Guest Fred Stone Posted June 27, 2007 Posted June 27, 2007 James Norris wrote: > On Jun 26, 6:07?pm, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote >> innews:1182830289.431036.318650@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> >> >> >> > On Jun 26, 3:54?am, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> >> James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote >> >> innews:1182812217.732849.12130@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> > On Jun 25, 11:17?pm, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> >> >> James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote >> >> >> innews:1182800402.912119.124370@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> >> > On Jun 25, 7:56?pm, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote >> >> [...] >> >> >> > I hope you can understand from my postings, what consciousness >> >> >> > is, and how conscious awareness has evolved along with brains >> >> >> > and the associated sense organs, over billions of generations of >> >> >> > continuous evolution, from tiny creatures with minuscule >> >> >> > automatic reactions to light and dark, hot and cold, and so on, >> >> >> > to our full-blown human 'we understand everything' awareness of >> >> >> > reality. You are unlikely to find a better explanation than the >> >> >> > one I have given, and if you don't understand it at first, you >> >> >> > should think about it occasionally over a period of a few weeks. >> >> >> > If you are reasonably intelligent, you will then understand >> >> >> > what consciousness is. >> >> >> >> OK, fine so far, but your explanation up to here doesn't say >> >> >> anything about why a computer cannot be conscious. >> >> >> > Computers, on the other hand, are not intended to be conscious. >> >> > They are designed just to perform simple arithmetic/logical >> >> > operations at high speed, and there is no reason to expect them to >> >> > be conscious. They certainly haven't evolved any ability to be >> >> > aware of and interact with the environment so that they can exist, >> >> > any more than a teaspoon has, so why would they be any more >> >> > conscious than a teaspoon? >> >> >> So what if computers haven't evolved? Comparing them to a teaspoon >> >> doesn't make their computational power equivalent to a teaspoon - it >> >> is equivalent to that of the neural networks that make up a brain. >> >> > You seem to think that nature evolved the brain independently of the >> > rest of the body. >> >> Where did I say anything of the sort? I see that you're going to drag >> out a whole box full of strawmen to shoot down to prove that you're such >> a great debater. Do you carry that baggage around with you just so that >> you don't have to actually debate the points that people raise when you >> pretend to "discuss" things with them? > > Don't be silly. I wrote 'you seem to think that ...', which means you > didn't actually write it, but that is what your sentence implied to > me. You could have misworded it perhaps - I was being polite. > Ah, you're in the habit of finding meanings in sentences based on what people didn't actually write? >> >> > If that were the case, there would probably not be >> > much difference between a computer neural network and a brain, as you >> > suggest. >> >> > But in fact, as you probably know deep in your subconsious mind, the >> > brain evolved to bioelectrically trigger the heart about once per >> > second so it provides blood to the brain and the rest of a biological >> > organism such as yourself. >> >> The brain evolved by doing a lot more than triggering the heartbeat. >> >> > From nature's perspective, the brain is >> > less important than the penis and vagina. The Chinese Room and Turing >> > test immediately fail if you try to mate with the computer. If you >> > can't tell the difference between a computer and a person, you are >> > similar to a zebra that thinks it's a horse. >> >> I'm beginning to wonder if you could pass the Turing Test yourself, >> Norris. > > Well I can't tell the difference between you and a computer, that's > for sure. I'm glad we are on the same wavelength about the obvious > and unsubtle artificiality of most of the postings to Usenet > newsgreoups. > >> >> > From nature's point of >> > view, zebra and horse are different species and cannot procreate, in >> > the same way that a computer and a human cannot produce offspring. >> >> What an amazing non sequituur. I haven't suggested that computers >> evolved, and certainly not by sexual reproduction. >> >> > Evolution depends on the sexual transmission of genetic >> > characteristics via the DNA molecule (and even the Catholic Pope >> > agrees that Darwinism is 'more than a hypothesis'). It is possible >> > that conscious awareness of reality is less important, as a Darwinian >> > survival trait, than the solidity of an organism's cilia. So for >> > example. after a few thousand generations of human evolution from >> > today, humans awareness of reality might have been discarded by >> > nature, to be replaced by humans who mate with each other based only >> > on their hairstyles, and their ability to make conscious decisions >> > about reality would be irrelevant. >> >> Well, I can imagine that you'll have managed to hallucinate yourself to >> be the "winner" of this debate and I won't have to bother to respond. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The notion of a >> >> > conscious robot is just the same ancient myth of golems and statues >> >> > brought to life, given an up-to-date gloss because of modern >> >> > technology. Anyone who imagines that computers might be conscious >> >> > doesn't really understand consciousness, or that computers are just >> >> > complicated machines, like a car or a television - it is almost >> >> > more likely that a galaxy might be conscious, or a forest or ocean, >> >> > but to me, that is also so unlikely that if it turned out to be >> >> > true, I'd consider changing my religious beliefs and start thinking >> >> > that perhaps God does exist after all. >> >> >> Ah, touch up your blatant assertion with a little arrogant well- >> >> poisoning about how anybody who disagrees with your arrogant >> >> presumptions just doesn't understand consciousness and you've got >> >> yourself >> >> >>> a foolproof proof. Except that we're not fools. >> >> > It is very easy for me to accept that we are not fools. I accept >> > (that is, I understand because of the evidence) that I am not a fool. >> >> That statement could only be made by a fool like you, James. >> >> > 'We' are not both fools because I am not a fool. You might or might >> > not be a fool - as I only have a few paragraphs of your writings to >> > make the decision on, I wouldn't immediately say 'you are a fool', >> > because you might just be pretending to be a fool. >> >> > "Fools rush in where angels fear to tread" >> > A. Pope >> >> -- >> Fred Stone > > What a boring 'person' you are. What stirred your boring brain to get > out of its boring box and boringly write the rather dull and banal > insults that you boringly posted with your boring and predictable > phrasing and your boring boring boring ... Oh dear, James is bored with being denied the opportunity to impress us mere mortals with his superior intellect. -- Fred Stone aa# 1369 "Five years ago, Middle Eastern extremists were killing Israelis and Americans. Today they are killing each other. Why is it that some people persist in claiming that Israel's and America's Middle East policy is a failure?" -- Alan Chamberlain" Quote
Guest James Norris Posted June 27, 2007 Posted June 27, 2007 > >> > On Jun 26, 3:54?am, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: > >> >> James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote > >> >> innews:1182812217.732849.12130@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com: > > >> >> > On Jun 25, 11:17?pm, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: > >> >> >> James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote > >> >> >> innews:1182800402.912119.124370@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com: > > >> >> >> > On Jun 25, 7:56?pm, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote > >> >> [...] > >> >> >> > I hope you can understand from my postings, what consciousness > >> >> >> > is, and how conscious awareness has evolved along with brains > >> >> >> > and the associated sense organs, over billions of generations of > >> >> >> > continuous evolution, from tiny creatures with minuscule > >> >> >> > automatic reactions to light and dark, hot and cold, and so on, > >> >> >> > to our full-blown human 'we understand everything' awareness of > >> >> >> > reality. You are unlikely to find a better explanation than the > >> >> >> > one I have given, and if you don't understand it at first, you > >> >> >> > should think about it occasionally over a period of a few weeks. > >> >> >> > If you are reasonably intelligent, you will then understand > >> >> >> > what consciousness is. > > >> >> >> OK, fine so far, but your explanation up to here doesn't say > >> >> >> anything about why a computer cannot be conscious. > > >> >> > Computers, on the other hand, are not intended to be conscious. > >> >> > They are designed just to perform simple arithmetic/logical > >> >> > operations at high speed, and there is no reason to expect them to > >> >> > be conscious. They certainly haven't evolved any ability to be > >> >> > aware of and interact with the environment so that they can exist, > >> >> > any more than a teaspoon has, so why would they be any more > >> >> > conscious than a teaspoon? > [...] > >> >> > The notion of a > >> >> > conscious robot is just the same ancient myth of golems and statues > >> >> > brought to life, given an up-to-date gloss because of modern > >> >> > technology. Anyone who imagines that computers might be conscious > >> >> > doesn't really understand consciousness, or that computers are just > >> >> > complicated machines, like a car or a television - it is almost > >> >> > more likely that a galaxy might be conscious, or a forest or ocean, > >> >> > but to me, that is also so unlikely that if it turned out to be > >> >> > true, I'd consider changing my religious beliefs and start thinking > >> >> > that perhaps God does exist after all. > > >> >> Ah, touch up your blatant assertion with a little arrogant well- > >> >> poisoning about how anybody who disagrees with your arrogant > >> >> presumptions just doesn't understand consciousness and you've got > >> >> yourself a foolproof proof. Except that we're not fools. > > >> > "Fools rush in where angels fear to tread" > >> > A. Pope > > Oh dear, James is bored with being denied the opportunity to impress us mere > mortals with his superior intellect. On Jun 27, 6:40 am, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > On Jun 26, 2:14?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > For the enlightenment of those alt.atheism, I present James Norris, > > and his story of why evolved mechanisms consciously experience sound, > > but man made ones wouldn't. James welcomes questions from the group. > > If I have misrepresented the feat James is about to perform, I'm sure > > he'll be the first to mention it. Over to you James. > > You and several other people have a strange notion that man-made > mechanical devices, such as computers, might be constructed so that > they would be conscious. At present, although we understand how > biological consciousness has evolved, no-one knows how to construct a > conscious device from computer components. And basically, even it was > possible, how would anyone know that the computer was conscious, or > what it was experiencing? > > How would a mechanical consciousness work? Would you just write some > software and put it in a machine and say 'Behold - it is conscious'? > How would you know it was conscious, and what would the computer be > conscious of? Its program perhaps? Can someone answer these > questions, and then we can discuss how it differs from the > consciousness of an evolved biological organism. > > Here's my effort at a constructed conscious device, it is self- > constructing and not totally man-made, but it's near enough: > Let's start off with millions of identical ordinary (non-conscious) > robots which are programmed to collect things from the environment at > random and incorporate them into themselves. Their pre-programmed > 'purpose' is to replace all their original constituent parts with > things they have picked up from the environment. Now let them free to > interact with the environment. The idea is that if you started off > with sufficient robots, some of them might, by sheer chance, > eventually manage to achieve the seemingly impossible task of building > a functioning version of themselves out of material from their > surroundings. Most of them would cease to function quite rapidly, of > course, and if they still had some parts from the original robots, we > would say that they were probably just the original non-conscious > devices with a few meaningless alterations. But if any of the robots > had completely replaced all its original parts with bits and pieces of > things from the environment (twigs, elastic bands, coffee cups, > wheels, oranges etc), and was still functioning, we could conjecture > that it might be conscious. Unfortunately, as I said before, we > wouldn't know whether or not it was conscious, we could just agree > that it might be. > > What's your idea for a conscious mechanical device? A conscious mechanical device would need a certain amount of complexity. In the device I suggested, that might be provided by using the twigs to twang the elastic bands - the vibrational properties of the twig-twanging elastic bands could easily carry any complexity necessary for the occurrence of thought. Quote
Guest pbamvv@worldonline.nl Posted June 27, 2007 Posted June 27, 2007 On 24 jun, 21:04, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 24 Jun, 19:45, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > wrote: > > > On 24 jun, 17:18, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 24 Jun, 16:07, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > wrote: > > > > > On 24 jun, 16:29, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 24 Jun, 13:29, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > On 17 jun, 02:53, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 16 Jun, 14:49, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 15 jun, 19:40, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 14 Jun, 20:50, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On 12 jun, 23:49, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On 12 Jun, 17:31, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 jun, 18:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think you understand Fred and me. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to > > > > > > > > > > > > > avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to > > > > > > > > > > > > > you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the > > > > > > > > > > > > > answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable > > > > > > > > > > > > > of doing it yourself. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I had asked: > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > Do you see that the following is always true: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > > > > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > > > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > > > > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You replied: > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it > > > > > > > > > > > > > does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead > > > > > > > > > > > > > (or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can > > > > > > > > > > > > > influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may > > > > > > > > > > > > > use the state of synapses that constitutes P. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on > > > > > > > > > > > > > it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong > > > > > > > > > > > > > balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may > > > > > > > > > > > > > even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then > > > > > > > > > > > > > black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its > > > > > > > > > > > > > bouncing. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Nevertheless its composition is. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > M = a ball > > > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) = the bouncing of the ball. > > > > > > > > > > > > > P = a property of the ball > > > > > > > > > > > > > If P = the colour, your assessment is right. > > > > > > > > > > > > > If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong. > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > > To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive > > > > > > > > > > > > > as: > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property > > > > > > > > > > > > > of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property > > > > > > > > > > > > > isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true, > > > > > > > > > > > > > and so is (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the > > > > > > > > > > > > > ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not > > > > > > > > > > > > > be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > > > > > > > > > > > > > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > > > > > > > > > > > > > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > > > > > > > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > > > > > > > > > > > > > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > > > > > > > > > > > > > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as > > > > > > > > > > > > > above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be > > > > > > > > > > > > > thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that > > > > > > > > > > > > > particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the > > > > > > > > > > > > > biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was > > > > > > > > > > > > > correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves, > > > > > > > > > > > > > which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without, > > > > > > > > > > > > > then (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is > > > > > > > > > > > > > presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world > > > > > > > > > > > > > perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit, > > > > > > > > > > > > > that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and > > > > > > > > > > > > > thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same? > > > > > > > > > > > > > You keep on assuming that subjective experiences do not have physical > > > > > > > > > > > > properties. > > > > > > > > > > > > However they do. Subjective experiences are memories (either temporary > > > > > > > > > > > > or lasting) > > > > > > > > > > > > These memories do influence our behaviour as you very well know. > > > > > > > > > > > > Although I do not know how memories are actually "stored" in cortex, > > > > > > > > > > > > we have ample proof that they are. Of course we can theoretically > > > > > > > > > > > > explain our conduct mechanically without realizing that the synapse > > > > > > > > > > > > behaviour we are describing is actually the act of "remembering" but > > > > > > > > > > > > that does not change the fact, that without the information coming > > > > > > > > > > > > from our memory our behaviour would change drastically. > > > > > > > > > > > > > In my previous example of my computer program > > > > > > > > > > > > you can explain the working by the hexadecimal machine code (a mix of > > > > > > > > > > > > numbers and the letters A,B,C,D, E and F) and totally ignore what they > > > > > > > > > > > > mean, > > > > > > > > > > > > but that does not mean that the fact that the employee is a female > > > > > > > > > > > > does not matter! > > > > > > > > > > > > > Likewise you can explain human behaviour by the chemical working of > > > > > > > > > > > > synapses, > > > > > > > > > > > > but that does not mean in doesn't matter whether I thought I saw > > > > > > > > > > > > Ashley or Kate. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Humans are actually using subjective experiences to guide their > > > > > > > > > > > > behaviour. > > > > > > > > > > > > > I started re-reading "consciousness explained" by Daniel C. Dennett, > > > > > > > > > > > > and found out his idea of consciousness goes one step further than I > > > > > > > > > > > > thought. He thinks consciousness is caused by ideas in our head, that > > > > > > > > > > > > make us think in a conscious way. Ideas that we have mostly learned > > > > > > > > > > > > from other people. > > > > > > > > > > > > I am not sure that is correct. To me everything we can theoretically > > > > > > > > > > > > remember and theoretically communicate about, is a subjective > > > > > > > > > > > > experience and is or has been part of our consciousness. > > > > > > > > > > > > But the fact that almost nobody can remember much of his/her early > > > > > > > > > > > > childhood, might mean that Dennett is right. > > > > > > > > > > > > But it would be a good thing to read to book anyway. (did you read it > > > > > > > > > > > > already?) > > > > > > > > > > > > I can understand that you have been deceived by Dennet's explanation. > > > > > > > > > > > I can show it to be a deception. > > > > > > > > > > > > Step 1. > > > > > > > > > > > > Do you understand that if there was a robot, no matter how it behaved, > > > > > > > > > > > as long as it followed the known laws of physics, and therefore its > > > > > > > > > > > behaviour could be explained to you in these terms, you wouldn't know > > > > > > > > > > > whether it actually had any subjective experiences or not. This isn't > > > > > > > > > > > about what your guess would be, it is about the truth about what you > > > > > > > > > > > know. Nor is it a statement that the robot couldn't be subjectively > > > > > > > > > > > experiencing by the way, in case you were going to disingeniously > > > > > > > > > > > suggest that it was.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > > If the Robot could make deduction from its data and its memory and > > > > > > > > > > report them, I would have to assume it had a subjective experience. > > > > > > > > > > What else is a subjective experience, but an experience that is > > > > > > > > > > "coloured" by previous acquired information? > > > > > > > > > > > The robot - for instance - could have been imprinted with the idea > > > > > > > > > > "someone is an idiot" and then, after reading your post, conclude that > > > > > > > > > > the best way to react was to answer: "You are definitely an idiot". > > > > > > > > > > > The only difference between the robot and me as far as this event is > > > > > > > > > > concerned, is that my memory contains the postulate "other people who > > > > > > > > > > post on the NG have a brain similar to mine", which causes me to > > > > > > > > > > continue trying to communicate even if the communication is very > > > > > > > > > > difficult because you an me seem to have a different opinion on what > > > > > > > > > > we think a "Subjective experience" is. > > > > > > > > > > > Interesting to see you consider yourself able to disprove a man with > > > > > > > > > > the capabilities of Daniel C Dennet! > > > > > > > > > > > The fact that I cannot even take this first step with you may show > > > > > > > > > > you, that is not such an easy thing to do. > > > > > > > > > > > Someone2's Postulate : > > > > > > > > > > We cannot tell if entity R has subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > > > > Peter van Velzen's postulate: > > > > > > > > > > If entity R can be shown to make a report on an experience that is > > > > > > > > > > influenced by previous information, this means entity R has an > > > > > > > > > > subjective experience. > > > > > > > > > > (Especially if the previous information may not be true) > > > > > > > > > > If you could get Daniel Dennet, or any other person who has encouraged > > > > > > > > > people away from God, to come onto this group, and enter a debate > > > > > > > > > (maybe you could tell him how highly you regard him or whatever, and > > > > > > > > > ask for his help, and inform him that someone is saying he reasoning > > > > > > > > > is implausible, and that he is too cowardly to enter into an open > > > > > > > > > debate on the internet, or whatever), then I will show you how silly > > > > > > > > > he is.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > > > O, he knows people think they know better than him. He might not know > > > > > > > > that someone who makes about 20 posts without getting anywhere near > > > > > > > > what the subject suggests does so. Can you please get to the point, > > > > > > > > and give us a hint as to why materialism could possible be > > > > > > > > implausible? > > > > > > > > > So far you have only started out some riddle game, and being > > > > > > > > frustrated by the fact that we do not agree to you premises, embarked > > > > > > > > on another one, finding out that one too doesn't do the trick. > > > > > > > > > I still agree with Dennett that in fact it is dualism that is > > > > > > > > implausible: > > > > > > > > How can a Ghost influence matter without being observable? > > > > > > > > How can it be invisible (not interfere with electromagnetic waves), > > > > > > > > and still see (intercept electromagnetic waves) > > > > > > > > > Or like Dennett put it: > > > > > > > > How can Casper the friendly ghost, move an object and yet pass thru > > > > > > > > it? > > > > > > > > > Materialism is the result of verificationism: If it cannot be > > > > > > > > verified, it don't mean a thing, for apparently whether it is there or > > > > > > > > not doesn't change anything or anybody. > > > > > > > > > By the way: I do not mention Dennett as an authority, I just think I > > > > > > > > owe it to him, to tell you I learned from reading his book. So far I > > > > > > > > didn't learn much from your post, except that it gave me the good Idea > > > > > > > > to read Dennett's book once more. > > > > > > > > Dennet didn't know what reality was. There is only the spiritual. You > > > > > > > are presented with the physical world. What objections does he have > > > > > > > with regards to that? Isaiah 29, vs 14:16 (http://www.biblegateway.com/ > > > > > > > passage/?search=Isaiah%2029&version=31 )stated how the people that you > > > > > > > regard 'intelligent' like Dennet would turn reality upside down with > > > > > > > physicalism. Though if you took there assumption away that we were > > > > > > > simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, why would > > > > > > > you think that anything that did follow the laws of physics had any > > > > > > > subjective experiences at all? Not to mention what would know what the > > > > > > > neural state represented in the story he pedals? It's not like we get > > > > > > > a direct experience of neural state like fluctuations in the colour > > > > > > > green, the brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing at > > > > > > > anyone time. Consider a robot, if the data was working on was > > > > > > > encrypted, would you think that the encryption would always be > > > > > > > decyphered and it would still experience what the state represented? > > > > > > > > Don't you get that teddy bears don't have subjective experiences, nor > > > > > > > do the more advanced toys we have for children now, and neither would > > > > > > > any robot no matter how complicated you made it, nor what 'special' > > > > > > > configuration its internal state was. > > > > > > > > Do you think that the technology companies should budget for when the > > > > > > > complexity or configuration of what they produce, causes it to be > > > > > > > freed from the laws of physics? > > > > > > > > If not, then can you see that all anythink they would make would do is > > > > > > > behave as it was built to behave. Is it that it would only have > > > > > > > subjective experiences if it was built to talk about them? Are you so > > > > > > > blinkered by you ego so as not to allow any reason to pierce your > > > > > > > assumptions that God doesn't exist, and that we are simply a > > > > > > > biological mechanism. How do you explain that jien...@aol.com managed > > > > > > > to understand what was being said, yet to the atheists here it was all > > > > > > > a 'word salad'? > > > > > > > > You say you haven't heard any objections to materialism, well perhaps > > > > > > > it's because you only hear what you want to hear. Like the people who > > > > > > > claimed to have seen the Emporer's New Clothes, you still don't get > > > > > > > that the deception has been seen through. It is implausible that we > > > > > > > only coincidentally have the subjective experiences that we express in > > > > > > > our behaviour, and they couldn't be influential if it was the > > > > > > > materialist/physicalist story, any more than they could influence the > > > > > > > behaviour of a robot. There is only one path it could follow, and that > > > > > > > would be the laws of physics, whether it had subjective experiences or > > > > > > > not. If you don't get this, then maybe go through the posts, I have > > > > > > > explained it more than once. If you still think you are looking > > > > > > > intelligent, believing the deceptive story you have been told then > > > > > > > think again. > > > > > > > I send this reply before but it doesn't show up in Google groups, > > > > > > therfore I post it again. (sorry again) > > > > > > > Sorry, I think it is you who do not know what reality is. If someone > > > > > > wonders whether one is dreaming, what does one do? One pinches oneself > > > > > > in the arm. Ever tried pinching yourself in the spirit ? > > > > > > > All things spiritual are prominently present within the (human) brain. > > > > > > Therefore it is save to assume, that the spiritual indeed is little > > > > > > else that the workings of the (human) brain. This brain is our only > > > > > > real advantage in life compared to other species, and therefore we > > > > > > justly regard it as the most important thing we have. However - as > > > > > > Freud stated rightly - because it is so important to us, we tend to > > > > > > overestimate the value of the spiritual. > > > > > > > Hallucinations do not occur in the physical words, neither do dreams. > > > > > > Fairies unicorns and leprechauns do not occur in the physical word, > > > > > > neither do Hobbits or Ogers. The are pure spiritual and only exist in > > > > > > the human mind. That is why people like Dennett and me, think it is > > > > > > you who are turning reality upside down. > > > > > > > We think the human brain, although always following the laws of > > > > > > physics can process the input from our senses into something that can > > > > > > be stored in our memory. The parts of our memory we can talk about are > > > > > > usually called subjective experiences. Subjective, because they are > > > > > > not merely a copy of the physical input from our senses, and not even > > > > > > of the impulses our ears, eyes, etc. have send to the inner brain, but > > > > > > indeed a composite of this input and previously stored memory. In my > > > > > > example of the Robot, the visible image of Ashley together with the > > > > > > image of Mary-Kate in the database formed the subjective experience "I > > > > > > met Mary Jan" (objectively the Robot met Ashley). The reason we decide > > > > > > that we have subjective experiences is that we can report on it (talk, > > > > > > type) and compare it with reality. > > > > > > > If the spiritual was reality there couldn't be any subjective > > > > > > experience, because we would not have anything objective to compare it > > > > > > to. Consider: If I think I see Mary Jane and this spiritual thought > > > > > > was real, If would have seen Mary-Jane. There would not be a physical > > > > > > Ashley but only a spiritual Mary-Jane.. Moreover if the spiritual was > > > > > > real, than the child would be entitled to say "My teddy bear feels > > > > > > hurt, the way you ignore its subjective experiences" and there would > > > > > > be no bases for you to contradict. > > > > > > Therefore the idea that the spiritual takes precedence over the > > > > > > physical is a dead-end street. > > > > > > > As long as Randy doesn't have to part with his one million dollar in > > > > > > bonds, there is no (legal) proof that anything is free from the laws > > > > > > of physics. Subjective experiences can tell you differently because > > > > > > they include mistakes. When they are checked for mistakes, we speak of > > > > > > objective observations. Objective observations never show anything to > > > > > > be free of the laws of physics, which is logical as the laws of > > > > > > physics are actual just spiritual entities that are derived from > > > > > > objective observations. > > > > > > > I can't explain why Jien managed to understand your "word salad". But > > > > > > actually I understood most of it. What I do completely not understand > > > > > > is why you think subjective experiences would make materialism > > > > > > implausible. From you last post I would guess that because you think > > > > > > the spiritual is more real, that because you think you are a ghost > > > > > > inside a body and you think the physical observation that all "you" > > > > > > are is a functioning human brain inside a body is illusive, you > > > > > > conclude that dualism complies better with the spiritual. Whereas I > > > > > > think the spiritual is subjective and the physical is objective, > > > > > > materialism complies better with the objective reality while dualism > > > > > > is illusive. > > > > > > > Again the emperors new cloths were completely spiritual thus not so > > > > > > real, whereas his nakedness was very physical and objectively true. > > > > > > Deception is always discovered by objective physical observations, not > > > > > > by figments of your imagination. > > > > > > > I have - again and again - explained how subjective experiences (I saw > > > > > > Mary Jane) can influence behaviour. I do not know what on earth gives > > > > > > you the idea that they can not? That is the key issue I think. > > > > > > > Materialism - as I see it - means that subjective experiences can be > > > > > > physically explained, not that they are just illusive. Anything > > > > > > illusive about them, can also be physically explained. > > > > > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > > > > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > > > > > behaviour? > > > > > > Your objections to the spiritual reality aren't reasoned. You simply > > > > > have stated what you think the spiritual reality would be like. I > > > > > don't mind going through it with you, but not for it to serve as a > > > > > distraction from the implausibility of materialism. > > > > > > Do you understand that a robot that was behaving in a way that you or > > > > > other atheists might consider "imbuing" it with subjective/conscious > > > > > experiences, could always have its behaviour explained with the > > > > > assumption that it didn't have subjective/conscoius experiences? > > > > > I think you are expressing yourself a bit inexact. > > > > The behaviour could be explained without the assumption that it had > > > > subjecive experiences > > > > (simply by going to the machine instructions without wondering what > > > > they are about) > > > > but it cannot be explained with the assumption that it had no > > > > subjective experiences. > > > > If you assume te Robot has none, than the Robot would not be able to > > > > say "I met Mary Kate" > > > > for that expression is proof of a subjective experience > > > > (experience, because the Robot indeed met someone, subjective because > > > > objectively he met Ashley) > > > > > If you replace the Robot with Robert (a human being) the same is true. > > > > Robert would then say "I met Mary Kate" and this would proof Robert > > > > had a subjective experience. > > > > > Again: > > > > > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > > > > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > > > > > behaviour? > > > > > I suspect you and me do not share the same view on "subjective > > > > experience" > > > > but you haven't made clear to me what that difference is. > > > > I think I have made very clear what the expression means to me, > > > > so I think it is your turn to enlighten > > > > I mean by subjective experiences, sensations like pleasure, or pain, > > > or visual sensations, or auditory sensations for example. > > > > Also I meant that it could be explained with the assumption that it > > > had no subjective/conscious experiences. A theist physicist for > > > example, could assume that it had no more subjective/conscious > > > experiences than a teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply > > > in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as > > > the behaviour of a mobile phone is explained. > > > Sorry > > A physisist can explain the fact that someone is crying without the > > assumption of pain? > > He can explain the fact that someone closes his eyes from to much > > sunlight > > without the assumption of being blinded? > > He can explain a dog answering his owners call without the assumption > > of hearing? > > I cannot image that is what you mean. > > > You really haven't made yourself clear this time. > > We are not talking about a human, as I don't share your assumption > that we are simply a biological mechanism strictly following the laws > of physics. > > So talking about a robot... a theist physicist for example, could > assume that it had no more subjective/conscious experiences than a > teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply in terms of the > mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as the behaviour of > a mobile phone is explained. Do you acknowledge this? As long as you do not give a definition of subjective experience that is different from mine your theory that this physisist could do so is only true as far as he ignores that the physics he is using are in fact subjective experiences. Just as one can analize the sound that a dog is hearing and its response to it without any need of the concept "the owner calls the dog". It wouldn't proof the owner didn't call it! So I acknowledge that he could but I do not acknowledge that he should. Again my example suppose the cobol tekst if R130-KMV = 1 print "do you want to go out with me" end-if would in machine language be something like D201A123B456F812C789D234D34503451456C4D540E7D5E340E5C1D4E240E2D540C7D540D5E3E240E5C9E2C840D3C5 (any expert may feel free to insert the real code:) than the physicist could explain what happened by simply refering to the machine language, but that doesn't change the fact that "the computer asks every female employee to go out with him", (which is the more elegant way to explain things) The same would be true for a subjective experience. Got it? Peter van Velzen June 2007 Amstelveen The Netherlands Quote
Guest pbamvv@worldonline.nl Posted June 28, 2007 Posted June 28, 2007 On 25 jun, 17:34, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 25 Jun, 16:30, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > wrote: > > > On 24 jun, 21:04, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 24 Jun, 19:45, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > wrote: > > > > > On 24 jun, 17:18, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 24 Jun, 16:07, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > On 24 jun, 16:29, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 24 Jun, 13:29, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 17 jun, 02:53, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 16 Jun, 14:49, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On 15 jun, 19:40, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On 14 Jun, 20:50, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 12 jun, 23:49, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 12 Jun, 17:31, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 jun, 18:42, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 Jun, 16:41, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think you understand Fred and me. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think I do, you are desperately grasping at straws in an attempt to > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > avoid what has been shown to you in reason, and when I pointed out to > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > you that your objection was unfounded you just cut the whole post. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Still I'll put it put the last bits in, and directly show how the > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > answer I gave applies to your objection, in case you weren't capable > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > of doing it yourself. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I had asked: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Do you see that the following is always true: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > M refers to the physical entity in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) refers to the behaviour of M in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > P refers to the a property in question. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Where M is the same in (1) and (2), B(M) is the same in (1) and (2), > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > and P is the same in (1) and (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 1) B(M) is explained by the laws of physics without requiring > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > knowledge of whether it has P or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 2) Presence of P or lack of, does not influence/affect B(M), else the > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > explanation of behaviour could not be the same with or without P. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If (1) is true, then (2) is true. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You replied: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Fred Stone wasn't much help, but he is right. It is not always true > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If P is a property of M, it can influence B(M), but even when it > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > does, you do not need to specify P, but use components op P instead > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > (or use terms of which P is actually a part) to explain B(M). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > A subjective experience is a property of a person Hence it can > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > influence the persons behaviour, but in stead of naming it, you may > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > use the state of synapses that constitutes P. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > To get back to the ball: It's colour may have little influence on > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > it's bouncing, but its composition and weight might. As ping-pong > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > balls are mostly white and bowling balls used to be black, one may > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > even expect that - in general - white balls will bounce higher then > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > black balls, but I agree its whiteness is not the reason for its > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > bouncing. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Nevertheless its composition is. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > M = a ball > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > B(M) = the bouncing of the ball. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > P = a property of the ball > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If P = the colour, your assessment is right. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If P = the composition of the ball your assessment is wrong. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > To which I pointed out the how the your counter argument was deceptive > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > as: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > So with the first P, while the colour can be thought of as a property > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > of the composition of the ball, knowledge of that particular property > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > isn't required to explain the bouncing of the ball, so (1) is true, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > and so is (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > With the second P, the more general property of the composition of the > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ball, will include properties which the bouncing of the ball could not > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > be explained without knowledge of, therefore (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You have chosen not to respond to this directly, but let me show you > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > how it would be the same with the synapses and the subjective > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > experiences if we were considered to simply be a biological mechanism > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If we were then like a robot, if it were known how the mechanism > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > worked, the behaviour could be explained without knowledge of whether > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > the biological mechanism had subjective experiences or not. So as > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > above, with the first P being subjective experiences which can be > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > thought of as a property of the synapses/brain, knowledge of that > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > particular property wouldnn't required to explain the behaviour of the > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > biological mechanism (if the assertion that is what we were was > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > correct) so (1) would be true, and so would (2). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If the property was the more general property of synapses themselves, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > which include properties the behaviour could not be explained without, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > then (1) would not be true. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You seem to have a problem facing a reasoned truth when it is > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > presented to you, is this because it shows your whole world > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > perspective to be an implausible story, and you would have to admit, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > that not only did you claim to have seen and understood it, and > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > thought it was reasonable, you also encouraged others to do the same? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You keep on assuming that subjective experiences do not have physical > > > > > > > > > > > > > > properties. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > However they do. Subjective experiences are memories (either temporary > > > > > > > > > > > > > > or lasting) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > These memories do influence our behaviour as you very well know. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Although I do not know how memories are actually "stored" in cortex, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > we have ample proof that they are. Of course we can theoretically > > > > > > > > > > > > > > explain our conduct mechanically without realizing that the synapse > > > > > > > > > > > > > > behaviour we are describing is actually the act of "remembering" but > > > > > > > > > > > > > > that does not change the fact, that without the information coming > > > > > > > > > > > > > > from our memory our behaviour would change drastically. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > In my previous example of my computer program > > > > > > > > > > > > > > you can explain the working by the hexadecimal machine code (a mix of > > > > > > > > > > > > > > numbers and the letters A,B,C,D, E and F) and totally ignore what they > > > > > > > > > > > > > > mean, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > but that does not mean that the fact that the employee is a female > > > > > > > > > > > > > > does not matter! > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Likewise you can explain human behaviour by the chemical working of > > > > > > > > > > > > > > synapses, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > but that does not mean in doesn't matter whether I thought I saw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Ashley or Kate. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Humans are actually using subjective experiences to guide their > > > > > > > > > > > > > > behaviour. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I started re-reading "consciousness explained" by Daniel C. Dennett, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > and found out his idea of consciousness goes one step further than I > > > > > > > > > > > > > > thought. He thinks consciousness is caused by ideas in our head, that > > > > > > > > > > > > > > make us think in a conscious way. Ideas that we have mostly learned > > > > > > > > > > > > > > from other people. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I am not sure that is correct. To me everything we can theoretically > > > > > > > > > > > > > > remember and theoretically communicate about, is a subjective > > > > > > > > > > > > > > experience and is or has been part of our consciousness. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > But the fact that almost nobody can remember much of his/her early > > > > > > > > > > > > > > childhood, might mean that Dennett is right. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > But it would be a good thing to read to book anyway. (did you read it > > > > > > > > > > > > > > already?) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I can understand that you have been deceived by Dennet's explanation. > > > > > > > > > > > > > I can show it to be a deception. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Step 1. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Do you understand that if there was a robot, no matter how it behaved, > > > > > > > > > > > > > as long as it followed the known laws of physics, and therefore its > > > > > > > > > > > > > behaviour could be explained to you in these terms, you wouldn't know > > > > > > > > > > > > > whether it actually had any subjective experiences or not. This isn't > > > > > > > > > > > > > about what your guess would be, it is about the truth about what you > > > > > > > > > > > > > know. Nor is it a statement that the robot couldn't be subjectively > > > > > > > > > > > > > experiencing by the way, in case you were going to disingeniously > > > > > > > > > > > > > suggest that it was.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > > > > If the Robot could make deduction from its data and its memory and > > > > > > > > > > > > report them, I would have to assume it had a subjective experience. > > > > > > > > > > > > What else is a subjective experience, but an experience that is > > > > > > > > > > > > "coloured" by previous acquired information? > > > > > > > > > > > > > The robot - for instance - could have been imprinted with the idea > > > > > > > > > > > > "someone is an idiot" and then, after reading your post, conclude that > > > > > > > > > > > > the best way to react was to answer: "You are definitely an idiot". > > > > > > > > > > > > > The only difference between the robot and me as far as this event is > > > > > > > > > > > > concerned, is that my memory contains the postulate "other people who > > > > > > > > > > > > post on the NG have a brain similar to mine", which causes me to > > > > > > > > > > > > continue trying to communicate even if the communication is very > > > > > > > > > > > > difficult because you an me seem to have a different opinion on what > > > > > > > > > > > > we think a "Subjective experience" is. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Interesting to see you consider yourself able to disprove a man with > > > > > > > > > > > > the capabilities of Daniel C Dennet! > > > > > > > > > > > > > The fact that I cannot even take this first step with you may show > > > > > > > > > > > > you, that is not such an easy thing to do. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Someone2's Postulate : > > > > > > > > > > > > We cannot tell if entity R has subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Peter van Velzen's postulate: > > > > > > > > > > > > If entity R can be shown to make a report on an experience that is > > > > > > > > > > > > influenced by previous information, this means entity R has an > > > > > > > > > > > > subjective experience. > > > > > > > > > > > > (Especially if the previous information may not be true) > > > > > > > > > > > > If you could get Daniel Dennet, or any other person who has encouraged > > > > > > > > > > > people away from God, to come onto this group, and enter a debate > > > > > > > > > > > (maybe you could tell him how highly you regard him or whatever, and > > > > > > > > > > > ask for his help, and inform him that someone is saying he reasoning > > > > > > > > > > > is implausible, and that he is too cowardly to enter into an open > > > > > > > > > > > debate on the internet, or whatever), then I will show you how silly > > > > > > > > > > > he is.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > > O, he knows people think they know better than him. He might not know > > > > > > > > > > that someone who makes about 20 posts without getting anywhere near > > > > > > > > > > what the subject suggests does so. Can you please get to the point, > > > > > > > > > > and give us a hint as to why materialism could possible be > > > > > > > > > > implausible? > > > > > > > > > > > So far you have only started out some riddle game, and being > > > > > > > > > > frustrated by the fact that we do not agree to you premises, embarked > > > > > > > > > > on another one, finding out that one too doesn't do the trick. > > > > > > > > > > > I still agree with Dennett that in fact it is dualism that is > > > > > > > > > > implausible: > > > > > > > > > > How can a Ghost influence matter without being observable? > > > > > > > > > > How can it be invisible (not interfere with electromagnetic waves), > > > > > > > > > > and still see (intercept electromagnetic waves) > > > > > > > > > > > Or like Dennett put it: > > > > > > > > > > How can Casper the friendly ghost, move an object and yet pass thru > > > > > > > > > > it? > > > > > > > > > > > Materialism is the result of verificationism: If it cannot be > > > > > > > > > > verified, it don't mean a thing, for apparently whether it is there or > > > > > > > > > > not doesn't change anything or anybody. > > > > > > > > > > > By the way: I do not mention Dennett as an authority, I just think I > > > > > > > > > > owe it to him, to tell you I learned from reading his book. So far I > > > > > > > > > > didn't learn much from your post, except that it gave me the good Idea > > > > > > > > > > to read Dennett's book once more. > > > > > > > > > > Dennet didn't know what reality was. There is only the spiritual. You > > > > > > > > > are presented with the physical world. What objections does he have > > > > > > > > > with regards to that? Isaiah 29, vs 14:16 (http://www.biblegateway.com/ > > > > > > > > > passage/?search=Isaiah%2029&version=31 )stated how the people that you > > > > > > > > > regard 'intelligent' like Dennet would turn reality upside down with > > > > > > > > > physicalism. Though if you took there assumption away that we were > > > > > > > > > simply a biological mechanism following the laws of physics, why would > > > > > > > > > you think that anything that did follow the laws of physics had any > > > > > > > > > subjective experiences at all? Not to mention what would know what the > > > > > > > > > neural state represented in the story he pedals? It's not like we get > > > > > > > > > a direct experience of neural state like fluctuations in the colour > > > > > > > > > green, the brightness dependent on the amount of neurons firing at > > > > > > > > > anyone time. Consider a robot, if the data was working on was > > > > > > > > > encrypted, would you think that the encryption would always be > > > > > > > > > decyphered and it would still experience what the state represented? > > > > > > > > > > Don't you get that teddy bears don't have subjective experiences, nor > > > > > > > > > do the more advanced toys we have for children now, and neither would > > > > > > > > > any robot no matter how complicated you made it, nor what 'special' > > > > > > > > > configuration its internal state was. > > > > > > > > > > Do you think that the technology companies should budget for when the > > > > > > > > > complexity or configuration of what they produce, causes it to be > > > > > > > > > freed from the laws of physics? > > > > > > > > > > If not, then can you see that all anythink they would make would do is > > > > > > > > > behave as it was built to behave. Is it that it would only have > > > > > > > > > subjective experiences if it was built to talk about them? Are you so > > > > > > > > > blinkered by you ego so as not to allow any reason to pierce your > > > > > > > > > assumptions that God doesn't exist, and that we are simply a > > > > > > > > > biological mechanism. How do you explain that jien...@aol.com managed > > > > > > > > > to understand what was being said, yet to the atheists here it was all > > > > > > > > > a 'word salad'? > > > > > > > > > > You say you haven't heard any objections to materialism, well perhaps > > > > > > > > > it's because you only hear what you want to hear. Like the people who > > > > > > > > > claimed to have seen the Emporer's New Clothes, you still don't get > > > > > > > > > that the deception has been seen through. It is implausible that we > > > > > > > > > only coincidentally have the subjective experiences that we express in > > > > > > > > > our behaviour, and they couldn't be influential if it was the > > > > > > > > > materialist/physicalist story, any more than they could influence the > > > > > > > > > behaviour of a robot. There is only one path it could follow, and that > > > > > > > > > would be the laws of physics, whether it had subjective experiences or > > > > > > > > > not. If you don't get this, then maybe go through the posts, I have > > > > > > > > > explained it more than once. If you still think you are looking > > > > > > > > > intelligent, believing the deceptive story you have been told then > > > > > > > > > think again. > > > > > > > > > I send this reply before but it doesn't show up in Google groups, > > > > > > > > therfore I post it again. (sorry again) > > > > > > > > > Sorry, I think it is you who do not know what reality is. If someone > > > > > > > > wonders whether one is dreaming, what does one do? One pinches oneself > > > > > > > > in the arm. Ever tried pinching yourself in the spirit ? > > > > > > > > > All things spiritual are prominently present within the (human) brain. > > > > > > > > Therefore it is save to assume, that the spiritual indeed is little > > > > > > > > else that the workings of the (human) brain. This brain is our only > > > > > > > > real advantage in life compared to other species, and therefore we > > > > > > > > justly regard it as the most important thing we have. However - as > > > > > > > > Freud stated rightly - because it is so important to us, we tend to > > > > > > > > overestimate the value of the spiritual. > > > > > > > > > Hallucinations do not occur in the physical words, neither do dreams. > > > > > > > > Fairies unicorns and leprechauns do not occur in the physical word, > > > > > > > > neither do Hobbits or Ogers. The are pure spiritual and only exist in > > > > > > > > the human mind. That is why people like Dennett and me, think it is > > > > > > > > you who are turning reality upside down. > > > > > > > > > We think the human brain, although always following the laws of > > > > > > > > physics can process the input from our senses into something that can > > > > > > > > be stored in our memory. The parts of our memory we can talk about are > > > > > > > > usually called subjective experiences. Subjective, because they are > > > > > > > > not merely a copy of the physical input from our senses, and not even > > > > > > > > of the impulses our ears, eyes, etc. have send to the inner brain, but > > > > > > > > indeed a composite of this input and previously stored memory. In my > > > > > > > > example of the Robot, the visible image of Ashley together with the > > > > > > > > image of Mary-Kate in the database formed the subjective experience "I > > > > > > > > met Mary Jan" (objectively the Robot met Ashley). The reason we decide > > > > > > > > that we have subjective experiences is that we can report on it (talk, > > > > > > > > type) and compare it with reality. > > > > > > > > > If the spiritual was reality there couldn't be any subjective > > > > > > > > experience, because we would not have anything objective to compare it > > > > > > > > to. Consider: If I think I see Mary Jane and this spiritual thought > > > > > > > > was real, If would have seen Mary-Jane. There would not be a physical > > > > > > > > Ashley but only a spiritual Mary-Jane.. Moreover if the spiritual was > > > > > > > > real, than the child would be entitled to say "My teddy bear feels > > > > > > > > hurt, the way you ignore its subjective experiences" and there would > > > > > > > > be no bases for you to contradict. > > > > > > > > Therefore the idea that the spiritual takes precedence over the > > > > > > > > physical is a dead-end street. > > > > > > > > > As long as Randy doesn't have to part with his one million dollar in > > > > > > > > bonds, there is no (legal) proof that anything is free from the laws > > > > > > > > of physics. Subjective experiences can tell you differently because > > > > > > > > they include mistakes. When they are checked for mistakes, we speak of > > > > > > > > objective observations. Objective observations never show anything to > > > > > > > > be free of the laws of physics, which is logical as the laws of > > > > > > > > physics are actual just spiritual entities that are derived from > > > > > > > > objective observations. > > > > > > > > > I can't explain why Jien managed to understand your "word salad". But > > > > > > > > actually I understood most of it. What I do completely not understand > > > > > > > > is why you think subjective experiences would make materialism > > > > > > > > implausible. From you last post I would guess that because you think > > > > > > > > the spiritual is more real, that because you think you are a ghost > > > > > > > > inside a body and you think the physical observation that all "you" > > > > > > > > are is a functioning human brain inside a body is illusive, you > > > > > > > > conclude that dualism complies better with the spiritual. Whereas I > > > > > > > > think the spiritual is subjective and the physical is objective, > > > > > > > > materialism complies better with the objective reality while dualism > > > > > > > > is illusive. > > > > > > > > > Again the emperors new cloths were completely spiritual thus not so > > > > > > > > real, whereas his nakedness was very physical and objectively true. > > > > > > > > Deception is always discovered by objective physical observations, not > > > > > > > > by figments of your imagination. > > > > > > > > > I have - again and again - explained how subjective experiences (I saw > > > > > > > > Mary Jane) can influence behaviour. I do not know what on earth gives > > > > > > > > you the idea that they can not? That is the key issue I think. > > > > > > > > > Materialism - as I see it - means that subjective experiences can be > > > > > > > > physically explained, not that they are just illusive. Anything > > > > > > > > illusive about them, can also be physically explained. > > > > > > > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > > > > > > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > > > > > > > behaviour? > > > > > > > > Your objections to the spiritual reality aren't reasoned. You simply > > > > > > > have stated what you think the spiritual reality would be like. I > > > > > > > don't mind going through it with you, but not for it to serve as a > > > > > > > distraction from the implausibility of materialism. > > > > > > > > Do you understand that a robot that was behaving in a way that you or > > > > > > > other atheists might consider "imbuing" it with subjective/conscious > > > > > > > experiences, could always have its behaviour explained with the > > > > > > > assumption that it didn't have subjective/conscoius experiences? > > > > > > > I think you are expressing yourself a bit inexact. > > > > > > The behaviour could be explained without the assumption that it had > > > > > > subjecive experiences > > > > > > (simply by going to the machine instructions without wondering what > > > > > > they are about) > > > > > > but it cannot be explained with the assumption that it had no > > > > > > subjective experiences. > > > > > > If you assume te Robot has none, than the Robot would not be able to > > > > > > say "I met Mary Kate" > > > > > > for that expression is proof of a subjective experience > > > > > > (experience, because the Robot indeed met someone, subjective because > > > > > > objectively he met Ashley) > > > > > > > If you replace the Robot with Robert (a human being) the same is true. > > > > > > Robert would then say "I met Mary Kate" and this would proof Robert > > > > > > had a subjective experience. > > > > > > > Again: > > > > > > > > > Why do you insist - even after I explained the opposite to you - > > > > > > > > that materialism means that subjective experiences cannot influence > > > > > > > > behaviour? > > > > > > > I suspect you and me do not share the same view on "subjective > > > > > > experience" > > > > > > but you haven't made clear to me what that difference is. > > > > > > I think I have made very clear what the expression means to me, > > > > > > so I think it is your turn to enlighten > > > > > > I mean by subjective experiences, sensations like pleasure, or pain, > > > > > or visual sensations, or auditory sensations for example. > > > > > > Also I meant that it could be explained with the assumption that it > > > > > had no subjective/conscious experiences. A theist physicist for > > > > > example, could assume that it had no more subjective/conscious > > > > > experiences than a teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply > > > > > in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as > > > > > the behaviour of a mobile phone is explained. > > > > > Sorry > > > > A physisist can explain the fact that someone is crying without the > > > > assumption of pain? > > > > He can explain the fact that someone closes his eyes from to much > > > > sunlight > > > > without the assumption of being blinded? > > > > He can explain a dog answering his owners call without the assumption > > > > of hearing? > > > > I cannot image that is what you mean. > > > > > You really haven't made yourself clear this time. > > > > We are not talking about a human, as I don't share your assumption > > > that we are simply a biological mechanism strictly following the laws > > > of physics. > > > > So talking about a robot... a theist physicist for example, could > > > assume that it had no more subjective/conscious experiences than a > > > teddy bear, and explain the way it behaved simply in terms of the > > > mechanism following the laws of physics, the same as the behaviour of > > > a mobile phone is explained. Do you acknowledge this? > > > No > > a teddybear can not reckognize an image > > neither can the mobile phone > > This is essential to having a subjective experience > > You have to be able to process the data your senses supply, > > wether you are human or robot > > So you are claiming that the robot's behaviour wouldn't be able to be > explained simply in terms of a mechanism following the laws of > physics, the same as a mobile phone, even though they would both be > simply mechanisms following the laws of physics. Perhaps you could > explain why the theist physicist wouldn't be able to explain the > robot's behaviour as simply a mechanism following the laws of physics, > given that is what it would be? "Apparently you are missing the point" With this the text between quotes, I have just explained why you do not understand me, without saying that you are stupid. In the same way the physicist can explain the Robot's behaviour without mentioning any of the Robots experiences. Now do you understand, or do I have to spell it out? Peter van Velzen June 2007 Amstelveen The Netherlands Quote
Guest Jim07D7 Posted June 28, 2007 Posted June 28, 2007 "pbamvv@worldonline.nl" <pbamvv@worldonline.nl> said: >On 25 jun, 17:34, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: <...> >> >> So you are claiming that the robot's behaviour wouldn't be able to be >> explained simply in terms of a mechanism following the laws of >> physics, the same as a mobile phone, even though they would both be >> simply mechanisms following the laws of physics. Perhaps you could >> explain why the theist physicist wouldn't be able to explain the >> robot's behaviour as simply a mechanism following the laws of physics, >> given that is what it would be? > > >"Apparently you are missing the point" > >With this the text between quotes, I have just explained why you do >not understand me, >without saying that you are stupid. > >In the same way the physicist can explain the Robot's behaviour >without mentioning any of the Robots experiences. > > >Now do you understand, or do I have to spell it out? I believe you have stated the idea as well as it can be stated. In a particular instance of a human and a robot performing an observable action identically, if an explanation of the robot's behavior was sufficient and did not impute subjective experience to the robot, would the same explanation for the human's behavior be sufficient? Why or why not? Because the sufficiency of explanations is a matter of opinion, we would need first to come to agreement on the applicable criteria of sufficiency. The ability to use the explanation to predict future behavior, is an accepted criterion in the discipline of science. However, in a discipline like justice, the concept of culpability needs to be addressed, and this might bring in a criterion that the explanation must state whether the behavior was, say, premeditated, not coerced, etc. The criteria of the discipline of justice require that the explanation address whether the entity had the corresponding subjective experiences. However, I do not personally see how such an added criterion would imply that there is an immaterial aspect to humans, if that is the implication of the "Implausibility of Materialism". Is that the implication? An interesting discussion. Quote
Guest Lisbeth Andersson Posted June 28, 2007 Posted June 28, 2007 "Jeckyl" <noone@nowhere.com> wrote in news:467d05ca$0$1187$61c65585@un-2park-reader-01.sydney.pipenetworks ..com.au: > "Fred Stone" <fstone69@earthling.com> wrote in message > news:Xns99578BA125096freddybear@216.151.153.41... >> Where are you going with this, Glenn? How about you just go >> there and skip all the preliminaries? > > That's what I've been asking .. along with others .. still no go. > > I don't think he acutally has a complete argument and a point to > make. > At the moment my guess about his argument is: We cannot tell if robots have subjective experiences THEREFORE humans have souls. > If he had, then he'd have done so by now. As soon as somebody agrees to the premise, perhaps .... :-) Lisbeth. ---- The day I don't learn anything new is the day I die. What we know is not nearly as interesting as how we know it. -- Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com Quote
Guest pbamvv@worldonline.nl Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 On 28 jun, 19:43, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> said: > > > > > > > > >On 25 jun, 17:34, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > <...> > > >> So you are claiming that the robot's behaviour wouldn't be able to be > >> explained simply in terms of a mechanism following the laws of > >> physics, the same as a mobile phone, even though they would both be > >> simply mechanisms following the laws of physics. Perhaps you could > >> explain why the theist physicist wouldn't be able to explain the > >> robot's behaviour as simply a mechanism following the laws of physics, > >> given that is what it would be? > > >"Apparently you are missing the point" > > >With this the text between quotes, I have just explained why you do > >not understand me, > >without saying that you are stupid. > > >In the same way the physicist can explain the Robot's behaviour > >without mentioning any of the Robots experiences. > > >Now do you understand, or do I have to spell it out? > > I believe you have stated the idea as well as it can be stated. > > In a particular instance of a human and a robot performing an > observable action identically, if an explanation of the robot's > behavior was sufficient and did not impute subjective experience to > the robot, would the same explanation for the human's behavior be > sufficient? Why or why not? > > Because the sufficiency of explanations is a matter of opinion, we > would need first to come to agreement on the applicable criteria of > sufficiency. The ability to use the explanation to predict future > behavior, is an accepted criterion in the discipline of science. > However, in a discipline like justice, the concept of culpability > needs to be addressed, and this might bring in a criterion that the > explanation must state whether the behavior was, say, premeditated, > not coerced, etc. The criteria of the discipline of justice require > that the explanation address whether the entity had the corresponding > subjective experiences. > > However, I do not personally see how such an added criterion would > imply that there is an immaterial aspect to humans, if that is the > implication of the "Implausibility of Materialism". Is that the > implication? > > An interesting discussion.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - In a justice court the question is indeed all about intend. Did the accused make a plan to murder? That is did he have a subjective experience saying "I am going to do this and that, and this will cause this person to die" Did he more or less react in a reflex? The gun went off before he realized what had happened Or was it something in between. Generally we feel the sentence should be different according to the answer to these questions. Maybe in the far future we can show that indeed different parts of the brain were involved with premeditaded murder and manslaugther. But whether it reallly makes sense of punishing the cortex more heavily than the thalamus? Mayve people committing manslaughter are actually more likely to do it again than people comitting premeditated murder. I suppose that could be investigated. In any case this has little to do with materialism versus dualism dualism is not about the Cortex it is about an imaginary spirit. Peter van Velzen June 2007 Amstelveen The Netherladns Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 On 3 Jun, 13:50, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the > following: > > Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a > biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective > experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a > coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we > did, which isn't plausible. Can you all follow that though some atheists might claim we are simply a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have conscious experiences, as why should there be anything special about the meat machine. The thing is with a robot though, it can always be explained simply as a mechanism following the laws of physics, without any need to believe in any atheist story that it was consciously experiencing anything. Same as a mobile phone (no need to believe in the atheist pansychics story). So you can see that even if the atheists wanted to make up a story that the robot wasn't the same as a teady bear with regards to conscious experiences, they couldn't claim the consciousness was influencing the behaviour of the robot. If we were like the robot, simply meat machines, then the same would hold for us. In which case it would have to be a coincidence the conscious experiences the 'meat machine' talked actually existed (they couldn't have been influencing the behaviour). Are the athiests having a problem following it (maybe the complexity of it), or just having a problem that you believed an implausible story? Quote
Guest Jim07D7 Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 "pbamvv@worldonline.nl" <pbamvv@worldonline.nl> said: >On 28 jun, 19:43, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: >> "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> said: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >On 25 jun, 17:34, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: >> <...> >> >> >> So you are claiming that the robot's behaviour wouldn't be able to be >> >> explained simply in terms of a mechanism following the laws of >> >> physics, the same as a mobile phone, even though they would both be >> >> simply mechanisms following the laws of physics. Perhaps you could >> >> explain why the theist physicist wouldn't be able to explain the >> >> robot's behaviour as simply a mechanism following the laws of physics, >> >> given that is what it would be? >> >> >"Apparently you are missing the point" >> >> >With this the text between quotes, I have just explained why you do >> >not understand me, >> >without saying that you are stupid. >> >> >In the same way the physicist can explain the Robot's behaviour >> >without mentioning any of the Robots experiences. >> >> >Now do you understand, or do I have to spell it out? >> >> I believe you have stated the idea as well as it can be stated. >> >> In a particular instance of a human and a robot performing an >> observable action identically, if an explanation of the robot's >> behavior was sufficient and did not impute subjective experience to >> the robot, would the same explanation for the human's behavior be >> sufficient? Why or why not? >> >> Because the sufficiency of explanations is a matter of opinion, we >> would need first to come to agreement on the applicable criteria of >> sufficiency. The ability to use the explanation to predict future >> behavior, is an accepted criterion in the discipline of science. >> However, in a discipline like justice, the concept of culpability >> needs to be addressed, and this might bring in a criterion that the >> explanation must state whether the behavior was, say, premeditated, >> not coerced, etc. The criteria of the discipline of justice require >> that the explanation address whether the entity had the corresponding >> subjective experiences. >> >> However, I do not personally see how such an added criterion would >> imply that there is an immaterial aspect to humans, if that is the >> implication of the "Implausibility of Materialism". Is that the >> implication? >> >> An interesting discussion.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - >> >> - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - My thoughts on that are in Sanskrit and the available fonts are inadequate for expressing them. > >In a justice court the question is indeed all about intend. >Did the accused make a plan to murder? >That is did he have a subjective experience saying >"I am going to do this and that, and this will cause this person to >die" > >Did he more or less react in a reflex? >The gun went off before he realized what had happened > >Or was it something in between. > >Generally we feel the sentence should be different according >to the answer to these questions. > >Maybe in the far future we can show that indeed different parts of the >brain were involved with premeditaded murder and manslaugther. >But whether it reallly makes sense of punishing the cortex >more heavily than the thalamus? >Mayve people committing manslaughter are actually more likely to do it >again than people comitting premeditated murder. I suppose that could >be investigated. > >In any case this has little to do with materialism versus dualism >dualism is not about the Cortex >it is about an imaginary spirit. That seems to be the case. Quote
Guest Jim07D7 Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> said: >On 3 Jun, 13:50, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: >> I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the >> following: >> >> Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could >> have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't >> conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it >> did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a >> biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective >> experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a >> coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we >> did, which isn't plausible. > > >Can you all follow that though some atheists might claim we are simply >a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have conscious >experiences, as why should there be anything special about the meat >machine. The difference between conscious meatware and conscious hardware is that examples of the former are believed to exist today. Whether that makes them "special" is a matter of opinion. The thing is with a robot though, it can always be explained >simply as a mechanism following the laws of physics, without any need >to believe in any atheist story that it was consciously experiencing >anything. Same as a mobile phone (no need to believe in the atheist >pansychics story). > >So you can see that even if the atheists wanted to make up a story >that the robot wasn't the same as a teady bear with regards to >conscious experiences, they couldn't claim the consciousness was >influencing the behaviour of the robot. You appear to be generalizing about atheists. > >If we were like the robot, simply meat machines, then the same would >hold for us. In which case it would have to be a coincidence the >conscious experiences the 'meat machine' talked actually existed (they >couldn't have been influencing the behaviour). > >Are the athiests having a problem following it (maybe the complexity >of it), or just having a problem that you believed an implausible >story? > Have you solved all the problems of the mind-body dualism you seem to prefer? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 On 29 Jun, 14:23, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: > > > > > > >On 3 Jun, 13:50, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > >> I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the > >> following: > > >> Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > >> have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > >> conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it > >> did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a > >> biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective > >> experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a > >> coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we > >> did, which isn't plausible. > > >Can you all follow that though some atheists might claim we are simply > >a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have conscious > >experiences, as why should there be anything special about the meat > >machine. > > The difference between conscious meatware and conscious hardware is > that examples of the former are believed to exist today. Whether that > makes them "special" is a matter of opinion. > > The thing is with a robot though, it can always be explained > > >simply as a mechanism following the laws of physics, without any need > >to believe in any atheist story that it was consciously experiencing > >anything. Same as a mobile phone (no need to believe in the atheist > >pansychics story). > > >So you can see that even if the atheists wanted to make up a story > >that the robot wasn't the same as a teady bear with regards to > >conscious experiences, they couldn't claim the consciousness was > >influencing the behaviour of the robot. > > You appear to be generalizing about atheists. > > >If we were like the robot, simply meat machines, then the same would > >hold for us. In which case it would have to be a coincidence the > >conscious experiences the 'meat machine' talked actually existed (they > >couldn't have been influencing the behaviour). > > >Are the athiests having a problem following it (maybe the complexity > >of it), or just having a problem that you believed an implausible > >story? > > Have you solved all the problems of the mind-body dualism you seem to > prefer? > > You seemed to have been unable to follow why it is implausible that we are simply a meat machine. What problems do you think there are with there only being the spiritual? Quote
Guest Jim07D7 Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> said: >On 29 Jun, 14:23, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: >> >> >> >> >> >> >On 3 Jun, 13:50, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: >> >> I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the >> >> following: >> >> >> Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could >> >> have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't >> >> conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it >> >> did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a >> >> biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective >> >> experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a >> >> coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we >> >> did, which isn't plausible. >> >> >Can you all follow that though some atheists might claim we are simply >> >a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have conscious >> >experiences, as why should there be anything special about the meat >> >machine. >> >> The difference between conscious meatware and conscious hardware is >> that examples of the former are believed to exist today. Whether that >> makes them "special" is a matter of opinion. >> >> The thing is with a robot though, it can always be explained >> >> >simply as a mechanism following the laws of physics, without any need >> >to believe in any atheist story that it was consciously experiencing >> >anything. Same as a mobile phone (no need to believe in the atheist >> >pansychics story). >> >> >So you can see that even if the atheists wanted to make up a story >> >that the robot wasn't the same as a teady bear with regards to >> >conscious experiences, they couldn't claim the consciousness was >> >influencing the behaviour of the robot. >> >> You appear to be generalizing about atheists. >> >> >If we were like the robot, simply meat machines, then the same would >> >hold for us. In which case it would have to be a coincidence the >> >conscious experiences the 'meat machine' talked actually existed (they >> >couldn't have been influencing the behaviour). >> >> >Are the athiests having a problem following it (maybe the complexity >> >of it), or just having a problem that you believed an implausible >> >story? >> >> Have you solved all the problems of the mind-body dualism you seem to >> prefer? >> >> > >You seemed to have been unable to follow why it is implausible that we >are simply a meat machine. If by "machine" you mean not conscious, I do think it is implausible to say we are a meat machine. But I have not seen the "argument". If you mean the paragraph above that refers to machines that "followed the known laws of physics" I would not assume that we know all of the so-called laws of physics, nor would I assume that physics is the best level of science for us to use to talk about consciousness. For example, physics does not and never will concern itself with whether it is an unconscious entity or a conscious entity that does something, but psychology does concern itself with this. > >What problems do you think there are with there only being the >spiritual? "Only being the spiritual" is not mind-body dualism. If "only being the spiritual" means subjective idealism, I think it's at least as defensible as materialism. But you don't need to argue against materialism to support subjective idealism. You only need to argue that all we really experience, are our ideas, and from that, that all we can say with confidence exists, are ideas and those that have them -- conscious minds. But even if subjective idealism is an accurate depiction of the real world, I think you will agree that there are regularities in that reality. Those regularities support inferring a "natural world" having "laws". All the same disciplines of current science can be built up out of these observations. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 On 29 Jun, 16:25, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: > > > > > > >On 29 Jun, 14:23, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: > > >> >On 3 Jun, 13:50, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > >> >> I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the > >> >> following: > > >> >> Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > >> >> have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > >> >> conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it > >> >> did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a > >> >> biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective > >> >> experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a > >> >> coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we > >> >> did, which isn't plausible. > > >> >Can you all follow that though some atheists might claim we are simply > >> >a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have conscious > >> >experiences, as why should there be anything special about the meat > >> >machine. > > >> The difference between conscious meatware and conscious hardware is > >> that examples of the former are believed to exist today. Whether that > >> makes them "special" is a matter of opinion. > > >> The thing is with a robot though, it can always be explained > > >> >simply as a mechanism following the laws of physics, without any need > >> >to believe in any atheist story that it was consciously experiencing > >> >anything. Same as a mobile phone (no need to believe in the atheist > >> >pansychics story). > > >> >So you can see that even if the atheists wanted to make up a story > >> >that the robot wasn't the same as a teady bear with regards to > >> >conscious experiences, they couldn't claim the consciousness was > >> >influencing the behaviour of the robot. > > >> You appear to be generalizing about atheists. > > >> >If we were like the robot, simply meat machines, then the same would > >> >hold for us. In which case it would have to be a coincidence the > >> >conscious experiences the 'meat machine' talked actually existed (they > >> >couldn't have been influencing the behaviour). > > >> >Are the athiests having a problem following it (maybe the complexity > >> >of it), or just having a problem that you believed an implausible > >> >story? > > >> Have you solved all the problems of the mind-body dualism you seem to > >> prefer? > > >You seemed to have been unable to follow why it is implausible that we > >are simply a meat machine. > > If by "machine" you mean not conscious, I do think it is implausible > to say we are a meat machine. > > But I have not seen the "argument". If you mean the paragraph above > that refers to machines that "followed the known laws of physics" I > would not assume that we know all of the so-called laws of physics, > nor would I assume that physics is the best level of science for us to > use to talk about consciousness. > > For example, physics does not and never will concern itself with > whether it is an unconscious entity or a conscious entity that does > something, but psychology does concern itself with this. > > > > >What problems do you think there are with there only being the > >spiritual? > > "Only being the spiritual" is not mind-body dualism. If "only being > the spiritual" means subjective idealism, I think it's at least as > defensible as materialism. But you don't need to argue against > materialism to support subjective idealism. You only need to argue > that all we really experience, are our ideas, and from that, that all > we can say with confidence exists, are ideas and those that have them > -- conscious minds. > > But even if subjective idealism is an accurate depiction of the real > world, I think you will agree that there are regularities in that > reality. Those regularities support inferring a "natural world" having > "laws". All the same disciplines of current science can be built up > out of these observations. > Materialism isn't defensible. I just posted reasoning showing you it isn't. Obviously I didn't mean by 'meat machine' something that isn't conscious (if I had of, then the rest of the sentance that it was first brought up in wouldn't have made sense). It is in reference to us, we have conscious experiences such as pleasure and pain. I'll run through the reasoning slowly for you, bit by bit. Can you all follow that though some atheists might claim we are simply a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have conscious experiences, as why should there be anything special about the meat machine? Quote
Guest Jim07D7 Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 Jim07D7 <Jim07D7@nospam.net> said: >someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> said: > >>On 29 Jun, 14:23, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: >>> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >On 3 Jun, 13:50, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: >>> >> I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the >>> >> following: >>> >>> >> Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could >>> >> have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't >>> >> conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it >>> >> did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a >>> >> biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective >>> >> experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a >>> >> coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we >>> >> did, which isn't plausible. >>> >>> >Can you all follow that though some atheists might claim we are simply >>> >a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have conscious >>> >experiences, as why should there be anything special about the meat >>> >machine. >>> >>> The difference between conscious meatware and conscious hardware is >>> that examples of the former are believed to exist today. Whether that >>> makes them "special" is a matter of opinion. >>> >>> The thing is with a robot though, it can always be explained >>> >>> >simply as a mechanism following the laws of physics, without any need >>> >to believe in any atheist story that it was consciously experiencing >>> >anything. Same as a mobile phone (no need to believe in the atheist >>> >pansychics story). >>> >>> >So you can see that even if the atheists wanted to make up a story >>> >that the robot wasn't the same as a teady bear with regards to >>> >conscious experiences, they couldn't claim the consciousness was >>> >influencing the behaviour of the robot. >>> >>> You appear to be generalizing about atheists. >>> >>> >If we were like the robot, simply meat machines, then the same would >>> >hold for us. In which case it would have to be a coincidence the >>> >conscious experiences the 'meat machine' talked actually existed (they >>> >couldn't have been influencing the behaviour). >>> >>> >Are the athiests having a problem following it (maybe the complexity >>> >of it), or just having a problem that you believed an implausible >>> >story? >>> >>> Have you solved all the problems of the mind-body dualism you seem to >>> prefer? >>> >>> >> >>You seemed to have been unable to follow why it is implausible that we >>are simply a meat machine. > >If by "machine" you mean not conscious, I do think it is implausible >to say we are a meat machine. > >But I have not seen the "argument". If you mean the paragraph above >that refers to machines that "followed the known laws of physics" I >would not assume that we know all of the so-called laws of physics, >nor would I assume that physics is the best level of science for us to >use to talk about consciousness. > >For example, physics does not and never will concern itself with >whether it is an unconscious entity or a conscious entity that does >something, but psychology does concern itself with this. Actually, I have to modify this. Some current ideas in physics concern whether the act of observing something can change it or can change something else that is "entangled" with it. It seems to me that observation implies consciousness. Whether these ideas will become part of established physics is unknown to me. >> >>What problems do you think there are with there only being the >>spiritual? > >"Only being the spiritual" is not mind-body dualism. If "only being >the spiritual" means subjective idealism, I think it's at least as >defensible as materialism. But you don't need to argue against >materialism to support subjective idealism. You only need to argue >that all we really experience, are our ideas, and from that, that all >we can say with confidence exists, are ideas and those that have them >-- conscious minds. > >But even if subjective idealism is an accurate depiction of the real >world, I think you will agree that there are regularities in that >reality. Those regularities support inferring a "natural world" having >"laws". All the same disciplines of current science can be built up >out of these observations. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 On 29 Jun, 16:40, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> said: > > > > > > >someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: > > >>On 29 Jun, 14:23, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > >>> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: > > >>> >On 3 Jun, 13:50, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > >>> >> I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the > >>> >> following: > > >>> >> Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > >>> >> have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > >>> >> conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it > >>> >> did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a > >>> >> biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective > >>> >> experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a > >>> >> coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we > >>> >> did, which isn't plausible. > > >>> >Can you all follow that though some atheists might claim we are simply > >>> >a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have conscious > >>> >experiences, as why should there be anything special about the meat > >>> >machine. > > >>> The difference between conscious meatware and conscious hardware is > >>> that examples of the former are believed to exist today. Whether that > >>> makes them "special" is a matter of opinion. > > >>> The thing is with a robot though, it can always be explained > > >>> >simply as a mechanism following the laws of physics, without any need > >>> >to believe in any atheist story that it was consciously experiencing > >>> >anything. Same as a mobile phone (no need to believe in the atheist > >>> >pansychics story). > > >>> >So you can see that even if the atheists wanted to make up a story > >>> >that the robot wasn't the same as a teady bear with regards to > >>> >conscious experiences, they couldn't claim the consciousness was > >>> >influencing the behaviour of the robot. > > >>> You appear to be generalizing about atheists. > > >>> >If we were like the robot, simply meat machines, then the same would > >>> >hold for us. In which case it would have to be a coincidence the > >>> >conscious experiences the 'meat machine' talked actually existed (they > >>> >couldn't have been influencing the behaviour). > > >>> >Are the athiests having a problem following it (maybe the complexity > >>> >of it), or just having a problem that you believed an implausible > >>> >story? > > >>> Have you solved all the problems of the mind-body dualism you seem to > >>> prefer? > > >>You seemed to have been unable to follow why it is implausible that we > >>are simply a meat machine. > > >If by "machine" you mean not conscious, I do think it is implausible > >to say we are a meat machine. > > >But I have not seen the "argument". If you mean the paragraph above > >that refers to machines that "followed the known laws of physics" I > >would not assume that we know all of the so-called laws of physics, > >nor would I assume that physics is the best level of science for us to > >use to talk about consciousness. > > >For example, physics does not and never will concern itself with > >whether it is an unconscious entity or a conscious entity that does > >something, but psychology does concern itself with this. > > Actually, I have to modify this. Some current ideas in physics concern > whether the act of observing something can change it or can change > something else that is "entangled" with it. It seems to me that > observation implies consciousness. Whether these ideas will become > part of established physics is unknown to me. > > > >>What problems do you think there are with there only being the > >>spiritual? > > >"Only being the spiritual" is not mind-body dualism. If "only being > >the spiritual" means subjective idealism, I think it's at least as > >defensible as materialism. But you don't need to argue against > >materialism to support subjective idealism. You only need to argue > >that all we really experience, are our ideas, and from that, that all > >we can say with confidence exists, are ideas and those that have them > >-- conscious minds. > > >But even if subjective idealism is an accurate depiction of the real > >world, I think you will agree that there are regularities in that > >reality. Those regularities support inferring a "natural world" having > >"laws". All the same disciplines of current science can be built up > >out of these observations > Regards to your modification, the observations have nothing to do with consciousness. They aren't refering to a conscious observer. In the 2- slit experiment for example, the observation is hitting the screen. Anyway, as I had replied before your modification. Materialism isn't defensible. I just posted reasoning showing you it isn't. Obviously I didn't mean by 'meat machine' something that isn't conscious (if I had of, then the rest of the sentance that it was first brought up in wouldn't have made sense). It is in reference to us, we have conscious experiences such as pleasure and pain. I'll run through the reasoning slowly for you, bit by bit. Can you all follow that though some atheists might claim we are simply a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have conscious experiences, as why should there be anything special about the meat machine? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 On 29 Jun, 16:40, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> said: > > > > > > >someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: > > >>On 29 Jun, 14:23, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > >>> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: > > >>> >On 3 Jun, 13:50, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > >>> >> I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the > >>> >> following: > > >>> >> Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > >>> >> have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > >>> >> conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it > >>> >> did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a > >>> >> biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective > >>> >> experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a > >>> >> coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we > >>> >> did, which isn't plausible. > > >>> >Can you all follow that though some atheists might claim we are simply > >>> >a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have conscious > >>> >experiences, as why should there be anything special about the meat > >>> >machine. > > >>> The difference between conscious meatware and conscious hardware is > >>> that examples of the former are believed to exist today. Whether that > >>> makes them "special" is a matter of opinion. > > >>> The thing is with a robot though, it can always be explained > > >>> >simply as a mechanism following the laws of physics, without any need > >>> >to believe in any atheist story that it was consciously experiencing > >>> >anything. Same as a mobile phone (no need to believe in the atheist > >>> >pansychics story). > > >>> >So you can see that even if the atheists wanted to make up a story > >>> >that the robot wasn't the same as a teady bear with regards to > >>> >conscious experiences, they couldn't claim the consciousness was > >>> >influencing the behaviour of the robot. > > >>> You appear to be generalizing about atheists. > > >>> >If we were like the robot, simply meat machines, then the same would > >>> >hold for us. In which case it would have to be a coincidence the > >>> >conscious experiences the 'meat machine' talked actually existed (they > >>> >couldn't have been influencing the behaviour). > > >>> >Are the athiests having a problem following it (maybe the complexity > >>> >of it), or just having a problem that you believed an implausible > >>> >story? > > >>> Have you solved all the problems of the mind-body dualism you seem to > >>> prefer? > > >>You seemed to have been unable to follow why it is implausible that we > >>are simply a meat machine. > > >If by "machine" you mean not conscious, I do think it is implausible > >to say we are a meat machine. > > >But I have not seen the "argument". If you mean the paragraph above > >that refers to machines that "followed the known laws of physics" I > >would not assume that we know all of the so-called laws of physics, > >nor would I assume that physics is the best level of science for us to > >use to talk about consciousness. > > >For example, physics does not and never will concern itself with > >whether it is an unconscious entity or a conscious entity that does > >something, but psychology does concern itself with this. > > Actually, I have to modify this. Some current ideas in physics concern > whether the act of observing something can change it or can change > something else that is "entangled" with it. It seems to me that > observation implies consciousness. Whether these ideas will become > part of established physics is unknown to me. > > > > > > >>What problems do you think there are with there only being the > >>spiritual? > > >"Only being the spiritual" is not mind-body dualism. If "only being > >the spiritual" means subjective idealism, I think it's at least as > >defensible as materialism. But you don't need to argue against > >materialism to support subjective idealism. You only need to argue > >that all we really experience, are our ideas, and from that, that all > >we can say with confidence exists, are ideas and those that have them > >-- conscious minds. > > >But even if subjective idealism is an accurate depiction of the real > >world, I think you will agree that there are regularities in that > >reality. Those regularities support inferring a "natural world" having > >"laws". All the same disciplines of current science can be built up > >out of these observations. > Regards to your modification, the observations have nothing to do with consciousness. They aren't referring to a conscious observer. In the 2- slit experiment for example, the observation is hitting the screen. Anyway, as I had replied before your modification. Materialism isn't defensible. I just posted reasoning showing you it isn't. Obviously I didn't mean by 'meat machine' something that isn't conscious (if I had of, then the rest of the sentance that it was first brought up in wouldn't have made sense). It is in reference to us, we have conscious experiences such as pleasure and pain. I'll run through the reasoning slowly for you, bit by bit. Can you all follow that though some atheists might claim we are simply a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have conscious experiences, as why should there be anything special about the meat machine? Quote
Guest Jim07D7 Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> said: >On 29 Jun, 16:25, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: <...> >> >> If by "machine" you mean not conscious, I do think it is implausible >> to say we are a meat machine. >> >> But I have not seen the "argument". If you mean the paragraph above >> that refers to machines that "followed the known laws of physics" I >> would not assume that we know all of the so-called laws of physics, >> nor would I assume that physics is the best level of science for us to >> use to talk about consciousness. >> >> For example, physics does not and never will concern itself with >> whether it is an unconscious entity or a conscious entity that does >> something, but psychology does concern itself with this. >> I'll assume you saw my correction of my statement above, as follows: Actually, I have to modify this. Some current ideas in physics concern whether the act of observing something can change it or can change something else that is "entangled" with it. It seems to me that observation implies consciousness. Whether these ideas will become part of established physics is unknown to me. >> >> >What problems do you think there are with there only being the >> >spiritual? >> >> "Only being the spiritual" is not mind-body dualism. If "only being >> the spiritual" means subjective idealism, I think it's at least as >> defensible as materialism. But you don't need to argue against >> materialism to support subjective idealism. You only need to argue >> that all we really experience, are our ideas, and from that, that all >> we can say with confidence exists, are ideas and those that have them >> -- conscious minds. >> >> But even if subjective idealism is an accurate depiction of the real >> world, I think you will agree that there are regularities in that >> reality. Those regularities support inferring a "natural world" having >> "laws". All the same disciplines of current science can be built up >> out of these observations. >> > >Materialism isn't defensible. I just posted reasoning showing you it >isn't. Obviously I didn't mean by 'meat machine' something that isn't >conscious (if I had of, then the rest of the sentance that it was >first brought up in wouldn't have made sense). It is in reference to >us, we have conscious experiences such as pleasure and pain. > >I'll run through the reasoning slowly for you, bit by bit. > >Can you all follow that though some atheists might claim we are simply >a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have conscious >experiences, as why should there be anything special about the meat >machine? > I follow that, but I don't think it is stated very well. By definition a robot does not have conscious experiences, so, such a claim by a materialist would be better stated something like this: "Matter, energy, space, time and fields, are all there is. Matter exists as atoms that can form into molecules. At the present time we have no reason to rule out the possibility that there might someday be conscious entities made of molecules that differ from those currently found in conscious entities ." Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 On 29 Jun, 17:17, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: > > > > > > >On 29 Jun, 16:25, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > <...> > > >> If by "machine" you mean not conscious, I do think it is implausible > >> to say we are a meat machine. > > >> But I have not seen the "argument". If you mean the paragraph above > >> that refers to machines that "followed the known laws of physics" I > >> would not assume that we know all of the so-called laws of physics, > >> nor would I assume that physics is the best level of science for us to > >> use to talk about consciousness. > > >> For example, physics does not and never will concern itself with > >> whether it is an unconscious entity or a conscious entity that does > >> something, but psychology does concern itself with this. > > I'll assume you saw my correction of my statement above, as follows: > > Actually, I have to modify this. Some current ideas in physics concern > whether the act of observing something can change it or can change > something else that is "entangled" with it. It seems to me that > observation implies consciousness. Whether these ideas will become > part of established physics is unknown to me. > > > > > > >> >What problems do you think there are with there only being the > >> >spiritual? > > >> "Only being the spiritual" is not mind-body dualism. If "only being > >> the spiritual" means subjective idealism, I think it's at least as > >> defensible as materialism. But you don't need to argue against > >> materialism to support subjective idealism. You only need to argue > >> that all we really experience, are our ideas, and from that, that all > >> we can say with confidence exists, are ideas and those that have them > >> -- conscious minds. > > >> But even if subjective idealism is an accurate depiction of the real > >> world, I think you will agree that there are regularities in that > >> reality. Those regularities support inferring a "natural world" having > >> "laws". All the same disciplines of current science can be built up > >> out of these observations. > > >Materialism isn't defensible. I just posted reasoning showing you it > >isn't. Obviously I didn't mean by 'meat machine' something that isn't > >conscious (if I had of, then the rest of the sentance that it was > >first brought up in wouldn't have made sense). It is in reference to > >us, we have conscious experiences such as pleasure and pain. > > >I'll run through the reasoning slowly for you, bit by bit. > > >Can you all follow that though some atheists might claim we are simply > >a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have conscious > >experiences, as why should there be anything special about the meat > >machine? > > I follow that, but I don't think it is stated very well. By definition > a robot does not have conscious experiences, so, such a claim by a > materialist would be better stated something like this: "Matter, > energy, space, time and fields, are all there is. Matter exists as > atoms that can form into molecules. At the present time we have no > reason to rule out the possibility that there might someday be > conscious entities made of molecules that differ from those currently > found in conscious entities ." > [i did respond to your modification earlier btw. The observations have nothing to do with consciousness. They aren't refering to a conscious observer. In the 2-slit experiment for example, the observation is hitting the screen.] Why would a robot "by definition" not have conscious experiences, simply because it is a mechanism whose behaviour can be explained simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics? What if it was a Turing equivalent? Quote
Guest Jim07D7 Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> said: >On 29 Jun, 17:17, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: >> >> >> >> >> >> >On 29 Jun, 16:25, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: >> <...> >> >> >> If by "machine" you mean not conscious, I do think it is implausible >> >> to say we are a meat machine. >> >> >> But I have not seen the "argument". If you mean the paragraph above >> >> that refers to machines that "followed the known laws of physics" I >> >> would not assume that we know all of the so-called laws of physics, >> >> nor would I assume that physics is the best level of science for us to >> >> use to talk about consciousness. >> >> >> For example, physics does not and never will concern itself with >> >> whether it is an unconscious entity or a conscious entity that does >> >> something, but psychology does concern itself with this. >> >> I'll assume you saw my correction of my statement above, as follows: >> >> Actually, I have to modify this. Some current ideas in physics concern >> whether the act of observing something can change it or can change >> something else that is "entangled" with it. It seems to me that >> observation implies consciousness. Whether these ideas will become >> part of established physics is unknown to me. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >What problems do you think there are with there only being the >> >> >spiritual? >> >> >> "Only being the spiritual" is not mind-body dualism. If "only being >> >> the spiritual" means subjective idealism, I think it's at least as >> >> defensible as materialism. But you don't need to argue against >> >> materialism to support subjective idealism. You only need to argue >> >> that all we really experience, are our ideas, and from that, that all >> >> we can say with confidence exists, are ideas and those that have them >> >> -- conscious minds. >> >> >> But even if subjective idealism is an accurate depiction of the real >> >> world, I think you will agree that there are regularities in that >> >> reality. Those regularities support inferring a "natural world" having >> >> "laws". All the same disciplines of current science can be built up >> >> out of these observations. >> >> >Materialism isn't defensible. I just posted reasoning showing you it >> >isn't. Obviously I didn't mean by 'meat machine' something that isn't >> >conscious (if I had of, then the rest of the sentance that it was >> >first brought up in wouldn't have made sense). It is in reference to >> >us, we have conscious experiences such as pleasure and pain. >> >> >I'll run through the reasoning slowly for you, bit by bit. >> >> >Can you all follow that though some atheists might claim we are simply >> >a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have conscious >> >experiences, as why should there be anything special about the meat >> >machine? >> >> I follow that, but I don't think it is stated very well. By definition >> a robot does not have conscious experiences, so, such a claim by a >> materialist would be better stated something like this: "Matter, >> energy, space, time and fields, are all there is. Matter exists as >> atoms that can form into molecules. At the present time we have no >> reason to rule out the possibility that there might someday be >> conscious entities made of molecules that differ from those currently >> found in conscious entities ." >> > >[i did respond to your modification earlier btw. The observations have >nothing to do with consciousness. They aren't refering to a conscious >observer. In the 2-slit experiment for example, the observation is >hitting the screen.] Yes, I saw your reply. There are things I could say in response but won't because it is a less interesting way to go, IMO. > >Why would a robot "by definition" not have conscious experiences, >simply because it is a mechanism whose behaviour can be explained >simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics? What >if it was a Turing equivalent? No. I was thinking of the usual definitions of "robot" which include words like "automaton", doing things on command, mechanical, operating automatically, etc. But we can use the word "robot". I'll reword my reply, as follows: I follow that, but I (still) don't think it is stated very well. Such a claim by a materialist would be better stated something like this: "Matter, energy, space, time and fields, are all there is. Matter exists as atoms that can form into molecules. At the present time I have no reason to rule out the possibility that there might someday be conscious entities (e.g., conscious robots) made of molecules that differ from those currently found in conscious entities (e.g., human beings)." I don't know of any reason to rule out this possibility, but in itself my ignorance is not an argument that it is possible. While you are under no obligation to do so, I would ask for your thought on where you think we should look, for an explanation of consciousness; or alternatively, do you think consciousness should be treated as a fundamental constituent of reality, as the materialist treats matter or space? Or whatever else you want to say. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 On 29 Jun, 17:54, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: > > > > > > >On 29 Jun, 17:17, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: > > >> >On 29 Jun, 16:25, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > >> <...> > > >> >> If by "machine" you mean not conscious, I do think it is implausible > >> >> to say we are a meat machine. > > >> >> But I have not seen the "argument". If you mean the paragraph above > >> >> that refers to machines that "followed the known laws of physics" I > >> >> would not assume that we know all of the so-called laws of physics, > >> >> nor would I assume that physics is the best level of science for us to > >> >> use to talk about consciousness. > > >> >> For example, physics does not and never will concern itself with > >> >> whether it is an unconscious entity or a conscious entity that does > >> >> something, but psychology does concern itself with this. > > >> I'll assume you saw my correction of my statement above, as follows: > > >> Actually, I have to modify this. Some current ideas in physics concern > >> whether the act of observing something can change it or can change > >> something else that is "entangled" with it. It seems to me that > >> observation implies consciousness. Whether these ideas will become > >> part of established physics is unknown to me. > > >> >> >What problems do you think there are with there only being the > >> >> >spiritual? > > >> >> "Only being the spiritual" is not mind-body dualism. If "only being > >> >> the spiritual" means subjective idealism, I think it's at least as > >> >> defensible as materialism. But you don't need to argue against > >> >> materialism to support subjective idealism. You only need to argue > >> >> that all we really experience, are our ideas, and from that, that all > >> >> we can say with confidence exists, are ideas and those that have them > >> >> -- conscious minds. > > >> >> But even if subjective idealism is an accurate depiction of the real > >> >> world, I think you will agree that there are regularities in that > >> >> reality. Those regularities support inferring a "natural world" having > >> >> "laws". All the same disciplines of current science can be built up > >> >> out of these observations. > > >> >Materialism isn't defensible. I just posted reasoning showing you it > >> >isn't. Obviously I didn't mean by 'meat machine' something that isn't > >> >conscious (if I had of, then the rest of the sentance that it was > >> >first brought up in wouldn't have made sense). It is in reference to > >> >us, we have conscious experiences such as pleasure and pain. > > >> >I'll run through the reasoning slowly for you, bit by bit. > > >> >Can you all follow that though some atheists might claim we are simply > >> >a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have conscious > >> >experiences, as why should there be anything special about the meat > >> >machine? > > >> I follow that, but I don't think it is stated very well. By definition > >> a robot does not have conscious experiences, so, such a claim by a > >> materialist would be better stated something like this: "Matter, > >> energy, space, time and fields, are all there is. Matter exists as > >> atoms that can form into molecules. At the present time we have no > >> reason to rule out the possibility that there might someday be > >> conscious entities made of molecules that differ from those currently > >> found in conscious entities ." > > >[i did respond to your modification earlier btw. The observations have > >nothing to do with consciousness. They aren't refering to a conscious > >observer. In the 2-slit experiment for example, the observation is > >hitting the screen.] > > Yes, I saw your reply. There are things I could say in response but > won't because it is a less interesting way to go, IMO. > > > > >Why would a robot "by definition" not have conscious experiences, > >simply because it is a mechanism whose behaviour can be explained > >simply in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics? What > >if it was a Turing equivalent? > > No. I was thinking of the usual definitions of "robot" which include > words like "automaton", doing things on command, mechanical, operating > automatically, etc. But we can use the word "robot". I'll reword my > reply, as follows: > > I follow that, but I (still) don't think it is stated very well. Such > a claim by a materialist would be better stated something like this: > "Matter, energy, space, time and fields, are all there is. Matter > exists as atoms that can form into molecules. At the present time I > have no reason to rule out the possibility that there might someday be > conscious entities (e.g., conscious robots) made of molecules that > differ from those currently found in conscious entities (e.g., human > beings)." > > I don't know of any reason to rule out this possibility, but in itself > my ignorance is not an argument that it is possible. > > While you are under no obligation to do so, I would ask for your > thought on where you think we should look, for an explanation of > consciousness; or alternatively, do you think consciousness should be > treated as a fundamental constituent of reality, as the materialist > treats matter or space? Or whatever else you want to say. > Sure, I can do that later, at the moment do you mind if we stick to the point and just go through the implausibility of materialism. Later I can address the issue of whether although it is implausible, it must be true, as there is no other explanation. So you could follow that though some atheists might claim we are simply a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have conscious experiences, as why should there be anything special about the meat machine. [it isn't a definition of materialism btw] Can you also follow that with a robot though, it can always be explained simply as a mechanism following the laws of physics, without any need to believe in any atheist story that it was consciously experiencing anything. Same as a mobile phone (no need to believe in the atheist pansychics story)? Quote
Guest Jim07D7 Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> said: >On 29 Jun, 17:54, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: <...> >> I follow that, but I (still) don't think it is stated very well. Such >> a claim by a materialist would be better stated something like this: >> "Matter, energy, space, time and fields, are all there is. Matter >> exists as atoms that can form into molecules. At the present time I >> have no reason to rule out the possibility that there might someday be >> conscious entities (e.g., conscious robots) made of molecules that >> differ from those currently found in conscious entities (e.g., human >> beings)." >> >> I don't know of any reason to rule out this possibility, but in itself >> my ignorance is not an argument that it is possible. >> >> While you are under no obligation to do so, I would ask for your >> thought on where you think we should look, for an explanation of >> consciousness; or alternatively, do you think consciousness should be >> treated as a fundamental constituent of reality, as the materialist >> treats matter or space? Or whatever else you want to say. >> > >Sure, I can do that later, at the moment do you mind if we stick to >the point and just go through the implausibility of materialism. Later >I can address the issue of whether although it is implausible, it must >be true, as there is no other explanation. > >So you could follow that though some atheists might claim we are >simply a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have >conscious experiences, as why should there be anything special about >the meat machine. [it isn't a definition of materialism btw] > >Can you also follow that with a robot though, it can always be >explained simply as a mechanism following the laws of physics, without >any need to believe in any atheist story that it was consciously >experiencing anything. Same as a mobile phone (no need to believe in >the atheist pansychics story)? > "Always" is a long time. I think it depends on the robot. I don't know if someday, we will or will not believe that the best explanation for a robot includes the belief that it is consciously experiencing things. I know the Cartesians believed that non-human animals were not conscious, and so they would have said that if these animals can be explained, they can be explained without believing that they are consciously experiencing anything. Nowadays we believe that at least some animals have conscious experience, and we use that in explaining them. Someday we may believe the same about some robots. If we do, will we necessarily be wrong? If so, why? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 On 29 Jun, 19:19, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: > > > > > > > > >On 29 Jun, 17:54, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > <...> > >> I follow that, but I (still) don't think it is stated very well. Such > >> a claim by a materialist would be better stated something like this: > >> "Matter, energy, space, time and fields, are all there is. Matter > >> exists as atoms that can form into molecules. At the present time I > >> have no reason to rule out the possibility that there might someday be > >> conscious entities (e.g., conscious robots) made of molecules that > >> differ from those currently found in conscious entities (e.g., human > >> beings)." > > >> I don't know of any reason to rule out this possibility, but in itself > >> my ignorance is not an argument that it is possible. > > >> While you are under no obligation to do so, I would ask for your > >> thought on where you think we should look, for an explanation of > >> consciousness; or alternatively, do you think consciousness should be > >> treated as a fundamental constituent of reality, as the materialist > >> treats matter or space? Or whatever else you want to say. > > >Sure, I can do that later, at the moment do you mind if we stick to > >the point and just go through the implausibility of materialism. Later > >I can address the issue of whether although it is implausible, it must > >be true, as there is no other explanation. > > >So you could follow that though some atheists might claim we are > >simply a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have > >conscious experiences, as why should there be anything special about > >the meat machine. [it isn't a definition of materialism btw] > > >Can you also follow that with a robot though, it can always be > >explained simply as a mechanism following the laws of physics, without > >any need to believe in any atheist story that it was consciously > >experiencing anything. Same as a mobile phone (no need to believe in > >the atheist pansychics story)? > > "Always" is a long time. I think it depends on the robot. I don't know > if someday, we will or will not believe that the best explanation for > a robot includes the belief that it is consciously experiencing > things. I know the Cartesians believed that non-human animals were not > conscious, and so they would have said that if these animals can be > explained, they can be explained without believing that they are > consciously experiencing anything. Nowadays we believe that at least > some animals have conscious experience, and we use that in explaining > them. Someday we may believe the same about some robots. If we do, > will we necessarily be wrong? If so, why? > So you think that one day, the robot's behaviour won't be able to be explained in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 On 29 Jun, 20:08, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 29 Jun, 19:19, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > > > > > > > someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: > > > >On 29 Jun, 17:54, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > > <...> > > >> I follow that, but I (still) don't think it is stated very well. Such > > >> a claim by a materialist would be better stated something like this: > > >> "Matter, energy, space, time and fields, are all there is. Matter > > >> exists as atoms that can form into molecules. At the present time I > > >> have no reason to rule out the possibility that there might someday be > > >> conscious entities (e.g., conscious robots) made of molecules that > > >> differ from those currently found in conscious entities (e.g., human > > >> beings)." > > > >> I don't know of any reason to rule out this possibility, but in itself > > >> my ignorance is not an argument that it is possible. > > > >> While you are under no obligation to do so, I would ask for your > > >> thought on where you think we should look, for an explanation of > > >> consciousness; or alternatively, do you think consciousness should be > > >> treated as a fundamental constituent of reality, as the materialist > > >> treats matter or space? Or whatever else you want to say. > > > >Sure, I can do that later, at the moment do you mind if we stick to > > >the point and just go through the implausibility of materialism. Later > > >I can address the issue of whether although it is implausible, it must > > >be true, as there is no other explanation. > > > >So you could follow that though some atheists might claim we are > > >simply a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have > > >conscious experiences, as why should there be anything special about > > >the meat machine. [it isn't a definition of materialism btw] > > > >Can you also follow that with a robot though, it can always be > > >explained simply as a mechanism following the laws of physics, without > > >any need to believe in any atheist story that it was consciously > > >experiencing anything. Same as a mobile phone (no need to believe in > > >the atheist pansychics story)? > > > "Always" is a long time. I think it depends on the robot. I don't know > > if someday, we will or will not believe that the best explanation for > > a robot includes the belief that it is consciously experiencing > > things. I know the Cartesians believed that non-human animals were not > > conscious, and so they would have said that if these animals can be > > explained, they can be explained without believing that they are > > consciously experiencing anything. Nowadays we believe that at least > > some animals have conscious experience, and we use that in explaining > > them. Someday we may believe the same about some robots. If we do, > > will we necessarily be wrong? If so, why? > > So you think that one day, the robot's behaviour won't be able to be > explained in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics?> The reason I said that, is that you started with " 'Always' is a long time" as though you were disagreeing with the point made that: Can you also follow that with a robot though, it can always be explained simply as a mechanism following the laws of physics, withhout any need to believe in any atheist story that it was consciously experiencing anything. Same as a mobile phone (no need to believe in the atheist pansychics story)? Quote
Guest Jim07D7 Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> said: >On 29 Jun, 19:19, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >On 29 Jun, 17:54, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: >> <...> >> >> I follow that, but I (still) don't think it is stated very well. Such >> >> a claim by a materialist would be better stated something like this: >> >> "Matter, energy, space, time and fields, are all there is. Matter >> >> exists as atoms that can form into molecules. At the present time I >> >> have no reason to rule out the possibility that there might someday be >> >> conscious entities (e.g., conscious robots) made of molecules that >> >> differ from those currently found in conscious entities (e.g., human >> >> beings)." >> >> >> I don't know of any reason to rule out this possibility, but in itself >> >> my ignorance is not an argument that it is possible. >> >> >> While you are under no obligation to do so, I would ask for your >> >> thought on where you think we should look, for an explanation of >> >> consciousness; or alternatively, do you think consciousness should be >> >> treated as a fundamental constituent of reality, as the materialist >> >> treats matter or space? Or whatever else you want to say. >> >> >Sure, I can do that later, at the moment do you mind if we stick to >> >the point and just go through the implausibility of materialism. Later >> >I can address the issue of whether although it is implausible, it must >> >be true, as there is no other explanation. >> >> >So you could follow that though some atheists might claim we are >> >simply a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have >> >conscious experiences, as why should there be anything special about >> >the meat machine. [it isn't a definition of materialism btw] >> >> >Can you also follow that with a robot though, it can always be >> >explained simply as a mechanism following the laws of physics, without >> >any need to believe in any atheist story that it was consciously >> >experiencing anything. Same as a mobile phone (no need to believe in >> >the atheist pansychics story)? >> >> "Always" is a long time. I think it depends on the robot. I don't know >> if someday, we will or will not believe that the best explanation for >> a robot includes the belief that it is consciously experiencing >> things. I know the Cartesians believed that non-human animals were not >> conscious, and so they would have said that if these animals can be >> explained, they can be explained without believing that they are >> consciously experiencing anything. Nowadays we believe that at least >> some animals have conscious experience, and we use that in explaining >> them. Someday we may believe the same about some robots. If we do, >> will we necessarily be wrong? If so, why? >> > >So you think that one day, the robot's behaviour won't be able to be >explained in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics? Well, I certainly didn't say that. Let me explain. You coupled "(1) it can always be explained simply as a mechanism following the laws of physics" with "(2) without any need to believe in any atheist story that it was consciously experiencing anything." First, I made a change from a "need" to explain as conscious, to whether explaining as conscious might become the "best" way to go. I think this change is essential. The question of what makes for the "best" explanation is left open, here, perhaps for more discussion, perhaps not. Second, it may be that the robot's behavior can be fully explained in terms of the mechanisms following the laws of physics, regardless of whether we decide it is conscious. For example, this ability could depend on whether we built a conscious robot start to finish, in which case we will be applying known theories, or we start a class of non-conscious robots on an evolutionary road toward consciousness, but do not keep track of the software and hardware changes they are making as consciousness emerges (if it can). In this latter case it will be a matter of our being intelligent enough to see how current theories apply, or to develop any new or revised physics theories that explain how they did it -- if they give us access. ;-) Third, it may be that the "best" way to explain it, even if we can explain it by physics, will be to explain it by psychology. I don't know. For example, in humans, we can explain and treat some disorders with drugs (at the brain chemistry level) or with talk therapy, at the psychological level. Will those two alternatives exist for robots someday? I see no reason to say yes or no. Do you? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 29, 2007 Posted June 29, 2007 On 29 Jun, 23:26, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: > > > > > > >On 29 Jun, 19:19, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said: > > >> >On 29 Jun, 17:54, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > >> <...> > >> >> I follow that, but I (still) don't think it is stated very well. Such > >> >> a claim by a materialist would be better stated something like this: > >> >> "Matter, energy, space, time and fields, are all there is. Matter > >> >> exists as atoms that can form into molecules. At the present time I > >> >> have no reason to rule out the possibility that there might someday be > >> >> conscious entities (e.g., conscious robots) made of molecules that > >> >> differ from those currently found in conscious entities (e.g., human > >> >> beings)." > > >> >> I don't know of any reason to rule out this possibility, but in itself > >> >> my ignorance is not an argument that it is possible. > > >> >> While you are under no obligation to do so, I would ask for your > >> >> thought on where you think we should look, for an explanation of > >> >> consciousness; or alternatively, do you think consciousness should be > >> >> treated as a fundamental constituent of reality, as the materialist > >> >> treats matter or space? Or whatever else you want to say. > > >> >Sure, I can do that later, at the moment do you mind if we stick to > >> >the point and just go through the implausibility of materialism. Later > >> >I can address the issue of whether although it is implausible, it must > >> >be true, as there is no other explanation. > > >> >So you could follow that though some atheists might claim we are > >> >simply a meat machine, and then suggest a robot could also have > >> >conscious experiences, as why should there be anything special about > >> >the meat machine. [it isn't a definition of materialism btw] > > >> >Can you also follow that with a robot though, it can always be > >> >explained simply as a mechanism following the laws of physics, without > >> >any need to believe in any atheist story that it was consciously > >> >experiencing anything. Same as a mobile phone (no need to believe in > >> >the atheist pansychics story)? > > >> "Always" is a long time. I think it depends on the robot. I don't know > >> if someday, we will or will not believe that the best explanation for > >> a robot includes the belief that it is consciously experiencing > >> things. I know the Cartesians believed that non-human animals were not > >> conscious, and so they would have said that if these animals can be > >> explained, they can be explained without believing that they are > >> consciously experiencing anything. Nowadays we believe that at least > >> some animals have conscious experience, and we use that in explaining > >> them. Someday we may believe the same about some robots. If we do, > >> will we necessarily be wrong? If so, why? > > >So you think that one day, the robot's behaviour won't be able to be > >explained in terms of the mechanism following the laws of physics? > > Well, I certainly didn't say that. Let me explain. > > You coupled "(1) it can always be explained simply as a mechanism > following the laws of physics" with "(2) without any need to believe > in any atheist story that it was consciously experiencing anything." > > First, I made a change from a "need" to explain as conscious, to > whether explaining as conscious might become the "best" way to go. I > think this change is essential. > > The question of what makes for the "best" explanation is left open, > here, perhaps for more discussion, perhaps not. > > Second, it may be that the robot's behavior can be fully explained in > terms of the mechanisms following the laws of physics, regardless of > whether we decide it is conscious. For example, this ability could > depend on whether we built a conscious robot start to finish, in which > case we will be applying known theories, or we start a class of > non-conscious robots on an evolutionary road toward consciousness, but > do not keep track of the software and hardware changes they are making > as consciousness emerges (if it can). In this latter case it will be a > matter of our being intelligent enough to see how current theories > apply, or to develop any new or revised physics theories that explain > how they did it -- if they give us access. ;-) > > Third, it may be that the "best" way to explain it, even if we can > explain it by physics, will be to explain it by psychology. I don't > know. For example, in humans, we can explain and treat some disorders > with drugs (at the brain chemistry level) or with talk therapy, at the > psychological level. Will those two alternatives exist for robots > someday? I see no reason to say yes or no. Do you? > So you do agree with the following: Can you also follow that with a robot though, it can always be explained simply as a mechanism following the laws of physics, without any need to believe in any atheist story that it was consciously experiencing anything. Same as a mobile phone (no need to believe in the atheist pansychics story)? It isn't about whether you think the explanation would be better with the story on top. Quote
Recommended Posts
Join the conversation
You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.