > > > > > > > > explained in terms of the known laws of physics. No knowledge of > > > > > > > > > > > > whether anything is experiencing or not is required in any explanation > > > > > > > > > > > > in terms of physics, due to the known laws of physics not mentioning > > > > > > > > > > > > the subject. So it isn't an assertion, it is a FACT. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Furthermore, any explanation in these terms is quite useful, all our > > > > > > > > > > > > technology relies on such explanations. When are you going to face > > > > > > > > > > > > FACTS?- Hide quoted text - > > > > > > > > > > > > > - Show quoted text - > > > > > > > > > > > > Evolution has endowed us human 'biological mechanisms' with the > > > > > > > > > > > ability to understand physical reality with our brains, using the > > > > > > > > > > > information provided by our senses. This evolved because awareness of > > > > > > > > > > > reality is a useful survival trait for an organism, allowing it to > > > > > > > > > > > make rational decisions about its life in the natural environment. > > > > > > > > > > > Awareness is an inherited trait, and it has developed, along with > > > > > > > > > > > brains and the associated sense organs, over billions of generations > > > > > > > > > > > of continuous evolution, from tiny creatures with minuscule awareness > > > > > > > > > > > of light and dark, hot and cold, and so on, to our full-blown human > > > > > > > > > > > 'we understand everything' awareness of reality. > > > > > > > > > > > > A newly-manufactured robot mechanism has no ancestors, so it has no > > > > > > > > > > > evolved consciousness. Its sense organs (eg television cameras and > > > > > > > > > > > microphones) and methods of understanding information (eg computer > > > > > > > > > > > memory and programs), have not been designed to be at all useful or > > > > > > > > > > > relevant to any conscious understanding of reality, they are just bits > > > > > > > > > > > of metal and plastic arranged (by humans) to perform a rather > > > > > > > > > > > aribitrary mathematical calculation (ie the running program). A robot > > > > > > > > > > > is no more likely to be conscious than an abacus, or a piece of > > > > > > > > > > > paper. > > > > > > > > > > > I assume you consider the human 'biological mechanisms' to follow the > > > > > > > > > > laws of physics? If so what evolutionary advantage would it be to > > > > > > > > > > consciously experience? Consider an evolutionary mutation that caused > > > > > > > > > > the biological mechanism to be changed in a certain way. Consider how > > > > > > > > > > the change of the mechanism might be advantageous. Now state what > > > > > > > > > > difference it makes whether the mechanistic change is consciously > > > > > > > > > > experienced or not. > > > > > > > > > > Biological senses have evolved to sense reality, which is obviously a > > > > > > > > > useful evolutionary trait (the sense of smell smells real food, not > > > > > > > > > imaginary food, or it would be useless) otherwise they would not have > > > > > > > > > evolved. We are aware of our senses => our senses are aware of > > > > > > > > > reality => we are aware of reality (ie we are conscious). > > > > > > > > (Just reposted and cleared up for ease of understanding) > > > > > > > > Yeah, yeah, I know your story, I asked you a question, which you > > > > > > > avoided answering, or maybe didn't understand. What difference would > > > > > > > it make whether the evolved mechanism which detects properties of its > > > > > > > environment, as in detecting chemical compounds in the air etc, > > > > > > > consciously experienced what was detected as smell? The way the > > > > > > > organism detected the chemicals, and the way it responded to any > > > > > > > detection would be simply governed by the rules of physics, in a > > > > > > > similar way to a robot. When you can grasp this, you will understand > > > > > > > that the idea that consciously experiencing anything would be any > > > > > > > evolutionary advantage (as you claimed) is a deception. > > > > > > > Now you're starting to sound like a madman. Who's trying to deceive > > > > > > anyone with the idea that consciousness gives an evolutionary > > > > > > advantage? I'm more conscious than a plant, that's why I eat plants > > > > > > and plants don't eat me! > > > > > > > You seem to think that consciousness it not governed by the laws of > > > > > > physics, but it is. There is no doubt that biological organisms ARE > > > > > > conscious (ie aware of reality) because evolution has evolved > > > > > > organisms to be aware of their surroundings (ie conscious). A robot > > > > > > would be extremely unlikely to be aware of anything at all, but an > > > > > > evolved biological organism would be aware that it is smelling > > > > > > something, for example, because that is what the sense of smell is. > > > > > > > In answer to your question, there would not be much difference in > > > > > > behaviour, if you look at a concious being or a non-conscious robot > > > > > > performing the same activity. > > > > > > Well I saw in your response the ad-hominid attack, and the restatement > > > > > of your story, but where was the answer to the question: > > > > > > What difference would it make whether the evolved mechanism which > > > > > detects properties of its environment, as in detecting chemical > > > > > compounds in the air etc, consciously experienced what was detected as > > > > > smell? > > > > > The difference would be that a biological mechanism which consciously > > > > experienced smells would be conscious, and a robot mechanism which > > > > could not experience (have awareness of) them would not be conscious. > > > > What's your point? > > > > > Perhaps you are saying that the behavior (of the evolved organism) > > > > might be the same whether or not it was conscious? It might be, but > > > > if you build a robot to imitate a conscious organism, the behavior > > > > would be (look) the same, but the robot would not be conscious. > > > > > The awareness of a smell is represented by the arrangement of > > > > (bioelectrically) active neurons in the conscious organism's brain. > > > > You seem to be gradually getting round to arguing that if you isolated > > > > this arrangement of neurons, and transferred it into a system of > > > > electric wires and batteries, logically it would be 'the same as' a > > > > conscious awareness of the particular smell, in some way. You could > > > > isolate lots of similar subjective experiences, and perhaps plug them > > > > all together to end up with a conscious robot? Is that what you mean? > > > > No, that isn't what I was getting to. It was the point that there > > > would be no actual advantage to the conscious experience of smell. The > > > way the mechanism detects the chemicals in the air, and responds to > > > them, is simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of > > > physics, and isn't influenced by whether it was consciously > > > experienced or not. > > > I disagree with you there, as I tried to explain in my first posting > > to your thread: > > > > > > > > > > > > information provided by our senses. This evolved because awareness of > > > > > > > > > > > reality is a useful survival trait for an organism, allowing it to > > > > > > > > > > > make rational decisions about its life in the natural environment. > > > The conscious awareness of reality, which allows the organism to think > > about a situation, using its brain, and then decide on a course of > > action, has in fact evolved, so it must have an evolutionary benefit. > > Presumably, rational (ie thought about, rather than automatic) > > decisions have an edge over purely automatic ones, in some species at > > least. The organism decides what to do about the smell because of > > neuronal activity based on its previous subjective and personal > > experiences, rather than 'automatically' reacting biochemically with > > the molecules of the smell directly, like plantlife. > > > > Though, if your story was correct, and conceptually the system was > > > copied to a man made robotic system, like you suggested, whether that > > > system had any conscious experiences or not (possibly conscious > > > experiences only being found in biological systems), wouldn't > > > influence the way it behaved i.e. it'd behave just the same. That's > > > correct isn't it. > > > I'm not sure whether you are correct there. What you call copying > > [patterns of neuronal bioelectrical activity corresponding to > > conscious awareness of a smell] to a robotic system wouldn't result in > > consciousness in the robot, but the robot's behaviour might be > > arranged by the manufacturers so it copied the original behaviour > > corresponding to the consciousness. You wouldn't be resurrecting a > > dead person's awareness of talking if you built a robot that copied > > the persons speech while they were alive, so why would the robot with > > the copied smell patterns be any different? - the patterns are only > > copies, like a photograph perhaps, and not the real thing. If you > > copied patterns of neuronal activity from one brain to another > > conscious brain, that is quite likely to have the same influence on > > the behavior of the 'receiving' brain as it did on the original > > 'thinker'. > > Your reasoning is fluffy to say the least. Where? > The mechanism is copied > in the conceptual scenario, that you brought up. Which conceptual scenario? >How couldn't it cause > the same behaviour if there were no conscious experiences? How couldn't what cause the same behaviour as what? >Surely in > both cases, the behaviour would simply be the result of the mechanism > following the laws of physics. Both cases? What two cases are you talking about? In fact, what are you talking about at all? Your ideas seem rather confused so it's very difficult to work out what you are trying to say. It looks like you think there is more to reality than the laws of physics - is that so? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 23, 2007 Posted June 23, 2007 On 23 Jun, 21:36, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > On Jun 22, 12:35?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > On 22 Jun, 04:07, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > On Jun 21, 10:48?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 21 Jun, 22:02, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > On Jun 21, 8:10?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 20:03, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On Jun 21, 5:36?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 16:24, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 14:36, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On Jun 21, 1:17?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 04:55, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On Jun 21, 2:30?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 20 Jun, 23:51, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > > > > > > > > > > > > >news:1182349024.090381.241030@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > So with the substitutions: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the robot > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > would give: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > subjective experiences or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > That is what you assert .. you have not shown that to be true. You make the > > > > > > > > > > > > > > assumption that subjective experiences cannot be part of the mechanism and > > > > > > > > > > > > > > are not part of what the physics is explaining .. you are assuming your own > > > > > > > > > > > > > > conclusion. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Another problem with your 1 and 2 is that you consider P as indivisible .. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > you must either consider it as a whole, or not at all. Eg. in a computer > > > > > > > > > > > > > > you can explain how a computer handles the individual electrical impulses > > > > > > > > > > > > > > that represent a binary number, without knowing what that number is. That > > > > > > > > > > > > > > the bits even represent a number (they might represent something else) does > > > > > > > > > > > > > > not need to be known in order to explain the behaviour of the circuits. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Obviously any robot that follows the known laws of physics can be > > > > > > > > > > > > > explained in terms of the known laws of physics. No knowledge of > > > > > > > > > > > > > whether anything is experiencing or not is required in any explanation > > > > > > > > > > > > > in terms of physics, due to the known laws of physics not mentioning > > > > > > > > > > > > > the subject. So it isn't an assertion, it is a FACT. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Furthermore, any explanation in these terms is quite useful, all our > > > > > > > > > > > > > technology relies on such explanations. When are you going to face > > > > > > > > > > > > > FACTS?- Hide quoted text - > > > > > > > > > > > > > > - Show quoted text - > > > > > > > > > > > > > Evolution has endowed us human 'biological mechanisms' with the > > > > > > > > > > > > ability to understand physical reality with our brains, using the > > > > > > > > > > > > information provided by our senses. This evolved because awareness of > > > > > > > > > > > > reality is a useful survival trait for an organism, allowing it to > > > > > > > > > > > > make rational decisions about its life in the natural environment. > > > > > > > > > > > > Awareness is an inherited trait, and it has developed, along with > > > > > > > > > > > > brains and the associated sense organs, over billions of generations > > > > > > > > > > > > of continuous evolution, from tiny creatures with minuscule awareness > > > > > > > > > > > > of light and dark, hot and cold, and so on, to our full-blown human > > > > > > > > > > > > 'we understand everything' awareness of reality. > > > > > > > > > > > > > A newly-manufactured robot mechanism has no ancestors, so it has no > > > > > > > > > > > > evolved consciousness. Its sense organs (eg television cameras and > > > > > > > > > > > > microphones) and methods of understanding information (eg computer > > > > > > > > > > > > memory and programs), have not been designed to be at all useful or > > > > > > > > > > > > relevant to any conscious understanding of reality, they are just bits > > > > > > > > > > > > of metal and plastic arranged (by humans) to perform a rather > > > > > > > > > > > > aribitrary mathematical calculation (ie the running program). A robot > > > > > > > > > > > > is no more likely to be conscious than an abacus, or a piece of > > > > > > > > > > > > paper. > > > > > > > > > > > > I assume you consider the human 'biological mechanisms' to follow the > > > > > > > > > > > laws of physics? If so what evolutionary advantage would it be to > > > > > > > > > > > consciously experience? Consider an evolutionary mutation that caused > > > > > > > > > > > the biological mechanism to be changed in a certain way. Consider how > > > > > > > > > > > the change of the mechanism might be advantageous. Now state what > > > > > > > > > > > difference it makes whether the mechanistic change is consciously > > > > > > > > > > > experienced or not. > > > > > > > > > > > Biological senses have evolved to sense reality, which is obviously a > > > > > > > > > > useful evolutionary trait (the sense of smell smells real food, not > > > > > > > > > > imaginary food, or it would be useless) otherwise they would not have > > > > > > > > > > evolved. We are aware of our senses => our senses are aware of > > > > > > > > > > reality => we are aware of reality (ie we are conscious). > > > > > > > > > (Just reposted and cleared up for ease of understanding) > > > > > > > > > Yeah, yeah, I know your story, I asked you a question, which you > > > > > > > > avoided answering, or maybe didn't understand. What difference would > > > > > > > > it make whether the evolved mechanism which detects properties of its > > > > > > > > environment, as in detecting chemical compounds in the air etc, > > > > > > > > consciously experienced what was detected as smell? The way the > > > > > > > > organism detected the chemicals, and the way it responded to any > > > > > > > > detection would be simply governed by the rules of physics, in a > > > > > > > > similar way to a robot. When you can grasp this, you will understand > > > > > > > > that the idea that consciously experiencing anything would be any > > > > > > > > evolutionary advantage (as you claimed) is a deception. > > > > > > > > Now you're starting to sound like a madman. Who's trying to deceive > > > > > > > anyone with the idea that consciousness gives an evolutionary > > > > > > > advantage? I'm more conscious than a plant, that's why I eat plants > > > > > > > and plants don't eat me! > > > > > > > > You seem to think that consciousness it not governed by the laws of > > > > > > > physics, but it is. There is no doubt that biological organisms ARE > > > > > > > conscious (ie aware of reality) because evolution has evolved > > > > > > > organisms to be aware of their surroundings (ie conscious). A robot > > > > > > > would be extremely unlikely to be aware of anything at all, but an > > > > > > > evolved biological organism would be aware that it is smelling > > > > > > > something, for example, because that is what the sense of smell is. > > > > > > > > In answer to your question, there would not be much difference in > > > > > > > behaviour, if you look at a concious being or a non-conscious robot > > > > > > > performing the same activity. > > > > > > > Well I saw in your response the ad-hominid attack, and the restatement > > > > > > of your story, but where was the answer to the question: > > > > > > > What difference would it make whether the evolved mechanism which > > > > > > detects properties of its environment, as in detecting chemical > > > > > > compounds in the air etc, consciously experienced what was detected as > > > > > > smell? > > > > > > The difference would be that a biological mechanism which consciously > > > > > experienced smells would be conscious, and a robot mechanism which > > > > > could not experience (have awareness of) them would not be conscious. > > > > > What's your point? > > > > > > Perhaps you are saying that the behavior (of the evolved organism) > > > > > might be the same whether or not it was conscious? It might be, but > > > > > if you build a robot to imitate a conscious organism, the behavior > > > > > would be (look) the same, but the robot would not be conscious. > > > > > > The awareness of a smell is represented by the arrangement of > > > > > (bioelectrically) active neurons in the conscious organism's brain. > > > > > You seem to be gradually getting round to arguing that if you isolated > > > > > this arrangement of neurons, and transferred it into a system of > > > > > electric wires and batteries, logically it would be 'the same as' a > > > > > conscious awareness of the particular smell, in some way. You could > > > > > isolate lots of similar subjective experiences, and perhaps plug them > > > > > all together to end up with a conscious robot? Is that what you mean? > > > > > No, that isn't what I was getting to. It was the point that there > > > > would be no actual advantage to the conscious experience of smell. The > > > > way the mechanism detects the chemicals in the air, and responds to > > > > them, is simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of > > > > physics, and isn't influenced by whether it was consciously > > > > experienced or not. > > > > I disagree with you there, as I tried to explain in my first posting > > > to your thread: > > > > > > > > > > > > > information provided by our senses. This evolved because awareness of > > > > > > > > > > > > reality is a useful survival trait for an organism, allowing it to > > > > > > > > > > > > make rational decisions about its life in the natural environment. > > > > The conscious awareness of reality, which allows the organism to think > > > about a situation, using its brain, and then decide on a course of > > > action, has in fact evolved, so it must have an evolutionary benefit. > > > Presumably, rational (ie thought about, rather than automatic) > > > decisions have an edge over purely automatic ones, in some species at > > > least. The organism decides what to do about the smell because of > > > neuronal activity based on its previous subjective and personal > > > experiences, rather than 'automatically' reacting biochemically with > > > the molecules of the smell directly, like plantlife. > > > > > Though, if your story was correct, and conceptually the system was > > > > copied to a man made robotic system, like you suggested, whether that > > > > system had any conscious experiences or not (possibly conscious > > > > experiences only being found in biological systems), wouldn't > > > > influence the way it behaved i.e. it'd behave just the same. That's > > > > correct isn't it. > > > > I'm not sure whether you are correct there. What you call copying > > > [patterns of neuronal bioelectrical activity corresponding to > > > conscious awareness of a smell] to a robotic system wouldn't result in > > > consciousness in the robot, but the robot's behaviour might be > > > arranged by the manufacturers so it copied the original behaviour > > > corresponding to the consciousness. You wouldn't be resurrecting a > > > dead person's awareness of talking if you built a robot that copied > > > the persons speech while they were alive, so why would the robot with > > > the copied smell patterns be any different? - the patterns are only > > > copies, like a photograph perhaps, and not the real thing. If you > > > copied patterns of neuronal activity from one brain to another > > > conscious brain, that is quite likely to have the same influence on > > > the behavior of the 'receiving' brain as it did on the original > > > 'thinker'. > > > Your reasoning is fluffy to say the least. > > Where? > > > The mechanism is copied > > in the conceptual scenario, that you brought up. > > Which conceptual scenario? > > >How couldn't it cause > > the same behaviour if there were no conscious experiences? > > How couldn't what cause the same behaviour as what? > > >Surely in > > both cases, the behaviour would simply be the result of the mechanism > > following the laws of physics. > > Both cases? What two cases are you talking about? > > In fact, what are you talking about at all? Your ideas seem rather > confused so it's very difficult to work out what you are trying to > say. It looks like you think there is more to reality than the laws > of physics - is that so? I was talking about the suggestion you made about if the arrangement of neurons, was emulated using a different physical underlying. In an artificial neural network for example. If your story was true, then conceptually the biological mechanism of the brain could be emulated by an artificial neural network. The behaviour of this network could be explained without knowledge of whether it had conscious/subjective experiences or not. Do you agree? Quote
Guest James Norris Posted June 23, 2007 Posted June 23, 2007 On Jun 23, 10:08?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 23 Jun, 21:36, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > On Jun 22, 12:35?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 22 Jun, 04:07, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > On Jun 21, 10:48?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 22:02, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > On Jun 21, 8:10?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 20:03, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On Jun 21, 5:36?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 16:24, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 14:36, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On Jun 21, 1:17?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 04:55, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Jun 21, 2:30?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 20 Jun, 23:51, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >news:1182349024.090381.241030@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > So with the substitutions: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the robot > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > would give: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > subjective experiences or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > That is what you assert .. you have not shown that to be true. You make the > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > assumption that subjective experiences cannot be part of the mechanism and > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > are not part of what the physics is explaining .. you are assuming your own > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > conclusion. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Another problem with your 1 and 2 is that you consider P as indivisible .. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > you must either consider it as a whole, or not at all. Eg. in a computer > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > you can explain how a computer handles the individual electrical impulses > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > that represent a binary number, without knowing what that number is. That > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > the bits even represent a number (they might represent something else) does > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > not need to be known in order to explain the behaviour of the circuits. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Obviously any robot that follows the known laws of physics can be > > > > > > > > > > > > > > explained in terms of the known laws of physics. No knowledge of > > > > > > > > > > > > > > whether anything is experiencing or not is required in any explanation > > > > > > > > > > > > > > in terms of physics, due to the known laws of physics not mentioning > > > > > > > > > > > > > > the subject. So it isn't an assertion, it is a FACT. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Furthermore, any explanation in these terms is quite useful, all our > > > > > > > > > > > > > > technology relies on such explanations. When are you going to face > > > > > > > > > > > > > > FACTS?- Hide quoted text - > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > - Show quoted text - > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Evolution has endowed us human 'biological mechanisms' with the > > > > > > > > > > > > > ability to understand physical reality with our brains, using the > > > > > > > > > > > > > information provided by our senses. This evolved because awareness of > > > > > > > > > > > > > reality is a useful survival trait for an organism, allowing it to > > > > > > > > > > > > > make rational decisions about its life in the natural environment. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Awareness is an inherited trait, and it has developed, along with > > > > > > > > > > > > > brains and the associated sense organs, over billions of generations > > > > > > > > > > > > > of continuous evolution, from tiny creatures with minuscule awareness > > > > > > > > > > > > > of light and dark, hot and cold, and so on, to our full-blown human > > > > > > > > > > > > > 'we understand everything' awareness of reality. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > A newly-manufactured robot mechanism has no ancestors, so it has no > > > > > > > > > > > > > evolved consciousness. Its sense organs (eg television cameras and > > > > > > > > > > > > > microphones) and methods of understanding information (eg computer > > > > > > > > > > > > > memory and programs), have not been designed to be at all useful or > > > > > > > > > > > > > relevant to any conscious understanding of reality, they are just bits > > > > > > > > > > > > > of metal and plastic arranged (by humans) to perform a rather > > > > > > > > > > > > > aribitrary mathematical calculation (ie the running program). A robot > > > > > > > > > > > > > is no more likely to be conscious than an abacus, or a piece of > > > > > > > > > > > > > paper. > > > > > > > > > > > > > I assume you consider the human 'biological mechanisms' to follow the > > > > > > > > > > > > laws of physics? If so what evolutionary advantage would it be to > > > > > > > > > > > > consciously experience? Consider an evolutionary mutation that caused > > > > > > > > > > > > the biological mechanism to be changed in a certain way. Consider how > > > > > > > > > > > > the change of the mechanism might be advantageous. Now state what > > > > > > > > > > > > difference it makes whether the mechanistic change is consciously > > > > > > > > > > > > experienced or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > Biological senses have evolved to sense reality, which is obviously a > > > > > > > > > > > useful evolutionary trait (the sense of smell smells real food, not > > > > > > > > > > > imaginary food, or it would be useless) otherwise they would not have > > > > > > > > > > > evolved. We are aware of our senses => our senses are aware of > > > > > > > > > > > reality => we are aware of reality (ie we are conscious). > > > > > > > > > > (Just reposted and cleared up for ease of understanding) > > > > > > > > > > Yeah, yeah, I know your story, I asked you a question, which you > > > > > > > > > avoided answering, or maybe didn't understand. What difference would > > > > > > > > > it make whether the evolved mechanism which detects properties of its > > > > > > > > > environment, as in detecting chemical compounds in the air etc, > > > > > > > > > consciously experienced what was detected as smell? The way the > > > > > > > > > organism detected the chemicals, and the way it responded to any > > > > > > > > > detection would be simply governed by the rules of physics, in a > > > > > > > > > similar way to a robot. When you can grasp this, you will understand > > > > > > > > > that the idea that consciously experiencing anything would be any > > > > > > > > > evolutionary advantage (as you claimed) is a deception. > > > > > > > > > Now you're starting to sound like a madman. Who's trying to deceive > > > > > > > > anyone with the idea that consciousness gives an evolutionary > > > > > > > > advantage? I'm more conscious than a plant, that's why I eat plants > > > > > > > > and plants don't eat me! > > > > > > > > > You seem to think that consciousness it not governed by the laws of > > > > > > > > physics, but it is. There is no doubt that biological organisms ARE > > > > > > > > conscious (ie aware of reality) because evolution has evolved > > > > > > > > organisms to be aware of their surroundings (ie conscious). A robot > > > > > > > > would be extremely unlikely to be aware of anything at all, but an > > > > > > > > evolved biological organism would be aware that it is smelling > > > > > > > > something, for example, because that is what the sense of smell is. > > > > > > > > > In answer to your question, there would not be much difference in > > > > > > > > behaviour, if you look at a concious being or a non-conscious robot > > > > > > > > performing the same activity. > > > > > > > > Well I saw in your response the ad-hominid attack, and the restatement > > > > > > > of your story, but where was the answer to the question: > > > > > > > > What difference would it make whether the evolved mechanism which > > > > > > > detects properties of its environment, as in detecting chemical > > > > > > > compounds in the air etc, consciously experienced what was detected as > > > > > > > smell? > > > > > > > The difference would be that a biological mechanism which consciously > > > > > > experienced smells would be conscious, and a robot mechanism which > > > > > > could not experience (have awareness of) them would not be conscious. > > > > > > What's your point? > > > > > > > Perhaps you are saying that the behavior (of the evolved organism) > > > > > > might be the same whether or not it was conscious? It might be, but > > > > > > if you build a robot to imitate a conscious organism, the behavior > > > > > > would be (look) the same, but the robot would not be conscious. > > > > > > > The awareness of a smell is represented by the arrangement of > > > > > > (bioelectrically) active neurons in the conscious organism's brain. > > > > > > You seem to be gradually getting round to arguing that if you isolated > > > > > > this arrangement of neurons, and transferred it into a system of > > > > > > electric wires and batteries, logically it would be 'the same as' a > > > > > > conscious awareness of the particular smell, in some way. You could > > > > > > isolate lots of similar subjective experiences, and perhaps plug them > > > > > > all together to end up with a conscious robot? Is that what you mean? > > > > > > No, that isn't what I was getting to. It was the point that there > > > > > would be no actual advantage to the conscious experience of smell. The > > > > > way the mechanism detects the chemicals in the air, and responds to > > > > > them, is simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of > > > > > physics, and isn't influenced by whether it was consciously > > > > > experienced or not. > > > > > I disagree with you there, as I tried to explain in my first posting > > > > to your thread: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > information provided by our senses. This evolved because awareness of > > > > > > > > > > > > > reality is a useful survival trait for an organism, allowing it to > > > > > > > > > > > > > make rational decisions about its life in the natural environment. > > > > > The conscious awareness of reality, which allows the organism to think > > > > about a situation, using its brain, and then decide on a course of > > > > action, has in fact evolved, so it must have an evolutionary benefit. > > > > Presumably, rational (ie thought about, rather than automatic) > > > > decisions have an edge over purely automatic ones, in some species at > > > > least. The organism decides what to do about the smell because of > > > > neuronal activity based on its previous subjective and personal > > > > experiences, rather than 'automatically' reacting biochemically with > > > > the molecules of the smell directly, like plantlife. > > > > > > Though, if your story was correct, and conceptually the system was > > > > > copied to a man made robotic system, like you suggested, whether that > > > > > system had any conscious experiences or not (possibly conscious > > > > > experiences only being found in biological systems), wouldn't > > > > > influence the way it behaved i.e. it'd behave just the same. That's > > > > > correct isn't it. > > > > > I'm not sure whether you are correct there. What you call copying > > > > [patterns of neuronal bioelectrical activity corresponding to > > > > conscious awareness of a smell] to a robotic system wouldn't result in > > > > consciousness in the robot, but the robot's behaviour might be > > > > arranged by the manufacturers so it copied the original behaviour > > > > corresponding to the consciousness. You wouldn't be resurrecting a > > > > dead person's awareness of talking if you built a robot that copied > > > > the persons speech while they were alive, so why would the robot with > > > > the copied smell patterns be any different? - the patterns are only > > > > copies, like a photograph perhaps, and not the real thing. If you > > > > copied patterns of neuronal activity from one brain to another > > > > conscious brain, that is quite likely to have the same influence on > > > > the behavior of the 'receiving' brain as it did on the original > > > > 'thinker'. > > > > Your reasoning is fluffy to say the least. > > > Where? > > > > The mechanism is copied > > > in the conceptual scenario, that you brought up. > > > Which conceptual scenario? > > > >How couldn't it cause > > > the same behaviour if there were no conscious experiences? > > > How couldn't what cause the same behaviour as what? > > > >Surely in > > > both cases, the behaviour would simply be the result of the mechanism > > > following the laws of physics. > > > Both cases? What two cases are you talking about? > > > In fact, what are you talking about at all? Your ideas seem rather > > confused so it's very difficult to work out what you are trying to > > say. It looks like you think there is more to reality than the laws > > of physics - is that so? > > I was talking about the suggestion you made about if the arrangement > of neurons, was emulated using a different physical underlying. In an > artificial neural network for example. If your story was true, then > conceptually the biological mechanism of the brain could be emulated > by an artificial neural network. The behaviour of this network could > be explained without knowledge of whether it had conscious/subjective > experiences or not. Do you agree? If the 'behaviour of the neural network' is the behaviour of a computer program (the cpu performs simple operations on binary data), so it wouldn't have any conscious experiences. The behaviour of the neural network can be explained by asking what the programmer put into the program, and whether or not it has conscious experiences is irrelevant, I agree. A conscious experience (such as awareness of a smell) in an evolved organism corresponds to an arrangement of activated neurons in the organism's brain. The brain has goals, such as finding food, and it uses its evolved senses to 'experience' its environment. If the experience of a smell indicates to the organism that it should reproduce, that is what its behaviour would be. I think you are mixing up two issues: What is consciousness? and What is the difference between a computer and a brain? It also looks like you think that the laws of physics don't explain consciousness, but you don't want to say yes or no about that? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 24, 2007 Posted June 24, 2007 On 23 Jun, 23:12, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > On Jun 23, 10:08?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > On 23 Jun, 21:36, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > On Jun 22, 12:35?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 22 Jun, 04:07, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > On Jun 21, 10:48?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 22:02, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On Jun 21, 8:10?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 20:03, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On Jun 21, 5:36?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 16:24, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 14:36, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On Jun 21, 1:17?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 21 Jun, 04:55, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Jun 21, 2:30?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 20 Jun, 23:51, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >news:1182349024.090381.241030@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > So with the substitutions: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the robot > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > would give: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > subjective experiences or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > That is what you assert .. you have not shown that to be true. You make the > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > assumption that subjective experiences cannot be part of the mechanism and > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > are not part of what the physics is explaining .. you are assuming your own > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > conclusion. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Another problem with your 1 and 2 is that you consider P as indivisible .. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > you must either consider it as a whole, or not at all. Eg. in a computer > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > you can explain how a computer handles the individual electrical impulses > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > that represent a binary number, without knowing what that number is. That > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > the bits even represent a number (they might represent something else) does > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > not need to be known in order to explain the behaviour of the circuits. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Obviously any robot that follows the known laws of physics can be > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > explained in terms of the known laws of physics. No knowledge of > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > whether anything is experiencing or not is required in any explanation > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > in terms of physics, due to the known laws of physics not mentioning > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > the subject. So it isn't an assertion, it is a FACT. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Furthermore, any explanation in these terms is quite useful, all our > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > technology relies on such explanations. When are you going to face > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > FACTS?- Hide quoted text - > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > - Show quoted text - > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Evolution has endowed us human 'biological mechanisms' with the > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ability to understand physical reality with our brains, using the > > > > > > > > > > > > > > information provided by our senses. This evolved because awareness of > > > > > > > > > > > > > > reality is a useful survival trait for an organism, allowing it to > > > > > > > > > > > > > > make rational decisions about its life in the natural environment. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Awareness is an inherited trait, and it has developed, along with > > > > > > > > > > > > > > brains and the associated sense organs, over billions of generations > > > > > > > > > > > > > > of continuous evolution, from tiny creatures with minuscule awareness > > > > > > > > > > > > > > of light and dark, hot and cold, and so on, to our full-blown human > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 'we understand everything' awareness of reality. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > A newly-manufactured robot mechanism has no ancestors, so it has no > > > > > > > > > > > > > > evolved consciousness. Its sense organs (eg television cameras and > > > > > > > > > > > > > > microphones) and methods of understanding information (eg computer > > > > > > > > > > > > > > memory and programs), have not been designed to be at all useful or > > > > > > > > > > > > > > relevant to any conscious understanding of reality, they are just bits > > > > > > > > > > > > > > of metal and plastic arranged (by humans) to perform a rather > > > > > > > > > > > > > > aribitrary mathematical calculation (ie the running program). A robot > > > > > > > > > > > > > > is no more likely to be conscious than an abacus, or a piece of > > > > > > > > > > > > > > paper. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I assume you consider the human 'biological mechanisms' to follow the > > > > > > > > > > > > > laws of physics? If so what evolutionary advantage would it be to > > > > > > > > > > > > > consciously experience? Consider an evolutionary mutation that caused > > > > > > > > > > > > > the biological mechanism to be changed in a certain way. Consider how > > > > > > > > > > > > > the change of the mechanism might be advantageous. Now state what > > > > > > > > > > > > > difference it makes whether the mechanistic change is consciously > > > > > > > > > > > > > experienced or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Biological senses have evolved to sense reality, which is obviously a > > > > > > > > > > > > useful evolutionary trait (the sense of smell smells real food, not > > > > > > > > > > > > imaginary food, or it would be useless) otherwise they would not have > > > > > > > > > > > > evolved. We are aware of our senses => our senses are aware of > > > > > > > > > > > > reality => we are aware of reality (ie we are conscious). > > > > > > > > > > > (Just reposted and cleared up for ease of understanding) > > > > > > > > > > > Yeah, yeah, I know your story, I asked you a question, which you > > > > > > > > > > avoided answering, or maybe didn't understand. What difference would > > > > > > > > > > it make whether the evolved mechanism which detects properties of its > > > > > > > > > > environment, as in detecting chemical compounds in the air etc, > > > > > > > > > > consciously experienced what was detected as smell? The way the > > > > > > > > > > organism detected the chemicals, and the way it responded to any > > > > > > > > > > detection would be simply governed by the rules of physics, in a > > > > > > > > > > similar way to a robot. When you can grasp this, you will understand > > > > > > > > > > that the idea that consciously experiencing anything would be any > > > > > > > > > > evolutionary advantage (as you claimed) is a deception. > > > > > > > > > > Now you're starting to sound like a madman. Who's trying to deceive > > > > > > > > > anyone with the idea that consciousness gives an evolutionary > > > > > > > > > advantage? I'm more conscious than a plant, that's why I eat plants > > > > > > > > > and plants don't eat me! > > > > > > > > > > You seem to think that consciousness it not governed by the laws of > > > > > > > > > physics, but it is. There is no doubt that biological organisms ARE > > > > > > > > > conscious (ie aware of reality) because evolution has evolved > > > > > > > > > organisms to be aware of their surroundings (ie conscious). A robot > > > > > > > > > would be extremely unlikely to be aware of anything at all, but an > > > > > > > > > evolved biological organism would be aware that it is smelling > > > > > > > > > something, for example, because that is what the sense of smell is. > > > > > > > > > > In answer to your question, there would not be much difference in > > > > > > > > > behaviour, if you look at a concious being or a non-conscious robot > > > > > > > > > performing the same activity. > > > > > > > > > Well I saw in your response the ad-hominid attack, and the restatement > > > > > > > > of your story, but where was the answer to the question: > > > > > > > > > What difference would it make whether the evolved mechanism which > > > > > > > > detects properties of its environment, as in detecting chemical > > > > > > > > compounds in the air etc, consciously experienced what was detected as > > > > > > > > smell? > > > > > > > > The difference would be that a biological mechanism which consciously > > > > > > > experienced smells would be conscious, and a robot mechanism which > > > > > > > could not experience (have awareness of) them would not be conscious. > > > > > > > What's your point? > > > > > > > > Perhaps you are saying that the behavior (of the evolved organism) > > > > > > > might be the same whether or not it was conscious? It might be, but > > > > > > > if you build a robot to imitate a conscious organism, the behavior > > > > > > > would be (look) the same, but the robot would not be conscious. > > > > > > > > The awareness of a smell is represented by the arrangement of > > > > > > > (bioelectrically) active neurons in the conscious organism's brain. > > > > > > > You seem to be gradually getting round to arguing that if you isolated > > > > > > > this arrangement of neurons, and transferred it into a system of > > > > > > > electric wires and batteries, logically it would be 'the same as' a > > > > > > > conscious awareness of the particular smell, in some way. You could > > > > > > > isolate lots of similar subjective experiences, and perhaps plug them > > > > > > > all together to end up with a conscious robot? Is that what you mean? > > > > > > > No, that isn't what I was getting to. It was the point that there > > > > > > would be no actual advantage to the conscious experience of smell. The > > > > > > way the mechanism detects the chemicals in the air, and responds to > > > > > > them, is simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of > > > > > > physics, and isn't influenced by whether it was consciously > > > > > > experienced or not. > > > > > > I disagree with you there, as I tried to explain in my first posting > > > > > to your thread: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > information provided by our senses. This evolved because awareness of > > > > > > > > > > > > > > reality is a useful survival trait for an organism, allowing it to > > > > > > > > > > > > > > make rational decisions about its life in the natural environment. > > > > > > The conscious awareness of reality, which allows the organism to think > > > > > about a situation, using its brain, and then decide on a course of > > > > > action, has in fact evolved, so it must have an evolutionary benefit. > > > > > Presumably, rational (ie thought about, rather than automatic) > > > > > decisions have an edge over purely automatic ones, in some species at > > > > > least. The organism decides what to do about the smell because of > > > > > neuronal activity based on its previous subjective and personal > > > > > experiences, rather than 'automatically' reacting biochemically with > > > > > the molecules of the smell directly, like plantlife. > > > > > > > Though, if your story was correct, and conceptually the system was > > > > > > copied to a man made robotic system, like you suggested, whether that > > > > > > system had any conscious experiences or not (possibly conscious > > > > > > experiences only being found in biological systems), wouldn't > > > > > > influence the way it behaved i.e. it'd behave just the same. That's > > > > > > correct isn't it. > > > > > > I'm not sure whether you are correct there. What you call copying > > > > > [patterns of neuronal bioelectrical activity corresponding to > > > > > conscious awareness of a smell] to a robotic system wouldn't result in > > > > > consciousness in the robot, but the robot's behaviour might be > > > > > arranged by the manufacturers so it copied the original behaviour > > > > > corresponding to the consciousness. You wouldn't be resurrecting a > > > > > dead person's awareness of talking if you built a robot that copied > > > > > the persons speech while they were alive, so why would the robot with > > > > > the copied smell patterns be any different? - the patterns are only > > > > > copies, like a photograph perhaps, and not the real thing. If you > > > > > copied patterns of neuronal activity from one brain to another > > > > > conscious brain, that is quite likely to have the same influence on > > > > > the behavior of the 'receiving' brain as it did on the original > > > > > 'thinker'. > > > > > Your reasoning is fluffy to say the least. > > > > Where? > > > > > The mechanism is copied > > > > in the conceptual scenario, that you brought up. > > > > Which conceptual scenario? > > > > >How couldn't it cause > > > > the same behaviour if there were no conscious experiences? > > > > How couldn't what cause the same behaviour as what? > > > > >Surely in > > > > both cases, the behaviour would simply be the result of the mechanism > > > > following the laws of physics. > > > > Both cases? What two cases are you talking about? > > > > In fact, what are you talking about at all? Your ideas seem rather > > > confused so it's very difficult to work out what you are trying to > > > say. It looks like you think there is more to reality than the laws > > > of physics - is that so? > > > I was talking about the suggestion you made about if the arrangement > > of neurons, was emulated using a different physical underlying. In an > > artificial neural network for example. If your story was true, then > > conceptually the biological mechanism of the brain could be emulated > > by an artificial neural network. The behaviour of this network could > > be explained without knowledge of whether it had conscious/subjective > > experiences or not. Do you agree? > > If the 'behaviour of the neural network' is the behaviour of a > computer program (the cpu performs simple operations on binary data), > so it wouldn't have any conscious experiences. The behaviour of the > neural network can be explained by asking what the programmer put into > the program, and whether or not it has conscious experiences is > irrelevant, I agree. > > A conscious experience (such as awareness of a smell) in an evolved > organism corresponds to an arrangement of activated neurons in the > organism's brain. The brain has goals, such as finding food, and it > uses its evolved senses to 'experience' its environment. If the > experience of a smell indicates to the organism that it should > reproduce, that is what its behaviour would be. > > I think you are mixing up two issues: What is consciousness? and What > is the difference between a computer and a brain? It also looks like > you think that the laws of physics don't explain consciousness, but > you don't want to say yes or no about that? That the laws of physics could never explain consciousness is a seperate issue. Even if, for arguments sake, the brain was just a biological mechanism that explained the behaviour of the human, there could be no explanation to why the experience wasn't simply of fluctuations of the colour green for example, the brightness being dependent on the amount of neurons firing. Anyway, as it is a seperate issue, can we leave it for now, and not get distracted. Do you understand the following reasoning: M refers to the physical entity in question. B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. P refers to the a property in question. Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), and P is the same in (1) and (2). 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has P or not. 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. If (1) is true, then (2) is true. Quote
Guest pbamvv@worldonline.nl Posted June 24, 2007 Posted June 24, 2007 On 17 jun, 02:53, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 16 Jun, 14:49, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > wrote: > > > On 15 jun, 19:40, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 14 Jun, 20:50, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > wrote: > > > > > On 12 jun, 23:49, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 12 Jun, 17:31, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > On 11 jun, 18:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > I think you understand Fred and me. > > > > > > > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to > > > > > > > avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to > > > > > > > you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post. > > > > > > > Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the > > > > > > > answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable > > > > > > > of doing it yourself. > > > > > > > > I had asked: > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > Do you see that the following is always true: > > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > You replied: > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true > > > > > > > > If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it > > > > > > > does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead > > > > > > > (or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M). > > > > > > > > A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can > > > > > > > influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may > > > > > > > use the state of synapses that constitutes P. > > > > > > > > To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on > > > > > > > it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong > > > > > > > balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may > > > > > > > even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then > > > > > > > black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its > > > > > > > bouncing. > > > > > > > > Nevertheless its composition is. > > > > > > > > M = a ball > > > > > > > B(M) = the bouncing of the ball. > > > > > > > P = a property of the ball > > > > > > > If P = the colour, your assessment is right. > > > > > > > If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong. > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive > > > > > > > as: > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property > > > > > > > of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property > > > > > > > isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true, > > > > > > > and so is (2). > > > > > > > > With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the > > > > > > > ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not > > > > > > > be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > > > > > > > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > > > > > > > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > > > > > > > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > > > > > > > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as > > > > > > > above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be > > > > > > > thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that > > > > > > > particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the > > > > > > > biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was > > > > > > > correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2). > > > > > > > > If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves, > > > > > > > which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without, > > > > > > > then (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is > > > > > > > presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world > > > > > > > perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit, > > > > > > > that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and > > > > > > > thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same? > > > > > > > You keep on assuming that subjective experiences do not have physical > > > > > > properties. > > > > > > However they do. Subjective experiences are memories (either temporary > > > > > > or lasting) > > > > > > These memories do influence our behaviour as you very well know. > > > > > > Although I do not know how memories are actually "stored" in cortex, > > > > > > we have ample proof that they are. Of course we can theoretically > > > > > > explain our conduct mechanically without realizing that the synapse > > > > > > behaviour we are describing is actually the act of "remembering" but > > > > > > that does not change the fact, that without the information coming > > > > > > from our memory our behaviour would change drastically. > > > > > > > In my previous example of my computer program > > > > > > you can explain the working by the hexadecimal machine code (a mix of > > > > > > numbers and the letters A,B,C,D, E and F) and totally ignore what they > > > > > > mean, > > > > > > but that does not mean that the fact that the employee is a female > > > > > > does not matter! > > > > > > > Likewise you can explain human behaviour by the chemical working of > > > > > > synapses, > > > > > > but that does not mean in doesn't matter whether I thought I saw > > > > > > Ashley or Kate. > > > > > > > Humans are actually using subjective experiences to guide their > > > > > > behaviour. > > > > > > > I started re-reading "consciousness explained" by Daniel C. Dennett, > > > > > > and found out his idea of consciousness goes one step further than I > > > > > > thought. He thinks consciousness is caused by ideas in our head, that > > > > > > make us think in a conscious way. Ideas that we have mostly learned > > > > > > from other people. > > > > > > I am not sure that is correct. To me everything we can theoretically > > > > > > remember and theoretically communicate about, is a subjective > > > > > > experience and is or has been part of our consciousness. > > > > > > But the fact that almost nobody can remember much of his/her early > > > > > > childhood, might mean that Dennett is right. > > > > > > But it would be a good thing to read to book anyway. (did you read it > > > > > > already?) > > > > > > I can understand that you have been deceived by Dennet's explanation. > > > > > I can show it to be a deception. > > > > > > Step 1. > > > > > > Do you understand that if there was a robot, no matter how it behaved, > > > > > as long as it followed the known laws of physics, and therefore its > > > > > behaviour could be explained to you in these terms, you wouldn't know > > > > > whether it actually had any subjective experiences or not. This isn't > > > > > about what your guess would be, it is about the truth about what you > > > > > know. Nor is it a statement that the robot couldn't be subjectively > > > > > experiencing by the way, in case you were going to disingeniously > > > > > suggest that it was.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > If the Robot could make deduction from its data and its memory and > > > > report them, I would have to assume it had a subjective experience. > > > > What else is a subjective experience, but an experience that is > > > > "coloured" by previous acquired information? > > > > > The robot - for instance - could have been imprinted with the idea > > > > "someone is an idiot" and then, after reading your post, conclude that > > > > the best way to react was to answer: "You are definitely an idiot". > > > > > The only difference between the robot and me as far as this event is > > > > concerned, is that my memory contains the postulate "other people who > > > > post on the NG have a brain similar to mine", which causes me to > > > > continue trying to communicate even if the communication is very > > > > difficult because you an me seem to have a different opinion on what > > > > we think a "Subjective experience" is. > > > > > Interesting to see you consider yourself able to disprove a man with > > > > the capabilities of Daniel C Dennet! > > > > > The fact that I cannot even take this first step with you may show > > > > you, that is not such an easy thing to do. > > > > > Someone2's Postulate : > > > > We cannot tell if entity R has subjective experiences. > > > > > Peter van Velzen's postulate: > > > > If entity R can be shown to make a report on an experience that is > > > > influenced by previous information, this means entity R has an > > > > subjective experience. > > > > (Especially if the previous information may not be true) > > > > If you could get Daniel Dennet, or any other person who has encouraged > > > people away from God, to come onto this group, and enter a debate > > > (maybe you could tell him how highly you regard him or whatever, and > > > ask for his help, and inform him that someone is saying he reasoning > > > is implausible, and that he is too cowardly to enter into an open > > > debate on the internet, or whatever), then I will show you how silly > > > he is.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > O, he knows people think they know better than him. He might not know > > that someone who makes about 20 posts without getting anywhere near > > what the subject suggests does so. Can you please get to the point, > > and give us a hint as to why materialism could possible be > > implausible? > > > So far you have only started out some riddle game, and being > > frustrated by the fact that we do not agree to you premises, embarked > > on another one, finding out that one too doesn't do the trick. > > > I still agree with Dennett that in fact it is dualism that is > > implausible: > > How can a Ghost influence matter without being observable? > > How can it be invisible (not interfere with electromagnetic waves), > > and still see (intercept electromagnetic waves) > > > Or like Dennett put it: > > How can Casper the friendly ghost, move an object and yet pass thru > > it? > > > Materialism is the result of verificationism: If it cannot be > > verified, it don't mean a thing, for apparently whether it is there or > > not doesn't change anything or anybody. > > > By the way: I do not mention Dennett as an authority, I just think I > > owe it to him, to tell you I learned from reading his book. So far I > > didn't learn much from your post, except that it gave me the good Idea > > to read Dennett's book once more. > > Dennet didn't know what reality was. There is only the spiritual. You > are presented with the physical world. What objections does he have > with regards to that? Isaiah 29, vs 14:16 (http://www.biblegateway.com/ > passage/?search=Isaiah%2029&version=31 )stated how the people that you > regard 'intelligent' like Dennet would turn reality upside down with > physicalism. Though if you took there assumption away that we were > simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, why would > you think that anything that did follow the laws of physics had any > subjective experiences at all? Not to mention what would know what the > neural state represented in the story he pedals? It's not like we get > a direct experience of neural state like fluctuations in the colour > green, the brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing at > anyone time. Consider a robot, if the data was working on was > encrypted, would you think that the encryption would always be > decyphered and it would still experience what the state represented? > > Don't you get that teddy bears don't have subjective experiences, nor > do the more advanced toys we have for children now, and neither would > any robot no matter how complicated you made it, nor what 'special' > configuration its internal state was. > > Do you think that the technology companies should budget for when the > complexity or configuration of what they produce, causes it to be > freed from the laws of physics? > > If not, then can you see that all anythink they would make would do is > behave as it was built to behave. Is it that it would only have > subjective experiences if it was built to talk about them? Are you so > blinkered by you ego so as not to allow any reason to pierce your > assumptions that God doesn't exist, and that we are simply a > biological mechanism. How do you explain that jien...@aol.com managed > to understand what was being said, yet to the atheists here it was all > a 'word salad'? > > You say you haven't heard any objections to materialism, well perhaps > it's because you only hear what you want to hear. Like the people who > claimed to have seen the Emporer's New Clothes, you still don't get > that the deception has been seen through. It is implausible that we > only coincidentally have the subjective experiences that we express in > our behaviour, and they couldn't be influential if it was the > materialist/physicalist story, any more than they could influence the > behaviour of a robot. There is only one path it could follow, and that > would be the laws of physics, whether it had subjective experiences or > not. If you don't get this, then maybe go through the posts, I have > explained it more than once. If you still think you are looking > intelligent, believing the deceptive story you have been told then > think again. I send this reply before but it doesn't show up in Google groups, therfore I post it again. (sorry again) Sorry, I think it is you who do not know what reality is. If someone wonders whether one is dreaming, what does one do? One pinches oneself in the arm. Ever tried pinching yourself in the spirit ? All things spiritual are prominently present within the (human) brain. Therefore it is save to assume, that the spiritual indeed is little else that the workings of the (human) brain. This brain is our only real advantage in life compared to other species, and therefore we justly regard it as the most important thing we have. However - as Freud stated rightly - because it is so important to us, we tend to overestimate the value of the spiritual. Hallucinations do not occur in the physical words, neither do dreams. Fairies unicorns and leprechauns do not occur in the physical word, neither do Hobbits or Ogers. The are pure spiritual and only exist in the human mind. That is why people like Dennett and me, think it is you who are turning reality upside down. We think the human brain, although always following the laws of physics can process the input from our senses into something that can be stored in our memory. The parts of our memory we can talk about are usually called subjective experiences. Subjective, because they are not merely a copy of the physical input from our senses, and not even of the impulses our ears, eyes, etc. have send to the inner brain, but indeed a composite of this input and previously stored memory. In my example of the Robot, the visible image of Ashley together with the image of Mary-Kate in the database formed the subjective experience "I met Mary Jan" (objectively the Robot met Ashley). The reason we decide that we have subjective experiences is that we can report on it (talk, type) and compare it with reality. If the spiritual was reality there couldn't be any subjective experience, because we would not have anything objective to compare it to. Consider: If I think I see Mary Jane and this spiritual thought was real, If would have seen Mary-Jane. There would not be a physical Ashley but only a spiritual Mary-Jane.. Moreover if the spiritual was real, than the child would be entitled to say "My teddy bear feels hurt, the way you ignore its subjective experiences" and there would be no bases for you to contradict. Therefore the idea that the spiritual takes precedence over the physical is a dead-end street. As long as Randy doesn't have to part with his one million dollar in bonds, there is no (legal) proof that anything is free from the laws of physics. Subjective experiences can tell you differently because they include mistakes. When they are checked for mistakes, we speak of objective observations. Objective observations never show anything to be free of the laws of physics, which is logical as the laws of physics are actual just spiritual entities that are derived from objective observations. I can't explain why Jien managed to understand your "word salad". But actually I understood most of it. What I do completely not understand is why you think subjective experiences would make materialism implausible. From you last post I would guess that because you think the spiritual is more real, that because you think you are a ghost inside a body and you think the physical observation that all "you" are is a functioning human brain inside a body is illusive, you conclude that dualism complies better with the spiritual. Whereas I think the spiritual is subjective and the physical is objective, materialism complies better with the objective reality while dualism is illusive. Again the emperors new cloths were completely spiritual thus not so real, whereas his nakedness was very physical and objectively true. Deception is always discovered by objective physical observations, not by figments of your imagination. I have - again and again - explained how subjective experiences (I saw Mary Jane) can influence behaviour. I do not know what on earth gives you the idea that they can not? That is the key issue I think. Materialism - as I see it - means that subjective experiences can be physically explained, not that they are just illusive. Anything illusive about them, can also be physically explained. Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence behaviour? Peter van Velzen June 2007 Amstelveen The Netherlands Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 24, 2007 Posted June 24, 2007 On 24 Jun, 13:29, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> wrote: > On 17 jun, 02:53, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > On 16 Jun, 14:49, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > wrote: > > > > On 15 jun, 19:40, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 14 Jun, 20:50, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > On 12 jun, 23:49, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 12 Jun, 17:31, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > On 11 jun, 18:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > I think you understand Fred and me. > > > > > > > > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to > > > > > > > > avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to > > > > > > > > you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post. > > > > > > > > Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the > > > > > > > > answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable > > > > > > > > of doing it yourself. > > > > > > > > > I had asked: > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > Do you see that the following is always true: > > > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > You replied: > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true > > > > > > > > > If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it > > > > > > > > does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead > > > > > > > > (or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M). > > > > > > > > > A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can > > > > > > > > influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may > > > > > > > > use the state of synapses that constitutes P. > > > > > > > > > To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on > > > > > > > > it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong > > > > > > > > balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may > > > > > > > > even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then > > > > > > > > black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its > > > > > > > > bouncing. > > > > > > > > > Nevertheless its composition is. > > > > > > > > > M = a ball > > > > > > > > B(M) = the bouncing of the ball. > > > > > > > > P = a property of the ball > > > > > > > > If P = the colour, your assessment is right. > > > > > > > > If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong. > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive > > > > > > > > as: > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property > > > > > > > > of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property > > > > > > > > isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true, > > > > > > > > and so is (2). > > > > > > > > > With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the > > > > > > > > ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not > > > > > > > > be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > > > > > > > > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > > > > > > > > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > > > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > > > > > > > > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > > > > > > > > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as > > > > > > > > above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be > > > > > > > > thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that > > > > > > > > particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the > > > > > > > > biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was > > > > > > > > correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2). > > > > > > > > > If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves, > > > > > > > > which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without, > > > > > > > > then (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is > > > > > > > > presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world > > > > > > > > perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit, > > > > > > > > that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and > > > > > > > > thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same? > > > > > > > > You keep on assuming that subjective experiences do not have physical > > > > > > > properties. > > > > > > > However they do. Subjective experiences are memories (either temporary > > > > > > > or lasting) > > > > > > > These memories do influence our behaviour as you very well know. > > > > > > > Although I do not know how memories are actually "stored" in cortex, > > > > > > > we have ample proof that they are. Of course we can theoretically > > > > > > > explain our conduct mechanically without realizing that the synapse > > > > > > > behaviour we are describing is actually the act of "remembering" but > > > > > > > that does not change the fact, that without the information coming > > > > > > > from our memory our behaviour would change drastically. > > > > > > > > In my previous example of my computer program > > > > > > > you can explain the working by the hexadecimal machine code (a mix of > > > > > > > numbers and the letters A,B,C,D, E and F) and totally ignore what they > > > > > > > mean, > > > > > > > but that does not mean that the fact that the employee is a female > > > > > > > does not matter! > > > > > > > > Likewise you can explain human behaviour by the chemical working of > > > > > > > synapses, > > > > > > > but that does not mean in doesn't matter whether I thought I saw > > > > > > > Ashley or Kate. > > > > > > > > Humans are actually using subjective experiences to guide their > > > > > > > behaviour. > > > > > > > > I started re-reading "consciousness explained" by Daniel C. Dennett, > > > > > > > and found out his idea of consciousness goes one step further than I > > > > > > > thought. He thinks consciousness is caused by ideas in our head, that > > > > > > > make us think in a conscious way. Ideas that we have mostly learned > > > > > > > from other people. > > > > > > > I am not sure that is correct. To me everything we can theoretically > > > > > > > remember and theoretically communicate about, is a subjective > > > > > > > experience and is or has been part of our consciousness. > > > > > > > But the fact that almost nobody can remember much of his/her early > > > > > > > childhood, might mean that Dennett is right. > > > > > > > But it would be a good thing to read to book anyway. (did you read it > > > > > > > already?) > > > > > > > I can understand that you have been deceived by Dennet's explanation. > > > > > > I can show it to be a deception. > > > > > > > Step 1. > > > > > > > Do you understand that if there was a robot, no matter how it behaved, > > > > > > as long as it followed the known laws of physics, and therefore its > > > > > > behaviour could be explained to you in these terms, you wouldn't know > > > > > > whether it actually had any subjective experiences or not. This isn't > > > > > > about what your guess would be, it is about the truth about what you > > > > > > know. Nor is it a statement that the robot couldn't be subjectively > > > > > > experiencing by the way, in case you were going to disingeniously > > > > > > suggest that it was.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > If the Robot could make deduction from its data and its memory and > > > > > report them, I would have to assume it had a subjective experience. > > > > > What else is a subjective experience, but an experience that is > > > > > "coloured" by previous acquired information? > > > > > > The robot - for instance - could have been imprinted with the idea > > > > > "someone is an idiot" and then, after reading your post, conclude that > > > > > the best way to react was to answer: "You are definitely an idiot". > > > > > > The only difference between the robot and me as far as this event is > > > > > concerned, is that my memory contains the postulate "other people who > > > > > post on the NG have a brain similar to mine", which causes me to > > > > > continue trying to communicate even if the communication is very > > > > > difficult because you an me seem to have a different opinion on what > > > > > we think a "Subjective experience" is. > > > > > > Interesting to see you consider yourself able to disprove a man with > > > > > the capabilities of Daniel C Dennet! > > > > > > The fact that I cannot even take this first step with you may show > > > > > you, that is not such an easy thing to do. > > > > > > Someone2's Postulate : > > > > > We cannot tell if entity R has subjective experiences. > > > > > > Peter van Velzen's postulate: > > > > > If entity R can be shown to make a report on an experience that is > > > > > influenced by previous information, this means entity R has an > > > > > subjective experience. > > > > > (Especially if the previous information may not be true) > > > > > If you could get Daniel Dennet, or any other person who has encouraged > > > > people away from God, to come onto this group, and enter a debate > > > > (maybe you could tell him how highly you regard him or whatever, and > > > > ask for his help, and inform him that someone is saying he reasoning > > > > is implausible, and that he is too cowardly to enter into an open > > > > debate on the internet, or whatever), then I will show you how silly > > > > he is.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > O, he knows people think they know better than him. He might not know > > > that someone who makes about 20 posts without getting anywhere near > > > what the subject suggests does so. Can you please get to the point, > > > and give us a hint as to why materialism could possible be > > > implausible? > > > > So far you have only started out some riddle game, and being > > > frustrated by the fact that we do not agree to you premises, embarked > > > on another one, finding out that one too doesn't do the trick. > > > > I still agree with Dennett that in fact it is dualism that is > > > implausible: > > > How can a Ghost influence matter without being observable? > > > How can it be invisible (not interfere with electromagnetic waves), > > > and still see (intercept electromagnetic waves) > > > > Or like Dennett put it: > > > How can Casper the friendly ghost, move an object and yet pass thru > > > it? > > > > Materialism is the result of verificationism: If it cannot be > > > verified, it don't mean a thing, for apparently whether it is there or > > > not doesn't change anything or anybody. > > > > By the way: I do not mention Dennett as an authority, I just think I > > > owe it to him, to tell you I learned from reading his book. So far I > > > didn't learn much from your post, except that it gave me the good Idea > > > to read Dennett's book once more. > > > Dennet didn't know what reality was. There is only the spiritual. You > > are presented with the physical world. What objections does he have > > with regards to that? Isaiah 29, vs 14:16 (http://www.biblegateway.com/ > > passage/?search=Isaiah%2029&version=31 )stated how the people that you > > regard 'intelligent' like Dennet would turn reality upside down with > > physicalism. Though if you took there assumption away that we were > > simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, why would > > you think that anything that did follow the laws of physics had any > > subjective experiences at all? Not to mention what would know what the > > neural state represented in the story he pedals? It's not like we get > > a direct experience of neural state like fluctuations in the colour > > green, the brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing at > > anyone time. Consider a robot, if the data was working on was > > encrypted, would you think that the encryption would always be > > decyphered and it would still experience what the state represented? > > > Don't you get that teddy bears don't have subjective experiences, nor > > do the more advanced toys we have for children now, and neither would > > any robot no matter how complicated you made it, nor what 'special' > > configuration its internal state was. > > > Do you think that the technology companies should budget for when the > > complexity or configuration of what they produce, causes it to be > > freed from the laws of physics? > > > If not, then can you see that all anythink they would make would do is > > behave as it was built to behave. Is it that it would only have > > subjective experiences if it was built to talk about them? Are you so > > blinkered by you ego so as not to allow any reason to pierce your > > assumptions that God doesn't exist, and that we are simply a > > biological mechanism. How do you explain that jien...@aol.com managed > > to understand what was being said, yet to the atheists here it was all > > a 'word salad'? > > > You say you haven't heard any objections to materialism, well perhaps > > it's because you only hear what you want to hear. Like the people who > > claimed to have seen the Emporer's New Clothes, you still don't get > > that the deception has been seen through. It is implausible that we > > only coincidentally have the subjective experiences that we express in > > our behaviour, and they couldn't be influential if it was the > > materialist/physicalist story, any more than they could influence the > > behaviour of a robot. There is only one path it could follow, and that > > would be the laws of physics, whether it had subjective experiences or > > not. If you don't get this, then maybe go through the posts, I have > > explained it more than once. If you still think you are looking > > intelligent, believing the deceptive story you have been told then > > think again. > > I send this reply before but it doesn't show up in Google groups, > therfore I post it again. (sorry again) > > Sorry, I think it is you who do not know what reality is. If someone > wonders whether one is dreaming, what does one do? One pinches oneself > in the arm. Ever tried pinching yourself in the spirit ? > > All things spiritual are prominently present within the (human) brain. > Therefore it is save to assume, that the spiritual indeed is little > else that the workings of the (human) brain. This brain is our only > real advantage in life compared to other species, and therefore we > justly regard it as the most important thing we have. However - as > Freud stated rightly - because it is so important to us, we tend to > overestimate the value of the spiritual. > > Hallucinations do not occur in the physical words, neither do dreams. > Fairies unicorns and leprechauns do not occur in the physical word, > neither do Hobbits or Ogers. The are pure spiritual and only exist in > the human mind. That is why people like Dennett and me, think it is > you who are turning reality upside down. > > We think the human brain, although always following the laws of > physics can process the input from our senses into something that can > be stored in our memory. The parts of our memory we can talk about are > usually called subjective experiences. Subjective, because they are > not merely a copy of the physical input from our senses, and not even > of the impulses our ears, eyes, etc. have send to the inner brain, but > indeed a composite of this input and previously stored memory. In my > example of the Robot, the visible image of Ashley together with the > image of Mary-Kate in the database formed the subjective experience "I > met Mary Jan" (objectively the Robot met Ashley). The reason we decide > that we have subjective experiences is that we can report on it (talk, > type) and compare it with reality. > > If the spiritual was reality there couldn't be any subjective > experience, because we would not have anything objective to compare it > to. Consider: If I think I see Mary Jane and this spiritual thought > was real, If would have seen Mary-Jane. There would not be a physical > Ashley but only a spiritual Mary-Jane.. Moreover if the spiritual was > real, than the child would be entitled to say "My teddy bear feels > hurt, the way you ignore its subjective experiences" and there would > be no bases for you to contradict. > Therefore the idea that the spiritual takes precedence over the > physical is a dead-end street. > > As long as Randy doesn't have to part with his one million dollar in > bonds, there is no (legal) proof that anything is free from the laws > of physics. Subjective experiences can tell you differently because > they include mistakes. When they are checked for mistakes, we speak of > objective observations. Objective observations never show anything to > be free of the laws of physics, which is logical as the laws of > physics are actual just spiritual entities that are derived from > objective observations. > > I can't explain why Jien managed to understand your "word salad". But > actually I understood most of it. What I do completely not understand > is why you think subjective experiences would make materialism > implausible. From you last post I would guess that because you think > the spiritual is more real, that because you think you are a ghost > inside a body and you think the physical observation that all "you" > are is a functioning human brain inside a body is illusive, you > conclude that dualism complies better with the spiritual. Whereas I > think the spiritual is subjective and the physical is objective, > materialism complies better with the objective reality while dualism > is illusive. > > Again the emperors new cloths were completely spiritual thus not so > real, whereas his nakedness was very physical and objectively true. > Deception is always discovered by objective physical observations, not > by figments of your imagination. > > I have - again and again - explained how subjective experiences (I saw > Mary Jane) can influence behaviour. I do not know what on earth gives > you the idea that they can not? That is the key issue I think. > > Materialism - as I see it - means that subjective experiences can be > physically explained, not that they are just illusive. Anything > illusive about them, can also be physically explained. > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > behaviour? > Your objections to the spiritual reality aren't reasoned. You simply have stated what you think the spiritual reality would be like. I don't mind going through it with you, but not for it to serve as a distraction from the implausibility of materialism. Do you understand that a robot that was behaving in a way that you or other atheists might consider "imbuing" it with subjective/conscious experiences, could always have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it didn't have subjective/conscoius experiences? Quote
Guest pbamvv@worldonline.nl Posted June 24, 2007 Posted June 24, 2007 On 24 jun, 16:29, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 24 Jun, 13:29, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > wrote: > > > On 17 jun, 02:53, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 16 Jun, 14:49, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > wrote: > > > > > On 15 jun, 19:40, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 14 Jun, 20:50, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > On 12 jun, 23:49, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 12 Jun, 17:31, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 11 jun, 18:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > I think you understand Fred and me. > > > > > > > > > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to > > > > > > > > > avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to > > > > > > > > > you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post. > > > > > > > > > Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the > > > > > > > > > answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable > > > > > > > > > of doing it yourself. > > > > > > > > > > I had asked: > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > Do you see that the following is always true: > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > You replied: > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true > > > > > > > > > > If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it > > > > > > > > > does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead > > > > > > > > > (or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M). > > > > > > > > > > A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can > > > > > > > > > influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may > > > > > > > > > use the state of synapses that constitutes P. > > > > > > > > > > To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on > > > > > > > > > it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong > > > > > > > > > balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may > > > > > > > > > even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then > > > > > > > > > black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its > > > > > > > > > bouncing. > > > > > > > > > > Nevertheless its composition is. > > > > > > > > > > M = a ball > > > > > > > > > B(M) = the bouncing of the ball. > > > > > > > > > P = a property of the ball > > > > > > > > > If P = the colour, your assessment is right. > > > > > > > > > If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong. > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive > > > > > > > > > as: > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property > > > > > > > > > of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property > > > > > > > > > isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true, > > > > > > > > > and so is (2). > > > > > > > > > > With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the > > > > > > > > > ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not > > > > > > > > > be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > > > > > > > > > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > > > > > > > > > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > > > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > > > > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > > > > > > > > > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > > > > > > > > > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as > > > > > > > > > above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be > > > > > > > > > thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that > > > > > > > > > particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the > > > > > > > > > biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was > > > > > > > > > correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2). > > > > > > > > > > If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves, > > > > > > > > > which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without, > > > > > > > > > then (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is > > > > > > > > > presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world > > > > > > > > > perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit, > > > > > > > > > that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and > > > > > > > > > thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same? > > > > > > > > > You keep on assuming that subjective experiences do not have physical > > > > > > > > properties. > > > > > > > > However they do. Subjective experiences are memories (either temporary > > > > > > > > or lasting) > > > > > > > > These memories do influence our behaviour as you very well know. > > > > > > > > Although I do not know how memories are actually "stored" in cortex, > > > > > > > > we have ample proof that they are. Of course we can theoretically > > > > > > > > explain our conduct mechanically without realizing that the synapse > > > > > > > > behaviour we are describing is actually the act of "remembering" but > > > > > > > > that does not change the fact, that without the information coming > > > > > > > > from our memory our behaviour would change drastically. > > > > > > > > > In my previous example of my computer program > > > > > > > > you can explain the working by the hexadecimal machine code (a mix of > > > > > > > > numbers and the letters A,B,C,D, E and F) and totally ignore what they > > > > > > > > mean, > > > > > > > > but that does not mean that the fact that the employee is a female > > > > > > > > does not matter! > > > > > > > > > Likewise you can explain human behaviour by the chemical working of > > > > > > > > synapses, > > > > > > > > but that does not mean in doesn't matter whether I thought I saw > > > > > > > > Ashley or Kate. > > > > > > > > > Humans are actually using subjective experiences to guide their > > > > > > > > behaviour. > > > > > > > > > I started re-reading "consciousness explained" by Daniel C. Dennett, > > > > > > > > and found out his idea of consciousness goes one step further than I > > > > > > > > thought. He thinks consciousness is caused by ideas in our head, that > > > > > > > > make us think in a conscious way. Ideas that we have mostly learned > > > > > > > > from other people. > > > > > > > > I am not sure that is correct. To me everything we can theoretically > > > > > > > > remember and theoretically communicate about, is a subjective > > > > > > > > experience and is or has been part of our consciousness. > > > > > > > > But the fact that almost nobody can remember much of his/her early > > > > > > > > childhood, might mean that Dennett is right. > > > > > > > > But it would be a good thing to read to book anyway. (did you read it > > > > > > > > already?) > > > > > > > > I can understand that you have been deceived by Dennet's explanation. > > > > > > > I can show it to be a deception. > > > > > > > > Step 1. > > > > > > > > Do you understand that if there was a robot, no matter how it behaved, > > > > > > > as long as it followed the known laws of physics, and therefore its > > > > > > > behaviour could be explained to you in these terms, you wouldn't know > > > > > > > whether it actually had any subjective experiences or not. This isn't > > > > > > > about what your guess would be, it is about the truth about what you > > > > > > > know. Nor is it a statement that the robot couldn't be subjectively > > > > > > > experiencing by the way, in case you were going to disingeniously > > > > > > > suggest that it was.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > If the Robot could make deduction from its data and its memory and > > > > > > report them, I would have to assume it had a subjective experience. > > > > > > What else is a subjective experience, but an experience that is > > > > > > "coloured" by previous acquired information? > > > > > > > The robot - for instance - could have been imprinted with the idea > > > > > > "someone is an idiot" and then, after reading your post, conclude that > > > > > > the best way to react was to answer: "You are definitely an idiot". > > > > > > > The only difference between the robot and me as far as this event is > > > > > > concerned, is that my memory contains the postulate "other people who > > > > > > post on the NG have a brain similar to mine", which causes me to > > > > > > continue trying to communicate even if the communication is very > > > > > > difficult because you an me seem to have a different opinion on what > > > > > > we think a "Subjective experience" is. > > > > > > > Interesting to see you consider yourself able to disprove a man with > > > > > > the capabilities of Daniel C Dennet! > > > > > > > The fact that I cannot even take this first step with you may show > > > > > > you, that is not such an easy thing to do. > > > > > > > Someone2's Postulate : > > > > > > We cannot tell if entity R has subjective experiences. > > > > > > > Peter van Velzen's postulate: > > > > > > If entity R can be shown to make a report on an experience that is > > > > > > influenced by previous information, this means entity R has an > > > > > > subjective experience. > > > > > > (Especially if the previous information may not be true) > > > > > > If you could get Daniel Dennet, or any other person who has encouraged > > > > > people away from God, to come onto this group, and enter a debate > > > > > (maybe you could tell him how highly you regard him or whatever, and > > > > > ask for his help, and inform him that someone is saying he reasoning > > > > > is implausible, and that he is too cowardly to enter into an open > > > > > debate on the internet, or whatever), then I will show you how silly > > > > > he is.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > O, he knows people think they know better than him. He might not know > > > > that someone who makes about 20 posts without getting anywhere near > > > > what the subject suggests does so. Can you please get to the point, > > > > and give us a hint as to why materialism could possible be > > > > implausible? > > > > > So far you have only started out some riddle game, and being > > > > frustrated by the fact that we do not agree to you premises, embarked > > > > on another one, finding out that one too doesn't do the trick. > > > > > I still agree with Dennett that in fact it is dualism that is > > > > implausible: > > > > How can a Ghost influence matter without being observable? > > > > How can it be invisible (not interfere with electromagnetic waves), > > > > and still see (intercept electromagnetic waves) > > > > > Or like Dennett put it: > > > > How can Casper the friendly ghost, move an object and yet pass thru > > > > it? > > > > > Materialism is the result of verificationism: If it cannot be > > > > verified, it don't mean a thing, for apparently whether it is there or > > > > not doesn't change anything or anybody. > > > > > By the way: I do not mention Dennett as an authority, I just think I > > > > owe it to him, to tell you I learned from reading his book. So far I > > > > didn't learn much from your post, except that it gave me the good Idea > > > > to read Dennett's book once more. > > > > Dennet didn't know what reality was. There is only the spiritual. You > > > are presented with the physical world. What objections does he have > > > with regards to that? Isaiah 29, vs 14:16 (http://www.biblegateway.com/ > > > passage/?search=Isaiah%2029&version=31 )stated how the people that you > > > regard 'intelligent' like Dennet would turn reality upside down with > > > physicalism. Though if you took there assumption away that we were > > > simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, why would > > > you think that anything that did follow the laws of physics had any > > > subjective experiences at all? Not to mention what would know what the > > > neural state represented in the story he pedals? It's not like we get > > > a direct experience of neural state like fluctuations in the colour > > > green, the brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing at > > > anyone time. Consider a robot, if the data was working on was > > > encrypted, would you think that the encryption would always be > > > decyphered and it would still experience what the state represented? > > > > Don't you get that teddy bears don't have subjective experiences, nor > > > do the more advanced toys we have for children now, and neither would > > > any robot no matter how complicated you made it, nor what 'special' > > > configuration its internal state was. > > > > Do you think that the technology companies should budget for when the > > > complexity or configuration of what they produce, causes it to be > > > freed from the laws of physics? > > > > If not, then can you see that all anythink they would make would do is > > > behave as it was built to behave. Is it that it would only have > > > subjective experiences if it was built to talk about them? Are you so > > > blinkered by you ego so as not to allow any reason to pierce your > > > assumptions that God doesn't exist, and that we are simply a > > > biological mechanism. How do you explain that jien...@aol.com managed > > > to understand what was being said, yet to the atheists here it was all > > > a 'word salad'? > > > > You say you haven't heard any objections to materialism, well perhaps > > > it's because you only hear what you want to hear. Like the people who > > > claimed to have seen the Emporer's New Clothes, you still don't get > > > that the deception has been seen through. It is implausible that we > > > only coincidentally have the subjective experiences that we express in > > > our behaviour, and they couldn't be influential if it was the > > > materialist/physicalist story, any more than they could influence the > > > behaviour of a robot. There is only one path it could follow, and that > > > would be the laws of physics, whether it had subjective experiences or > > > not. If you don't get this, then maybe go through the posts, I have > > > explained it more than once. If you still think you are looking > > > intelligent, believing the deceptive story you have been told then > > > think again. > > > I send this reply before but it doesn't show up in Google groups, > > therfore I post it again. (sorry again) > > > Sorry, I think it is you who do not know what reality is. If someone > > wonders whether one is dreaming, what does one do? One pinches oneself > > in the arm. Ever tried pinching yourself in the spirit ? > > > All things spiritual are prominently present within the (human) brain. > > Therefore it is save to assume, that the spiritual indeed is little > > else that the workings of the (human) brain. This brain is our only > > real advantage in life compared to other species, and therefore we > > justly regard it as the most important thing we have. However - as > > Freud stated rightly - because it is so important to us, we tend to > > overestimate the value of the spiritual. > > > Hallucinations do not occur in the physical words, neither do dreams. > > Fairies unicorns and leprechauns do not occur in the physical word, > > neither do Hobbits or Ogers. The are pure spiritual and only exist in > > the human mind. That is why people like Dennett and me, think it is > > you who are turning reality upside down. > > > We think the human brain, although always following the laws of > > physics can process the input from our senses into something that can > > be stored in our memory. The parts of our memory we can talk about are > > usually called subjective experiences. Subjective, because they are > > not merely a copy of the physical input from our senses, and not even > > of the impulses our ears, eyes, etc. have send to the inner brain, but > > indeed a composite of this input and previously stored memory. In my > > example of the Robot, the visible image of Ashley together with the > > image of Mary-Kate in the database formed the subjective experience "I > > met Mary Jan" (objectively the Robot met Ashley). The reason we decide > > that we have subjective experiences is that we can report on it (talk, > > type) and compare it with reality. > > > If the spiritual was reality there couldn't be any subjective > > experience, because we would not have anything objective to compare it > > to. Consider: If I think I see Mary Jane and this spiritual thought > > was real, If would have seen Mary-Jane. There would not be a physical > > Ashley but only a spiritual Mary-Jane.. Moreover if the spiritual was > > real, than the child would be entitled to say "My teddy bear feels > > hurt, the way you ignore its subjective experiences" and there would > > be no bases for you to contradict. > > Therefore the idea that the spiritual takes precedence over the > > physical is a dead-end street. > > > As long as Randy doesn't have to part with his one million dollar in > > bonds, there is no (legal) proof that anything is free from the laws > > of physics. Subjective experiences can tell you differently because > > they include mistakes. When they are checked for mistakes, we speak of > > objective observations. Objective observations never show anything to > > be free of the laws of physics, which is logical as the laws of > > physics are actual just spiritual entities that are derived from > > objective observations. > > > I can't explain why Jien managed to understand your "word salad". But > > actually I understood most of it. What I do completely not understand > > is why you think subjective experiences would make materialism > > implausible. From you last post I would guess that because you think > > the spiritual is more real, that because you think you are a ghost > > inside a body and you think the physical observation that all "you" > > are is a functioning human brain inside a body is illusive, you > > conclude that dualism complies better with the spiritual. Whereas I > > think the spiritual is subjective and the physical is objective, > > materialism complies better with the objective reality while dualism > > is illusive. > > > Again the emperors new cloths were completely spiritual thus not so > > real, whereas his nakedness was very physical and objectively true. > > Deception is always discovered by objective physical observations, not > > by figments of your imagination. > > > I have - again and again - explained how subjective experiences (I saw > > Mary Jane) can influence behaviour. I do not know what on earth gives > > you the idea that they can not? That is the key issue I think. > > > Materialism - as I see it - means that subjective experiences can be > > physically explained, not that they are just illusive. Anything > > illusive about them, can also be physically explained. > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > behaviour? > > Your objections to the spiritual reality aren't reasoned. You simply > have stated what you think the spiritual reality would be like. I > don't mind going through it with you, but not for it to serve as a > distraction from the implausibility of materialism. > > Do you understand that a robot that was behaving in a way that you or > other atheists might consider "imbuing" it with subjective/conscious > experiences, could always have its behaviour explained with the > assumption that it didn't have subjective/conscoius experiences? I think you are expressing yourself a bit inexact. The behaviour could be explained without the assumption that it had subjecive experiences (simply by going to the machine instructions without wondering what they are about) but it cannot be explained with the assumption that it had no subjective experiences. If you assume te Robot has none, than the Robot would not be able to say "I met Mary Kate" for that expression is proof of a subjective experience (experience, because the Robot indeed met someone, subjective because objectively he met Ashley) If you replace the Robot with Robert (a human being) the same is true. Robert would then say "I met Mary Kate" and this would proof Robert had a subjective experience. Again: > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > behaviour? I suspect you and me do not share the same view on "subjective experience" but you haven't made clear to me what that difference is. I think I have made very clear what the expression means to me, so I think it is your turn to enlighten Peter van Velzen June 2007 Amstelveen The Netherlands Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 24, 2007 Posted June 24, 2007 On 24 Jun, 16:07, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> wrote: > On 24 jun, 16:29, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > On 24 Jun, 13:29, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > wrote: > > > > On 17 jun, 02:53, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 16 Jun, 14:49, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > On 15 jun, 19:40, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 14 Jun, 20:50, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > On 12 jun, 23:49, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 12 Jun, 17:31, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 11 jun, 18:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > I think you understand Fred and me. > > > > > > > > > > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to > > > > > > > > > > avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to > > > > > > > > > > you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post. > > > > > > > > > > Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the > > > > > > > > > > answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable > > > > > > > > > > of doing it yourself. > > > > > > > > > > > I had asked: > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > Do you see that the following is always true: > > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > You replied: > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true > > > > > > > > > > > If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it > > > > > > > > > > does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead > > > > > > > > > > (or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M). > > > > > > > > > > > A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can > > > > > > > > > > influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may > > > > > > > > > > use the state of synapses that constitutes P. > > > > > > > > > > > To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on > > > > > > > > > > it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong > > > > > > > > > > balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may > > > > > > > > > > even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then > > > > > > > > > > black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its > > > > > > > > > > bouncing. > > > > > > > > > > > Nevertheless its composition is. > > > > > > > > > > > M = a ball > > > > > > > > > > B(M) = the bouncing of the ball. > > > > > > > > > > P = a property of the ball > > > > > > > > > > If P = the colour, your assessment is right. > > > > > > > > > > If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong. > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive > > > > > > > > > > as: > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property > > > > > > > > > > of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property > > > > > > > > > > isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true, > > > > > > > > > > and so is (2). > > > > > > > > > > > With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the > > > > > > > > > > ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not > > > > > > > > > > be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > > > > > > > > > > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > > > > > > > > > > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > > > > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > > > > > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > > > > > > > > > > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > > > > > > > > > > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as > > > > > > > > > > above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be > > > > > > > > > > thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that > > > > > > > > > > particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the > > > > > > > > > > biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was > > > > > > > > > > correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2). > > > > > > > > > > > If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves, > > > > > > > > > > which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without, > > > > > > > > > > then (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > > You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is > > > > > > > > > > presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world > > > > > > > > > > perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit, > > > > > > > > > > that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and > > > > > > > > > > thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same? > > > > > > > > > > You keep on assuming that subjective experiences do not have physical > > > > > > > > > properties. > > > > > > > > > However they do. Subjective experiences are memories (either temporary > > > > > > > > > or lasting) > > > > > > > > > These memories do influence our behaviour as you very well know. > > > > > > > > > Although I do not know how memories are actually "stored" in cortex, > > > > > > > > > we have ample proof that they are. Of course we can theoretically > > > > > > > > > explain our conduct mechanically without realizing that the synapse > > > > > > > > > behaviour we are describing is actually the act of "remembering" but > > > > > > > > > that does not change the fact, that without the information coming > > > > > > > > > from our memory our behaviour would change drastically. > > > > > > > > > > In my previous example of my computer program > > > > > > > > > you can explain the working by the hexadecimal machine code (a mix of > > > > > > > > > numbers and the letters A,B,C,D, E and F) and totally ignore what they > > > > > > > > > mean, > > > > > > > > > but that does not mean that the fact that the employee is a female > > > > > > > > > does not matter! > > > > > > > > > > Likewise you can explain human behaviour by the chemical working of > > > > > > > > > synapses, > > > > > > > > > but that does not mean in doesn't matter whether I thought I saw > > > > > > > > > Ashley or Kate. > > > > > > > > > > Humans are actually using subjective experiences to guide their > > > > > > > > > behaviour. > > > > > > > > > > I started re-reading "consciousness explained" by Daniel C. Dennett, > > > > > > > > > and found out his idea of consciousness goes one step further than I > > > > > > > > > thought. He thinks consciousness is caused by ideas in our head, that > > > > > > > > > make us think in a conscious way. Ideas that we have mostly learned > > > > > > > > > from other people. > > > > > > > > > I am not sure that is correct. To me everything we can theoretically > > > > > > > > > remember and theoretically communicate about, is a subjective > > > > > > > > > experience and is or has been part of our consciousness. > > > > > > > > > But the fact that almost nobody can remember much of his/her early > > > > > > > > > childhood, might mean that Dennett is right. > > > > > > > > > But it would be a good thing to read to book anyway. (did you read it > > > > > > > > > already?) > > > > > > > > > I can understand that you have been deceived by Dennet's explanation. > > > > > > > > I can show it to be a deception. > > > > > > > > > Step 1. > > > > > > > > > Do you understand that if there was a robot, no matter how it behaved, > > > > > > > > as long as it followed the known laws of physics, and therefore its > > > > > > > > behaviour could be explained to you in these terms, you wouldn't know > > > > > > > > whether it actually had any subjective experiences or not. This isn't > > > > > > > > about what your guess would be, it is about the truth about what you > > > > > > > > know. Nor is it a statement that the robot couldn't be subjectively > > > > > > > > experiencing by the way, in case you were going to disingeniously > > > > > > > > suggest that it was.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > > If the Robot could make deduction from its data and its memory and > > > > > > > report them, I would have to assume it had a subjective experience. > > > > > > > What else is a subjective experience, but an experience that is > > > > > > > "coloured" by previous acquired information? > > > > > > > > The robot - for instance - could have been imprinted with the idea > > > > > > > "someone is an idiot" and then, after reading your post, conclude that > > > > > > > the best way to react was to answer: "You are definitely an idiot". > > > > > > > > The only difference between the robot and me as far as this event is > > > > > > > concerned, is that my memory contains the postulate "other people who > > > > > > > post on the NG have a brain similar to mine", which causes me to > > > > > > > continue trying to communicate even if the communication is very > > > > > > > difficult because you an me seem to have a different opinion on what > > > > > > > we think a "Subjective experience" is. > > > > > > > > Interesting to see you consider yourself able to disprove a man with > > > > > > > the capabilities of Daniel C Dennet! > > > > > > > > The fact that I cannot even take this first step with you may show > > > > > > > you, that is not such an easy thing to do. > > > > > > > > Someone2's Postulate : > > > > > > > We cannot tell if entity R has subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > Peter van Velzen's postulate: > > > > > > > If entity R can be shown to make a report on an experience that is > > > > > > > influenced by previous information, this means entity R has an > > > > > > > subjective experience. > > > > > > > (Especially if the previous information may not be true) > > > > > > > If you could get Daniel Dennet, or any other person who has encouraged > > > > > > people away from God, to come onto this group, and enter a debate > > > > > > (maybe you could tell him how highly you regard him or whatever, and > > > > > > ask for his help, and inform him that someone is saying he reasoning > > > > > > is implausible, and that he is too cowardly to enter into an open > > > > > > debate on the internet, or whatever), then I will show you how silly > > > > > > he is.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > O, he knows people think they know better than him. He might not know > > > > > that someone who makes about 20 posts without getting anywhere near > > > > > what the subject suggests does so. Can you please get to the point, > > > > > and give us a hint as to why materialism could possible be > > > > > implausible? > > > > > > So far you have only started out some riddle game, and being > > > > > frustrated by the fact that we do not agree to you premises, embarked > > > > > on another one, finding out that one too doesn't do the trick. > > > > > > I still agree with Dennett that in fact it is dualism that is > > > > > implausible: > > > > > How can a Ghost influence matter without being observable? > > > > > How can it be invisible (not interfere with electromagnetic waves), > > > > > and still see (intercept electromagnetic waves) > > > > > > Or like Dennett put it: > > > > > How can Casper the friendly ghost, move an object and yet pass thru > > > > > it? > > > > > > Materialism is the result of verificationism: If it cannot be > > > > > verified, it don't mean a thing, for apparently whether it is there or > > > > > not doesn't change anything or anybody. > > > > > > By the way: I do not mention Dennett as an authority, I just think I > > > > > owe it to him, to tell you I learned from reading his book. So far I > > > > > didn't learn much from your post, except that it gave me the good Idea > > > > > to read Dennett's book once more. > > > > > Dennet didn't know what reality was. There is only the spiritual. You > > > > are presented with the physical world. What objections does he have > > > > with regards to that? Isaiah 29, vs 14:16 (http://www.biblegateway.com/ > > > > passage/?search=Isaiah%2029&version=31 )stated how the people that you > > > > regard 'intelligent' like Dennet would turn reality upside down with > > > > physicalism. Though if you took there assumption away that we were > > > > simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, why would > > > > you think that anything that did follow the laws of physics had any > > > > subjective experiences at all? Not to mention what would know what the > > > > neural state represented in the story he pedals? It's not like we get > > > > a direct experience of neural state like fluctuations in the colour > > > > green, the brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing at > > > > anyone time. Consider a robot, if the data was working on was > > > > encrypted, would you think that the encryption would always be > > > > decyphered and it would still experience what the state represented? > > > > > Don't you get that teddy bears don't have subjective experiences, nor > > > > do the more advanced toys we have for children now, and neither would > > > > any robot no matter how complicated you made it, nor what 'special' > > > > configuration its internal state was. > > > > > Do you think that the technology companies should budget for when the > > > > complexity or configuration of what they produce, causes it to be > > > > freed from the laws of physics? > > > > > If not, then can you see that all anythink they would make would do is > > > > behave as it was built to behave. Is it that it would only have > > > > subjective experiences if it was built to talk about them? Are you so > > > > blinkered by you ego so as not to allow any reason to pierce your > > > > assumptions that God doesn't exist, and that we are simply a > > > > biological mechanism. How do you explain that jien...@aol.com managed > > > > to understand what was being said, yet to the atheists here it was all > > > > a 'word salad'? > > > > > You say you haven't heard any objections to materialism, well perhaps > > > > it's because you only hear what you want to hear. Like the people who > > > > claimed to have seen the Emporer's New Clothes, you still don't get > > > > that the deception has been seen through. It is implausible that we > > > > only coincidentally have the subjective experiences that we express in > > > > our behaviour, and they couldn't be influential if it was the > > > > materialist/physicalist story, any more than they could influence the > > > > behaviour of a robot. There is only one path it could follow, and that > > > > would be the laws of physics, whether it had subjective experiences or > > > > not. If you don't get this, then maybe go through the posts, I have > > > > explained it more than once. If you still think you are looking > > > > intelligent, believing the deceptive story you have been told then > > > > think again. > > > > I send this reply before but it doesn't show up in Google groups, > > > therfore I post it again. (sorry again) > > > > Sorry, I think it is you who do not know what reality is. If someone > > > wonders whether one is dreaming, what does one do? One pinches oneself > > > in the arm. Ever tried pinching yourself in the spirit ? > > > > All things spiritual are prominently present within the (human) brain. > > > Therefore it is save to assume, that the spiritual indeed is little > > > else that the workings of the (human) brain. This brain is our only > > > real advantage in life compared to other species, and therefore we > > > justly regard it as the most important thing we have. However - as > > > Freud stated rightly - because it is so important to us, we tend to > > > overestimate the value of the spiritual. > > > > Hallucinations do not occur in the physical words, neither do dreams. > > > Fairies unicorns and leprechauns do not occur in the physical word, > > > neither do Hobbits or Ogers. The are pure spiritual and only exist in > > > the human mind. That is why people like Dennett and me, think it is > > > you who are turning reality upside down. > > > > We think the human brain, although always following the laws of > > > physics can process the input from our senses into something that can > > > be stored in our memory. The parts of our memory we can talk about are > > > usually called subjective experiences. Subjective, because they are > > > not merely a copy of the physical input from our senses, and not even > > > of the impulses our ears, eyes, etc. have send to the inner brain, but > > > indeed a composite of this input and previously stored memory. In my > > > example of the Robot, the visible image of Ashley together with the > > > image of Mary-Kate in the database formed the subjective experience "I > > > met Mary Jan" (objectively the Robot met Ashley). The reason we decide > > > that we have subjective experiences is that we can report on it (talk, > > > type) and compare it with reality. > > > > If the spiritual was reality there couldn't be any subjective > > > experience, because we would not have anything objective to compare it > > > to. Consider: If I think I see Mary Jane and this spiritual thought > > > was real, If would have seen Mary-Jane. There would not be a physical > > > Ashley but only a spiritual Mary-Jane.. Moreover if the spiritual was > > > real, than the child would be entitled to say "My teddy bear feels > > > hurt, the way you ignore its subjective experiences" and there would > > > be no bases for you to contradict. > > > Therefore the idea that the spiritual takes precedence over the > > > physical is a dead-end street. > > > > As long as Randy doesn't have to part with his one million dollar in > > > bonds, there is no (legal) proof that anything is free from the laws > > > of physics. Subjective experiences can tell you differently because > > > they include mistakes. When they are checked for mistakes, we speak of > > > objective observations. Objective observations never show anything to > > > be free of the laws of physics, which is logical as the laws of > > > physics are actual just spiritual entities that are derived from > > > objective observations. > > > > I can't explain why Jien managed to understand your "word salad". But > > > actually I understood most of it. What I do completely not understand > > > is why you think subjective experiences would make materialism > > > implausible. From you last post I would guess that because you think > > > the spiritual is more real, that because you think you are a ghost > > > inside a body and you think the physical observation that all "you" > > > are is a functioning human brain inside a body is illusive, you > > > conclude that dualism complies better with the spiritual. Whereas I > > > think the spiritual is subjective and the physical is objective, > > > materialism complies better with the objective reality while dualism > > > is illusive. > > > > Again the emperors new cloths were completely spiritual thus not so > > > real, whereas his nakedness was very physical and objectively true. > > > Deception is always discovered by objective physical observations, not > > > by figments of your imagination. > > > > I have - again and again - explained how subjective experiences (I saw > > > Mary Jane) can influence behaviour. I do not know what on earth gives > > > you the idea that they can not? That is the key issue I think. > > > > Materialism - as I see it - means that subjective experiences can be > > > physically explained, not that they are just illusive. Anything > > > illusive about them, can also be physically explained. > > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > > behaviour? > > > Your objections to the spiritual reality aren't reasoned. You simply > > have stated what you think the spiritual reality would be like. I > > don't mind going through it with you, but not for it to serve as a > > distraction from the implausibility of materialism. > > > Do you understand that a robot that was behaving in a way that you or > > other atheists might consider "imbuing" it with subjective/conscious > > experiences, could always have its behaviour explained with the > > assumption that it didn't have subjective/conscoius experiences? > > I think you are expressing yourself a bit inexact. > The behaviour could be explained without the assumption that it had > subjecive experiences > (simply by going to the machine instructions without wondering what > they are about) > but it cannot be explained with the assumption that it had no > subjective experiences. > If you assume te Robot has none, than the Robot would not be able to > say "I met Mary Kate" > for that expression is proof of a subjective experience > (experience, because the Robot indeed met someone, subjective because > objectively he met Ashley) > > If you replace the Robot with Robert (a human being) the same is true. > Robert would then say "I met Mary Kate" and this would proof Robert > had a subjective experience. > > Again: > > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > > behaviour? > > I suspect you and me do not share the same view on "subjective > experience" > but you haven't made clear to me what that difference is. > I think I have made very clear what the expression means to me, > so I think it is your turn to enlighten > I mean by subjective experiences, sensations like pleasure, or pain, or visual sensations, or auditory sensations for example. Also I meant that it could be explained with the assumption that it had no subjective/conscious experiences. A theist physicist for example, could assume that it had no more subjective/conscious experiences than a teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as the behaviour of a mobile phone is explained. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 24, 2007 Posted June 24, 2007 On 24 Jun, 16:18, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 24 Jun, 16:07, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > wrote: > > > > > > > On 24 jun, 16:29, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 24 Jun, 13:29, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > wrote: > > > > > On 17 jun, 02:53, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 16 Jun, 14:49, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > On 15 jun, 19:40, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 14 Jun, 20:50, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 12 jun, 23:49, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 12 Jun, 17:31, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 jun, 18:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think you understand Fred and me. > > > > > > > > > > > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to > > > > > > > > > > > avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to > > > > > > > > > > > you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post. > > > > > > > > > > > Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the > > > > > > > > > > > answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable > > > > > > > > > > > of doing it yourself. > > > > > > > > > > > > I had asked: > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > Do you see that the following is always true: > > > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > You replied: > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true > > > > > > > > > > > > If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it > > > > > > > > > > > does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead > > > > > > > > > > > (or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M). > > > > > > > > > > > > A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can > > > > > > > > > > > influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may > > > > > > > > > > > use the state of synapses that constitutes P. > > > > > > > > > > > > To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on > > > > > > > > > > > it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong > > > > > > > > > > > balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may > > > > > > > > > > > even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then > > > > > > > > > > > black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its > > > > > > > > > > > bouncing. > > > > > > > > > > > > Nevertheless its composition is. > > > > > > > > > > > > M = a ball > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) = the bouncing of the ball. > > > > > > > > > > > P = a property of the ball > > > > > > > > > > > If P = the colour, your assessment is right. > > > > > > > > > > > If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong. > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive > > > > > > > > > > > as: > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property > > > > > > > > > > > of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property > > > > > > > > > > > isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true, > > > > > > > > > > > and so is (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the > > > > > > > > > > > ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not > > > > > > > > > > > be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > > > > > > > > > > > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > > > > > > > > > > > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > > > > > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > > > > > > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > > > > > > > > > > > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > > > > > > > > > > > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as > > > > > > > > > > > above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be > > > > > > > > > > > thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that > > > > > > > > > > > particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the > > > > > > > > > > > biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was > > > > > > > > > > > correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves, > > > > > > > > > > > which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without, > > > > > > > > > > > then (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > > > You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is > > > > > > > > > > > presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world > > > > > > > > > > > perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit, > > > > > > > > > > > that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and > > > > > > > > > > > thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same? > > > > > > > > > > > You keep on assuming that subjective experiences do not have physical > > > > > > > > > > properties. > > > > > > > > > > However they do. Subjective experiences are memories (either temporary > > > > > > > > > > or lasting) > > > > > > > > > > These memories do influence our behaviour as you very well know. > > > > > > > > > > Although I do not know how memories are actually "stored" in cortex, > > > > > > > > > > we have ample proof that they are. Of course we can theoretically > > > > > > > > > > explain our conduct mechanically without realizing that the synapse > > > > > > > > > > behaviour we are describing is actually the act of "remembering" but > > > > > > > > > > that does not change the fact, that without the information coming > > > > > > > > > > from our memory our behaviour would change drastically. > > > > > > > > > > > In my previous example of my computer program > > > > > > > > > > you can explain the working by the hexadecimal machine code (a mix of > > > > > > > > > > numbers and the letters A,B,C,D, E and F) and totally ignore what they > > > > > > > > > > mean, > > > > > > > > > > but that does not mean that the fact that the employee is a female > > > > > > > > > > does not matter! > > > > > > > > > > > Likewise you can explain human behaviour by the chemical working of > > > > > > > > > > synapses, > > > > > > > > > > but that does not mean in doesn't matter whether I thought I saw > > > > > > > > > > Ashley or Kate. > > > > > > > > > > > Humans are actually using subjective experiences to guide their > > > > > > > > > > behaviour. > > > > > > > > > > > I started re-reading "consciousness explained" by Daniel C. Dennett, > > > > > > > > > > and found out his idea of consciousness goes one step further than I > > > > > > > > > > thought. He thinks consciousness is caused by ideas in our head, that > > > > > > > > > > make us think in a conscious way. Ideas that we have mostly learned > > > > > > > > > > from other people. > > > > > > > > > > I am not sure that is correct. To me everything we can theoretically > > > > > > > > > > remember and theoretically communicate about, is a subjective > > > > > > > > > > experience and is or has been part of our consciousness. > > > > > > > > > > But the fact that almost nobody can remember much of his/her early > > > > > > > > > > childhood, might mean that Dennett is right. > > > > > > > > > > But it would be a good thing to read to book anyway. (did you read it > > > > > > > > > > already?) > > > > > > > > > > I can understand that you have been deceived by Dennet's explanation. > > > > > > > > > I can show it to be a deception. > > > > > > > > > > Step 1. > > > > > > > > > > Do you understand that if there was a robot, no matter how it behaved, > > > > > > > > > as long as it followed the known laws of physics, and therefore its > > > > > > > > > behaviour could be explained to you in these terms, you wouldn't know > > > > > > > > > whether it actually had any subjective experiences or not. This isn't > > > > > > > > > about what your guess would be, it is about the truth about what you > > > > > > > > > know. Nor is it a statement that the robot couldn't be subjectively > > > > > > > > > experiencing by the way, in case you were going to disingeniously > > > > > > > > > suggest that it was.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > > > If the Robot could make deduction from its data and its memory and > > > > > > > > report them, I would have to assume it had a subjective experience. > > > > > > > > What else is a subjective experience, but an experience that is > > > > > > > > "coloured" by previous acquired information? > > > > > > > > > The robot - for instance - could have been imprinted with the idea > > > > > > > > "someone is an idiot" and then, after reading your post, conclude that > > > > > > > > the best way to react was to answer: "You are definitely an idiot". > > > > > > > > > The only difference between the robot and me as far as this event is > > > > > > > > concerned, is that my memory contains the postulate "other people who > > > > > > > > post on the NG have a brain similar to mine", which causes me to > > > > > > > > continue trying to communicate even if the communication is very > > > > > > > > difficult because you an me seem to have a different opinion on what > > > > > > > > we think a "Subjective experience" is. > > > > > > > > > Interesting to see you consider yourself able to disprove a man with > > > > > > > > the capabilities of Daniel C Dennet! > > > > > > > > > The fact that I cannot even take this first step with you may show > > > > > > > > you, that is not such an easy thing to do. > > > > > > > > > Someone2's Postulate : > > > > > > > > We cannot tell if entity R has subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > > Peter van Velzen's postulate: > > > > > > > > If entity R can be shown to make a report on an experience that is > > > > > > > > influenced by previous information, this means entity R has an > > > > > > > > subjective experience. > > > > > > > > (Especially if the previous information may not be true) > > > > > > > > If you could get Daniel Dennet, or any other person who has encouraged > > > > > > > people away from God, to come onto this group, and enter a debate > > > > > > > (maybe you could tell him how highly you regard him or whatever, and > > > > > > > ask for his help, and inform him that someone is saying he reasoning > > > > > > > is implausible, and that he is too cowardly to enter into an open > > > > > > > debate on the internet, or whatever), then I will show you how silly > > > > > > > he is.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > O, he knows people think they know better than him. He might not know > > > > > > that someone who makes about 20 posts without getting anywhere near > > > > > > what the subject suggests does so. Can you please get to the point, > > > > > > and give us a hint as to why materialism could possible be > > > > > > implausible? > > > > > > > So far you have only started out some riddle game, and being > > > > > > frustrated by the fact that we do not agree to you premises, embarked > > > > > > on another one, finding out that one too doesn't do the trick. > > > > > > > I still agree with Dennett that in fact it is dualism that is > > > > > > implausible: > > > > > > How can a Ghost influence matter without being observable? > > > > > > How can it be invisible (not interfere with electromagnetic waves), > > > > > > and still see (intercept electromagnetic waves) > > > > > > > Or like Dennett put it: > > > > > > How can Casper the friendly ghost, move an object and yet pass thru > > > > > > it? > > > > > > > Materialism is the result of verificationism: If it cannot be > > > > > > verified, it don't mean a thing, for apparently whether it is there or > > > > > > not doesn't change anything or anybody. > > > > > > > By the way: I do not mention Dennett as an authority, I just think I > > > > > > owe it to him, to tell you I learned from reading his book. So far I > > > > > > didn't learn much from your post, except that it gave me the good Idea > > > > > > to read Dennett's book once more. > > > > > > Dennet didn't know what reality was. There is only the spiritual. You > > > > > are presented with the physical world. What objections does he have > > > > > with regards to that? Isaiah 29, vs 14:16 (http://www.biblegateway.com/ > > > > > passage/?search=Isaiah%2029&version=31 )stated how the people that you > > > > > regard 'intelligent' like Dennet would turn reality upside down with > > > > > physicalism. Though if you took there assumption away that we were > > > > > simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, why would > > > > > you think that anything that did follow the laws of physics had any > > > > > subjective experiences at all? Not to mention what would know what the > > > > > neural state represented in the story he pedals? It's not like we get > > > > > a direct experience of neural state like fluctuations in the colour > > > > > green, the brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing at > > > > > anyone time. Consider a robot, if the data was working on was > > > > > encrypted, would you think that the encryption would always be > > > > > decyphered and it would still experience what the state represented? > > > > > > Don't you get that teddy bears don't have subjective experiences, nor > > > > > do the more advanced toys we have for children now, and neither would > > > > > any robot no matter how complicated you made it, nor what 'special' > > > > > configuration its internal state was. > > > > > > Do you think that the technology companies should budget for when the > > > > > complexity or configuration of what they produce, causes it to be > > > > > freed from the laws of physics? > > > > > > If not, then can you see that all anythink they would make would do is > > > > > behave as it was built to behave. Is it that it would only have > > > > > subjective experiences if it was built to talk about them? Are you so > > > > > blinkered by you ego so as not to allow any reason to pierce your > > > > > assumptions that God doesn't exist, and that we are simply a > > > > > biological mechanism. How do you explain that jien...@aol.com managed > > > > > to understand what was being said, yet to the atheists here it was all > > > > > a 'word salad'? > > > > > > You say you haven't heard any objections to materialism, well perhaps > > > > > it's because you only hear what you want to hear. Like the people who > > > > > claimed to have seen the Emporer's New Clothes, you still don't get > > > > > that the deception has been seen through. It is implausible that we > > > > > only coincidentally have the subjective experiences that we express in > > > > > our behaviour, and they couldn't be influential if it was the > > > > > materialist/physicalist story, any more than they could influence the > > > > > behaviour of a robot. There is only one path it could follow, and that > > > > > would be the laws of physics, whether it had subjective experiences or > > > > > not. If you don't get this, then maybe go through the posts, I have > > > > > explained it more than once. If you still think you are looking > > > > > intelligent, believing the deceptive story you have been told then > > > > > think again. > > > > > I send this reply before but it doesn't show up in Google groups, > > > > therfore I post it again. (sorry again) > > > > > Sorry, I think it is you who do not know what reality is. If someone > > > > wonders whether one is dreaming, what does one do? One pinches oneself > > > > in the arm. Ever tried pinching yourself in the spirit ? > > > > > All things spiritual are prominently present within the (human) brain. > > > > Therefore it is save to assume, that the spiritual indeed is little > > > > else that the workings of the (human) brain. This brain is our only > > > > real advantage in life compared to other species, and therefore we > > > > justly regard it as the most important thing we have. However - as > > > > Freud stated rightly - because it is so important to us, we tend to > > > > overestimate the value of the spiritual. > > > > > Hallucinations do not occur in the physical words, neither do dreams. > > > > Fairies unicorns and leprechauns do not occur in the physical word, > > > > neither do Hobbits or Ogers. The are pure spiritual and only exist in > > > > the human mind. That is why people like Dennett and me, think it is > > > > you who are turning reality upside down. > > > > > We think the human brain, although always following the laws of > > > > physics can process the input from our senses into something that can > > > > be stored in our memory. The parts of our memory we can talk about are > > > > usually called subjective experiences. Subjective, because they are > > > > not merely a copy of the physical input from our senses, and not even > > > > of the impulses our ears, eyes, etc. have send to the inner brain, but > > > > indeed a composite of this input and previously stored memory. In my > > > > example of the Robot, the visible image of Ashley together with the > > > > image of Mary-Kate in the database formed the subjective experience "I > > > > met Mary Jan" (objectively the Robot met Ashley). The reason we decide > > > > that we have subjective experiences is that we can report on it (talk, > > > > type) and compare it with reality. > > > > > If the spiritual was reality there couldn't be any subjective > > > > experience, because we would not have anything objective to compare it > > > > to. Consider: If I think I see Mary Jane and this spiritual thought > > > > was real, If would have seen Mary-Jane. There would not be a physical > > > > Ashley but only a spiritual Mary-Jane.. Moreover if the spiritual was > > > > real, than the child would be entitled to say "My teddy bear feels > > > > hurt, the way you ignore its subjective experiences" and there would > > > > be no bases for you to contradict. > > > > Therefore the idea that the spiritual takes precedence over the > > > > physical is a dead-end street. > > > > > As long as Randy doesn't have to part with his one million dollar in > > > > bonds, there is no (legal) proof that anything is free from the laws > > > > of physics. Subjective experiences can tell you differently because > > > > they include mistakes. When they are checked for mistakes, we speak of > > > > objective observations. Objective observations never show anything to > > > > be free of the laws of physics, which is logical as the laws of > > > > physics are actual just spiritual entities that are derived from > > > > objective observations. > > > > > I can't explain why Jien managed to understand your "word salad". But > > > > actually I understood most of it. What I do completely not understand > > > > is why you think subjective experiences would make materialism > > > > implausible. From you last post I would guess that because you think > > > > the spiritual is more real, that because you think you are a ghost > > > > inside a body and you think the physical observation that all "you" > > > > are is a functioning human brain inside a body is illusive, you > > > > conclude that dualism complies better with the spiritual. Whereas I > > > > think the spiritual is subjective and the physical is objective, > > > > materialism complies better with the objective reality while dualism > > > > is illusive. > > > > > Again the emperors new cloths were completely spiritual thus not so > > > > real, whereas his nakedness was very physical and objectively true. > > > > Deception is always discovered by objective physical observations, not > > > > by figments of your imagination. > > > > > I have - again and again - explained how subjective experiences (I saw > > > > Mary Jane) can influence behaviour. I do not know what on earth gives > > > > you the idea that they can not? That is the key issue I think. > > > > > Materialism - as I see it - means that subjective experiences can be > > > > physically explained, not that they are just illusive. Anything > > > > illusive about them, can also be physically explained. > > > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > > > behaviour? > > > > Your objections to the spiritual reality aren't reasoned. You simply > > > have stated what you think the spiritual reality would be like. I > > > don't mind going through it with you, but not for it to serve as a > > > distraction from the implausibility of materialism. > > > > Do you understand that a robot that was behaving in a way that you or > > > other atheists might consider "imbuing" it with subjective/conscious > > > experiences, could always have its behaviour explained with the > > > assumption that it didn't have subjective/conscoius experiences? > > > I think you are expressing yourself a bit inexact. > > The behaviour could be explained without the assumption that it had > > subjecive experiences > > (simply by going to the machine instructions without wondering what > > they are about) > > but it cannot be explained with the assumption that it had no > > subjective experiences. > > If you assume te Robot has none, than the Robot would not be able to > > say "I met Mary Kate" > > for that expression is proof of a subjective experience > > (experience, because the Robot indeed met someone, subjective because > > objectively he met Ashley) > > > If you replace the Robot with Robert (a human being) the same is true. > > Robert would then say "I met Mary Kate" and this would proof Robert > > had a subjective experience. > > > Again: > > > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > > > behaviour? > > > I suspect you and me do not share the same view on "subjective > > experience" > > but you haven't made clear to me what that difference is. > > I think I have made very clear what the expression means to me, > > so I think it is your turn to enlighten > > I mean by subjective experiences, sensations like pleasure, or pain, > or visual sensations, or auditory sensations for example. > > Also I meant that it could be explained with the assumption that it > had no subjective/conscious experiences. A theist physicist for > example, could assume that it had no more subjective/conscious > experiences than a teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply > in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as > the behaviour of a mobile phone is explained. > I don't know whether you haven't answered yet because you don't want to accept what is a fact about the theist physicist being able to explain the robots behaviour in such terms, and so are looking for a way to distract from or obscure the point being made, or whether you are just busy and haven't noticed it, or whether it was because you didn't see a question to which you were expected to respond. If the later, the question is, do you agree that a theist physicist for example, could assume that the robot had no more subjective/conscious experiences than a teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as the behaviour of a mobile phone is explained? Quote
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