Guest pbamvv@worldonline.nl Posted June 24, 2007 Posted June 24, 2007 On 24 jun, 17:18, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 24 Jun, 16:07, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > wrote: > > > On 24 jun, 16:29, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 24 Jun, 13:29, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > wrote: > > > > > On 17 jun, 02:53, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 16 Jun, 14:49, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > On 15 jun, 19:40, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 14 Jun, 20:50, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 12 jun, 23:49, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 12 Jun, 17:31, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 jun, 18:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think you understand Fred and me. > > > > > > > > > > > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to > > > > > > > > > > > avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to > > > > > > > > > > > you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post. > > > > > > > > > > > Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the > > > > > > > > > > > answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable > > > > > > > > > > > of doing it yourself. > > > > > > > > > > > > I had asked: > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > Do you see that the following is always true: > > > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > You replied: > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true > > > > > > > > > > > > If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it > > > > > > > > > > > does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead > > > > > > > > > > > (or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M). > > > > > > > > > > > > A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can > > > > > > > > > > > influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may > > > > > > > > > > > use the state of synapses that constitutes P. > > > > > > > > > > > > To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on > > > > > > > > > > > it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong > > > > > > > > > > > balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may > > > > > > > > > > > even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then > > > > > > > > > > > black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its > > > > > > > > > > > bouncing. > > > > > > > > > > > > Nevertheless its composition is. > > > > > > > > > > > > M = a ball > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) = the bouncing of the ball. > > > > > > > > > > > P = a property of the ball > > > > > > > > > > > If P = the colour, your assessment is right. > > > > > > > > > > > If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong. > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive > > > > > > > > > > > as: > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property > > > > > > > > > > > of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property > > > > > > > > > > > isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true, > > > > > > > > > > > and so is (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the > > > > > > > > > > > ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not > > > > > > > > > > > be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > > > > > > > > > > > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > > > > > > > > > > > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > > > > > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > > > > > > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > > > > > > > > > > > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > > > > > > > > > > > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as > > > > > > > > > > > above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be > > > > > > > > > > > thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that > > > > > > > > > > > particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the > > > > > > > > > > > biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was > > > > > > > > > > > correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves, > > > > > > > > > > > which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without, > > > > > > > > > > > then (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > > > You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is > > > > > > > > > > > presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world > > > > > > > > > > > perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit, > > > > > > > > > > > that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and > > > > > > > > > > > thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same? > > > > > > > > > > > You keep on assuming that subjective experiences do not have physical > > > > > > > > > > properties. > > > > > > > > > > However they do. Subjective experiences are memories (either temporary > > > > > > > > > > or lasting) > > > > > > > > > > These memories do influence our behaviour as you very well know. > > > > > > > > > > Although I do not know how memories are actually "stored" in cortex, > > > > > > > > > > we have ample proof that they are. Of course we can theoretically > > > > > > > > > > explain our conduct mechanically without realizing that the synapse > > > > > > > > > > behaviour we are describing is actually the act of "remembering" but > > > > > > > > > > that does not change the fact, that without the information coming > > > > > > > > > > from our memory our behaviour would change drastically. > > > > > > > > > > > In my previous example of my computer program > > > > > > > > > > you can explain the working by the hexadecimal machine code (a mix of > > > > > > > > > > numbers and the letters A,B,C,D, E and F) and totally ignore what they > > > > > > > > > > mean, > > > > > > > > > > but that does not mean that the fact that the employee is a female > > > > > > > > > > does not matter! > > > > > > > > > > > Likewise you can explain human behaviour by the chemical working of > > > > > > > > > > synapses, > > > > > > > > > > but that does not mean in doesn't matter whether I thought I saw > > > > > > > > > > Ashley or Kate. > > > > > > > > > > > Humans are actually using subjective experiences to guide their > > > > > > > > > > behaviour. > > > > > > > > > > > I started re-reading "consciousness explained" by Daniel C. Dennett, > > > > > > > > > > and found out his idea of consciousness goes one step further than I > > > > > > > > > > thought. He thinks consciousness is caused by ideas in our head, that > > > > > > > > > > make us think in a conscious way. Ideas that we have mostly learned > > > > > > > > > > from other people. > > > > > > > > > > I am not sure that is correct. To me everything we can theoretically > > > > > > > > > > remember and theoretically communicate about, is a subjective > > > > > > > > > > experience and is or has been part of our consciousness. > > > > > > > > > > But the fact that almost nobody can remember much of his/her early > > > > > > > > > > childhood, might mean that Dennett is right. > > > > > > > > > > But it would be a good thing to read to book anyway. (did you read it > > > > > > > > > > already?) > > > > > > > > > > I can understand that you have been deceived by Dennet's explanation. > > > > > > > > > I can show it to be a deception. > > > > > > > > > > Step 1. > > > > > > > > > > Do you understand that if there was a robot, no matter how it behaved, > > > > > > > > > as long as it followed the known laws of physics, and therefore its > > > > > > > > > behaviour could be explained to you in these terms, you wouldn't know > > > > > > > > > whether it actually had any subjective experiences or not. This isn't > > > > > > > > > about what your guess would be, it is about the truth about what you > > > > > > > > > know. Nor is it a statement that the robot couldn't be subjectively > > > > > > > > > experiencing by the way, in case you were going to disingeniously > > > > > > > > > suggest that it was.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > > > If the Robot could make deduction from its data and its memory and > > > > > > > > report them, I would have to assume it had a subjective experience. > > > > > > > > What else is a subjective experience, but an experience that is > > > > > > > > "coloured" by previous acquired information? > > > > > > > > > The robot - for instance - could have been imprinted with the idea > > > > > > > > "someone is an idiot" and then, after reading your post, conclude that > > > > > > > > the best way to react was to answer: "You are definitely an idiot". > > > > > > > > > The only difference between the robot and me as far as this event is > > > > > > > > concerned, is that my memory contains the postulate "other people who > > > > > > > > post on the NG have a brain similar to mine", which causes me to > > > > > > > > continue trying to communicate even if the communication is very > > > > > > > > difficult because you an me seem to have a different opinion on what > > > > > > > > we think a "Subjective experience" is. > > > > > > > > > Interesting to see you consider yourself able to disprove a man with > > > > > > > > the capabilities of Daniel C Dennet! > > > > > > > > > The fact that I cannot even take this first step with you may show > > > > > > > > you, that is not such an easy thing to do. > > > > > > > > > Someone2's Postulate : > > > > > > > > We cannot tell if entity R has subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > > Peter van Velzen's postulate: > > > > > > > > If entity R can be shown to make a report on an experience that is > > > > > > > > influenced by previous information, this means entity R has an > > > > > > > > subjective experience. > > > > > > > > (Especially if the previous information may not be true) > > > > > > > > If you could get Daniel Dennet, or any other person who has encouraged > > > > > > > people away from God, to come onto this group, and enter a debate > > > > > > > (maybe you could tell him how highly you regard him or whatever, and > > > > > > > ask for his help, and inform him that someone is saying he reasoning > > > > > > > is implausible, and that he is too cowardly to enter into an open > > > > > > > debate on the internet, or whatever), then I will show you how silly > > > > > > > he is.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > O, he knows people think they know better than him. He might not know > > > > > > that someone who makes about 20 posts without getting anywhere near > > > > > > what the subject suggests does so. Can you please get to the point, > > > > > > and give us a hint as to why materialism could possible be > > > > > > implausible? > > > > > > > So far you have only started out some riddle game, and being > > > > > > frustrated by the fact that we do not agree to you premises, embarked > > > > > > on another one, finding out that one too doesn't do the trick. > > > > > > > I still agree with Dennett that in fact it is dualism that is > > > > > > implausible: > > > > > > How can a Ghost influence matter without being observable? > > > > > > How can it be invisible (not interfere with electromagnetic waves), > > > > > > and still see (intercept electromagnetic waves) > > > > > > > Or like Dennett put it: > > > > > > How can Casper the friendly ghost, move an object and yet pass thru > > > > > > it? > > > > > > > Materialism is the result of verificationism: If it cannot be > > > > > > verified, it don't mean a thing, for apparently whether it is there or > > > > > > not doesn't change anything or anybody. > > > > > > > By the way: I do not mention Dennett as an authority, I just think I > > > > > > owe it to him, to tell you I learned from reading his book. So far I > > > > > > didn't learn much from your post, except that it gave me the good Idea > > > > > > to read Dennett's book once more. > > > > > > Dennet didn't know what reality was. There is only the spiritual. You > > > > > are presented with the physical world. What objections does he have > > > > > with regards to that? Isaiah 29, vs 14:16 (http://www.biblegateway.com/ > > > > > passage/?search=Isaiah%2029&version=31 )stated how the people that you > > > > > regard 'intelligent' like Dennet would turn reality upside down with > > > > > physicalism. Though if you took there assumption away that we were > > > > > simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, why would > > > > > you think that anything that did follow the laws of physics had any > > > > > subjective experiences at all? Not to mention what would know what the > > > > > neural state represented in the story he pedals? It's not like we get > > > > > a direct experience of neural state like fluctuations in the colour > > > > > green, the brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing at > > > > > anyone time. Consider a robot, if the data was working on was > > > > > encrypted, would you think that the encryption would always be > > > > > decyphered and it would still experience what the state represented? > > > > > > Don't you get that teddy bears don't have subjective experiences, nor > > > > > do the more advanced toys we have for children now, and neither would > > > > > any robot no matter how complicated you made it, nor what 'special' > > > > > configuration its internal state was. > > > > > > Do you think that the technology companies should budget for when the > > > > > complexity or configuration of what they produce, causes it to be > > > > > freed from the laws of physics? > > > > > > If not, then can you see that all anythink they would make would do is > > > > > behave as it was built to behave. Is it that it would only have > > > > > subjective experiences if it was built to talk about them? Are you so > > > > > blinkered by you ego so as not to allow any reason to pierce your > > > > > assumptions that God doesn't exist, and that we are simply a > > > > > biological mechanism. How do you explain that jien...@aol.com managed > > > > > to understand what was being said, yet to the atheists here it was all > > > > > a 'word salad'? > > > > > > You say you haven't heard any objections to materialism, well perhaps > > > > > it's because you only hear what you want to hear. Like the people who > > > > > claimed to have seen the Emporer's New Clothes, you still don't get > > > > > that the deception has been seen through. It is implausible that we > > > > > only coincidentally have the subjective experiences that we express in > > > > > our behaviour, and they couldn't be influential if it was the > > > > > materialist/physicalist story, any more than they could influence the > > > > > behaviour of a robot. There is only one path it could follow, and that > > > > > would be the laws of physics, whether it had subjective experiences or > > > > > not. If you don't get this, then maybe go through the posts, I have > > > > > explained it more than once. If you still think you are looking > > > > > intelligent, believing the deceptive story you have been told then > > > > > think again. > > > > > I send this reply before but it doesn't show up in Google groups, > > > > therfore I post it again. (sorry again) > > > > > Sorry, I think it is you who do not know what reality is. If someone > > > > wonders whether one is dreaming, what does one do? One pinches oneself > > > > in the arm. Ever tried pinching yourself in the spirit ? > > > > > All things spiritual are prominently present within the (human) brain. > > > > Therefore it is save to assume, that the spiritual indeed is little > > > > else that the workings of the (human) brain. This brain is our only > > > > real advantage in life compared to other species, and therefore we > > > > justly regard it as the most important thing we have. However - as > > > > Freud stated rightly - because it is so important to us, we tend to > > > > overestimate the value of the spiritual. > > > > > Hallucinations do not occur in the physical words, neither do dreams. > > > > Fairies unicorns and leprechauns do not occur in the physical word, > > > > neither do Hobbits or Ogers. The are pure spiritual and only exist in > > > > the human mind. That is why people like Dennett and me, think it is > > > > you who are turning reality upside down. > > > > > We think the human brain, although always following the laws of > > > > physics can process the input from our senses into something that can > > > > be stored in our memory. The parts of our memory we can talk about are > > > > usually called subjective experiences. Subjective, because they are > > > > not merely a copy of the physical input from our senses, and not even > > > > of the impulses our ears, eyes, etc. have send to the inner brain, but > > > > indeed a composite of this input and previously stored memory. In my > > > > example of the Robot, the visible image of Ashley together with the > > > > image of Mary-Kate in the database formed the subjective experience "I > > > > met Mary Jan" (objectively the Robot met Ashley). The reason we decide > > > > that we have subjective experiences is that we can report on it (talk, > > > > type) and compare it with reality. > > > > > If the spiritual was reality there couldn't be any subjective > > > > experience, because we would not have anything objective to compare it > > > > to. Consider: If I think I see Mary Jane and this spiritual thought > > > > was real, If would have seen Mary-Jane. There would not be a physical > > > > Ashley but only a spiritual Mary-Jane.. Moreover if the spiritual was > > > > real, than the child would be entitled to say "My teddy bear feels > > > > hurt, the way you ignore its subjective experiences" and there would > > > > be no bases for you to contradict. > > > > Therefore the idea that the spiritual takes precedence over the > > > > physical is a dead-end street. > > > > > As long as Randy doesn't have to part with his one million dollar in > > > > bonds, there is no (legal) proof that anything is free from the laws > > > > of physics. Subjective experiences can tell you differently because > > > > they include mistakes. When they are checked for mistakes, we speak of > > > > objective observations. Objective observations never show anything to > > > > be free of the laws of physics, which is logical as the laws of > > > > physics are actual just spiritual entities that are derived from > > > > objective observations. > > > > > I can't explain why Jien managed to understand your "word salad". But > > > > actually I understood most of it. What I do completely not understand > > > > is why you think subjective experiences would make materialism > > > > implausible. From you last post I would guess that because you think > > > > the spiritual is more real, that because you think you are a ghost > > > > inside a body and you think the physical observation that all "you" > > > > are is a functioning human brain inside a body is illusive, you > > > > conclude that dualism complies better with the spiritual. Whereas I > > > > think the spiritual is subjective and the physical is objective, > > > > materialism complies better with the objective reality while dualism > > > > is illusive. > > > > > Again the emperors new cloths were completely spiritual thus not so > > > > real, whereas his nakedness was very physical and objectively true. > > > > Deception is always discovered by objective physical observations, not > > > > by figments of your imagination. > > > > > I have - again and again - explained how subjective experiences (I saw > > > > Mary Jane) can influence behaviour. I do not know what on earth gives > > > > you the idea that they can not? That is the key issue I think. > > > > > Materialism - as I see it - means that subjective experiences can be > > > > physically explained, not that they are just illusive. Anything > > > > illusive about them, can also be physically explained. > > > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > > > behaviour? > > > > Your objections to the spiritual reality aren't reasoned. You simply > > > have stated what you think the spiritual reality would be like. I > > > don't mind going through it with you, but not for it to serve as a > > > distraction from the implausibility of materialism. > > > > Do you understand that a robot that was behaving in a way that you or > > > other atheists might consider "imbuing" it with subjective/conscious > > > experiences, could always have its behaviour explained with the > > > assumption that it didn't have subjective/conscoius experiences? > > > I think you are expressing yourself a bit inexact. > > The behaviour could be explained without the assumption that it had > > subjecive experiences > > (simply by going to the machine instructions without wondering what > > they are about) > > but it cannot be explained with the assumption that it had no > > subjective experiences. > > If you assume te Robot has none, than the Robot would not be able to > > say "I met Mary Kate" > > for that expression is proof of a subjective experience > > (experience, because the Robot indeed met someone, subjective because > > objectively he met Ashley) > > > If you replace the Robot with Robert (a human being) the same is true. > > Robert would then say "I met Mary Kate" and this would proof Robert > > had a subjective experience. > > > Again: > > > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > > > behaviour? > > > I suspect you and me do not share the same view on "subjective > > experience" > > but you haven't made clear to me what that difference is. > > I think I have made very clear what the expression means to me, > > so I think it is your turn to enlighten > > I mean by subjective experiences, sensations like pleasure, or pain, > or visual sensations, or auditory sensations for example. > > Also I meant that it could be explained with the assumption that it > had no subjective/conscious experiences. A theist physicist for > example, could assume that it had no more subjective/conscious > experiences than a teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply > in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as > the behaviour of a mobile phone is explained. Sorry A physisist can explain the fact that someone is crying without the assumption of pain? He can explain the fact that someone closes his eyes from to much sunlight without the assumption of being blinded? He can explain a dog answering his owners call without the assumption of hearing? I cannot image that is what you mean. You really haven't made yourself clear this time. Peter van Velzen June 2007 Amstelveen The Netherlands Quote
Guest pbamvv@worldonline.nl Posted June 24, 2007 Posted June 24, 2007 On 24 jun, 17:54, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 24 Jun, 16:18, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > On 24 Jun, 16:07, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > wrote: > > > > On 24 jun, 16:29, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 24 Jun, 13:29, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > On 17 jun, 02:53, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 16 Jun, 14:49, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > On 15 jun, 19:40, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 14 Jun, 20:50, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 12 jun, 23:49, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On 12 Jun, 17:31, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 jun, 18:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think you understand Fred and me. > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to > > > > > > > > > > > > avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to > > > > > > > > > > > > you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post. > > > > > > > > > > > > Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the > > > > > > > > > > > > answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable > > > > > > > > > > > > of doing it yourself. > > > > > > > > > > > > > I had asked: > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > Do you see that the following is always true: > > > > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > > > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > > > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > You replied: > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true > > > > > > > > > > > > > If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it > > > > > > > > > > > > does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead > > > > > > > > > > > > (or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M). > > > > > > > > > > > > > A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can > > > > > > > > > > > > influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may > > > > > > > > > > > > use the state of synapses that constitutes P. > > > > > > > > > > > > > To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on > > > > > > > > > > > > it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong > > > > > > > > > > > > balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may > > > > > > > > > > > > even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then > > > > > > > > > > > > black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its > > > > > > > > > > > > bouncing. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Nevertheless its composition is. > > > > > > > > > > > > > M = a ball > > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) = the bouncing of the ball. > > > > > > > > > > > > P = a property of the ball > > > > > > > > > > > > If P = the colour, your assessment is right. > > > > > > > > > > > > If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong. > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive > > > > > > > > > > > > as: > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property > > > > > > > > > > > > of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property > > > > > > > > > > > > isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true, > > > > > > > > > > > > and so is (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > > With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the > > > > > > > > > > > > ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not > > > > > > > > > > > > be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > > > > > > > > > > > > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > > > > > > > > > > > > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > > > > > > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > > > > > > > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > > > > > > > > > > > > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > > > > > > > > > > > > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as > > > > > > > > > > > > above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be > > > > > > > > > > > > thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that > > > > > > > > > > > > particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the > > > > > > > > > > > > biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was > > > > > > > > > > > > correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > > If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves, > > > > > > > > > > > > which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without, > > > > > > > > > > > > then (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > > > > You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is > > > > > > > > > > > > presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world > > > > > > > > > > > > perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit, > > > > > > > > > > > > that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and > > > > > > > > > > > > thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same? > > > > > > > > > > > > You keep on assuming that subjective experiences do not have physical > > > > > > > > > > > properties. > > > > > > > > > > > However they do. Subjective experiences are memories (either temporary > > > > > > > > > > > or lasting) > > > > > > > > > > > These memories do influence our behaviour as you very well know. > > > > > > > > > > > Although I do not know how memories are actually "stored" in cortex, > > > > > > > > > > > we have ample proof that they are. Of course we can theoretically > > > > > > > > > > > explain our conduct mechanically without realizing that the synapse > > > > > > > > > > > behaviour we are describing is actually the act of "remembering" but > > > > > > > > > > > that does not change the fact, that without the information coming > > > > > > > > > > > from our memory our behaviour would change drastically. > > > > > > > > > > > > In my previous example of my computer program > > > > > > > > > > > you can explain the working by the hexadecimal machine code (a mix of > > > > > > > > > > > numbers and the letters A,B,C,D, E and F) and totally ignore what they > > > > > > > > > > > mean, > > > > > > > > > > > but that does not mean that the fact that the employee is a female > > > > > > > > > > > does not matter! > > > > > > > > > > > > Likewise you can explain human behaviour by the chemical working of > > > > > > > > > > > synapses, > > > > > > > > > > > but that does not mean in doesn't matter whether I thought I saw > > > > > > > > > > > Ashley or Kate. > > > > > > > > > > > > Humans are actually using subjective experiences to guide their > > > > > > > > > > > behaviour. > > > > > > > > > > > > I started re-reading "consciousness explained" by Daniel C. Dennett, > > > > > > > > > > > and found out his idea of consciousness goes one step further than I > > > > > > > > > > > thought. He thinks consciousness is caused by ideas in our head, that > > > > > > > > > > > make us think in a conscious way. Ideas that we have mostly learned > > > > > > > > > > > from other people. > > > > > > > > > > > I am not sure that is correct. To me everything we can theoretically > > > > > > > > > > > remember and theoretically communicate about, is a subjective > > > > > > > > > > > experience and is or has been part of our consciousness. > > > > > > > > > > > But the fact that almost nobody can remember much of his/her early > > > > > > > > > > > childhood, might mean that Dennett is right. > > > > > > > > > > > But it would be a good thing to read to book anyway. (did you read it > > > > > > > > > > > already?) > > > > > > > > > > > I can understand that you have been deceived by Dennet's explanation. > > > > > > > > > > I can show it to be a deception. > > > > > > > > > > > Step 1. > > > > > > > > > > > Do you understand that if there was a robot, no matter how it behaved, > > > > > > > > > > as long as it followed the known laws of physics, and therefore its > > > > > > > > > > behaviour could be explained to you in these terms, you wouldn't know > > > > > > > > > > whether it actually had any subjective experiences or not. This isn't > > > > > > > > > > about what your guess would be, it is about the truth about what you > > > > > > > > > > know. Nor is it a statement that the robot couldn't be subjectively > > > > > > > > > > experiencing by the way, in case you were going to disingeniously > > > > > > > > > > suggest that it was.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > If the Robot could make deduction from its data and its memory and > > > > > > > > > report them, I would have to assume it had a subjective experience. > > > > > > > > > What else is a subjective experience, but an experience that is > > > > > > > > > "coloured" by previous acquired information? > > > > > > > > > > The robot - for instance - could have been imprinted with the idea > > > > > > > > > "someone is an idiot" and then, after reading your post, conclude that > > > > > > > > > the best way to react was to answer: "You are definitely an idiot". > > > > > > > > > > The only difference between the robot and me as far as this event is > > > > > > > > > concerned, is that my memory contains the postulate "other people who > > > > > > > > > post on the NG have a brain similar to mine", which causes me to > > > > > > > > > continue trying to communicate even if the communication is very > > > > > > > > > difficult because you an me seem to have a different opinion on what > > > > > > > > > we think a "Subjective experience" is. > > > > > > > > > > Interesting to see you consider yourself able to disprove a man with > > > > > > > > > the capabilities of Daniel C Dennet! > > > > > > > > > > The fact that I cannot even take this first step with you may show > > > > > > > > > you, that is not such an easy thing to do. > > > > > > > > > > Someone2's Postulate : > > > > > > > > > We cannot tell if entity R has subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > > > Peter van Velzen's postulate: > > > > > > > > > If entity R can be shown to make a report on an experience that is > > > > > > > > > influenced by previous information, this means entity R has an > > > > > > > > > subjective experience. > > > > > > > > > (Especially if the previous information may not be true) > > > > > > > > > If you could get Daniel Dennet, or any other person who has encouraged > > > > > > > > people away from God, to come onto this group, and enter a debate > > > > > > > > (maybe you could tell him how highly you regard him or whatever, and > > > > > > > > ask for his help, and inform him that someone is saying he reasoning > > > > > > > > is implausible, and that he is too cowardly to enter into an open > > > > > > > > debate on the internet, or whatever), then I will show you how silly > > > > > > > > he is.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > > O, he knows people think they know better than him. He might not know > > > > > > > that someone who makes about 20 posts without getting anywhere near > > > > > > > what the subject suggests does so. Can you please get to the point, > > > > > > > and give us a hint as to why materialism could possible be > > > > > > > implausible? > > > > > > > > So far you have only started out some riddle game, and being > > > > > > > frustrated by the fact that we do not agree to you premises, embarked > > > > > > > on another one, finding out that one too doesn't do the trick. > > > > > > > > I still agree with Dennett that in fact it is dualism that is > > > > > > > implausible: > > > > > > > How can a Ghost influence matter without being observable? > > > > > > > How can it be invisible (not interfere with electromagnetic waves), > > > > > > > and still see (intercept electromagnetic waves) > > > > > > > > Or like Dennett put it: > > > > > > > How can Casper the friendly ghost, move an object and yet pass thru > > > > > > > it? > > > > > > > > Materialism is the result of verificationism: If it cannot be > > > > > > > verified, it don't mean a thing, for apparently whether it is there or > > > > > > > not doesn't change anything or anybody. > > > > > > > > By the way: I do not mention Dennett as an authority, I just think I > > > > > > > owe it to him, to tell you I learned from reading his book. So far I > > > > > > > didn't learn much from your post, except that it gave me the good Idea > > > > > > > to read Dennett's book once more. > > > > > > > Dennet didn't know what reality was. There is only the spiritual. You > > > > > > are presented with the physical world. What objections does he have > > > > > > with regards to that? Isaiah 29, vs 14:16 (http://www.biblegateway.com/ > > > > > > passage/?search=Isaiah%2029&version=31 )stated how the people that you > > > > > > regard 'intelligent' like Dennet would turn reality upside down with > > > > > > physicalism. Though if you took there assumption away that we were > > > > > > simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, why would > > > > > > you think that anything that did follow the laws of physics had any > > > > > > subjective experiences at all? Not to mention what would know what the > > > > > > neural state represented in the story he pedals? It's not like we get > > > > > > a direct experience of neural state like fluctuations in the colour > > > > > > green, the brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing at > > > > > > anyone time. Consider a robot, if the data was working on was > > > > > > encrypted, would you think that the encryption would always be > > > > > > decyphered and it would still experience what the state represented? > > > > > > > Don't you get that teddy bears don't have subjective experiences, nor > > > > > > do the more advanced toys we have for children now, and neither would > > > > > > any robot no matter how complicated you made it, nor what 'special' > > > > > > configuration its internal state was. > > > > > > > Do you think that the technology companies should budget for when the > > > > > > complexity or configuration of what they produce, causes it to be > > > > > > freed from the laws of physics? > > > > > > > If not, then can you see that all anythink they would make would do is > > > > > > behave as it was built to behave. Is it that it would only have > > > > > > subjective experiences if it was built to talk about them? Are you so > > > > > > blinkered by you ego so as not to allow any reason to pierce your > > > > > > assumptions that God doesn't exist, and that we are simply a > > > > > > biological mechanism. How do you explain that jien...@aol.com managed > > > > > > to understand what was being said, yet to the atheists here it was all > > > > > > a 'word salad'? > > > > > > > You say you haven't heard any objections to materialism, well perhaps > > > > > > it's because you only hear what you want to hear. Like the people who > > > > > > claimed to have seen the Emporer's New Clothes, you still don't get > > > > > > that the deception has been seen through. It is implausible that we > > > > > > only coincidentally have the subjective experiences that we express in > > > > > > our behaviour, and they couldn't be influential if it was the > > > > > > materialist/physicalist story, any more than they could influence the > > > > > > behaviour of a robot. There is only one path it could follow, and that > > > > > > would be the laws of physics, whether it had subjective experiences or > > > > > > not. If you don't get this, then maybe go through the posts, I have > > > > > > explained it more than once. If you still think you are looking > > > > > > intelligent, believing the deceptive story you have been told then > > > > > > think again. > > > > > > I send this reply before but it doesn't show up in Google groups, > > > > > therfore I post it again. (sorry again) > > > > > > Sorry, I think it is you who do not know what reality is. If someone > > > > > wonders whether one is dreaming, what does one do? One pinches oneself > > > > > in the arm. Ever tried pinching yourself in the spirit ? > > > > > > All things spiritual are prominently present within the (human) brain. > > > > > Therefore it is save to assume, that the spiritual indeed is little > > > > > else that the workings of the (human) brain. This brain is our only > > > > > real advantage in life compared to other species, and therefore we > > > > > justly regard it as the most important thing we have. However - as > > > > > Freud stated rightly - because it is so important to us, we tend to > > > > > overestimate the value of the spiritual. > > > > > > Hallucinations do not occur in the physical words, neither do dreams. > > > > > Fairies unicorns and leprechauns do not occur in the physical word, > > > > > neither do Hobbits or Ogers. The are pure spiritual and only exist in > > > > > the human mind. That is why people like Dennett and me, think it is > > > > > you who are turning reality upside down. > > > > > > We think the human brain, although always following the laws of > > > > > physics can process the input from our senses into something that can > > > > > be stored in our memory. The parts of our memory we can talk about are > > > > > usually called subjective experiences. Subjective, because they are > > > > > not merely a copy of the physical input from our senses, and not even > > > > > of the impulses our ears, eyes, etc. have send to the inner brain, but > > > > > indeed a composite of this input and previously stored memory. In my > > > > > example of the Robot, the visible image of Ashley together with the > > > > > image of Mary-Kate in the database formed the subjective experience "I > > > > > met Mary Jan" (objectively the Robot met Ashley). The reason we decide > > > > > that we have subjective experiences is that we can report on it (talk, > > > > > type) and compare it with reality. > > > > > > If the spiritual was reality there couldn't be any subjective > > > > > experience, because we would not have anything objective to compare it > > > > > to. Consider: If I think I see Mary Jane and this spiritual thought > > > > > was real, If would have seen Mary-Jane. There would not be a physical > > > > > Ashley but only a spiritual Mary-Jane.. Moreover if the spiritual was > > > > > real, than the child would be entitled to say "My teddy bear feels > > > > > hurt, the way you ignore its subjective experiences" and there would > > > > > be no bases for you to contradict. > > > > > Therefore the idea that the spiritual takes precedence over the > > > > > physical is a dead-end street. > > > > > > As long as Randy doesn't have to part with his one million dollar in > > > > > bonds, there is no (legal) proof that anything is free from the laws > > > > > of physics. Subjective experiences can tell you differently because > > > > > they include mistakes. When they are checked for mistakes, we speak of > > > > > objective observations. Objective observations never show anything to > > > > > be free of the laws of physics, which is logical as the laws of > > > > > physics are actual just spiritual entities that are derived from > > > > > objective observations. > > > > > > I can't explain why Jien managed to understand your "word salad". But > > > > > actually I understood most of it. What I do completely not understand > > > > > is why you think subjective experiences would make materialism > > > > > implausible. From you last post I would guess that because you think > > > > > the spiritual is more real, that because you think you are a ghost > > > > > inside a body and you think the physical observation that all "you" > > > > > are is a functioning human brain inside a body is illusive, you > > > > > conclude that dualism complies better with the spiritual. Whereas I > > > > > think the spiritual is subjective and the physical is objective, > > > > > materialism complies better with the objective reality while dualism > > > > > is illusive. > > > > > > Again the emperors new cloths were completely spiritual thus not so > > > > > real, whereas his nakedness was very physical and objectively true. > > > > > Deception is always discovered by objective physical observations, not > > > > > by figments of your imagination. > > > > > > I have - again and again - explained how subjective experiences (I saw > > > > > Mary Jane) can influence behaviour. I do not know what on earth gives > > > > > you the idea that they can not? That is the key issue I think. > > > > > > Materialism - as I see it - means that subjective experiences can be > > > > > physically explained, not that they are just illusive. Anything > > > > > illusive about them, can also be physically explained. > > > > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > > > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > > > > behaviour? > > > > > Your objections to the spiritual reality aren't reasoned. You simply > > > > have stated what you think the spiritual reality would be like. I > > > > don't mind going through it with you, but not for it to serve as a > > > > distraction from the implausibility of materialism. > > > > > Do you understand that a robot that was behaving in a way that you or > > > > other atheists might consider "imbuing" it with subjective/conscious > > > > experiences, could always have its behaviour explained with the > > > > assumption that it didn't have subjective/conscoius experiences? > > > > I think you are expressing yourself a bit inexact. > > > The behaviour could be explained without the assumption that it had > > > subjecive experiences > > > (simply by going to the machine instructions without wondering what > > > they are about) > > > but it cannot be explained with the assumption that it had no > > > subjective experiences. > > > If you assume te Robot has none, than the Robot would not be able to > > > say "I met Mary Kate" > > > for that expression is proof of a subjective experience > > > (experience, because the Robot indeed met someone, subjective because > > > objectively he met Ashley) > > > > If you replace the Robot with Robert (a human being) the same is true. > > > Robert would then say "I met Mary Kate" and this would proof Robert > > > had a subjective experience. > > > > Again: > > > > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > > > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > > > > behaviour? > > > > I suspect you and me do not share the same view on "subjective > > > experience" > > > but you haven't made clear to me what that difference is. > > > I think I have made very clear what the expression means to me, > > > so I think it is your turn to enlighten > > > I mean by subjective experiences, sensations like pleasure, or pain, > > or visual sensations, or auditory sensations for example. > > > Also I meant that it could be explained with the assumption that it > > had no subjective/conscious experiences. A theist physicist for > > example, could assume that it had no more subjective/conscious > > experiences than a teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply > > in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as > > the behaviour of a mobile phone is explained. > > I don't know whether you haven't answered yet because you don't want > to accept what is a fact about the theist physicist being able to > explain the robots behaviour in such terms, and so are looking for a > way to distract from or obscure the point being made, or whether you > are just busy and haven't noticed it, or whether it was because you > didn't see a question to which you were expected to respond. If the > later, the question is, do you agree that a theist physicist for > example, could assume that the robot had no more subjective/conscious > experiences than a teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply > in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as > the behaviour of a mobile phone is explained? As long as you do not give a defenition of subjective experience that i different from mine your theory that this physisist could do so is only true as far as he ignores that the physics he is using are in fact subjective experiences. Just as one can analize the sound that a dog is hearing and its response to it without any need of the concept "the owner calls the dog". It wouldn't proof the owner didn't call it! Peter van Velzen June 2007 Amstelveen The Netherlands Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 24, 2007 Posted June 24, 2007 On 24 Jun, 19:45, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> wrote: > On 24 jun, 17:18, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > On 24 Jun, 16:07, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > wrote: > > > > On 24 jun, 16:29, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 24 Jun, 13:29, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > On 17 jun, 02:53, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 16 Jun, 14:49, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > On 15 jun, 19:40, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 14 Jun, 20:50, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 12 jun, 23:49, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On 12 Jun, 17:31, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 jun, 18:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think you understand Fred and me. > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to > > > > > > > > > > > > avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to > > > > > > > > > > > > you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post. > > > > > > > > > > > > Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the > > > > > > > > > > > > answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable > > > > > > > > > > > > of doing it yourself. > > > > > > > > > > > > > I had asked: > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > Do you see that the following is always true: > > > > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > > > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > > > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > You replied: > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true > > > > > > > > > > > > > If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it > > > > > > > > > > > > does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead > > > > > > > > > > > > (or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M). > > > > > > > > > > > > > A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can > > > > > > > > > > > > influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may > > > > > > > > > > > > use the state of synapses that constitutes P. > > > > > > > > > > > > > To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on > > > > > > > > > > > > it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong > > > > > > > > > > > > balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may > > > > > > > > > > > > even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then > > > > > > > > > > > > black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its > > > > > > > > > > > > bouncing. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Nevertheless its composition is. > > > > > > > > > > > > > M = a ball > > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) = the bouncing of the ball. > > > > > > > > > > > > P = a property of the ball > > > > > > > > > > > > If P = the colour, your assessment is right. > > > > > > > > > > > > If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong. > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive > > > > > > > > > > > > as: > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property > > > > > > > > > > > > of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property > > > > > > > > > > > > isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true, > > > > > > > > > > > > and so is (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > > With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the > > > > > > > > > > > > ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not > > > > > > > > > > > > be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > > > > > > > > > > > > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > > > > > > > > > > > > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > > > > > > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > > > > > > > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > > > > > > > > > > > > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > > > > > > > > > > > > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as > > > > > > > > > > > > above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be > > > > > > > > > > > > thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that > > > > > > > > > > > > particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the > > > > > > > > > > > > biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was > > > > > > > > > > > > correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > > If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves, > > > > > > > > > > > > which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without, > > > > > > > > > > > > then (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > > > > You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is > > > > > > > > > > > > presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world > > > > > > > > > > > > perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit, > > > > > > > > > > > > that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and > > > > > > > > > > > > thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same? > > > > > > > > > > > > You keep on assuming that subjective experiences do not have physical > > > > > > > > > > > properties. > > > > > > > > > > > However they do. Subjective experiences are memories (either temporary > > > > > > > > > > > or lasting) > > > > > > > > > > > These memories do influence our behaviour as you very well know. > > > > > > > > > > > Although I do not know how memories are actually "stored" in cortex, > > > > > > > > > > > we have ample proof that they are. Of course we can theoretically > > > > > > > > > > > explain our conduct mechanically without realizing that the synapse > > > > > > > > > > > behaviour we are describing is actually the act of "remembering" but > > > > > > > > > > > that does not change the fact, that without the information coming > > > > > > > > > > > from our memory our behaviour would change drastically. > > > > > > > > > > > > In my previous example of my computer program > > > > > > > > > > > you can explain the working by the hexadecimal machine code (a mix of > > > > > > > > > > > numbers and the letters A,B,C,D, E and F) and totally ignore what they > > > > > > > > > > > mean, > > > > > > > > > > > but that does not mean that the fact that the employee is a female > > > > > > > > > > > does not matter! > > > > > > > > > > > > Likewise you can explain human behaviour by the chemical working of > > > > > > > > > > > synapses, > > > > > > > > > > > but that does not mean in doesn't matter whether I thought I saw > > > > > > > > > > > Ashley or Kate. > > > > > > > > > > > > Humans are actually using subjective experiences to guide their > > > > > > > > > > > behaviour. > > > > > > > > > > > > I started re-reading "consciousness explained" by Daniel C. Dennett, > > > > > > > > > > > and found out his idea of consciousness goes one step further than I > > > > > > > > > > > thought. He thinks consciousness is caused by ideas in our head, that > > > > > > > > > > > make us think in a conscious way. Ideas that we have mostly learned > > > > > > > > > > > from other people. > > > > > > > > > > > I am not sure that is correct. To me everything we can theoretically > > > > > > > > > > > remember and theoretically communicate about, is a subjective > > > > > > > > > > > experience and is or has been part of our consciousness. > > > > > > > > > > > But the fact that almost nobody can remember much of his/her early > > > > > > > > > > > childhood, might mean that Dennett is right. > > > > > > > > > > > But it would be a good thing to read to book anyway. (did you read it > > > > > > > > > > > already?) > > > > > > > > > > > I can understand that you have been deceived by Dennet's explanation. > > > > > > > > > > I can show it to be a deception. > > > > > > > > > > > Step 1. > > > > > > > > > > > Do you understand that if there was a robot, no matter how it behaved, > > > > > > > > > > as long as it followed the known laws of physics, and therefore its > > > > > > > > > > behaviour could be explained to you in these terms, you wouldn't know > > > > > > > > > > whether it actually had any subjective experiences or not. This isn't > > > > > > > > > > about what your guess would be, it is about the truth about what you > > > > > > > > > > know. Nor is it a statement that the robot couldn't be subjectively > > > > > > > > > > experiencing by the way, in case you were going to disingeniously > > > > > > > > > > suggest that it was.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > If the Robot could make deduction from its data and its memory and > > > > > > > > > report them, I would have to assume it had a subjective experience. > > > > > > > > > What else is a subjective experience, but an experience that is > > > > > > > > > "coloured" by previous acquired information? > > > > > > > > > > The robot - for instance - could have been imprinted with the idea > > > > > > > > > "someone is an idiot" and then, after reading your post, conclude that > > > > > > > > > the best way to react was to answer: "You are definitely an idiot". > > > > > > > > > > The only difference between the robot and me as far as this event is > > > > > > > > > concerned, is that my memory contains the postulate "other people who > > > > > > > > > post on the NG have a brain similar to mine", which causes me to > > > > > > > > > continue trying to communicate even if the communication is very > > > > > > > > > difficult because you an me seem to have a different opinion on what > > > > > > > > > we think a "Subjective experience" is. > > > > > > > > > > Interesting to see you consider yourself able to disprove a man with > > > > > > > > > the capabilities of Daniel C Dennet! > > > > > > > > > > The fact that I cannot even take this first step with you may show > > > > > > > > > you, that is not such an easy thing to do. > > > > > > > > > > Someone2's Postulate : > > > > > > > > > We cannot tell if entity R has subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > > > Peter van Velzen's postulate: > > > > > > > > > If entity R can be shown to make a report on an experience that is > > > > > > > > > influenced by previous information, this means entity R has an > > > > > > > > > subjective experience. > > > > > > > > > (Especially if the previous information may not be true) > > > > > > > > > If you could get Daniel Dennet, or any other person who has encouraged > > > > > > > > people away from God, to come onto this group, and enter a debate > > > > > > > > (maybe you could tell him how highly you regard him or whatever, and > > > > > > > > ask for his help, and inform him that someone is saying he reasoning > > > > > > > > is implausible, and that he is too cowardly to enter into an open > > > > > > > > debate on the internet, or whatever), then I will show you how silly > > > > > > > > he is.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > > O, he knows people think they know better than him. He might not know > > > > > > > that someone who makes about 20 posts without getting anywhere near > > > > > > > what the subject suggests does so. Can you please get to the point, > > > > > > > and give us a hint as to why materialism could possible be > > > > > > > implausible? > > > > > > > > So far you have only started out some riddle game, and being > > > > > > > frustrated by the fact that we do not agree to you premises, embarked > > > > > > > on another one, finding out that one too doesn't do the trick. > > > > > > > > I still agree with Dennett that in fact it is dualism that is > > > > > > > implausible: > > > > > > > How can a Ghost influence matter without being observable? > > > > > > > How can it be invisible (not interfere with electromagnetic waves), > > > > > > > and still see (intercept electromagnetic waves) > > > > > > > > Or like Dennett put it: > > > > > > > How can Casper the friendly ghost, move an object and yet pass thru > > > > > > > it? > > > > > > > > Materialism is the result of verificationism: If it cannot be > > > > > > > verified, it don't mean a thing, for apparently whether it is there or > > > > > > > not doesn't change anything or anybody. > > > > > > > > By the way: I do not mention Dennett as an authority, I just think I > > > > > > > owe it to him, to tell you I learned from reading his book. So far I > > > > > > > didn't learn much from your post, except that it gave me the good Idea > > > > > > > to read Dennett's book once more. > > > > > > > Dennet didn't know what reality was. There is only the spiritual. You > > > > > > are presented with the physical world. What objections does he have > > > > > > with regards to that? Isaiah 29, vs 14:16 (http://www.biblegateway.com/ > > > > > > passage/?search=Isaiah%2029&version=31 )stated how the people that you > > > > > > regard 'intelligent' like Dennet would turn reality upside down with > > > > > > physicalism. Though if you took there assumption away that we were > > > > > > simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, why would > > > > > > you think that anything that did follow the laws of physics had any > > > > > > subjective experiences at all? Not to mention what would know what the > > > > > > neural state represented in the story he pedals? It's not like we get > > > > > > a direct experience of neural state like fluctuations in the colour > > > > > > green, the brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing at > > > > > > anyone time. Consider a robot, if the data was working on was > > > > > > encrypted, would you think that the encryption would always be > > > > > > decyphered and it would still experience what the state represented? > > > > > > > Don't you get that teddy bears don't have subjective experiences, nor > > > > > > do the more advanced toys we have for children now, and neither would > > > > > > any robot no matter how complicated you made it, nor what 'special' > > > > > > configuration its internal state was. > > > > > > > Do you think that the technology companies should budget for when the > > > > > > complexity or configuration of what they produce, causes it to be > > > > > > freed from the laws of physics? > > > > > > > If not, then can you see that all anythink they would make would do is > > > > > > behave as it was built to behave. Is it that it would only have > > > > > > subjective experiences if it was built to talk about them? Are you so > > > > > > blinkered by you ego so as not to allow any reason to pierce your > > > > > > assumptions that God doesn't exist, and that we are simply a > > > > > > biological mechanism. How do you explain that jien...@aol.com managed > > > > > > to understand what was being said, yet to the atheists here it was all > > > > > > a 'word salad'? > > > > > > > You say you haven't heard any objections to materialism, well perhaps > > > > > > it's because you only hear what you want to hear. Like the people who > > > > > > claimed to have seen the Emporer's New Clothes, you still don't get > > > > > > that the deception has been seen through. It is implausible that we > > > > > > only coincidentally have the subjective experiences that we express in > > > > > > our behaviour, and they couldn't be influential if it was the > > > > > > materialist/physicalist story, any more than they could influence the > > > > > > behaviour of a robot. There is only one path it could follow, and that > > > > > > would be the laws of physics, whether it had subjective experiences or > > > > > > not. If you don't get this, then maybe go through the posts, I have > > > > > > explained it more than once. If you still think you are looking > > > > > > intelligent, believing the deceptive story you have been told then > > > > > > think again. > > > > > > I send this reply before but it doesn't show up in Google groups, > > > > > therfore I post it again. (sorry again) > > > > > > Sorry, I think it is you who do not know what reality is. If someone > > > > > wonders whether one is dreaming, what does one do? One pinches oneself > > > > > in the arm. Ever tried pinching yourself in the spirit ? > > > > > > All things spiritual are prominently present within the (human) brain. > > > > > Therefore it is save to assume, that the spiritual indeed is little > > > > > else that the workings of the (human) brain. This brain is our only > > > > > real advantage in life compared to other species, and therefore we > > > > > justly regard it as the most important thing we have. However - as > > > > > Freud stated rightly - because it is so important to us, we tend to > > > > > overestimate the value of the spiritual. > > > > > > Hallucinations do not occur in the physical words, neither do dreams. > > > > > Fairies unicorns and leprechauns do not occur in the physical word, > > > > > neither do Hobbits or Ogers. The are pure spiritual and only exist in > > > > > the human mind. That is why people like Dennett and me, think it is > > > > > you who are turning reality upside down. > > > > > > We think the human brain, although always following the laws of > > > > > physics can process the input from our senses into something that can > > > > > be stored in our memory. The parts of our memory we can talk about are > > > > > usually called subjective experiences. Subjective, because they are > > > > > not merely a copy of the physical input from our senses, and not even > > > > > of the impulses our ears, eyes, etc. have send to the inner brain, but > > > > > indeed a composite of this input and previously stored memory. In my > > > > > example of the Robot, the visible image of Ashley together with the > > > > > image of Mary-Kate in the database formed the subjective experience "I > > > > > met Mary Jan" (objectively the Robot met Ashley). The reason we decide > > > > > that we have subjective experiences is that we can report on it (talk, > > > > > type) and compare it with reality. > > > > > > If the spiritual was reality there couldn't be any subjective > > > > > experience, because we would not have anything objective to compare it > > > > > to. Consider: If I think I see Mary Jane and this spiritual thought > > > > > was real, If would have seen Mary-Jane. There would not be a physical > > > > > Ashley but only a spiritual Mary-Jane.. Moreover if the spiritual was > > > > > real, than the child would be entitled to say "My teddy bear feels > > > > > hurt, the way you ignore its subjective experiences" and there would > > > > > be no bases for you to contradict. > > > > > Therefore the idea that the spiritual takes precedence over the > > > > > physical is a dead-end street. > > > > > > As long as Randy doesn't have to part with his one million dollar in > > > > > bonds, there is no (legal) proof that anything is free from the laws > > > > > of physics. Subjective experiences can tell you differently because > > > > > they include mistakes. When they are checked for mistakes, we speak of > > > > > objective observations. Objective observations never show anything to > > > > > be free of the laws of physics, which is logical as the laws of > > > > > physics are actual just spiritual entities that are derived from > > > > > objective observations. > > > > > > I can't explain why Jien managed to understand your "word salad". But > > > > > actually I understood most of it. What I do completely not understand > > > > > is why you think subjective experiences would make materialism > > > > > implausible. From you last post I would guess that because you think > > > > > the spiritual is more real, that because you think you are a ghost > > > > > inside a body and you think the physical observation that all "you" > > > > > are is a functioning human brain inside a body is illusive, you > > > > > conclude that dualism complies better with the spiritual. Whereas I > > > > > think the spiritual is subjective and the physical is objective, > > > > > materialism complies better with the objective reality while dualism > > > > > is illusive. > > > > > > Again the emperors new cloths were completely spiritual thus not so > > > > > real, whereas his nakedness was very physical and objectively true. > > > > > Deception is always discovered by objective physical observations, not > > > > > by figments of your imagination. > > > > > > I have - again and again - explained how subjective experiences (I saw > > > > > Mary Jane) can influence behaviour. I do not know what on earth gives > > > > > you the idea that they can not? That is the key issue I think. > > > > > > Materialism - as I see it - means that subjective experiences can be > > > > > physically explained, not that they are just illusive. Anything > > > > > illusive about them, can also be physically explained. > > > > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > > > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > > > > behaviour? > > > > > Your objections to the spiritual reality aren't reasoned. You simply > > > > have stated what you think the spiritual reality would be like. I > > > > don't mind going through it with you, but not for it to serve as a > > > > distraction from the implausibility of materialism. > > > > > Do you understand that a robot that was behaving in a way that you or > > > > other atheists might consider "imbuing" it with subjective/conscious > > > > experiences, could always have its behaviour explained with the > > > > assumption that it didn't have subjective/conscoius experiences? > > > > I think you are expressing yourself a bit inexact. > > > The behaviour could be explained without the assumption that it had > > > subjecive experiences > > > (simply by going to the machine instructions without wondering what > > > they are about) > > > but it cannot be explained with the assumption that it had no > > > subjective experiences. > > > If you assume te Robot has none, than the Robot would not be able to > > > say "I met Mary Kate" > > > for that expression is proof of a subjective experience > > > (experience, because the Robot indeed met someone, subjective because > > > objectively he met Ashley) > > > > If you replace the Robot with Robert (a human being) the same is true. > > > Robert would then say "I met Mary Kate" and this would proof Robert > > > had a subjective experience. > > > > Again: > > > > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > > > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > > > > behaviour? > > > > I suspect you and me do not share the same view on "subjective > > > experience" > > > but you haven't made clear to me what that difference is. > > > I think I have made very clear what the expression means to me, > > > so I think it is your turn to enlighten > > > I mean by subjective experiences, sensations like pleasure, or pain, > > or visual sensations, or auditory sensations for example. > > > Also I meant that it could be explained with the assumption that it > > had no subjective/conscious experiences. A theist physicist for > > example, could assume that it had no more subjective/conscious > > experiences than a teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply > > in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as > > the behaviour of a mobile phone is explained. > > Sorry > A physisist can explain the fact that someone is crying without the > assumption of pain? > He can explain the fact that someone closes his eyes from to much > sunlight > without the assumption of being blinded? > He can explain a dog answering his owners call without the assumption > of hearing? > I cannot image that is what you mean. > > You really haven't made yourself clear this time. > We are not talking about a human, as I don't share your assumption that we are simply a biological mechanism strictly following the laws of physics. So talking about a robot... a theist physicist for example, could assume that it had no more subjective/conscious experiences than a teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as the behaviour of a mobile phone is explained. Do you acknowledge this? Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 24, 2007 Posted June 24, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1182677464.955647.179080@o61g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... I see you're still ignoring me .. Guess I can safely assume you found no flaw in my arguments against your partial-arguments and have shown you wrong. Thanks for playing Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 24, 2007 Posted June 24, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1182695388.165493.104610@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > Do you understand that a robot that was behaving in a way that you or > other atheists might consider "imbuing" it with subjective/conscious > experiences, could always have its behaviour explained with the > assumption that it didn't have subjective/conscoius experiences? Only if it did not have them. That is the assertion you are implicitly making, and have not proven. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1182698286.894584.151970@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > I mean by subjective experiences, sensations like pleasure, or pain, > or visual sensations, or auditory sensations for example. > > Also I meant that it could be explained with the assumption that it > had no subjective/conscious experiences. A theist physicist for > example, could assume that it had no more subjective/conscious > experiences than a teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply > in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as > the behaviour of a mobile phone is explained. You have not shown that that is the case .. how do you KNOW that you can explain B(M) without P, when M has P. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 On 25 Jun, 01:33, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1182698286.894584.151970@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > > I mean by subjective experiences, sensations like pleasure, or pain, > > or visual sensations, or auditory sensations for example. > > > Also I meant that it could be explained with the assumption that it > > had no subjective/conscious experiences. A theist physicist for > > example, could assume that it had no more subjective/conscious > > experiences than a teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply > > in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as > > the behaviour of a mobile phone is explained. > > You have not shown that that is the case .. how do you KNOW that you can > explain B(M) without P, when M has P. Well why would you suggest that the theist physicist wouldn't be able to explain the way it behaved simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics? Are you suggesting that the mechanism wouldn't be following the laws of physics? You seem to be having a problem facing reality. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1182711880.929588.163530@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > We are not talking about a human, as I don't share your assumption > that we are simply a biological mechanism strictly following the laws > of physics. Again .. you are making assumptions and assertion and then using circular arguments. Not logical. > So talking about a robot... a theist physicist for example, could > assume that it had no more subjective/conscious experiences than a > teddy bear, Why would he be justified in doing that? > and explain the way it behaved simply in terms of the > mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as the behaviour of > a mobile phone is explained. Do you acknowledge this? Of course it could be explained using physics .. it would probably be an incredibly lengthy explanation depending on the level of detail you go to. if it goes down to what individual sub-atomic particles are doing, then that would be very lengthy indeed. If you explain at one level of detail, concepts/information about things at other levels of detail would not appear in the explanation. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 On 25 Jun, 02:12, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1182711880.929588.163530@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > > We are not talking about a human, as I don't share your assumption > > that we are simply a biological mechanism strictly following the laws > > of physics. > > Again .. you are making assumptions and assertion and then using circular > arguments. Not logical. > > > So talking about a robot... a theist physicist for example, could > > assume that it had no more subjective/conscious experiences than a > > teddy bear, > > Why would he be justified in doing that? > > > and explain the way it behaved simply in terms of the > > mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as the behaviour of > > a mobile phone is explained. Do you acknowledge this? > > Of course it could be explained using physics .. it would probably be an > incredibly lengthy explanation depending on the level of detail you go to. > if it goes down to what individual sub-atomic particles are doing, then that > would be very lengthy indeed. If you explain at one level of detail, > concepts/information about things at other levels of detail would not appear > in the explanation. They would assume it wasn't consciously experiencing as there would be no spiritual being experiencing being the robot. So you acknowledge that the theist physicist could explain the behaviour simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as they could a mobile phone. Quote
Guest Richo Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 On Jun 21, 10:06 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 21 Jun, 04:45, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > On Jun 21, 12:17 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 20 Jun, 09:01, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > On Jun 20, 11:40 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 20 Jun, 02:26, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > > > On Jun 20, 11:21 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 20 Jun, 02:05, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On Jun 20, 9:27 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > <snip> > > > > > > > > > > Could you put forward for clarity, if it isn't too much effort, where > > > > > > > > > you think the following isn't reasoned: > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > > > > > You still do not seem to understand that people in general have no > > > > > > > > problem with this scheme. > > > > > > > > What we have difficulty is the truth of (1). > > > > > > > > IF (1) is false then it matters not that a true (1) is equivalent to > > > > > > > > (2) being true. > > > > > > > > You do understand that do you not? > > > > > > > > > Have you any reason for believing (1) to be true? > > > > > > > > (By "reason" I do not mean a personal subjective conviction of its > > > > > > > > truth.) > > > > > > > > Well obviously if the (1) put forward was false, then (2) would be > > > > > > > false. Whether (1) is false or not depends on the substitutions for M, > > > > > > > B(M), and P. > > > > > > > > Are you ok with the following example: > > > > > > > > M = a car > > > > > > > B(M) = parked with its engine running > > > > > > > P = its serial number > > > > > > > > Which means: > > > > > > > > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of > > > > > > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a serial number > > > > > > > or not. > > > > > > > > As (1) is true, so is: > > > > > > > > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not affect the car > > > > > > > parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour > > > > > > > could not be the same with or without a serial number. > > > > > > > Yes. > > > > > > > Can you answer my question with a yes or a no. > > > > > > > Do you understand that I (and others) are disagreeing with (or have > > > > > > no belief in the truth of ) your statement (1)? > > > > > > Which statement (1) are you talking about? > > > > > Your statement (1) of course! > > > > You are being deliberately obtuse. > > > > > > Do you understand that M, > > > > > B(M), and P are to be substituted, as in the example that you have > > > > > just said you were ok with. > > > > > Of course. > > > > Now answer the question in relation to your original assertion about > > > > the hypothetical robot. > > > > Yes or no? > > > > Well if you say you disagree with it, then I can understand that you > > > disagree it. Though not in the sense that I understand your > > > disagreement, as you haven't told me what your disagreement is. You > > > have agreed the reasoning is true, and have stated that it would be > > > the substituted assertion (1) that you would disagree with. > > > > So with the substitutions: > > > > M refers to the robot > > > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question > > > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences. > > > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences > > > > would give: > > > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it > > > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of > > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/ > > > subjective experiences or not. > > > > So you disagreeing that the robot could be explained in terms of its > > > components strictly following the laws of physics, in the same way in > > > which we can explain the behaviour of a mobile phone. Perhaps you > > > could put forward why it couldn't be explained in such terms? > > > My position is that we do not currently know how to fully explain > > conciousness and subjective experience. > > Therefore I cannot know (and you cannot know) whether or not the known > > laws of physics can fully explain the behavior of a being without > > reference to the being having subjective experience. > > > What I believe is the case is that subjective experience are > > ultimately the result of physical processes in my physical brain. > > If this is true then it follows that any explanation of me that > > failed to account for and take into account my subjective > > experiences would be incomplete. > > > Now an incomplete explanation is still an explanation - and it still > > may be a correct explanation as far as it goes. > > > Your standard reply that "the laws of physics do not reference > > subjective experience" is an irrelevancy. > > That the laws of physics to not talk about vanilla icecream has no > > bearing on whether or not all of vanilla icecreams properties are > > fully explained by the laws of physics. > > > Furthermore I am still having trouble with "explained by" . > > This is why. > > My computer is currently running a piece of software - Firefox - and > > another piece of software Windows 2000. > > The electrical switching - the voltage levels and the currents flowing > > through the computers wiring is, I am quite certain, Ultimately the > > cause (the explanation?) of the behavior of the computer - but to > > explain some detail of the high level behavior of Windows in terms of > > voltage levels and switching of MOSFETs would be a ridiculous and > > pointless exercise - it would convey no useful information to a human. > > (A meaningful explanation of a particular behavior would be in terms > > of software - a bug in the C++ module that was responsible for the > > behavior - for example) > > The reason is that the behavior of interest to a human - that the > > computer is displaying text and images etc is very far removed from > > the switching of transistors and currents running through wires - even > > though physically that is all that is going on. > > There are many layers of interpretation and abstraction between the > > physical activity and the gross observable behavior. > > Any "explanation" of the computer behavior in these low level terms > > would look - to a human observer - indistinguishable whether the > > computer was running Windows or Linux or running a spreadsheet or a > > web browser. > > > I believe ultimately that all that is happening when I experience the > > color red or the taste of honey or feel sad is physical processes > > happening in my physical brain. > > However listing a moment by moment configuration of my neuronal > > activity for every neuron in my cerebral cortex would be as > > meaningless to a human observer as listing all the transistors inside > > my CPU and all their states - it would be a staggeringly huge list of > > data which would be meaningless on a human scale. > > So in one sense the explanation is "neurons are firing" "transistors > > are switching" and in another sense - in the sense of an explanation > > that is meaningful to or understandable to a human mind it is no > > explanation at all. > > > So the question you must ask yourself is what do you mean by > > "explained"? > > I mean explained in the sense that a mobile phone and the PC are built > based on the explanation. > That really doesn't help very much - here is why. When an engineer builds a computer or a mobile phone he needs to something about the component parts - he needs to use parts that are well characterized - what inputs give what outputs at what repetition rate and signal level. He will integrate a system from component subsystems - many designed by other engineers in other places other times. He can quite successfully build the mobile phone without knowing the complete details of how the components do what they do - he really needs to know what they do but doesn't care how they do it. This is called top down or modular design. This process applies to Software engineers too - they can use "modules" written by other programmers without knowing how modules work - this free the engineer to build a system without having to "re-invent" the wheel and the nut and bolt and transistor every time. > So back to reality. Reality?!! This robot actually exists? Can I see it? > Do you understand that: > > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/ > subjective experiences or not. I believe it is incompletely explained, yes. Just as a computer is incompletely explained by specifying the materials and their spatial distribution and temperature - it would tell you a lot but would not tell you whether it was running a spreadsheet or a video on Youtube. It wouldn't tell you if the video was funny or interesting. Physics will tell you everything about what something is composed of and what its bits are doing - at the most fundamental level. What the purpose and meaning of the computers furious activity is not in the realm of physics. It's like explaining a performance of Beethoven's 9th symphony by choir and full orchestra as spatial temporal variations in air pressure - its possible but utterly pointless - the description in these terms can be as accurate and complete as you like. It will not tell you what "art" is - it will not speak of the joyful cooperation of many individuals in making art together. The explanation would be at one level and the meaning would exist at another level. The sound pressure really is varying in space and time - the "explanation" is completely accurate AND totally worthless. Just because art and beauty are not physical concepts it does not mean they can exist separately from the existence of atoms in motion - it does not mean that magic and spirits and gods are needed in addition to atoms in motion. Their addition never explains anything. There was once a belief in a "life force" - living beings couldn't be explained by just being atoms in motion. Guess what? Pull a living thing apart and its just atoms. Not dead atoms, not live atoms. At the level of atoms there is no distinction between dead and alive - these things are only meaningful at a much higher level of complexity. It's the organization and coordinated action of the components of a living being that we call "life". The carbon atoms of a living thing are no more alive than the carbon atoms in the bubbles in mineral water or a piece of chalk. The growing the consuming and the excreting and reproducing living things do is just rearrangements of atoms in a coordinated way. There is no life force. There is the energy of motion and there is potential energy - configuration energy. That's it - no "life" force - and yet things live. This is no longer controversial. Life is a higher order/mode of atoms in motion. I suspect conciousness is like wise a higher order/mode of atoms in motion. It is less well understood - but ignorance is not a reason to start inventing entities like "spirits" or "gods". Things like thought and desire and sadness and the sensation of the color blue also don't exist in atoms - they exist at a higher level of abstraction in very complex systems - feel sad or think of grandma - at the level of physics its just atoms in motion - at the level of neurons its just firing and inhibiting firing - at the level of clusters of neurons its ... and so on up though ever more abstract levels of organization. These higher levels are where the phenomenon that you are interested exist - at a much higher level than the physical - but they cannot exist without the physical stuff being there - there existence is totally dependent and conditional on the physical. Cheers, Mark. Quote
Guest James Norris Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 On Jun 24, 10:31?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 23 Jun, 23:12, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > I think you are mixing up two issues: What is consciousness? and What > > is the difference between a computer and a brain? It also looks like > > you think that the laws of physics don't explain consciousness, but > > you don't want to say yes or no about that? > > That the laws of physics could never explain consciousness is a > seperate issue. Even if, for arguments sake, the brain was just a > biological mechanism that explained the behaviour of the human, there > could be no explanation to why the experience wasn't simply of > fluctuations of the colour green for example, the brightness being > dependent on the amount of neurons firing. Anyway, as it is a seperate > issue, can we leave it for now, and not get distracted. > > Do you understand the following reasoning: > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > P refers to the a property in question. > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. If you answer my question (do you think the laws of physics can explain consciousness), I will look at your logic, and tell you what I think of it. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 On 25 Jun, 07:53, Richo <m.richardso...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Jun 21, 10:06 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:> On 21 Jun, 04:45, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > On Jun 21, 12:17 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 20 Jun, 09:01, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > > On Jun 20, 11:40 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 20 Jun, 02:26, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > > > > On Jun 20, 11:21 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 20 Jun, 02:05, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On Jun 20, 9:27 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > <snip> > > > > > > > > > > > Could you put forward for clarity, if it isn't too much effort, where > > > > > > > > > > you think the following isn't reasoned: > > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > > > > > > You still do not seem to understand that people in general have no > > > > > > > > > problem with this scheme. > > > > > > > > > What we have difficulty is the truth of (1). > > > > > > > > > IF (1) is false then it matters not that a true (1) is equivalent to > > > > > > > > > (2) being true. > > > > > > > > > You do understand that do you not? > > > > > > > > > > Have you any reason for believing (1) to be true? > > > > > > > > > (By "reason" I do not mean a personal subjective conviction of its > > > > > > > > > truth.) > > > > > > > > > Well obviously if the (1) put forward was false, then (2) would be > > > > > > > > false. Whether (1) is false or not depends on the substitutions for M, > > > > > > > > B(M), and P. > > > > > > > > > Are you ok with the following example: > > > > > > > > > M = a car > > > > > > > > B(M) = parked with its engine running > > > > > > > > P = its serial number > > > > > > > > > Which means: > > > > > > > > > 1) A car parked with its engine running is explained by the laws of > > > > > > > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has a serial number > > > > > > > > or not. > > > > > > > > > As (1) is true, so is: > > > > > > > > > 2) Presence of a serial number, or lack of, does not affect the car > > > > > > > > parked with its engine running, else the explanation of behaviour > > > > > > > > could not be the same with or without a serial number. > > > > > > > > Yes. > > > > > > > > Can you answer my question with a yes or a no. > > > > > > > > Do you understand that I (and others) are disagreeing with (or have > > > > > > > no belief in the truth of ) your statement (1)? > > > > > > > Which statement (1) are you talking about? > > > > > > Your statement (1) of course! > > > > > You are being deliberately obtuse. > > > > > > > Do you understand that M, > > > > > > B(M), and P are to be substituted, as in the example that you have > > > > > > just said you were ok with. > > > > > > Of course. > > > > > Now answer the question in relation to your original assertion about > > > > > the hypothetical robot. > > > > > Yes or no? > > > > > Well if you say you disagree with it, then I can understand that you > > > > disagree it. Though not in the sense that I understand your > > > > disagreement, as you haven't told me what your disagreement is. You > > > > have agreed the reasoning is true, and have stated that it would be > > > > the substituted assertion (1) that you would disagree with. > > > > > So with the substitutions: > > > > > M refers to the robot > > > > B(M) refers a robot behaving in a way in which some might question > > > > whether it had conscious/subjective experiences. > > > > P refers to the property of conscious/subjective experiences > > > > > would give: > > > > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it > > > > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of > > > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/ > > > > subjective experiences or not. > > > > > So you disagreeing that the robot could be explained in terms of its > > > > components strictly following the laws of physics, in the same way in > > > > which we can explain the behaviour of a mobile phone. Perhaps you > > > > could put forward why it couldn't be explained in such terms? > > > > My position is that we do not currently know how to fully explain > > > conciousness and subjective experience. > > > Therefore I cannot know (and you cannot know) whether or not the known > > > laws of physics can fully explain the behavior of a being without > > > reference to the being having subjective experience. > > > > What I believe is the case is that subjective experience are > > > ultimately the result of physical processes in my physical brain. > > > If this is true then it follows that any explanation of me that > > > failed to account for and take into account my subjective > > > experiences would be incomplete. > > > > Now an incomplete explanation is still an explanation - and it still > > > may be a correct explanation as far as it goes. > > > > Your standard reply that "the laws of physics do not reference > > > subjective experience" is an irrelevancy. > > > That the laws of physics to not talk about vanilla icecream has no > > > bearing on whether or not all of vanilla icecreams properties are > > > fully explained by the laws of physics. > > > > Furthermore I am still having trouble with "explained by" . > > > This is why. > > > My computer is currently running a piece of software - Firefox - and > > > another piece of software Windows 2000. > > > The electrical switching - the voltage levels and the currents flowing > > > through the computers wiring is, I am quite certain, Ultimately the > > > cause (the explanation?) of the behavior of the computer - but to > > > explain some detail of the high level behavior of Windows in terms of > > > voltage levels and switching of MOSFETs would be a ridiculous and > > > pointless exercise - it would convey no useful information to a human. > > > (A meaningful explanation of a particular behavior would be in terms > > > of software - a bug in the C++ module that was responsible for the > > > behavior - for example) > > > The reason is that the behavior of interest to a human - that the > > > computer is displaying text and images etc is very far removed from > > > the switching of transistors and currents running through wires - even > > > though physically that is all that is going on. > > > There are many layers of interpretation and abstraction between the > > > physical activity and the gross observable behavior. > > > Any "explanation" of the computer behavior in these low level terms > > > would look - to a human observer - indistinguishable whether the > > > computer was running Windows or Linux or running a spreadsheet or a > > > web browser. > > > > I believe ultimately that all that is happening when I experience the > > > color red or the taste of honey or feel sad is physical processes > > > happening in my physical brain. > > > However listing a moment by moment configuration of my neuronal > > > activity for every neuron in my cerebral cortex would be as > > > meaningless to a human observer as listing all the transistors inside > > > my CPU and all their states - it would be a staggeringly huge list of > > > data which would be meaningless on a human scale. > > > So in one sense the explanation is "neurons are firing" "transistors > > > are switching" and in another sense - in the sense of an explanation > > > that is meaningful to or understandable to a human mind it is no > > > explanation at all. > > > > So the question you must ask yourself is what do you mean by > > > "explained"? > > > I mean explained in the sense that a mobile phone and the PC are built > > based on the explanation. > > That really doesn't help very much - here is why. > When an engineer builds a computer or a mobile phone he needs to > something about the component parts - he needs to use parts that are > well characterized - what inputs give what outputs at what repetition > rate and signal level. He will integrate a system from component > subsystems - many designed by other engineers in other places other > times. > He can quite successfully build the mobile phone without knowing the > complete details of how the components do what they do - he really > needs to know what they do but doesn't care how they do it. This > is called top down or modular design. This process applies to Software > engineers too - they can use "modules" written by other programmers > without knowing how modules work - this free the engineer to build a > system without having to "re-invent" the wheel and the nut and bolt > and transistor every time. > > > So back to reality. > > Reality?!! > This robot actually exists? > Can I see it? > > > Do you understand that: > > > 1) A robot behaving in a way in which some might question whether it > > had conscious/subjective experiences is explained by the laws of > > physics without requiring knowledge of whether it has conscious/ > > subjective experiences or not. > > I believe it is incompletely explained, yes. > Just as a computer is incompletely explained by specifying the > materials and their spatial distribution and temperature - it would > tell you a lot but would not tell you whether it was running a > spreadsheet or a video on Youtube. > It wouldn't tell you if the video was funny or interesting. > > Physics will tell you everything about what something is composed of > and what its bits are doing - at the most fundamental level. > > What the purpose and meaning of the computers furious activity is > not in the realm of physics. > > It's like explaining a performance of Beethoven's 9th symphony by > choir and full orchestra as spatial temporal variations in air > pressure - its possible but utterly pointless - the description in > these terms can be as accurate and complete as you like. > It will not tell you what "art" is - it will not speak of the joyful > cooperation of many individuals in making art together. > The explanation would be at one level and the meaning would exist at > another level. > > The sound pressure really is varying in space and time - the > "explanation" is completely accurate AND totally worthless. > > Just because art and beauty are not physical concepts it does not mean > they can exist separately from the existence of atoms in motion - it > does not mean that magic and spirits and gods are needed in addition > to atoms in motion. > Their addition never explains anything. > > There was once a belief in a "life force" - living beings couldn't be > explained by just being atoms in motion. > Guess what? Pull a living thing apart and its just atoms. > Not dead atoms, not live atoms. At the level of atoms there is no > distinction between dead and alive - these things are only meaningful > at a much higher level of complexity. > > It's the organization and coordinated action of the components of a > living being that we call "life". > The carbon atoms of a living thing are no more alive than the carbon > atoms in the bubbles in mineral water or a piece of chalk. > > The growing the consuming and the excreting and reproducing living > things do is just rearrangements of atoms in a coordinated way. > There is no life force. > > There is the energy of motion and there is potential energy - > configuration energy. > That's it - no "life" force - and yet things live. > This is no longer controversial. > > Life is a higher order/mode of atoms in motion. > I suspect conciousness is like wise a higher order/mode of atoms in > motion. > It is less well understood - but ignorance is not a reason to start > inventing entities like "spirits" or "gods". > > Things like thought and desire and sadness and the sensation of the > color blue also don't exist in atoms - they exist at a higher level of > abstraction in very complex systems - feel sad or think of grandma - > at the level of physics its just atoms in motion - at the level of > neurons its just firing and inhibiting firing - at the level of > clusters of neurons its ... and so on up though ever more abstract > levels of organization. These higher levels are where the phenomenon > that you are interested exist - at a much higher level than the > physical - but they cannot exist without the physical stuff being > there - there existence is totally dependent and conditional on the > physical. > I understand you believe in the story that we are just meat machines. Though I am trying to explain to you that it implausible that we are. Reality is that we are spiritual beings experiencing being humans. The problem is that you distract away from reasoning about machines, and start talking about the subjective/conscious experiences we have as spiritual beings. Do you accept, that the robot behaving in a way in which some atheists might claim it had conscious/subjective experiences, can be explained by a theist physicist (to the same extent the behaviour of a mobile phone can be explained) as simply a mechanism following the laws of physics, with the assumption that it isn't consciously experiencing? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 On 25 Jun, 10:05, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > On Jun 24, 10:31?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 23 Jun, 23:12, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > I think you are mixing up two issues: What is consciousness? and What > > > is the difference between a computer and a brain? It also looks like > > > you think that the laws of physics don't explain consciousness, but > > > you don't want to say yes or no about that? > > > That the laws of physics could never explain consciousness is a > > seperate issue. Even if, for arguments sake, the brain was just a > > biological mechanism that explained the behaviour of the human, there > > could be no explanation to why the experience wasn't simply of > > fluctuations of the colour green for example, the brightness being > > dependent on the amount of neurons firing. Anyway, as it is a seperate > > issue, can we leave it for now, and not get distracted. > > > Do you understand the following reasoning: > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > If you answer my question (do you think the laws of physics can > explain consciousness), I will look at your logic, and tell you what I > think of it. > No the laws of physics can't explain consciousness. They could never explain why anything physical should consciously/subjectively experience. You must understand that on a computer for example, which received signals of 1's and 0's and performed functions on the signals according to its design, that it wouldn't matter what the signals represented. It could be encoded military data, or a bit map, or mpeg. It doesn't affect the way the machine processes it. What we as spiritual beings experience, is what the neural state represents, but nothing in your story would know what it represents. We don't just experience fluctuations in the colour green for example, the brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing (which would require no knowledge of what the information represented). If atheists are to claim that a robot might be having conscious/ subjective experiences, as why should it only be meat machines, then consider the following: Consider 72 information channels, representing nerve signals. t1 and t2 represent the information (from the 72 channels) at different times. t1:011111110010000010010101010010000010001111100010000010010000010100000001 t2:011111110010000010010101010010000010001111100001001000001001000000110000 Now supposing the information was from the optic nerve, and the spacial configuration was such that the information could be viewed as: t1: 011111110 010000010 010101010 010000010 001111100 010000010 010000010 100000001 t2: 011111110 010000010 010101010 010000010 001111100 001001000 001001000 000110000 such that it could be viewed as a "space invader" from the arcade game (if you are familiar with it). What would they be saying caused this information to be subjectively/consciously experienced as visual information? The positioning of it in the brain, or would they claim that what it represented would automatically be known? If they go for spatial positioning, then in the robot, as the spatial positioning would be different, the implication would be that it wouldn't have the subjective/conscious visual experience. If they go for the representation being automatically known, then what if the information had come through 72 channels represented a 'space invader' impression being made on an arm. The information contains no knowledge of what it represents. If nerves were cut, and nerves from the arm connected to the optic nerve, would they be claiming that a subjective/conscious experience of touch would still be experienced, as it would automatically be known what the information represented? If not, then they are back to the spacial positioning. So with regards to the robot (as this is a neutral topic, and doesn't mention whether we ourselves are simply meat machines, or whether we are spiritual beings being presented with the physical world, and whose 'will' is a communication back, and influnces the human we experience being), how would the atheists be claiming that it had subjective/conscious experiences of what the 1's and 0's represented? Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1182732529.710881.294850@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com... > On 25 Jun, 01:33, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1182698286.894584.151970@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> > I mean by subjective experiences, sensations like pleasure, or pain, >> > or visual sensations, or auditory sensations for example. >> >> > Also I meant that it could be explained with the assumption that it >> > had no subjective/conscious experiences. A theist physicist for >> > example, could assume that it had no more subjective/conscious >> > experiences than a teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply >> > in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as >> > the behaviour of a mobile phone is explained. >> >> You have not shown that that is the case .. how do you KNOW that you can >> explain B(M) without P, when M has P. > > Well why would you suggest that the theist physicist wouldn't be able > to explain the way it behaved simply in terms of the mechanism > following the laws of physics? You are the one making claims here .. you have the burden of proof. How do you KNOW that you can explain B(M) without P, when M has P? > Are you suggesting that the mechanism > wouldn't be following the laws of physics? Fool .. of course not. That is what youseem to be suggesting .. if you'd actually post a complete statment of your argument. > You seem to be having a> problem facing reality. You seem to have a problem answering simple questions and framing a logical argument. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1182734548.461309.284670@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > On 25 Jun, 02:12, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1182711880.929588.163530@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> > We are not talking about a human, as I don't share your assumption >> > that we are simply a biological mechanism strictly following the laws >> > of physics. >> >> Again .. you are making assumptions and assertion and then using circular >> arguments. Not logical. >> >> > So talking about a robot... a theist physicist for example, could >> > assume that it had no more subjective/conscious experiences than a >> > teddy bear, >> >> Why would he be justified in doing that? >> >> > and explain the way it behaved simply in terms of the >> > mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as the behaviour of >> > a mobile phone is explained. Do you acknowledge this? >> >> Of course it could be explained using physics .. it would probably be an >> incredibly lengthy explanation depending on the level of detail you go >> to. >> if it goes down to what individual sub-atomic particles are doing, then >> that >> would be very lengthy indeed. If you explain at one level of detail, >> concepts/information about things at other levels of detail would not >> appear >> in the explanation. > > They would assume it wasn't consciously experiencing as there would be > no spiritual being experiencing being the robot. ZZZZZT. Wrong answer Why? Because you're assuming your own conclusions again .. Very poor logic. You just seem incapable of making a logical argument .. is that because you're a theist? > So you acknowledge that the theist physicist could explain the > behaviour simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of > physics, the same as they could a mobile phone. Why .. are you suggesting the the mechanism (robot or human) does NOT follow the laws of physics? And you have STILL point-blank refused to post your actual argument in a single post. I don't think you actually have one .. you're just trolling. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 On 25 Jun, 14:33, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1182732529.710881.294850@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com... > > > > > > > On 25 Jun, 01:33, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >>news:1182698286.894584.151970@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> > I mean by subjective experiences, sensations like pleasure, or pain, > >> > or visual sensations, or auditory sensations for example. > > >> > Also I meant that it could be explained with the assumption that it > >> > had no subjective/conscious experiences. A theist physicist for > >> > example, could assume that it had no more subjective/conscious > >> > experiences than a teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply > >> > in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as > >> > the behaviour of a mobile phone is explained. > > >> You have not shown that that is the case .. how do you KNOW that you can > >> explain B(M) without P, when M has P. > > > Well why would you suggest that the theist physicist wouldn't be able > > to explain the way it behaved simply in terms of the mechanism > > following the laws of physics? > > You are the one making claims here .. you have the burden of proof. > > How do you KNOW that you can explain B(M) without P, when M has P? > > > Are you suggesting that the mechanism > > wouldn't be following the laws of physics? > > Fool .. of course not. That is what youseem to be suggesting .. if you'd > actually post a complete statment of your argument. > > > You seem to be having a> problem facing reality. > > You seem to have a problem answering simple questions and framing a logical > argument. > In response to: ------- ...and explain the way it behaved simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as the behaviour of a mobile phone is explained. Do you acknowledge this? ------- You said yourself: ------- Of course it could be explained using physics .. it would probably be an incredibly lengthy explanation depending on the level of detail you go to. ------- You accept that the robot would be a mechanism following the laws of physics, and you have said (as I just quoted) that of course it could be explained using physics. So why do you suggest that I would have to prove that a mechanism following the laws of physics would be explained in terms of a mechanism following the laws of physics? Quote
Guest pbamvv@worldonline.nl Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 On 24 jun, 21:04, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 24 Jun, 19:45, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > wrote: > > > On 24 jun, 17:18, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 24 Jun, 16:07, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > wrote: > > > > > On 24 jun, 16:29, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 24 Jun, 13:29, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > On 17 jun, 02:53, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 16 Jun, 14:49, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 15 jun, 19:40, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 14 Jun, 20:50, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On 12 jun, 23:49, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On 12 Jun, 17:31, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 jun, 18:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think you understand Fred and me. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to > > > > > > > > > > > > > avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to > > > > > > > > > > > > > you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the > > > > > > > > > > > > > answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable > > > > > > > > > > > > > of doing it yourself. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I had asked: > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > Do you see that the following is always true: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > > > > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > > > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > > > > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You replied: > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it > > > > > > > > > > > > > does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead > > > > > > > > > > > > > (or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can > > > > > > > > > > > > > influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may > > > > > > > > > > > > > use the state of synapses that constitutes P. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on > > > > > > > > > > > > > it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong > > > > > > > > > > > > > balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may > > > > > > > > > > > > > even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then > > > > > > > > > > > > > black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its > > > > > > > > > > > > > bouncing. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Nevertheless its composition is. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > M = a ball > > > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) = the bouncing of the ball. > > > > > > > > > > > > > P = a property of the ball > > > > > > > > > > > > > If P = the colour, your assessment is right. > > > > > > > > > > > > > If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong. > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > > To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive > > > > > > > > > > > > > as: > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property > > > > > > > > > > > > > of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property > > > > > > > > > > > > > isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true, > > > > > > > > > > > > > and so is (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the > > > > > > > > > > > > > ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not > > > > > > > > > > > > > be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > > > > > > > > > > > > > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > > > > > > > > > > > > > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > > > > > > > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > > > > > > > > > > > > > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > > > > > > > > > > > > > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as > > > > > > > > > > > > > above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be > > > > > > > > > > > > > thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that > > > > > > > > > > > > > particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the > > > > > > > > > > > > > biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was > > > > > > > > > > > > > correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves, > > > > > > > > > > > > > which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without, > > > > > > > > > > > > > then (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is > > > > > > > > > > > > > presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world > > > > > > > > > > > > > perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit, > > > > > > > > > > > > > that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and > > > > > > > > > > > > > thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same? > > > > > > > > > > > > > You keep on assuming that subjective experiences do not have physical > > > > > > > > > > > > properties. > > > > > > > > > > > > However they do. Subjective experiences are memories (either temporary > > > > > > > > > > > > or lasting) > > > > > > > > > > > > These memories do influence our behaviour as you very well know. > > > > > > > > > > > > Although I do not know how memories are actually "stored" in cortex, > > > > > > > > > > > > we have ample proof that they are. Of course we can theoretically > > > > > > > > > > > > explain our conduct mechanically without realizing that the synapse > > > > > > > > > > > > behaviour we are describing is actually the act of "remembering" but > > > > > > > > > > > > that does not change the fact, that without the information coming > > > > > > > > > > > > from our memory our behaviour would change drastically. > > > > > > > > > > > > > In my previous example of my computer program > > > > > > > > > > > > you can explain the working by the hexadecimal machine code (a mix of > > > > > > > > > > > > numbers and the letters A,B,C,D, E and F) and totally ignore what they > > > > > > > > > > > > mean, > > > > > > > > > > > > but that does not mean that the fact that the employee is a female > > > > > > > > > > > > does not matter! > > > > > > > > > > > > > Likewise you can explain human behaviour by the chemical working of > > > > > > > > > > > > synapses, > > > > > > > > > > > > but that does not mean in doesn't matter whether I thought I saw > > > > > > > > > > > > Ashley or Kate. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Humans are actually using subjective experiences to guide their > > > > > > > > > > > > behaviour. > > > > > > > > > > > > > I started re-reading "consciousness explained" by Daniel C. Dennett, > > > > > > > > > > > > and found out his idea of consciousness goes one step further than I > > > > > > > > > > > > thought. He thinks consciousness is caused by ideas in our head, that > > > > > > > > > > > > make us think in a conscious way. Ideas that we have mostly learned > > > > > > > > > > > > from other people. > > > > > > > > > > > > I am not sure that is correct. To me everything we can theoretically > > > > > > > > > > > > remember and theoretically communicate about, is a subjective > > > > > > > > > > > > experience and is or has been part of our consciousness. > > > > > > > > > > > > But the fact that almost nobody can remember much of his/her early > > > > > > > > > > > > childhood, might mean that Dennett is right. > > > > > > > > > > > > But it would be a good thing to read to book anyway. (did you read it > > > > > > > > > > > > already?) > > > > > > > > > > > > I can understand that you have been deceived by Dennet's explanation. > > > > > > > > > > > I can show it to be a deception. > > > > > > > > > > > > Step 1. > > > > > > > > > > > > Do you understand that if there was a robot, no matter how it behaved, > > > > > > > > > > > as long as it followed the known laws of physics, and therefore its > > > > > > > > > > > behaviour could be explained to you in these terms, you wouldn't know > > > > > > > > > > > whether it actually had any subjective experiences or not. This isn't > > > > > > > > > > > about what your guess would be, it is about the truth about what you > > > > > > > > > > > know. Nor is it a statement that the robot couldn't be subjectively > > > > > > > > > > > experiencing by the way, in case you were going to disingeniously > > > > > > > > > > > suggest that it was.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > > If the Robot could make deduction from its data and its memory and > > > > > > > > > > report them, I would have to assume it had a subjective experience. > > > > > > > > > > What else is a subjective experience, but an experience that is > > > > > > > > > > "coloured" by previous acquired information? > > > > > > > > > > > The robot - for instance - could have been imprinted with the idea > > > > > > > > > > "someone is an idiot" and then, after reading your post, conclude that > > > > > > > > > > the best way to react was to answer: "You are definitely an idiot". > > > > > > > > > > > The only difference between the robot and me as far as this event is > > > > > > > > > > concerned, is that my memory contains the postulate "other people who > > > > > > > > > > post on the NG have a brain similar to mine", which causes me to > > > > > > > > > > continue trying to communicate even if the communication is very > > > > > > > > > > difficult because you an me seem to have a different opinion on what > > > > > > > > > > we think a "Subjective experience" is. > > > > > > > > > > > Interesting to see you consider yourself able to disprove a man with > > > > > > > > > > the capabilities of Daniel C Dennet! > > > > > > > > > > > The fact that I cannot even take this first step with you may show > > > > > > > > > > you, that is not such an easy thing to do. > > > > > > > > > > > Someone2's Postulate : > > > > > > > > > > We cannot tell if entity R has subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > > > > Peter van Velzen's postulate: > > > > > > > > > > If entity R can be shown to make a report on an experience that is > > > > > > > > > > influenced by previous information, this means entity R has an > > > > > > > > > > subjective experience. > > > > > > > > > > (Especially if the previous information may not be true) > > > > > > > > > > If you could get Daniel Dennet, or any other person who has encouraged > > > > > > > > > people away from God, to come onto this group, and enter a debate > > > > > > > > > (maybe you could tell him how highly you regard him or whatever, and > > > > > > > > > ask for his help, and inform him that someone is saying he reasoning > > > > > > > > > is implausible, and that he is too cowardly to enter into an open > > > > > > > > > debate on the internet, or whatever), then I will show you how silly > > > > > > > > > he is.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > > > O, he knows people think they know better than him. He might not know > > > > > > > > that someone who makes about 20 posts without getting anywhere near > > > > > > > > what the subject suggests does so. Can you please get to the point, > > > > > > > > and give us a hint as to why materialism could possible be > > > > > > > > implausible? > > > > > > > > > So far you have only started out some riddle game, and being > > > > > > > > frustrated by the fact that we do not agree to you premises, embarked > > > > > > > > on another one, finding out that one too doesn't do the trick. > > > > > > > > > I still agree with Dennett that in fact it is dualism that is > > > > > > > > implausible: > > > > > > > > How can a Ghost influence matter without being observable? > > > > > > > > How can it be invisible (not interfere with electromagnetic waves), > > > > > > > > and still see (intercept electromagnetic waves) > > > > > > > > > Or like Dennett put it: > > > > > > > > How can Casper the friendly ghost, move an object and yet pass thru > > > > > > > > it? > > > > > > > > > Materialism is the result of verificationism: If it cannot be > > > > > > > > verified, it don't mean a thing, for apparently whether it is there or > > > > > > > > not doesn't change anything or anybody. > > > > > > > > > By the way: I do not mention Dennett as an authority, I just think I > > > > > > > > owe it to him, to tell you I learned from reading his book. So far I > > > > > > > > didn't learn much from your post, except that it gave me the good Idea > > > > > > > > to read Dennett's book once more. > > > > > > > > Dennet didn't know what reality was. There is only the spiritual. You > > > > > > > are presented with the physical world. What objections does he have > > > > > > > with regards to that? Isaiah 29, vs 14:16 (http://www.biblegateway.com/ > > > > > > > passage/?search=Isaiah%2029&version=31 )stated how the people that you > > > > > > > regard 'intelligent' like Dennet would turn reality upside down with > > > > > > > physicalism. Though if you took there assumption away that we were > > > > > > > simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, why would > > > > > > > you think that anything that did follow the laws of physics had any > > > > > > > subjective experiences at all? Not to mention what would know what the > > > > > > > neural state represented in the story he pedals? It's not like we get > > > > > > > a direct experience of neural state like fluctuations in the colour > > > > > > > green, the brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing at > > > > > > > anyone time. Consider a robot, if the data was working on was > > > > > > > encrypted, would you think that the encryption would always be > > > > > > > decyphered and it would still experience what the state represented? > > > > > > > > Don't you get that teddy bears don't have subjective experiences, nor > > > > > > > do the more advanced toys we have for children now, and neither would > > > > > > > any robot no matter how complicated you made it, nor what 'special' > > > > > > > configuration its internal state was. > > > > > > > > Do you think that the technology companies should budget for when the > > > > > > > complexity or configuration of what they produce, causes it to be > > > > > > > freed from the laws of physics? > > > > > > > > If not, then can you see that all anythink they would make would do is > > > > > > > behave as it was built to behave. Is it that it would only have > > > > > > > subjective experiences if it was built to talk about them? Are you so > > > > > > > blinkered by you ego so as not to allow any reason to pierce your > > > > > > > assumptions that God doesn't exist, and that we are simply a > > > > > > > biological mechanism. How do you explain that jien...@aol.com managed > > > > > > > to understand what was being said, yet to the atheists here it was all > > > > > > > a 'word salad'? > > > > > > > > You say you haven't heard any objections to materialism, well perhaps > > > > > > > it's because you only hear what you want to hear. Like the people who > > > > > > > claimed to have seen the Emporer's New Clothes, you still don't get > > > > > > > that the deception has been seen through. It is implausible that we > > > > > > > only coincidentally have the subjective experiences that we express in > > > > > > > our behaviour, and they couldn't be influential if it was the > > > > > > > materialist/physicalist story, any more than they could influence the > > > > > > > behaviour of a robot. There is only one path it could follow, and that > > > > > > > would be the laws of physics, whether it had subjective experiences or > > > > > > > not. If you don't get this, then maybe go through the posts, I have > > > > > > > explained it more than once. If you still think you are looking > > > > > > > intelligent, believing the deceptive story you have been told then > > > > > > > think again. > > > > > > > I send this reply before but it doesn't show up in Google groups, > > > > > > therfore I post it again. (sorry again) > > > > > > > Sorry, I think it is you who do not know what reality is. If someone > > > > > > wonders whether one is dreaming, what does one do? One pinches oneself > > > > > > in the arm. Ever tried pinching yourself in the spirit ? > > > > > > > All things spiritual are prominently present within the (human) brain. > > > > > > Therefore it is save to assume, that the spiritual indeed is little > > > > > > else that the workings of the (human) brain. This brain is our only > > > > > > real advantage in life compared to other species, and therefore we > > > > > > justly regard it as the most important thing we have. However - as > > > > > > Freud stated rightly - because it is so important to us, we tend to > > > > > > overestimate the value of the spiritual. > > > > > > > Hallucinations do not occur in the physical words, neither do dreams. > > > > > > Fairies unicorns and leprechauns do not occur in the physical word, > > > > > > neither do Hobbits or Ogers. The are pure spiritual and only exist in > > > > > > the human mind. That is why people like Dennett and me, think it is > > > > > > you who are turning reality upside down. > > > > > > > We think the human brain, although always following the laws of > > > > > > physics can process the input from our senses into something that can > > > > > > be stored in our memory. The parts of our memory we can talk about are > > > > > > usually called subjective experiences. Subjective, because they are > > > > > > not merely a copy of the physical input from our senses, and not even > > > > > > of the impulses our ears, eyes, etc. have send to the inner brain, but > > > > > > indeed a composite of this input and previously stored memory. In my > > > > > > example of the Robot, the visible image of Ashley together with the > > > > > > image of Mary-Kate in the database formed the subjective experience "I > > > > > > met Mary Jan" (objectively the Robot met Ashley). The reason we decide > > > > > > that we have subjective experiences is that we can report on it (talk, > > > > > > type) and compare it with reality. > > > > > > > If the spiritual was reality there couldn't be any subjective > > > > > > experience, because we would not have anything objective to compare it > > > > > > to. Consider: If I think I see Mary Jane and this spiritual thought > > > > > > was real, If would have seen Mary-Jane. There would not be a physical > > > > > > Ashley but only a spiritual Mary-Jane.. Moreover if the spiritual was > > > > > > real, than the child would be entitled to say "My teddy bear feels > > > > > > hurt, the way you ignore its subjective experiences" and there would > > > > > > be no bases for you to contradict. > > > > > > Therefore the idea that the spiritual takes precedence over the > > > > > > physical is a dead-end street. > > > > > > > As long as Randy doesn't have to part with his one million dollar in > > > > > > bonds, there is no (legal) proof that anything is free from the laws > > > > > > of physics. Subjective experiences can tell you differently because > > > > > > they include mistakes. When they are checked for mistakes, we speak of > > > > > > objective observations. Objective observations never show anything to > > > > > > be free of the laws of physics, which is logical as the laws of > > > > > > physics are actual just spiritual entities that are derived from > > > > > > objective observations. > > > > > > > I can't explain why Jien managed to understand your "word salad". But > > > > > > actually I understood most of it. What I do completely not understand > > > > > > is why you think subjective experiences would make materialism > > > > > > implausible. From you last post I would guess that because you think > > > > > > the spiritual is more real, that because you think you are a ghost > > > > > > inside a body and you think the physical observation that all "you" > > > > > > are is a functioning human brain inside a body is illusive, you > > > > > > conclude that dualism complies better with the spiritual. Whereas I > > > > > > think the spiritual is subjective and the physical is objective, > > > > > > materialism complies better with the objective reality while dualism > > > > > > is illusive. > > > > > > > Again the emperors new cloths were completely spiritual thus not so > > > > > > real, whereas his nakedness was very physical and objectively true. > > > > > > Deception is always discovered by objective physical observations, not > > > > > > by figments of your imagination. > > > > > > > I have - again and again - explained how subjective experiences (I saw > > > > > > Mary Jane) can influence behaviour. I do not know what on earth gives > > > > > > you the idea that they can not? That is the key issue I think. > > > > > > > Materialism - as I see it - means that subjective experiences can be > > > > > > physically explained, not that they are just illusive. Anything > > > > > > illusive about them, can also be physically explained. > > > > > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > > > > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > > > > > behaviour? > > > > > > Your objections to the spiritual reality aren't reasoned. You simply > > > > > have stated what you think the spiritual reality would be like. I > > > > > don't mind going through it with you, but not for it to serve as a > > > > > distraction from the implausibility of materialism. > > > > > > Do you understand that a robot that was behaving in a way that you or > > > > > other atheists might consider "imbuing" it with subjective/conscious > > > > > experiences, could always have its behaviour explained with the > > > > > assumption that it didn't have subjective/conscoius experiences? > > > > > I think you are expressing yourself a bit inexact. > > > > The behaviour could be explained without the assumption that it had > > > > subjecive experiences > > > > (simply by going to the machine instructions without wondering what > > > > they are about) > > > > but it cannot be explained with the assumption that it had no > > > > subjective experiences. > > > > If you assume te Robot has none, than the Robot would not be able to > > > > say "I met Mary Kate" > > > > for that expression is proof of a subjective experience > > > > (experience, because the Robot indeed met someone, subjective because > > > > objectively he met Ashley) > > > > > If you replace the Robot with Robert (a human being) the same is true. > > > > Robert would then say "I met Mary Kate" and this would proof Robert > > > > had a subjective experience. > > > > > Again: > > > > > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > > > > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > > > > > behaviour? > > > > > I suspect you and me do not share the same view on "subjective > > > > experience" > > > > but you haven't made clear to me what that difference is. > > > > I think I have made very clear what the expression means to me, > > > > so I think it is your turn to enlighten > > > > I mean by subjective experiences, sensations like pleasure, or pain, > > > or visual sensations, or auditory sensations for example. > > > > Also I meant that it could be explained with the assumption that it > > > had no subjective/conscious experiences. A theist physicist for > > > example, could assume that it had no more subjective/conscious > > > experiences than a teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply > > > in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as > > > the behaviour of a mobile phone is explained. > > > Sorry > > A physisist can explain the fact that someone is crying without the > > assumption of pain? > > He can explain the fact that someone closes his eyes from to much > > sunlight > > without the assumption of being blinded? > > He can explain a dog answering his owners call without the assumption > > of hearing? > > I cannot image that is what you mean. > > > You really haven't made yourself clear this time. > > We are not talking about a human, as I don't share your assumption > that we are simply a biological mechanism strictly following the laws > of physics. > > So talking about a robot... a theist physicist for example, could > assume that it had no more subjective/conscious experiences than a > teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply in terms of the > mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as the behaviour of > a mobile phone is explained. Do you acknowledge this? No a teddybear can not reckognize an image neither can the mobile phone This is essential to having a subjective experience You have to be able to process the data your senses supply, wether you are human or robot Peter van Velzen June 2007 Amstelveen The Netherlands Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 On 25 Jun, 16:30, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> wrote: > On 24 jun, 21:04, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 24 Jun, 19:45, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > wrote: > > > > On 24 jun, 17:18, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 24 Jun, 16:07, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > On 24 jun, 16:29, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 24 Jun, 13:29, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > On 17 jun, 02:53, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 16 Jun, 14:49, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 15 jun, 19:40, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On 14 Jun, 20:50, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On 12 jun, 23:49, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 12 Jun, 17:31, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 jun, 18:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think you understand Fred and me. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to > > > > > > > > > > > > > > avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to > > > > > > > > > > > > > > you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the > > > > > > > > > > > > > > answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable > > > > > > > > > > > > > > of doing it yourself. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I had asked: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Do you see that the following is always true: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > > > > > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > > > > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > > > > > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You replied: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it > > > > > > > > > > > > > > does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead > > > > > > > > > > > > > > (or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can > > > > > > > > > > > > > > influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may > > > > > > > > > > > > > > use the state of synapses that constitutes P. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on > > > > > > > > > > > > > > it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong > > > > > > > > > > > > > > balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may > > > > > > > > > > > > > > even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then > > > > > > > > > > > > > > black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its > > > > > > > > > > > > > > bouncing. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Nevertheless its composition is. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > M = a ball > > > > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) = the bouncing of the ball. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > P = a property of the ball > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If P = the colour, your assessment is right. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive > > > > > > > > > > > > > > as: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > > So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property > > > > > > > > > > > > > > of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property > > > > > > > > > > > > > > isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > and so is (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not > > > > > > > > > > > > > > be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > > > > > > > > > > > > > > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > > > > > > > > > > > > > > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > > > > > > > > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > > > > > > > > > > > > > > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > > > > > > > > > > > > > > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as > > > > > > > > > > > > > > above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be > > > > > > > > > > > > > > thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that > > > > > > > > > > > > > > particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the > > > > > > > > > > > > > > biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was > > > > > > > > > > > > > > correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > then (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is > > > > > > > > > > > > > > presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world > > > > > > > > > > > > > > perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and > > > > > > > > > > > > > > thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You keep on assuming that subjective experiences do not have physical > > > > > > > > > > > > > properties. > > > > > > > > > > > > > However they do. Subjective experiences are memories (either temporary > > > > > > > > > > > > > or lasting) > > > > > > > > > > > > > These memories do influence our behaviour as you very well know. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Although I do not know how memories are actually "stored" in cortex, > > > > > > > > > > > > > we have ample proof that they are. Of course we can theoretically > > > > > > > > > > > > > explain our conduct mechanically without realizing that the synapse > > > > > > > > > > > > > behaviour we are describing is actually the act of "remembering" but > > > > > > > > > > > > > that does not change the fact, that without the information coming > > > > > > > > > > > > > from our memory our behaviour would change drastically. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > In my previous example of my computer program > > > > > > > > > > > > > you can explain the working by the hexadecimal machine code (a mix of > > > > > > > > > > > > > numbers and the letters A,B,C,D, E and F) and totally ignore what they > > > > > > > > > > > > > mean, > > > > > > > > > > > > > but that does not mean that the fact that the employee is a female > > > > > > > > > > > > > does not matter! > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Likewise you can explain human behaviour by the chemical working of > > > > > > > > > > > > > synapses, > > > > > > > > > > > > > but that does not mean in doesn't matter whether I thought I saw > > > > > > > > > > > > > Ashley or Kate. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Humans are actually using subjective experiences to guide their > > > > > > > > > > > > > behaviour. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I started re-reading "consciousness explained" by Daniel C. Dennett, > > > > > > > > > > > > > and found out his idea of consciousness goes one step further than I > > > > > > > > > > > > > thought. He thinks consciousness is caused by ideas in our head, that > > > > > > > > > > > > > make us think in a conscious way. Ideas that we have mostly learned > > > > > > > > > > > > > from other people. > > > > > > > > > > > > > I am not sure that is correct. To me everything we can theoretically > > > > > > > > > > > > > remember and theoretically communicate about, is a subjective > > > > > > > > > > > > > experience and is or has been part of our consciousness. > > > > > > > > > > > > > But the fact that almost nobody can remember much of his/her early > > > > > > > > > > > > > childhood, might mean that Dennett is right. > > > > > > > > > > > > > But it would be a good thing to read to book anyway. (did you read it > > > > > > > > > > > > > already?) > > > > > > > > > > > > > I can understand that you have been deceived by Dennet's explanation. > > > > > > > > > > > > I can show it to be a deception. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Step 1. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Do you understand that if there was a robot, no matter how it behaved, > > > > > > > > > > > > as long as it followed the known laws of physics, and therefore its > > > > > > > > > > > > behaviour could be explained to you in these terms, you wouldn't know > > > > > > > > > > > > whether it actually had any subjective experiences or not. This isn't > > > > > > > > > > > > about what your guess would be, it is about the truth about what you > > > > > > > > > > > > know. Nor is it a statement that the robot couldn't be subjectively > > > > > > > > > > > > experiencing by the way, in case you were going to disingeniously > > > > > > > > > > > > suggest that it was.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > > > If the Robot could make deduction from its data and its memory and > > > > > > > > > > > report them, I would have to assume it had a subjective experience. > > > > > > > > > > > What else is a subjective experience, but an experience that is > > > > > > > > > > > "coloured" by previous acquired information? > > > > > > > > > > > > The robot - for instance - could have been imprinted with the idea > > > > > > > > > > > "someone is an idiot" and then, after reading your post, conclude that > > > > > > > > > > > the best way to react was to answer: "You are definitely an idiot". > > > > > > > > > > > > The only difference between the robot and me as far as this event is > > > > > > > > > > > concerned, is that my memory contains the postulate "other people who > > > > > > > > > > > post on the NG have a brain similar to mine", which causes me to > > > > > > > > > > > continue trying to communicate even if the communication is very > > > > > > > > > > > difficult because you an me seem to have a different opinion on what > > > > > > > > > > > we think a "Subjective experience" is. > > > > > > > > > > > > Interesting to see you consider yourself able to disprove a man with > > > > > > > > > > > the capabilities of Daniel C Dennet! > > > > > > > > > > > > The fact that I cannot even take this first step with you may show > > > > > > > > > > > you, that is not such an easy thing to do. > > > > > > > > > > > > Someone2's Postulate : > > > > > > > > > > > We cannot tell if entity R has subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > > > > > Peter van Velzen's postulate: > > > > > > > > > > > If entity R can be shown to make a report on an experience that is > > > > > > > > > > > influenced by previous information, this means entity R has an > > > > > > > > > > > subjective experience. > > > > > > > > > > > (Especially if the previous information may not be true) > > > > > > > > > > > If you could get Daniel Dennet, or any other person who has encouraged > > > > > > > > > > people away from God, to come onto this group, and enter a debate > > > > > > > > > > (maybe you could tell him how highly you regard him or whatever, and > > > > > > > > > > ask for his help, and inform him that someone is saying he reasoning > > > > > > > > > > is implausible, and that he is too cowardly to enter into an open > > > > > > > > > > debate on the internet, or whatever), then I will show you how silly > > > > > > > > > > he is.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > O, he knows people think they know better than him. He might not know > > > > > > > > > that someone who makes about 20 posts without getting anywhere near > > > > > > > > > what the subject suggests does so. Can you please get to the point, > > > > > > > > > and give us a hint as to why materialism could possible be > > > > > > > > > implausible? > > > > > > > > > > So far you have only started out some riddle game, and being > > > > > > > > > frustrated by the fact that we do not agree to you premises, embarked > > > > > > > > > on another one, finding out that one too doesn't do the trick. > > > > > > > > > > I still agree with Dennett that in fact it is dualism that is > > > > > > > > > implausible: > > > > > > > > > How can a Ghost influence matter without being observable? > > > > > > > > > How can it be invisible (not interfere with electromagnetic waves), > > > > > > > > > and still see (intercept electromagnetic waves) > > > > > > > > > > Or like Dennett put it: > > > > > > > > > How can Casper the friendly ghost, move an object and yet pass thru > > > > > > > > > it? > > > > > > > > > > Materialism is the result of verificationism: If it cannot be > > > > > > > > > verified, it don't mean a thing, for apparently whether it is there or > > > > > > > > > not doesn't change anything or anybody. > > > > > > > > > > By the way: I do not mention Dennett as an authority, I just think I > > > > > > > > > owe it to him, to tell you I learned from reading his book. So far I > > > > > > > > > didn't learn much from your post, except that it gave me the good Idea > > > > > > > > > to read Dennett's book once more. > > > > > > > > > Dennet didn't know what reality was. There is only the spiritual. You > > > > > > > > are presented with the physical world. What objections does he have > > > > > > > > with regards to that? Isaiah 29, vs 14:16 (http://www.biblegateway.com/ > > > > > > > > passage/?search=Isaiah%2029&version=31 )stated how the people that you > > > > > > > > regard 'intelligent' like Dennet would turn reality upside down with > > > > > > > > physicalism. Though if you took there assumption away that we were > > > > > > > > simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, why would > > > > > > > > you think that anything that did follow the laws of physics had any > > > > > > > > subjective experiences at all? Not to mention what would know what the > > > > > > > > neural state represented in the story he pedals? It's not like we get > > > > > > > > a direct experience of neural state like fluctuations in the colour > > > > > > > > green, the brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing at > > > > > > > > anyone time. Consider a robot, if the data was working on was > > > > > > > > encrypted, would you think that the encryption would always be > > > > > > > > decyphered and it would still experience what the state represented? > > > > > > > > > Don't you get that teddy bears don't have subjective experiences, nor > > > > > > > > do the more advanced toys we have for children now, and neither would > > > > > > > > any robot no matter how complicated you made it, nor what 'special' > > > > > > > > configuration its internal state was. > > > > > > > > > Do you think that the technology companies should budget for when the > > > > > > > > complexity or configuration of what they produce, causes it to be > > > > > > > > freed from the laws of physics? > > > > > > > > > If not, then can you see that all anythink they would make would do is > > > > > > > > behave as it was built to behave. Is it that it would only have > > > > > > > > subjective experiences if it was built to talk about them? Are you so > > > > > > > > blinkered by you ego so as not to allow any reason to pierce your > > > > > > > > assumptions that God doesn't exist, and that we are simply a > > > > > > > > biological mechanism. How do you explain that jien...@aol.com managed > > > > > > > > to understand what was being said, yet to the atheists here it was all > > > > > > > > a 'word salad'? > > > > > > > > > You say you haven't heard any objections to materialism, well perhaps > > > > > > > > it's because you only hear what you want to hear. Like the people who > > > > > > > > claimed to have seen the Emporer's New Clothes, you still don't get > > > > > > > > that the deception has been seen through. It is implausible that we > > > > > > > > only coincidentally have the subjective experiences that we express in > > > > > > > > our behaviour, and they couldn't be influential if it was the > > > > > > > > materialist/physicalist story, any more than they could influence the > > > > > > > > behaviour of a robot. There is only one path it could follow, and that > > > > > > > > would be the laws of physics, whether it had subjective experiences or > > > > > > > > not. If you don't get this, then maybe go through the posts, I have > > > > > > > > explained it more than once. If you still think you are looking > > > > > > > > intelligent, believing the deceptive story you have been told then > > > > > > > > think again. > > > > > > > > I send this reply before but it doesn't show up in Google groups, > > > > > > > therfore I post it again. (sorry again) > > > > > > > > Sorry, I think it is you who do not know what reality is. If someone > > > > > > > wonders whether one is dreaming, what does one do? One pinches oneself > > > > > > > in the arm. Ever tried pinching yourself in the spirit ? > > > > > > > > All things spiritual are prominently present within the (human) brain. > > > > > > > Therefore it is save to assume, that the spiritual indeed is little > > > > > > > else that the workings of the (human) brain. This brain is our only > > > > > > > real advantage in life compared to other species, and therefore we > > > > > > > justly regard it as the most important thing we have. However - as > > > > > > > Freud stated rightly - because it is so important to us, we tend to > > > > > > > overestimate the value of the spiritual. > > > > > > > > Hallucinations do not occur in the physical words, neither do dreams. > > > > > > > Fairies unicorns and leprechauns do not occur in the physical word, > > > > > > > neither do Hobbits or Ogers. The are pure spiritual and only exist in > > > > > > > the human mind. That is why people like Dennett and me, think it is > > > > > > > you who are turning reality upside down. > > > > > > > > We think the human brain, although always following the laws of > > > > > > > physics can process the input from our senses into something that can > > > > > > > be stored in our memory. The parts of our memory we can talk about are > > > > > > > usually called subjective experiences. Subjective, because they are > > > > > > > not merely a copy of the physical input from our senses, and not even > > > > > > > of the impulses our ears, eyes, etc. have send to the inner brain, but > > > > > > > indeed a composite of this input and previously stored memory. In my > > > > > > > example of the Robot, the visible image of Ashley together with the > > > > > > > image of Mary-Kate in the database formed the subjective experience "I > > > > > > > met Mary Jan" (objectively the Robot met Ashley). The reason we decide > > > > > > > that we have subjective experiences is that we can report on it (talk, > > > > > > > type) and compare it with reality. > > > > > > > > If the spiritual was reality there couldn't be any subjective > > > > > > > experience, because we would not have anything objective to compare it > > > > > > > to. Consider: If I think I see Mary Jane and this spiritual thought > > > > > > > was real, If would have seen Mary-Jane. There would not be a physical > > > > > > > Ashley but only a spiritual Mary-Jane.. Moreover if the spiritual was > > > > > > > real, than the child would be entitled to say "My teddy bear feels > > > > > > > hurt, the way you ignore its subjective experiences" and there would > > > > > > > be no bases for you to contradict. > > > > > > > Therefore the idea that the spiritual takes precedence over the > > > > > > > physical is a dead-end street. > > > > > > > > As long as Randy doesn't have to part with his one million dollar in > > > > > > > bonds, there is no (legal) proof that anything is free from the laws > > > > > > > of physics. Subjective experiences can tell you differently because > > > > > > > they include mistakes. When they are checked for mistakes, we speak of > > > > > > > objective observations. Objective observations never show anything to > > > > > > > be free of the laws of physics, which is logical as the laws of > > > > > > > physics are actual just spiritual entities that are derived from > > > > > > > objective observations. > > > > > > > > I can't explain why Jien managed to understand your "word salad". But > > > > > > > actually I understood most of it. What I do completely not understand > > > > > > > is why you think subjective experiences would make materialism > > > > > > > implausible. From you last post I would guess that because you think > > > > > > > the spiritual is more real, that because you think you are a ghost > > > > > > > inside a body and you think the physical observation that all "you" > > > > > > > are is a functioning human brain inside a body is illusive, you > > > > > > > conclude that dualism complies better with the spiritual. Whereas I > > > > > > > think the spiritual is subjective and the physical is objective, > > > > > > > materialism complies better with the objective reality while dualism > > > > > > > is illusive. > > > > > > > > Again the emperors new cloths were completely spiritual thus not so > > > > > > > real, whereas his nakedness was very physical and objectively true. > > > > > > > Deception is always discovered by objective physical observations, not > > > > > > > by figments of your imagination. > > > > > > > > I have - again and again - explained how subjective experiences (I saw > > > > > > > Mary Jane) can influence behaviour. I do not know what on earth gives > > > > > > > you the idea that they can not? That is the key issue I think. > > > > > > > > Materialism - as I see it - means that subjective experiences can be > > > > > > > physically explained, not that they are just illusive. Anything > > > > > > > illusive about them, can also be physically explained. > > > > > > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > > > > > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > > > > > > behaviour? > > > > > > > Your objections to the spiritual reality aren't reasoned. You simply > > > > > > have stated what you think the spiritual reality would be like. I > > > > > > don't mind going through it with you, but not for it to serve as a > > > > > > distraction from the implausibility of materialism. > > > > > > > Do you understand that a robot that was behaving in a way that you or > > > > > > other atheists might consider "imbuing" it with subjective/conscious > > > > > > experiences, could always have its behaviour explained with the > > > > > > assumption that it didn't have subjective/conscoius experiences? > > > > > > I think you are expressing yourself a bit inexact. > > > > > The behaviour could be explained without the assumption that it had > > > > > subjecive experiences > > > > > (simply by going to the machine instructions without wondering what > > > > > they are about) > > > > > but it cannot be explained with the assumption that it had no > > > > > subjective experiences. > > > > > If you assume te Robot has none, than the Robot would not be able to > > > > > say "I met Mary Kate" > > > > > for that expression is proof of a subjective experience > > > > > (experience, because the Robot indeed met someone, subjective because > > > > > objectively he met Ashley) > > > > > > If you replace the Robot with Robert (a human being) the same is true. > > > > > Robert would then say "I met Mary Kate" and this would proof Robert > > > > > had a subjective experience. > > > > > > Again: > > > > > > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > > > > > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > > > > > > behaviour? > > > > > > I suspect you and me do not share the same view on "subjective > > > > > experience" > > > > > but you haven't made clear to me what that difference is. > > > > > I think I have made very clear what the expression means to me, > > > > > so I think it is your turn to enlighten > > > > > I mean by subjective experiences, sensations like pleasure, or pain, > > > > or visual sensations, or auditory sensations for example. > > > > > Also I meant that it could be explained with the assumption that it > > > > had no subjective/conscious experiences. A theist physicist for > > > > example, could assume that it had no more subjective/conscious > > > > experiences than a teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply > > > > in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as > > > > the behaviour of a mobile phone is explained. > > > > Sorry > > > A physisist can explain the fact that someone is crying without the > > > assumption of pain? > > > He can explain the fact that someone closes his eyes from to much > > > sunlight > > > without the assumption of being blinded? > > > He can explain a dog answering his owners call without the assumption > > > of hearing? > > > I cannot image that is what you mean. > > > > You really haven't made yourself clear this time. > > > We are not talking about a human, as I don't share your assumption > > that we are simply a biological mechanism strictly following the laws > > of physics. > > > So talking about a robot... a theist physicist for example, could > > assume that it had no more subjective/conscious experiences than a > > teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply in terms of the > > mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as the behaviour of > > a mobile phone is explained. Do you acknowledge this? > > No > a teddybear can not reckognize an image > neither can the mobile phone > This is essential to having a subjective experience > You have to be able to process the data your senses supply, > wether you are human or robot > So you are claiming that the robot's behaviour wouldn't be able to be explained simply in terms of a mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as a mobile phone, even though they would both be simply mechanisms following the laws of physics. Perhaps you could explain why the theist physicist wouldn't be able to explain the robot's behaviour as simply a mechanism following the laws of physics, given that is what it would be? Quote
Guest James Norris Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 On Jun 25, 11:51 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 25 Jun, 10:05, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > On Jun 24, 10:31?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > On 23 Jun, 23:12, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > I think you are mixing up two issues: What is consciousness? and What > > > > is the difference between a computer and a brain? It also looks like > > > > you think that the laws of physics don't explain consciousness, but > > > > you don't want to say yes or no about that? > > > > That the laws of physics could never explain consciousness is a > > > seperate issue. Even if, for arguments sake, the brain was just a > > > biological mechanism that explained the behaviour of the human, there > > > could be no explanation to why the experience wasn't simply of > > > fluctuations of the colour green for example, the brightness being > > > dependent on the amount of neurons firing. Anyway, as it is a seperate > > > issue, can we leave it for now, and not get distracted. > > > > Do you understand the following reasoning: > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > If you answer my question (do you think the laws of physics can > > explain consciousness), I will look at your logic, and tell you what I > > think of it. > > No the laws of physics can't explain consciousness. They could never > explain why anything physical should consciously/subjectively > experience. I disagree with you. The 'laws of physics' do explain consciousness. Conscious awareness of reality is an evolved feature of some biological organisms. Evolution occurs because of ordinary physical processes. > You must understand that on a computer for example, which received > signals of 1's and 0's and performed functions on the signals > according to its design, that it wouldn't matter what the signals > represented. It could be encoded military data, or a bit map, or mpeg. > It doesn't affect the way the machine processes it. What we as > spiritual beings experience, is what the neural state represents, but > nothing in your story would know what it represents. We don't just > experience fluctuations in the colour green for example, the > brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing (which would > require no knowledge of what the information represented). Yes, I agree with that (though it is a struggle to understand what you are getting at in your writings - almost every sentence is badly ungrammatical or ambiguous). A computer could have a 'copy' of the pattern of active neurons in a brain which correspond to an experience of smell, but it would not experience the pattern as smell. But, as I wrote earlier, it is quite possible that if you copied the pattern into another living brain, that brain would have a similar subjective experience to the first brain. > If atheists are to claim that a robot might be having conscious/ > subjective experiences, as why should it only be meat machines, then > consider the following: > > Consider 72 information channels, representing nerve signals. > > t1 and t2 represent the information (from the 72 channels) at > different times. > > t1:011111110010000010010101010010000010001111100010000010010000010100000001 > t2:011111110010000010010101010010000010001111100001001000001001000000110000 > > Now supposing the information was from the optic nerve, and the > spacial configuration was such that the information could be viewed > as: > > t1: > 011111110 > 010000010 > 010101010 > 010000010 > 001111100 > 010000010 > 010000010 > 100000001 > > t2: > 011111110 > 010000010 > 010101010 > 010000010 > 001111100 > 001001000 > 001001000 > 000110000 > > such that it could be viewed as a "space invader" from the arcade game > (if you are familiar with it). What would they be saying caused this > information to be subjectively/consciously experienced as visual > information? The positioning of it in the brain, or would they claim > that what it represented would automatically be known? > > If they go for spatial positioning, then in the robot, as the spatial > positioning would be different, the implication would be that it > wouldn't have the subjective/conscious visual experience. > > If they go for the representation being automatically known, then what > if the information had come through 72 channels represented a 'space > invader' impression being made on an arm. The information contains no > knowledge of what it represents. If nerves were cut, and nerves from > the arm connected to the optic nerve, would they be claiming that a > subjective/conscious experience of touch would still be experienced, > as it would automatically be known what the information represented? > If not, then they are back to the spacial positioning. > > So with regards to the robot (as this is a neutral topic, and doesn't > mention whether we ourselves are simply meat machines, or whether we > are spiritual beings being presented with the physical world, and > whose 'will' is a communication back, and influnces the human we > experience being), how would the atheists be claiming that it had > subjective/conscious experiences of what the 1's and 0's represented? It seems to me from all that lot that you don't understand what consciousness is, so it is not surprising that you have a problem working out why a mechanical robot is not conscious, but a human 'meat machine' is conscious. Take the awareness of hunger, as a simple example. 'Feeling hungry' is a subjective experience: you can't experience someone else's hunger for them, so how do you know it exists? How would your robot ever feel hungry - and how would you know if it did? Undeneath it all, the occurrence in nature of low-blood sugar levels in an organism to make it move about and ingest material from the surroundings, is little more than a chemical process. Low level organisms that don't have brains are not aware of their surroundings, and are not conscious, but they still eat. A biological organism dies if it doesn't eat, and, in conscious animals, nature has evolved the ability to feel hunger, together with the ability to find food in the environment. When an animal's blood sugar levels are too low, a pattern of neurons forms in its brain which indicate to the animal that it is hungry, and should eat. The experience of hunger occurs in the brain, not the stomach - if we didn't have a brain, we wouldn't feel hungry; brains evolved solely so that they can experience hunger, and fill its stomach to correct it. If the awareness of hunger hadn't evolved, the species would not survive, because the animal wouldn't eat. Conscious evolved animals would not exist if they didn't feel hungry sometimes; low sugar-levels cause a brain pattern corresponding to hunger, and that is all that consciousness (of hunger) is. The awareness has evolved because it is directly related to reality, and that awareness of reality is what we call consciousness. The more aware of hunger, and what to do about it, the species becomes, the better the species survives, and that causes evolution to maximise awareness of reality (consciousness) - animals which are less conscious just die out, because they can't compete with the animals that understand their surroundings. Our own awareness is very highly- evolved and we tend to think of it as particularly special, but from nature's point of view, consciousness is no more special than a giraffe's neck or a toenail, each of which is similarly highly evolved. The only conscious beings we know of are biologically evolved ones, such as ourselves. You can (I hope) understand from my postings, how conscious awareness has evolved along with brains and the associated sense organs, over billions of generations of continuous evolution, from tiny creatures with minuscule awareness of light and dark, hot and cold, and so on, to our full-blown human 'we understand everything' awareness of reality. Computers are not intended to be conscious. They are designed just to perform simple arithmetic/logical operations at high speed, and there is no reason to expect them to be conscious. They certainly haven't evolved any ability to be aware of and interact with the environment, so that they can exist, any more than a teaspoon has, so why would they be any more conscious than a teaspoon? You could pretend that a robot was conscious, by copying brain patterns from a human and arranging them in the computer 'memory', and then getting the robot to say 'I want food' whenever the memory corresponding to 'hunger' was accessed by the computer user. You could plug the robot into electricity until it made a programmed 'burping' sound, and possibly turn on a small tap to let out some smelly water at the same time, to make the effect more convincing. But that would clearly just be an expensive toy doll. It would be simpler to give the computer a wig made of human hair, and then talk about the computer's behaviour compared to a human, than to bother with computer simulation of patterns of biological neuronal activity, and pretending that it was aware. The only conscious beings we know of are biologically evolved ones, and it may well be the case that biological creatures are the only conscious creatures that can exist. The notion of a conscious robot is just the same ancient myth of golems and statues brought to life, given an up-to-date gloss because of modern technology. Anyone who imagines that computers might be conscious doesn't really understand that computers are just complicated machines, like a car or a television - it is almost more likely that a galaxy might be conscious, or a forest or ocean, but to me, that is also so unlikely that if it were true, I'd say perhaps God does exist after all. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 On 25 Jun, 17:16, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > On Jun 25, 11:51 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > On 25 Jun, 10:05, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > On Jun 24, 10:31?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 23 Jun, 23:12, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > I think you are mixing up two issues: What is consciousness? and What > > > > > is the difference between a computer and a brain? It also looks like > > > > > you think that the laws of physics don't explain consciousness, but > > > > > you don't want to say yes or no about that? > > > > > That the laws of physics could never explain consciousness is a > > > > seperate issue. Even if, for arguments sake, the brain was just a > > > > biological mechanism that explained the behaviour of the human, there > > > > could be no explanation to why the experience wasn't simply of > > > > fluctuations of the colour green for example, the brightness being > > > > dependent on the amount of neurons firing. Anyway, as it is a seperate > > > > issue, can we leave it for now, and not get distracted. > > > > > Do you understand the following reasoning: > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > If you answer my question (do you think the laws of physics can > > > explain consciousness), I will look at your logic, and tell you what I > > > think of it. > > > No the laws of physics can't explain consciousness. They could never > > explain why anything physical should consciously/subjectively > > experience. > > I disagree with you. The 'laws of physics' do explain > consciousness. Conscious awareness of reality is an evolved feature > of some biological organisms. Evolution occurs because of ordinary > physical processes. > > > You must understand that on a computer for example, which received > > signals of 1's and 0's and performed functions on the signals > > according to its design, that it wouldn't matter what the signals > > represented. It could be encoded military data, or a bit map, or mpeg. > > It doesn't affect the way the machine processes it. What we as > > spiritual beings experience, is what the neural state represents, but > > nothing in your story would know what it represents. We don't just > > experience fluctuations in the colour green for example, the > > brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing (which would > > require no knowledge of what the information represented). > > Yes, I agree with that (though it is a struggle to understand what you > are getting at in your writings - almost every sentence is badly > ungrammatical or ambiguous). A computer could have a 'copy' of the > pattern of active neurons in a brain which correspond to an experience > of smell, but it would not experience the pattern as smell. But, as I > wrote earlier, it is quite possible that if you copied the pattern > into another living brain, that brain would have a similar subjective > experience to the first brain. > > > If atheists are to claim that a robot might be having conscious/ > > subjective experiences, as why should it only be meat machines, then > > consider the following: > > > Consider 72 information channels, representing nerve signals. > > > t1 and t2 represent the information (from the 72 channels) at > > different times. > > > t1:011111110010000010010101010010000010001111100010000010010000010100000001 > > t2:011111110010000010010101010010000010001111100001001000001001000000110000 > > > Now supposing the information was from the optic nerve, and the > > spacial configuration was such that the information could be viewed > > as: > > > t1: > > 011111110 > > 010000010 > > 010101010 > > 010000010 > > 001111100 > > 010000010 > > 010000010 > > 100000001 > > > t2: > > 011111110 > > 010000010 > > 010101010 > > 010000010 > > 001111100 > > 001001000 > > 001001000 > > 000110000 > > > such that it could be viewed as a "space invader" from the arcade game > > (if you are familiar with it). What would they be saying caused this > > information to be subjectively/consciously experienced as visual > > information? The positioning of it in the brain, or would they claim > > that what it represented would automatically be known? > > > If they go for spatial positioning, then in the robot, as the spatial > > positioning would be different, the implication would be that it > > wouldn't have the subjective/conscious visual experience. > > > If they go for the representation being automatically known, then what > > if the information had come through 72 channels represented a 'space > > invader' impression being made on an arm. The information contains no > > knowledge of what it represents. If nerves were cut, and nerves from > > the arm connected to the optic nerve, would they be claiming that a > > subjective/conscious experience of touch would still be experienced, > > as it would automatically be known what the information represented? > > If not, then they are back to the spacial positioning. > > > So with regards to the robot (as this is a neutral topic, and doesn't > > mention whether we ourselves are simply meat machines, or whether we > > are spiritual beings being presented with the physical world, and > > whose 'will' is a communication back, and influnces the human we > > experience being), how would the atheists be claiming that it had > > subjective/conscious experiences of what the 1's and 0's represented? > > It seems to me from all that lot that you don't understand what > consciousness is, so it is not surprising that you have a problem > working out why a mechanical robot is not conscious, but a human 'meat > machine' is conscious. > > Take the awareness of hunger, as a simple example. 'Feeling hungry' > is a subjective experience: you can't experience someone else's > hunger for them, so how do you know it exists? How would your robot > ever feel hungry - and how would you know if it did? > > Undeneath it all, the occurrence in nature of low-blood sugar levels > in an organism to make it move about and ingest material from the > surroundings, is little more than a chemical process. Low level > organisms that don't have brains are not aware of their surroundings, > and are not conscious, but they still eat. A biological organism > dies if it doesn't eat, and, in conscious animals, nature has evolved > the ability to feel hunger, together with the ability to find food in > the environment. When an animal's blood sugar levels are too low, a > pattern of neurons forms in its brain which indicate to the animal > that it is hungry, and should eat. The experience of hunger occurs in > the brain, not the stomach - if we didn't have a brain, we wouldn't > feel hungry; brains evolved solely so that they can experience > hunger, and fill its stomach to correct it. If the awareness of > hunger hadn't evolved, the species would not survive, because the > animal wouldn't eat. Conscious evolved animals would not exist if > they didn't feel hungry sometimes; low sugar-levels cause a brain > pattern corresponding to hunger, and that is all that consciousness > (of hunger) is. The awareness has evolved because it is directly > related to reality, and that awareness of reality is what we call > consciousness. > > The more aware of hunger, and what to do about it, the species > becomes, the better the species survives, and that causes evolution to > maximise awareness of reality (consciousness) - animals which are less > conscious just die out, because they can't compete with the animals > that understand their surroundings. Our own awareness is very highly- > evolved and we tend to think of it as particularly special, but from > nature's point of view, consciousness is no more special than a > giraffe's neck or a toenail, each of which is similarly highly > evolved. > > The only conscious beings we know of are biologically evolved ones, > such as ourselves. You can (I hope) understand from my postings, how > conscious awareness has evolved along with brains and the associated > sense organs, over billions of generations of continuous evolution, > from tiny creatures with minuscule awareness of light and dark, hot > and cold, and so on, to our full-blown human 'we understand > everything' awareness of reality. > > Computers are not intended to be conscious. They are designed just to > perform simple arithmetic/logical operations at high speed, and there > is no reason to expect them to be conscious. They certainly haven't > evolved any ability to be aware of and interact with the environment, > so that they can exist, any more than a teaspoon has, so why would > they be any more conscious than a teaspoon? > > You could pretend that a robot was conscious, by copying brain > patterns from a human and arranging them in the computer 'memory', and > then getting the robot to say 'I want food' whenever the memory > corresponding to 'hunger' was accessed by the computer user. You > could plug the robot into electricity until it made a programmed > 'burping' sound, and possibly turn on a small tap to let out some > smelly water at the same time, to make the effect more convincing. > But that would clearly just be an expensive toy doll. It would be > simpler to give the computer a wig made of human hair, and then talk > about the computer's behaviour compared to a human, than to bother > with computer simulation of patterns of biological neuronal activity, > and pretending that it was aware. > > The only conscious beings we know of are biologically evolved ones, > and it may well be the case that biological creatures are the only > conscious creatures that can exist. The notion of a conscious robot > is just the same ancient myth of golems and statues brought to life, > given an up-to-date gloss because of modern technology. Anyone who > imagines that computers might be conscious doesn't really understand > that computers are just complicated machines, like a car or a > television - it is almost more likely that a galaxy might be > conscious, or a forest or ocean, but to me, that is also so unlikely > that if it were true, I'd say perhaps God does exist after all. So you think we are explainable as biological mechanisms, but you don't think that robots could be conscious, only biological mechanisms is that it? Quote
Guest James Norris Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 On Jun 25, 6:08?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 25 Jun, 17:16, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > On Jun 25, 11:51 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 25 Jun, 10:05, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > On Jun 24, 10:31?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 23 Jun, 23:12, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > I think you are mixing up two issues: What is consciousness? and What > > > > > > is the difference between a computer and a brain? It also looks like > > > > > > you think that the laws of physics don't explain consciousness, but > > > > > > you don't want to say yes or no about that? > > > > > > That the laws of physics could never explain consciousness is a > > > > > seperate issue. Even if, for arguments sake, the brain was just a > > > > > biological mechanism that explained the behaviour of the human, there > > > > > could be no explanation to why the experience wasn't simply of > > > > > fluctuations of the colour green for example, the brightness being > > > > > dependent on the amount of neurons firing. Anyway, as it is a seperate > > > > > issue, can we leave it for now, and not get distracted. > > > > > > Do you understand the following reasoning: > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > If you answer my question (do you think the laws of physics can > > > > explain consciousness), I will look at your logic, and tell you what I > > > > think of it. > > > > No the laws of physics can't explain consciousness. They could never > > > explain why anything physical should consciously/subjectively > > > experience. > > > I disagree with you. The 'laws of physics' do explain > > consciousness. Conscious awareness of reality is an evolved feature > > of some biological organisms. Evolution occurs because of ordinary > > physical processes. > > > > You must understand that on a computer for example, which received > > > signals of 1's and 0's and performed functions on the signals > > > according to its design, that it wouldn't matter what the signals > > > represented. It could be encoded military data, or a bit map, or mpeg. > > > It doesn't affect the way the machine processes it. What we as > > > spiritual beings experience, is what the neural state represents, but > > > nothing in your story would know what it represents. We don't just > > > experience fluctuations in the colour green for example, the > > > brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing (which would > > > require no knowledge of what the information represented). > > > Yes, I agree with that (though it is a struggle to understand what you > > are getting at in your writings - almost every sentence is badly > > ungrammatical or ambiguous). A computer could have a 'copy' of the > > pattern of active neurons in a brain which correspond to an experience > > of smell, but it would not experience the pattern as smell. But, as I > > wrote earlier, it is quite possible that if you copied the pattern > > into another living brain, that brain would have a similar subjective > > experience to the first brain. > > > > If atheists are to claim that a robot might be having conscious/ > > > subjective experiences, as why should it only be meat machines, then > > > consider the following: > > > > Consider 72 information channels, representing nerve signals. > > > > t1 and t2 represent the information (from the 72 channels) at > > > different times. > > > > t1:011111110010000010010101010010000010001111100010000010010000010100000001 > > > t2:011111110010000010010101010010000010001111100001001000001001000000110000 > > > > Now supposing the information was from the optic nerve, and the > > > spacial configuration was such that the information could be viewed > > > as: > > > > t1: > > > 011111110 > > > 010000010 > > > 010101010 > > > 010000010 > > > 001111100 > > > 010000010 > > > 010000010 > > > 100000001 > > > > t2: > > > 011111110 > > > 010000010 > > > 010101010 > > > 010000010 > > > 001111100 > > > 001001000 > > > 001001000 > > > 000110000 > > > > such that it could be viewed as a "space invader" from the arcade game > > > (if you are familiar with it). What would they be saying caused this > > > information to be subjectively/consciously experienced as visual > > > information? The positioning of it in the brain, or would they claim > > > that what it represented would automatically be known? > > > > If they go for spatial positioning, then in the robot, as the spatial > > > positioning would be different, the implication would be that it > > > wouldn't have the subjective/conscious visual experience. > > > > If they go for the representation being automatically known, then what > > > if the information had come through 72 channels represented a 'space > > > invader' impression being made on an arm. The information contains no > > > knowledge of what it represents. If nerves were cut, and nerves from > > > the arm connected to the optic nerve, would they be claiming that a > > > subjective/conscious experience of touch would still be experienced, > > > as it would automatically be known what the information represented? > > > If not, then they are back to the spacial positioning. > > > > So with regards to the robot (as this is a neutral topic, and doesn't > > > mention whether we ourselves are simply meat machines, or whether we > > > are spiritual beings being presented with the physical world, and > > > whose 'will' is a communication back, and influnces the human we > > > experience being), how would the atheists be claiming that it had > > > subjective/conscious experiences of what the 1's and 0's represented? > > > It seems to me from all that lot that you don't understand what > > consciousness is, so it is not surprising that you have a problem > > working out why a mechanical robot is not conscious, but a human 'meat > > machine' is conscious. > > > Take the awareness of hunger, as a simple example. 'Feeling hungry' > > is a subjective experience: you can't experience someone else's > > hunger for them, so how do you know it exists? How would your robot > > ever feel hungry - and how would you know if it did? > > > Undeneath it all, the occurrence in nature of low-blood sugar levels > > in an organism to make it move about and ingest material from the > > surroundings, is little more than a chemical process. Low level > > organisms that don't have brains are not aware of their surroundings, > > and are not conscious, but they still eat. A biological organism > > dies if it doesn't eat, and, in conscious animals, nature has evolved > > the ability to feel hunger, together with the ability to find food in > > the environment. When an animal's blood sugar levels are too low, a > > pattern of neurons forms in its brain which indicate to the animal > > that it is hungry, and should eat. The experience of hunger occurs in > > the brain, not the stomach - if we didn't have a brain, we wouldn't > > feel hungry; brains evolved solely so that they can experience > > hunger, and fill its stomach to correct it. If the awareness of > > hunger hadn't evolved, the species would not survive, because the > > animal wouldn't eat. Conscious evolved animals would not exist if > > they didn't feel hungry sometimes; low sugar-levels cause a brain > > pattern corresponding to hunger, and that is all that consciousness > > (of hunger) is. The awareness has evolved because it is directly > > related to reality, and that awareness of reality is what we call > > consciousness. > > > The more aware of hunger, and what to do about it, the species > > becomes, the better the species survives, and that causes evolution to > > maximise awareness of reality (consciousness) - animals which are less > > conscious just die out, because they can't compete with the animals > > that understand their surroundings. Our own awareness is very highly- > > evolved and we tend to think of it as particularly special, but from > > nature's point of view, consciousness is no more special than a > > giraffe's neck or a toenail, each of which is similarly highly > > evolved. > > > The only conscious beings we know of are biologically evolved ones, > > such as ourselves. You can (I hope) understand from my postings, how > > conscious awareness has evolved along with brains and the associated > > sense organs, over billions of generations of continuous evolution, > > from tiny creatures with minuscule awareness of light and dark, hot > > and cold, and so on, to our full-blown human 'we understand > > everything' awareness of reality. > > > Computers are not intended to be conscious. They are designed just to > > perform simple arithmetic/logical operations at high speed, and there > > is no reason to expect them to be conscious. They certainly haven't > > evolved any ability to be aware of and interact with the environment, > > so that they can exist, any more than a teaspoon has, so why would > > they be any more conscious than a teaspoon? > > > You could pretend that a robot was conscious, by copying brain > > patterns from a human and arranging them in the computer 'memory', and > > then getting the robot to say 'I want food' whenever the memory > > corresponding to 'hunger' was accessed by the computer user. You > > could plug the robot into electricity until it made a programmed > > 'burping' sound, and possibly turn on a small tap to let out some > > smelly water at the same time, to make the effect more convincing. > > But that would clearly just be an expensive toy doll. It would be > > simpler to give the computer a wig made of human hair, and then talk > > about the computer's behaviour compared to a human, than to bother > > with computer simulation of patterns of biological neuronal activity, > > and pretending that it was aware. > > > The only conscious beings we know of are biologically evolved ones, > > and it may well be the case that biological creatures are the only > > conscious creatures that can exist. The notion of a conscious robot > > is just the same ancient myth of golems and statues brought to life, > > given an up-to-date gloss because of modern technology. Anyone who > > imagines that computers might be conscious doesn't really understand > > that computers are just complicated machines, like a car or a > > television - it is almost more likely that a galaxy might be > > conscious, or a forest or ocean, but to me, that is also so unlikely > > that if it were true, I'd say perhaps God does exist after all. > > So you think we are explainable as biological mechanisms, but you > don't think that robots could be conscious, only biological mechanisms > is that it? Yes, you've almost understood what I was explaining. Biological organisms such as ourselves have evolved a very high level of awareness of our surroundings, because we interact biologically with it in order to exist. Robots (mechanical computer-controlled devices) are no more aware of their surroundings than a washing machine. Surgeons can construct a conscious being from functioning parts of other biological animals - head transplants of decapitated chimps were performed successfully as early as the 1960s, for example. But I'm not saying that only biological material can be conscious - clouds of chemicals containing electrical energy might be conscious on a planet such as Jupiter, for example. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 On 25 Jun, 18:38, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > On Jun 25, 6:08?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > On 25 Jun, 17:16, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > On Jun 25, 11:51 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 25 Jun, 10:05, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > On Jun 24, 10:31?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 23 Jun, 23:12, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > I think you are mixing up two issues: What is consciousness? and What > > > > > > > is the difference between a computer and a brain? It also looks like > > > > > > > you think that the laws of physics don't explain consciousness, but > > > > > > > you don't want to say yes or no about that? > > > > > > > That the laws of physics could never explain consciousness is a > > > > > > seperate issue. Even if, for arguments sake, the brain was just a > > > > > > biological mechanism that explained the behaviour of the human, there > > > > > > could be no explanation to why the experience wasn't simply of > > > > > > fluctuations of the colour green for example, the brightness being > > > > > > dependent on the amount of neurons firing. Anyway, as it is a seperate > > > > > > issue, can we leave it for now, and not get distracted. > > > > > > > Do you understand the following reasoning: > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > > If you answer my question (do you think the laws of physics can > > > > > explain consciousness), I will look at your logic, and tell you what I > > > > > think of it. > > > > > No the laws of physics can't explain consciousness. They could never > > > > explain why anything physical should consciously/subjectively > > > > experience. > > > > I disagree with you. The 'laws of physics' do explain > > > consciousness. Conscious awareness of reality is an evolved feature > > > of some biological organisms. Evolution occurs because of ordinary > > > physical processes. > > > > > You must understand that on a computer for example, which received > > > > signals of 1's and 0's and performed functions on the signals > > > > according to its design, that it wouldn't matter what the signals > > > > represented. It could be encoded military data, or a bit map, or mpeg. > > > > It doesn't affect the way the machine processes it. What we as > > > > spiritual beings experience, is what the neural state represents, but > > > > nothing in your story would know what it represents. We don't just > > > > experience fluctuations in the colour green for example, the > > > > brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing (which would > > > > require no knowledge of what the information represented). > > > > Yes, I agree with that (though it is a struggle to understand what you > > > are getting at in your writings - almost every sentence is badly > > > ungrammatical or ambiguous). A computer could have a 'copy' of the > > > pattern of active neurons in a brain which correspond to an experience > > > of smell, but it would not experience the pattern as smell. But, as I > > > wrote earlier, it is quite possible that if you copied the pattern > > > into another living brain, that brain would have a similar subjective > > > experience to the first brain. > > > > > If atheists are to claim that a robot might be having conscious/ > > > > subjective experiences, as why should it only be meat machines, then > > > > consider the following: > > > > > Consider 72 information channels, representing nerve signals. > > > > > t1 and t2 represent the information (from the 72 channels) at > > > > different times. > > > > > t1:011111110010000010010101010010000010001111100010000010010000010100000001 > > > > t2:011111110010000010010101010010000010001111100001001000001001000000110000 > > > > > Now supposing the information was from the optic nerve, and the > > > > spacial configuration was such that the information could be viewed > > > > as: > > > > > t1: > > > > 011111110 > > > > 010000010 > > > > 010101010 > > > > 010000010 > > > > 001111100 > > > > 010000010 > > > > 010000010 > > > > 100000001 > > > > > t2: > > > > 011111110 > > > > 010000010 > > > > 010101010 > > > > 010000010 > > > > 001111100 > > > > 001001000 > > > > 001001000 > > > > 000110000 > > > > > such that it could be viewed as a "space invader" from the arcade game > > > > (if you are familiar with it). What would they be saying caused this > > > > information to be subjectively/consciously experienced as visual > > > > information? The positioning of it in the brain, or would they claim > > > > that what it represented would automatically be known? > > > > > If they go for spatial positioning, then in the robot, as the spatial > > > > positioning would be different, the implication would be that it > > > > wouldn't have the subjective/conscious visual experience. > > > > > If they go for the representation being automatically known, then what > > > > if the information had come through 72 channels represented a 'space > > > > invader' impression being made on an arm. The information contains no > > > > knowledge of what it represents. If nerves were cut, and nerves from > > > > the arm connected to the optic nerve, would they be claiming that a > > > > subjective/conscious experience of touch would still be experienced, > > > > as it would automatically be known what the information represented? > > > > If not, then they are back to the spacial positioning. > > > > > So with regards to the robot (as this is a neutral topic, and doesn't > > > > mention whether we ourselves are simply meat machines, or whether we > > > > are spiritual beings being presented with the physical world, and > > > > whose 'will' is a communication back, and influnces the human we > > > > experience being), how would the atheists be claiming that it had > > > > subjective/conscious experiences of what the 1's and 0's represented? > > > > It seems to me from all that lot that you don't understand what > > > consciousness is, so it is not surprising that you have a problem > > > working out why a mechanical robot is not conscious, but a human 'meat > > > machine' is conscious. > > > > Take the awareness of hunger, as a simple example. 'Feeling hungry' > > > is a subjective experience: you can't experience someone else's > > > hunger for them, so how do you know it exists? How would your robot > > > ever feel hungry - and how would you know if it did? > > > > Undeneath it all, the occurrence in nature of low-blood sugar levels > > > in an organism to make it move about and ingest material from the > > > surroundings, is little more than a chemical process. Low level > > > organisms that don't have brains are not aware of their surroundings, > > > and are not conscious, but they still eat. A biological organism > > > dies if it doesn't eat, and, in conscious animals, nature has evolved > > > the ability to feel hunger, together with the ability to find food in > > > the environment. When an animal's blood sugar levels are too low, a > > > pattern of neurons forms in its brain which indicate to the animal > > > that it is hungry, and should eat. The experience of hunger occurs in > > > the brain, not the stomach - if we didn't have a brain, we wouldn't > > > feel hungry; brains evolved solely so that they can experience > > > hunger, and fill its stomach to correct it. If the awareness of > > > hunger hadn't evolved, the species would not survive, because the > > > animal wouldn't eat. Conscious evolved animals would not exist if > > > they didn't feel hungry sometimes; low sugar-levels cause a brain > > > pattern corresponding to hunger, and that is all that consciousness > > > (of hunger) is. The awareness has evolved because it is directly > > > related to reality, and that awareness of reality is what we call > > > consciousness. > > > > The more aware of hunger, and what to do about it, the species > > > becomes, the better the species survives, and that causes evolution to > > > maximise awareness of reality (consciousness) - animals which are less > > > conscious just die out, because they can't compete with the animals > > > that understand their surroundings. Our own awareness is very highly- > > > evolved and we tend to think of it as particularly special, but from > > > nature's point of view, consciousness is no more special than a > > > giraffe's neck or a toenail, each of which is similarly highly > > > evolved. > > > > The only conscious beings we know of are biologically evolved ones, > > > such as ourselves. You can (I hope) understand from my postings, how > > > conscious awareness has evolved along with brains and the associated > > > sense organs, over billions of generations of continuous evolution, > > > from tiny creatures with minuscule awareness of light and dark, hot > > > and cold, and so on, to our full-blown human 'we understand > > > everything' awareness of reality. > > > > Computers are not intended to be conscious. They are designed just to > > > perform simple arithmetic/logical operations at high speed, and there > > > is no reason to expect them to be conscious. They certainly haven't > > > evolved any ability to be aware of and interact with the environment, > > > so that they can exist, any more than a teaspoon has, so why would > > > they be any more conscious than a teaspoon? > > > > You could pretend that a robot was conscious, by copying brain > > > patterns from a human and arranging them in the computer 'memory', and > > > then getting the robot to say 'I want food' whenever the memory > > > corresponding to 'hunger' was accessed by the computer user. You > > > could plug the robot into electricity until it made a programmed > > > 'burping' sound, and possibly turn on a small tap to let out some > > > smelly water at the same time, to make the effect more convincing. > > > But that would clearly just be an expensive toy doll. It would be > > > simpler to give the computer a wig made of human hair, and then talk > > > about the computer's behaviour compared to a human, than to bother > > > with computer simulation of patterns of biological neuronal activity, > > > and pretending that it was aware. > > > > The only conscious beings we know of are biologically evolved ones, > > > and it may well be the case that biological creatures are the only > > > conscious creatures that can exist. The notion of a conscious robot > > > is just the same ancient myth of golems and statues brought to life, > > > given an up-to-date gloss because of modern technology. Anyone who > > > imagines that computers might be conscious doesn't really understand > > > that computers are just complicated machines, like a car or a > > > television - it is almost more likely that a galaxy might be > > > conscious, or a forest or ocean, but to me, that is also so unlikely > > > that if it were true, I'd say perhaps God does exist after all. > > > So you think we are explainable as biological mechanisms, but you > > don't think that robots could be conscious, only biological mechanisms > > is that it? > > Yes, you've almost understood what I was explaining. Biological > organisms such as ourselves have evolved a very high level of > awareness of our surroundings, because we interact biologically with > it in order to exist. Robots (mechanical computer-controlled devices) > are no more aware of their surroundings than a washing machine. > > Surgeons can construct a conscious being from functioning parts of > other biological animals - head transplants of decapitated chimps were > performed successfully as early as the 1960s, for example. But I'm > not saying that only biological material can be conscious - clouds of > chemicals containing electrical energy might be conscious on a planet > such as Jupiter, for example. So if conceptually the biological mechanism was emulated with a different underlying (say an artificial neural network), it would behave the same but the biological one would be conscious, but the emulated one wouldn't be? Or would they both be? Quote
Guest James Norris Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 On Jun 25, 6:48?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 25 Jun, 18:38, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > On Jun 25, 6:08?pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > On 25 Jun, 17:16, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > On Jun 25, 11:51 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 25 Jun, 10:05, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > On Jun 24, 10:31?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > No the laws of physics can't explain consciousness. They could never > > > > > explain why anything physical should consciously/subjectively > > > > > experience. > > > > > I disagree with you. The 'laws of physics' do explain > > > > consciousness. Conscious awareness of reality is an evolved feature > > > > of some biological organisms. Evolution occurs because of ordinary > > > > physical processes. > > [...] > > > > > It seems to me from all that lot that you don't understand what > > > > consciousness is, so it is not surprising that you have a problem > > > > working out why a mechanical robot is not conscious, but a human 'meat > > > > machine' is conscious. > > > > > Take the awareness of hunger, as a simple example. 'Feeling hungry' > > > > is a subjective experience: you can't experience someone else's > > > > hunger for them, so how do you know it exists? How would your robot > > > > ever feel hungry - and how would you know if it did? > > > > > Undeneath it all, the occurrence in nature of low-blood sugar levels > > > > in an organism to make it move about and ingest material from the > > > > surroundings, is little more than a chemical process. Low level > > > > organisms that don't have brains are not aware of their surroundings, > > > > and are not conscious, but they still eat. A biological organism > > > > dies if it doesn't eat, and, in conscious animals, nature has evolved > > > > the ability to feel hunger, together with the ability to find food in > > > > the environment. When an animal's blood sugar levels are too low, a > > > > pattern of neurons forms in its brain which indicate to the animal > > > > that it is hungry, and should eat. The experience of hunger occurs in > > > > the brain, not the stomach - if we didn't have a brain, we wouldn't > > > > feel hungry; brains evolved solely so that they can experience > > > > hunger, and fill its stomach to correct it. If the awareness of > > > > hunger hadn't evolved, the species would not survive, because the > > > > animal wouldn't eat. Conscious evolved animals would not exist if > > > > they didn't feel hungry sometimes; low sugar-levels cause a brain > > > > pattern corresponding to hunger, and that is all that consciousness > > > > (of hunger) is. The awareness has evolved because it is directly > > > > related to reality, and that awareness of reality is what we call > > > > consciousness. > > > > > The more aware of hunger, and what to do about it, the species > > > > becomes, the better the species survives, and that causes evolution to > > > > maximise awareness of reality (consciousness) - animals which are less > > > > conscious just die out, because they can't compete with the animals > > > > that understand their surroundings. Our own awareness is very highly- > > > > evolved and we tend to think of it as particularly special, but from > > > > nature's point of view, consciousness is no more special than a > > > > giraffe's neck or a toenail, each of which is similarly highly > > > > evolved. > > > > > The only conscious beings we know of are biologically evolved ones, > > > > such as ourselves. You can (I hope) understand from my postings, how > > > > conscious awareness has evolved along with brains and the associated > > > > sense organs, over billions of generations of continuous evolution, > > > > from tiny creatures with minuscule awareness of light and dark, hot > > > > and cold, and so on, to our full-blown human 'we understand > > > > everything' awareness of reality. > > > > > Computers are not intended to be conscious. They are designed just to > > > > perform simple arithmetic/logical operations at high speed, and there > > > > is no reason to expect them to be conscious. They certainly haven't > > > > evolved any ability to be aware of and interact with the environment, > > > > so that they can exist, any more than a teaspoon has, so why would > > > > they be any more conscious than a teaspoon? > > > > > You could pretend that a robot was conscious, by copying brain > > > > patterns from a human and arranging them in the computer 'memory', and > > > > then getting the robot to say 'I want food' whenever the memory > > > > corresponding to 'hunger' was accessed by the computer user. You > > > > could plug the robot into electricity until it made a programmed > > > > 'burping' sound, and possibly turn on a small tap to let out some > > > > smelly water at the same time, to make the effect more convincing. > > > > But that would clearly just be an expensive toy doll. It would be > > > > simpler to give the computer a wig made of human hair, and then talk > > > > about the computer's behaviour compared to a human, than to bother > > > > with computer simulation of patterns of biological neuronal activity, > > > > and pretending that it was aware. > > > > > The only conscious beings we know of are biologically evolved ones, > > > > and it may well be the case that biological creatures are the only > > > > conscious creatures that can exist. The notion of a conscious robot > > > > is just the same ancient myth of golems and statues brought to life, > > > > given an up-to-date gloss because of modern technology. Anyone who > > > > imagines that computers might be conscious doesn't really understand > > > > that computers are just complicated machines, like a car or a > > > > television - it is almost more likely that a galaxy might be > > > > conscious, or a forest or ocean, but to me, that is also so unlikely > > > > that if it were true, I'd say perhaps God does exist after all. > > > > So you think we are explainable as biological mechanisms, but you > > > don't think that robots could be conscious, only biological mechanisms > > > is that it? > > > Yes, you've almost understood what I was explaining. Biological > > organisms such as ourselves have evolved a very high level of > > awareness of our surroundings, because we interact biologically with > > it in order to exist. Robots (mechanical computer-controlled devices) > > are no more aware of their surroundings than a washing machine. > > > Surgeons can construct a conscious being from functioning parts of > > other biological animals - head transplants of decapitated chimps were > > performed successfully as early as the 1960s, for example. But I'm > > not saying that only biological material can be conscious - clouds of > > chemicals containing electrical energy might be conscious on a planet > > such as Jupiter, for example. > > So if conceptually the biological mechanism was emulated with a > different underlying (say an artificial neural network), it would > behave the same but the biological one would be conscious, but the > emulated one wouldn't be? Or would they both be? The biological brain is by definition conscious, so you shouldn't be getting confused about that. If you 'emulate' a brain with a computer it wouldn't be conscious. Is that clear enough? If you only did a conceptual emulation, as you suggested, you would just be imagining it. But if you actually performed a computer emulation of the neuronal behaviour in a brain, all it would be doing is describing the position and state of the neurons at any particular time, like a printout of the traffic flow in a network. It wouldn't have any experiences, any more than a piece of paper with writing on it has experiences. It is just a computer running a program on some data, even though it might be running a special program called a neural network algorithm, which you seem to think important for some reason. Neural networks are just ordinary programs that have been 'taught' (the subroutine parameters have been 'tweaked') to match specific types of pattern. The idea for doing it that way came from studies of vision in mammal brains, but a neural network algorithm is no more likely to be conscious than an algorithm that decides on the spin behaviour of the drum in a washing machine. Computers aren't conscious. If you think they might be, you don't understand what consciousness is. It is a red-herring to wonder about computers as having consciousness. Perhaps they do - they presumably would be aware of what it is like to being computers? But you might as well wonder if a chair could be conscious of being a chair. Every so often, of the billions of chairs in the world, one of them perhaps has a fleeting notion of existence - the arms and legs, and constant interaction with humans, together with the minute amounts of electrostatic energy in the stuffing, might cause consciousness - how would we know if it did or didn't? Of course, the chair is most likely to have a mad notion of existence, and think its a hat or something. Perhaps humans should consider building mental hospitals for chairs, just in case? Quote
Guest Fred Stone Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 James Norris <JimNorris01@aol.com> wrote in news:1182797074.772268.53300@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com: > Computers aren't conscious. If you think they might be, you don't > understand what consciousness is. So what is consciousness then? -- Fred Stone aa# 1369 Quote
Guest Sippuddin Posted June 25, 2007 Posted June 25, 2007 Jeckyl wrote: > "Sippuddin" <sipp@macrosoft.net> wrote in message > news:_q-dnWeKNLTKaObbnZ2dnUVZ_vKunZ2d@comcast.com... >> Jeckyl wrote: >> >>> ... That a robot pushed off a cliff falls down, and a human with >>> subjective experiences pushed off a cliff also falls down, does not imply >>> that humans have no subjective experience. >> >> It's not the falling that hurts, it's the sudden impact with the ground at >> the end of the experience that does. > > Just like whales and flowers that suddenly appear from nowhere above a > planet > >> 'experience' usually means events gone through >> wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn > > eh? 'experience' usually means events gone through wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn Is there something you don't understand about this simple explanation of the term 'experience'? You go through an event, that is an experience. Get it now? > >> Are you saying that the one will have gone through destruction at the >> bottom of the cliff but the other will not?? That would be a pretty stout >> robot! >> If you just mean the experience of falling through space, then why can't >> we provide the robot with the same sort of motion-sensing equipment, >> including visual apparatus the human has so that the perceptions of both >> are equal? >> >> If not, then what's your operational definition of 'experience'? >> >> >> operational definition: a description of something in terms of how it is >> actually observed and measured. >> >> http://preview.tinyurl.com/248ept > > As usual, you have the whole question backwards > No I don't, it's you who appear to be experiencing total confusion here. 'experience' usually means events gone through wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn Take the event we were discussing, crashing into the rocks after falling off a cliff. Human or robot, it does not matter, either one can be observed having such an experience (going through such an event). It's one of the laws of the universe (gravity) in action determining the observable behavior of the subject of study, human or robot. Quote
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