Implausibility of Materialism

July 12, 2007

On 12 Jul, 16:17, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >> >You seem to be suggesting that the majority of atheists haven't even

> >> >thought as far as I had suggested,

>

> >> I don't mean to suggest that, I mean only to suggest that most of our

> >> conscious decisions, theistic or not, are quite mundane,

>

> >> >...and yet led away from God's

> >> >existance. Is that because they trusted in the so called 'intelligent'

> >> >who were biased against the acknowledgement of God's existance, and

> >> >were applauded for their deceptive use of language to cover up simple

> >> >truths? Did they do so because they thought they were bound to be able

> >> >to hide behind the deceptions, because the 'intelligent' atheists

> >> >assured them they weren't wrong, and that by repeating like parrots

> >> >the polished deceptions that these people propagated that they too

> >> >would seem intelligent?

>

> >> No.

>

> >In the physical, Heaven, and Hell, you are being presented the

> >conscious experiences by a spiritual source. Given that your brain is

> >within the presentation, and so is not part of you, you are being

> >optimistic about constructive thoughts coming to you when experiencing

> >Hell.

>

> So do you lean more toward Berkeley's or toward DesCartes'

> metaphysics: subjective idealism, or mind-body dualism?

>

Haven't read them, though all there is is the spiritual. The

'physical' is just a communication that you spiritually experience.

Though you might find this hard to understand, you can surely grasp

that in the 'brain in a vat' thought experiment, there would be no

corresponding physical objects to the ones you experience. What you

experience is based on what your neural state represents. Every

'object' you experience is simply a translation of what your a portion

of your neural state represents. If you can understand that you

communicate with the 'Translation Layer' so to speak, then you can

perhaps understand everything you think of as the 'physical' is the

'other side' of the 'Translation Layer' and there is no need

conceptually to think of it existing in its own right. This is because

it doesn't. The physicalists turned reality upside down, as it was

prophesised they would do. You will have a problem in understanding

this, if you hold to your upside down view of reality.

July 12, 2007

On Jul 12, 10:55 am, Matt Silberstein

<RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> On Thu, 12 Jul 2007 04:21:59 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> <1184239319.210411.129...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> >On 12 Jul, 05:27, Matt Silberstein

<snip>

> >> Sorry, but my disagreement does not constitute my lack of

> >> understanding.

>

> >No disagreement doesn't. You have however totally misunderstood. I'm

> >not saying that because a component of X does not have property Y that

> >X does not have property Y.

>

> Actually you are.

No he isn't; this is part of your misunderstanding.

> You have pointed out that a particular node is not

> conscious and that no node is conscious and then jump to the

> conclusion that no set of nodes can be conscious.

No he hasn't (pointed that out) and no he doesn't (jump to that

conclusion). He is talking about the _influence_ of conscious

experience, not the _existence_ of conscious experience, in both

cases. And once again, sheesh! <shakes head>

<snip>

It's not worth talking about any of the rest of it with you, when you

demonstrate such a _fundamental_ misunderstanding of what has been

clearly stated on multiple occassions by multiple people now.

Someone2 sure seems correct about the irrational resistance to such a

simple argument. Why don't you just agree, yes, human behavior is

influenced by something that is not explained by the present laws of

physics; and no, science at at present does not have in-hand a full

explanation of subjective/conscious experience. Your (and others')

extreme resistance to that simple (and resolving) reply is telling.

Jeff

July 12, 2007

someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> said:

>On 12 Jul, 16:17, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>>

>> >> >You seem to be suggesting that the majority of atheists haven't even

>> >> >thought as far as I had suggested,

>>

>> >> I don't mean to suggest that, I mean only to suggest that most of our

>> >> conscious decisions, theistic or not, are quite mundane,

>>

>> >> >...and yet led away from God's

>> >> >existance. Is that because they trusted in the so called 'intelligent'

>> >> >who were biased against the acknowledgement of God's existance, and

>> >> >were applauded for their deceptive use of language to cover up simple

>> >> >truths? Did they do so because they thought they were bound to be able

>> >> >to hide behind the deceptions, because the 'intelligent' atheists

>> >> >assured them they weren't wrong, and that by repeating like parrots

>> >> >the polished deceptions that these people propagated that they too

>> >> >would seem intelligent?

>>

>> >> No.

>>

>> >In the physical, Heaven, and Hell, you are being presented the

>> >conscious experiences by a spiritual source. Given that your brain is

>> >within the presentation, and so is not part of you, you are being

>> >optimistic about constructive thoughts coming to you when experiencing

>> >Hell.

>>

>> So do you lean more toward Berkeley's or toward DesCartes'

>> metaphysics: subjective idealism, or mind-body dualism?

>>

>

>Haven't read them, though all there is is the spiritual. The

>'physical' is just a communication that you spiritually experience.

OK That's pretty much Bishop Berkeley's theistic idealism.

>

>Though you might find this hard to understand, you can surely grasp

>that in the 'brain in a vat' thought experiment, there would be no

>corresponding physical objects to the ones you experience. What you

>experience is based on what your neural state represents. Every

>'object' you experience is simply a translation of what your a portion

>of your neural state represents. If you can understand that you

>communicate with the 'Translation Layer' so to speak, then you can

>perhaps understand everything you think of as the 'physical' is the

>'other side' of the 'Translation Layer' and there is no need

>conceptually to think of it existing in its own right. This is because

>it doesn't. The physicalists turned reality upside down, as it was

>prophesised they would do. You will have a problem in understanding

>this, if you hold to your upside down view of reality.

Oh, I understand it all right. One writer who explored this idea

pretty well is Peter Koestenbaum, in his book "The Vitality of Death".

I think this book is out of print, and Koestenbaum has moved on from

philosophy.

In outline, if we discard the idea that the "stuff" of reality is

matter, but instead view it as experience (or, ideas, spirit,

whatever), we find that we continue to have the same kind of

experiences as before. We can classify, study, posit other minds,

discuss hypotheses, test them, publish theories, etc. We end up right

where we are, with the same laws of matter and physics except with

asterisks that mean that the science involved is the science of

experiences. Soon we forget what the hubbub was all about. The fact

is, the ultimate nature of the "substance" referred to by materialists

is, well, immaterial to their philosophy. It's an otherwise

propertyless bearer of properties.

Going through this thought process is part of gaining an understanding

of metaphysics and specifically, materialism.

It is really theism that changes things substantially, by providing a

creator and sustainer of the experiences and experiencer(s).

But then, the change can bring as important a realization as do the

considerations above. The experiencer need not be distinguished from

the deity, "except in It's own Mind". And being the source of

experiences, they too, need not be distinguished from It, "except in

It's own Mind". And the situation is subject to change, as are the

contents of that mind. In fact, the deity is that mind, and the

situation is the contents of that mind. Speaking as a theist, that

is.

Of course, many theists are taught things about "God", just as they

are taught things about Santa and the Tooth Fairy -- things that get

in the way. You seem to have been, with your silly notion that God

would subject parts of "His" mind to the experience of Heaven or Hell

(which are other parts of His mind). It can be more difficult for them

to come to the above realization about God, than it is for proponents

of materialism to come to the above realization about it.

July 12, 2007

jientho@aol.com said:

>Someone2 sure seems correct about the irrational resistance to such a

>simple argument. Why don't you just agree, yes, human behavior is

>influenced by something that is not explained by the present laws of

>physics; and no, science at at present does not have in-hand a full

>explanation of subjective/conscious experience. Your (and others')

>extreme resistance to that simple (and resolving) reply is telling.

Don't count me among those who have an extreme resistance to that

simple and resolving reply. In return, I will not count on you to be

the one who decides if it is seen as simple and resolving, by

someone2.

July 12, 2007

On Jul 7, 2:26 pm, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >On 7 Jul, 07:20, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

> <...>

> >> >Where is the affect of conscious experiences in the outputs, if all

> >> >the nodes are justgiving the same outputs as they would have singly in

> >> >the lab given the same inputs. Are you suggesting that the outputs

> >> >given by a single node in the lab were consciously affected, or that

> >> >the affect is such that the outputs are the same as without the

> >> >affect?

>

> >> >I notice you avoided facing answering the question. Perhaps you would

> >> >care to directly answer this.

>

> >> My resistance is causing you to start acknowledging that structure

> >> plays a role in your deciding whether an entity is conscious; not just

> >> behavior. Eventually you might see that you ascribe consciousness to

> >> other humans on account of, in part, their structural similarity to

> >> you. The question will remain, what justifies ascribing consciousness

> >> to an entity. WHen we agree on that, I will be able to give you an

> >> answer that satisfies you. Not until then.

>

> >I fail to how my understanding affects your answer. You are just

> >avoiding answering.

>

> Obviously, " When we agree on [a well-defined rule that] justifies

> ascribing consciousness to an entity" means, in part, that I will

> have a rule. I don't now. If I did, I would apply it to the situation

> you describe and tell you how it rules.

I'm not so sure you could apply any arbitrary such well-defined rule

to the situation as described; I think I have a counterexample to your

"obviously" here:

Purely for the sake of argument, define "conscious" for any neural-net

type mechanism as is under discussion here as: the first output node

fires under some sets of inputs _and_ the first output node does not

fire under some (other) sets of inputs. That is, it is non-conscious

only if the first output node behaves identically under all inputs.

(Of course this simple "behavior varies" definition does not

correspond to any non-superficial definition of consciousness, but

even _it_ is sufficient to make a counterexample I think.) This

certainly seems to meet even a narrow meaning of well-defined, yes?

I don't think you can use even that simple rule to answer the

question:

"Where is the affect of conscious experiences in the outputs, if all

the nodes are just giving the same outputs as they would have singly

in the lab given the same inputs. Are you suggesting that the outputs

given by a single node in the lab were consciously affected, or that

the affect is such that the outputs are the same as without the

affect?"

The "ability" to give a different output under some other set of

inputs (the for-the-sake-of-argument definition of consciousness) does

not affect the output for any single set of inputs. Or maybe you

would choose someone2's second option there: the affect is such that

the outputs are the same as without the affect?

Jeff

July 12, 2007

On 12 Jul, 19:07, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >On 12 Jul, 16:17, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >> >> >You seem to be suggesting that the majority of atheists haven't even

> >> >> >thought as far as I had suggested,

>

> >> >> I don't mean to suggest that, I mean only to suggest that most of our

> >> >> conscious decisions, theistic or not, are quite mundane,

>

> >> >> >...and yet led away from God's

> >> >> >existance. Is that because they trusted in the so called 'intelligent'

> >> >> >who were biased against the acknowledgement of God's existance, and

> >> >> >were applauded for their deceptive use of language to cover up simple

> >> >> >truths? Did they do so because they thought they were bound to be able

> >> >> >to hide behind the deceptions, because the 'intelligent' atheists

> >> >> >assured them they weren't wrong, and that by repeating like parrots

> >> >> >the polished deceptions that these people propagated that they too

> >> >> >would seem intelligent?

>

> >> >> No.

>

> >> >In the physical, Heaven, and Hell, you are being presented the

> >> >conscious experiences by a spiritual source. Given that your brain is

> >> >within the presentation, and so is not part of you, you are being

> >> >optimistic about constructive thoughts coming to you when experiencing

> >> >Hell.

>

> >> So do you lean more toward Berkeley's or toward DesCartes'

> >> metaphysics: subjective idealism, or mind-body dualism?

>

> >Haven't read them, though all there is is the spiritual. The

> >'physical' is just a communication that you spiritually experience.

>

> OK That's pretty much Bishop Berkeley's theistic idealism.

>

> >Though you might find this hard to understand, you can surely grasp

> >that in the 'brain in a vat' thought experiment, there would be no

> >corresponding physical objects to the ones you experience. What you

> >experience is based on what your neural state represents. Every

> >'object' you experience is simply a translation of what your a portion

> >of your neural state represents. If you can understand that you

> >communicate with the 'Translation Layer' so to speak, then you can

> >perhaps understand everything you think of as the 'physical' is the

> >'other side' of the 'Translation Layer' and there is no need

> >conceptually to think of it existing in its own right. This is because

> >it doesn't. The physicalists turned reality upside down, as it was

> >prophesised they would do. You will have a problem in understanding

> >this, if you hold to your upside down view of reality.

>

> Oh, I understand it all right. One writer who explored this idea

> pretty well is Peter Koestenbaum, in his book "The Vitality of Death".

> I think this book is out of print, and Koestenbaum has moved on from

> philosophy.

>

> In outline, if we discard the idea that the "stuff" of reality is

> matter, but instead view it as experience (or, ideas, spirit,

> whatever), we find that we continue to have the same kind of

> experiences as before. We can classify, study, posit other minds,

> discuss hypotheses, test them, publish theories, etc. We end up right

> where we are, with the same laws of matter and physics except with

> asterisks that mean that the science involved is the science of

> experiences. Soon we forget what the hubbub was all about. The fact

> is, the ultimate nature of the "substance" referred to by materialists

> is, well, immaterial to their philosophy. It's an otherwise

> propertyless bearer of properties.

>

> Going through this thought process is part of gaining an understanding

> of metaphysics and specifically, materialism.

>

> It is really theism that changes things substantially, by providing a

> creator and sustainer of the experiences and experiencer(s).

>

> But then, the change can bring as important a realization as do the

> considerations above. The experiencer need not be distinguished from

> the deity, "except in It's own Mind". And being the source of

> experiences, they too, need not be distinguished from It, "except in

> It's own Mind". And the situation is subject to change, as are the

> contents of that mind. In fact, the deity is that mind, and the

> situation is the contents of that mind. Speaking as a theist, that

> is.

>

> Of course, many theists are taught things about "God", just as they

> are taught things about Santa and the Tooth Fairy -- things that get

> in the way. You seem to have been, with your silly notion that God

> would subject parts of "His" mind to the experience of Heaven or Hell

> (which are other parts of His mind). It can be more difficult for them

> to come to the above realization about God, than it is for proponents

> of materialism to come to the above realization about it.

>

Yes you that is experiencing does need to be distinguished from that

which is providing you with the experiences. The experiences aren't

generated by yourself, you don't know what the neural state represents

for example.

July 12, 2007

jientho@aol.com said:

>On Jul 7, 2:26 pm, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>>

>> >On 7 Jul, 07:20, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>> <...>

>> >> >Where is the affect of conscious experiences in the outputs, if all

>> >> >the nodes are justgiving the same outputs as they would have singly in

>> >> >the lab given the same inputs. Are you suggesting that the outputs

>> >> >given by a single node in the lab were consciously affected, or that

>> >> >the affect is such that the outputs are the same as without the

>> >> >affect?

>>

>> >> >I notice you avoided facing answering the question. Perhaps you would

>> >> >care to directly answer this.

>>

>> >> My resistance is causing you to start acknowledging that structure

>> >> plays a role in your deciding whether an entity is conscious; not just

>> >> behavior. Eventually you might see that you ascribe consciousness to

>> >> other humans on account of, in part, their structural similarity to

>> >> you. The question will remain, what justifies ascribing consciousness

>> >> to an entity. WHen we agree on that, I will be able to give you an

>> >> answer that satisfies you. Not until then.

>>

>> >I fail to how my understanding affects your answer. You are just

>> >avoiding answering.

>>

>> Obviously, " When we agree on [a well-defined rule that] justifies

>> ascribing consciousness to an entity" means, in part, that I will

>> have a rule. I don't now. If I did, I would apply it to the situation

>> you describe and tell you how it rules.

>

>I'm not so sure you could apply any arbitrary such well-defined rule

>to the situation as described; I think I have a counterexample to your

>"obviously" here:

You continue to misinterpret my remarks and then critique that

misinterpretation.

My "obviously" means that it is, IMO, obviously (I guess it's not

though?) necessary to agree on a rule, if we are to agree on our

judgments.

>

>Purely for the sake of argument, define "conscious" for any neural-net

>type mechanism as is under discussion here as: the first output node

>fires under some sets of inputs _and_ the first output node does not

>fire under some (other) sets of inputs. That is, it is non-conscious

>only if the first output node behaves identically under all inputs.

I was talking about a decision rule we could use, not a definition.

But we can look at that example as a decision rule, just to have

something to argue about..

>(Of course this simple "behavior varies" definition does not

>correspond to any non-superficial definition of consciousness, but

>even _it_ is sufficient to make a counterexample I think.) This

>certainly seems to meet even a narrow meaning of well-defined, yes?

Leaving out the essential element of agreement, yes I'd say so.

>

>I don't think you can use even that simple rule to answer the

>question:

>

>"Where is the affect of conscious experiences in the outputs, if all

>the nodes are just giving the same outputs as they would have singly

>in the lab given the same inputs. Are you suggesting that the outputs

>given by a single node in the lab were consciously affected, or that

>the affect is such that the outputs are the same as without the

>affect?"

Then perhaps the question needs improvement.

>

>The "ability" to give a different output under some other set of

>inputs (the for-the-sake-of-argument definition of consciousness) does

>not affect the output for any single set of inputs. Or maybe you

>would choose someone2's second option there: the affect is such that

>the outputs are the same as without the affect?

>

Using "affect" as a noun means something quite different than as a

verb. I'll deal with the sentence where is it is used as a verb.

I would say that the ability to give a different response for

different inputs can affect the output for a single output, just as my

ability to choose between, say, 3 proven chess defenses I have

studied, affects my response to your opening move.

However, I could say that my ability to play chess is a result of

previous inputs (eg, my training) that form part of the "set" of

inputs. Even my genetic inheritance can be viewed as an input. So I

don't think these questions are well enough thought out.

July 12, 2007

someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> said:

>Yes you that is experiencing does need to be distinguished from that

>which is providing you with the experiences. The experiences aren't

>generated by yourself, you don't know what the neural state represents

>for example.

All readily seen to be God's ideas, under theistic idealism.

Are we close to done, for now?

July 13, 2007

On 12 Jul, 22:52, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >Yes you that is experiencing does need to be distinguished from that

> >which is providing you with the experiences. The experiences aren't

> >generated by yourself, you don't know what the neural state represents

> >for example.

>

> All readily seen to be God's ideas, under theistic idealism.

>

> Are we close to done, for now?

The post was about the implausibility of materialism, not about what

reality actually is. Did you understand why it is implausible that we

are a biological mechanism behaving according to the known laws of

physics?

July 13, 2007

someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> said:

>On 12 Jul, 22:52, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>>

>> >Yes you that is experiencing does need to be distinguished from that

>> >which is providing you with the experiences. The experiences aren't

>> >generated by yourself, you don't know what the neural state represents

>> >for example.

>>

>> All readily seen to be God's ideas, under theistic idealism.

>>

>> Are we close to done, for now?

>

>The post was about the implausibility of materialism, not about what

>reality actually is. Did you understand why it is implausible that we

>are a biological mechanism behaving according to the known laws of

>physics?

It will never be entirely plausible IMO that we are a biological

mechanism behaving according to the KNOWN laws of physics, because we

will never, IMO, correctly know all the laws of physics. (History is

my guide, I could be wrong.) But this does not make materialism, IMO,

implausible. Nor does it make materialism plausible.

How's that? Can I go?

July 13, 2007

On 13 Jul, 06:19, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >On 12 Jul, 22:52, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >> >Yes you that is experiencing does need to be distinguished from that

> >> >which is providing you with the experiences. The experiences aren't

> >> >generated by yourself, you don't know what the neural state represents

> >> >for example.

>

> >> All readily seen to be God's ideas, under theistic idealism.

>

> >> Are we close to done, for now?

>

> >The post was about the implausibility of materialism, not about what

> >reality actually is. Did you understand why it is implausible that we

> >are a biological mechanism behaving according to the known laws of

> >physics?

>

> It will never be entirely plausible IMO that we are a biological

> mechanism behaving according to the KNOWN laws of physics, because we

> will never, IMO, correctly know all the laws of physics. (History is

> my guide, I could be wrong.) But this does not make materialism, IMO,

> implausible. Nor does it make materialism plausible.

>

> How's that? Can I go?

>

That isn't what I meant though. A car could be said to follow the

known laws of physics in the sense that they can be used to explain

its behaviour, as could any of our technology. Did you understand that

it is implausible that our behaviour can be explained in terms of the

known laws of physics?

Also regarding your comment earlier when you said, "All readily seen

to be God's ideas, under theistic idealism.", were you suggesting that

we are just an idea of God's, and that therefore we are effectively

God? If so, that is wrong, and certainly not what I am suggesting.

That sounds like a Satanic inspiration. It would imply that nothing we

could do could be unpleasing to God, and therefore would also be an

insult to God given what some people chose to do.

July 13, 2007

On 12 jul, 17:44, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

> On 12 Jul, 15:55, Matt Silberstein

>

> <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> > On Thu, 12 Jul 2007 04:21:59 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> > <1184239319.210411.129...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> > >On 12 Jul, 05:27, Matt Silberstein

> > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> > >> On Wed, 11 Jul 2007 19:07:23 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> > >> <1184206043.831834.51...@r34g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> > >> >On 11 Jul, 21:45, Matt Silberstein

> > >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> > >> >> On Wed, 11 Jul 2007 12:59:16 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> > >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> > >> >> <1184183956.023911.247...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>

> > >> >> [snip]

>

> > >> >> >If we were found not to be following the known laws of physics, and it

> > >> >> >is implausible that we are (even though it might never be shown),

>

> > >> >> You have yet to approach showing it is implausible. In fact, you seem

> > >> >> to work really hard at avoiding all of the evidence that says we are

> > >> >> simply physical beings. In particular you ignore all of the evidence

> > >> >> of the ways that subjective experience is affected/determined by

> > >> >> physical phenomena.

>

> > >> >> >I

> > >> >> >don't think that there would be a problem in science regarding us as

> > >> >> >spiritual beings influencing the human we experience being. Unless you

> > >> >> >are stating that through bias science will never have an understanding

> > >> >> >of reality.

>

> > >> >> From a scientific POV what does "spiritual being" mean?

>

> > >> >> >Already we know that on quantum events there is either events with no

> > >> >> >cause within the physical (quantum randomness, in orthodox quantum

> > >> >> >mechanics), or "spooky interaction" at a distance where everything

> > >> >> >physical effects everything physical regardless of distance (as

> > >> >> >suggested in bohmian mechanics). It is already known that the "spooky

> > >> >> >interaction at a distance", as I think Einstein called it, exists for

> > >> >> >quantum entanglement. I understand this lead Bohm to suggest that the

> > >> >> >physical isn't really seperated.

>

> > >> >> Which has no actually connection to consciousness, not more than it

> > >> >> does to cinder blocks or photosynthesis.

>

> > >> >> >Though I can see that there could be a school of thought that could

> > >> >> >explain brain not following the known laws of physics because of some

> > >> >> >"special complicated configuration",

>

> > >> >> What in the world does that mean? I don't know of anyone who suggests

> > >> >> anything like this.

>

> > >> >> >though they could always attempt

> > >> >> >to show this on an artificial neural network as in the example, hoping

> > >> >> >that they will stumble upon a complicated configuration where either

> > >> >> >unexpected messages started appearing,

>

> > >> >> Why? I see no reason to look for anything like that.

>

> > >> >> >or the nodes didn't give the

> > >> >> >same outputs in the network, as they would have in the lab,

>

> > >> >> Why? I see no reason to look for anything like that either.

>

> > >> >> >given the

> > >> >> >same inputs. I guess atheists are betting their soul (not that they

> > >> >> >believe they have one), that either this is the case, or that their

> > >> >> >whole conscious experience was a coincidental deception, and that

> > >> >> >nothing they experienced influenced the behaviour of the human they

> > >> >> >experienced being.

>

> > >> >> Again, none of the alternatives you propose are those I see in the

> > >> >> literature. They are all straw. Consciousness is the product of

> > >> >> biology. "Complicated" is a subjective determination, not a property

> > >> >> of a thing in the world. Things are "complicated" if the perceiver has

> > >> >> trouble understanding them. You have yet to justify this

> > >> >> "coincidental" claim. Our consciousness relates to actions in the

> > >> >> external world because it is connected, and affected by, that external

> > >> >> world.

>

> > >> >It was shown to be implausible with the simple scenario I gave, which

> > >> >showed that what we consciously experience couldn't influence a

> > >> >biological mechanism which simply followed the laws of physics. If you

> > >> >still can't comprehend why, I'll go through it with you.

>

> > >> No, it does not show that it is implausible. Roughly speaking you

> > >> assert that robots can't be conscious, therefore human consciousness

> > >> isn't physical. A problem with that is that we don't know that robots

> > >> can't, some day, have subjective experience. People who actually work

> > >> on this tend to think that they will someday. You add to this problem

> > >> the fallacy of composition: just because a component of X does not

> > >> have property Y does not mean that X does not have property Y.

>

> > >> >Perhaps it is best if you can see this clearly before we continue. As

> > >> >you ask about several other topics, and haven't yet understood some

> > >> >basic truths.

>

> > >> Sorry, but my disagreement does not constitute my lack of

> > >> understanding.

>

> > >No disagreement doesn't. You have however totally misunderstood. I'm

> > >not saying that because a component of X does not have property Y that

> > >X does not have property Y.

>

> > Actually you are. You have pointed out that a particular node is not

> > conscious and that no node is conscious and then jump to the

> > conclusion that no set of nodes can be conscious. That is either a

> > fallacy of composition or a Sorities Heap.

>

> > >I'll write out the scenario again, and the options, maybe by selecting

> > >one, you will see what I am driving at, though jien has explained it

> > >to you, as well as myself yet you don't seem to be able to understand,

> > >maybe it is your preconceived notion of what is being said, is

> > >blinding you to what actually is being said.

>

> > Or maybe because you are wrong.

>

> > >Supposing there was an artificial neural network, with a billion more

> > >nodes than you had neurons in your brain, and a very 'complicated'

> > >configuration,

>

> > The 'complicated' is irrelevant and just messes up the presentation.

>

> > >which drove a robot. The robot, due to its behaviour

> > >(being a Turing Equivalent),

>

> > Do you mean a Universal Turing Machine, what that term usually means,

> > or do you mean passes the Turing Test?

>

> > >caused some atheists

>

> > What if a theist makes the came conclusion?

>

> > >to claim it was

> > >consciously experiencing. Now supposing each message between each node

> > >contained additional information such as source node, destination node

> > >(which could be the same as the source node, for feedback loops), the

> > >time the message was sent, and the message. Each node wrote out to a

> > >log on receipt of a message, and on sending a message out. Now after

> > >an hour of the atheist communicating with the robot, the logs could be

> > >examined by a bank of computers, varifying, that for the input

> > >messages each received, the outputs were those expected by a single

> > >node in a lab given the same inputs. They could also varify that no

> > >unexplained messages appeared.

> > >What would you be saying with regards to it consciously experiencing:

>

> > I would say that it passed the Turing Test and that it seemed to have

> > all of the external qualities I can determine regarding conscious

> > experience, so it likely had the same kind of conscious experience

> > humans have.

>

> > >A) The atheists, mentioned in the example, were wrong to consider it

> > >to be consciously experiencing.

>

> > Why? Nothing in the presentation leads to that. You had some stuff

> > about logs, but I have no idea why that changes anything. I am no less

> > conscious if someone is able to track all of my neurons/brain

> > chemicals.

>

> > >B) Were correct to say that was consciously experiencing, but that it

> > >doesn't influence behaviour.

>

> > Again, why? Nothing in the scenario leads me to that.

>

> > >C) It might have been consciously experiencing, how could you tell, it

> > >doesn't influence behaviour.

>

> > I can't see making that conclusion.

>

> > >D) It was consciously experiencing and that influenced its behaviour.

>

> > Yep.

>

> > >If you select D, as all the nodes are giving the same outputs as they

> > >would have singly in the lab given the same inputs, could you also

> > >select between D1, and D2:

>

> > >D1) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were also influenced

> > >by conscious experiences.

>

> > And now we have that fallacy of composition I referred to. The

> > conscious experience is not the influence of a single node. I can do

> > the same above with a single neuron in an active brain, that would not

> > eliminate conscious experience for that person.

>

> > >D2) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were not influenced

> > >by conscious experiences, but the influence of the conscious

> > >experiences within the robot, is such that the outputs are the same as

> > >without the influence of the conscious experiences.

>

> > Lets try this: I have a computer with thousands of chips and I log all

> > of the inputs and outputs and such. I run an OS and a newsreader on

> > that computer. Now I take one of the chips and put it in a separate

> > test rig and subject it to the same inputs and output it had in the

> > computer. Would I say that the chip in the test rig was influenced by

> > the OS/newsreader? Not really. I could argue, I suppose, in both this

> > and your case, that the "influence" comes in the determination of the

> > inputs for the node/chip.

>

> > Sorry, but I do understand the argument and it is fallacious.

>

> You don't understand I am not saying that because one node isn't

> conscious, that the network can't be conscious. I told you this, but

> you continue to misunderstand.

>

> While you chose D, and weren't selecting D1, you avoided selecting D2.

>

> With your example of the computer with a thousand chips, running an OS

> and newsreader, the OS and newreader refer to software

> configurations.

>

> D is not asking whether the robot was influenced by the configuration

> of the nodes. D was asking whether you would be claiming that the

> robot being consciously experienced influenced the way it behaves.

>

> D2 is asking whether the influence you are talking about is such that

> the behaviour is the same as without the influence.

You seemed to have been learning a lot since you stopped replying to

me!

You are really getting near to the essence of the subject,

Now the funny thing is the node is not working differently when the

whole network is consious then it would work when the whole network is

not conscious. But the input of many of the nodes will be different

when the network is conscious then when the network is not concious.

A typical conscious remark would be:

"That is the same story I heard yesterday, with the exception that

yesterday the women was said to be pregnant, and today the women is

said to have overweight"

You will see some typical conscious components, like "yesterday" "I'

and "same"

In order to show consciousness to amount that could pass the turing

test,

the network would have to understand the concept of a selfe,

it has to be able to react differently because of what happened in the

past,

and it has to "know" that it reacts differently because of what

happened in the past.

No single node would have to react differently in order to accomplish

that,

but many nodes will have to receive different input in order for the

whole system to produce different output.

The fact that you are now so clause to the essence

is - in my opinion - a clear sign that you are very consciouss

indeed:)

Peter van Velzen

July 2007

Amstelveen

The Netherlands

July 13, 2007

someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> said:

>On 13 Jul, 06:19, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>>

>> >On 12 Jul, 22:52, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>>

>> >> >Yes you that is experiencing does need to be distinguished from that

>> >> >which is providing you with the experiences. The experiences aren't

>> >> >generated by yourself, you don't know what the neural state represents

>> >> >for example.

>>

>> >> All readily seen to be God's ideas, under theistic idealism.

>>

>> >> Are we close to done, for now?

>>

>> >The post was about the implausibility of materialism, not about what

>> >reality actually is. Did you understand why it is implausible that we

>> >are a biological mechanism behaving according to the known laws of

>> >physics?

>>

>> It will never be entirely plausible IMO that we are a biological

>> mechanism behaving according to the KNOWN laws of physics, because we

>> will never, IMO, correctly know all the laws of physics. (History is

>> my guide, I could be wrong.) But this does not make materialism, IMO,

>> implausible. Nor does it make materialism plausible.

>>

>> How's that? Can I go?

>>

>

>That isn't what I meant though. A car could be said to follow the

>known laws of physics in the sense that they can be used to explain

>its behaviour, as could any of our technology. Did you understand that

>it is implausible that our behaviour can be explained in terms of the

>known laws of physics?

I would like to hear your reason why, and then I might be able to

agree without reservation.

For example if you said humans will never be able to go to the surface

of the Sun and run around only in bathing suits, and your reason is

that it would be too expensive, I'd say I agree we can't go to the Sun

and run around like that, but that's the wrong reason. So I need to

hear your reason why it is implausible that we will ever be able to

explain human behavior in terms of the known laws of physics, if

that's what you mean.

>

>Also regarding your comment earlier when you said, "All readily seen

>to be God's ideas, under theistic idealism.", were you suggesting that

>we are just an idea of God's, and that therefore we are effectively

>God? If so, that is wrong, and certainly not what I am suggesting.

>That sounds like a Satanic inspiration. It would imply that nothing we

>could do could be unpleasing to God, and therefore would also be an

>insult to God given what some people chose to do.

>

No, I am not saying anything firmly. I am saying that when I think

about theistic subjective idealism, with an omnipotent ex nihilo

creator sustainer deity, it leads me to that kind of mental image.

Your mileage may vary. You might have an entirely different idea of

theistic subjective idealism. But I am really just an amateur student

of such metaphysics. I haven't any firm stand on it.

July 13, 2007

On Jul 13, 11:23 am, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >On 13 Jul, 06:19, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

<snip>

> >> > Did you understand why it is implausible that we

> >> >are a biological mechanism behaving according to the known laws of

> >> >physics?

>

> >> It will never be entirely plausible IMO that we are a biological

> >> mechanism behaving according to the KNOWN laws of physics, because we

> >> will never, IMO, correctly know all the laws of physics. (History is

> >> my guide, I could be wrong.) But this does not make materialism, IMO,

> >> implausible. Nor does it make materialism plausible.

>

> >> How's that? Can I go?

>

> >That isn't what I meant though. A car could be said to follow the

> >known laws of physics in the sense that they can be used to explain

> >its behaviour, as could any of our technology. Did you understand that

> >it is implausible that our behaviour can be explained in terms of the

> >known laws of physics?

>

> I would like to hear your reason why, and then I might be able to

> agree without reservation.

As best I can decipher his ramblings:

DI27. Explanations in terms of the known laws of physics cannot

reference subjective experiences.

DI28. Thus, if our behaviour can be completely explained in terms of

the known laws of physics, then it can be explained without reference

to our SEs.

DI29. If it can be explained without reference to our SEs, then our

SEs do not influence our behavior.

DI30. If our SEs do not influence our behavior, then it is mere

coincidence that we have the SEs our behavior seems to indicate we're

having.

DI31. Such a coincidence is absurd. Thus, our behaviour cannot be

completely explained in terms of the known laws of physics.

I still haven't seen any justification for DI27. What's been hinted at

is that either

DI32. An explanation that doesn't use psychological-type vocabulary

("sense impression", "memory", etc.) does not reference SEs, even if

it provides an atom-by-atom account of the brain events that are the

SEs, or

DI33. SEs are mystical and outside the bounds of physics.

If it's DI32, then that's just cheap, sorry semantics and I'll be

forced to track Glenn down and give him a double titty-twister.

If it's DI33, then I'd love to see the proof.

July 13, 2007

DuhIdiot <jmashburn@alltel.net> said:

>On Jul 13, 11:23 am, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>>

>> >On 13 Jul, 06:19, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

><snip>

>

>> >> > Did you understand why it is implausible that we

>> >> >are a biological mechanism behaving according to the known laws of

>> >> >physics?

>>

>> >> It will never be entirely plausible IMO that we are a biological

>> >> mechanism behaving according to the KNOWN laws of physics, because we

>> >> will never, IMO, correctly know all the laws of physics. (History is

>> >> my guide, I could be wrong.) But this does not make materialism, IMO,

>> >> implausible. Nor does it make materialism plausible.

>>

>> >> How's that? Can I go?

>>

>> >That isn't what I meant though. A car could be said to follow the

>> >known laws of physics in the sense that they can be used to explain

>> >its behaviour, as could any of our technology. Did you understand that

>> >it is implausible that our behaviour can be explained in terms of the

>> >known laws of physics?

>>

>> I would like to hear your reason why, and then I might be able to

>> agree without reservation.

>

>As best I can decipher his ramblings:

>DI27. Explanations in terms of the known laws of physics cannot

>reference subjective experiences.

>DI28. Thus, if our behaviour can be completely explained in terms of

>the known laws of physics, then it can be explained without reference

>to our SEs.

>DI29. If it can be explained without reference to our SEs, then our

>SEs do not influence our behavior.

>DI30. If our SEs do not influence our behavior, then it is mere

>coincidence that we have the SEs our behavior seems to indicate we're

>having.

>DI31. Such a coincidence is absurd. Thus, our behaviour cannot be

>completely explained in terms of the known laws of physics.

>

>I still haven't seen any justification for DI27. What's been hinted at

>is that either

>DI32. An explanation that doesn't use psychological-type vocabulary

>("sense impression", "memory", etc.) does not reference SEs, even if

>it provides an atom-by-atom account of the brain events that are the

>SEs, or

>DI33. SEs are mystical and outside the bounds of physics.

>

>If it's DI32, then that's just cheap, sorry semantics and I'll be

>forced to track Glenn down and give him a double titty-twister.

>If it's DI33, then I'd love to see the proof.

Iv'e seen D127 in some form, and wonder what is meant by "reference".

In a way, physics can't "reference" very many things. For example, if

we want to determine the trajectory of a baseball thrown at ATT Park

to some degree of accuracy, can we "reference" it as a baseball? After

all, it's being called a baseball, implies its purpose or use, but

purposes or uses are assigned by humans to objects. As far as physics

goes, it is an object of such and such mass, etc., referencing only

those properties that will appear in the equations (for example the

simplest equations would treat it as a point mass and the earth as a

flat surface of uniform gravitational field). So does this mean that

because its being used for playing a game does not influence its

trajectory, physics can't reference it, and so, it is implausible that

physics can explain (to various degrees of approximation) the

trajectory (behavior) of a baseball?

July 13, 2007

On 13 Jul, 16:23, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >On 13 Jul, 06:19, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >> >On 12 Jul, 22:52, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >> >> >Yes you that is experiencing does need to be distinguished from that

> >> >> >which is providing you with the experiences. The experiences aren't

> >> >> >generated by yourself, you don't know what the neural state represents

> >> >> >for example.

>

> >> >> All readily seen to be God's ideas, under theistic idealism.

>

> >> >> Are we close to done, for now?

>

> >> >The post was about the implausibility of materialism, not about what

> >> >reality actually is. Did you understand why it is implausible that we

> >> >are a biological mechanism behaving according to the known laws of

> >> >physics?

>

> >> It will never be entirely plausible IMO that we are a biological

> >> mechanism behaving according to the KNOWN laws of physics, because we

> >> will never, IMO, correctly know all the laws of physics. (History is

> >> my guide, I could be wrong.) But this does not make materialism, IMO,

> >> implausible. Nor does it make materialism plausible.

>

> >> How's that? Can I go?

>

> >That isn't what I meant though. A car could be said to follow the

> >known laws of physics in the sense that they can be used to explain

> >its behaviour, as could any of our technology. Did you understand that

> >it is implausible that our behaviour can be explained in terms of the

> >known laws of physics?

>

> I would like to hear your reason why, and then I might be able to

> agree without reservation.

>

> For example if you said humans will never be able to go to the surface

> of the Sun and run around only in bathing suits, and your reason is

> that it would be too expensive, I'd say I agree we can't go to the Sun

> and run around like that, but that's the wrong reason. So I need to

> hear your reason why it is implausible that we will ever be able to

> explain human behavior in terms of the known laws of physics, if

> that's what you mean.

>

> >Also regarding your comment earlier when you said, "All readily seen

> >to be God's ideas, under theistic idealism.", were you suggesting that

> >we are just an idea of God's, and that therefore we are effectively

> >God? If so, that is wrong, and certainly not what I am suggesting.

> >That sounds like a Satanic inspiration. It would imply that nothing we

> >could do could be unpleasing to God, and therefore would also be an

> >insult to God given what some people chose to do.

>

> No, I am not saying anything firmly. I am saying that when I think

> about theistic subjective idealism, with an omnipotent ex nihilo

> creator sustainer deity, it leads me to that kind of mental image.

> Your mileage may vary. You might have an entirely different idea of

> theistic subjective idealism. But I am really just an amateur student

> of such metaphysics. I haven't any firm stand on it.

>

Regarding my reason why it is implausible that our behaviour can be

explained in terms of the known laws of physics, it has been explained

to you again and again, by myself and others. It would mean that

consciously experiencing wasn't influencing behaviour. Therefore it

would have to be a coincidence that we have the conscious experiences

the 'meat machine' is expresses in its behaviour.

As for your suggestion, which as I said, sounds like a satanistic

inspiration, what objection do you have in the alteration of it, such

that what we are experiencing is an unbiased presentation, neither

Heaven, nor Hell, and the reason we are experiencing it is that our

choices maybe observed in a context where we can choose between the

following the spiritual nature of a loving, selfless, God, and a

hateful, selfish Devil. The difference from what you were suggesting,

is that what we choose to do does matter, and that if we murder, or

cause suffering to others for example, it is not God doing it, it

would be us.

July 13, 2007

On 13 Jul, 13:37, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl>

wrote:

> On 12 jul, 17:44, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > On 12 Jul, 15:55, Matt Silberstein

>

> > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> > > On Thu, 12 Jul 2007 04:21:59 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> > > <1184239319.210411.129...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> > > >On 12 Jul, 05:27, Matt Silberstein

> > > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> > > >> On Wed, 11 Jul 2007 19:07:23 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> > > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> > > >> <1184206043.831834.51...@r34g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> > > >> >On 11 Jul, 21:45, Matt Silberstein

> > > >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> > > >> >> On Wed, 11 Jul 2007 12:59:16 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> > > >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> > > >> >> <1184183956.023911.247...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>

> > > >> >> [snip]

>

> > > >> >> >If we were found not to be following the known laws of physics, and it

> > > >> >> >is implausible that we are (even though it might never be shown),

>

> > > >> >> You have yet to approach showing it is implausible. In fact, you seem

> > > >> >> to work really hard at avoiding all of the evidence that says we are

> > > >> >> simply physical beings. In particular you ignore all of the evidence

> > > >> >> of the ways that subjective experience is affected/determined by

> > > >> >> physical phenomena.

>

> > > >> >> >I

> > > >> >> >don't think that there would be a problem in science regarding us as

> > > >> >> >spiritual beings influencing the human we experience being. Unless you

> > > >> >> >are stating that through bias science will never have an understanding

> > > >> >> >of reality.

>

> > > >> >> From a scientific POV what does "spiritual being" mean?

>

> > > >> >> >Already we know that on quantum events there is either events with no

> > > >> >> >cause within the physical (quantum randomness, in orthodox quantum

> > > >> >> >mechanics), or "spooky interaction" at a distance where everything

> > > >> >> >physical effects everything physical regardless of distance (as

> > > >> >> >suggested in bohmian mechanics). It is already known that the "spooky

> > > >> >> >interaction at a distance", as I think Einstein called it, exists for

> > > >> >> >quantum entanglement. I understand this lead Bohm to suggest that the

> > > >> >> >physical isn't really seperated.

>

> > > >> >> Which has no actually connection to consciousness, not more than it

> > > >> >> does to cinder blocks or photosynthesis.

>

> > > >> >> >Though I can see that there could be a school of thought that could

> > > >> >> >explain brain not following the known laws of physics because of some

> > > >> >> >"special complicated configuration",

>

> > > >> >> What in the world does that mean? I don't know of anyone who suggests

> > > >> >> anything like this.

>

> > > >> >> >though they could always attempt

> > > >> >> >to show this on an artificial neural network as in the example, hoping

> > > >> >> >that they will stumble upon a complicated configuration where either

> > > >> >> >unexpected messages started appearing,

>

> > > >> >> Why? I see no reason to look for anything like that.

>

> > > >> >> >or the nodes didn't give the

> > > >> >> >same outputs in the network, as they would have in the lab,

>

> > > >> >> Why? I see no reason to look for anything like that either.

>

> > > >> >> >given the

> > > >> >> >same inputs. I guess atheists are betting their soul (not that they

> > > >> >> >believe they have one), that either this is the case, or that their

> > > >> >> >whole conscious experience was a coincidental deception, and that

> > > >> >> >nothing they experienced influenced the behaviour of the human they

> > > >> >> >experienced being.

>

> > > >> >> Again, none of the alternatives you propose are those I see in the

> > > >> >> literature. They are all straw. Consciousness is the product of

> > > >> >> biology. "Complicated" is a subjective determination, not a property

> > > >> >> of a thing in the world. Things are "complicated" if the perceiver has

> > > >> >> trouble understanding them. You have yet to justify this

> > > >> >> "coincidental" claim. Our consciousness relates to actions in the

> > > >> >> external world because it is connected, and affected by, that external

> > > >> >> world.

>

> > > >> >It was shown to be implausible with the simple scenario I gave, which

> > > >> >showed that what we consciously experience couldn't influence a

> > > >> >biological mechanism which simply followed the laws of physics. If you

> > > >> >still can't comprehend why, I'll go through it with you.

>

> > > >> No, it does not show that it is implausible. Roughly speaking you

> > > >> assert that robots can't be conscious, therefore human consciousness

> > > >> isn't physical. A problem with that is that we don't know that robots

> > > >> can't, some day, have subjective experience. People who actually work

> > > >> on this tend to think that they will someday. You add to this problem

> > > >> the fallacy of composition: just because a component of X does not

> > > >> have property Y does not mean that X does not have property Y.

>

> > > >> >Perhaps it is best if you can see this clearly before we continue. As

> > > >> >you ask about several other topics, and haven't yet understood some

> > > >> >basic truths.

>

> > > >> Sorry, but my disagreement does not constitute my lack of

> > > >> understanding.

>

> > > >No disagreement doesn't. You have however totally misunderstood. I'm

> > > >not saying that because a component of X does not have property Y that

> > > >X does not have property Y.

>

> > > Actually you are. You have pointed out that a particular node is not

> > > conscious and that no node is conscious and then jump to the

> > > conclusion that no set of nodes can be conscious. That is either a

> > > fallacy of composition or a Sorities Heap.

>

> > > >I'll write out the scenario again, and the options, maybe by selecting

> > > >one, you will see what I am driving at, though jien has explained it

> > > >to you, as well as myself yet you don't seem to be able to understand,

> > > >maybe it is your preconceived notion of what is being said, is

> > > >blinding you to what actually is being said.

>

> > > Or maybe because you are wrong.

>

> > > >Supposing there was an artificial neural network, with a billion more

> > > >nodes than you had neurons in your brain, and a very 'complicated'

> > > >configuration,

>

> > > The 'complicated' is irrelevant and just messes up the presentation.

>

> > > >which drove a robot. The robot, due to its behaviour

> > > >(being a Turing Equivalent),

>

> > > Do you mean a Universal Turing Machine, what that term usually means,

> > > or do you mean passes the Turing Test?

>

> > > >caused some atheists

>

> > > What if a theist makes the came conclusion?

>

> > > >to claim it was

> > > >consciously experiencing. Now supposing each message between each node

> > > >contained additional information such as source node, destination node

> > > >(which could be the same as the source node, for feedback loops), the

> > > >time the message was sent, and the message. Each node wrote out to a

> > > >log on receipt of a message, and on sending a message out. Now after

> > > >an hour of the atheist communicating with the robot, the logs could be

> > > >examined by a bank of computers, varifying, that for the input

> > > >messages each received, the outputs were those expected by a single

> > > >node in a lab given the same inputs. They could also varify that no

> > > >unexplained messages appeared.

> > > >What would you be saying with regards to it consciously experiencing:

>

> > > I would say that it passed the Turing Test and that it seemed to have

> > > all of the external qualities I can determine regarding conscious

> > > experience, so it likely had the same kind of conscious experience

> > > humans have.

>

> > > >A) The atheists, mentioned in the example, were wrong to consider it

> > > >to be consciously experiencing.

>

> > > Why? Nothing in the presentation leads to that. You had some stuff

> > > about logs, but I have no idea why that changes anything. I am no less

> > > conscious if someone is able to track all of my neurons/brain

> > > chemicals.

>

> > > >B) Were correct to say that was consciously experiencing, but that it

> > > >doesn't influence behaviour.

>

> > > Again, why? Nothing in the scenario leads me to that.

>

> > > >C) It might have been consciously experiencing, how could you tell, it

> > > >doesn't influence behaviour.

>

> > > I can't see making that conclusion.

>

> > > >D) It was consciously experiencing and that influenced its behaviour.

>

> > > Yep.

>

> > > >If you select D, as all the nodes are giving the same outputs as they

> > > >would have singly in the lab given the same inputs, could you also

> > > >select between D1, and D2:

>

> > > >D1) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were also influenced

> > > >by conscious experiences.

>

> > > And now we have that fallacy of composition I referred to. The

> > > conscious experience is not the influence of a single node. I can do

> > > the same above with a single neuron in an active brain, that would not

> > > eliminate conscious experience for that person.

>

> > > >D2) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were not influenced

> > > >by conscious experiences, but the influence of the conscious

> > > >experiences within the robot, is such that the outputs are the same as

> > > >without the influence of the conscious experiences.

>

> > > Lets try this: I have a computer with thousands of chips and I log all

> > > of the inputs and outputs and such. I run an OS and a newsreader on

> > > that computer. Now I take one of the chips and put it in a separate

> > > test rig and subject it to the same inputs and output it had in the

> > > computer. Would I say that the chip in the test rig was influenced by

> > > the OS/newsreader? Not really. I could argue, I suppose, in both this

> > > and your case, that the "influence" comes in the determination of the

> > > inputs for the node/chip.

>

> > > Sorry, but I do understand the argument and it is fallacious.

>

> > You don't understand I am not saying that because one node isn't

> > conscious, that the network can't be conscious. I told you this, but

> > you continue to misunderstand.

>

> > While you chose D, and weren't selecting D1, you avoided selecting D2.

>

> > With your example of the computer with a thousand chips, running an OS

> > and newsreader, the OS and newreader refer to software

> > configurations.

>

> > D is not asking whether the robot was influenced by the configuration

> > of the nodes. D was asking whether you would be claiming that the

> > robot being consciously experienced influenced the way it behaves.

>

> > D2 is asking whether the influence you are talking about is such that

> > the behaviour is the same as without the influence.

>

> You seemed to have been learning a lot since you stopped replying to

> me!

> You are really getting near to the essence of the subject,

>

> Now the funny thing is the node is not working differently when the

> whole network is consious then it would work when the whole network is

> not conscious. But the input of many of the nodes will be different

> when the network is conscious then when the network is not concious.

>

> A typical conscious remark would be:

>

> "That is the same story I heard yesterday, with the exception that

> yesterday the women was said to be pregnant, and today the women is

> said to have overweight"

>

> You will see some typical conscious components, like "yesterday" "I'

> and "same"

> In order to show consciousness to amount that could pass the turing

> test,

> the network would have to understand the concept of a selfe,

> it has to be able to react differently because of what happened in the

> past,

> and it has to "know" that it reacts differently because of what

> happened in the past.

> No single node would have to react differently in order to accomplish

> that,

> but many nodes will have to receive different input in order for the

> whole system to produce different output.

>

> The fact that you are now so clause to the essence

> is - in my opinion - a clear sign that you are very consciouss

> indeed:)

>

You unfortunately don't seemed to have learnt anything.

In the robot scenario, there was no influence of conscious experiences

in its behaviour, no matter what its behaviour was. A simple truth you

seem to have a problem coming to terms with.

July 13, 2007

someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> said:

>On 13 Jul, 16:23, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>>

>> >On 13 Jul, 06:19, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>>

>> >> >On 12 Jul, 22:52, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>>

>> >> >> >Yes you that is experiencing does need to be distinguished from that

>> >> >> >which is providing you with the experiences. The experiences aren't

>> >> >> >generated by yourself, you don't know what the neural state represents

>> >> >> >for example.

>>

>> >> >> All readily seen to be God's ideas, under theistic idealism.

>>

>> >> >> Are we close to done, for now?

>>

>> >> >The post was about the implausibility of materialism, not about what

>> >> >reality actually is. Did you understand why it is implausible that we

>> >> >are a biological mechanism behaving according to the known laws of

>> >> >physics?

>>

>> >> It will never be entirely plausible IMO that we are a biological

>> >> mechanism behaving according to the KNOWN laws of physics, because we

>> >> will never, IMO, correctly know all the laws of physics. (History is

>> >> my guide, I could be wrong.) But this does not make materialism, IMO,

>> >> implausible. Nor does it make materialism plausible.

>>

>> >> How's that? Can I go?

>>

>> >That isn't what I meant though. A car could be said to follow the

>> >known laws of physics in the sense that they can be used to explain

>> >its behaviour, as could any of our technology. Did you understand that

>> >it is implausible that our behaviour can be explained in terms of the

>> >known laws of physics?

>>

>> I would like to hear your reason why, and then I might be able to

>> agree without reservation.

>>

>> For example if you said humans will never be able to go to the surface

>> of the Sun and run around only in bathing suits, and your reason is

>> that it would be too expensive, I'd say I agree we can't go to the Sun

>> and run around like that, but that's the wrong reason. So I need to

>> hear your reason why it is implausible that we will ever be able to

>> explain human behavior in terms of the known laws of physics, if

>> that's what you mean.

>>

>> >Also regarding your comment earlier when you said, "All readily seen

>> >to be God's ideas, under theistic idealism.", were you suggesting that

>> >we are just an idea of God's, and that therefore we are effectively

>> >God? If so, that is wrong, and certainly not what I am suggesting.

>> >That sounds like a Satanic inspiration. It would imply that nothing we

>> >could do could be unpleasing to God, and therefore would also be an

>> >insult to God given what some people chose to do.

>>

>> No, I am not saying anything firmly. I am saying that when I think

>> about theistic subjective idealism, with an omnipotent ex nihilo

>> creator sustainer deity, it leads me to that kind of mental image.

>> Your mileage may vary. You might have an entirely different idea of

>> theistic subjective idealism. But I am really just an amateur student

>> of such metaphysics. I haven't any firm stand on it.

>>

>

>Regarding my reason why it is implausible that our behaviour can be

>explained in terms of the known laws of physics, it has been explained

>to you again and again, by myself and others. It would mean that

>consciously experiencing wasn't influencing behaviour. Therefore it

>would have to be a coincidence that we have the conscious experiences

>the 'meat machine' is expresses in its behaviour.

Yes you have, but we never seem to understand it to your satisfaction.

My understanding is that you think there is something non-physical

about humans that is essential to the influence they have on their

behavior, and that non-physcal element is not physically explainable

in itself, so physics can never possibly explain human behavior. So,

tell me what I don't understand.

>

>As for your suggestion, which as I said, sounds like a satanistic

>inspiration, what objection do you have in the alteration of it, such

>that what we are experiencing is an unbiased presentation, neither

>Heaven, nor Hell, and the reason we are experiencing it is that our

>choices maybe observed in a context where we can choose between the

>following the spiritual nature of a loving, selfless, God, and a

>hateful, selfish Devil. The difference from what you were suggesting,

>is that what we choose to do does matter, and that if we murder, or

>cause suffering to others for example, it is not God doing it, it

>would be us.

As I said, I don't have a firm stand on such metaphysical things.

July 13, 2007

On 13 jul, 19:34, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

> On 13 Jul, 13:37, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl>

> wrote:

>

> > On 12 jul, 17:44, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > On 12 Jul, 15:55, Matt Silberstein

>

> > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> > > > On Thu, 12 Jul 2007 04:21:59 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> > > > <1184239319.210411.129...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> > > > >On 12 Jul, 05:27, Matt Silberstein

> > > > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> > > > >> On Wed, 11 Jul 2007 19:07:23 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> > > > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> > > > >> <1184206043.831834.51...@r34g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> > > > >> >On 11 Jul, 21:45, Matt Silberstein

> > > > >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> > > > >> >> On Wed, 11 Jul 2007 12:59:16 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> > > > >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> > > > >> >> <1184183956.023911.247...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>

> > > > >> >> [snip]

>

> > > > >> >> >If we were found not to be following the known laws of physics, and it

> > > > >> >> >is implausible that we are (even though it might never be shown),

>

> > > > >> >> You have yet to approach showing it is implausible. In fact, you seem

> > > > >> >> to work really hard at avoiding all of the evidence that says we are

> > > > >> >> simply physical beings. In particular you ignore all of the evidence

> > > > >> >> of the ways that subjective experience is affected/determined by

> > > > >> >> physical phenomena.

>

> > > > >> >> >I

> > > > >> >> >don't think that there would be a problem in science regarding us as

> > > > >> >> >spiritual beings influencing the human we experience being. Unless you

> > > > >> >> >are stating that through bias science will never have an understanding

> > > > >> >> >of reality.

>

> > > > >> >> From a scientific POV what does "spiritual being" mean?

>

> > > > >> >> >Already we know that on quantum events there is either events with no

> > > > >> >> >cause within the physical (quantum randomness, in orthodox quantum

> > > > >> >> >mechanics), or "spooky interaction" at a distance where everything

> > > > >> >> >physical effects everything physical regardless of distance (as

> > > > >> >> >suggested in bohmian mechanics). It is already known that the "spooky

> > > > >> >> >interaction at a distance", as I think Einstein called it, exists for

> > > > >> >> >quantum entanglement. I understand this lead Bohm to suggest that the

> > > > >> >> >physical isn't really seperated.

>

> > > > >> >> Which has no actually connection to consciousness, not more than it

> > > > >> >> does to cinder blocks or photosynthesis.

>

> > > > >> >> >Though I can see that there could be a school of thought that could

> > > > >> >> >explain brain not following the known laws of physics because of some

> > > > >> >> >"special complicated configuration",

>

> > > > >> >> What in the world does that mean? I don't know of anyone who suggests

> > > > >> >> anything like this.

>

> > > > >> >> >though they could always attempt

> > > > >> >> >to show this on an artificial neural network as in the example, hoping

> > > > >> >> >that they will stumble upon a complicated configuration where either

> > > > >> >> >unexpected messages started appearing,

>

> > > > >> >> Why? I see no reason to look for anything like that.

>

> > > > >> >> >or the nodes didn't give the

> > > > >> >> >same outputs in the network, as they would have in the lab,

>

> > > > >> >> Why? I see no reason to look for anything like that either.

>

> > > > >> >> >given the

> > > > >> >> >same inputs. I guess atheists are betting their soul (not that they

> > > > >> >> >believe they have one), that either this is the case, or that their

> > > > >> >> >whole conscious experience was a coincidental deception, and that

> > > > >> >> >nothing they experienced influenced the behaviour of the human they

> > > > >> >> >experienced being.

>

> > > > >> >> Again, none of the alternatives you propose are those I see in the

> > > > >> >> literature. They are all straw. Consciousness is the product of

> > > > >> >> biology. "Complicated" is a subjective determination, not a property

> > > > >> >> of a thing in the world. Things are "complicated" if the perceiver has

> > > > >> >> trouble understanding them. You have yet to justify this

> > > > >> >> "coincidental" claim. Our consciousness relates to actions in the

> > > > >> >> external world because it is connected, and affected by, that external

> > > > >> >> world.

>

> > > > >> >It was shown to be implausible with the simple scenario I gave, which

> > > > >> >showed that what we consciously experience couldn't influence a

> > > > >> >biological mechanism which simply followed the laws of physics. If you

> > > > >> >still can't comprehend why, I'll go through it with you.

>

> > > > >> No, it does not show that it is implausible. Roughly speaking you

> > > > >> assert that robots can't be conscious, therefore human consciousness

> > > > >> isn't physical. A problem with that is that we don't know that robots

> > > > >> can't, some day, have subjective experience. People who actually work

> > > > >> on this tend to think that they will someday. You add to this problem

> > > > >> the fallacy of composition: just because a component of X does not

> > > > >> have property Y does not mean that X does not have property Y.

>

> > > > >> >Perhaps it is best if you can see this clearly before we continue. As

> > > > >> >you ask about several other topics, and haven't yet understood some

> > > > >> >basic truths.

>

> > > > >> Sorry, but my disagreement does not constitute my lack of

> > > > >> understanding.

>

> > > > >No disagreement doesn't. You have however totally misunderstood. I'm

> > > > >not saying that because a component of X does not have property Y that

> > > > >X does not have property Y.

>

> > > > Actually you are. You have pointed out that a particular node is not

> > > > conscious and that no node is conscious and then jump to the

> > > > conclusion that no set of nodes can be conscious. That is either a

> > > > fallacy of composition or a Sorities Heap.

>

> > > > >I'll write out the scenario again, and the options, maybe by selecting

> > > > >one, you will see what I am driving at, though jien has explained it

> > > > >to you, as well as myself yet you don't seem to be able to understand,

> > > > >maybe it is your preconceived notion of what is being said, is

> > > > >blinding you to what actually is being said.

>

> > > > Or maybe because you are wrong.

>

> > > > >Supposing there was an artificial neural network, with a billion more

> > > > >nodes than you had neurons in your brain, and a very 'complicated'

> > > > >configuration,

>

> > > > The 'complicated' is irrelevant and just messes up the presentation.

>

> > > > >which drove a robot. The robot, due to its behaviour

> > > > >(being a Turing Equivalent),

>

> > > > Do you mean a Universal Turing Machine, what that term usually means,

> > > > or do you mean passes the Turing Test?

>

> > > > >caused some atheists

>

> > > > What if a theist makes the came conclusion?

>

> > > > >to claim it was

> > > > >consciously experiencing. Now supposing each message between each node

> > > > >contained additional information such as source node, destination node

> > > > >(which could be the same as the source node, for feedback loops), the

> > > > >time the message was sent, and the message. Each node wrote out to a

> > > > >log on receipt of a message, and on sending a message out. Now after

> > > > >an hour of the atheist communicating with the robot, the logs could be

> > > > >examined by a bank of computers, varifying, that for the input

> > > > >messages each received, the outputs were those expected by a single

> > > > >node in a lab given the same inputs. They could also varify that no

> > > > >unexplained messages appeared.

> > > > >What would you be saying with regards to it consciously experiencing:

>

> > > > I would say that it passed the Turing Test and that it seemed to have

> > > > all of the external qualities I can determine regarding conscious

> > > > experience, so it likely had the same kind of conscious experience

> > > > humans have.

>

> > > > >A) The atheists, mentioned in the example, were wrong to consider it

> > > > >to be consciously experiencing.

>

> > > > Why? Nothing in the presentation leads to that. You had some stuff

> > > > about logs, but I have no idea why that changes anything. I am no less

> > > > conscious if someone is able to track all of my neurons/brain

> > > > chemicals.

>

> > > > >B) Were correct to say that was consciously experiencing, but that it

> > > > >doesn't influence behaviour.

>

> > > > Again, why? Nothing in the scenario leads me to that.

>

> > > > >C) It might have been consciously experiencing, how could you tell, it

> > > > >doesn't influence behaviour.

>

> > > > I can't see making that conclusion.

>

> > > > >D) It was consciously experiencing and that influenced its behaviour.

>

> > > > Yep.

>

> > > > >If you select D, as all the nodes are giving the same outputs as they

> > > > >would have singly in the lab given the same inputs, could you also

> > > > >select between D1, and D2:

>

> > > > >D1) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were also influenced

> > > > >by conscious experiences.

>

> > > > And now we have that fallacy of composition I referred to. The

> > > > conscious experience is not the influence of a single node. I can do

> > > > the same above with a single neuron in an active brain, that would not

> > > > eliminate conscious experience for that person.

>

> > > > >D2) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were not influenced

> > > > >by conscious experiences, but the influence of the conscious

> > > > >experiences within the robot, is such that the outputs are the same as

> > > > >without the influence of the conscious experiences.

>

> > > > Lets try this: I have a computer with thousands of chips and I log all

> > > > of the inputs and outputs and such. I run an OS and a newsreader on

> > > > that computer. Now I take one of the chips and put it in a separate

> > > > test rig and subject it to the same inputs and output it had in the

> > > > computer. Would I say that the chip in the test rig was influenced by

> > > > the OS/newsreader? Not really. I could argue, I suppose, in both this

> > > > and your case, that the "influence" comes in the determination of the

> > > > inputs for the node/chip.

>

> > > > Sorry, but I do understand the argument and it is fallacious.

>

> > > You don't understand I am not saying that because one node isn't

> > > conscious, that the network can't be conscious. I told you this, but

> > > you continue to misunderstand.

>

> > > While you chose D, and weren't selecting D1, you avoided selecting D2.

>

> > > With your example of the computer with a thousand chips, running an OS

> > > and newsreader, the OS and newreader refer to software

> > > configurations.

>

> > > D is not asking whether the robot was influenced by the configuration

> > > of the nodes. D was asking whether you would be claiming that the

> > > robot being consciously experienced influenced the way it behaves.

>

> > > D2 is asking whether the influence you are talking about is such that

> > > the behaviour is the same as without the influence.

>

> > You seemed to have been learning a lot since you stopped replying to

> > me!

> > You are really getting near to the essence of the subject,

>

> > Now the funny thing is the node is not working differently when the

> > whole network is consious then it would work when the whole network is

> > not conscious. But the input of many of the nodes will be different

> > when the network is conscious then when the network is not concious.

>

> > A typical conscious remark would be:

>

> > "That is the same story I heard yesterday, with the exception that

> > yesterday the women was said to be pregnant, and today the women is

> > said to have overweight"

>

> > You will see some typical conscious components, like "yesterday" "I'

> > and "same"

> > In order to show consciousness to amount that could pass the turing

> > test,

> > the network would have to understand the concept of a selfe,

> > it has to be able to react differently because of what happened in the

> > past,

> > and it has to "know" that it reacts differently because of what

> > happened in the past.

> > No single node would have to react differently in order to accomplish

> > that,

> > but many nodes will have to receive different input in order for the

> > whole system to produce different output.

>

> > The fact that you are now so clause to the essence

> > is - in my opinion - a clear sign that you are very consciouss

> > indeed:)

>

> You unfortunately don't seemed to have learnt anything.

>

> In the robot scenario, there was no influence of conscious experiences

> in its behaviour, no matter what its behaviour was. A simple truth you

> seem to have a problem coming to terms with.

What it pity that you didn't think over my words before you replied.

What you call a simple truth is not simple and not true.

If the Robot passed the turing test, than the Robot is conscious

If his conscious experiences didn't influence the output,

than it wouldn't have passed the Turing test.

It was you who were supposing the Robot past the Turing test, not me.

I do not think that it will be possible for a Robot to pass the Turing

test this century.

but if it does, than it is certainly consciouss.

In fact consciousness is not enough to pass it!

I am conscious and you are conscious

yet none of our synapses are.

Maybe you will understand that some day

Best to you,

Peter van Velzen

July 2007

Amstelveen

The Nethelands

July 13, 2007

"pbamvv@worldonline.nl" <pbamvv@worldonline.nl> said:

>I do not think that it will be possible for a Robot to pass the Turing

>test this century.

>but if it does, than it is certainly consciouss.

>In fact consciousness is not enough to pass it!

Try http://www.jabberwacky.com/.

It's a little difficult to see how to start, but plays a pretty good

game.

July 13, 2007

On 13 Jul, 20:01, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >On 13 Jul, 16:23, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >> >On 13 Jul, 06:19, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >> >> >On 12 Jul, 22:52, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> >> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >> >> >> >Yes you that is experiencing does need to be distinguished from that

> >> >> >> >which is providing you with the experiences. The experiences aren't

> >> >> >> >generated by yourself, you don't know what the neural state represents

> >> >> >> >for example.

>

> >> >> >> All readily seen to be God's ideas, under theistic idealism.

>

> >> >> >> Are we close to done, for now?

>

> >> >> >The post was about the implausibility of materialism, not about what

> >> >> >reality actually is. Did you understand why it is implausible that we

> >> >> >are a biological mechanism behaving according to the known laws of

> >> >> >physics?

>

> >> >> It will never be entirely plausible IMO that we are a biological

> >> >> mechanism behaving according to the KNOWN laws of physics, because we

> >> >> will never, IMO, correctly know all the laws of physics. (History is

> >> >> my guide, I could be wrong.) But this does not make materialism, IMO,

> >> >> implausible. Nor does it make materialism plausible.

>

> >> >> How's that? Can I go?

>

> >> >That isn't what I meant though. A car could be said to follow the

> >> >known laws of physics in the sense that they can be used to explain

> >> >its behaviour, as could any of our technology. Did you understand that

> >> >it is implausible that our behaviour can be explained in terms of the

> >> >known laws of physics?

>

> >> I would like to hear your reason why, and then I might be able to

> >> agree without reservation.

>

> >> For example if you said humans will never be able to go to the surface

> >> of the Sun and run around only in bathing suits, and your reason is

> >> that it would be too expensive, I'd say I agree we can't go to the Sun

> >> and run around like that, but that's the wrong reason. So I need to

> >> hear your reason why it is implausible that we will ever be able to

> >> explain human behavior in terms of the known laws of physics, if

> >> that's what you mean.

>

> >> >Also regarding your comment earlier when you said, "All readily seen

> >> >to be God's ideas, under theistic idealism.", were you suggesting that

> >> >we are just an idea of God's, and that therefore we are effectively

> >> >God? If so, that is wrong, and certainly not what I am suggesting.

> >> >That sounds like a Satanic inspiration. It would imply that nothing we

> >> >could do could be unpleasing to God, and therefore would also be an

> >> >insult to God given what some people chose to do.

>

> >> No, I am not saying anything firmly. I am saying that when I think

> >> about theistic subjective idealism, with an omnipotent ex nihilo

> >> creator sustainer deity, it leads me to that kind of mental image.

> >> Your mileage may vary. You might have an entirely different idea of

> >> theistic subjective idealism. But I am really just an amateur student

> >> of such metaphysics. I haven't any firm stand on it.

>

> >Regarding my reason why it is implausible that our behaviour can be

> >explained in terms of the known laws of physics, it has been explained

> >to you again and again, by myself and others. It would mean that

> >consciously experiencing wasn't influencing behaviour. Therefore it

> >would have to be a coincidence that we have the conscious experiences

> >the 'meat machine' is expresses in its behaviour.

>

> Yes you have, but we never seem to understand it to your satisfaction.

> My understanding is that you think there is something non-physical

> about humans that is essential to the influence they have on their

> behavior, and that non-physcal element is not physically explainable

> in itself, so physics can never possibly explain human behavior. So,

> tell me what I don't understand.

>

> >As for your suggestion, which as I said, sounds like a satanistic

> >inspiration, what objection do you have in the alteration of it, such

> >that what we are experiencing is an unbiased presentation, neither

> >Heaven, nor Hell, and the reason we are experiencing it is that our

> >choices maybe observed in a context where we can choose between the

> >following the spiritual nature of a loving, selfless, God, and a

> >hateful, selfish Devil. The difference from what you were suggesting,

> >is that what we choose to do does matter, and that if we murder, or

> >cause suffering to others for example, it is not God doing it, it

> >would be us.

>

> As I said, I don't have a firm stand on such metaphysical things.

>

When the issue seemed like it was going to be avoided, by you

suggesting that we don't know the true laws of physics, and therefore

we don't follow the known laws of physics, and I replied:

-----------

That isn't what I meant though. A car could be said to follow the

known laws of physics in the sense that they can be used to explain

its behaviour, as could any of our technology. Did you understand that

it is implausible that our behaviour can be explained in terms of the

known laws of physics?

-----------

To which you responded:

-----------

I would like to hear your reason why, and then I might be able to

agree without reservation.

-----------

Now you claim to have known and understood the reason why. Though in

your response above, you didn't face actually addressing the reasoning

as to why it was implausible. Conscious experiences aren't an

influencing factor in the known laws of physics. You understand that

simple truth don't you?

July 13, 2007

On 13 Jul, 22:16, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl>

wrote:

> On 13 jul, 19:34, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > On 13 Jul, 13:37, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl>

> > wrote:

>

> > > On 12 jul, 17:44, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > > On 12 Jul, 15:55, Matt Silberstein

>

> > > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> > > > > On Thu, 12 Jul 2007 04:21:59 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> > > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> > > > > <1184239319.210411.129...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> > > > > >On 12 Jul, 05:27, Matt Silberstein

> > > > > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> > > > > >> On Wed, 11 Jul 2007 19:07:23 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> > > > > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> > > > > >> <1184206043.831834.51...@r34g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> > > > > >> >On 11 Jul, 21:45, Matt Silberstein

> > > > > >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> > > > > >> >> On Wed, 11 Jul 2007 12:59:16 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> > > > > >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> > > > > >> >> <1184183956.023911.247...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>

> > > > > >> >> [snip]

>

> > > > > >> >> >If we were found not to be following the known laws of physics, and it

> > > > > >> >> >is implausible that we are (even though it might never be shown),

>

> > > > > >> >> You have yet to approach showing it is implausible. In fact, you seem

> > > > > >> >> to work really hard at avoiding all of the evidence that says we are

> > > > > >> >> simply physical beings. In particular you ignore all of the evidence

> > > > > >> >> of the ways that subjective experience is affected/determined by

> > > > > >> >> physical phenomena.

>

> > > > > >> >> >I

> > > > > >> >> >don't think that there would be a problem in science regarding us as

> > > > > >> >> >spiritual beings influencing the human we experience being. Unless you

> > > > > >> >> >are stating that through bias science will never have an understanding

> > > > > >> >> >of reality.

>

> > > > > >> >> From a scientific POV what does "spiritual being" mean?

>

> > > > > >> >> >Already we know that on quantum events there is either events with no

> > > > > >> >> >cause within the physical (quantum randomness, in orthodox quantum

> > > > > >> >> >mechanics), or "spooky interaction" at a distance where everything

> > > > > >> >> >physical effects everything physical regardless of distance (as

> > > > > >> >> >suggested in bohmian mechanics). It is already known that the "spooky

> > > > > >> >> >interaction at a distance", as I think Einstein called it, exists for

> > > > > >> >> >quantum entanglement. I understand this lead Bohm to suggest that the

> > > > > >> >> >physical isn't really seperated.

>

> > > > > >> >> Which has no actually connection to consciousness, not more than it

> > > > > >> >> does to cinder blocks or photosynthesis.

>

> > > > > >> >> >Though I can see that there could be a school of thought that could

> > > > > >> >> >explain brain not following the known laws of physics because of some

> > > > > >> >> >"special complicated configuration",

>

> > > > > >> >> What in the world does that mean? I don't know of anyone who suggests

> > > > > >> >> anything like this.

>

> > > > > >> >> >though they could always attempt

> > > > > >> >> >to show this on an artificial neural network as in the example, hoping

> > > > > >> >> >that they will stumble upon a complicated configuration where either

> > > > > >> >> >unexpected messages started appearing,

>

> > > > > >> >> Why? I see no reason to look for anything like that.

>

> > > > > >> >> >or the nodes didn't give the

> > > > > >> >> >same outputs in the network, as they would have in the lab,

>

> > > > > >> >> Why? I see no reason to look for anything like that either.

>

> > > > > >> >> >given the

> > > > > >> >> >same inputs. I guess atheists are betting their soul (not that they

> > > > > >> >> >believe they have one), that either this is the case, or that their

> > > > > >> >> >whole conscious experience was a coincidental deception, and that

> > > > > >> >> >nothing they experienced influenced the behaviour of the human they

> > > > > >> >> >experienced being.

>

> > > > > >> >> Again, none of the alternatives you propose are those I see in the

> > > > > >> >> literature. They are all straw. Consciousness is the product of

> > > > > >> >> biology. "Complicated" is a subjective determination, not a property

> > > > > >> >> of a thing in the world. Things are "complicated" if the perceiver has

> > > > > >> >> trouble understanding them. You have yet to justify this

> > > > > >> >> "coincidental" claim. Our consciousness relates to actions in the

> > > > > >> >> external world because it is connected, and affected by, that external

> > > > > >> >> world.

>

> > > > > >> >It was shown to be implausible with the simple scenario I gave, which

> > > > > >> >showed that what we consciously experience couldn't influence a

> > > > > >> >biological mechanism which simply followed the laws of physics. If you

> > > > > >> >still can't comprehend why, I'll go through it with you.

>

> > > > > >> No, it does not show that it is implausible. Roughly speaking you

> > > > > >> assert that robots can't be conscious, therefore human consciousness

> > > > > >> isn't physical. A problem with that is that we don't know that robots

> > > > > >> can't, some day, have subjective experience. People who actually work

> > > > > >> on this tend to think that they will someday. You add to this problem

> > > > > >> the fallacy of composition: just because a component of X does not

> > > > > >> have property Y does not mean that X does not have property Y.

>

> > > > > >> >Perhaps it is best if you can see this clearly before we continue. As

> > > > > >> >you ask about several other topics, and haven't yet understood some

> > > > > >> >basic truths.

>

> > > > > >> Sorry, but my disagreement does not constitute my lack of

> > > > > >> understanding.

>

> > > > > >No disagreement doesn't. You have however totally misunderstood. I'm

> > > > > >not saying that because a component of X does not have property Y that

> > > > > >X does not have property Y.

>

> > > > > Actually you are. You have pointed out that a particular node is not

> > > > > conscious and that no node is conscious and then jump to the

> > > > > conclusion that no set of nodes can be conscious. That is either a

> > > > > fallacy of composition or a Sorities Heap.

>

> > > > > >I'll write out the scenario again, and the options, maybe by selecting

> > > > > >one, you will see what I am driving at, though jien has explained it

> > > > > >to you, as well as myself yet you don't seem to be able to understand,

> > > > > >maybe it is your preconceived notion of what is being said, is

> > > > > >blinding you to what actually is being said.

>

> > > > > Or maybe because you are wrong.

>

> > > > > >Supposing there was an artificial neural network, with a billion more

> > > > > >nodes than you had neurons in your brain, and a very 'complicated'

> > > > > >configuration,

>

> > > > > The 'complicated' is irrelevant and just messes up the presentation.

>

> > > > > >which drove a robot. The robot, due to its behaviour

> > > > > >(being a Turing Equivalent),

>

> > > > > Do you mean a Universal Turing Machine, what that term usually means,

> > > > > or do you mean passes the Turing Test?

>

> > > > > >caused some atheists

>

> > > > > What if a theist makes the came conclusion?

>

> > > > > >to claim it was

> > > > > >consciously experiencing. Now supposing each message between each node

> > > > > >contained additional information such as source node, destination node

> > > > > >(which could be the same as the source node, for feedback loops), the

> > > > > >time the message was sent, and the message. Each node wrote out to a

> > > > > >log on receipt of a message, and on sending a message out. Now after

> > > > > >an hour of the atheist communicating with the robot, the logs could be

> > > > > >examined by a bank of computers, varifying, that for the input

> > > > > >messages each received, the outputs were those expected by a single

> > > > > >node in a lab given the same inputs. They could also varify that no

> > > > > >unexplained messages appeared.

> > > > > >What would you be saying with regards to it consciously experiencing:

>

> > > > > I would say that it passed the Turing Test and that it seemed to have

> > > > > all of the external qualities I can determine regarding conscious

> > > > > experience, so it likely had the same kind of conscious experience

> > > > > humans have.

>

> > > > > >A) The atheists, mentioned in the example, were wrong to consider it

> > > > > >to be consciously experiencing.

>

> > > > > Why? Nothing in the presentation leads to that. You had some stuff

> > > > > about logs, but I have no idea why that changes anything. I am no less

> > > > > conscious if someone is able to track all of my neurons/brain

> > > > > chemicals.

>

> > > > > >B) Were correct to say that was consciously experiencing, but that it

> > > > > >doesn't influence behaviour.

>

> > > > > Again, why? Nothing in the scenario leads me to that.

>

> > > > > >C) It might have been consciously experiencing, how could you tell, it

> > > > > >doesn't influence behaviour.

>

> > > > > I can't see making that conclusion.

>

> > > > > >D) It was consciously experiencing and that influenced its behaviour.

>

> > > > > Yep.

>

> > > > > >If you select D, as all the nodes are giving the same outputs as they

> > > > > >would have singly in the lab given the same inputs, could you also

> > > > > >select between D1, and D2:

>

> > > > > >D1) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were also influenced

> > > > > >by conscious experiences.

>

> > > > > And now we have that fallacy of composition I referred to. The

> > > > > conscious experience is not the influence of a single node. I can do

> > > > > the same above with a single neuron in an active brain, that would not

> > > > > eliminate conscious experience for that person.

>

> > > > > >D2) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were not influenced

> > > > > >by conscious experiences, but the influence of the conscious

> > > > > >experiences within the robot, is such that the outputs are the same as

> > > > > >without the influence of the conscious experiences.

>

> > > > > Lets try this: I have a computer with thousands of chips and I log all

> > > > > of the inputs and outputs and such. I run an OS and a newsreader on

> > > > > that computer. Now I take one of the chips and put it in a separate

> > > > > test rig and subject it to the same inputs and output it had in the

> > > > > computer. Would I say that the chip in the test rig was influenced by

> > > > > the OS/newsreader? Not really. I could argue, I suppose, in both this

> > > > > and your case, that the "influence" comes in the determination of the

> > > > > inputs for the node/chip.

>

> > > > > Sorry, but I do understand the argument and it is fallacious.

>

> > > > You don't understand I am not saying that because one node isn't

> > > > conscious, that the network can't be conscious. I told you this, but

> > > > you continue to misunderstand.

>

> > > > While you chose D, and weren't selecting D1, you avoided selecting D2.

>

> > > > With your example of the computer with a thousand chips, running an OS

> > > > and newsreader, the OS and newreader refer to software

> > > > configurations.

>

> > > > D is not asking whether the robot was influenced by the configuration

> > > > of the nodes. D was asking whether you would be claiming that the

> > > > robot being consciously experienced influenced the way it behaves.

>

> > > > D2 is asking whether the influence you are talking about is such that

> > > > the behaviour is the same as without the influence.

>

> > > You seemed to have been learning a lot since you stopped replying to

> > > me!

> > > You are really getting near to the essence of the subject,

>

> > > Now the funny thing is the node is not working differently when the

> > > whole network is consious then it would work when the whole network is

> > > not conscious. But the input of many of the nodes will be different

> > > when the network is conscious then when the network is not concious.

>

> > > A typical conscious remark would be:

>

> > > "That is the same story I heard yesterday, with the exception that

> > > yesterday the women was said to be pregnant, and today the women is

> > > said to have overweight"

>

> > > You will see some typical conscious components, like "yesterday" "I'

> > > and "same"

> > > In order to show consciousness to amount that could pass the turing

> > > test,

> > > the network would have to understand the concept of a selfe,

> > > it has to be able to react differently because of what happened in the

> > > past,

> > > and it has to "know" that it reacts differently because of what

> > > happened in the past.

> > > No single node would have to react differently in order to accomplish

> > > that,

> > > but many nodes will have to receive different input in order for the

> > > whole system to produce different output.

>

> > > The fact that you are now so clause to the essence

> > > is - in my opinion - a clear sign that you are very consciouss

> > > indeed:)

>

> > You unfortunately don't seemed to have learnt anything.

>

> > In the robot scenario, there was no influence of conscious experiences

> > in its behaviour, no matter what its behaviour was. A simple truth you

> > seem to have a problem coming to terms with.

>

> What it pity that you didn't think over my words before you replied.

> What you call a simple truth is not simple and not true.

> If the Robot passed the turing test, than the Robot is conscious

> If his conscious experiences didn't influence the output,

> than it wouldn't have passed the Turing test.

> It was you who were supposing the Robot past the Turing test, not me.

> I do not think that it will be possible for a Robot to pass the Turing

> test this century.

> but if it does, than it is certainly consciouss.

> In fact consciousness is not enough to pass it!

>

> I am conscious and you are conscious

> yet none of our synapses are.

>

> Maybe you will understand that some day

>

You can believe that the robot was conscious, and make such claims,

like the atheists in the following example, and perhaps as such an

atheist you could explain where you think the influence it consciously

experiencing as you claim is to be seen. Its behaviour can be

explained without the need to believe in your claims, nor do your

claims add any explanitory value with regards to its behaviour.

Here is the example:

------

Supposing there was an artificial neural network, with a billion more

nodes than you had neurons in your brain, and a very 'complicated'

configuration, which drove a robot. The robot, due to its behaviour

(being a Turing Equivalent), caused some atheists to claim it was

consciously experiencing. Now supposing each message between each node

contained additional information such as source node, destination node

(which could be the same as the source node, for feedback loops), the

time the message was sent, and the message. Each node wrote out to a

log on receipt of a message, and on sending a message out. Now after

an hour of the atheist communicating with the robot, the logs could be

examined by a bank of computers, varifying, that for the input

messages each received, the outputs were those expected by a single

node in a lab given the same inputs. They could also varify that no

unexplained messages appeared.

------

What would you be saying with regards to it consciously experiencing:

A) The atheists, mentioned in the example, were wrong to consider it

to be consciously experiencing.

B) Were correct to say that was consciously experiencing, but that it

doesn't influence behaviour.

C) It might have been consciously experiencing, how could you tell, it

doesn't influence behaviour.

D) It was consciously experiencing and that influenced its behaviour.

If you select D, as all the nodes are giving the same outputs as they

would have singly in the lab given the same inputs, could you also

select between D1, and D2:

D1) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were also influenced

by conscious experiences.

D2) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were not influenced

by conscious experiences, but the influence of the conscious

experiences within the robot, is such that the outputs are the same as

without the influence of the conscious experiences.

Perhaps you'd care to answer, or create a new option, please don't try

to avoid facing answering by selecting all the options. Option A would

obviously seem to be out for you considering what you have said. You

need to face some simple truths as I said. One such truth is that if

it wasn't consciously experiencing, and that does mean something other

than behaviour, conscious experiences are the reality for yourself,

then you stating that it does, doesn't make it so.

July 13, 2007

someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> said:

>On 13 Jul, 20:01, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>>

>> >On 13 Jul, 16:23, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>>

>> >> >On 13 Jul, 06:19, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>>

>> >> >> >On 12 Jul, 22:52, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> >> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>>

>> >> >> >> >Yes you that is experiencing does need to be distinguished from that

>> >> >> >> >which is providing you with the experiences. The experiences aren't

>> >> >> >> >generated by yourself, you don't know what the neural state represents

>> >> >> >> >for example.

>>

>> >> >> >> All readily seen to be God's ideas, under theistic idealism.

>>

>> >> >> >> Are we close to done, for now?

>>

>> >> >> >The post was about the implausibility of materialism, not about what

>> >> >> >reality actually is. Did you understand why it is implausible that we

>> >> >> >are a biological mechanism behaving according to the known laws of

>> >> >> >physics?

>>

>> >> >> It will never be entirely plausible IMO that we are a biological

>> >> >> mechanism behaving according to the KNOWN laws of physics, because we

>> >> >> will never, IMO, correctly know all the laws of physics. (History is

>> >> >> my guide, I could be wrong.) But this does not make materialism, IMO,

>> >> >> implausible. Nor does it make materialism plausible.

>>

>> >> >> How's that? Can I go?

>>

>> >> >That isn't what I meant though. A car could be said to follow the

>> >> >known laws of physics in the sense that they can be used to explain

>> >> >its behaviour, as could any of our technology. Did you understand that

>> >> >it is implausible that our behaviour can be explained in terms of the

>> >> >known laws of physics?

>>

>> >> I would like to hear your reason why, and then I might be able to

>> >> agree without reservation.

>>

>> >> For example if you said humans will never be able to go to the surface

>> >> of the Sun and run around only in bathing suits, and your reason is

>> >> that it would be too expensive, I'd say I agree we can't go to the Sun

>> >> and run around like that, but that's the wrong reason. So I need to

>> >> hear your reason why it is implausible that we will ever be able to

>> >> explain human behavior in terms of the known laws of physics, if

>> >> that's what you mean.

>>

>> >> >Also regarding your comment earlier when you said, "All readily seen

>> >> >to be God's ideas, under theistic idealism.", were you suggesting that

>> >> >we are just an idea of God's, and that therefore we are effectively

>> >> >God? If so, that is wrong, and certainly not what I am suggesting.

>> >> >That sounds like a Satanic inspiration. It would imply that nothing we

>> >> >could do could be unpleasing to God, and therefore would also be an

>> >> >insult to God given what some people chose to do.

>>

>> >> No, I am not saying anything firmly. I am saying that when I think

>> >> about theistic subjective idealism, with an omnipotent ex nihilo

>> >> creator sustainer deity, it leads me to that kind of mental image.

>> >> Your mileage may vary. You might have an entirely different idea of

>> >> theistic subjective idealism. But I am really just an amateur student

>> >> of such metaphysics. I haven't any firm stand on it.

>>

>> >Regarding my reason why it is implausible that our behaviour can be

>> >explained in terms of the known laws of physics, it has been explained

>> >to you again and again, by myself and others. It would mean that

>> >consciously experiencing wasn't influencing behaviour. Therefore it

>> >would have to be a coincidence that we have the conscious experiences

>> >the 'meat machine' is expresses in its behaviour.

>>

>> Yes you have, but we never seem to understand it to your satisfaction.

>> My understanding is that you think there is something non-physical

>> about humans that is essential to the influence they have on their

>> behavior, and that non-physcal element is not physically explainable

>> in itself, so physics can never possibly explain human behavior. So,

>> tell me what I don't understand.

>>

>> >As for your suggestion, which as I said, sounds like a satanistic

>> >inspiration, what objection do you have in the alteration of it, such

>> >that what we are experiencing is an unbiased presentation, neither

>> >Heaven, nor Hell, and the reason we are experiencing it is that our

>> >choices maybe observed in a context where we can choose between the

>> >following the spiritual nature of a loving, selfless, God, and a

>> >hateful, selfish Devil. The difference from what you were suggesting,

>> >is that what we choose to do does matter, and that if we murder, or

>> >cause suffering to others for example, it is not God doing it, it

>> >would be us.

>>

>> As I said, I don't have a firm stand on such metaphysical things.

>>

>

>When the issue seemed like it was going to be avoided, by you

>suggesting that we don't know the true laws of physics, and therefore

>we don't follow the known laws of physics, and I replied:

>

>-----------

>That isn't what I meant though. A car could be said to follow the

>known laws of physics in the sense that they can be used to explain

>its behaviour, as could any of our technology. Did you understand that

>it is implausible that our behaviour can be explained in terms of the

>known laws of physics?

>-----------

>

>To which you responded:

>-----------

>I would like to hear your reason why, and then I might be able to

>agree without reservation.

>-----------

>

>Now you claim to have known and understood the reason why.

No I didn't calim to know. I said "My understanding is..." and then

said. "So, tell me what I don't understand."

So I didn't claim to understand. So you can tell me if I do

understand, or how I missed.

>Though in

>your response above, you didn't face actually addressing the reasoning

>as to why it was implausible. Conscious experiences aren't an

>influencing factor in the known laws of physics. You understand that

>simple truth don't you?

And they will never be?

July 14, 2007

On 13 jul, 23:38, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> said:

>

> >I do not think that it will be possible for a Robot to pass the Turing

> >test this century.

> >but if it does, than it is certainly consciouss.

> >In fact consciousness is not enough to pass it!

>

> Tryhttp://www.jabberwacky.com/.

>

> It's a little difficult to see how to start, but plays a pretty good

> game.

It is really bad!

totally ignoring previous sentences

Is there any memory attached?!?

Peter van Velzen

July 2007

Amstelveen

The Netherlands

July 14, 2007

On 14 jul, 00:58, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

> On 13 Jul, 22:16, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl>

> wrote:

>

> > On 13 jul, 19:34, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > On 13 Jul, 13:37, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl>

> > > wrote:

>

> > > > On 12 jul, 17:44, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:

>

> > > > > On 12 Jul, 15:55, Matt Silberstein

>

> > > > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> > > > > > On Thu, 12 Jul 2007 04:21:59 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> > > > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> > > > > > <1184239319.210411.129...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> > > > > > >On 12 Jul, 05:27, Matt Silberstein

> > > > > > ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> > > > > > >> On Wed, 11 Jul 2007 19:07:23 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> > > > > > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> > > > > > >> <1184206043.831834.51...@r34g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> > > > > > >> >On 11 Jul, 21:45, Matt Silberstein

> > > > > > >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> > > > > > >> >> On Wed, 11 Jul 2007 12:59:16 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> > > > > > >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> > > > > > >> >> <1184183956.023911.247...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>

> > > > > > >> >> [snip]

>

> > > > > > >> >> >If we were found not to be following the known laws of physics, and it

> > > > > > >> >> >is implausible that we are (even though it might never be shown),

>

> > > > > > >> >> You have yet to approach showing it is implausible. In fact, you seem

> > > > > > >> >> to work really hard at avoiding all of the evidence that says we are

> > > > > > >> >> simply physical beings. In particular you ignore all of the evidence

> > > > > > >> >> of the ways that subjective experience is affected/determined by

> > > > > > >> >> physical phenomena.

>

> > > > > > >> >> >I

> > > > > > >> >> >don't think that there would be a problem in science regarding us as

> > > > > > >> >> >spiritual beings influencing the human we experience being. Unless you

> > > > > > >> >> >are stating that through bias science will never have an understanding

> > > > > > >> >> >of reality.

>

> > > > > > >> >> From a scientific POV what does "spiritual being" mean?

>

> > > > > > >> >> >Already we know that on quantum events there is either events with no

> > > > > > >> >> >cause within the physical (quantum randomness, in orthodox quantum

> > > > > > >> >> >mechanics), or "spooky interaction" at a distance where everything

> > > > > > >> >> >physical effects everything physical regardless of distance (as

> > > > > > >> >> >suggested in bohmian mechanics). It is already known that the "spooky

> > > > > > >> >> >interaction at a distance", as I think Einstein called it, exists for

> > > > > > >> >> >quantum entanglement. I understand this lead Bohm to suggest that the

> > > > > > >> >> >physical isn't really seperated.

>

> > > > > > >> >> Which has no actually connection to consciousness, not more than it

> > > > > > >> >> does to cinder blocks or photosynthesis.

>

> > > > > > >> >> >Though I can see that there could be a school of thought that could

> > > > > > >> >> >explain brain not following the known laws of physics because of some

> > > > > > >> >> >"special complicated configuration",

>

> > > > > > >> >> What in the world does that mean? I don't know of anyone who suggests

> > > > > > >> >> anything like this.

>

> > > > > > >> >> >though they could always attempt

> > > > > > >> >> >to show this on an artificial neural network as in the example, hoping

> > > > > > >> >> >that they will stumble upon a complicated configuration where either

> > > > > > >> >> >unexpected messages started appearing,

>

> > > > > > >> >> Why? I see no reason to look for anything like that.

>

> > > > > > >> >> >or the nodes didn't give the

> > > > > > >> >> >same outputs in the network, as they would have in the lab,

>

> > > > > > >> >> Why? I see no reason to look for anything like that either.

>

> > > > > > >> >> >given the

> > > > > > >> >> >same inputs. I guess atheists are betting their soul (not that they

> > > > > > >> >> >believe they have one), that either this is the case, or that their

> > > > > > >> >> >whole conscious experience was a coincidental deception, and that

> > > > > > >> >> >nothing they experienced influenced the behaviour of the human they

> > > > > > >> >> >experienced being.

>

> > > > > > >> >> Again, none of the alternatives you propose are those I see in the

> > > > > > >> >> literature. They are all straw. Consciousness is the product of

> > > > > > >> >> biology. "Complicated" is a subjective determination, not a property

> > > > > > >> >> of a thing in the world. Things are "complicated" if the perceiver has

> > > > > > >> >> trouble understanding them. You have yet to justify this

> > > > > > >> >> "coincidental" claim. Our consciousness relates to actions in the

> > > > > > >> >> external world because it is connected, and affected by, that external

> > > > > > >> >> world.

>

> > > > > > >> >It was shown to be implausible with the simple scenario I gave, which

> > > > > > >> >showed that what we consciously experience couldn't influence a

> > > > > > >> >biological mechanism which simply followed the laws of physics. If you

> > > > > > >> >still can't comprehend why, I'll go through it with you.

>

> > > > > > >> No, it does not show that it is implausible. Roughly speaking you

> > > > > > >> assert that robots can't be conscious, therefore human consciousness

> > > > > > >> isn't physical. A problem with that is that we don't know that robots

> > > > > > >> can't, some day, have subjective experience. People who actually work

> > > > > > >> on this tend to think that they will someday. You add to this problem

> > > > > > >> the fallacy of composition: just because a component of X does not

> > > > > > >> have property Y does not mean that X does not have property Y.

>

> > > > > > >> >Perhaps it is best if you can see this clearly before we continue. As

> > > > > > >> >you ask about several other topics, and haven't yet understood some

> > > > > > >> >basic truths.

>

> > > > > > >> Sorry, but my disagreement does not constitute my lack of

> > > > > > >> understanding.

>

> > > > > > >No disagreement doesn't. You have however totally misunderstood. I'm

> > > > > > >not saying that because a component of X does not have property Y that

> > > > > > >X does not have property Y.

>

> > > > > > Actually you are. You have pointed out that a particular node is not

> > > > > > conscious and that no node is conscious and then jump to the

> > > > > > conclusion that no set of nodes can be conscious. That is either a

> > > > > > fallacy of composition or a Sorities Heap.

>

> > > > > > >I'll write out the scenario again, and the options, maybe by selecting

> > > > > > >one, you will see what I am driving at, though jien has explained it

> > > > > > >to you, as well as myself yet you don't seem to be able to understand,

> > > > > > >maybe it is your preconceived notion of what is being said, is

> > > > > > >blinding you to what actually is being said.

>

> > > > > > Or maybe because you are wrong.

>

> > > > > > >Supposing there was an artificial neural network, with a billion more

> > > > > > >nodes than you had neurons in your brain, and a very 'complicated'

> > > > > > >configuration,

>

> > > > > > The 'complicated' is irrelevant and just messes up the presentation.

>

> > > > > > >which drove a robot. The robot, due to its behaviour

> > > > > > >(being a Turing Equivalent),

>

> > > > > > Do you mean a Universal Turing Machine, what that term usually means,

> > > > > > or do you mean passes the Turing Test?

>

> > > > > > >caused some atheists

>

> > > > > > What if a theist makes the came conclusion?

>

> > > > > > >to claim it was

> > > > > > >consciously experiencing. Now supposing each message between each node

> > > > > > >contained additional information such as source node, destination node

> > > > > > >(which could be the same as the source node, for feedback loops), the

> > > > > > >time the message was sent, and the message. Each node wrote out to a

> > > > > > >log on receipt of a message, and on sending a message out. Now after

> > > > > > >an hour of the atheist communicating with the robot, the logs could be

> > > > > > >examined by a bank of computers, varifying, that for the input

> > > > > > >messages each received, the outputs were those expected by a single

> > > > > > >node in a lab given the same inputs. They could also varify that no

> > > > > > >unexplained messages appeared.

> > > > > > >What would you be saying with regards to it consciously experiencing:

>

> > > > > > I would say that it passed the Turing Test and that it seemed to have

> > > > > > all of the external qualities I can determine regarding conscious

> > > > > > experience, so it likely had the same kind of conscious experience

> > > > > > humans have.

>

> > > > > > >A) The atheists, mentioned in the example, were wrong to consider it

> > > > > > >to be consciously experiencing.

>

> > > > > > Why? Nothing in the presentation leads to that. You had some stuff

> > > > > > about logs, but I have no idea why that changes anything. I am no less

> > > > > > conscious if someone is able to track all of my neurons/brain

> > > > > > chemicals.

>

> > > > > > >B) Were correct to say that was consciously experiencing, but that it

> > > > > > >doesn't influence behaviour.

>

> > > > > > Again, why? Nothing in the scenario leads me to that.

>

> > > > > > >C) It might have been consciously experiencing, how could you tell, it

> > > > > > >doesn't influence behaviour.

>

> > > > > > I can't see making that conclusion.

>

> > > > > > >D) It was consciously experiencing and that influenced its behaviour.

>

> > > > > > Yep.

>

> > > > > > >If you select D, as all the nodes are giving the same outputs as they

> > > > > > >would have singly in the lab given the same inputs, could you also

> > > > > > >select between D1, and D2:

>

> > > > > > >D1) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were also influenced

> > > > > > >by conscious experiences.

>

> > > > > > And now we have that fallacy of composition I referred to. The

> > > > > > conscious experience is not the influence of a single node. I can do

> > > > > > the same above with a single neuron in an active brain, that would not

> > > > > > eliminate conscious experience for that person.

>

> > > > > > >D2) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were not influenced

> > > > > > >by conscious experiences, but the influence of the conscious

> > > > > > >experiences within the robot, is such that the outputs are the same as

> > > > > > >without the influence of the conscious experiences.

>

> > > > > > Lets try this: I have a computer with thousands of chips and I log all

> > > > > > of the inputs and outputs and such. I run an OS and a newsreader on

> > > > > > that computer. Now I take one of the chips and put it in a separate

> > > > > > test rig and subject it to the same inputs and output it had in the

> > > > > > computer. Would I say that the chip in the test rig was influenced by

> > > > > > the OS/newsreader? Not really. I could argue, I suppose, in both this

> > > > > > and your case, that the "influence" comes in the determination of the

> > > > > > inputs for the node/chip.

>

> > > > > > Sorry, but I do understand the argument and it is fallacious.

>

> > > > > You don't understand I am not saying that because one node isn't

> > > > > conscious, that the network can't be conscious. I told you this, but

> > > > > you continue to misunderstand.

>

> > > > > While you chose D, and weren't selecting D1, you avoided selecting D2.

>

> > > > > With your example of the computer with a thousand chips, running an OS

> > > > > and newsreader, the OS and newreader refer to software

> > > > > configurations.

>

> > > > > D is not asking whether the robot was influenced by the configuration

> > > > > of the nodes. D was asking whether you would be claiming that the

> > > > > robot being consciously experienced influenced the way it behaves.

>

> > > > > D2 is asking whether the influence you are talking about is such that

> > > > > the behaviour is the same as without the influence.

>

> > > > You seemed to have been learning a lot since you stopped replying to

> > > > me!

> > > > You are really getting near to the essence of the subject,

>

> > > > Now the funny thing is the node is not working differently when the

> > > > whole network is consious then it would work when the whole network is

> > > > not conscious. But the input of many of the nodes will be different

> > > > when the network is conscious then when the network is not concious.

>

> > > > A typical conscious remark would be:

>

> > > > "That is the same story I heard yesterday, with the exception that

> > > > yesterday the women was said to be pregnant, and today the women is

> > > > said to have overweight"

>

> > > > You will see some typical conscious components, like "yesterday" "I'

> > > > and "same"

> > > > In order to show consciousness to amount that could pass the turing

> > > > test,

> > > > the network would have to understand the concept of a selfe,

> > > > it has to be able to react differently because of what happened in the

> > > > past,

> > > > and it has to "know" that it reacts differently because of what

> > > > happened in the past.

> > > > No single node would have to react differently in order to accomplish

> > > > that,

> > > > but many nodes will have to receive different input in order for the

> > > > whole system to produce different output.

>

> > > > The fact that you are now so clause to the essence

> > > > is - in my opinion - a clear sign that you are very consciouss

> > > > indeed:)

>

> > > You unfortunately don't seemed to have learnt anything.

>

> > > In the robot scenario, there was no influence of conscious experiences

> > > in its behaviour, no matter what its behaviour was. A simple truth you

> > > seem to have a problem coming to terms with.

>

> > What it pity that you didn't think over my words before you replied.

> > What you call a simple truth is not simple and not true.

> > If the Robot passed the turing test, than the Robot is conscious

> > If his conscious experiences didn't influence the output,

> > than it wouldn't have passed the Turing test.

> > It was you who were supposing the Robot past the Turing test, not me.

> > I do not think that it will be possible for a Robot to pass the Turing

> > test this century.

> > but if it does, than it is certainly consciouss.

> > In fact consciousness is not enough to pass it!

>

> > I am conscious and you are conscious

> > yet none of our synapses are.

>

> > Maybe you will understand that some day

>

> You can believe that the robot was conscious, and make such claims,

> like the atheists in the following example, and perhaps as such an

> atheist you could explain where you think the influence it consciously

> experiencing as you claim is to be seen. Its behaviour can be

> explained without the need to believe in your claims, nor do your

> claims add any explanitory value with regards to its behaviour.

>

> Here is the example:

> ------

> Supposing there was an artificial neural network, with a billion more

> nodes than you had neurons in your brain, and a very 'complicated'

> configuration, which drove a robot. The robot, due to its behaviour

> (being a Turing Equivalent), caused some atheists to claim it was

> consciously experiencing. Now supposing each message between each node

> contained additional information such as source node, destination node

> (which could be the same as the source node, for feedback loops), the

> time the message was sent, and the message. Each node wrote out to a

> log on receipt of a message, and on sending a message out. Now after

> an hour of the atheist communicating with the robot, the logs could be

> examined by a bank of computers, varifying, that for the input

> messages each received, the outputs were those expected by a single

> node in a lab given the same inputs. They could also varify that no

> unexplained messages appeared.

> ------

>

> What would you be saying with regards to it consciously experiencing:

>

> A) The atheists, mentioned in the example, were wrong to consider it

> to be consciously experiencing.

> B) Were correct to say that was consciously experiencing, but that it

> doesn't influence behaviour.

> C) It might have been consciously experiencing, how could you tell, it

> doesn't influence behaviour.

> D) It was consciously experiencing and that influenced its behaviour.

>

> If you select D, as all the nodes are giving the same outputs as they

> would have singly in the lab given the same inputs, could you also

> select between D1, and D2:

>

> D1) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were also influenced

> by conscious experiences.

> D2) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were not influenced

> by conscious experiences, but the influence of the conscious

> experiences within the robot, is such that the outputs are the same as

> without the influence of the conscious experiences.

>

> Perhaps you'd care to answer, or create a new option, please don't try

> to avoid facing answering by selecting all the options. Option A would

> obviously seem to be out for you considering what you have said. You

> need to face some simple truths as I said. One such truth is that if

> it wasn't consciously experiencing, and that does mean something other

> than behaviour, conscious experiences are the reality for yourself,

> then you stating that it does, doesn't make it so.

You said that already

(see above)

You do not pass the turing test

for you evidently lack sufficient memory:)

Peter van Velzen

July 2007

Amstelveen

The Netherlands

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