Guest someone2 Posted July 9, 2007 Posted July 9, 2007 On 9 Jul, 22:43, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > jien...@aol.com said: > > > > > > >On Jul 9, 2:40 pm, Matt Silberstein > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> On Fri, 29 Jun 2007 05:40:25 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> <1183120825.782515.196...@n2g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > >> [snip] > > >> >If we were like the robot, simply meat machines, then the same would > >> >hold for us. In which case it would have to be a coincidence the > >> >conscious experiences the 'meat machine' talked [about] actually existed (they > >> >couldn't have been influencing the behaviour). > > >> Sorry, but this still makes no sense to me > > >You snipped what "the same" referred (was agreed?) to, but I think I > >can take a cut a further explanation in hopes it might help you make > >sense of it. The context of all of this, to remind, is that a present- > >laws-of-physics explanation completely explains all (observable) > >behavior, in particular the behavior of any given human; that is the > >Materialistic premise. > > The materialism that someone2 is imagining, is as you say. It is a > Straw Man, because materialism does not definitionally limit itself to > a "present-laws" explanation of behavior. The misrepresentation that > materialism is based on the physics of 2007 (or, more likely, in > someone2's mind, of 1907) underlies much of the mistaken conclusion > that it is implausible. > > Materialism is, it should be said, an unprovable metaphysical > commitment, in that it depends on the unverifiable premise that it can > in principle explain all phenomena without reference to immaterial > entities. Inductive predictions of future success can be drawn from > the success of materialism (or, more properly, physicalism) -- but > inductive conclusions are always provisional. > > >So (the argument goes) there is no influence > >upon the behavior by anything not within-the-laws-of-physics. The > >laws of physics as presently constituted make no use whatsoever of > >conscious experiences as explanatory phenomena. So under the > >Materialist premise, conscious experiences do not influence observed > >behavior. > > Of course we know that physics does not rule out conscious > deliberation as an intermediate between imputs and outputs, that is > influential by virtue of its utility in developing outputs based on > imputs. Materialism only rules out consciousness as indicative of an > immaterial entity whose influence has no material cause. The > reductionist will say that physics will make room for conscious > experience. > > It is only eliminative materialism that will not, but if someones2's > brief was against eliminative materialism, I doubt he'd cause much > stir. > > > > >Conscious experiences may certainly be physically _caused_ under the > >Materialist premise (perhaps "emergent"), but they are an > >_effect_only_ and not the cause of any behavior themselves. > > Contrary to the conclusion that conscious experience has no effect, it > could be the materialist's position that the occurrence of conscious > experience is a material phenomenon, and its occurrence implies that > it has some utility, and if the current laws of physics see no use for > it, the current laws of physics need study and modification. > > > > >Now part of observable behavior of humans is "talking about conscious > >experiences". That behavior is not _caused_ by any of the conscious > >experiences so talked about. For example, I couldn't be saying "I > >have pain in my foot" because I feel pain in my foot. Both the > >feeling and the talking could be physically sourced by some common > >cause, but in no way could the feeling-of-pain itself be any part of > >the cause of the talking-of-pain. That is the "coincidental" aspect > >that "someone" finds implausible. > > His conclusion is due to his positing materialism in the way you have > described. > > >Probably because so much of our > >psychological, social, and intellectual systems rely on the exact > >opposite premise -- that our _subjective_ selves are the cause of our > >behavior and not just some side-effect (side show) of the universe. > > This false dichotomy follows from someone2's false view of > materialism. > > >(Compare all the successful jury nullification going on in the U.S. > >judicial system by appeal to "Johnny was the victim of xxxx physical > >circumstances, as we've proved, and is thus not really guilty of the > >crime his physical body committed." Or let's take an example perhaps > >closer to your own interests -- the raiding in Darfur; just a bunch of > >physical activity unfolding in its own course without any possible > >influence from appeals to solely subjectively-experienced things like > >ethics and morality, let alone emotion. Plausible?) > > Ethics and morality represent learned, internalized values, which must > be evaluated along with other learned and/or genetically internalized > elements, such as fear, hate, greed, etc, if external influences call > for a decision and action that may affect the decider. When > functioning, the human considers and estimates which output will best > satisfy the needs of the self-concept she has formed. It is the > utility of a self-concept, that makes conscious experience useful and > influential as part of the flow of events. > So what you're saying is that the impression given to children in the biology classes that we can be explained as a biological mechanism following the known laws of physics is misleading. The disagreement between the physicalists and the theists is the nature of the divergence from the known laws of physics that both fully expect to find. The physicalists will consider it to be connected to a 'special' configuration, and it being very complicated, whereas the theists will be saying that it would be the influence of the spiritual being that is experiencing being a human. The theists might also believe that though the divergence exists, it may never be found, due to what they consciously experience being set up in a way that that it wouldn't be found. Quote
Guest Matt Silberstein Posted July 9, 2007 Posted July 9, 2007 On Mon, 09 Jul 2007 13:04:11 -0700, in alt.atheism , jientho@aol.com in <1184011451.680502.65440@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: >On Jul 9, 2:40 pm, Matt Silberstein ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> On Fri, 29 Jun 2007 05:40:25 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> <1183120825.782515.196...@n2g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> [snip] >> >> >If we were like the robot, simply meat machines, then the same would >> >hold for us. In which case it would have to be a coincidence the >> >conscious experiences the 'meat machine' talked [about] actually existed (they >> >couldn't have been influencing the behaviour). >> >> Sorry, but this still makes no sense to me > >You snipped what "the same" referred (was agreed?) to, Because that was not relevant to my question. >but I think I >can take a cut a further explanation in hopes it might help you make >sense of it. The context of all of this, to remind, is that a present- >laws-of-physics explanation completely explains all (observable) >behavior, in particular the behavior of any given human; No one claims that we a current natural (I have no idea why you keep referring to physics only) explanation for all behavior. But neither is their particularly good reasons to think that some non-natural expiation will somehow work. >that is the >Materialistic premise. You might look up Physicalism, an idea that has pretty much replaced materialism. >So (the argument goes) there is no influence >upon the behavior by anything not within-the-laws-of-physics. That is, we can explain behavior with naturalistic explanations asserting naturalistic causes. >The >laws of physics as presently constituted make no use whatsoever of >conscious experiences as explanatory phenomena. That is, science sees conscious experience as an explanandum, not an explanation. >So under the >Materialist premise, conscious experiences do not influence observed >behavior. And here you are wrong. The assertion is that conscious experience is a physical process and so influences other physical processes. >Conscious experiences may certainly be physically _caused_ under the >Materialist premise (perhaps "emergent"), but they are an >_effect_only_ and not the cause of any behavior themselves. The "only" is not justified. Electricity is a physical process, it is explained by the laws of physics. But an electric flow is also part of the explanation of the working of a light bulb. >Now part of observable behavior of humans is "talking about conscious >experiences". That behavior is not _caused_ by any of the conscious >experiences so talked about. For example, I couldn't be saying "I >have pain in my foot" because I feel pain in my foot. I don't see why not. > Both the >feeling and the talking could be physically sourced by some common >cause, but in no way could the feeling-of-pain itself be any part of >the cause of the talking-of-pain. That simply makes no sense to me. I have no idea why you assert this. Every physical explanation I have seen for conscious actions would assert that something in the foot (perhaps, perceived foot pain does not have to originate in the foot) would affect the physical body which would react with, among other things, nerve impulses that would travel to the brain and set off various reactions that become the perception of pain. That perception would, in turn, lead to other reactions that might include the act of saying "my foot hurts". An entirely physical process. > That is the "coincidental" aspect >that "someone" finds implausible. Probably because so much of our >psychological, social, and intellectual systems rely on the exact >opposite premise -- that our _subjective_ selves are the cause of our >behavior and not just some side-effect (side show) of the universe. >(Compare all the successful jury nullification going on in the U.S. >judicial system by appeal to "Johnny was the victim of xxxx physical >circumstances, as we've proved, and is thus not really guilty of the >crime his physical body committed." That is a different set of issues and has little to do with jury nullification. >Or let's take an example perhaps >closer to your own interests -- the raiding in Darfur; just a bunch of >physical activity unfolding in its own course without any possible >influence from appeals to solely subjectively-experienced things like >ethics and morality, let alone emotion. Plausible?) Sorry, but Hume dealt with this ages ago. The "is" does not lead to the "ought". Morality is a human process. You are not going to fool me with this nonsense. -- Matt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" Quote
Guest Matt Silberstein Posted July 9, 2007 Posted July 9, 2007 On Mon, 09 Jul 2007 15:09:39 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> in <1184018979.751012.54710@o61g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote: >On 9 Jul, 19:40, Matt Silberstein ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> On Fri, 29 Jun 2007 05:40:25 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> <1183120825.782515.196...@n2g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> [snip] >> >> >If we were like the robot, simply meat machines, then the same would >> >hold for us. In which case it would have to be a coincidence the >> >conscious experiences the 'meat machine' talked actually existed (they >> >couldn't have been influencing the behaviour). >> >> Sorry, but this still makes no sense to me and you have yet to get >> beyond this unsupported claim. It is not a coincidence, there is >> physical activity that goes on affecting conscious experience. You >> have a host of hidden assumptions that you refuse, it seems, to make >> explicit or explore. >> >> >Are the athiests having a problem following it (maybe the complexity >> >of it), or just having a problem that you believed an implausible >> >story? >> >> Or maybe people (not just atheists) disagree with your unsupported >> claims. >> > >Well maybe this example will help what I am saying make sense to you. > >Supposing there was an artificial neural network, with a billion more >nodes than you had neurons in your brain, and a very 'complicated' >configuration, which drove a robot. The robot, due to its behaviour >(being a Turing Equivalent), That last bit makes me suspect you really don't understand computers. > caused some atheists to claim it was >consciously experiencing. Now supposing each message between each node >contained additional information such as source node, destination node >(which could be the same as the source node, for feedback loops), the >time the message was sent, and the message. Each node wrote out to a >log on receipt of a message, and on sending a message out. Now after >an hour of the atheist communicating with the robot, the logs could be >examined by a bank of computers, varifying, that for the input >messages each received, the outputs were those expected by a single >node in a lab given the same inputs. They could also varify that no >unexplained messages appeared. SFW? >What would you be saying with regards to it consciously experiencing: > >A) The atheists, mentioned in the example, were wrong to consider it >to be consciously experiencing. There is not enough information in the example to allow this determination. That the state can be written out is not relevant. That the person was an atheist is also not relevant. >B) Were correct to say that was consciously experiencing, but that it >doesn't influence behaviour. Why? >C) It might have been consciously experiencing, how could you tell, it >doesn't influence behaviour. Huh? >D) It was consciously experiencing and that influenced its behaviour. >If you select D, as all the nodes are giving the same outputs as they >would have singly in the lab given the same inputs, could you also >select between D1, and D2: >D1) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were also influenced >by conscious experiences. >D2) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were not influenced >by conscious experiences, but the influence of the conscious >experiences within the robot, is such that the outputs are the same as >without the influence of the conscious experiences. I forget the name of this error at the moment, but sets can have properties that the members don't have and members can have properties that the set does not have. I vote, but the population of New York, as a population, does not vote. Conscious experience is not a property of a single cell. So, again and still, I have no idea where you "coincidence" claim comes from. -- Matt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1183977562.424680.235890@r34g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > On 9 Jul, 09:03, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> D1) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were also influenced >> >> by conscious experiences. >> >> They were influenced by emulated conscious experiences. >> >> If you provide it with the same inputs that the other nodes the encoded >> the >> consious experience would have supplied. >> >> >> D2) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were not influenced >> >> by conscious experiences, but the influence of the conscious >> >> experiences within the robot, is such that the outputs are the same as >> >> without the influence of the conscious experiences. >> >> If the inputs are the same, the outputs are the same. >> >> In the lab, the inputs were directly set to emulate those of consicous >> experience encoded in the rest of the network, and so produced the same >> results >> >> >> or >> >> E) Avoid answering (like the other atheists so far) >> >> I'd prefer >> >> F) The combination of the nodes encodes the conscious experience >> >> > Saw you just post, was wondering whether you were going to maybe be >> > the first atheist on the forum to actually answer. >> >> I missed your earlier reply, or I would have- Hide quoted text - >> > > Regarding D2, lets say one node acted as an OR gate, and received > inputs from 1000 nodes, the input on one channel representing a 1, > thus the outputs it gave on its 100 output channels was a 1. Are you > suggesting that what caused one input channel to be 1, and the other > 999 to be 0 would give the node in the lab the appropriate conscious > experience? I never claimed a single node is conscious. Just as I would not claim a single neuron in the brain is conscious (even though it is a little more complicated than an OR gate). Just as I would not claim a molecule or an atom or an electron or... as conscious. Would you call an electron or proton a human being .. even though human beings have countless such particles within them? All you are possibly demonstrating is that an individual node is not conscious. That does not mean the neural network is not conscious. See my alternative F above Try again Quote
Guest James Norris Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 On Jul 9, 11:05�pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 9 Jul, 16:46, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On Jul 9, 11:26?am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 9 Jul, 03:41, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > > > [...] > > > > So you are asking the atheists "Would the robot's supposed conscious > > > > experiences affect the outputs?". Quote
Guest Jim07D7 Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 "Jeckyl" <noone@nowhere.com> said: >"someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message >news:1183977562.424680.235890@r34g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... >> On 9 Jul, 09:03, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: >>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >>> >> D1) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were also influenced >>> >> by conscious experiences. >>> >>> They were influenced by emulated conscious experiences. >>> >>> If you provide it with the same inputs that the other nodes the encoded >>> the >>> consious experience would have supplied. >>> >>> >> D2) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were not influenced >>> >> by conscious experiences, but the influence of the conscious >>> >> experiences within the robot, is such that the outputs are the same as >>> >> without the influence of the conscious experiences. >>> >>> If the inputs are the same, the outputs are the same. >>> >>> In the lab, the inputs were directly set to emulate those of consicous >>> experience encoded in the rest of the network, and so produced the same >>> results >>> >>> >> or >>> >> E) Avoid answering (like the other atheists so far) >>> >>> I'd prefer >>> >>> F) The combination of the nodes encodes the conscious experience >>> >>> > Saw you just post, was wondering whether you were going to maybe be >>> > the first atheist on the forum to actually answer. >>> >>> I missed your earlier reply, or I would have- Hide quoted text - >>> >> >> Regarding D2, lets say one node acted as an OR gate, and received >> inputs from 1000 nodes, the input on one channel representing a 1, >> thus the outputs it gave on its 100 output channels was a 1. Are you >> suggesting that what caused one input channel to be 1, and the other >> 999 to be 0 would give the node in the lab the appropriate conscious >> experience? > >I never claimed a single node is conscious. Just as I would not claim a >single neuron in the brain is conscious (even though it is a little more >complicated than an OR gate). Just as I would not claim a molecule or an >atom or an electron or... as conscious. > >Would you call an electron or proton a human being .. even though human >beings have countless such particles within them? > >All you are possibly demonstrating is that an individual node is not >conscious. That does not mean the neural network is not conscious. > >See my alternative F above > >Try again > THis started IIRC, with "what if" a complex network's outputs were replaceable by a single node. Now the single node is an OR gate? Quote
Guest Matt Silberstein Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 On Mon, 09 Jul 2007 15:21:18 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> in <1184019678.047361.253960@22g2000hsm.googlegroups.com> wrote: >On 9 Jul, 22:43, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: >> jien...@aol.com said: >> >> >> >> >> >> >On Jul 9, 2:40 pm, Matt Silberstein >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> On Fri, 29 Jun 2007 05:40:25 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> <1183120825.782515.196...@n2g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> >> [snip] >> >> >> >If we were like the robot, simply meat machines, then the same would >> >> >hold for us. In which case it would have to be a coincidence the >> >> >conscious experiences the 'meat machine' talked [about] actually existed (they >> >> >couldn't have been influencing the behaviour). >> >> >> Sorry, but this still makes no sense to me >> >> >You snipped what "the same" referred (was agreed?) to, but I think I >> >can take a cut a further explanation in hopes it might help you make >> >sense of it. The context of all of this, to remind, is that a present- >> >laws-of-physics explanation completely explains all (observable) >> >behavior, in particular the behavior of any given human; that is the >> >Materialistic premise. >> >> The materialism that someone2 is imagining, is as you say. It is a >> Straw Man, because materialism does not definitionally limit itself to >> a "present-laws" explanation of behavior. The misrepresentation that >> materialism is based on the physics of 2007 (or, more likely, in >> someone2's mind, of 1907) underlies much of the mistaken conclusion >> that it is implausible. >> >> Materialism is, it should be said, an unprovable metaphysical >> commitment, in that it depends on the unverifiable premise that it can >> in principle explain all phenomena without reference to immaterial >> entities. Inductive predictions of future success can be drawn from >> the success of materialism (or, more properly, physicalism) -- but >> inductive conclusions are always provisional. >> >> >So (the argument goes) there is no influence >> >upon the behavior by anything not within-the-laws-of-physics. The >> >laws of physics as presently constituted make no use whatsoever of >> >conscious experiences as explanatory phenomena. So under the >> >Materialist premise, conscious experiences do not influence observed >> >behavior. >> >> Of course we know that physics does not rule out conscious >> deliberation as an intermediate between imputs and outputs, that is >> influential by virtue of its utility in developing outputs based on >> imputs. Materialism only rules out consciousness as indicative of an >> immaterial entity whose influence has no material cause. The >> reductionist will say that physics will make room for conscious >> experience. >> >> It is only eliminative materialism that will not, but if someones2's >> brief was against eliminative materialism, I doubt he'd cause much >> stir. >> >> >> >> >Conscious experiences may certainly be physically _caused_ under the >> >Materialist premise (perhaps "emergent"), but they are an >> >_effect_only_ and not the cause of any behavior themselves. >> >> Contrary to the conclusion that conscious experience has no effect, it >> could be the materialist's position that the occurrence of conscious >> experience is a material phenomenon, and its occurrence implies that >> it has some utility, and if the current laws of physics see no use for >> it, the current laws of physics need study and modification. >> >> >> >> >Now part of observable behavior of humans is "talking about conscious >> >experiences". That behavior is not _caused_ by any of the conscious >> >experiences so talked about. For example, I couldn't be saying "I >> >have pain in my foot" because I feel pain in my foot. Both the >> >feeling and the talking could be physically sourced by some common >> >cause, but in no way could the feeling-of-pain itself be any part of >> >the cause of the talking-of-pain. That is the "coincidental" aspect >> >that "someone" finds implausible. >> >> His conclusion is due to his positing materialism in the way you have >> described. >> >> >Probably because so much of our >> >psychological, social, and intellectual systems rely on the exact >> >opposite premise -- that our _subjective_ selves are the cause of our >> >behavior and not just some side-effect (side show) of the universe. >> >> This false dichotomy follows from someone2's false view of >> materialism. >> >> >(Compare all the successful jury nullification going on in the U.S. >> >judicial system by appeal to "Johnny was the victim of xxxx physical >> >circumstances, as we've proved, and is thus not really guilty of the >> >crime his physical body committed." Or let's take an example perhaps >> >closer to your own interests -- the raiding in Darfur; just a bunch of >> >physical activity unfolding in its own course without any possible >> >influence from appeals to solely subjectively-experienced things like >> >ethics and morality, let alone emotion. Plausible?) >> >> Ethics and morality represent learned, internalized values, which must >> be evaluated along with other learned and/or genetically internalized >> elements, such as fear, hate, greed, etc, if external influences call >> for a decision and action that may affect the decider. When >> functioning, the human considers and estimates which output will best >> satisfy the needs of the self-concept she has formed. It is the >> utility of a self-concept, that makes conscious experience useful and >> influential as part of the flow of events. >> > >So what you're saying is that the impression given to children in the >biology classes that we can be explained as a biological mechanism >following the known laws of physics is misleading. No, he is not saying that. Again, I can "explain" my computer in terms of quarks. That explanation will not (necessarily) have a section on a newsreader, yet my computer has a physical newsreader. You should read up on the notion of levels of explanation. >The disagreement between the physicalists and the theists is the >nature of the divergence from the known laws of physics that both >fully expect to find. The physicalists will consider it to be >connected to a 'special' configuration, and it being very complicated, I have no idea where you get that. I am a physicalist (which does not say a thing about my belief in any g(G)od(s) ), and I don't expect any divergence from a natural universe. That does not mean I think that we currently have all of the "laws of physics" (and we certainly don't have a full understanding of how stuff works. >whereas the theists will be saying that it would be the influence of >the spiritual being that is experiencing being a human. Some theists might well say that. >The theists >might also believe that though the divergence exists, it may never be >found, due to what they consciously experience being set up in a way >that that it wouldn't be found. -- Matt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1184018743.898170.104030@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > On 9 Jul, 16:46, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: >> When you write 'where conscious experiences do not influence >> behaviour', I take it you mean 'where the hypothetical conscious >> experiences of the neural network do not influence the behaviour of >> the neural network', because conscious experiences in a neural network >> and its behaviour is what your earlier questions were about. So your >> next sentence must mean something along the lines of 'taking the >> analogy of human behaviour, if a human brain was not influenced by its >> conscious experiences, but the human brain indicated (by talking) that >> it was influenced by conscious experiences, what it was saying would >> be irrelevant'. If that's what you mean, I agree with you. The human >> could just be in a trance, automatically reciting a sentence about >> consciousness that was triggered by some external input, without >> consciously experiencing anything. So where do you go from there?> > > Well, it is implausible that we aren't influenced by our conscious > experiences Yes > therefore we cannot be simply a mechanism like the robot > in the example, where there is no conscious influence Obviously. But we are the same as a robot where ther IS conscious influence > the outputs > (which determine the behaviour) are the same as they are for a single > node in the lab which is uninfluenced by conscious experiences. Just like the outputs for a single neuron are the same in a lab which is uninfluenced by conscious experiences. It would be like looking at a single or-gate in a computer and claiming that 3d graphics games are not possible because the or-gate does not show any signs of being one. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1184019678.047361.253960@22g2000hsm.googlegroups.com... > So what you're saying is that the impression given to children in the > biology classes that we can be explained as a biological mechanism > following the known laws of physics is misleading. I'm not > The disagreement between the physicalists and the theists is the > nature of the divergence from the known laws of physics that both > fully expect to find. There is no divergence from physics. There may be some laws of physics that are not yetdiscovered, however, science isn't finished yet > The physicalists will consider it to be > connected to a 'special' configuration, and it being very complicated, But that does not put it outside the realm of physics .. it just makes it complicated > whereas the theists will be saying that it would be the influence of > the spiritual being that is experiencing being a human. Something for which there is absolutely no evidence, nor any logical argument for its existence. Whereas the phsyciallist has much evidence of us being biological mechanisms, and our consciousness being part of the mechanism. > The theists > might also believe that though the divergence exists, it may never be > found, due to what they consciously experience being set up in a way > that that it wouldn't be found. The theist position is not a logical or rational position .. it is one of faith despite lack of evidence (or evidence to the contrary). That is why you've failed in putting forward a logical argument that supports your illogical conclusions. Quote
Guest Jim07D7 Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nospam@ix.netcom.com> said: >On Mon, 09 Jul 2007 15:21:18 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 ><glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> in ><1184019678.047361.253960@22g2000hsm.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >>On 9 Jul, 22:43, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: >>> jien...@aol.com said: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >On Jul 9, 2:40 pm, Matt Silberstein >>> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >>> >> On Fri, 29 Jun 2007 05:40:25 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >>> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >>> >>> >> <1183120825.782515.196...@n2g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: >>> >>> >> [snip] >>> >>> >> >If we were like the robot, simply meat machines, then the same would >>> >> >hold for us. In which case it would have to be a coincidence the >>> >> >conscious experiences the 'meat machine' talked [about] actually existed (they >>> >> >couldn't have been influencing the behaviour). >>> >>> >> Sorry, but this still makes no sense to me >>> >>> >You snipped what "the same" referred (was agreed?) to, but I think I >>> >can take a cut a further explanation in hopes it might help you make >>> >sense of it. The context of all of this, to remind, is that a present- >>> >laws-of-physics explanation completely explains all (observable) >>> >behavior, in particular the behavior of any given human; that is the >>> >Materialistic premise. >>> >>> The materialism that someone2 is imagining, is as you say. It is a >>> Straw Man, because materialism does not definitionally limit itself to >>> a "present-laws" explanation of behavior. The misrepresentation that >>> materialism is based on the physics of 2007 (or, more likely, in >>> someone2's mind, of 1907) underlies much of the mistaken conclusion >>> that it is implausible. >>> >>> Materialism is, it should be said, an unprovable metaphysical >>> commitment, in that it depends on the unverifiable premise that it can >>> in principle explain all phenomena without reference to immaterial >>> entities. Inductive predictions of future success can be drawn from >>> the success of materialism (or, more properly, physicalism) -- but >>> inductive conclusions are always provisional. >>> >>> >So (the argument goes) there is no influence >>> >upon the behavior by anything not within-the-laws-of-physics. The >>> >laws of physics as presently constituted make no use whatsoever of >>> >conscious experiences as explanatory phenomena. So under the >>> >Materialist premise, conscious experiences do not influence observed >>> >behavior. >>> >>> Of course we know that physics does not rule out conscious >>> deliberation as an intermediate between imputs and outputs, that is >>> influential by virtue of its utility in developing outputs based on >>> imputs. Materialism only rules out consciousness as indicative of an >>> immaterial entity whose influence has no material cause. The >>> reductionist will say that physics will make room for conscious >>> experience. >>> >>> It is only eliminative materialism that will not, but if someones2's >>> brief was against eliminative materialism, I doubt he'd cause much >>> stir. >>> >>> >>> >>> >Conscious experiences may certainly be physically _caused_ under the >>> >Materialist premise (perhaps "emergent"), but they are an >>> >_effect_only_ and not the cause of any behavior themselves. >>> >>> Contrary to the conclusion that conscious experience has no effect, it >>> could be the materialist's position that the occurrence of conscious >>> experience is a material phenomenon, and its occurrence implies that >>> it has some utility, and if the current laws of physics see no use for >>> it, the current laws of physics need study and modification. >>> >>> >>> >>> >Now part of observable behavior of humans is "talking about conscious >>> >experiences". That behavior is not _caused_ by any of the conscious >>> >experiences so talked about. For example, I couldn't be saying "I >>> >have pain in my foot" because I feel pain in my foot. Both the >>> >feeling and the talking could be physically sourced by some common >>> >cause, but in no way could the feeling-of-pain itself be any part of >>> >the cause of the talking-of-pain. That is the "coincidental" aspect >>> >that "someone" finds implausible. >>> >>> His conclusion is due to his positing materialism in the way you have >>> described. >>> >>> >Probably because so much of our >>> >psychological, social, and intellectual systems rely on the exact >>> >opposite premise -- that our _subjective_ selves are the cause of our >>> >behavior and not just some side-effect (side show) of the universe. >>> >>> This false dichotomy follows from someone2's false view of >>> materialism. >>> >>> >(Compare all the successful jury nullification going on in the U.S. >>> >judicial system by appeal to "Johnny was the victim of xxxx physical >>> >circumstances, as we've proved, and is thus not really guilty of the >>> >crime his physical body committed." Or let's take an example perhaps >>> >closer to your own interests -- the raiding in Darfur; just a bunch of >>> >physical activity unfolding in its own course without any possible >>> >influence from appeals to solely subjectively-experienced things like >>> >ethics and morality, let alone emotion. Plausible?) >>> >>> Ethics and morality represent learned, internalized values, which must >>> be evaluated along with other learned and/or genetically internalized >>> elements, such as fear, hate, greed, etc, if external influences call >>> for a decision and action that may affect the decider. When >>> functioning, the human considers and estimates which output will best >>> satisfy the needs of the self-concept she has formed. It is the >>> utility of a self-concept, that makes conscious experience useful and >>> influential as part of the flow of events. >>> >> >>So what you're saying is that the impression given to children in the >>biology classes that we can be explained as a biological mechanism >>following the known laws of physics is misleading. > >No, he is not saying that. Again, I can "explain" my computer in terms >of quarks. That explanation will not (necessarily) have a section on a >newsreader, yet my computer has a physical newsreader. You should read >up on the notion of levels of explanation. Also, Someone2 and Jeff seem to be in disagreement about whether the so-called " present-laws-of-physics" approach is to be applied. I prefer to see if Jeff is capable of making the distinction -- I doubt that someone2 is. Quote
Guest Sippuddin Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 someone2 wrote: > The theists > might also believe that though the divergence exists, it may never be > found, due to what they consciously experience being set up in a way > that that it wouldn't be found. > That's the fallacy of creating an ad hoc hypothesis. "An ad hoc hypothesis is one created to explain away facts that seem to refute one's theory." -- http://skepdic.com/adhoc.html Quote
Guest someone2 Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 On 10 Jul, 01:43, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> said: > > > > > > >"someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > >news:1183977562.424680.235890@r34g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > >> On 9 Jul, 09:03, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > >>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > >>> >> D1) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were also influenced > >>> >> by conscious experiences. > > >>> They were influenced by emulated conscious experiences. > > >>> If you provide it with the same inputs that the other nodes the encoded > >>> the > >>> consious experience would have supplied. > > >>> >> D2) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were not influenced > >>> >> by conscious experiences, but the influence of the conscious > >>> >> experiences within the robot, is such that the outputs are the same as > >>> >> without the influence of the conscious experiences. > > >>> If the inputs are the same, the outputs are the same. > > >>> In the lab, the inputs were directly set to emulate those of consicous > >>> experience encoded in the rest of the network, and so produced the same > >>> results > > >>> >> or > >>> >> E) Avoid answering (like the other atheists so far) > > >>> I'd prefer > > >>> F) The combination of the nodes encodes the conscious experience > > >>> > Saw you just post, was wondering whether you were going to maybe be > >>> > the first atheist on the forum to actually answer. > > >>> I missed your earlier reply, or I would have- Hide quoted text - > > >> Regarding D2, lets say one node acted as an OR gate, and received > >> inputs from 1000 nodes, the input on one channel representing a 1, > >> thus the outputs it gave on its 100 output channels was a 1. Are you > >> suggesting that what caused one input channel to be 1, and the other > >> 999 to be 0 would give the node in the lab the appropriate conscious > >> experience? > > >I never claimed a single node is conscious. Just as I would not claim a > >single neuron in the brain is conscious (even though it is a little more > >complicated than an OR gate). Just as I would not claim a molecule or an > >atom or an electron or... as conscious. > > >Would you call an electron or proton a human being .. even though human > >beings have countless such particles within them? > > >All you are possibly demonstrating is that an individual node is not > >conscious. That does not mean the neural network is not conscious. > > >See my alternative F above > > >Try again > > THis started IIRC, with "what if" a complex network's outputs were > replaceable by a single node. Now the single node is an OR gate? > Where do you get this stuff from. There was never any mention of a complex network's outputs being replaceable by a single node. It was that each individual node within the network, would give the same outputs as a single node in a lab, given the same inputs. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 On 10 Jul, 03:57, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1184018743.898170.104030@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > > > > > > On 9 Jul, 16:46, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > >> When you write 'where conscious experiences do not influence > >> behaviour', I take it you mean 'where the hypothetical conscious > >> experiences of the neural network do not influence the behaviour of > >> the neural network', because conscious experiences in a neural network > >> and its behaviour is what your earlier questions were about. So your > >> next sentence must mean something along the lines of 'taking the > >> analogy of human behaviour, if a human brain was not influenced by its > >> conscious experiences, but the human brain indicated (by talking) that > >> it was influenced by conscious experiences, what it was saying would > >> be irrelevant'. If that's what you mean, I agree with you. The human > >> could just be in a trance, automatically reciting a sentence about > >> consciousness that was triggered by some external input, without > >> consciously experiencing anything. So where do you go from there?> > > > Well, it is implausible that we aren't influenced by our conscious > > experiences > > Yes > > > therefore we cannot be simply a mechanism like the robot > > in the example, where there is no conscious influence > > Obviously. > > But we are the same as a robot where ther IS conscious influence > > > the outputs > > (which determine the behaviour) are the same as they are for a single > > node in the lab which is uninfluenced by conscious experiences. > > Just like the outputs for a single neuron are the same in a lab which is > uninfluenced by conscious experiences. > > It would be like looking at a single or-gate in a computer and claiming that > 3d graphics games are not possible because the or-gate does not show any > signs of being one. > It would be like looking at a single or-gate in a computer running a 3d graphics game and just pointing out that its outputs aren't influenced by any conscious experiences of the 3d graphics game the computer might or might not be having. This can be shown by all the component parts behaving as they would be expected to without any conscious influence. [This is not an argument that because an individual component wasn't consciously experiencing that combined there couldn't because of some 'special' configuration a conscious experience emerge.] Quote
Guest someone2 Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 On 10 Jul, 08:14, Sippuddin <s...@macrosoft.net> wrote: > someone2 wrote: > > The theists > > might also believe that though the divergence exists, it may never be > > found, due to what they consciously experience being set up in a way > > that that it wouldn't be found. > > That's the fallacy of creating an ad hoc hypothesis. > It is simply that it might be set up so that faith would always be required, even if it is simply the faith that what we consciously experience isn't a coincidental deception. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1184058166.768448.96470@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > On 10 Jul, 01:43, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: >> "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> said: >> >I never claimed a single node is conscious. Just as I would not claim a >> >single neuron in the brain is conscious (even though it is a little more >> >complicated than an OR gate). Just as I would not claim a molecule or >> >an >> >atom or an electron or... as conscious. >> >Would you call an electron or proton a human being .. even though human >> >beings have countless such particles within them? >> >All you are possibly demonstrating is that an individual node is not >> >conscious. That does not mean the neural network is not conscious. >> >See my alternative F above >> >Try again >> THis started IIRC, with "what if" a complex network's outputs were >> replaceable by a single node. Now the single node is an OR gate? > > Where do you get this stuff from. There was never any mention of a > complex network's outputs being replaceable by a single node. It was > that each individual node within the network, would give the same > outputs as a single node in a lab, given the same inputs. Unless it was faulty. That says nothing, however, about whether the neural network is conscious .. only that the nodes that comprise it are functioning. BTW: It is not _necessarily_ the case that a neuron (or the machine equivalent) would always give the same response for a given set of inputs. But the result it does give would be able to be explained and one would determine whether or not it was working correctly. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1184059089.529048.217100@o61g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > On 10 Jul, 03:57, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1184018743.898170.104030@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 9 Jul, 16:46, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: >> >> When you write 'where conscious experiences do not influence >> >> behaviour', I take it you mean 'where the hypothetical conscious >> >> experiences of the neural network do not influence the behaviour of >> >> the neural network', because conscious experiences in a neural network >> >> and its behaviour is what your earlier questions were about. So your >> >> next sentence must mean something along the lines of 'taking the >> >> analogy of human behaviour, if a human brain was not influenced by its >> >> conscious experiences, but the human brain indicated (by talking) that >> >> it was influenced by conscious experiences, what it was saying would >> >> be irrelevant'. If that's what you mean, I agree with you. The human >> >> could just be in a trance, automatically reciting a sentence about >> >> consciousness that was triggered by some external input, without >> >> consciously experiencing anything. So where do you go from there?> >> >> > Well, it is implausible that we aren't influenced by our conscious >> > experiences >> >> Yes >> >> > therefore we cannot be simply a mechanism like the robot >> > in the example, where there is no conscious influence >> >> Obviously. >> >> But we are the same as a robot where ther IS conscious influence >> >> > the outputs >> > (which determine the behaviour) are the same as they are for a single >> > node in the lab which is uninfluenced by conscious experiences. >> >> Just like the outputs for a single neuron are the same in a lab which is >> uninfluenced by conscious experiences. >> >> It would be like looking at a single or-gate in a computer and claiming >> that >> 3d graphics games are not possible because the or-gate does not show any >> signs of being one. >> > > It would be like looking at a single or-gate in a computer running a > 3d graphics game and just pointing out that its outputs aren't > influenced by any conscious experiences of the 3d graphics game the > computer might or might not be having. This can be shown by all the > component parts behaving as they would be expected to without any > conscious influence. You're talking nonsense now .. 3d graphic games are not conscious. > [This is not an argument that because an individual component wasn't > consciously experiencing that combined there couldn't because of some > 'special' configuration a conscious experience emerge.] Could you state that again in grammatically correct English .. the above is just word salad. Quote
Guest jientho@aol.com Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 On Jul 9, 6:53 pm, Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > On Mon, 09 Jul 2007 13:04:11 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com > > in <1184011451.680502.65...@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: > >On Jul 9, 2:40 pm, Matt Silberstein > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > >> On Fri, 29 Jun 2007 05:40:25 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > >> <1183120825.782515.196...@n2g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > >> [snip] > > >> >If we were like the robot, simply meat machines, then the same would > >> >hold for us. In which case it would have to be a coincidence the > >> >conscious experiences the 'meat machine' talked [about] actually existed (they > >> >couldn't have been influencing the behaviour). > > >> Sorry, but this still makes no sense to me > > >You snipped what "the same" referred (was agreed?) to, > > Because that was not relevant to my question. > > >but I think I > >can take a cut a further explanation in hopes it might help you make > >sense of it. The context of all of this, to remind, is that a present- > >laws-of-physics explanation completely explains all (observable) > >behavior, in particular the behavior of any given human; > > No one claims that we a current natural (I have no idea why you keep > referring to physics only) explanation for all behavior. But neither > is their particularly good reasons to think that some non-natural > expiation will somehow work. > > >that is the > >Materialistic premise. > > You might look up Physicalism, an idea that has pretty much replaced > materialism. > > >So (the argument goes) there is no influence > >upon the behavior by anything not within-the-laws-of-physics. > > That is, we can explain behavior with naturalistic explanations > asserting naturalistic causes. > > >The > >laws of physics as presently constituted make no use whatsoever of > >conscious experiences as explanatory phenomena. > > That is, science sees conscious experience as an explanandum, not an > explanation. > > >So under the > >Materialist premise, conscious experiences do not influence observed > >behavior. > > And here you are wrong. It follows directly from the premises, so you are tilting at windmills, sir. > The assertion is that conscious experience is > a physical process and so influences other physical processes. You just got done saying that that conscious experience is an explanandum-only under the argument, so you have just contradicted yourself by asserting there's an influence. > >Conscious experiences may certainly be physically _caused_ under the > >Materialist premise (perhaps "emergent"), but they are an > >_effect_only_ and not the cause of any behavior themselves. > > The "only" is not justified. Electricity is a physical process, it is > explained by the laws of physics. But an electric flow is also part of > the explanation of the working of a light bulb. Then electric flow is not explanandum-only, and your analogy fails. <snip> I think the above demonstrates the root of the disagreement. If you'd care to identify what premises you think are false, or perhaps hidden, have at it. Jeff Quote
Guest Matt Silberstein Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 On Tue, 10 Jul 2007 06:40:25 -0700, in alt.atheism , jientho@aol.com in <1184074825.201767.205230@57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com> wrote: >On Jul 9, 6:53 pm, Matt Silberstein ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> On Mon, 09 Jul 2007 13:04:11 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com >> >> in <1184011451.680502.65...@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >On Jul 9, 2:40 pm, Matt Silberstein >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> On Fri, 29 Jun 2007 05:40:25 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> <1183120825.782515.196...@n2g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> >> [snip] >> >> >> >If we were like the robot, simply meat machines, then the same would >> >> >hold for us. In which case it would have to be a coincidence the >> >> >conscious experiences the 'meat machine' talked [about] actually existed (they >> >> >couldn't have been influencing the behaviour). >> >> >> Sorry, but this still makes no sense to me >> >> >You snipped what "the same" referred (was agreed?) to, >> >> Because that was not relevant to my question. >> >> >but I think I >> >can take a cut a further explanation in hopes it might help you make >> >sense of it. The context of all of this, to remind, is that a present- >> >laws-of-physics explanation completely explains all (observable) >> >behavior, in particular the behavior of any given human; >> >> No one claims that we a current natural (I have no idea why you keep >> referring to physics only) explanation for all behavior. But neither >> is their particularly good reasons to think that some non-natural >> expiation will somehow work. >> >> >that is the >> >Materialistic premise. >> >> You might look up Physicalism, an idea that has pretty much replaced >> materialism. >> >> >So (the argument goes) there is no influence >> >upon the behavior by anything not within-the-laws-of-physics. >> >> That is, we can explain behavior with naturalistic explanations >> asserting naturalistic causes. >> >> >The >> >laws of physics as presently constituted make no use whatsoever of >> >conscious experiences as explanatory phenomena. >> >> That is, science sees conscious experience as an explanandum, not an >> explanation. >> >> >So under the >> >Materialist premise, conscious experiences do not influence observed >> >behavior. >> >> And here you are wrong. > >It follows directly from the premises, so you are tilting at >windmills, sir. No, it does not follow from the premises as I explained below. >> The assertion is that conscious experience is >> a physical process and so influences other physical processes. > >You just got done saying that that conscious experience is an >explanandum-only under the argument, so you have just contradicted >yourself by asserting there's an influence. I never said only and I gave a similar situation. Let me try another: blood pressure is an explanandum, a thing to be explained. But I can also use blood pressure to explain other things. That is how things work in the world. >> >Conscious experiences may certainly be physically _caused_ under the >> >Materialist premise (perhaps "emergent"), but they are an >> >_effect_only_ and not the cause of any behavior themselves. >> >> The "only" is not justified. Electricity is a physical process, it is >> explained by the laws of physics. But an electric flow is also part of >> the explanation of the working of a light bulb. > >Then electric flow is not explanandum-only, and your analogy fails. But the "only" was your addition, not mine. We provide a physical explanation for conscious experience, but we can also use conscious experience to explain other things. There is no "only" there. It is your/Glenn's assertion that it is either explanandum or explanation, not both. ><snip> > >I think the above demonstrates the root of the disagreement. If you'd >care to identify what premises you think are false, or perhaps hidden, >have at it. I have done so. There is an unstated assumption that conscious experience is either explanandum or explanation, not both. There seems to be an unstated assumption that physics is all there is to science and that physics is as complete as it can get. (I may be wrong about that and "laws physics" is a fuzzy standing for science and naturalism, but that is not clear.) -- Matt Silberstein Do something today about the Darfur Genocide http://www.beawitness.org http://www.darfurgenocide.org http://www.savedarfur.org "Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop" Quote
Guest Jim07D7 Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 jientho@aol.com said: >On Jul 9, 6:53 pm, Matt Silberstein ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> On Mon, 09 Jul 2007 13:04:11 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com >> >> in <1184011451.680502.65...@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >On Jul 9, 2:40 pm, Matt Silberstein >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: >> >> On Fri, 29 Jun 2007 05:40:25 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in >> >> >> <1183120825.782515.196...@n2g2000hse.googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >> >> [snip] >> >> >> >If we were like the robot, simply meat machines, then the same would >> >> >hold for us. In which case it would have to be a coincidence the >> >> >conscious experiences the 'meat machine' talked [about] actually existed (they >> >> >couldn't have been influencing the behaviour). >> >> >> Sorry, but this still makes no sense to me >> >> >You snipped what "the same" referred (was agreed?) to, >> >> Because that was not relevant to my question. >> >> >but I think I >> >can take a cut a further explanation in hopes it might help you make >> >sense of it. The context of all of this, to remind, is that a present- >> >laws-of-physics explanation completely explains all (observable) >> >behavior, in particular the behavior of any given human; >> >> No one claims that we a current natural (I have no idea why you keep >> referring to physics only) explanation for all behavior. But neither >> is their particularly good reasons to think that some non-natural >> expiation will somehow work. >> >> >that is the >> >Materialistic premise. >> >> You might look up Physicalism, an idea that has pretty much replaced >> materialism. >> >> >So (the argument goes) there is no influence >> >upon the behavior by anything not within-the-laws-of-physics. >> >> That is, we can explain behavior with naturalistic explanations >> asserting naturalistic causes. >> >> >The >> >laws of physics as presently constituted make no use whatsoever of >> >conscious experiences as explanatory phenomena. >> >> That is, science sees conscious experience as an explanandum, not an >> explanation. >> >> >So under the >> >Materialist premise, conscious experiences do not influence observed >> >behavior. >> >> And here you are wrong. > >It follows directly from the premises, so you are tilting at >windmills, sir. The premise that limits materialism to "present-laws-of-physics is a straw man. Materialism dos not have that limitation. Perhaps "Someone2's materialism" does, and so, serves his purposes a bit better. ;-). > >> The assertion is that conscious experience is >> a physical process and so influences other physical processes. > >You just got done saying that that conscious experience is an >explanandum-only under the argument, so you have just contradicted >yourself by asserting there's an influence. Perhaps the influence is part of the explanandum. > >> >Conscious experiences may certainly be physically _caused_ under the >> >Materialist premise (perhaps "emergent"), but they are an >> >_effect_only_ and not the cause of any behavior themselves. >> >> The "only" is not justified. Electricity is a physical process, it is >> explained by the laws of physics. But an electric flow is also part of >> the explanation of the working of a light bulb. > >Then electric flow is not explanandum-only, and your analogy fails. > ><snip> > >I think the above demonstrates the root of the disagreement. If you'd >care to identify what premises you think are false, or perhaps hidden, >have at it. You hint at being aware there is a problem. Quote
Guest Jim07D7 Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 "Jeckyl" <noone@nowhere.com> said: >"someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message >news:1184058166.768448.96470@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> On 10 Jul, 01:43, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: >>> "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> said: >>> >I never claimed a single node is conscious. Just as I would not claim a >>> >single neuron in the brain is conscious (even though it is a little more >>> >complicated than an OR gate). Just as I would not claim a molecule or >>> >an >>> >atom or an electron or... as conscious. >>> >Would you call an electron or proton a human being .. even though human >>> >beings have countless such particles within them? >>> >All you are possibly demonstrating is that an individual node is not >>> >conscious. That does not mean the neural network is not conscious. >>> >See my alternative F above >>> >Try again >>> THis started IIRC, with "what if" a complex network's outputs were >>> replaceable by a single node. Now the single node is an OR gate? >> >> Where do you get this stuff from. There was never any mention of a >> complex network's outputs being replaceable by a single node. It was >> that each individual node within the network, would give the same >> outputs as a single node in a lab, given the same inputs. Thanks you for clearing up my misunderstanding. Suppose that in addition to monitoring the overall inputs and outputs of a complex, artificial network, we can monitor the inputs and outputs of each element (node) of that network, and come to fully understand, and predict, the overall outputs, based on knowing the overall inputs. (IOW, we could simulate that network.) Would doing this change our criteria, and/or our decision, as to whether the network was demonstrating conscious behavior? If so, why? By comparison, suppose that in addition to monitoring the overall inputs and outputs or a human being, we can monitor the inputs and outputs of each neuron of that human being and come to fully understand, and predict, the overall outputs, based on knowing the overall inputs. (IOW, we could simulate that human being.) Would doing this change our criteria, and/or our decision, as to whether the human being was demonstrating conscious behavior? If so, Why? Or is one of these two supposed situations, scientifically impossible even in principle , not just by current-day physics (digital electronics)? I think that is the crux of it. Quote
Guest Sippuddin Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 someone2 wrote: > On 10 Jul, 08:14, Sippuddin <s...@macrosoft.net> wrote: >> someone2 wrote: >>> The theists >>> might also believe that though the divergence exists, it may never be >>> found, due to what they consciously experience being set up in a way >>> that that it wouldn't be found. >> >> That's the fallacy of creating an ad hoc hypothesis. >> > > It is simply that it might be set up so that faith would always be > required, even if it is simply the faith that what we consciously > experience isn't a coincidental deception. > You have just said the same thing in different words and it is still the fallacy of creating an ad hoc hypothesis. "An ad hoc hypothesis is one created to explain away facts that seem to refute one's theory." -- http://skepdic.com/adhoc.html Quote
Guest someone2 Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 On 10 Jul, 14:16, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1184058166.768448.96470@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > > > > > > On 10 Jul, 01:43, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > >> "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> said: > >> >I never claimed a single node is conscious. Just as I would not claim a > >> >single neuron in the brain is conscious (even though it is a little more > >> >complicated than an OR gate). Just as I would not claim a molecule or > >> >an > >> >atom or an electron or... as conscious. > >> >Would you call an electron or proton a human being .. even though human > >> >beings have countless such particles within them? > >> >All you are possibly demonstrating is that an individual node is not > >> >conscious. That does not mean the neural network is not conscious. > >> >See my alternative F above > >> >Try again > >> THis started IIRC, with "what if" a complex network's outputs were > >> replaceable by a single node. Now the single node is an OR gate? > > > Where do you get this stuff from. There was never any mention of a > > complex network's outputs being replaceable by a single node. It was > > that each individual node within the network, would give the same > > outputs as a single node in a lab, given the same inputs. > > Unless it was faulty. > > That says nothing, however, about whether the neural network is conscious .. > only that the nodes that comprise it are functioning. > > BTW: It is not _necessarily_ the case that a neuron (or the machine > equivalent) would always give the same response for a given set of inputs. > But the result it does give would be able to be explained and one would > determine whether or not it was working correctly. > Well you know its behaviour, how would you ever know whether it was conscious or not from your perspective? It is a hypothetical example, and there is no mention of it being faulty. Really the lengths you atheists go to to avoid facing simple truths. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 On 10 Jul, 14:17, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1184059089.529048.217100@o61g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > > > > > > On 10 Jul, 03:57, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >>news:1184018743.898170.104030@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> > On 9 Jul, 16:46, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: > >> >> When you write 'where conscious experiences do not influence > >> >> behaviour', I take it you mean 'where the hypothetical conscious > >> >> experiences of the neural network do not influence the behaviour of > >> >> the neural network', because conscious experiences in a neural network > >> >> and its behaviour is what your earlier questions were about. So your > >> >> next sentence must mean something along the lines of 'taking the > >> >> analogy of human behaviour, if a human brain was not influenced by its > >> >> conscious experiences, but the human brain indicated (by talking) that > >> >> it was influenced by conscious experiences, what it was saying would > >> >> be irrelevant'. If that's what you mean, I agree with you. The human > >> >> could just be in a trance, automatically reciting a sentence about > >> >> consciousness that was triggered by some external input, without > >> >> consciously experiencing anything. So where do you go from there?> > > >> > Well, it is implausible that we aren't influenced by our conscious > >> > experiences > > >> Yes > > >> > therefore we cannot be simply a mechanism like the robot > >> > in the example, where there is no conscious influence > > >> Obviously. > > >> But we are the same as a robot where ther IS conscious influence > > >> > the outputs > >> > (which determine the behaviour) are the same as they are for a single > >> > node in the lab which is uninfluenced by conscious experiences. > > >> Just like the outputs for a single neuron are the same in a lab which is > >> uninfluenced by conscious experiences. > > >> It would be like looking at a single or-gate in a computer and claiming > >> that > >> 3d graphics games are not possible because the or-gate does not show any > >> signs of being one. > > > It would be like looking at a single or-gate in a computer running a > > 3d graphics game and just pointing out that its outputs aren't > > influenced by any conscious experiences of the 3d graphics game the > > computer might or might not be having. This can be shown by all the > > component parts behaving as they would be expected to without any > > conscious influence. > > You're talking nonsense now .. 3d graphic games are not conscious. > > > [This is not an argument that because an individual component wasn't > > consciously experiencing that combined there couldn't because of some > > 'special' configuration a conscious experience emerge.] > > Could you state that again in grammatically correct English .. the above is > just word salad. > How would you know computers running 3d graphic games aren't conscious from your perspective? Anyway, it was just to correct your poor analogy. Quote
Guest Sippuddin Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 Jeckyl wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message > news:1184059089.529048.217100@o61g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> On 10 Jul, 03:57, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: >>> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >>> >>> news:1184018743.898170.104030@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> On 9 Jul, 16:46, James Norris <JimNorri...@aol.com> wrote: >>>>> When you write 'where conscious experiences do not influence >>>>> behaviour', I take it you mean 'where the hypothetical conscious >>>>> experiences of the neural network do not influence the behaviour of >>>>> the neural network', because conscious experiences in a neural network >>>>> and its behaviour is what your earlier questions were about. So your >>>>> next sentence must mean something along the lines of 'taking the >>>>> analogy of human behaviour, if a human brain was not influenced by its >>>>> conscious experiences, but the human brain indicated (by talking) that >>>>> it was influenced by conscious experiences, what it was saying would >>>>> be irrelevant'. If that's what you mean, I agree with you. The human >>>>> could just be in a trance, automatically reciting a sentence about >>>>> consciousness that was triggered by some external input, without >>>>> consciously experiencing anything. So where do you go from there?> >>>> Well, it is implausible that we aren't influenced by our conscious >>>> experiences >>> Yes >>> >>>> therefore we cannot be simply a mechanism like the robot >>>> in the example, where there is no conscious influence >>> Obviously. >>> >>> But we are the same as a robot where ther IS conscious influence >>> >>>> the outputs >>>> (which determine the behaviour) are the same as they are for a single >>>> node in the lab which is uninfluenced by conscious experiences. >>> Just like the outputs for a single neuron are the same in a lab which is >>> uninfluenced by conscious experiences. >>> >>> It would be like looking at a single or-gate in a computer and claiming >>> that >>> 3d graphics games are not possible because the or-gate does not show any >>> signs of being one. >>> >> It would be like looking at a single or-gate in a computer running a >> 3d graphics game and just pointing out that its outputs aren't >> influenced by any conscious experiences of the 3d graphics game the >> computer might or might not be having. This can be shown by all the >> component parts behaving as they would be expected to without any >> conscious influence. > > You're talking nonsense now .. 3d graphic games are not conscious. > Games are always unconscious, they can't detect it when the player twiddles the user input device? That wouldn't be any fun would it, to play a dead game? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted July 10, 2007 Posted July 10, 2007 On 10 Jul, 16:32, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> said: > > > > > > >"someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > >news:1184058166.768448.96470@n60g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > >> On 10 Jul, 01:43, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: > >>> "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> said: > >>> >I never claimed a single node is conscious. Just as I would not claim a > >>> >single neuron in the brain is conscious (even though it is a little more > >>> >complicated than an OR gate). Just as I would not claim a molecule or > >>> >an > >>> >atom or an electron or... as conscious. > >>> >Would you call an electron or proton a human being .. even though human > >>> >beings have countless such particles within them? > >>> >All you are possibly demonstrating is that an individual node is not > >>> >conscious. That does not mean the neural network is not conscious. > >>> >See my alternative F above > >>> >Try again > >>> THis started IIRC, with "what if" a complex network's outputs were > >>> replaceable by a single node. Now the single node is an OR gate? > > >> Where do you get this stuff from. There was never any mention of a > >> complex network's outputs being replaceable by a single node. It was > >> that each individual node within the network, would give the same > >> outputs as a single node in a lab, given the same inputs. > > Thanks you for clearing up my misunderstanding. > > Suppose that in addition to monitoring the overall inputs and outputs > of a complex, artificial network, we can monitor the inputs and > outputs of each element (node) of that network, and come to fully > understand, and predict, the overall outputs, based on knowing the > overall inputs. (IOW, we could simulate that network.) Would doing > this change our criteria, and/or our decision, as to whether the > network was demonstrating conscious behavior? If so, why? > > By comparison, suppose that in addition to monitoring the overall > inputs and outputs or a human being, we can monitor the inputs and > outputs of each neuron of that human being and come to fully > understand, and predict, the overall outputs, based on knowing the > overall inputs. (IOW, we could simulate that human being.) Would > doing this change our criteria, and/or our decision, as to whether the > human being was demonstrating conscious behavior? If so, Why? > > Or is one of these two supposed situations, scientifically impossible > even in principle , not just by current-day physics (digital > electronics)? I think that is the crux of it. > In the example that was what was happening. The inputs and outputs of each individual node were being monitored. I'll write out the example again for you (well cut and paste). With regards to the human, the whole point is that it is implausible that we simply are a biological mechanism following the known laws of physics, or any law of physics which didn't take into account the conscious experiences themselves, and something willing to talking about them. First though, you need to actually comprehend what I am saying, may I suggest you read it carefully, as so far you seem to have been quick on giving your opinions, but hadn't actually read/understood the example scenario. Supposing there was an artificial neural network, with a billion more nodes than you had neurons in your brain, and a very 'complicated' configuration, which drove a robot. The robot, due to its behaviour (being a Turing Equivalent), caused some atheists to claim it was consciously experiencing. Now supposing each message between each node contained additional information such as source node, destination node (which could be the same as the source node, for feedback loops), the time the message was sent, and the message. Each node wrote out to a log on receipt of a message, and on sending a message out. Now after an hour of the atheist communicating with the robot, the logs could be examined by a bank of computers, varifying, that for the input messages each received, the outputs were those expected by a single node in a lab given the same inputs. They could also varify that no unexplained messages appeared. What would you be saying with regards to it consciously experiencing: A) The atheists, mentioned in the example, were wrong to consider it to be consciously experiencing. B) Were correct to say that was consciously experiencing, but that it doesn't influence behaviour. C) It might have been consciously experiencing, how could you tell, it doesn't influence behaviour. D) It was consciously experiencing and that influenced its behaviour. If you select D, as all the nodes are giving the same outputs as they would have singly in the lab given the same inputs, could you also select between D1, and D2: D1) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were also influenced by conscious experiences. D2) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were not influenced by conscious experiences, but the influence of the conscious experiences within the robot, is such that the outputs are the same as without the influence of the conscious experiences. Quote
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