Guest Richo Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 On Jun 3, 10:50 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the > following: > > Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a > biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective > experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a > coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we > did, which isn't plausible. I think I understand it - but I do not agree with it. I think it is a false statement. Cheers, Mark Quote
Guest raven1 Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 17:04:34 -0700, someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote: >On 3 Jun, 23:55, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 09:31:42 -0700, someone2 >> >> >> >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: >> >On 3 Jun, 17:20, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: >> >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 08:53:43 -0700, someone2 >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: >> >> >On 3 Jun, 16:49, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: >> >> >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 05:50:33 -0700, someone2 >> >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: >> >> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the >> >> >> >following: >> >> >> >> >Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could >> >> >> >have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't >> >> >> >conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it >> >> >> >did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a >> >> >> >biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective >> >> >> >experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a >> >> >> >coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we >> >> >> >did, which isn't plausible. >> >> >> >> I understand the gist of it, but the conclusion does not follow from >> >> >> the premises, sentence three is gobbledygook, and sentence four is an >> >> >> argument from personal incredulity (which would scan much better with >> >> >> "implied" substituted for "claimed"). Try again. >> >> >> >The conclusion does follow from the premises. Where do you think it >> >> >doesn't, >> >> >> It simply doesn't. How do you think that it does? >> >> >> Let's reduce it to an actual syllogism for illustration purposes: >> >> >> P1: "A mechanism can have its behavior explained without invoking >> >> consciousness" >> >> >> Okay so far? Am I fairly encapsulating your first premise? >> >> >> P2: (on which you're already de-railing, since it is a subset of P1as >> >> you phrased it, but doesn't logically follow from it) "Whether or not >> >> a mechanism is conscious has no effect on its behavior". This is >> >> unsupported, to say the least; you haven't demonstrated that >> >> consciousness has no effect on behavior, just assumed it. >> >> >> C: Sentence three is word salad, but the next sentence gives the idea >> >> that you're implying that because of P1 and P2, that there must be >> >> some kind of "Ghost In The Machine", which simply doesn't follow. >> >> >> >and what part of sentance three are you having problems in >> >> >comprehending? >> >> >> What the Hell you were trying to say in English. The words all mean >> >> something, but their combination is nonsensical. >> >> >If having subjective experiences did affect behaviour (your objection >> >to P2), >> >> My objection is that you have neither demonstrated that consciousness >> has no affect on behavior, nor pointed out why this would be an issue >> in the first place, other than your own personal incredulity. >> >> > then how could behaviour be explained without taking it into >> >account (P1)? >> >> As you haven't demonstrated P1 either, the ball is in your court, but >> again, it does not follow from either premise that some kind of >> immaterial agent is necessary for consciousness. >> -- >> > >I demonstrated it given P1, which is why you are unable to say why if >P1 were true then P2 wouldn't be, even though you eroneously claimed >P2 didn't follow. So will you admit you were wrong, and that P2 does >follow P1, or will you avoid facing it? Sorry, but it doesn't. You really need to brush up on logic, as well as the English language. > >You are free to say why you would object to P1, or perhaps the >original wording you based P1 on: > >------- >Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could >have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't >conscious (had no subjective experiences). Anything could hypothetically be explained with any arbitrary assumption. It's up to you to demonstrate that your particular assumption ought to be given credence. > >I'd be interested to hear why I couldn't simply explain the >behaviour of the mechanism simply in terms of the physical mechanism >following the laws of physics (which don't reference subjective >experiences), with the assumption that it didn't have any subjective >experiences. Indeed you could. But why would you? And how would you ever determine if you were right? >I wouldn't worry as of yet about your inability to understand the >ramifications, just try to concentrate on understanding the point at >hand, then we can go onto the ramifications after you comprehend some >simple truths. I understand your argument quite well at this point, I just find it to be poppycock. -- "O Sybilli, si ergo Fortibus es in ero O Nobili! Themis trux Sivat sinem? Causen Dux" Quote
Guest Ron Baker, Pluralitas! Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 "Jeckyl" <noone@nowhere.com> wrote in message news:46638ac0$0$1186$61c65585@un-2park-reader-01.sydney.pipenetworks.com.au... > "someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message > news:1180907578.054811.105110@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics >> couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the >> known laws of physics? > > Because the known laws of physics are not complete. The known laws of physics are complete enough to cover everything that happens on Earth. The unknown forefront is what happens at extreme energies, such as in black holes, or 1 picosecond after the Big Bang. We (mankind) (but pretty much excluding theists) have built particle accelerators that have plumbed the laws of physics to energy levels far exceeding those that naturally occur on Earth. -- rb #2187 Quote
Guest Ron Baker, Pluralitas! Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 "raven1" <quoththeraven@nevermore.com> wrote in message news:hg47631b1l7cetf8tfkto6saojpkp6l9d5@4ax.com... > On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 17:04:34 -0700, someone2 > <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote: <snip> >>> >> P1: "A mechanism can have its behavior explained without invoking >>> >> consciousness" >>> >>> >> Okay so far? Am I fairly encapsulating your first premise? >>> >>> >> P2: (on which you're already de-railing, since it is a subset of P1as >>> >> you phrased it, but doesn't logically follow from it) "Whether or >>> >> not >>> >> a mechanism is conscious has no effect on its behavior". This is >>> >> unsupported, to say the least; you haven't demonstrated that >>> >> consciousness has no effect on behavior, just assumed it. <snip> >>> >>> As you haven't demonstrated P1 either, the ball is in your court, but >>> again, it does not follow from either premise that some kind of >>> immaterial agent is necessary for consciousness. >>> -- >>> >> >>I demonstrated it given P1, which is why you are unable to say why if >>P1 were true then P2 wouldn't be, even though you eroneously claimed >>P2 didn't follow. So will you admit you were wrong, and that P2 does >>follow P1, or will you avoid facing it? > > Sorry, but it doesn't. You really need to brush up on logic, as well > as the English language. > Interesting. The argument fails at P1. 'someone' ignores that and focuses on P2. Red Herring! 'someone' has expanded his range of fallacies! Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 "Ron Baker, Pluralitas!" <this@aint.me> wrote in message news:46639616$0$16681$4c368faf@roadrunner.com... > > "Jeckyl" <noone@nowhere.com> wrote in message > news:46638ac0$0$1186$61c65585@un-2park-reader-01.sydney.pipenetworks.com.au... >> "someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> news:1180907578.054811.105110@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >>> Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics >>> couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the >>> known laws of physics? >> >> Because the known laws of physics are not complete. > > The known laws of physics are complete enough to cover > everything that happens on Earth. Not really > The unknown forefront is > what happens at extreme energies, such as in black holes, > or 1 picosecond after the Big Bang. We (mankind) (but pretty > much excluding theists) have built particle accelerators > that have plumbed the laws of physics to energy levels > far exceeding those that naturally occur on Earth. There is still much that is unknown, and all the 'laws' of physics are only models and explanations, we don not really know that they are 'correct' and they certainly don't tell reality what to do .. they only tell us what we think reality will do. There is simply much that we do not understand .. even if we may have some grasp of the basic 'laws'. Quote
Guest Ron Baker, Pluralitas! Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 "Jeckyl" <noone@nowhere.com> wrote in message news:46639f87$0$1183$61c65585@un-2park-reader-01.sydney.pipenetworks.com.au... > "Ron Baker, Pluralitas!" <this@aint.me> wrote in message > news:46639616$0$16681$4c368faf@roadrunner.com... >> >> "Jeckyl" <noone@nowhere.com> wrote in message >> news:46638ac0$0$1186$61c65585@un-2park-reader-01.sydney.pipenetworks.com.au... >>> "someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message >>> news:1180907578.054811.105110@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >>>> Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics >>>> couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the >>>> known laws of physics? >>> >>> Because the known laws of physics are not complete. >> >> The known laws of physics are complete enough to cover >> everything that happens on Earth. > > Not really Give examples. Quote
Guest Mike Painter Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 Jeckyl wrote: > "Ron Baker, Pluralitas!" <this@aint.me> wrote in message > news:466385b7$0$16582$4c368faf@roadrunner.com... >> >> <ttamborselli@gmail.com> wrote in message >> news:1180920860.275494.189490@n15g2000prd.googlegroups.com... >>> On Jun 3, 4:46 pm, someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: >>>> On 3 Jun, 22:56, ttamborse...@gmail.com wrote: >>>> >>>> >> >> <snip> >> >>> So, "if a chicken and a half can lay an egg and a half in a day and >>> a half, then a cat is like a sidewalk because neither can play the >>> piano." >> >> You've captured the essence of 'someone's logic right there. > > But is the chicken conscious of its subjective experiences. And does > playing the piano follow the laws of physics. Do you accept this? Which side of the road are the fireman's red suspenders on? Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 "Ron Baker, Pluralitas!" <this@aint.me> wrote in message news:4663ab08$0$30600$4c368faf@roadrunner.com... > > "Jeckyl" <noone@nowhere.com> wrote in message > news:46639f87$0$1183$61c65585@un-2park-reader-01.sydney.pipenetworks.com.au... >> "Ron Baker, Pluralitas!" <this@aint.me> wrote in message >> news:46639616$0$16681$4c368faf@roadrunner.com... >>> >>> "Jeckyl" <noone@nowhere.com> wrote in message >>> news:46638ac0$0$1186$61c65585@un-2park-reader-01.sydney.pipenetworks.com.au... >>>> "someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message >>>> news:1180907578.054811.105110@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >>>>> Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics >>>>> couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the >>>>> known laws of physics? >>>> >>>> Because the known laws of physics are not complete. >>> >>> The known laws of physics are complete enough to cover >>> everything that happens on Earth. >> >> Not really > > Give examples. Surely you jest.. you expect examples of things that we don't know? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 On 4 Jun, 04:45, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1180907578.054811.105110@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > > > Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics > > couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the > > known laws of physics? > > Because the known laws of physics are not complete. > > > Or is it that you think there is a reason that you would be unable to > > do so with the assumption that the mechanism had no subjective > > experiences? If so, please explain why I couldn't explain its > > behaviour in in terms of the physical mechanism following the known > > laws of physics (which don't reference any subjective experiences the > > physical might or might not be having), with the assumption that it > > didn't have any subjective experiences. > > Because the subjective experiences are part of the mechanism Ok you may say that the laws of physics aren't complete, but there are known laws of physics. So you seem to have missed out that I referred to the known laws of physics there. So in reference to them, do you accept that any mechanism following following the known laws of physics could be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics? When you say 'the subjective experiences' are part of the mechanism, I assume you are suggesting that a portion of the mechanism is responsible for our subjective experiences. Have I understood you correctly? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 On 4 Jun, 03:56, "Mike Painter" <mddotpain...@sbcglobal.net> wrote: > someone2 wrote: > > I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the > > following: > > > Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > > have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > > conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it > > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a > > biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective > > experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a > > coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we > > did, which isn't plausible. > > Good thing there is chemistry. > Good thing having it's behavior explained with an assumption does not > mean the assumption was valid. > > Good thing most of those sentences you probably parroted don't have any real > relation to each other. > > We know with absolute certainty that in any situation to date if we > stimulate, injure, or remove certain parts of the brain the results are a > change in consciousness. > If, as you imply consciousness is not a function of biology, why does it > change? > Can it only exist in certain areas? > If yes, if the person has those parts removed are they no longer human? So did you accept that any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't conscious (had no subjective experiences)? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 On 4 Jun, 05:21, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > On Jun 3, 10:50 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the > > following: > > > Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > > have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > > conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it > > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a > > biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective > > experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a > > coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we > > did, which isn't plausible. > > I think I understand it - but I do not agree with it. > I think it is a false statement. > Ok, we can go through it bit by bit. Did you agree that any mechanism that follows the known laws of physics could be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics (which don't have as a variable whether there are subjective experiences or not), which the assumption that there are no subjective experiences? [The question isn't about whether the mechanism had any subjective experiences, but about whether it is would be possible conceptually to explain the behaviour with the assumption that it didn't.] Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 On 4 Jun, 05:25, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: > On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 17:04:34 -0700, someone2 > > > > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > >On 3 Jun, 23:55, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: > >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 09:31:42 -0700, someone2 > > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > >> >On 3 Jun, 17:20, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: > >> >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 08:53:43 -0700, someone2 > > >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > >> >> >On 3 Jun, 16:49, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 05:50:33 -0700, someone2 > > >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the > >> >> >> >following: > > >> >> >> >Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > >> >> >> >have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > >> >> >> >conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it > >> >> >> >did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a > >> >> >> >biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective > >> >> >> >experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a > >> >> >> >coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we > >> >> >> >did, which isn't plausible. > > >> >> >> I understand the gist of it, but the conclusion does not follow from > >> >> >> the premises, sentence three is gobbledygook, and sentence four is an > >> >> >> argument from personal incredulity (which would scan much better with > >> >> >> "implied" substituted for "claimed"). Try again. > > >> >> >The conclusion does follow from the premises. Where do you think it > >> >> >doesn't, > > >> >> It simply doesn't. How do you think that it does? > > >> >> Let's reduce it to an actual syllogism for illustration purposes: > > >> >> P1: "A mechanism can have its behavior explained without invoking > >> >> consciousness" > > >> >> Okay so far? Am I fairly encapsulating your first premise? > > >> >> P2: (on which you're already de-railing, since it is a subset of P1as > >> >> you phrased it, but doesn't logically follow from it) "Whether or not > >> >> a mechanism is conscious has no effect on its behavior". This is > >> >> unsupported, to say the least; you haven't demonstrated that > >> >> consciousness has no effect on behavior, just assumed it. > > >> >> C: Sentence three is word salad, but the next sentence gives the idea > >> >> that you're implying that because of P1 and P2, that there must be > >> >> some kind of "Ghost In The Machine", which simply doesn't follow. > > >> >> >and what part of sentance three are you having problems in > >> >> >comprehending? > > >> >> What the Hell you were trying to say in English. The words all mean > >> >> something, but their combination is nonsensical. > > >> >If having subjective experiences did affect behaviour (your objection > >> >to P2), > > >> My objection is that you have neither demonstrated that consciousness > >> has no affect on behavior, nor pointed out why this would be an issue > >> in the first place, other than your own personal incredulity. > > >> > then how could behaviour be explained without taking it into > >> >account (P1)? > > >> As you haven't demonstrated P1 either, the ball is in your court, but > >> again, it does not follow from either premise that some kind of > >> immaterial agent is necessary for consciousness. > >> -- > > >I demonstrated it given P1, which is why you are unable to say why if > >P1 were true then P2 wouldn't be, even though you eroneously claimed > >P2 didn't follow. So will you admit you were wrong, and that P2 does > >follow P1, or will you avoid facing it? > > Sorry, but it doesn't. You really need to brush up on logic, as well > as the English language. > > > > >You are free to say why you would object to P1, or perhaps the > >original wording you based P1 on: > > >------- > >Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > >have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > >conscious (had no subjective experiences). > > Anything could hypothetically be explained with any arbitrary > assumption. It's up to you to demonstrate that your particular > assumption ought to be given credence. > > > > >I'd be interested to hear why I couldn't simply explain the > >behaviour of the mechanism simply in terms of the physical mechanism > >following the laws of physics (which don't reference subjective > >experiences), with the assumption that it didn't have any subjective > >experiences. > > Indeed you could. But why would you? And how would you ever determine > if you were right? > > >I wouldn't worry as of yet about your inability to understand the > >ramifications, just try to concentrate on understanding the point at > >hand, then we can go onto the ramifications after you comprehend some > >simple truths. > > I understand your argument quite well at this point, I just find it to > be poppycock. > You might think you understand it, but you don't. I'll reword P1 for you: The known laws of physics do not have subjective experiences as a variable which influences behaviour, therefore any physical mechanism which follows the known laws of physics could be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics with the assumption that there were no subjective experiences, even if this assumption were incorrect. Do you agree that the above is a factual statement? Quote
Guest Ron Baker, Pluralitas! Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 "Jeckyl" <noone@nowhere.com> wrote in message news:4663dd39$0$1184$61c65585@un-2park-reader-01.sydney.pipenetworks.com.au... > "Ron Baker, Pluralitas!" <this@aint.me> wrote in message > news:4663ab08$0$30600$4c368faf@roadrunner.com... >> >> "Jeckyl" <noone@nowhere.com> wrote in message >> news:46639f87$0$1183$61c65585@un-2park-reader-01.sydney.pipenetworks.com.au... >>> "Ron Baker, Pluralitas!" <this@aint.me> wrote in message >>> news:46639616$0$16681$4c368faf@roadrunner.com... >>>> >>>> "Jeckyl" <noone@nowhere.com> wrote in message >>>> news:46638ac0$0$1186$61c65585@un-2park-reader-01.sydney.pipenetworks.com.au... >>>>> "someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message >>>>> news:1180907578.054811.105110@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >>>>>> Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics >>>>>> couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following >>>>>> the >>>>>> known laws of physics? >>>>> >>>>> Because the known laws of physics are not complete. >>>> >>>> The known laws of physics are complete enough to cover >>>> everything that happens on Earth. >>> >>> Not really >> >> Give examples. > > Surely you jest.. you expect examples of things that we don't know? Are you equivocating? You can't name something you don't know? How can you say the known laws of physics are not complete enough to cover everything that happens on Earth? Quote
Guest Denis Loubet Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1180915714.304693.138900@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > On 4 Jun, 00:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1180903459.945467.317500@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 21:38, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >>news:1180891870.230456.185600@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 18:27, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >>news:1180875033.790773.206010@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the >> >> >> > following: >> >> >> >> > Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, >> >> >> > could >> >> >> > have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't >> >> >> > conscious (had no subjective experiences). >> >> >> >> No. If the mechanism was conscious, then the explanation of its >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> would necessarily include that consciousness. >> >> >> >> > Which means that whether it >> >> >> > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. >> >> >> >> Which is nonsense. The explanation of its behavior would >> >> >> necessarily >> >> >> include >> >> >> the operation of its consciousness if it was conscious. >> >> >> >> > Therefore if we were simply a >> >> >> > biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective >> >> >> > experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a >> >> >> > coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour >> >> >> > claimed >> >> >> > we >> >> >> > did, which isn't plausible. >> >> >> >> Well, since you obviously don't understand what you wrote, it's not >> >> >> surprising that you've reached incorrect conclusions. >> >> >> > Why would I be required to assume any mechanism that simply followed >> >> > the laws of physics was conscious, >> >> >> Who said you had to? >> >> >> > why couldn't I explain it simply in >> >> > terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics with >> >> > the >> >> > assumption that it wasn't? >> >> >> If you fully describe the behavior of the mechanism in terms of a >> >> physical >> >> mechanism following the laws of physics, then you are describing all >> >> the >> >> events that contribute to that behavior. If the mechanism is >> >> conscious, >> >> the >> >> consciousness will be included in the description of events in terms >> >> of >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of physics. Consciousness >> >> is >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of physics. Consciousness is >> >> just >> >> our >> >> word that labels a particular VARIETY of physical mechanisms following >> >> the >> >> laws of physics. >> >> > While I you can believe that the mechanism is responsible for our >> > subjective experiences, you avoided explaining why I couldn't >> > explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply in terms of the physical >> > mechanism following the laws of physics, with the assumption that >> > there were no subjective experiences, or could I? >> >> I did not say you couldn't explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply >> in >> terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics, with the >> assumption that there were no subjective experiences, and I defy you to >> point out where I did. >> >> What I DID say is that in explaining the behaviour of the mechanism >> simply >> in terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics, with >> the >> assumption that there were no subjective experiences, you would, of >> necessity, include in that explanation the physical events that >> constitute >> consciousness if they occurred. >> >> Unless, of course, you arbitrarily want to avoid describing those >> physical >> events that constitute consciousness, and affect behavior, and leave your >> explanation incomplete. You are free to do that. >> > > So you admit, that the behaviour of the mechanism could be explained > with the assumption that it didn't have any subjective experiences. Sure. But if it did have subjective experiences, those experiences would be included in the explanation in terms of physical mechanisms following the laws of physics. In other words, you could explain the behavior with a rote description of physical events, unaware that you are describing subjective experiences and their effect on behavior, in terms of physical events. > Can you follow that this being the case, whether it did or didn't have > any subjective experiences couldn't influence the behaviour, for if it > did, its behaviour could not be explained without taking into account > whether it did or didn't have any subjective experiences? If it has subjective experiences, then they are part of its behavior, and any explanation that failed to include them would be incomplete, by definition. -- Denis Loubet dloubet@io.com http//www.io.com/~dloubet Quote
Guest Neil Kelsey Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 On Jun 4, 5:32 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 4 Jun, 05:25, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 17:04:34 -0700, someone2 > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > >On 3 Jun, 23:55, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: > > >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 09:31:42 -0700, someone2 > > > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > >> >On 3 Jun, 17:20, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: > > >> >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 08:53:43 -0700, someone2 > > > >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > >> >> >On 3 Jun, 16:49, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: > > >> >> >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 05:50:33 -0700, someone2 > > > >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > >> >> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the > > >> >> >> >following: > > > >> >> >> >Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > > >> >> >> >have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > > >> >> >> >conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it > > >> >> >> >did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a > > >> >> >> >biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective > > >> >> >> >experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a > > >> >> >> >coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we > > >> >> >> >did, which isn't plausible. > > > >> >> >> I understand the gist of it, but the conclusion does not follow from > > >> >> >> the premises, sentence three is gobbledygook, and sentence four is an > > >> >> >> argument from personal incredulity (which would scan much better with > > >> >> >> "implied" substituted for "claimed"). Try again. > > > >> >> >The conclusion does follow from the premises. Where do you think it > > >> >> >doesn't, > > > >> >> It simply doesn't. How do you think that it does? > > > >> >> Let's reduce it to an actual syllogism for illustration purposes: > > > >> >> P1: "A mechanism can have its behavior explained without invoking > > >> >> consciousness" > > > >> >> Okay so far? Am I fairly encapsulating your first premise? > > > >> >> P2: (on which you're already de-railing, since it is a subset of P1as > > >> >> you phrased it, but doesn't logically follow from it) "Whether or not > > >> >> a mechanism is conscious has no effect on its behavior". This is > > >> >> unsupported, to say the least; you haven't demonstrated that > > >> >> consciousness has no effect on behavior, just assumed it. > > > >> >> C: Sentence three is word salad, but the next sentence gives the idea > > >> >> that you're implying that because of P1 and P2, that there must be > > >> >> some kind of "Ghost In The Machine", which simply doesn't follow. > > > >> >> >and what part of sentance three are you having problems in > > >> >> >comprehending? > > > >> >> What the Hell you were trying to say in English. The words all mean > > >> >> something, but their combination is nonsensical. > > > >> >If having subjective experiences did affect behaviour (your objection > > >> >to P2), > > > >> My objection is that you have neither demonstrated that consciousness > > >> has no affect on behavior, nor pointed out why this would be an issue > > >> in the first place, other than your own personal incredulity. > > > >> > then how could behaviour be explained without taking it into > > >> >account (P1)? > > > >> As you haven't demonstrated P1 either, the ball is in your court, but > > >> again, it does not follow from either premise that some kind of > > >> immaterial agent is necessary for consciousness. > > >> -- > > > >I demonstrated it given P1, which is why you are unable to say why if > > >P1 were true then P2 wouldn't be, even though you eroneously claimed > > >P2 didn't follow. So will you admit you were wrong, and that P2 does > > >follow P1, or will you avoid facing it? > > > Sorry, but it doesn't. You really need to brush up on logic, as well > > as the English language. > > > >You are free to say why you would object to P1, or perhaps the > > >original wording you based P1 on: > > > >------- > > >Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > > >have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > > >conscious (had no subjective experiences). > > > Anything could hypothetically be explained with any arbitrary > > assumption. It's up to you to demonstrate that your particular > > assumption ought to be given credence. > > > >I'd be interested to hear why I couldn't simply explain the > > >behaviour of the mechanism simply in terms of the physical mechanism > > >following the laws of physics (which don't reference subjective > > >experiences), with the assumption that it didn't have any subjective > > >experiences. > > > Indeed you could. But why would you? And how would you ever determine > > if you were right? > > > >I wouldn't worry as of yet about your inability to understand the > > >ramifications, just try to concentrate on understanding the point at > > >hand, then we can go onto the ramifications after you comprehend some > > >simple truths. > > > I understand your argument quite well at this point, I just find it to > > be poppycock. > > You might think you understand it, but you don't. I'll reword P1 for > you: > > The known laws of physics do not have subjective experiences as a > variable which influences behaviour, That is not the case with quantum physics. The observer does influence the behaviour of quantum particles. And the quantum world is a member of the known laws of physics. > therefore any physical mechanism > which follows the known laws of physics could be explained in terms > of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics with the > assumption that there were no subjective experiences, even if this > assumption were incorrect. > > Do you agree that the above is a factual statement? Quote
Guest raven1 Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 On Mon, 04 Jun 2007 05:32:20 -0700, someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote: >On 4 Jun, 05:25, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 17:04:34 -0700, someone2 >> >> >> >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: >> >On 3 Jun, 23:55, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: >> >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 09:31:42 -0700, someone2 >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: >> >> >On 3 Jun, 17:20, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: >> >> >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 08:53:43 -0700, someone2 >> >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: >> >> >> >On 3 Jun, 16:49, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 05:50:33 -0700, someone2 >> >> >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the >> >> >> >> >following: >> >> >> >> >> >Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could >> >> >> >> >have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't >> >> >> >> >conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it >> >> >> >> >did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a >> >> >> >> >biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective >> >> >> >> >experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a >> >> >> >> >coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we >> >> >> >> >did, which isn't plausible. >> >> >> >> >> I understand the gist of it, but the conclusion does not follow from >> >> >> >> the premises, sentence three is gobbledygook, and sentence four is an >> >> >> >> argument from personal incredulity (which would scan much better with >> >> >> >> "implied" substituted for "claimed"). Try again. >> >> >> >> >The conclusion does follow from the premises. Where do you think it >> >> >> >doesn't, >> >> >> >> It simply doesn't. How do you think that it does? >> >> >> >> Let's reduce it to an actual syllogism for illustration purposes: >> >> >> >> P1: "A mechanism can have its behavior explained without invoking >> >> >> consciousness" >> >> >> >> Okay so far? Am I fairly encapsulating your first premise? >> >> >> >> P2: (on which you're already de-railing, since it is a subset of P1as >> >> >> you phrased it, but doesn't logically follow from it) "Whether or not >> >> >> a mechanism is conscious has no effect on its behavior". This is >> >> >> unsupported, to say the least; you haven't demonstrated that >> >> >> consciousness has no effect on behavior, just assumed it. >> >> >> >> C: Sentence three is word salad, but the next sentence gives the idea >> >> >> that you're implying that because of P1 and P2, that there must be >> >> >> some kind of "Ghost In The Machine", which simply doesn't follow. >> >> >> >> >and what part of sentance three are you having problems in >> >> >> >comprehending? >> >> >> >> What the Hell you were trying to say in English. The words all mean >> >> >> something, but their combination is nonsensical. >> >> >> >If having subjective experiences did affect behaviour (your objection >> >> >to P2), >> >> >> My objection is that you have neither demonstrated that consciousness >> >> has no affect on behavior, nor pointed out why this would be an issue >> >> in the first place, other than your own personal incredulity. >> >> >> > then how could behaviour be explained without taking it into >> >> >account (P1)? >> >> >> As you haven't demonstrated P1 either, the ball is in your court, but >> >> again, it does not follow from either premise that some kind of >> >> immaterial agent is necessary for consciousness. >> >> -- >> >> >I demonstrated it given P1, which is why you are unable to say why if >> >P1 were true then P2 wouldn't be, even though you eroneously claimed >> >P2 didn't follow. So will you admit you were wrong, and that P2 does >> >follow P1, or will you avoid facing it? >> >> Sorry, but it doesn't. You really need to brush up on logic, as well >> as the English language. >> >> >> >> >You are free to say why you would object to P1, or perhaps the >> >original wording you based P1 on: >> >> >------- >> >Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could >> >have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't >> >conscious (had no subjective experiences). >> >> Anything could hypothetically be explained with any arbitrary >> assumption. It's up to you to demonstrate that your particular >> assumption ought to be given credence. >> >> >> >> >I'd be interested to hear why I couldn't simply explain the >> >behaviour of the mechanism simply in terms of the physical mechanism >> >following the laws of physics (which don't reference subjective >> >experiences), with the assumption that it didn't have any subjective >> >experiences. >> >> Indeed you could. But why would you? And how would you ever determine >> if you were right? >> >> >I wouldn't worry as of yet about your inability to understand the >> >ramifications, just try to concentrate on understanding the point at >> >hand, then we can go onto the ramifications after you comprehend some >> >simple truths. >> >> I understand your argument quite well at this point, I just find it to >> be poppycock. >> > >You might think you understand it, but you don't. Actually, I'm far from certain that you understand it... > I'll reword P1 for >you: > >The known laws of physics do not have subjective experiences as a >variable which influences behaviour, therefore any physical mechanism >which follows the known laws of physics could be explained in terms >of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics with the >assumption that there were no subjective experiences, even if this >assumption were incorrect. > >Do you agree that the above is a factual statement? No. Read a bit on QM. -- "O Sybilli, si ergo Fortibus es in ero O Nobili! Themis trux Sivat sinem? Causen Dux" Quote
Guest pbamvv@worldonline.nl Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 On 3 jun, 23:52, someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 3 Jun, 22:46, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > wrote: > > > On 3 jun, 22:23, someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 3 Jun, 21:11, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > wrote: > > > > > On 3 jun, 21:09, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 3 Jun, 20:03, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > On 3 jun, 16:01, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 3 Jun, 14:24, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 3 jun, 14:50, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the > > > > > > > > > following: > > > > > > > > > > Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > > > > > > > > > have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > > > > > > > > > conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it > > > > > > > > > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a > > > > > > > > > biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective > > > > > > > > > experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a > > > > > > > > > coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we > > > > > > > > > did, which isn't plausible. > > > > > > > > > Pardon? > > > > > > > > "Which means that wheter it did or didn't" > > > > > > > > did or didn't what? > > > > > > > > > If a cameraman goes out with soldiers to make pictures of the war, > > > > > > > > the behaviour of the soldiers during intense combat can be explained > > > > > > > > without references to the camera. > > > > > > > > Thus - according to you it - would be a coincidence if the camera > > > > > > > > would have recorded what actually happened? > > > > > > > > > Funny way of reasoning:) > > > > > > > > > In "consciousness explained" Dennet actually describes conciousness as > > > > > > > > the narative our brain stores of what has happened. So comparing it > > > > > > > > whith the camera is not a silly thing to do. Of course unlike the > > > > > > > > camera our consiousness does not consist of raw data, but is also > > > > > > > > build up from conclusions our mind has been making during or after the > > > > > > > > facts that are described happened. This is very usefull for our > > > > > > > > actions during the events (supposing someone is aiming to kill you > > > > > > > > provedes a better guidline for soldiers) that merely concluding that > > > > > > > > certain sounds present themselves to our ears), but somewhat spoiling > > > > > > > > our memory as far as reliability is concerned. (someone might be > > > > > > > > playing a tape of bullets flying around instead of really shooting). > > > > > > > > > If you have any real problems with materialism, > > > > > > > > you may present them to me, > > > > > > > > I know of no problems so far, > > > > > > > > and am willing the learn wether one is serious enough to ponder about. > > > > > > > > Your analogy was poor. The soldiers behaviour isn't affected by > > > > > > > whether unknown to them the cameraman was filming. So if they were > > > > > > > talking about the cameraman filming, it would only be a coincidence > > > > > > > that there was a cameraman filming. > > > > > > > > You couldn't be talking about anything you experience, and about your > > > > > > > subjective experiences, because you actually had subjective > > > > > > > experiences was the point. It would only be a coincidence that you had > > > > > > > the subjective experiences that you were discussing. It would also > > > > > > > have to be a deception that your behaviour was influenced by anything > > > > > > > you subjectively experienced, so on top of it being a coincidence, it > > > > > > > wouldn't even fit with our actual experience.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > You evidently seem to think that soldiers bother to talk to the > > > > > > cameraman when bullets are flying. I do not think that is the case. > > > > > > But any analogy is poor. > > > > > > Let's suppose there is no cameramen but only a hidden camera inside a > > > > > > helmet, of which even the soldier wearing the helmet is oblivious. > > > > > > The effect of the camera would be minimal, > > > > > > yet the story it's picture would tell would not be false. > > > > > > > Why could I not be talking about my experiences > > > > > > Why can't a camera work? > > > > > > You give me no serious reason for this impromptu statement. > > > > > > > Again if ourt consience (as Dennett suggest) is only a narrative > > > > > > that doesn't mean it is totally coincidental if the narrative is > > > > > > somewhat correct. > > > > > > Experiences lead to actions - even by robots - > > > > > > if these actions are that monitored > > > > > > than the narrative made by the monitor too is a result of those > > > > > > experiences. > > > > > > > Futrhermore materialsm doesn't mean consious experciences do not > > > > > > influence our decissions. In my example the camera would not influence > > > > > > the decissions of the soldiers, but if the rewind and look at the > > > > > > pictures, they may find some information about the position of the > > > > > > enemy and plan their future actions accordingly. > > > > > > > Likewise a robot may learn from it's experciences by using a > > > > > > background program that is modifying the foreground program to work > > > > > > more efficiently, by analizing the data collected by a monitoring > > > > > > unit. > > > > > > > Of course at present it may be more efficient to have the analyzing > > > > > > done by a human, as humans are already equipped with the hardware and > > > > > > software to do that job. > > > > > > > In my viwed You haven't said anything that makes "materialism" > > > > > > implausible. > > > > > > (actually I am wondering what you are saying if anything at all) > > > > > > There is a lot though that makes dualism implausible. > > > > > > especially Ockham's razor knife. > > > > > > The camera in the helmet is analogous to having subjective experiences > > > > > right? Do you understand that if the soldiers were talking about > > > > > having a camera in their helmet (which doesn't affect their > > > > > behaviour), then it would only be a coincidence that there was a > > > > > camera in their helmet? > > > > > > Do you understand that any mechanism that followed the known laws of > > > > > physics could be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism > > > > > following the known laws of physics with the assumption that the > > > > > mechanism had no subjective experiences? > > > > > The first paragraph I understand > > > > what I do not understand what connection that would have towards > > > > the plausibility of materialism. > > > > > However the second paragraph is known to be untrue. > > > > People do not only have subjective experiences but they act on them. > > > > There are people who think they have been abcucted by aliens and act > > > > accordingly. > > > > There are people who think they have heard the voice of God and act > > > > accordingly. > > > > There is ample evidence to suggest that some of these subjective > > > > experiences are objectively false.(as some maintain that god declares > > > > Islam to be the only true religion while others declare God says it is > > > > not) > > > > > The fact that spirits do not exist does not mean people do not act > > > > upon their delusions. > > > > If we disagree on this then apperantly one of us is delusional and > > > > acts accordingly. > > > > That doesn't mean there is anything else than brains that acting > > > > differently. > > > > (I can't say better or worse, for if one of us is wrong about this > > > > particular subject, it may well be that the other is decidingly > > > > thinking better about all other subjects) > > > > > Think about it > > > > and let me know > > > > What you say is known, is simply your belief. What you are glossing > > > over is that your belief is implausible. > > > > You state that you believe the following to be untrue: > > > ------------ > > > Do you understand that any mechanism that followed the known laws of > > > physics could be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism > > > following the known laws of physics with the assumption that the > > > mechanism had no subjective experiences? > > > ------------ > > > > Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics > > > couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the > > > known laws of physics? > > > > Or is it that you think there is a reason that you would be unable to > > > do so with the assumption that the mechanism had no subjective > > > experiences? If so, please explain why I couldn't explain its > > > behaviour in in terms of the physical mechanism following the known > > > laws of physics (which don't reference any subjective experiences the > > > physical might or might not be having), with the assumption that it > > > didn't have any subjective experiences. > > > I am not sure that human actions can be easily explained without the > > assumption of subjective experiences. Of course one can refer to what > > happens in our brains synapsis and disregard anything in the real or > > imagined world that this synaps event deals with but that is certainly > > not easy and actually evading the question whether the subjective > > experience has any importance. > > > Fact is that subjective experiences do influence our behavior even if > > both the experience and the behaviour contain nothing more than > > someone saying "I experience X". > > > That does not mean that someone who says to have been abducted by > > aliens was abducted by aliens, but it does mean that this person acts > > differently than some who does not claim so. > > > Fact is also that these subjecive experiences as such have little > > influence during the experience they are describing. > > The clue to Dennetts vision towards consciousness is that he does not > > imply that the subjective experience is anything more than that: > > Saying what we think has happened.. > > > Of course someone claiming to have been abducted by aliens may also > > react differently towards a plain flying over in the nightsky. > > > If consiousness/subjective experience is narrative and contained in > > our memory it always is about the past, while as everything it can > > only influence the future. > > It does however (totally!) determine the way we view the past. > > > Still puzzled as how this has any reference towards materialism. > > > In case anyone misunderstands: > > Mine are the following views: > > > 1. Subjective experience has no influence on the real experience it it > > desrcibing > > (unless the experience takes enough time for nr.2 to have effect) > > 2. Subjective experience has a lot of influence on future behaviour. > > 3. Subjective experience is practically the only source for the way we > > view our past. > > 3. Subjective experience need not always to be conscious even though > > consciousness is little more than the subjective experience we > > momentarily > > remember. (I do not want to get flamed by psychologists) > > You just avoided answering the questions as to why > ------------ > Do you understand that any mechanism that followed the known laws of > physics could be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism > following the known laws of physics with the assumption that the > mechanism had no subjective experiences? > ------------ > > As I asked: > ---------------- > Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics > couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the > known laws of physics? > > Or is it that you think there is a reason that you would be unable to > do so with the assumption that the mechanism had no subjective > experiences? If so, please explain why I couldn't explain its > behaviour in in terms of the physical mechanism following the known > laws of physics (which don't reference any subjective experiences the > physical might or might not be having), with the assumption that it > didn't have any subjective experiences. > ---------------- > > You could avoid being taken through the reasoning of why materialism > is implausible, and then state that you see no reason why it should be > regarded as such, but why would you? > > (I'm off for tonight, I'll check the board tommorrow for your response) If I didn't make clear why I think it might not be easy to explain human action without the assumption of a subjective experience, I can tell you that it is a lot easier to explain something if you do not go into details. Instead of a mechanical explanation involving hundreds or thousands of synapses we may just say, "he had an earlier experience that made him feel suspicious even though he couldn't tell why" or "She knew unprotected sex may give you aids". Of course far too many people neglect their knowledge about aids, but some actually do. Some guys even remember that they are married! Memory and conscious knowledge however are all part of PREVIOUS subjective experiences. So using that, might make the actions easier to explain. Is this what you meant with "you just avoided the questions as to why? Or do you want to ask more? The answer to your question "can any mechanism following the known laws of physics be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism without the assumption of a subjective experience" Is Yes. But as far as human behaviour is concerned, assuming some of the actions are due to subjective experiences can make them a lot easier to explain (as to why: See above) If you need my why's in order to explain why materialism would not be plausible, the plausibility of your explanation becomes a bit dubious, but I will try and tell you anyway, as I do not enjoy frustrating my partners in a serious discussion. I know a bit about the frustration as several intelligent (I assume) posters have succeeded in frustrating me. I know discussions get tangled up even when we do our best to avoid it, but at least we should try Do not forget my views on these subjective experiences. As I stated them previously for if you are going to reason while ignoring them, the discussion might get long and difficult. If you have any objection to them state these objections as soon as possible, for they may come haunt us later. 1. Subjective experience has no influence on the real experience it is describing (unless the experience takes enough time for nr.2 to have effect) 2. Subjective experience has a lot of influence on future behaviour. 3. Subjective experience is practically the only source for the way we view our past. 4. Subjective experience need not always to be conscious even though consciousness is little more than the subjective experience we momentarily remember. Peter van Velzen June 2007 Amstelveen The Netherlands Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 On 4 Jun, 16:07, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1180915714.304693.138900@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > > > > > > On 4 Jun, 00:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >>news:1180903459.945467.317500@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > > >> > On 3 Jun, 21:38, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >>news:1180891870.230456.185600@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> > On 3 Jun, 18:27, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >>news:1180875033.790773.206010@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the > >> >> >> > following: > > >> >> >> > Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, > >> >> >> > could > >> >> >> > have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > >> >> >> > conscious (had no subjective experiences). > > >> >> >> No. If the mechanism was conscious, then the explanation of its > >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> would necessarily include that consciousness. > > >> >> >> > Which means that whether it > >> >> >> > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. > > >> >> >> Which is nonsense. The explanation of its behavior would > >> >> >> necessarily > >> >> >> include > >> >> >> the operation of its consciousness if it was conscious. > > >> >> >> > Therefore if we were simply a > >> >> >> > biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective > >> >> >> > experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a > >> >> >> > coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour > >> >> >> > claimed > >> >> >> > we > >> >> >> > did, which isn't plausible. > > >> >> >> Well, since you obviously don't understand what you wrote, it's not > >> >> >> surprising that you've reached incorrect conclusions. > > >> >> > Why would I be required to assume any mechanism that simply followed > >> >> > the laws of physics was conscious, > > >> >> Who said you had to? > > >> >> > why couldn't I explain it simply in > >> >> > terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics with > >> >> > the > >> >> > assumption that it wasn't? > > >> >> If you fully describe the behavior of the mechanism in terms of a > >> >> physical > >> >> mechanism following the laws of physics, then you are describing all > >> >> the > >> >> events that contribute to that behavior. If the mechanism is > >> >> conscious, > >> >> the > >> >> consciousness will be included in the description of events in terms > >> >> of > >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of physics. Consciousness > >> >> is > >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of physics. Consciousness is > >> >> just > >> >> our > >> >> word that labels a particular VARIETY of physical mechanisms following > >> >> the > >> >> laws of physics. > > >> > While I you can believe that the mechanism is responsible for our > >> > subjective experiences, you avoided explaining why I couldn't > >> > explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply in terms of the physical > >> > mechanism following the laws of physics, with the assumption that > >> > there were no subjective experiences, or could I? > > >> I did not say you couldn't explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply > >> in > >> terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics, with the > >> assumption that there were no subjective experiences, and I defy you to > >> point out where I did. > > >> What I DID say is that in explaining the behaviour of the mechanism > >> simply > >> in terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics, with > >> the > >> assumption that there were no subjective experiences, you would, of > >> necessity, include in that explanation the physical events that > >> constitute > >> consciousness if they occurred. > > >> Unless, of course, you arbitrarily want to avoid describing those > >> physical > >> events that constitute consciousness, and affect behavior, and leave your > >> explanation incomplete. You are free to do that. > > > So you admit, that the behaviour of the mechanism could be explained > > with the assumption that it didn't have any subjective experiences. > > Sure. But if it did have subjective experiences, those experiences would be > included in the explanation in terms of physical mechanisms following the > laws of physics. In other words, you could explain the behavior with a rote > description of physical events, unaware that you are describing subjective > experiences and their effect on behavior, in terms of physical events. > > > Can you follow that this being the case, whether it did or didn't have > > any subjective experiences couldn't influence the behaviour, for if it > > did, its behaviour could not be explained without taking into account > > whether it did or didn't have any subjective experiences? > > If it has subjective experiences, then they are part of its behavior, and > any explanation that failed to include them would be incomplete, by > definition. > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard as responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed there were any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. No knowledge of whether there were any subjective experiences or not would be required. So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced or not, wouldn't influence the behaviour. So if we were to be regarded as a biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our subjective experiences because they actually existed. To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object that it would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an alternative universe, which followed the same known laws of physics, but there were no subjective experiences associated with it, it would act the same. The objection that if it followed the same known laws of physics, then it would automatically be subjectively experienced, if it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the known laws of physics don't reference subjective experiences, thus it is conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both following the same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having subjective experiences and one not, without the need for any of the known laws of physics to be altered. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 On 4 Jun, 16:57, Neil Kelsey <neil_kel...@hotmail.com> wrote: > On Jun 4, 5:32 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 4 Jun, 05:25, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: > > > > On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 17:04:34 -0700, someone2 > > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > >On 3 Jun, 23:55, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: > > > >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 09:31:42 -0700, someone2 > > > > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > >> >On 3 Jun, 17:20, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: > > > >> >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 08:53:43 -0700, someone2 > > > > >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > >> >> >On 3 Jun, 16:49, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: > > > >> >> >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 05:50:33 -0700, someone2 > > > > >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > >> >> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the > > > >> >> >> >following: > > > > >> >> >> >Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > > > >> >> >> >have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > > > >> >> >> >conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it > > > >> >> >> >did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a > > > >> >> >> >biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective > > > >> >> >> >experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a > > > >> >> >> >coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we > > > >> >> >> >did, which isn't plausible. > > > > >> >> >> I understand the gist of it, but the conclusion does not follow from > > > >> >> >> the premises, sentence three is gobbledygook, and sentence four is an > > > >> >> >> argument from personal incredulity (which would scan much better with > > > >> >> >> "implied" substituted for "claimed"). Try again. > > > > >> >> >The conclusion does follow from the premises. Where do you think it > > > >> >> >doesn't, > > > > >> >> It simply doesn't. How do you think that it does? > > > > >> >> Let's reduce it to an actual syllogism for illustration purposes: > > > > >> >> P1: "A mechanism can have its behavior explained without invoking > > > >> >> consciousness" > > > > >> >> Okay so far? Am I fairly encapsulating your first premise? > > > > >> >> P2: (on which you're already de-railing, since it is a subset of P1as > > > >> >> you phrased it, but doesn't logically follow from it) "Whether or not > > > >> >> a mechanism is conscious has no effect on its behavior". This is > > > >> >> unsupported, to say the least; you haven't demonstrated that > > > >> >> consciousness has no effect on behavior, just assumed it. > > > > >> >> C: Sentence three is word salad, but the next sentence gives the idea > > > >> >> that you're implying that because of P1 and P2, that there must be > > > >> >> some kind of "Ghost In The Machine", which simply doesn't follow. > > > > >> >> >and what part of sentance three are you having problems in > > > >> >> >comprehending? > > > > >> >> What the Hell you were trying to say in English. The words all mean > > > >> >> something, but their combination is nonsensical. > > > > >> >If having subjective experiences did affect behaviour (your objection > > > >> >to P2), > > > > >> My objection is that you have neither demonstrated that consciousness > > > >> has no affect on behavior, nor pointed out why this would be an issue > > > >> in the first place, other than your own personal incredulity. > > > > >> > then how could behaviour be explained without taking it into > > > >> >account (P1)? > > > > >> As you haven't demonstrated P1 either, the ball is in your court, but > > > >> again, it does not follow from either premise that some kind of > > > >> immaterial agent is necessary for consciousness. > > > >> -- > > > > >I demonstrated it given P1, which is why you are unable to say why if > > > >P1 were true then P2 wouldn't be, even though you eroneously claimed > > > >P2 didn't follow. So will you admit you were wrong, and that P2 does > > > >follow P1, or will you avoid facing it? > > > > Sorry, but it doesn't. You really need to brush up on logic, as well > > > as the English language. > > > > >You are free to say why you would object to P1, or perhaps the > > > >original wording you based P1 on: > > > > >------- > > > >Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > > > >have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > > > >conscious (had no subjective experiences). > > > > Anything could hypothetically be explained with any arbitrary > > > assumption. It's up to you to demonstrate that your particular > > > assumption ought to be given credence. > > > > >I'd be interested to hear why I couldn't simply explain the > > > >behaviour of the mechanism simply in terms of the physical mechanism > > > >following the laws of physics (which don't reference subjective > > > >experiences), with the assumption that it didn't have any subjective > > > >experiences. > > > > Indeed you could. But why would you? And how would you ever determine > > > if you were right? > > > > >I wouldn't worry as of yet about your inability to understand the > > > >ramifications, just try to concentrate on understanding the point at > > > >hand, then we can go onto the ramifications after you comprehend some > > > >simple truths. > > > > I understand your argument quite well at this point, I just find it to > > > be poppycock. > > > You might think you understand it, but you don't. I'll reword P1 for > > you: > > > The known laws of physics do not have subjective experiences as a > > variable which influences behaviour, > > That is not the case with quantum physics. The observer does influence > the behaviour of quantum particles. And the quantum world is a member > of the known laws of physics. > > > therefore any physical mechanism > > which follows the known laws of physics could be explained in terms > > of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics with the > > assumption that there were no subjective experiences, even if this > > assumption were incorrect. > > > Do you agree that the above is a factual statement? If you were to regard the Cophenhagen interpretation as correct, even then, there is no reference to subjective experiences. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 On 4 Jun, 17:51, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: > On Mon, 04 Jun 2007 05:32:20 -0700, someone2 > > > > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > >On 4 Jun, 05:25, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: > >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 17:04:34 -0700, someone2 > > >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > >> >On 3 Jun, 23:55, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: > >> >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 09:31:42 -0700, someone2 > > >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > >> >> >On 3 Jun, 17:20, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 08:53:43 -0700, someone2 > > >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >On 3 Jun, 16:49, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 05:50:33 -0700, someone2 > > >> >> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the > >> >> >> >> >following: > > >> >> >> >> >Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > >> >> >> >> >have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > >> >> >> >> >conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it > >> >> >> >> >did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a > >> >> >> >> >biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective > >> >> >> >> >experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a > >> >> >> >> >coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we > >> >> >> >> >did, which isn't plausible. > > >> >> >> >> I understand the gist of it, but the conclusion does not follow from > >> >> >> >> the premises, sentence three is gobbledygook, and sentence four is an > >> >> >> >> argument from personal incredulity (which would scan much better with > >> >> >> >> "implied" substituted for "claimed"). Try again. > > >> >> >> >The conclusion does follow from the premises. Where do you think it > >> >> >> >doesn't, > > >> >> >> It simply doesn't. How do you think that it does? > > >> >> >> Let's reduce it to an actual syllogism for illustration purposes: > > >> >> >> P1: "A mechanism can have its behavior explained without invoking > >> >> >> consciousness" > > >> >> >> Okay so far? Am I fairly encapsulating your first premise? > > >> >> >> P2: (on which you're already de-railing, since it is a subset of P1as > >> >> >> you phrased it, but doesn't logically follow from it) "Whether or not > >> >> >> a mechanism is conscious has no effect on its behavior". This is > >> >> >> unsupported, to say the least; you haven't demonstrated that > >> >> >> consciousness has no effect on behavior, just assumed it. > > >> >> >> C: Sentence three is word salad, but the next sentence gives the idea > >> >> >> that you're implying that because of P1 and P2, that there must be > >> >> >> some kind of "Ghost In The Machine", which simply doesn't follow. > > >> >> >> >and what part of sentance three are you having problems in > >> >> >> >comprehending? > > >> >> >> What the Hell you were trying to say in English. The words all mean > >> >> >> something, but their combination is nonsensical. > > >> >> >If having subjective experiences did affect behaviour (your objection > >> >> >to P2), > > >> >> My objection is that you have neither demonstrated that consciousness > >> >> has no affect on behavior, nor pointed out why this would be an issue > >> >> in the first place, other than your own personal incredulity. > > >> >> > then how could behaviour be explained without taking it into > >> >> >account (P1)? > > >> >> As you haven't demonstrated P1 either, the ball is in your court, but > >> >> again, it does not follow from either premise that some kind of > >> >> immaterial agent is necessary for consciousness. > >> >> -- > > >> >I demonstrated it given P1, which is why you are unable to say why if > >> >P1 were true then P2 wouldn't be, even though you eroneously claimed > >> >P2 didn't follow. So will you admit you were wrong, and that P2 does > >> >follow P1, or will you avoid facing it? > > >> Sorry, but it doesn't. You really need to brush up on logic, as well > >> as the English language. > > >> >You are free to say why you would object to P1, or perhaps the > >> >original wording you based P1 on: > > >> >------- > >> >Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > >> >have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > >> >conscious (had no subjective experiences). > > >> Anything could hypothetically be explained with any arbitrary > >> assumption. It's up to you to demonstrate that your particular > >> assumption ought to be given credence. > > >> >I'd be interested to hear why I couldn't simply explain the > >> >behaviour of the mechanism simply in terms of the physical mechanism > >> >following the laws of physics (which don't reference subjective > >> >experiences), with the assumption that it didn't have any subjective > >> >experiences. > > >> Indeed you could. But why would you? And how would you ever determine > >> if you were right? > > >> >I wouldn't worry as of yet about your inability to understand the > >> >ramifications, just try to concentrate on understanding the point at > >> >hand, then we can go onto the ramifications after you comprehend some > >> >simple truths. > > >> I understand your argument quite well at this point, I just find it to > >> be poppycock. > > >You might think you understand it, but you don't. > > Actually, I'm far from certain that you understand it... > > > I'll reword P1 for > >you: > > >The known laws of physics do not have subjective experiences as a > >variable which influences behaviour, therefore any physical mechanism > >which follows the known laws of physics could be explained in terms > >of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics with the > >assumption that there were no subjective experiences, even if this > >assumption were incorrect. > > >Do you agree that the above is a factual statement? > > No. Read a bit on QM. > -- There is nothing in QM that affects the statement. You are more than welcome to show your misunderstanding on the subject by pointing out where you think it does. Quote
Guest raven1 Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 On Mon, 04 Jun 2007 10:25:07 -0700, someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote: >On 4 Jun, 16:07, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1180915714.304693.138900@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 00:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >>news:1180903459.945467.317500@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 21:38, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >>news:1180891870.230456.185600@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 18:27, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >>news:1180875033.790773.206010@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the >> >> >> >> > following: >> >> >> >> >> > Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, >> >> >> >> > could >> >> >> >> > have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't >> >> >> >> > conscious (had no subjective experiences). >> >> >> >> >> No. If the mechanism was conscious, then the explanation of its >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> would necessarily include that consciousness. >> >> >> >> >> > Which means that whether it >> >> >> >> > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. >> >> >> >> >> Which is nonsense. The explanation of its behavior would >> >> >> >> necessarily >> >> >> >> include >> >> >> >> the operation of its consciousness if it was conscious. >> >> >> >> >> > Therefore if we were simply a >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective >> >> >> >> > experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a >> >> >> >> > coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour >> >> >> >> > claimed >> >> >> >> > we >> >> >> >> > did, which isn't plausible. >> >> >> >> >> Well, since you obviously don't understand what you wrote, it's not >> >> >> >> surprising that you've reached incorrect conclusions. >> >> >> >> > Why would I be required to assume any mechanism that simply followed >> >> >> > the laws of physics was conscious, >> >> >> >> Who said you had to? >> >> >> >> > why couldn't I explain it simply in >> >> >> > terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics with >> >> >> > the >> >> >> > assumption that it wasn't? >> >> >> >> If you fully describe the behavior of the mechanism in terms of a >> >> >> physical >> >> >> mechanism following the laws of physics, then you are describing all >> >> >> the >> >> >> events that contribute to that behavior. If the mechanism is >> >> >> conscious, >> >> >> the >> >> >> consciousness will be included in the description of events in terms >> >> >> of >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of physics. Consciousness >> >> >> is >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of physics. Consciousness is >> >> >> just >> >> >> our >> >> >> word that labels a particular VARIETY of physical mechanisms following >> >> >> the >> >> >> laws of physics. >> >> >> > While I you can believe that the mechanism is responsible for our >> >> > subjective experiences, you avoided explaining why I couldn't >> >> > explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply in terms of the physical >> >> > mechanism following the laws of physics, with the assumption that >> >> > there were no subjective experiences, or could I? >> >> >> I did not say you couldn't explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply >> >> in >> >> terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics, with the >> >> assumption that there were no subjective experiences, and I defy you to >> >> point out where I did. >> >> >> What I DID say is that in explaining the behaviour of the mechanism >> >> simply >> >> in terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics, with >> >> the >> >> assumption that there were no subjective experiences, you would, of >> >> necessity, include in that explanation the physical events that >> >> constitute >> >> consciousness if they occurred. >> >> >> Unless, of course, you arbitrarily want to avoid describing those >> >> physical >> >> events that constitute consciousness, and affect behavior, and leave your >> >> explanation incomplete. You are free to do that. >> >> > So you admit, that the behaviour of the mechanism could be explained >> > with the assumption that it didn't have any subjective experiences. >> >> Sure. But if it did have subjective experiences, those experiences would be >> included in the explanation in terms of physical mechanisms following the >> laws of physics. In other words, you could explain the behavior with a rote >> description of physical events, unaware that you are describing subjective >> experiences and their effect on behavior, in terms of physical events. >> >> > Can you follow that this being the case, whether it did or didn't have >> > any subjective experiences couldn't influence the behaviour, for if it >> > did, its behaviour could not be explained without taking into account >> > whether it did or didn't have any subjective experiences? >> >> If it has subjective experiences, then they are part of its behavior, and >> any explanation that failed to include them would be incomplete, by >> definition. >> > >So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard as >responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed there were >any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. No knowledge of >whether there were any subjective experiences or not would be >required. > >So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced or not, >wouldn't influence the behaviour. So if we were to be regarded as a >biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our subjective >experiences because they actually existed. > >To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object that it >would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an alternative >universe, which followed the same known laws of physics, but there >were no subjective experiences associated with it, it would act the >same. The objection that if it followed the same known laws of >physics, then it would automatically be subjectively experienced, if >it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the known laws of >physics don't reference subjective experiences, thus it is >conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both following the >same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having subjective >experiences and one not, without the need for any of the known laws >of physics to be altered. This is close to word salad. -- "O Sybilli, si ergo Fortibus es in ero O Nobili! Themis trux Sivat sinem? Causen Dux" Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 On 4 Jun, 18:08, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> wrote: > On 3 jun, 23:52, someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > On 3 Jun, 22:46, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > wrote: > > > > On 3 jun, 22:23, someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 3 Jun, 21:11, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > On 3 jun, 21:09, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 3 Jun, 20:03, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > On 3 jun, 16:01, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 3 Jun, 14:24, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 3 jun, 14:50, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the > > > > > > > > > > following: > > > > > > > > > > > Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > > > > > > > > > > have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > > > > > > > > > > conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it > > > > > > > > > > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a > > > > > > > > > > biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective > > > > > > > > > > experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a > > > > > > > > > > coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we > > > > > > > > > > did, which isn't plausible. > > > > > > > > > > Pardon? > > > > > > > > > "Which means that wheter it did or didn't" > > > > > > > > > did or didn't what? > > > > > > > > > > If a cameraman goes out with soldiers to make pictures of the war, > > > > > > > > > the behaviour of the soldiers during intense combat can be explained > > > > > > > > > without references to the camera. > > > > > > > > > Thus - according to you it - would be a coincidence if the camera > > > > > > > > > would have recorded what actually happened? > > > > > > > > > > Funny way of reasoning:) > > > > > > > > > > In "consciousness explained" Dennet actually describes conciousness as > > > > > > > > > the narative our brain stores of what has happened. So comparing it > > > > > > > > > whith the camera is not a silly thing to do. Of course unlike the > > > > > > > > > camera our consiousness does not consist of raw data, but is also > > > > > > > > > build up from conclusions our mind has been making during or after the > > > > > > > > > facts that are described happened. This is very usefull for our > > > > > > > > > actions during the events (supposing someone is aiming to kill you > > > > > > > > > provedes a better guidline for soldiers) that merely concluding that > > > > > > > > > certain sounds present themselves to our ears), but somewhat spoiling > > > > > > > > > our memory as far as reliability is concerned. (someone might be > > > > > > > > > playing a tape of bullets flying around instead of really shooting). > > > > > > > > > > If you have any real problems with materialism, > > > > > > > > > you may present them to me, > > > > > > > > > I know of no problems so far, > > > > > > > > > and am willing the learn wether one is serious enough to ponder about. > > > > > > > > > Your analogy was poor. The soldiers behaviour isn't affected by > > > > > > > > whether unknown to them the cameraman was filming. So if they were > > > > > > > > talking about the cameraman filming, it would only be a coincidence > > > > > > > > that there was a cameraman filming. > > > > > > > > > You couldn't be talking about anything you experience, and about your > > > > > > > > subjective experiences, because you actually had subjective > > > > > > > > experiences was the point. It would only be a coincidence that you had > > > > > > > > the subjective experiences that you were discussing. It would also > > > > > > > > have to be a deception that your behaviour was influenced by anything > > > > > > > > you subjectively experienced, so on top of it being a coincidence, it > > > > > > > > wouldn't even fit with our actual experience.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > > You evidently seem to think that soldiers bother to talk to the > > > > > > > cameraman when bullets are flying. I do not think that is the case. > > > > > > > But any analogy is poor. > > > > > > > Let's suppose there is no cameramen but only a hidden camera inside a > > > > > > > helmet, of which even the soldier wearing the helmet is oblivious. > > > > > > > The effect of the camera would be minimal, > > > > > > > yet the story it's picture would tell would not be false. > > > > > > > > Why could I not be talking about my experiences > > > > > > > Why can't a camera work? > > > > > > > You give me no serious reason for this impromptu statement. > > > > > > > > Again if ourt consience (as Dennett suggest) is only a narrative > > > > > > > that doesn't mean it is totally coincidental if the narrative is > > > > > > > somewhat correct. > > > > > > > Experiences lead to actions - even by robots - > > > > > > > if these actions are that monitored > > > > > > > than the narrative made by the monitor too is a result of those > > > > > > > experiences. > > > > > > > > Futrhermore materialsm doesn't mean consious experciences do not > > > > > > > influence our decissions. In my example the camera would not influence > > > > > > > the decissions of the soldiers, but if the rewind and look at the > > > > > > > pictures, they may find some information about the position of the > > > > > > > enemy and plan their future actions accordingly. > > > > > > > > Likewise a robot may learn from it's experciences by using a > > > > > > > background program that is modifying the foreground program to work > > > > > > > more efficiently, by analizing the data collected by a monitoring > > > > > > > unit. > > > > > > > > Of course at present it may be more efficient to have the analyzing > > > > > > > done by a human, as humans are already equipped with the hardware and > > > > > > > software to do that job. > > > > > > > > In my viwed You haven't said anything that makes "materialism" > > > > > > > implausible. > > > > > > > (actually I am wondering what you are saying if anything at all) > > > > > > > There is a lot though that makes dualism implausible. > > > > > > > especially Ockham's razor knife. > > > > > > > The camera in the helmet is analogous to having subjective experiences > > > > > > right? Do you understand that if the soldiers were talking about > > > > > > having a camera in their helmet (which doesn't affect their > > > > > > behaviour), then it would only be a coincidence that there was a > > > > > > camera in their helmet? > > > > > > > Do you understand that any mechanism that followed the known laws of > > > > > > physics could be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism > > > > > > following the known laws of physics with the assumption that the > > > > > > mechanism had no subjective experiences? > > > > > > The first paragraph I understand > > > > > what I do not understand what connection that would have towards > > > > > the plausibility of materialism. > > > > > > However the second paragraph is known to be untrue. > > > > > People do not only have subjective experiences but they act on them. > > > > > There are people who think they have been abcucted by aliens and act > > > > > accordingly. > > > > > There are people who think they have heard the voice of God and act > > > > > accordingly. > > > > > There is ample evidence to suggest that some of these subjective > > > > > experiences are objectively false.(as some maintain that god declares > > > > > Islam to be the only true religion while others declare God says it is > > > > > not) > > > > > > The fact that spirits do not exist does not mean people do not act > > > > > upon their delusions. > > > > > If we disagree on this then apperantly one of us is delusional and > > > > > acts accordingly. > > > > > That doesn't mean there is anything else than brains that acting > > > > > differently. > > > > > (I can't say better or worse, for if one of us is wrong about this > > > > > particular subject, it may well be that the other is decidingly > > > > > thinking better about all other subjects) > > > > > > Think about it > > > > > and let me know > > > > > What you say is known, is simply your belief. What you are glossing > > > > over is that your belief is implausible. > > > > > You state that you believe the following to be untrue: > > > > ------------ > > > > Do you understand that any mechanism that followed the known laws of > > > > physics could be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism > > > > following the known laws of physics with the assumption that the > > > > mechanism had no subjective experiences? > > > > ------------ > > > > > Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics > > > > couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the > > > > known laws of physics? > > > > > Or is it that you think there is a reason that you would be unable to > > > > do so with the assumption that the mechanism had no subjective > > > > experiences? If so, please explain why I couldn't explain its > > > > behaviour in in terms of the physical mechanism following the known > > > > laws of physics (which don't reference any subjective experiences the > > > > physical might or might not be having), with the assumption that it > > > > didn't have any subjective experiences. > > > > I am not sure that human actions can be easily explained without the > > > assumption of subjective experiences. Of course one can refer to what > > > happens in our brains synapsis and disregard anything in the real or > > > imagined world that this synaps event deals with but that is certainly > > > not easy and actually evading the question whether the subjective > > > experience has any importance. > > > > Fact is that subjective experiences do influence our behavior even if > > > both the experience and the behaviour contain nothing more than > > > someone saying "I experience X". > > > > That does not mean that someone who says to have been abducted by > > > aliens was abducted by aliens, but it does mean that this person acts > > > differently than some who does not claim so. > > > > Fact is also that these subjecive experiences as such have little > > > influence during the experience they are describing. > > > The clue to Dennetts vision towards consciousness is that he does not > > > imply that the subjective experience is anything more than that: > > > Saying what we think has happened.. > > > > Of course someone claiming to have been abducted by aliens may also > > > react differently towards a plain flying over in the nightsky. > > > > If consiousness/subjective experience is narrative and contained in > > > our memory it always is about the past, while as everything it can > > > only influence the future. > > > It does however (totally!) determine the way we view the past. > > > > Still puzzled as how this has any reference towards materialism. > > > > In case anyone misunderstands: > > > Mine are the following views: > > > > 1. Subjective experience has no influence on the real experience it it > > > desrcibing > > > (unless the experience takes enough time for nr.2 to have effect) > > > 2. Subjective experience has a lot of influence on future behaviour. > > > 3. Subjective experience is practically the only source for the way we > > > view our past. > > > 3. Subjective experience need not always to be conscious even though > > > consciousness is little more than the subjective experience we > > > momentarily > > > remember. (I do not want to get flamed by psychologists) > > > You just avoided answering the questions as to why > > ------------ > > Do you understand that any mechanism that followed the known laws of > > physics could be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism > > following the known laws of physics with the assumption that the > > mechanism had no subjective experiences? > > ------------ > > > As I asked: > > ---------------- > > Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics > > couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the > > known laws of physics? > > > Or is it that you think there is a reason that you would be unable to > > do so with the assumption that the mechanism had no subjective > > experiences? If so, please explain why I couldn't explain its > > behaviour in in terms of the physical mechanism following the known > > laws of physics (which don't reference any subjective experiences the > > physical might or might not be having), with the assumption that it > > didn't have any subjective experiences. > > ---------------- > > > You could avoid being taken through the reasoning of why materialism > > is implausible, and then state that you see no reason why it should be > > regarded as such, but why would you? > > > (I'm off for tonight, I'll check the board tommorrow for your response) > > If I didn't make clear why I think it might not be easy to explain > human action without the assumption of a subjective experience, I can > tell you that it is a lot easier to explain something if you do not go > into details. Instead of a mechanical explanation involving hundreds > or thousands of synapses we may just say, "he had an earlier > experience that made him feel suspicious even though he couldn't tell > why" or "She knew unprotected sex may give you aids". Of course far > too many people neglect their knowledge about aids, but some actually > do. Some guys even remember that they are married! > > Memory and conscious knowledge however are all part of PREVIOUS > subjective experiences. So using that, might make the actions easier > to explain. > > Is this what you meant with "you just avoided the questions as to why? > Or do you want to ask more? > > The answer to your question "can any mechanism following the known > laws of physics be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism > without the assumption of a subjective experience" Is Yes. > But as far as human behaviour is concerned, assuming some of the > actions are due to subjective experiences can make them a lot easier > to explain (as to why: See above) > > If you need my why's in order to explain why materialism would not be > plausible, the plausibility of your explanation becomes a bit dubious, > but I will try and tell you anyway, as I do not enjoy frustrating my > partners in a serious discussion. I know a bit about the frustration > as several intelligent (I assume) posters have succeeded in > frustrating me. I know discussions get tangled up even when we do our > best to avoid it, but at least we should try > > Do not forget my views on these subjective experiences. As I stated > them previously for if you are going to reason while ignoring them, > the discussion might get long and difficult. If you have any objection > to them state these objections as soon as possible, for they may come > haunt us later. > > 1. Subjective experience has no influence on the real experience it is > describing > (unless the experience takes enough time for nr.2 to have effect) > 2. Subjective experience has a lot of influence on future behaviour. > 3. Subjective experience is practically the only source for the way we > view our past. > 4. Subjective experience need not always to be conscious even though > consciousness > is little more than the subjective experience we momentarily > remember. > Hmm, you avoided the questions yet again. Or maybe you could point out where you answered either of the questions: ------------ Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics? Or is it that you think there is a reason that you would be unable to do so with the assumption that the mechanism had no subjective experiences? If so, please explain why I couldn't explain its behaviour in in terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics (which don't reference any subjective experiences the physical might or might not be having), with the assumption that it didn't have any subjective experiences. ------------ Why don't you just answer them, if you are so sure of your perspective? It is though you are worried that if you did, your whole world perspective would be shown to be implausible, and so you'd rather talk around the subject than face some home truths about what you believe. Quote
Guest Fred Stone Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in news:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com: > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard as > responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed there were > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. No knowledge of > whether there were any subjective experiences or not would be > required. > Whether or not the mechanism did in fact have subjective experiences, knowledge of that fact by an external observer would not be necessary to explain the operation of the mechanism in terms of the physical structure of the mechanism. However, the fact that the mechanism does have subjective experiences is part of the operation of that mechanism and therefore does influence the behavior of the mechanism. > So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced or not, > wouldn't influence the behaviour. So if we were to be regarded as a > biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our subjective > experiences because they actually existed. > Wrong. The external observer does not know the content of the mechanism's subjective experience, but the fact that the mechanism has such an experience is part of the operation of the mechanism. > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object that it > would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an alternative > universe, which followed the same known laws of physics, but there > were no subjective experiences associated with it, it would act the > same. There is a contradiction here. Either your alternate universe does not follow the same laws of physics or the mechanism itself is not identical in structure or operation. > The objection that if it followed the same known laws of > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively experienced, if > it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the known laws of > physics don't reference subjective experiences, thus it is > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both following the > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having subjective > experiences and one not, without the need for any of the known laws > of physics to be altered. > The laws of physics don't have to reference subjective experience. The subjective experience is, by definition of the problem, entailed by the structure of certain mechanisms. -- Fred Stone aa# 1369 "When they put out that deadline, people realized that we were going to lose," said an aide to an anti-war lawmaker. "Everything after that seemed like posturing." -- Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 On 4 Jun, 18:39, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 4 Jun, 18:08, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > wrote: > > > On 3 jun, 23:52, someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 3 Jun, 22:46, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > wrote: > > > > > On 3 jun, 22:23, someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 3 Jun, 21:11, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > On 3 jun, 21:09, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 3 Jun, 20:03, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 3 jun, 16:01, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 3 Jun, 14:24, "pba...@worldonline.nl" <pba...@worldonline.nl> > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On 3 jun, 14:50, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the > > > > > > > > > > > following: > > > > > > > > > > > > Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could > > > > > > > > > > > have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > > > > > > > > > > > conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it > > > > > > > > > > > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a > > > > > > > > > > > biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective > > > > > > > > > > > experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a > > > > > > > > > > > coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we > > > > > > > > > > > did, which isn't plausible. > > > > > > > > > > > Pardon? > > > > > > > > > > "Which means that wheter it did or didn't" > > > > > > > > > > did or didn't what? > > > > > > > > > > > If a cameraman goes out with soldiers to make pictures of the war, > > > > > > > > > > the behaviour of the soldiers during intense combat can be explained > > > > > > > > > > without references to the camera. > > > > > > > > > > Thus - according to you it - would be a coincidence if the camera > > > > > > > > > > would have recorded what actually happened? > > > > > > > > > > > Funny way of reasoning:) > > > > > > > > > > > In "consciousness explained" Dennet actually describes conciousness as > > > > > > > > > > the narative our brain stores of what has happened. So comparing it > > > > > > > > > > whith the camera is not a silly thing to do. Of course unlike the > > > > > > > > > > camera our consiousness does not consist of raw data, but is also > > > > > > > > > > build up from conclusions our mind has been making during or after the > > > > > > > > > > facts that are described happened. This is very usefull for our > > > > > > > > > > actions during the events (supposing someone is aiming to kill you > > > > > > > > > > provedes a better guidline for soldiers) that merely concluding that > > > > > > > > > > certain sounds present themselves to our ears), but somewhat spoiling > > > > > > > > > > our memory as far as reliability is concerned. (someone might be > > > > > > > > > > playing a tape of bullets flying around instead of really shooting). > > > > > > > > > > > If you have any real problems with materialism, > > > > > > > > > > you may present them to me, > > > > > > > > > > I know of no problems so far, > > > > > > > > > > and am willing the learn wether one is serious enough to ponder about. > > > > > > > > > > Your analogy was poor. The soldiers behaviour isn't affected by > > > > > > > > > whether unknown to them the cameraman was filming. So if they were > > > > > > > > > talking about the cameraman filming, it would only be a coincidence > > > > > > > > > that there was a cameraman filming. > > > > > > > > > > You couldn't be talking about anything you experience, and about your > > > > > > > > > subjective experiences, because you actually had subjective > > > > > > > > > experiences was the point. It would only be a coincidence that you had > > > > > > > > > the subjective experiences that you were discussing. It would also > > > > > > > > > have to be a deception that your behaviour was influenced by anything > > > > > > > > > you subjectively experienced, so on top of it being a coincidence, it > > > > > > > > > wouldn't even fit with our actual experience.- Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht niet weergeven - > > > > > > > > > > - Tekst uit oorspronkelijk bericht weergeven - > > > > > > > > > You evidently seem to think that soldiers bother to talk to the > > > > > > > > cameraman when bullets are flying. I do not think that is the case. > > > > > > > > But any analogy is poor. > > > > > > > > Let's suppose there is no cameramen but only a hidden camera inside a > > > > > > > > helmet, of which even the soldier wearing the helmet is oblivious. > > > > > > > > The effect of the camera would be minimal, > > > > > > > > yet the story it's picture would tell would not be false. > > > > > > > > > Why could I not be talking about my experiences > > > > > > > > Why can't a camera work? > > > > > > > > You give me no serious reason for this impromptu statement. > > > > > > > > > Again if ourt consience (as Dennett suggest) is only a narrative > > > > > > > > that doesn't mean it is totally coincidental if the narrative is > > > > > > > > somewhat correct. > > > > > > > > Experiences lead to actions - even by robots - > > > > > > > > if these actions are that monitored > > > > > > > > than the narrative made by the monitor too is a result of those > > > > > > > > experiences. > > > > > > > > > Futrhermore materialsm doesn't mean consious experciences do not > > > > > > > > influence our decissions. In my example the camera would not influence > > > > > > > > the decissions of the soldiers, but if the rewind and look at the > > > > > > > > pictures, they may find some information about the position of the > > > > > > > > enemy and plan their future actions accordingly. > > > > > > > > > Likewise a robot may learn from it's experciences by using a > > > > > > > > background program that is modifying the foreground program to work > > > > > > > > more efficiently, by analizing the data collected by a monitoring > > > > > > > > unit. > > > > > > > > > Of course at present it may be more efficient to have the analyzing > > > > > > > > done by a human, as humans are already equipped with the hardware and > > > > > > > > software to do that job. > > > > > > > > > In my viwed You haven't said anything that makes "materialism" > > > > > > > > implausible. > > > > > > > > (actually I am wondering what you are saying if anything at all) > > > > > > > > There is a lot though that makes dualism implausible. > > > > > > > > especially Ockham's razor knife. > > > > > > > > The camera in the helmet is analogous to having subjective experiences > > > > > > > right? Do you understand that if the soldiers were talking about > > > > > > > having a camera in their helmet (which doesn't affect their > > > > > > > behaviour), then it would only be a coincidence that there was a > > > > > > > camera in their helmet? > > > > > > > > Do you understand that any mechanism that followed the known laws of > > > > > > > physics could be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics with the assumption that the > > > > > > > mechanism had no subjective experiences? > > > > > > > The first paragraph I understand > > > > > > what I do not understand what connection that would have towards > > > > > > the plausibility of materialism. > > > > > > > However the second paragraph is known to be untrue. > > > > > > People do not only have subjective experiences but they act on them. > > > > > > There are people who think they have been abcucted by aliens and act > > > > > > accordingly. > > > > > > There are people who think they have heard the voice of God and act > > > > > > accordingly. > > > > > > There is ample evidence to suggest that some of these subjective > > > > > > experiences are objectively false.(as some maintain that god declares > > > > > > Islam to be the only true religion while others declare God says it is > > > > > > not) > > > > > > > The fact that spirits do not exist does not mean people do not act > > > > > > upon their delusions. > > > > > > If we disagree on this then apperantly one of us is delusional and > > > > > > acts accordingly. > > > > > > That doesn't mean there is anything else than brains that acting > > > > > > differently. > > > > > > (I can't say better or worse, for if one of us is wrong about this > > > > > > particular subject, it may well be that the other is decidingly > > > > > > thinking better about all other subjects) > > > > > > > Think about it > > > > > > and let me know > > > > > > What you say is known, is simply your belief. What you are glossing > > > > > over is that your belief is implausible. > > > > > > You state that you believe the following to be untrue: > > > > > ------------ > > > > > Do you understand that any mechanism that followed the known laws of > > > > > physics could be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism > > > > > following the known laws of physics with the assumption that the > > > > > mechanism had no subjective experiences? > > > > > ------------ > > > > > > Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics > > > > > couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the > > > > > known laws of physics? > > > > > > Or is it that you think there is a reason that you would be unable to > > > > > do so with the assumption that the mechanism had no subjective > > > > > experiences? If so, please explain why I couldn't explain its > > > > > behaviour in in terms of the physical mechanism following the known > > > > > laws of physics (which don't reference any subjective experiences the > > > > > physical might or might not be having), with the assumption that it > > > > > didn't have any subjective experiences. > > > > > I am not sure that human actions can be easily explained without the > > > > assumption of subjective experiences. Of course one can refer to what > > > > happens in our brains synapsis and disregard anything in the real or > > > > imagined world that this synaps event deals with but that is certainly > > > > not easy and actually evading the question whether the subjective > > > > experience has any importance. > > > > > Fact is that subjective experiences do influence our behavior even if > > > > both the experience and the behaviour contain nothing more than > > > > someone saying "I experience X". > > > > > That does not mean that someone who says to have been abducted by > > > > aliens was abducted by aliens, but it does mean that this person acts > > > > differently than some who does not claim so. > > > > > Fact is also that these subjecive experiences as such have little > > > > influence during the experience they are describing. > > > > The clue to Dennetts vision towards consciousness is that he does not > > > > imply that the subjective experience is anything more than that: > > > > Saying what we think has happened.. > > > > > Of course someone claiming to have been abducted by aliens may also > > > > react differently towards a plain flying over in the nightsky. > > > > > If consiousness/subjective experience is narrative and contained in > > > > our memory it always is about the past, while as everything it can > > > > only influence the future. > > > > It does however (totally!) determine the way we view the past. > > > > > Still puzzled as how this has any reference towards materialism. > > > > > In case anyone misunderstands: > > > > Mine are the following views: > > > > > 1. Subjective experience has no influence on the real experience it it > > > > desrcibing > > > > (unless the experience takes enough time for nr.2 to have effect) > > > > 2. Subjective experience has a lot of influence on future behaviour. > > > > 3. Subjective experience is practically the only source for the way we > > > > view our past. > > > > 3. Subjective experience need not always to be conscious even though > > > > consciousness is little more than the subjective experience we > > > > momentarily > > > > remember. (I do not want to get flamed by psychologists) > > > > You just avoided answering the questions as to why > > > ------------ > > > Do you understand that any mechanism that followed the known laws of > > > physics could be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism > > > following the known laws of physics with the assumption that the > > > mechanism had no subjective experiences? > > > ------------ > > > > As I asked: > > > ---------------- > > > Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics > > > couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the > > > known laws of physics? > > > > Or is it that you think there is a reason that you would be unable to > > > do so with the assumption that the mechanism had no subjective > > > experiences? If so, please explain why I couldn't explain its > > > behaviour in in terms of the physical mechanism following the known > > > laws of physics (which don't reference any subjective experiences the > > > physical might or might not be having), with the assumption that it > > > didn't have any subjective experiences. > > > ---------------- > > > > You could avoid being taken through the reasoning of why materialism > > > is implausible, and then state that you see no reason why it should be > > > regarded as such, but why would you? > > > > (I'm off for tonight, I'll check the board tommorrow for your response) > > > If I didn't make clear why I think it might not be easy to explain > > human action without the assumption of a subjective experience, I can > > tell you that it is a lot easier to explain something if you do not go > > into details. Instead of a mechanical explanation involving hundreds > > or thousands of synapses we may just say, "he had an earlier > > experience that made him feel suspicious even though he couldn't tell > > why" or "She knew unprotected sex may give you aids". Of course far > > too many people neglect their knowledge about aids, but some actually > > do. Some guys even remember that they are married! > > > Memory and conscious knowledge however are all part of PREVIOUS > > subjective experiences. So using that, might make the actions easier > > to explain. > > > Is this what you meant with "you just avoided the questions as to why? > > Or do you want to ask more? > > > The answer to your question "can any mechanism following the known > > laws of physics be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism > > without the assumption of a subjective experience" Is Yes. > > But as far as human behaviour is concerned, assuming some of the > > actions are due to subjective experiences can make them a lot easier > > to explain (as to why: See above) > > > If you need my why's in order to explain why materialism would not be > > plausible, the plausibility of your explanation becomes a bit dubious, > > but I will try and tell you anyway, as I do not enjoy frustrating my > > partners in a serious discussion. I know a bit about the frustration > > as several intelligent (I assume) posters have succeeded in > > frustrating me. I know discussions get tangled up even when we do our > > best to avoid it, but at least we should try > > > Do not forget my views on these subjective experiences. As I stated > > them previously for if you are going to reason while ignoring them, > > the discussion might get long and difficult. If you have any objection > > to them state these objections as soon as possible, for they may come > > haunt us later. > > > 1. Subjective experience has no influence on the real experience it is > > describing > > (unless the experience takes enough time for nr.2 to have effect) > > 2. Subjective experience has a lot of influence on future behaviour. > > 3. Subjective experience is practically the only source for the way we > > view our past. > > 4. Subjective experience need not always to be conscious even though > > consciousness > > is little more than the subjective experience we momentarily > > remember. > > Hmm, you avoided the questions yet again. > > Or maybe you could point out where you answered either of the > questions: > > ------------ > Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics > couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the > known laws of physics? > > Or is it that you think there is a reason that you would be unable to > do so with the assumption that the mechanism had no subjective > experiences? If so, please explain why I couldn't explain its > behaviour in in terms of the physical mechanism following the known > laws of physics (which don't reference any subjective experiences the > physical might or might not be having), with the assumption that it > didn't have any subjective experiences. > ------------ > > Why don't you just answer them, if you are so sure of your > perspective? It is though you are worried that if you did, your whole > world perspective would be shown to be implausible, and so you'd > rather talk around the subject than face some home truths about what > you believe. I appologise, there was an answer to the question in the middle of your response. You replied: ----- The answer to your question "can any mechanism following the known laws of physics be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism without the assumption of a subjective experience" Is Yes. ----- Can you therefore see, that whether there were or weren't subjective experiences in the case of a mechanism following the known laws of physics, couldn't influence behaviour, otherwise the mechanism couldn't be explained without taking them into account? So your belief number 2 for example would have to be false for any mechanism strictly following the known laws of physics. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 4, 2007 Posted June 4, 2007 On 4 Jun, 18:37, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote: > On Mon, 04 Jun 2007 10:25:07 -0700, someone2 > > > > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > >On 4 Jun, 16:07, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >>news:1180915714.304693.138900@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > >> > On 4 Jun, 00:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >>news:1180903459.945467.317500@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> > On 3 Jun, 21:38, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >>news:1180891870.230456.185600@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 18:27, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >>news:1180875033.790773.206010@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the > >> >> >> >> > following: > > >> >> >> >> > Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, > >> >> >> >> > could > >> >> >> >> > have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't > >> >> >> >> > conscious (had no subjective experiences). > > >> >> >> >> No. If the mechanism was conscious, then the explanation of its > >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> would necessarily include that consciousness. > > >> >> >> >> > Which means that whether it > >> >> >> >> > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. > > >> >> >> >> Which is nonsense. The explanation of its behavior would > >> >> >> >> necessarily > >> >> >> >> include > >> >> >> >> the operation of its consciousness if it was conscious. > > >> >> >> >> > Therefore if we were simply a > >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective > >> >> >> >> > experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a > >> >> >> >> > coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour > >> >> >> >> > claimed > >> >> >> >> > we > >> >> >> >> > did, which isn't plausible. > > >> >> >> >> Well, since you obviously don't understand what you wrote, it's not > >> >> >> >> surprising that you've reached incorrect conclusions. > > >> >> >> > Why would I be required to assume any mechanism that simply followed > >> >> >> > the laws of physics was conscious, > > >> >> >> Who said you had to? > > >> >> >> > why couldn't I explain it simply in > >> >> >> > terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics with > >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> > assumption that it wasn't? > > >> >> >> If you fully describe the behavior of the mechanism in terms of a > >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> mechanism following the laws of physics, then you are describing all > >> >> >> the > >> >> >> events that contribute to that behavior. If the mechanism is > >> >> >> conscious, > >> >> >> the > >> >> >> consciousness will be included in the description of events in terms > >> >> >> of > >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of physics. Consciousness > >> >> >> is > >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of physics. Consciousness is > >> >> >> just > >> >> >> our > >> >> >> word that labels a particular VARIETY of physical mechanisms following > >> >> >> the > >> >> >> laws of physics. > > >> >> > While I you can believe that the mechanism is responsible for our > >> >> > subjective experiences, you avoided explaining why I couldn't > >> >> > explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply in terms of the physical > >> >> > mechanism following the laws of physics, with the assumption that > >> >> > there were no subjective experiences, or could I? > > >> >> I did not say you couldn't explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply > >> >> in > >> >> terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics, with the > >> >> assumption that there were no subjective experiences, and I defy you to > >> >> point out where I did. > > >> >> What I DID say is that in explaining the behaviour of the mechanism > >> >> simply > >> >> in terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics, with > >> >> the > >> >> assumption that there were no subjective experiences, you would, of > >> >> necessity, include in that explanation the physical events that > >> >> constitute > >> >> consciousness if they occurred. > > >> >> Unless, of course, you arbitrarily want to avoid describing those > >> >> physical > >> >> events that constitute consciousness, and affect behavior, and leave your > >> >> explanation incomplete. You are free to do that. > > >> > So you admit, that the behaviour of the mechanism could be explained > >> > with the assumption that it didn't have any subjective experiences. > > >> Sure. But if it did have subjective experiences, those experiences would be > >> included in the explanation in terms of physical mechanisms following the > >> laws of physics. In other words, you could explain the behavior with a rote > >> description of physical events, unaware that you are describing subjective > >> experiences and their effect on behavior, in terms of physical events. > > >> > Can you follow that this being the case, whether it did or didn't have > >> > any subjective experiences couldn't influence the behaviour, for if it > >> > did, its behaviour could not be explained without taking into account > >> > whether it did or didn't have any subjective experiences? > > >> If it has subjective experiences, then they are part of its behavior, and > >> any explanation that failed to include them would be incomplete, by > >> definition. > > >So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard as > >responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed there were > >any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. No knowledge of > >whether there were any subjective experiences or not would be > >required. > > >So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced or not, > >wouldn't influence the behaviour. So if we were to be regarded as a > >biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our subjective > >experiences because they actually existed. > > >To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object that it > >would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an alternative > >universe, which followed the same known laws of physics, but there > >were no subjective experiences associated with it, it would act the > >same. The objection that if it followed the same known laws of > >physics, then it would automatically be subjectively experienced, if > >it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the known laws of > >physics don't reference subjective experiences, thus it is > >conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both following the > >same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having subjective > >experiences and one not, without the need for any of the known laws > >of physics to be altered. > > This is close to word salad. > -- > Though I am having a conversation with you elsewhere on this thread (I'm still awaiting your response), out of curiousity, what bit were you unable to comprehend? Quote
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