Implausibility of Materialism

July 16, 2007

On 15 Jul, 17:51, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >On 14 Jul, 00:05, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >> >On 13 Jul, 20:01, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >> >> >On 13 Jul, 16:23, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> >> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >> >> >> >On 13 Jul, 06:19, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> >> >> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >> >> >> >> >On 12 Jul, 22:52, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> >> >> >> >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >> >> >> >> >> >Yes you that is experiencing does need to be distinguished from that

> >> >> >> >> >> >which is providing you with the experiences. The experiences aren't

> >> >> >> >> >> >generated by yourself, you don't know what the neural state represents

> >> >> >> >> >> >for example.

>

> >> >> >> >> >> All readily seen to be God's ideas, under theistic idealism.

>

> >> >> >> >> >> Are we close to done, for now?

>

> >> >> >> >> >The post was about the implausibility of materialism, not about what

> >> >> >> >> >reality actually is. Did you understand why it is implausible that we

> >> >> >> >> >are a biological mechanism behaving according to the known laws of

> >> >> >> >> >physics?

>

> >> >> >> >> It will never be entirely plausible IMO that we are a biological

> >> >> >> >> mechanism behaving according to the KNOWN laws of physics, because we

> >> >> >> >> will never, IMO, correctly know all the laws of physics. (History is

> >> >> >> >> my guide, I could be wrong.) But this does not make materialism, IMO,

> >> >> >> >> implausible. Nor does it make materialism plausible.

>

> >> >> >> >> How's that? Can I go?

>

> >> >> >> >That isn't what I meant though. A car could be said to follow the

> >> >> >> >known laws of physics in the sense that they can be used to explain

> >> >> >> >its behaviour, as could any of our technology. Did you understand that

> >> >> >> >it is implausible that our behaviour can be explained in terms of the

> >> >> >> >known laws of physics?

>

> >> >> >> I would like to hear your reason why, and then I might be able to

> >> >> >> agree without reservation.

>

> >> >> >> For example if you said humans will never be able to go to the surface

> >> >> >> of the Sun and run around only in bathing suits, and your reason is

> >> >> >> that it would be too expensive, I'd say I agree we can't go to the Sun

> >> >> >> and run around like that, but that's the wrong reason. So I need to

> >> >> >> hear your reason why it is implausible that we will ever be able to

> >> >> >> explain human behavior in terms of the known laws of physics, if

> >> >> >> that's what you mean.

>

> >> >> >> >Also regarding your comment earlier when you said, "All readily seen

> >> >> >> >to be God's ideas, under theistic idealism.", were you suggesting that

> >> >> >> >we are just an idea of God's, and that therefore we are effectively

> >> >> >> >God? If so, that is wrong, and certainly not what I am suggesting.

> >> >> >> >That sounds like a Satanic inspiration. It would imply that nothing we

> >> >> >> >could do could be unpleasing to God, and therefore would also be an

> >> >> >> >insult to God given what some people chose to do.

>

> >> >> >> No, I am not saying anything firmly. I am saying that when I think

> >> >> >> about theistic subjective idealism, with an omnipotent ex nihilo

> >> >> >> creator sustainer deity, it leads me to that kind of mental image.

> >> >> >> Your mileage may vary. You might have an entirely different idea of

> >> >> >> theistic subjective idealism. But I am really just an amateur student

> >> >> >> of such metaphysics. I haven't any firm stand on it.

>

> >> >> >Regarding my reason why it is implausible that our behaviour can be

> >> >> >explained in terms of the known laws of physics, it has been explained

> >> >> >to you again and again, by myself and others. It would mean that

> >> >> >consciously experiencing wasn't influencing behaviour. Therefore it

> >> >> >would have to be a coincidence that we have the conscious experiences

> >> >> >the 'meat machine' is expresses in its behaviour.

>

> >> >> Yes you have, but we never seem to understand it to your satisfaction.

> >> >> My understanding is that you think there is something non-physical

> >> >> about humans that is essential to the influence they have on their

> >> >> behavior, and that non-physcal element is not physically explainable

> >> >> in itself, so physics can never possibly explain human behavior. So,

> >> >> tell me what I don't understand.

>

> >> >> >As for your suggestion, which as I said, sounds like a satanistic

> >> >> >inspiration, what objection do you have in the alteration of it, such

> >> >> >that what we are experiencing is an unbiased presentation, neither

> >> >> >Heaven, nor Hell, and the reason we are experiencing it is that our

> >> >> >choices maybe observed in a context where we can choose between the

> >> >> >following the spiritual nature of a loving, selfless, God, and a

> >> >> >hateful, selfish Devil. The difference from what you were suggesting,

> >> >> >is that what we choose to do does matter, and that if we murder, or

> >> >> >cause suffering to others for example, it is not God doing it, it

> >> >> >would be us.

>

> >> >> As I said, I don't have a firm stand on such metaphysical things.

>

> >> >When the issue seemed like it was going to be avoided, by you

> >> >suggesting that we don't know the true laws of physics, and therefore

> >> >we don't follow the known laws of physics, and I replied:

>

> >> >-----------

> >> >That isn't what I meant though. A car could be said to follow the

> >> >known laws of physics in the sense that they can be used to explain

> >> >its behaviour, as could any of our technology. Did you understand that

> >> >it is implausible that our behaviour can be explained in terms of the

> >> >known laws of physics?

> >> >-----------

>

> >> >To which you responded:

> >> >-----------

> >> >I would like to hear your reason why, and then I might be able to

> >> >agree without reservation.

> >> >-----------

>

> >> >Now you claim to have known and understood the reason why.

>

> >> No I didn't calim to know. I said "My understanding is..." and then

> >> said. "So, tell me what I don't understand."

>

> >> So I didn't claim to understand. So you can tell me if I do

> >> understand, or how I missed.

>

> >> >Though in

> >> >your response above, you didn't face actually addressing the reasoning

> >> >as to why it was implausible. Conscious experiences aren't an

> >> >influencing factor in the known laws of physics. You understand that

> >> >simple truth don't you?

>

> >> And they will never be?

>

> >You avoided the question of whether you acknowledge the simple truth,

> >that according to the known laws of physics, whether anything is

> >consiously experienced or not isn't relevent to behaviour. Do you

> >acknowledge this simple truth.

>

> It seems that we are each, in the other's eyes, avoiding questions. At

> least I do not say that the answers to my questions are "simple"

> truths.

>

> According to the known laws of physics, whether anything is

> consciously experienced or not isn't relevant to behavior.

>

> There, I've said it and I believe it.

>

> This is because among the known variables that appear in the equations

> of today's physics, there is no variable that quantizes (or even

> estimates of the relative intensity of) conscious experiences. Such

> sciences as psychology do this. Marketing people take advantage of

> studies showing preferences for colors and patterns, for example.

>

> Now, if you think that physics will never be able to explain human

> behavior, please tell me the reason. Is it, as I have suggested (but

> not claimed) that you believe there is something non-physical about

> humans that is active in their decisions about how to behave?

>

> There might be a very simple reason that I would have no reason to

> question.

>

> IOW, it's your turn to avoid avoiding the question.

>

Well the reason that physics will never be able to explain human

behaviour is because we are spiritual beings experiencing being a

human. We influence the behaviour of the human we experience being,

and even if that influence were ever to be detected, how could it be

explained other than perhaps a "special" configuration freeing the

behaviour from the known laws of physics, in such a way that the

configuration was able to influence its own behaviour based upon what

the experience of that configuration was. I'm sure I don't need to

explain to you that any mechanistic explanation would again make

whatever the conscious experience of the mechanism was coincidental to

behaviour.

As you have said according to the known laws of physics whether

anything is consciously experienced or not isn't relevant to behavior.

Do you agree that it is implausible that we don't consciously

influence our behaviour as the known laws of physics suggest?

July 16, 2007

someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> said:

>On 15 Jul, 17:51, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

<...>

>>

>> According to the known laws of physics, whether anything is

>> consciously experienced or not isn't relevant to behavior.

>>

>> There, I've said it and I believe it.

>>

>> This is because among the known variables that appear in the equations

>> of today's physics, there is no variable that quantizes (or even

>> estimates of the relative intensity of) conscious experiences. Such

>> sciences as psychology do this. Marketing people take advantage of

>> studies showing preferences for colors and patterns, for example.

>>

>> Now, if you think that physics will never be able to explain human

>> behavior, please tell me the reason. Is it, as I have suggested (but

>> not claimed) that you believe there is something non-physical about

>> humans that is active in their decisions about how to behave?

>>

>> There might be a very simple reason that I would have no reason to

>> question.

>>

>> IOW, it's your turn to avoid avoiding the question.

>>

>

>Well the reason that physics will never be able to explain human

>behaviour is because we are spiritual beings experiencing being a

>human. We influence the behaviour of the human we experience being,

>and even if that influence were ever to be detected, how could it be

>explained other than perhaps a "special" configuration freeing the

>behaviour from the known laws of physics, in such a way that the

>configuration was able to influence its own behaviour based upon what

>the experience of that configuration was. I'm sure I don't need to

>explain to you that any mechanistic explanation would again make

>whatever the conscious experience of the mechanism was coincidental to

>behaviour.

Thank you for the reply. It is almost exactly what I expected.

I want it to be clear that you are saying that physics will never be

able to explain human behavior. Personally, I think this is the right

argument to have, instead of talking only of currently known physics.

However, I note that the spiritual being so described, experiences

being a human. To be human could include believing one's behavior

cannot be explained by physical law, but being in error about this.

(We know that humans can believe untruths.) The spiritual being would

have this experience.

It seems like you need more than this -- you need to say that the

spiritual being not only experiences being a human, but the spiritual

being itself influences the human behavior, in a way that is free of

known and future physical laws.

>

>As you have said according to the known laws of physics whether

>anything is consciously experienced or not isn't relevant to behavior.

The question of whether the known laws of physics can explain human

behavior is now irrelevant, AFAIAC.

>Do you agree that it is implausible that we don't consciously

>influence our behaviour as the known laws of physics suggest?

This sentence is difficult to interpret. Put a comma between

"behaviour" and "as", and I think I understand it. I will say a few

things about it that way, and you can tell me if I at least understand

the question.

I think that the known and future laws of physics do not, and will

not, suggest that we are spiritual beings. But I also think that the

known and future laws of physics do not, and will not, suggest that we

are not spiritual beings.

July 17, 2007

On Jul 16, 7:02 pm, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>

> >On 15 Jul, 17:51, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> <...>

>

> >> According to the known laws of physics, whether anything is

> >> consciously experienced or not isn't relevant to behavior.

>

> >> There, I've said it and I believe it.

>

> >> This is because among the known variables that appear in the equations

> >> of today's physics, there is no variable that quantizes (or even

> >> estimates of the relative intensity of) conscious experiences. Such

> >> sciences as psychology do this. Marketing people take advantage of

> >> studies showing preferences for colors and patterns, for example.

>

> >> Now, if you think that physics will never be able to explain human

> >> behavior, please tell me the reason. Is it, as I have suggested (but

> >> not claimed) that you believe there is something non-physical about

> >> humans that is active in their decisions about how to behave?

>

> >> There might be a very simple reason that I would have no reason to

> >> question.

>

> >> IOW, it's your turn to avoid avoiding the question.

>

> >Well the reason that physics will never be able to explain human

> >behaviour is because we are spiritual beings experiencing being a

> >human. We influence the behaviour of the human we experience being,

> >and even if that influence were ever to be detected, how could it be

> >explained other than perhaps a "special" configuration freeing the

> >behaviour from the known laws of physics, in such a way that the

> >configuration was able to influence its own behaviour based upon what

> >the experience of that configuration was. I'm sure I don't need to

> >explain to you that any mechanistic explanation would again make

> >whatever the conscious experience of the mechanism was coincidental to

> >behaviour.

>

> Thank you for the reply. It is almost exactly what I expected.

>

> I want it to be clear that you are saying that physics will never be

> able to explain human behavior. Personally, I think this is the right

> argument to have, instead of talking only of currently known physics.

If I may, let me raise the issue of what "physics" is. The laws of

physics will certainly keep changing. I would submit that any move

toward successfully explaining subjective experience as an influence

of behavior will run up against strong (status-quo) objections that

"that's not physics any more". Much as quantum mechanics has in the

past seemed too philosophy-soaked to be physics, so any furutre

"physics" explanation of subjective experience will seem too

psychological to be physics, I predict. We shall see, I suppose.

Stay tuned. :-)

> However, I note that the spiritual being so described, experiences

> being a human. To be human could include believing one's behavior

> cannot be explained by physical law, but being in error about this.

Errr, the issue is whether one can be in error about the nature of

one's _subjective_experience_ (including its connection to behavior),

not simply one's behavior. (That is, you keep leaving out the

qualifier "fully" whenever you say "explained". I wonder why that

is. ;-))

> (We know that humans can believe untruths.) The spiritual being would

> have this experience.

The spiritual being would experience being a fallible human, yes.

(What do you think the whole New Testament is about?)

> It seems like you need more than this -- you need to say that the

> spiritual being not only experiences being a human, but the spiritual

> being itself influences the human behavior, in a way that is free of

> known and future physical laws.

Free of anything that would be considered theistic and/or

supernatural, I think you mean. If physics ever moves toward the

theistic or supernatural as any part of its domain, will you go along

with that as "physics" or will you be part of the certain-to-be-

accompanying hew and cry?

> >As you have said according to the known laws of physics whether

> >anything is consciously experienced or not isn't relevant to behavior.

>

> The question of whether the known laws of physics can explain human

> behavior is now irrelevant, AFAIAC.

Only at the cost of opening the new questions above.

> >Do you agree that it is implausible that we don't consciously

> >influence our behaviour as the known laws of physics suggest?

>

> This sentence is difficult to interpret. Put a comma between

> "behaviour" and "as", and I think I understand it. I will say a few

> things about it that way, and you can tell me if I at least understand

> the question.

>

> I think that the known and future laws of physics do not, and will

> not, suggest that we are spiritual beings. But I also think that the

> known and future laws of physics do not, and will not, suggest that we

> are not spiritual beings.

That's interesting but doesn't seem to be answering the question.

"Known laws of physics" vs. "spiritual" is a False Dichotomy Fallacy.

Jeff

July 17, 2007

jientho@aol.com said:

>On Jul 16, 7:02 pm, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> said:

>>

>> >On 15 Jul, 17:51, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> <...>

>>

>> >> According to the known laws of physics, whether anything is

>> >> consciously experienced or not isn't relevant to behavior.

>>

>> >> There, I've said it and I believe it.

>>

>> >> This is because among the known variables that appear in the equations

>> >> of today's physics, there is no variable that quantizes (or even

>> >> estimates of the relative intensity of) conscious experiences. Such

>> >> sciences as psychology do this. Marketing people take advantage of

>> >> studies showing preferences for colors and patterns, for example.

>>

>> >> Now, if you think that physics will never be able to explain human

>> >> behavior, please tell me the reason. Is it, as I have suggested (but

>> >> not claimed) that you believe there is something non-physical about

>> >> humans that is active in their decisions about how to behave?

>>

>> >> There might be a very simple reason that I would have no reason to

>> >> question.

>>

>> >> IOW, it's your turn to avoid avoiding the question.

>>

>> >Well the reason that physics will never be able to explain human

>> >behaviour is because we are spiritual beings experiencing being a

>> >human. We influence the behaviour of the human we experience being,

>> >and even if that influence were ever to be detected, how could it be

>> >explained other than perhaps a "special" configuration freeing the

>> >behaviour from the known laws of physics, in such a way that the

>> >configuration was able to influence its own behaviour based upon what

>> >the experience of that configuration was. I'm sure I don't need to

>> >explain to you that any mechanistic explanation would again make

>> >whatever the conscious experience of the mechanism was coincidental to

>> >behaviour.

>>

>> Thank you for the reply. It is almost exactly what I expected.

>>

>> I want it to be clear that you are saying that physics will never be

>> able to explain human behavior. Personally, I think this is the right

>> argument to have, instead of talking only of currently known physics.

>

>If I may, let me raise the issue of what "physics" is.

You may.

>...>The laws of

>physics will certainly keep changing. I would submit that any move

>toward successfully explaining subjective experience as an influence

>of behavior will run up against strong (status-quo) objections that

>"that's not physics any more". Much as quantum mechanics has in the

>past seemed too philosophy-soaked to be physics, so any furutre

>"physics" explanation of subjective experience will seem too

>psychological to be physics, I predict. We shall see, I suppose.

>Stay tuned. :-)

It depends. ;-)

>

>> However, I note that the spiritual being so described, experiences

>> being a human. To be human could include believing one's behavior

>> cannot be explained by physical law, but being in error about this.

>

>Errr, the issue is whether one can be in error about the nature of

>one's _subjective_experience_ (including its connection to behavior),

>not simply one's behavior. (That is, you keep leaving out the

>qualifier "fully" whenever you say "explained". I wonder why that

>is. ;-))

Pardon me, but whether "my behavior cannot be explained by physical

law" is an error, does appear to be an issue in this discussion. But

when you say "including its [subjective experience's] connection to

behavior" you let it back in the door anyway.

If "fully" is needed and is being left out, it is not just by me.

However, it may taken to imply more than should be implied. The fact

is, physics explains to an extent defined by its (current) scope

(refer back to your raising the issue of what physics is.)

>

>> (We know that humans can believe untruths.) The spiritual being would

>> have this experience.

>

>The spiritual being would experience being a fallible human, yes.

>(What do you think the whole New Testament is about?)

It agrees with me in this respect. ;-)

>

>> It seems like you need more than this -- you need to say that the

>> spiritual being not only experiences being a human, but the spiritual

>> being itself influences the human behavior, in a way that is free of

>> known and future physical laws.

>

>Free of anything that would be considered theistic and/or

>supernatural, I think you mean. If physics ever moves toward the

>theistic or supernatural as any part of its domain, will you go along

>with that as "physics" or will you be part of the certain-to-be-

>accompanying hew and cry?

Exposure of theistic positions to examination by science has generally

rased more concern among theologians, than among scientists. But we

might have to let the theologians decide first which version of the

theistic or supernatural physics should move toward.I for one would

recommend looking at the Dali Lama's approach.

>

>> >As you have said according to the known laws of physics whether

>> >anything is consciously experienced or not isn't relevant to behavior.

>>

>> The question of whether the known laws of physics can explain human

>> behavior is now irrelevant, AFAIAC.

>

>Only at the cost of opening the new questions above.

>

>> >Do you agree that it is implausible that we don't consciously

>> >influence our behaviour as the known laws of physics suggest?

>>

>> This sentence is difficult to interpret. Put a comma between

>> "behaviour" and "as", and I think I understand it. I will say a few

>> things about it that way, and you can tell me if I at least understand

>> the question.

>>

>> I think that the known and future laws of physics do not, and will

>> not, suggest that we are spiritual beings. But I also think that the

>> known and future laws of physics do not, and will not, suggest that we

>> are not spiritual beings.

>

>That's interesting but doesn't seem to be answering the question.

>"Known laws of physics" vs. "spiritual" is a False Dichotomy Fallacy.

>

I suggest you talk to somebody2 about that.

July 17, 2007

On Thu, 12 Jul 2007 08:44:25 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

<glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> in

<1184255065.477789.241240@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>On 12 Jul, 15:55, Matt Silberstein

><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

>> On Thu, 12 Jul 2007 04:21:59 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

>> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>>

>> <1184239319.210411.129...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>> >On 12 Jul, 05:27, Matt Silberstein

>> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

>> >> On Wed, 11 Jul 2007 19:07:23 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

>> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>>

>> >> <1184206043.831834.51...@r34g2000hsd.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>> >> >On 11 Jul, 21:45, Matt Silberstein

>> >> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

>> >> >> On Wed, 11 Jul 2007 12:59:16 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

>> >> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>>

>> >> >> <1184183956.023911.247...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>>

>> >> >> [snip]

>>

>> >> >> >If we were found not to be following the known laws of physics, and it

>> >> >> >is implausible that we are (even though it might never be shown),

>>

>> >> >> You have yet to approach showing it is implausible. In fact, you seem

>> >> >> to work really hard at avoiding all of the evidence that says we are

>> >> >> simply physical beings. In particular you ignore all of the evidence

>> >> >> of the ways that subjective experience is affected/determined by

>> >> >> physical phenomena.

>>

>> >> >> >I

>> >> >> >don't think that there would be a problem in science regarding us as

>> >> >> >spiritual beings influencing the human we experience being. Unless you

>> >> >> >are stating that through bias science will never have an understanding

>> >> >> >of reality.

>>

>> >> >> From a scientific POV what does "spiritual being" mean?

>>

>> >> >> >Already we know that on quantum events there is either events with no

>> >> >> >cause within the physical (quantum randomness, in orthodox quantum

>> >> >> >mechanics), or "spooky interaction" at a distance where everything

>> >> >> >physical effects everything physical regardless of distance (as

>> >> >> >suggested in bohmian mechanics). It is already known that the "spooky

>> >> >> >interaction at a distance", as I think Einstein called it, exists for

>> >> >> >quantum entanglement. I understand this lead Bohm to suggest that the

>> >> >> >physical isn't really seperated.

>>

>> >> >> Which has no actually connection to consciousness, not more than it

>> >> >> does to cinder blocks or photosynthesis.

>>

>> >> >> >Though I can see that there could be a school of thought that could

>> >> >> >explain brain not following the known laws of physics because of some

>> >> >> >"special complicated configuration",

>>

>> >> >> What in the world does that mean? I don't know of anyone who suggests

>> >> >> anything like this.

>>

>> >> >> >though they could always attempt

>> >> >> >to show this on an artificial neural network as in the example, hoping

>> >> >> >that they will stumble upon a complicated configuration where either

>> >> >> >unexpected messages started appearing,

>>

>> >> >> Why? I see no reason to look for anything like that.

>>

>> >> >> >or the nodes didn't give the

>> >> >> >same outputs in the network, as they would have in the lab,

>>

>> >> >> Why? I see no reason to look for anything like that either.

>>

>> >> >> >given the

>> >> >> >same inputs. I guess atheists are betting their soul (not that they

>> >> >> >believe they have one), that either this is the case, or that their

>> >> >> >whole conscious experience was a coincidental deception, and that

>> >> >> >nothing they experienced influenced the behaviour of the human they

>> >> >> >experienced being.

>>

>> >> >> Again, none of the alternatives you propose are those I see in the

>> >> >> literature. They are all straw. Consciousness is the product of

>> >> >> biology. "Complicated" is a subjective determination, not a property

>> >> >> of a thing in the world. Things are "complicated" if the perceiver has

>> >> >> trouble understanding them. You have yet to justify this

>> >> >> "coincidental" claim. Our consciousness relates to actions in the

>> >> >> external world because it is connected, and affected by, that external

>> >> >> world.

>>

>> >> >It was shown to be implausible with the simple scenario I gave, which

>> >> >showed that what we consciously experience couldn't influence a

>> >> >biological mechanism which simply followed the laws of physics. If you

>> >> >still can't comprehend why, I'll go through it with you.

>>

>> >> No, it does not show that it is implausible. Roughly speaking you

>> >> assert that robots can't be conscious, therefore human consciousness

>> >> isn't physical. A problem with that is that we don't know that robots

>> >> can't, some day, have subjective experience. People who actually work

>> >> on this tend to think that they will someday. You add to this problem

>> >> the fallacy of composition: just because a component of X does not

>> >> have property Y does not mean that X does not have property Y.

>>

>> >> >Perhaps it is best if you can see this clearly before we continue. As

>> >> >you ask about several other topics, and haven't yet understood some

>> >> >basic truths.

>>

>> >> Sorry, but my disagreement does not constitute my lack of

>> >> understanding.

>>

>> >No disagreement doesn't. You have however totally misunderstood. I'm

>> >not saying that because a component of X does not have property Y that

>> >X does not have property Y.

>>

>> Actually you are. You have pointed out that a particular node is not

>> conscious and that no node is conscious and then jump to the

>> conclusion that no set of nodes can be conscious. That is either a

>> fallacy of composition or a Sorities Heap.

>>

>> >I'll write out the scenario again, and the options, maybe by selecting

>> >one, you will see what I am driving at, though jien has explained it

>> >to you, as well as myself yet you don't seem to be able to understand,

>> >maybe it is your preconceived notion of what is being said, is

>> >blinding you to what actually is being said.

>>

>> Or maybe because you are wrong.

>>

>> >Supposing there was an artificial neural network, with a billion more

>> >nodes than you had neurons in your brain, and a very 'complicated'

>> >configuration,

>>

>> The 'complicated' is irrelevant and just messes up the presentation.

>>

>> >which drove a robot. The robot, due to its behaviour

>> >(being a Turing Equivalent),

>>

>> Do you mean a Universal Turing Machine, what that term usually means,

>> or do you mean passes the Turing Test?

>>

>> >caused some atheists

>>

>> What if a theist makes the came conclusion?

>>

>> >to claim it was

>> >consciously experiencing. Now supposing each message between each node

>> >contained additional information such as source node, destination node

>> >(which could be the same as the source node, for feedback loops), the

>> >time the message was sent, and the message. Each node wrote out to a

>> >log on receipt of a message, and on sending a message out. Now after

>> >an hour of the atheist communicating with the robot, the logs could be

>> >examined by a bank of computers, varifying, that for the input

>> >messages each received, the outputs were those expected by a single

>> >node in a lab given the same inputs. They could also varify that no

>> >unexplained messages appeared.

>> >What would you be saying with regards to it consciously experiencing:

>>

>> I would say that it passed the Turing Test and that it seemed to have

>> all of the external qualities I can determine regarding conscious

>> experience, so it likely had the same kind of conscious experience

>> humans have.

>>

>> >A) The atheists, mentioned in the example, were wrong to consider it

>> >to be consciously experiencing.

>>

>> Why? Nothing in the presentation leads to that. You had some stuff

>> about logs, but I have no idea why that changes anything. I am no less

>> conscious if someone is able to track all of my neurons/brain

>> chemicals.

>>

>> >B) Were correct to say that was consciously experiencing, but that it

>> >doesn't influence behaviour.

>>

>> Again, why? Nothing in the scenario leads me to that.

>>

>> >C) It might have been consciously experiencing, how could you tell, it

>> >doesn't influence behaviour.

>>

>> I can't see making that conclusion.

>>

>> >D) It was consciously experiencing and that influenced its behaviour.

>>

>> Yep.

>>

>> >If you select D, as all the nodes are giving the same outputs as they

>> >would have singly in the lab given the same inputs, could you also

>> >select between D1, and D2:

>>

>> >D1) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were also influenced

>> >by conscious experiences.

>>

>> And now we have that fallacy of composition I referred to. The

>> conscious experience is not the influence of a single node. I can do

>> the same above with a single neuron in an active brain, that would not

>> eliminate conscious experience for that person.

>>

>> >D2) The outputs given by a single node in the lab were not influenced

>> >by conscious experiences, but the influence of the conscious

>> >experiences within the robot, is such that the outputs are the same as

>> >without the influence of the conscious experiences.

>>

>> Lets try this: I have a computer with thousands of chips and I log all

>> of the inputs and outputs and such. I run an OS and a newsreader on

>> that computer. Now I take one of the chips and put it in a separate

>> test rig and subject it to the same inputs and output it had in the

>> computer. Would I say that the chip in the test rig was influenced by

>> the OS/newsreader? Not really. I could argue, I suppose, in both this

>> and your case, that the "influence" comes in the determination of the

>> inputs for the node/chip.

>>

>> Sorry, but I do understand the argument and it is fallacious.

>>

>

>You don't understand I am not saying that because one node isn't

>conscious, that the network can't be conscious. I told you this, but

>you continue to misunderstand.

I know you tell me, I disagree. Your argument is a version of the

Chinese Room and neither works. How are you magically getting the

inputs for that node? If they come from the original system, then the

conscious behavior is embedded there.

>

>While you chose D, and weren't selecting D1, you avoided selecting D2.

You gave false dichotomies, I don't have to chose among your

alternatives.

>With your example of the computer with a thousand chips, running an OS

>and newsreader, the OS and newreader refer to software

>configurations.

Not to the configurations, but to the software and its operation.

>D is not asking whether the robot was influenced by the configuration

>of the nodes. D was asking whether you would be claiming that the

>robot being consciously experienced influenced the way it behaves.

The OS/newsreader is not simply configuration, when they run they are

part of the operation of the computer. Yet a quark level discussion

will not include them.

>D2 is asking whether the influence you are talking about is such that

>the behaviour is the same as without the influence.

The "influence" comes with the recording.

--

Matt Silberstein

Do something today about the Darfur Genocide

http://www.beawitness.org

http://www.darfurgenocide.org

http://www.savedarfur.org

"Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop"

July 17, 2007

On Thu, 12 Jul 2007 09:19:28 -0700, in alt.atheism , jientho@aol.com

in <1184257168.908508.55480@57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>On Jul 12, 10:55 am, Matt Silberstein

><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

>> On Thu, 12 Jul 2007 04:21:59 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

>> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>>

>> <1184239319.210411.129...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>> >On 12 Jul, 05:27, Matt Silberstein

>

><snip>

>

>> >> Sorry, but my disagreement does not constitute my lack of

>> >> understanding.

>>

>> >No disagreement doesn't. You have however totally misunderstood. I'm

>> >not saying that because a component of X does not have property Y that

>> >X does not have property Y.

>>

>> Actually you are.

>

>No he isn't; this is part of your misunderstanding.

>

>> You have pointed out that a particular node is not

>> conscious and that no node is conscious and then jump to the

>> conclusion that no set of nodes can be conscious.

>

>No he hasn't (pointed that out) and no he doesn't (jump to that

>conclusion). He is talking about the _influence_ of conscious

>experience, not the _existence_ of conscious experience, in both

>cases. And once again, sheesh! <shakes head>

It is part of the same thing: he attempts to break it down and then

declare that the consciousness is not in the pieces. What is running

the single node? If it is a recording, then the consciousness was in

the original and so influences the recording and so influences the

separate node. No problem at all.

><snip>

>

>It's not worth talking about any of the rest of it with you, when you

>demonstrate such a _fundamental_ misunderstanding of what has been

>clearly stated on multiple occassions by multiple people now.

>

>Someone2 sure seems correct about the irrational resistance to such a

>simple argument. Why don't you just agree, yes, human behavior is

>influenced by something that is not explained by the present laws of

>physics; and no, science at at present does not have in-hand a full

>explanation of subjective/conscious experience. Your (and others')

>extreme resistance to that simple (and resolving) reply is telling.

Because I disagree with the claim.

--

Matt Silberstein

Do something today about the Darfur Genocide

http://www.beawitness.org

http://www.darfurgenocide.org

http://www.savedarfur.org

"Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop"

July 17, 2007

Jim07D7 <Jim07D7@nospam.net> said:

>jientho@aol.com said:

>

I am adding this post script to recommend a link that is quite

relevant IMO. It points out the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness".

It discusses time, not subjective experience, but there are parallels.

This link tends to support someone2's objections to physicalism,

without overtly supporting spiritualism.

It is:

http://www.anthonyflood.com/griffintimemisplacedconcreteness.htm

Start quote:

The third position is constituted by those who hold that it is not

the task of one of the special sciences to define and account for the

reality of time. <...> However, some within this third group would

say that time is a topic for metaphysics, or ontology,13 meaning

thereby that an approach is required that does not limit itself to the

methods and abstractions of any of the special sciences, but that

attempts to synthesize the presuppositions and results of all the

special sciences with each other and with the knowledge and especially

presuppositions of human experience in its fullness (which may include

features not in the province of any of the special sciences).

1.2. Time in Process Philosophy

There are many ontologies or metaphysical systems that fit the general

characterization given in the previous sentence. (There are also some

that do not, since they ignore the results of the special sciences;

but they are themselves ignored here, just for that reason.) This

introductory essay is written from the point of view of one of them,

the "process philosophy" derived primarily from the writings of

Alfred North Whitehead. From this perspective, the natural

sciences, at least as practiced thus far, methodologically abstract

from the full concreteness of the entities or processes they study.

Therefore, to jump from the mere fact that time is not present in

natural science to the conclusion that time is not real at the

fundamental level of nature is to commit the "fallacy of misplaced

concreteness." The fallacy is to treat the abstractions from certain

things -- as abstractions focused on because of certain interests and

methods -- as if they were the concrete things themselves.14 It is to

treat the map as if it were the territory, assuming that what is not

on the map is not in the actual terrain itself. [Emphasis added]

end quote

July 19, 2007

On Jul 17, 1:58 pm, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

> Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> said:

>

> >jien...@aol.com said:

>

> <whatever>

>

> I am adding this post script to recommend a link that is quite

> relevant IMO. It points out the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness".

> It discusses time, not subjective experience, but there are parallels.

>

> This link tends to support someone2's objections to physicalism,

> without overtly supporting spiritualism.

>

> It is:

>

> http://www.anthonyflood.com/griffintimemisplacedconcreteness.htm

>

> Start quote:

>

> The third position is constituted by those who hold that it is not

> the task of one of the special sciences to define and account for the

> reality of time. <...> However, some within this third group would

> say that time is a topic for metaphysics, or ontology,13 meaning

> thereby that an approach is required that does not limit itself to the

> methods and abstractions of any of the special sciences, but that

> attempts to synthesize the presuppositions and results of all the

> special sciences with each other and with the knowledge and especially

> presuppositions of human experience in its fullness (which may include

> features not in the province of any of the special sciences).

>

> 1.2. Time in Process Philosophy

>

> There are many ontologies or metaphysical systems that fit the general

> characterization given in the previous sentence. (There are also some

> that do not, since they ignore the results of the special sciences;

> but they are themselves ignored here, just for that reason.) This

> introductory essay is written from the point of view of one of them,

> the "process philosophy" derived primarily from the writings of

> Alfred North Whitehead. From this perspective, the natural

> sciences, at least as practiced thus far, methodologically abstract

> from the full concreteness of the entities or processes they study.

> Therefore, to jump from the mere fact that time is not present in

> natural science to the conclusion that time is not real at the

> fundamental level of nature is to commit the "fallacy of misplaced

> concreteness." The fallacy is to treat the abstractions from certain

> things -- as abstractions focused on because of certain interests and

> methods -- as if they were the concrete things themselves.14 It is to

> treat the map as if it were the territory, assuming that what is not

> on the map is not in the actual terrain itself. [Emphasis added]

>

> end quote

The relevant question in the analogy to someone2's argument is _not_

whether time exists or is real, but whether time has any influence on

events. And the quote you provide is _not_ directly relevant to that

issue. But perhaps we could ask whether a map has any _influence_

over the territory mapped (answer = no) to bring the discussion back

to the point of someone2's argument. If our subjective experience is

just a "map" to the "territory" of our behavior, then our (quite

direct) experience that our subjective experience _influences_ our

behavior is a mere illusion. (And we're not talking (a type of

behavior) about SE _because_ we have SE; the talk would have to be

purely coincidental, like soldiers talking about cameras rolling (from

a previous analogy in the thread).) The implausibility that our

direct experience is actually illusion (Matrix-like) is the strength

of someone2's argument. (And there's been nothing like any red pill

in this thread for sure. :-))

Jeff

July 19, 2007

jientho@aol.com said:

>On Jul 17, 1:58 pm, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote:

>> Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> said:

>>

>> >jien...@aol.com said:

>>

>> <whatever>

>>

>> I am adding this post script to recommend a link that is quite

>> relevant IMO. It points out the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness".

>> It discusses time, not subjective experience, but there are parallels.

>>

>> This link tends to support someone2's objections to physicalism,

>> without overtly supporting spiritualism.

>>

>> It is:

>>

>> http://www.anthonyflood.com/griffintimemisplacedconcreteness.htm

>>

>> Start quote:

>>

>> The third position is constituted by those who hold that it is not

>> the task of one of the special sciences to define and account for the

>> reality of time. <...> However, some within this third group would

>> say that time is a topic for metaphysics, or ontology,13 meaning

>> thereby that an approach is required that does not limit itself to the

>> methods and abstractions of any of the special sciences, but that

>> attempts to synthesize the presuppositions and results of all the

>> special sciences with each other and with the knowledge and especially

>> presuppositions of human experience in its fullness (which may include

>> features not in the province of any of the special sciences).

>>

>> 1.2. Time in Process Philosophy

>>

>> There are many ontologies or metaphysical systems that fit the general

>> characterization given in the previous sentence. (There are also some

>> that do not, since they ignore the results of the special sciences;

>> but they are themselves ignored here, just for that reason.) This

>> introductory essay is written from the point of view of one of them,

>> the "process philosophy" derived primarily from the writings of

>> Alfred North Whitehead. From this perspective, the natural

>> sciences, at least as practiced thus far, methodologically abstract

>> from the full concreteness of the entities or processes they study.

>> Therefore, to jump from the mere fact that time is not present in

>> natural science to the conclusion that time is not real at the

>> fundamental level of nature is to commit the "fallacy of misplaced

>> concreteness." The fallacy is to treat the abstractions from certain

>> things -- as abstractions focused on because of certain interests and

>> methods -- as if they were the concrete things themselves.14 It is to

>> treat the map as if it were the territory, assuming that what is not

>> on the map is not in the actual terrain itself. [Emphasis added]

>>

>> end quote

>

>The relevant question in the analogy to someone2's argument is _not_

>whether time exists or is real, but whether time has any influence on

>events. And the quote you provide is _not_ directly relevant to that

>issue.

I called it a parallel, not an analogy, because I do not make an

argument from analogy.

It is me taking the argument further. I think that the parallel causes

us to conclude that if time is not seen as real by science, because it

has no influence, then we are compelled to conclude that SE is not

real, because it has no influence. If things are to be seen as not

real because they have no influence, the logic applies regardless of

the thing under discussion.

>...But perhaps we could ask whether a map has any _influence_

>over the territory mapped (answer = no) to bring the discussion back

>to the point of someone2's argument. If our subjective experience is

>just a "map" to the "territory" of our behavior, then our (quite

>direct) experience that our subjective experience _influences_ our

>behavior is a mere illusion. (And we're not talking (a type of

>behavior) about SE _because_ we have SE; the talk would have to be

>purely coincidental, like soldiers talking about cameras rolling (from

>a previous analogy in the thread).) The implausibility that our

>direct experience is actually illusion (Matrix-like) is the strength

>of someone2's argument. (And there's been nothing like any red pill

>in this thread for sure. :-))

>

I think he argues in a sparse fashion for the position that just

because physics does not reference SE, this doesn't mean it isn't

real. THe above link suggests a reason: It only means that the

methodology of physics is, (and I'd add, by design) blind to some

things. The natural sciences only provide maps of what we see using

their methods of seeing, and this does not warrant the metaphysical

conclusion that the map is the reality.

Where I can't follow someone2, is how to justify what I think of as

another metaphysical conclusion that he refers to when he calls us

spiritual beings that are presented with experiences, or words to that

effect. It might be something like subjective idealism, a la

Berkeley, if I knew more about his position.

July 19, 2007

On Jul 17, 11:57 am, Matt Silberstein

<RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> On Thu, 12 Jul 2007 09:19:28 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com

>

> in <1184257168.908508.55...@57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> >On Jul 12, 10:55 am, Matt Silberstein

> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> >> On Thu, 12 Jul 2007 04:21:59 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>

> >> <1184239319.210411.129...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote:

> >> >On 12 Jul, 05:27, Matt Silberstein

>

> ><snip>

>

> >> >> Sorry, but my disagreement does not constitute my lack of

> >> >> understanding.

>

> >> >No disagreement doesn't. You have however totally misunderstood. I'm

> >> >not saying that because a component of X does not have property Y that

> >> >X does not have property Y.

>

> >> Actually you are.

>

> >No he isn't; this is part of your misunderstanding.

>

> >> You have pointed out that a particular node is not

> >> conscious and that no node is conscious and then jump to the

> >> conclusion that no set of nodes can be conscious.

>

> >No he hasn't (pointed that out) and no he doesn't (jump to that

> >conclusion). He is talking about the _influence_ of conscious

> >experience, not the _existence_ of conscious experience, in both

> >cases. And once again, sheesh! <shakes head>

>

> It is part of the same thing: he attempts to break it down and then

> declare that the consciousness is not in the pieces. What is running

> the single node? If it is a recording, then the consciousness was in

> the original and so influences the recording and so influences the

> separate node. No problem at all.

Ignorance is bliss. (You remind me of the meerkat in The Lion King

whose answer to the question "what are those lights in the night sky"

was that they're obviously just fireflies on that big black dome thing

up there. No problem at all.)

> ><snip>

>

> >It's not worth talking about any of the rest of it with you, when you

> >demonstrate such a _fundamental_ misunderstanding of what has been

> >clearly stated on multiple occassions by multiple people now.

>

> >Someone2 sure seems correct about the irrational resistance to such a

> >simple argument. Why don't you just agree, yes, human behavior is

> >influenced by something that is not explained by the present laws of

> >physics; and no, science at at present does not have in-hand a full

> >explanation of subjective/conscious experience. Your (and others')

> >extreme resistance to that simple (and resolving) reply is telling.

>

> Because I disagree with the claim.

Then you are one of the people you asked about at the end of this

post:

http://groups.google.com/group/alt.atheism/msg/7545542a78467760?hl=en&

Just go look in the mirror.

Jeff

July 19, 2007

On Thu, 19 Jul 2007 12:57:06 -0700, in alt.atheism , jientho@aol.com

in <1184875026.743956.105970@57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>On Jul 17, 11:57 am, Matt Silberstein

><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

>> On Thu, 12 Jul 2007 09:19:28 -0700, in alt.atheism , jien...@aol.com

>>

>> in <1184257168.908508.55...@57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>> >On Jul 12, 10:55 am, Matt Silberstein

>> ><RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

>> >> On Thu, 12 Jul 2007 04:21:59 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2

>> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in

>>

>> >> <1184239319.210411.129...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote:

>> >> >On 12 Jul, 05:27, Matt Silberstein

>>

>> ><snip>

>>

>> >> >> Sorry, but my disagreement does not constitute my lack of

>> >> >> understanding.

>>

>> >> >No disagreement doesn't. You have however totally misunderstood. I'm

>> >> >not saying that because a component of X does not have property Y that

>> >> >X does not have property Y.

>>

>> >> Actually you are.

>>

>> >No he isn't; this is part of your misunderstanding.

>>

>> >> You have pointed out that a particular node is not

>> >> conscious and that no node is conscious and then jump to the

>> >> conclusion that no set of nodes can be conscious.

>>

>> >No he hasn't (pointed that out) and no he doesn't (jump to that

>> >conclusion). He is talking about the _influence_ of conscious

>> >experience, not the _existence_ of conscious experience, in both

>> >cases. And once again, sheesh! <shakes head>

>>

>> It is part of the same thing: he attempts to break it down and then

>> declare that the consciousness is not in the pieces. What is running

>> the single node? If it is a recording, then the consciousness was in

>> the original and so influences the recording and so influences the

>> separate node. No problem at all.

>

>Ignorance is bliss. (You remind me of the meerkat in The Lion King

>whose answer to the question "what are those lights in the night sky"

>was that they're obviously just fireflies on that big black dome thing

>up there. No problem at all.)

>

>> ><snip>

>>

>> >It's not worth talking about any of the rest of it with you, when you

>> >demonstrate such a _fundamental_ misunderstanding of what has been

>> >clearly stated on multiple occassions by multiple people now.

>>

>> >Someone2 sure seems correct about the irrational resistance to such a

>> >simple argument. Why don't you just agree, yes, human behavior is

>> >influenced by something that is not explained by the present laws of

>> >physics; and no, science at at present does not have in-hand a full

>> >explanation of subjective/conscious experience. Your (and others')

>> >extreme resistance to that simple (and resolving) reply is telling.

>>

>> Because I disagree with the claim.

>

>Then you are one of the people you asked about at the end of this

>post:

>

>http://groups.google.com/group/alt.atheism/msg/7545542a78467760?hl=en&

>

>Just go look in the mirror.

Sorry, but, no, I do not think that the present laws of physics are

sufficient to explain consciousness. I have explained why so many

times I have lost count. Instead of his straw P1, I propose my Pz1

(pun intended for those who get it, don't bother for those who don't):

Human consciousness is, as far as we can tell or understand or see, a

natural phenomenon. That is, consciousness occurs due to the nature of

the stuff involved. We probably have a pretty good idea of how the

basic stuff work and it is certain that we need to know more about how

stuff works together before we can produce a useful explanation of how

consciousness actually occurs.

See, none of Glenn's straw there.

--

Matt Silberstein

Do something today about the Darfur Genocide

http://www.beawitness.org

http://www.darfurgenocide.org

http://www.savedarfur.org

"Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop"

July 19, 2007

Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nospam@ix.netcom.com> said:

>Human consciousness is, as far as we can tell or understand or see, a

>natural phenomenon. That is, consciousness occurs due to the nature of

>the stuff involved. We probably have a pretty good idea of how the

>basic stuff work and it is certain that we need to know more about how

>stuff works together before we can produce a useful explanation of how

>consciousness actually occurs.

At the worst, this analysis could be self referential, if the stuff is

consciousness itself.

But even if we take consciousness itself to be the stuff of nature. we

end up where we are now.

Some things experienced by this consciousness (and the "things" are

the experiences themselves) seem quite unamenable to the will, and

seem regular. A "physics" can be built up.

Then the quotation marks can be dropped, around physics.

July 20, 2007

On 17 Jul, 00:02, Jim07D7 <Jim0...@nospam.net> wrote: