Guest Denis Loubet Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181091930.182688.105050@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > On 5 Jun, 22:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1181074124.893550.190550@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> > On 5 Jun, 17:12, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >>news:1181044055.576591.170490@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> > On 5 Jun, 04:17, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >>news:1180997004.586680.126950@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 23:27, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >>news:1180992269.825596.105660@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 19:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 16:07, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180915714.304693.138900@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 00:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180903459.945467.317500@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 21:38, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180891870.230456.185600@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 18:27, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180875033.790773.206010@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist page can >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >understand >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Any mechanism which simply followed the known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have its behaviour explained with the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wasn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > conscious (had no subjective experiences). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No. If the mechanism was conscious, then the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> explanation >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> its >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would necessarily include that consciousness. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Which means that whether it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Which is nonsense. The explanation of its >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> necessarily >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> include >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the operation of its consciousness if it was >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Therefore if we were simply a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > about >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences because of their existance. It >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > coincidence that we actually experienced what >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > claimed >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > we >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did, which isn't plausible. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Well, since you obviously don't understand what >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> surprising that you've reached incorrect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusions. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Why would I be required to assume any mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > followed >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the laws of physics was conscious, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Who said you had to? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > why couldn't I explain it simply in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > terms of the physical mechanism following the laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption that it wasn't? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If you fully describe the behavior of the mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism following the laws of physics, then you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> all >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events that contribute to that behavior. If the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness will be included in the description of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Consciousness >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Consciousness >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> just >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> our >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> word that labels a particular VARIETY of physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws of physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > While I you can believe that the mechanism is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > responsible >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective experiences, you avoided explaining why I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > terms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism following the laws of physics, with the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there were no subjective experiences, or could I? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I did not say you couldn't explain the behaviour of the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> assumption that there were no subjective experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> defy >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> point out where I did. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What I DID say is that in explaining the behaviour of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in terms of the physical mechanism following the laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> assumption that there were no subjective experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> necessity, include in that explanation the physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> constitute >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness if they occurred. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Unless, of course, you arbitrarily want to avoid >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> those >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events that constitute consciousness, and affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> leave >> >> >> >> >> >> >> your >> >> >> >> >> >> >> explanation incomplete. You are free to do that. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So you admit, that the behaviour of the mechanism could >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> > explained >> >> >> >> >> >> > with the assumption that it didn't have any subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Sure. But if it did have subjective experiences, those >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences >> >> >> >> >> >> would >> >> >> >> >> >> be >> >> >> >> >> >> included in the explanation in terms of physical >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms >> >> >> >> >> >> following >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> laws of physics. In other words, you could explain the >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> with a >> >> >> >> >> >> rote >> >> >> >> >> >> description of physical events, unaware that you are >> >> >> >> >> >> describing >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences and their effect on behavior, in terms of >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> events. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Can you follow that this being the case, whether it did >> >> >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> > didn't >> >> >> >> >> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> > any subjective experiences couldn't influence the >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour, >> >> >> >> >> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> > did, its behaviour could not be explained without taking >> >> >> >> >> >> > into >> >> >> >> >> >> > account >> >> >> >> >> >> > whether it did or didn't have any subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If it has subjective experiences, then they are part of >> >> >> >> >> >> its >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior, >> >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> any explanation that failed to include them would be >> >> >> >> >> >> incomplete, >> >> >> >> >> >> by >> >> >> >> >> >> definition. >> >> >> >> >> >> > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard as >> >> >> >> >> > responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed there >> >> >> >> >> > were >> >> >> >> >> > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. >> >> >> >> >> >> "Only"? I never suggested that was the only factor that >> >> >> >> >> effects >> >> >> >> >> behavior. >> >> >> >> >> I'm saying that if you want a complete explanation of >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> have >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> account for all factors. >> >> >> >> >> >> And are you attempting to separate subjective experience form >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> mechanism >> >> >> >> >> responsible for it? >> >> >> >> >> >> > No knowledge of >> >> >> >> >> > whether there were any subjective experiences or not would >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> > required. >> >> >> >> >> >> True. >> >> >> >> >> >> > So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced or >> >> >> >> >> > not, >> >> >> >> >> > wouldn't influence the behaviour. >> >> >> >> >> >> Of course it would affect the behavior. Haven't you listened >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> word >> >> >> >> >> I've >> >> >> >> >> said? >> >> >> >> >> >> > So if we were to be regarded as a >> >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> > experiences because they actually existed. >> >> >> >> >> >> Our subjective experiences actually exist as material >> >> >> >> >> patterns >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> brains. >> >> >> >> >> These material patterns affect behavior. Is this impossible >> >> >> >> >> for >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> understand? >> >> >> >> >> >> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would >> >> >> >> >> > object >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> > would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an >> >> >> >> >> > alternative >> >> >> >> >> > universe, which followed the same known laws of physics, >> >> >> >> >> > but >> >> >> >> >> > there >> >> >> >> >> > were no subjective experiences associated with it, it would >> >> >> >> >> > act >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> > same. >> >> >> >> >> >> No. If you disallow the material process of consciousness and >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> experience, then you've obviously got a universe that behaves >> >> >> >> >> differently >> >> >> >> >> from the one we're in. You're trying to violate the principle >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> identity, >> >> >> >> >> which pretty much hoses logic completely. >> >> >> >> >> >> > The objection that if it followed the same known laws of >> >> >> >> >> > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively >> >> >> >> >> > experienced, >> >> >> >> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> > it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the known >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> > physics don't reference subjective experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> We do not note any subjective experiences in the absence of >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> brains. >> >> >> >> >> Thus we are justified in holding the tentative conclusion >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> brains are required for subjective experience. Since we note >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> manipulation of the physical brain produces changes in >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> experience, we are justified in holding the tentative >> >> >> >> >> conclusion >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> subjective experience depends on the arrangement of matter in >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> brain. >> >> >> >> >> >> > thus it is >> >> >> >> >> > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both >> >> >> >> >> > following >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> > experiences and one not, without the need for any of the >> >> >> >> >> > known >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> > of physics to be altered. >> >> >> >> >> >> So this is a "Consciousness of the Gaps" argument? >> >> >> >> >> > Do you accept that you could conceptually due to the known >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> > physics not referencing subjective experiences, have a two >> >> >> >> > universes >> >> >> >> > which both followed the same known laws of physics, and yet >> >> >> >> > in >> >> >> >> > one, >> >> >> >> > a given mechanism gave rise to subjective experiences, and in >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> > other it didn't? >> >> >> >> >> No. >> >> >> >> >> I'm a materialist, and you're asking me to abandon the principle >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> identity. You're asking me to abandon logic. >> >> >> >> >> I will not do so. >> >> >> >> > Sit in denial if you like, >> >> >> >> Thank you, I will keep adhering to logic. >> >> >> >> > but it is conceptually possible to consider >> >> >> > two universes following the same known laws of physics, and yet >> >> >> > one >> >> >> > having subjective experiences and the other not, >> >> >> >> Well, I can conceive of a universe just like this one that doesn't >> >> >> have >> >> >> subjective experiences, but it would be trillions of years further >> >> >> along >> >> >> its >> >> >> timeline where proton decay has finally removed all matter from the >> >> >> universe. No matter, no subjective experiences. >> >> >> >> > because the laws of >> >> >> > physics don't reference whether anything subjectively >> >> >> > experiences. >> >> >> >> How do you know they don't? If you record the actions of all the >> >> >> atoms >> >> >> in >> >> >> my >> >> >> brain, then you'll have a complete record of my subjective >> >> >> experiences >> >> >> if >> >> >> materialism is correct. >> >> >> >> > So >> >> >> > you can sit there not being able to even face thinking about it >> >> >> >> Actually, I just showed I can think about it. It's just stupid. >> >> >> >> > because it would show your whole world perspective to be >> >> >> > implausible, >> >> >> >> You haven't managed to do that yet to anyone's satisfaction. It's >> >> >> just >> >> >> you >> >> >> making an assertion. No one else appears to agree with you. >> >> >> >> > but it seems to me pathetic and cowardly to not be able to face >> >> >> > reason. >> >> >> >> It is pathetic and cowardly not to be able to face reason, is that >> >> >> your >> >> >> excuse? >> >> >> >> > When you feel brave enough, maybe you'll read it again, and >> >> >> > consider the possibility, and how it highlights how you had been >> >> >> > deceived. >> >> >> >> By the same logic, you're terrified by materialism and can't face >> >> >> the >> >> >> truth. >> >> >> >> See how bland assertions don't get you anywhere? >> >> >> > Unlike you, I'm not afraid of following reason though. If you were >> >> > to >> >> > ask me to conceptually consider that God didn't exist for example to >> >> > highlight a point you were making, I wouldn't turn around and reply >> >> > that I couldn't, and that I'd refuse to, as you did about an >> >> > alternative universe which followed the same known laws of physics >> >> > but >> >> > in which there were no subjective experiences. >> >> >> What if I asked you to believe that god did exist and didn't exist at >> >> the >> >> same time? That's the equivalent of what you asked me to do. It's not >> >> that I >> >> don't want to conceive of such things, it's that I can't. Maybe you >> >> can >> >> hold >> >> two mutually contradictory ideas in your head at once and call both >> >> true, >> >> but I can't. I have to respect logic. >> >> >> Besides, I admitted I could conceive of such a universe, and described >> >> how >> >> it would have to be. Another way would be if the universe didn't have >> >> any >> >> matter in it because of a perfectly balanced ratio of matter to >> >> antimatter. >> >> All that's required is that a universe be in such a state that brains >> >> cannot >> >> form. Without brains, you have no consciousness. >> >> >> But you don't like my solution to your little conundrum, so you >> >> pretend I >> >> didn't respond. >> >> >> > I'm sure if it had been >> >> > a thought experiment which could have been used to pose a question >> >> > about how could God exist, then you would have had no problem, but >> >> > because it points out how your world view is implausible, you'd >> >> > rather >> >> > be deaf and blind about the matter, and not even consider it. >> >> >> No. Please acknowledge that I conceived of your stupid universe >> >> scenario. >> >> >> It's you who are unable to conceive of the idea that your scenario >> >> might >> >> be >> >> silly. >> >> >> > You aren't adhering to logic, you are refusing to look at it >> >> > reasonably. >> >> >> You have not shown that to be the case. Until you do, you're just >> >> blabbering. >> >> >> > It isn't as though it couldn't be done, for example if a >> >> > robot behaved >> >> >> What? Universes and robots are equivalent in your mind? >> >> >> > as though it might have subjective experiences, i.e. it >> >> > talked about them etc, you could surely conceive of that either (a) >> >> > it >> >> > did have, or (b) it didn't have. >> >> >> Yes. So what? >> >> >> > In one universe you could conceive of >> >> > it having subjective experiences, in the other that it didn't. >> >> >> You said the universes were the SAME! If they're the same, then >> >> they're >> >> the >> >> same. If one possesses consciousness, then the other one does too. If >> >> one >> >> doesn't, then the other doesn't either. You can't say they're the same >> >> but >> >> different. >> >> >> > In >> >> > either though it would be acting just the same, as in both it would >> >> > simply just be a mechanism following the known laws of physics. >> >> >> In other words, the same but different. Sorry, that violates the >> >> principle >> >> of identity. A cannot equal NOT A. You've cast logic out the window. >> >> >> > The >> >> > same would apply to humans if you were to consider them to be simply >> >> > biological mechanisms following the known laws of physics, even if >> >> > you >> >> > run from logic and reason, when it goes against your unfounded bias. >> >> >> Phrase your question where it does not violate fundamental principle >> >> of >> >> logic and I might entertain it. >> >> > It is simply a case of both universes following the known laws of >> > physics. >> >> Then as far as we know, they're THE SAME! We will expect exactly the same >> behaviors in both. >> >> > There was no need to add other differences to them as you did >> > to avoid facing the issue. >> >> The distant future universe with no matter is not different from ours. >> It's >> exactly the same. Our universe will be exactly that universe. >> >> > Which bit are you finding illogical? >> >> The part where you say something is the same, but different. Logic >> dictates >> that things that are the same CAN'T be different. >> >> If you want to throw out logic, that's fine, but the discussion ends >> there. >> >> > Supposing there was a robot that >> > behaved as though it might be conscious. You could know how it worked, >> > but it wouldn't tell you anything about whether it was subjectively >> > experienced or not. >> >> What? I don't know that. It could easily be that if I knew how it worked, >> I'd know whether it had subjective experiences or not. >> >> > Now in the thought experiment, in one universe it >> > could be considered that it did have subjective experiences, in the >> > other that it did not. >> >> It? What it? The robot? The robot wasn't involved in your universe >> scenario >> until just now. >> >> So the robot works differently in the two universes. Ok...So...? >> >> > By doing so you could see that whether it did >> > or didn't it couldn't affect its behaviour, as in both, it will simply >> > behave the same, i.e. follow the laws of physics, so in fact it isn't >> > only logical, it is a useful tool. >> >> No. It still makes no sense. If the same operation results in >> consciousness >> in one universe, and no consciousness in the other universe, then the >> universes are different. >> >> One would expect different behaviors in different universes with >> different >> laws. >> >> > It shows the implausibility of your >> > world view for starters. >> >> No. It doesn't appear to do that at all. >> >> > Is truthfully so difficult for you, or is it >> > that you can't face applying reason to your perspective? >> >> You have yet to establish that you are speaking truthfully. Or utilizing >> reason. >> > > How would knowing that the behaviour of the robot was explainable in > terms of it following the known laws of physics, give you any > indication of whether it subjectively experienced or not. I didn't say it would. I offered the possibility that it could. YOU are the one making the absolute statement said it wouldn't. Care to back up that assertion? > You seem to > be living in some sci-fi fantasy world. And you don't seem to understand the difference between a speculation and a statement of fact. > Regarding the thought experiment, the robots would both be following > the same known laws of physics. So perhaps you could explain why you > suggest they would act differently. Robots? This is the first time you've suggested more than one robot. You seem to enjoy adding more and more items to your scenarios willy-nilly before we've even settled the original point you're trying to make. Ok, are we talking identical robots in identical universes? Then I suppose they'd behave exactly the same. If we're talking robots that are different in identical universes, then I suppose they'd behave differently. If we're talking identical robots in universes that are different, then I suppose they'd behave differently. And if we're talking robots that are different in universes that are different, I suppose they'd behave differently there too. (Unless there was the unlikely event that the differences cancelled each other out.) I can't think of another permutation. Did I answer your question? It boils down to things that are the same act the same, and things that are different act different. Did you want me to go into some sort of explanation of this conclusion? It seems pretty self explanatory. If, on the other hand, you're back to your "The universes are the same, but magically different" tune, then I have no answer for you, as you've abandoned logic and I can't follow you there. -- Denis Loubet dloubet@io.com http//www.io.com/~dloubet Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181091930.182688.105050@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > How would knowing that the behaviour of the robot was explainable in > terms of it following the known laws of physics, give you any > indication of whether it subjectively experienced or not. You seem to > be living in some sci-fi fantasy world. You're the one with the robots. > Regarding the thought experiment, the robots would both be following > the same known laws of physics. So perhaps you could explain why you > suggest they would act differently. Because they have different inputs .. the subjective experiences. you really are slow on the uptake .. do you usually have problems understanding things? Quote
Guest Ron Baker, Pluralitas! Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "Jeckyl" <noone@nowhere.com> wrote in message news:4664a2ea$1$1184$61c65585@un-2park-reader-01.sydney.pipenetworks.com.au... > "Ron Baker, Pluralitas!" <this@aint.me> wrote in message > news:46641e36$0$4653$4c368faf@roadrunner.com... >> >> "Jeckyl" <noone@nowhere.com> wrote in message >> news:4663dd39$0$1184$61c65585@un-2park-reader-01.sydney.pipenetworks.com.au... >>> "Ron Baker, Pluralitas!" <this@aint.me> wrote in message >>> news:4663ab08$0$30600$4c368faf@roadrunner.com... >>>> >>>> "Jeckyl" <noone@nowhere.com> wrote in message >>>> news:46639f87$0$1183$61c65585@un-2park-reader-01.sydney.pipenetworks.com.au... >>>>> "Ron Baker, Pluralitas!" <this@aint.me> wrote in message >>>>> news:46639616$0$16681$4c368faf@roadrunner.com... >>>>>> >>>>>> "Jeckyl" <noone@nowhere.com> wrote in message >>>>>> news:46638ac0$0$1186$61c65585@un-2park-reader-01.sydney.pipenetworks.com.au... >>>>>>> "someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message >>>>>>> news:1180907578.054811.105110@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >>>>>>>> Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of >>>>>>>> physics >>>>>>>> couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> known laws of physics? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Because the known laws of physics are not complete. >>>>>> >>>>>> The known laws of physics are complete enough to cover >>>>>> everything that happens on Earth. >>>>> >>>>> Not really >>>> >>>> Give examples. >>> >>> Surely you jest.. you expect examples of things that we don't know? >> >> Are you equivocating? >> You can't name something you don't know? > > If I could, then it wouldn't be something i don't know So if you don't know the number of cats in Glasgow you can't say you don't know the number of cats in Glasgow. I'll leave you to converse with 'someone'. You and he are a good match. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 02:33, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181091930.182688.105050@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > > On 5 Jun, 22:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >>news:1181074124.893550.190550@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > >> > On 5 Jun, 17:12, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >>news:1181044055.576591.170490@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> > On 5 Jun, 04:17, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >>news:1180997004.586680.126950@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 23:27, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >>news:1180992269.825596.105660@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 19:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >> >>news:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 16:07, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180915714.304693.138900@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 00:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180903459.945467.317500@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 21:38, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180891870.230456.185600@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 18:27, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180875033.790773.206010@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist page can > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >understand > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Any mechanism which simply followed the known > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have its behaviour explained with the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wasn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > conscious (had no subjective experiences). > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No. If the mechanism was conscious, then the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> explanation > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> its > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would necessarily include that consciousness. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Which means that whether it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Which is nonsense. The explanation of its > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> necessarily > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> include > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the operation of its consciousness if it was > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Therefore if we were simply a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > about > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences because of their existance. It > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > coincidence that we actually experienced what > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > claimed > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > we > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did, which isn't plausible. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Well, since you obviously don't understand what > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it's > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> surprising that you've reached incorrect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusions. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Why would I be required to assume any mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > followed > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the laws of physics was conscious, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Who said you had to? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > why couldn't I explain it simply in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > terms of the physical mechanism following the laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption that it wasn't? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If you fully describe the behavior of the mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism following the laws of physics, then you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> all > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events that contribute to that behavior. If the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness will be included in the description of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of physics. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Consciousness > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of physics. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Consciousness > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> just > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> our > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> word that labels a particular VARIETY of physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> following > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws of physics. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > While I you can believe that the mechanism is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > responsible > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > for > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective experiences, you avoided explaining why I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > couldn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > terms > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism following the laws of physics, with the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there were no subjective experiences, or could I? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I did not say you couldn't explain the behaviour of the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> assumption that there were no subjective experiences, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> defy > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> point out where I did. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What I DID say is that in explaining the behaviour of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in terms of the physical mechanism following the laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> assumption that there were no subjective experiences, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> necessity, include in that explanation the physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> constitute > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness if they occurred. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Unless, of course, you arbitrarily want to avoid > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> those > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events that constitute consciousness, and affect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> leave > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> your > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> explanation incomplete. You are free to do that. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > So you admit, that the behaviour of the mechanism could > >> >> >> >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> > explained > >> >> >> >> >> >> > with the assumption that it didn't have any subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> Sure. But if it did have subjective experiences, those > >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences > >> >> >> >> >> >> would > >> >> >> >> >> >> be > >> >> >> >> >> >> included in the explanation in terms of physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms > >> >> >> >> >> >> following > >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> laws of physics. In other words, you could explain the > >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> with a > >> >> >> >> >> >> rote > >> >> >> >> >> >> description of physical events, unaware that you are > >> >> >> >> >> >> describing > >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences and their effect on behavior, in terms of > >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> events. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > Can you follow that this being the case, whether it did > >> >> >> >> >> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >> > didn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> > have > >> >> >> >> >> >> > any subjective experiences couldn't influence the > >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour, > >> >> >> >> >> >> > for > >> >> >> >> >> >> > if > >> >> >> >> >> >> > it > >> >> >> >> >> >> > did, its behaviour could not be explained without taking > >> >> >> >> >> >> > into > >> >> >> >> >> >> > account > >> >> >> >> >> >> > whether it did or didn't have any subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> If it has subjective experiences, then they are part of > >> >> >> >> >> >> its > >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior, > >> >> >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >> any explanation that failed to include them would be > >> >> >> >> >> >> incomplete, > >> >> >> >> >> >> by > >> >> >> >> >> >> definition. > > >> >> >> >> >> > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard as > >> >> >> >> >> > responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed there > >> >> >> >> >> > were > >> >> >> >> >> > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. > > >> >> >> >> >> "Only"? I never suggested that was the only factor that > >> >> >> >> >> effects > >> >> >> >> >> behavior. > >> >> >> >> >> I'm saying that if you want a complete explanation of > >> >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> have > >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> account for all factors. > > >> >> >> >> >> And are you attempting to separate subjective experience form > >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> responsible for it? > > >> >> >> >> >> > No knowledge of > >> >> >> >> >> > whether there were any subjective experiences or not would > >> >> >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> >> > required. > > >> >> >> >> >> True. > > >> >> >> >> >> > So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced or > >> >> >> >> >> > not, > >> >> >> >> >> > wouldn't influence the behaviour. > > >> >> >> >> >> Of course it would affect the behavior. Haven't you listened > >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> word > >> >> >> >> >> I've > >> >> >> >> >> said? > > >> >> >> >> >> > So if we were to be regarded as a > >> >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our > >> >> >> >> >> > subjective > >> >> >> >> >> > experiences because they actually existed. > > >> >> >> >> >> Our subjective experiences actually exist as material > >> >> >> >> >> patterns > >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> brains. > >> >> >> >> >> These material patterns affect behavior. Is this impossible > >> >> >> >> >> for > >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> understand? > > >> >> >> >> >> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would > >> >> >> >> >> > object > >> >> >> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> >> > it > >> >> >> >> >> > would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an > >> >> >> >> >> > alternative > >> >> >> >> >> > universe, which followed the same known laws of physics, > >> >> >> >> >> > but > >> >> >> >> >> > there > >> >> >> >> >> > were no subjective experiences associated with it, it would > >> >> >> >> >> > act > >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> > same. > > >> >> >> >> >> No. If you disallow the material process of consciousness and > >> >> >> >> >> subjective > >> >> >> >> >> experience, then you've obviously got a universe that behaves > >> >> >> >> >> differently > >> >> >> >> >> from the one we're in. You're trying to violate the principle > >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> identity, > >> >> >> >> >> which pretty much hoses logic completely. > > >> >> >> >> >> > The objection that if it followed the same known laws of > >> >> >> >> >> > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively > >> >> >> >> >> > experienced, > >> >> >> >> >> > if > >> >> >> >> >> > it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the known > >> >> >> >> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> > physics don't reference subjective experiences, > > >> >> >> >> >> We do not note any subjective experiences in the absence of > >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> brains. > >> >> >> >> >> Thus we are justified in holding the tentative conclusion > >> >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> brains are required for subjective experience. Since we note > >> >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> >> manipulation of the physical brain produces changes in > >> >> >> >> >> subjective > >> >> >> >> >> experience, we are justified in holding the tentative > >> >> >> >> >> conclusion > >> >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> >> subjective experience depends on the arrangement of matter in > >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> brain. > > >> >> >> >> >> > thus it is > >> >> >> >> >> > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both > >> >> >> >> >> > following > >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having > >> >> >> >> >> > subjective > >> >> >> >> >> > experiences and one not, without the need for any of the > >> >> >> >> >> > known > >> >> >> >> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> > of physics to be altered. > > >> >> >> >> >> So this is a "Consciousness of the Gaps" argument? > > >> >> >> >> > Do you accept that you could conceptually due to the known > >> >> >> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> > physics not referencing subjective experiences, have a two > >> >> >> >> > universes > >> >> >> >> > which both followed the same known laws of physics, and yet > >> >> >> >> > in > >> >> >> >> > one, > >> >> >> >> > a given mechanism gave rise to subjective experiences, and in > >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> > other it didn't? > > >> >> >> >> No. > > >> >> >> >> I'm a materialist, and you're asking me to abandon the principle > >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> identity. You're asking me to abandon logic. > > >> >> >> >> I will not do so. > > >> >> >> > Sit in denial if you like, > > >> >> >> Thank you, I will keep adhering to logic. > > >> >> >> > but it is conceptually possible to consider > >> >> >> > two universes following the same known laws of physics, and yet > >> >> >> > one > >> >> >> > having subjective experiences and the other not, > > >> >> >> Well, I can conceive of a universe just like this one that doesn't > >> >> >> have > >> >> >> subjective experiences, but it would be trillions of years further > >> >> >> along > >> >> >> its > >> >> >> timeline where proton decay has finally removed all matter from the > >> >> >> universe. No matter, no subjective experiences. > > >> >> >> > because the laws of > >> >> >> > physics don't reference whether anything subjectively > >> >> >> > experiences. > > >> >> >> How do you know they don't? If you record the actions of all the > >> >> >> atoms > >> >> >> in > >> >> >> my > >> >> >> brain, then you'll have a complete record of my subjective > >> >> >> experiences > >> >> >> if > >> >> >> materialism is correct. > > >> >> >> > So > >> >> >> > you can sit there not being able to even face thinking about it > > >> >> >> Actually, I just showed I can think about it. It's just stupid. > > >> >> >> > because it would show your whole world perspective to be > >> >> >> > implausible, > > >> >> >> You haven't managed to do that yet to anyone's satisfaction. It's > >> >> >> just > >> >> >> you > >> >> >> making an assertion. No one else appears to agree with you. > > >> >> >> > but it seems to me pathetic and cowardly to not be able to face > >> >> >> > reason. > > >> >> >> It is pathetic and cowardly not to be able to face reason, is that > >> >> >> your > >> >> >> excuse? > > >> >> >> > When you feel brave enough, maybe you'll read it again, and > >> >> >> > consider the possibility, and how it highlights how you had been > >> >> >> > deceived. > > >> >> >> By the same logic, you're terrified by materialism and can't face > >> >> >> the > >> >> >> truth. > > >> >> >> See how bland assertions don't get you anywhere? > > >> >> > Unlike you, I'm not afraid of following reason though. If you were > >> >> > to > >> >> > ask me to conceptually consider that God didn't exist for example to > >> >> > highlight a point you were making, I wouldn't turn around and reply > >> >> > that I couldn't, and that I'd refuse to, as you did about an > >> >> > alternative universe which followed the same known laws of physics > >> >> > but > >> >> > in which there were no subjective experiences. > > >> >> What if I asked you to believe that god did exist and didn't exist at > >> >> the > >> >> same time? That's the equivalent of what you asked me to do. It's not > >> >> that I > >> >> don't want to conceive of such things, it's that I can't. Maybe you > >> >> can > >> >> hold > >> >> two mutually contradictory ideas in your head at once and call both > >> >> true, > >> >> but I can't. I have to respect logic. > > >> >> Besides, I admitted I could conceive of such a universe, and described > >> >> how > >> >> it would have to be. Another way would be if the universe didn't have > >> >> any > >> >> matter in it because of a perfectly balanced ratio of matter to > >> >> antimatter. > >> >> All that's required is that a universe be in such a state that brains > >> >> cannot > >> >> form. Without brains, you have no consciousness. > > >> >> But you don't like my solution to your little conundrum, so you > >> >> pretend I > >> >> didn't respond. > > >> >> > I'm sure if it had been > >> >> > a thought experiment which could have been used to pose a question > >> >> > about how could God exist, then you would have had no problem, but > >> >> > because it points out how your world view is implausible, you'd > >> >> > rather > >> >> > be deaf and blind about the matter, and not even consider it. > > >> >> No. Please acknowledge that I conceived of your stupid universe > >> >> scenario. > > >> >> It's you who are unable to conceive of the idea that your scenario > >> >> might > >> >> be > >> >> silly. > > >> >> > You aren't adhering to logic, you are refusing to look at it > >> >> > reasonably. > > >> >> You have not shown that to be the case. Until you do, you're just > >> >> blabbering. > > >> >> > It isn't as though it couldn't be done, for example if a > >> >> > robot behaved > > >> >> What? Universes and robots are equivalent in your mind? > > >> >> > as though it might have subjective experiences, i.e. it > >> >> > talked about them etc, you could surely conceive of that either (a) > >> >> > it > >> >> > did have, or (b) it didn't have. > > >> >> Yes. So what? > > >> >> > In one universe you could conceive of > >> >> > it having subjective experiences, in the other that it didn't. > > >> >> You said the universes were the SAME! If they're the same, then > >> >> they're > >> >> the > >> >> same. If one possesses consciousness, then the other one does too. If > >> >> one > >> >> doesn't, then the other doesn't either. You can't say they're the same > >> >> but > >> >> different. > > >> >> > In > >> >> > either though it would be acting just the same, as in both it would > >> >> > simply just be a mechanism following the known laws of physics. > > >> >> In other words, the same but different. Sorry, that violates the > >> >> principle > >> >> of identity. A cannot equal NOT A. You've cast logic out the window. > > >> >> > The > >> >> > same would apply to humans if you were to consider them to be simply > >> >> > biological mechanisms following the known laws of physics, even if > >> >> > you > >> >> > run from logic and reason, when it goes against your unfounded bias. > > >> >> Phrase your question where it does not violate fundamental principle > >> >> of > >> >> logic and I might entertain it. > > >> > It is simply a case of both universes following the known laws of > >> > physics. > > >> Then as far as we know, they're THE SAME! We will expect exactly the same > >> behaviors in both. > > >> > There was no need to add other differences to them as you did > >> > to avoid facing the issue. > > >> The distant future universe with no matter is not different from ours. > >> It's > >> exactly the same. Our universe will be exactly that universe. > > >> > Which bit are you finding illogical? > > >> The part where you say something is the same, but different. Logic > >> dictates > >> that things that are the same CAN'T be different. > > >> If you want to throw out logic, that's fine, but the discussion ends > >> there. > > >> > Supposing there was a robot that > >> > behaved as though it might be conscious. You could know how it worked, > >> > but it wouldn't tell you anything about whether it was subjectively > >> > experienced or not. > > >> What? I don't know that. It could easily be that if I knew how it worked, > >> I'd know whether it had subjective experiences or not. > > >> > Now in the thought experiment, in one universe it > >> > could be considered that it did have subjective experiences, in the > >> > other that it did not. > > >> It? What it? The robot? The robot wasn't involved in your universe > >> scenario > >> until just now. > > >> So the robot works differently in the two universes. Ok...So...? > > >> > By doing so you could see that whether it did > >> > or didn't it couldn't affect its behaviour, as in both, it will simply > >> > behave the same, i.e. follow the laws of physics, so in fact it isn't > >> > only logical, it is a useful tool. > > >> No. It still makes no sense. If the same operation results in > >> consciousness > >> in one universe, and no consciousness in the other universe, then the > >> universes are different. > > >> One would expect different behaviors in different universes with > >> different > >> laws. > > >> > It shows the implausibility of your > >> > world view for starters. > > >> No. It doesn't appear to do that at all. > > >> > Is truthfully so difficult for you, or is it > >> > that you can't face applying reason to your perspective? > > >> You have yet to establish that you are speaking truthfully. Or utilizing > >> reason. > > > How would knowing that the behaviour of the robot was explainable in > > terms of it following the known laws of physics, give you any > > indication of whether it subjectively experienced or not. > > I didn't say it would. I offered the possibility that it could. YOU are the > one making the absolute statement said it wouldn't. > > Care to back up that assertion? > > > You seem to > > be living in some sci-fi fantasy world. > > And you don't seem to understand the difference between a speculation and a > statement of fact. > > > Regarding the thought experiment, the robots would both be following > > the same known laws of physics. So perhaps you could explain why you > > suggest they would act differently. > > Robots? This is the first time you've suggested more than one robot. You > seem to enjoy adding more and more items to your scenarios willy-nilly > before we've even settled the original point you're trying to make. > > Ok, are we talking identical robots in identical universes? Then I suppose > they'd behave exactly the same. > > If we're talking robots that are different in identical universes, then I > suppose they'd behave differently. > > If we're talking identical robots in universes that are different, then I > suppose they'd behave differently. > > And if we're talking robots that are different in universes that are > different, I suppose they'd behave differently there too. (Unless there was > the unlikely event that the differences cancelled each other out.) > > I can't think of another permutation. Did I answer your question? It boils > down to things that are the same act the same, and things that are different > act different. Did you want me to go into some sort of explanation of this > conclusion? It seems pretty self explanatory. > > If, on the other hand, you're back to your "The universes are the same, but > magically different" tune, then I have no answer for you, as you've > abandoned logic and I can't follow you there. > Well there are two universes, and a robot in each, so how is it the first time it was mentioned that there were two of them? The universes are the same in regards to the known laws of physics. In case you weren't aware, the laws of physics don't touch on the subject of whether anything is subjectively experienced or not. Therefore you could conceptually have two universes, which both follow the same laws of physics, and yet in one, the mechanism had no subjective experiences, and the other it did. So no the universes wouldn't be identical, they would simply both follow the known laws of physics. Regarding the question, how would knowing that the behaviour of the robot was explainable in terms of it following the known laws of physics, give you any indication of whether it subjectively experienced or not, you didn't answer it. As for backing up the assertion, well it is backed up by the fact that there would be no indication, and that neither you nor any materialist experiencing the physical world could point to one. Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: ------------- I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program "Philosophy Talk". Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to look at it, and there are two scenarios: 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's happening, more or less. 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's happening, more or less. Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves consciousness? ------------- To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did because it had subjective experiences? Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism following the known laws of physics. So its behaviour, if you still chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective experiences. Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. They in themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the behaviour. The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. As I've said, you seem to having problems facing this point, but it is a fact regarding the known laws of physics nevertheless. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "Ron Baker, Pluralitas!" <this@aint.me> wrote in message news:4666153e$0$16659$4c368faf@roadrunner.com... >> If I could, then it wouldn't be something i don't know > > So if you don't know the number of cats in Glasgow > you can't say you don't know the number of > cats in Glasgow. So .. you claim that science knows everything .. so you'd better call up all the scientists out there andtell them they are out of jobs. If you want to know what things we don't know .. ask the scientist who are inestigating those areas. Do we know the one-way speed of light and that it is isotropic? Do we know gravitons exist? > I'll leave you to converse with 'someone'. You and > he are a good match. Nasty insult there. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 4 Jun, 18:47, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: > someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote innews:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com: > > > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard as > > responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed there were > > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. No knowledge of > > whether there were any subjective experiences or not would be > > required. > > Whether or not the mechanism did in fact have subjective experiences, > knowledge of that fact by an external observer would not be necessary to > explain the operation of the mechanism in terms of the physical > structure of the mechanism. However, the fact that the mechanism does > have subjective experiences is part of the operation of that mechanism > and therefore does influence the behavior of the mechanism. > > > So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced or not, > > wouldn't influence the behaviour. So if we were to be regarded as a > > biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our subjective > > experiences because they actually existed. > > Wrong. The external observer does not know the content of the > mechanism's subjective experience, but the fact that the mechanism has > such an experience is part of the operation of the mechanism. > > > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object that it > > would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an alternative > > universe, which followed the same known laws of physics, but there > > were no subjective experiences associated with it, it would act the > > same. > > There is a contradiction here. Either your alternate universe does not > follow the same laws of physics or the mechanism itself is not identical > in structure or operation. > > > The objection that if it followed the same known laws of > > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively experienced, if > > it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the known laws of > > physics don't reference subjective experiences, thus it is > > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both following the > > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having subjective > > experiences and one not, without the need for any of the known laws > > of physics to be altered. > > The laws of physics don't have to reference subjective experience. The > subjective experience is, by definition of the problem, entailed by the > structure of certain mechanisms. > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: ------------- I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program "Philosophy Talk". Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to ook at it, and there are two scenarios: 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's happening, more or less. 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's happening, more or less. Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves consciousness? ------------- To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did because it had subjective experiences? Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism following the known laws of physics. So its behaviour, if you still chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective experiences. Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism ollowing the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. They in themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the behaviour. The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. Though your point is taken, that if it was just a coincidence, then it would be, though my counter point is as I have said that it is implausible that it is just a coincidence that we have the subjective experiences our behaviour expresses, and that in reality our behaviour of us talking about them, was uninfluenced by their existance. With regards to the universe scenario, there is no contradiction, it is simply that they both follow the same laws of physics that are known to us, which as you acknowledge, don't reference whether anything is subjectively experienced or not, allowing for in one the mechanism to be subjectively experienced, in the other it not. It is simply a device to illustrate the same point that is I have made above in this response. Quote
Guest Richo Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On Jun 5, 1:18 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 5 Jun, 02:23, Matt Silberstein > > > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > On Mon, 04 Jun 2007 17:16:13 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > <1181002573.602439.47...@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > [snip] > > > >Sorry, I hadn't written it clearly enough. > > > >Do do you accept that conceptually the behaviour of any mechanism > > >following the known laws of physics could be explained in terms of the > > >physical mechanism > > >following the known laws of physics, and that this will not reference > > >whether there are any associated subjective experiences or not? > > > Sorry but that still seems to assume that subjective experience either > > does not exist or is not a physical phenomenon. If subjective > > experience is a physical phenomenon then our explanations will > > reference that experience. Perhaps the problem you have with wording > > this is that you have some bad assumptions. > > It doesn't make any assumptions. It is a fact that the known laws of > physics don't reference subjective experiences. >So it is a fact that > the behaviour of any mechanism following the known laws of physics can > be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the said > laws, "Can be" means it is possible. That is not the same as saying Matt or anyone alive can do it right now - it just says its possible. You are apparently saying it is not possible. How do you know it is not possible? No one has done it so far. There are still areas of science for which we do not know the whole story - which is good - there is still something for science to do. > and as they don't reference whether there are any associated > subjective experiences, the explanation won't reference whether there > are any associated subjective experiences. > We haven't got the explanation in front of us - so we cannot say what it looks like. You are speculating that IF we ever get a complete explanation of the phenomenon of consciousness in purely physical terms then it will not refer to the subjective experiences. This is a hypothetical and also it seems to me that if it did not account for the subjective experiences it would not qualify as "complete". You are really saying that any incomplete explanation of conscious experience would exclude the subjective. I would agree with that. > Since it is obvious you can't deny that the behaviour of any mechanism > following the known laws of physics can conceptually be explained in > terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, I dont deny that t is possible - such an explanation my not exist for another 500 years. > are you denying that it is a fact that the known laws of physics don't > reference whether there are any associated subjective experiences? The laws of physics don't reference the existence of vanilla ice cream - but that does not imply that anything about the existence of vanilla ice cream is in conflict with the laws of physics. Mark. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 03:29, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > On Jun 5, 1:18 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 5 Jun, 02:23, Matt Silberstein > > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > On Mon, 04 Jun 2007 17:16:13 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > <1181002573.602439.47...@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > [snip] > > > > >Sorry, I hadn't written it clearly enough. > > > > >Do do you accept that conceptually the behaviour of any mechanism > > > >following the known laws of physics could be explained in terms of the > > > >physical mechanism > > > >following the known laws of physics, and that this will not reference > > > >whether there are any associated subjective experiences or not? > > > > Sorry but that still seems to assume that subjective experience either > > > does not exist or is not a physical phenomenon. If subjective > > > experience is a physical phenomenon then our explanations will > > > reference that experience. Perhaps the problem you have with wording > > > this is that you have some bad assumptions. > > > It doesn't make any assumptions. It is a fact that the known laws of > > physics don't reference subjective experiences. > >So it is a fact that > > the behaviour of any mechanism following the known laws of physics can > > be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the said > > laws, > > "Can be" means it is possible. > That is not the same as saying Matt or anyone alive can do it right > now - it just says its possible. > You are apparently saying it is not possible. > How do you know it is not possible? > > No one has done it so far. > There are still areas of science for which we do not know the whole > story - which is good - there is still something for science to do. > > > and as they don't reference whether there are any associated > > subjective experiences, the explanation won't reference whether there > > are any associated subjective experiences. > > We haven't got the explanation in front of us - so we cannot say what > it looks like. > You are speculating that IF we ever get a complete explanation of the > phenomenon of consciousness in purely physical terms then it will not > refer to the subjective experiences. > This is a hypothetical and also it seems to me that if it did not > account for the subjective experiences it would not qualify as > "complete". > You are really saying that any incomplete explanation of conscious > experience would exclude the subjective. > I would agree with that. > > > Since it is obvious you can't deny that the behaviour of any mechanism > > following the known laws of physics can conceptually be explained in > > terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, > > I dont deny that t is possible - such an explanation my not exist > for another 500 years. > > > are you denying that it is a fact that the known laws of physics don't > > reference whether there are any associated subjective experiences? > > The laws of physics don't reference the existence of vanilla ice > cream - but that does not imply that anything about the existence of > vanilla ice cream is in conflict with the laws of physics. > I'm not sure what you are suggesting I am saying is impossible. The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: ------------- I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program "Philosophy Talk". Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to ook at it, and there are two scenarios: 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's happening, more or less. 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's happening, more or less. Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves consciousness? ------------- To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that if I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did because it had subjective experiences? Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism following the known laws of physics. So its behaviour, if you still chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective experiences. Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism ollowing the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. They in themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the behaviour). The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181096859.045313.216360@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > On 4 Jun, 18:47, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> innews:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com: >> >> > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard as >> > responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed there were >> > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. No knowledge of >> > whether there were any subjective experiences or not would be >> > required. >> >> Whether or not the mechanism did in fact have subjective experiences, >> knowledge of that fact by an external observer would not be necessary to >> explain the operation of the mechanism in terms of the physical >> structure of the mechanism. However, the fact that the mechanism does >> have subjective experiences is part of the operation of that mechanism >> and therefore does influence the behavior of the mechanism. >> >> > So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced or not, >> > wouldn't influence the behaviour. So if we were to be regarded as a >> > biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our subjective >> > experiences because they actually existed. >> >> Wrong. The external observer does not know the content of the >> mechanism's subjective experience, but the fact that the mechanism has >> such an experience is part of the operation of the mechanism. >> >> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object that it >> > would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an alternative >> > universe, which followed the same known laws of physics, but there >> > were no subjective experiences associated with it, it would act the >> > same. >> >> There is a contradiction here. Either your alternate universe does not >> follow the same laws of physics or the mechanism itself is not identical >> in structure or operation. >> >> > The objection that if it followed the same known laws of >> > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively experienced, if >> > it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the known laws of >> > physics don't reference subjective experiences, thus it is >> > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both following the >> > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having subjective >> > experiences and one not, without the need for any of the known laws >> > of physics to be altered. >> >> The laws of physics don't have to reference subjective experience. The >> subjective experience is, by definition of the problem, entailed by the >> structure of certain mechanisms. >> > > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: > > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: > > ------------- > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program > "Philosophy Talk". > > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to ook > at it, and there are two scenarios: > > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's > happening, more or less. > > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where > it's happening, more or less. > > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. > > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves > consciousness? > ------------- > > > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, Really .. where is this robot? > and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I > explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what > basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did > because it had subjective experiences? On what basis would you think that it was NOT acting because it had subjective experiences > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism > following the known laws of physics. Ofcourse it would make a difference, unless you claim that subjective experiences do not influence behaviour. > So its behaviour, if you still > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be > said to be influenced by them, Yes, it could > as it would be expected to act the same > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective > experiences. So are you saying that if you can make a mechanism that emulates the same behaviour as subjective experiences, then that proves that subjective experiences are not a mechanism. That's utter nonsense > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism ollowing > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. No. We do behave the way we do and we do have subjective experiences and we are biological mechanisms. You've not proven otherwise. [snip same old tripe] > With regards to the universe scenario, there is no contradiction, it > is simply that they both follow the same laws of physics that are > known to us, which as you acknowledge, don't reference whether > anything is subjectively experienced or not, allowing for in one the > mechanism to be subjectively experienced, in the other it not. It is > simply a device to illustrate the same point that is I have made above > in this response. You have made no points at all .. you just keep stating tautologies .. and are too cowardly to address that fact despite my numerous replies to you. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 03:49, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181096859.045313.216360@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > > > > > > > On 4 Jun, 18:47, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: > >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > >> innews:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com: > > >> > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard as > >> > responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed there were > >> > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. No knowledge of > >> > whether there were any subjective experiences or not would be > >> > required. > > >> Whether or not the mechanism did in fact have subjective experiences, > >> knowledge of that fact by an external observer would not be necessary to > >> explain the operation of the mechanism in terms of the physical > >> structure of the mechanism. However, the fact that the mechanism does > >> have subjective experiences is part of the operation of that mechanism > >> and therefore does influence the behavior of the mechanism. > > >> > So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced or not, > >> > wouldn't influence the behaviour. So if we were to be regarded as a > >> > biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our subjective > >> > experiences because they actually existed. > > >> Wrong. The external observer does not know the content of the > >> mechanism's subjective experience, but the fact that the mechanism has > >> such an experience is part of the operation of the mechanism. > > >> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object that it > >> > would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an alternative > >> > universe, which followed the same known laws of physics, but there > >> > were no subjective experiences associated with it, it would act the > >> > same. > > >> There is a contradiction here. Either your alternate universe does not > >> follow the same laws of physics or the mechanism itself is not identical > >> in structure or operation. > > >> > The objection that if it followed the same known laws of > >> > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively experienced, if > >> > it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the known laws of > >> > physics don't reference subjective experiences, thus it is > >> > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both following the > >> > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having subjective > >> > experiences and one not, without the need for any of the known laws > >> > of physics to be altered. > > >> The laws of physics don't have to reference subjective experience. The > >> subjective experience is, by definition of the problem, entailed by the > >> structure of certain mechanisms. > > > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: > > > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: > > > ------------- > > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program > > "Philosophy Talk". > > > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy > > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to ook > > at it, and there are two scenarios: > > > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft > > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and > > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a > > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does > > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's > > happening, more or less. > > > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard > > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and > > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a > > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how > > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where > > it's happening, more or less. > > > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is > > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? > > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. > > > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering > > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on > > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in > > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we > > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves > > consciousness? > > ------------- > > > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > > I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, > > Really .. where is this robot? > > > and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I > > explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the > > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what > > basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did > > because it had subjective experiences? > > On what basis would you think that it was NOT acting because it had > subjective experiences > > > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any > > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism > > following the known laws of physics. > > Ofcourse it would make a difference, unless you claim that subjective > experiences do not influence behaviour. > > > So its behaviour, if you still > > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be > > said to be influenced by them, > > Yes, it could > > > as it would be expected to act the same > > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective > > experiences. > > So are you saying that if you can make a mechanism that emulates the same > behaviour as subjective experiences, then that proves that subjective > experiences are not a mechanism. > > That's utter nonsense > > > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism ollowing > > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > No. We do behave the way we do and we do have subjective experiences and we > are biological mechanisms. > > You've not proven otherwise. > > [snip same old tripe] > > > With regards to the universe scenario, there is no contradiction, it > > is simply that they both follow the same laws of physics that are > > known to us, which as you acknowledge, don't reference whether > > anything is subjectively experienced or not, allowing for in one the > > mechanism to be subjectively experienced, in the other it not. It is > > simply a device to illustrate the same point that is I have made above > > in this response. > > You have made no points at all .. you just keep stating tautologies .. and > are too cowardly to address that fact despite my numerous replies to you. > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: ------------- I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program "Philosophy Talk". Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to look at it, and there are two scenarios: 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's happening, more or less. 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's happening, more or less. Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves consciousness? ------------- To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that if I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did because it had subjective experiences? Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism following the known laws of physics. So its behaviour, if you still chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective experiences. Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. They in themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the behaviour). The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181097252.112756.247420@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > On 6 Jun, 03:29, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: >> The laws of physics don't reference the existence of vanilla ice >> cream - but that does not imply that anything about the existence of >> vanilla ice cream is in conflict with the laws of physics. > > I'm not sure what you are suggesting I am saying is impossible. You said the laws of physics did not reference subjective experiences. And tried to imply from that that any mechanism that follows the laws of physics cannot be influenced by subjective experiences. The counter example there is vanilla icrecrease ..physics does not reference vanilla iscream, yet the mechanism that discpences vanillar icrcream follow the laws of physics. > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: You're creating strawmen here. You've done nothing but express the same tautologies over and over, and made unfounded and incorrect assertions. [snip same rubbish as you've posted before and has been addressed before] Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181098347.552992.235120@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > On 6 Jun, 03:49, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> news:1181096859.045313.216360@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... >> > On 4 Jun, 18:47, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> innews:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com: >> >> >> > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard as >> >> > responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed there were >> >> > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. No knowledge of >> >> > whether there were any subjective experiences or not would be >> >> > required. >> >> >> Whether or not the mechanism did in fact have subjective experiences, >> >> knowledge of that fact by an external observer would not be necessary >> >> to >> >> explain the operation of the mechanism in terms of the physical >> >> structure of the mechanism. However, the fact that the mechanism >> >> does >> >> have subjective experiences is part of the operation of that mechanism >> >> and therefore does influence the behavior of the mechanism. >> >> >> > So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced or not, >> >> > wouldn't influence the behaviour. So if we were to be regarded as a >> >> > biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our subjective >> >> > experiences because they actually existed. >> >> >> Wrong. The external observer does not know the content of the >> >> mechanism's subjective experience, but the fact that the mechanism has >> >> such an experience is part of the operation of the mechanism. >> >> >> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object that >> >> > it >> >> > would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an >> >> > alternative >> >> > universe, which followed the same known laws of physics, but there >> >> > were no subjective experiences associated with it, it would act the >> >> > same. >> >> >> There is a contradiction here. Either your alternate universe does not >> >> follow the same laws of physics or the mechanism itself is not >> >> identical >> >> in structure or operation. >> >> >> > The objection that if it followed the same known laws of >> >> > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively experienced, if >> >> > it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the known laws of >> >> > physics don't reference subjective experiences, thus it is >> >> > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both following the >> >> > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having subjective >> >> > experiences and one not, without the need for any of the known >> >> > laws >> >> > of physics to be altered. >> >> >> The laws of physics don't have to reference subjective experience. The >> >> subjective experience is, by definition of the problem, entailed by >> >> the >> >> structure of certain mechanisms. >> >> > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: >> >> > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: >> >> > ------------- >> > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program >> > "Philosophy Talk". >> >> > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy >> > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to ook >> > at it, and there are two scenarios: >> >> > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft >> > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and >> > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a >> > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does >> > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's >> > happening, more or less. >> >> > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard >> > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and >> > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a >> > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how >> > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where >> > it's happening, more or less. >> >> > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is >> > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? >> > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. >> >> > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering >> > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on >> > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in >> > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we >> > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves >> > consciousness? >> > ------------- >> >> > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that >> > I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, >> >> Really .. where is this robot? >> >> > and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, >> > I >> > explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the >> > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what >> > basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did >> > because it had subjective experiences? >> >> On what basis would you think that it was NOT acting because it had >> subjective experiences >> >> > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any >> > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism >> > following the known laws of physics. >> >> Ofcourse it would make a difference, unless you claim that subjective >> experiences do not influence behaviour. >> >> > So its behaviour, if you still >> > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be >> > said to be influenced by them, >> >> Yes, it could >> >> > as it would be expected to act the same >> > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective >> > experiences. >> >> So are you saying that if you can make a mechanism that emulates the same >> behaviour as subjective experiences, then that proves that subjective >> experiences are not a mechanism. >> >> That's utter nonsense >> >> > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism ollowing >> > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way >> > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. >> >> No. We do behave the way we do and we do have subjective experiences and >> we >> are biological mechanisms. >> >> You've not proven otherwise. >> >> [snip same old tripe] >> >> > With regards to the universe scenario, there is no contradiction, it >> > is simply that they both follow the same laws of physics that are >> > known to us, which as you acknowledge, don't reference whether >> > anything is subjectively experienced or not, allowing for in one the >> > mechanism to be subjectively experienced, in the other it not. It is >> > simply a device to illustrate the same point that is I have made above >> > in this response. >> >> You have made no points at all .. you just keep stating tautologies .. >> and >> are too cowardly to address that fact despite my numerous replies to you. > > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: Coward. You refuse to address my point and soimply post the same thing that I JUST REPONSED TOO VERBATIM. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 04:06, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181098347.552992.235120@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > > > > > > On 6 Jun, 03:49, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > >>news:1181096859.045313.216360@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > >> > On 4 Jun, 18:47, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: > >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > >> >> innews:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com: > > >> >> > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard as > >> >> > responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed there were > >> >> > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. No knowledge of > >> >> > whether there were any subjective experiences or not would be > >> >> > required. > > >> >> Whether or not the mechanism did in fact have subjective experiences, > >> >> knowledge of that fact by an external observer would not be necessary > >> >> to > >> >> explain the operation of the mechanism in terms of the physical > >> >> structure of the mechanism. However, the fact that the mechanism > >> >> does > >> >> have subjective experiences is part of the operation of that mechanism > >> >> and therefore does influence the behavior of the mechanism. > > >> >> > So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced or not, > >> >> > wouldn't influence the behaviour. So if we were to be regarded as a > >> >> > biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our subjective > >> >> > experiences because they actually existed. > > >> >> Wrong. The external observer does not know the content of the > >> >> mechanism's subjective experience, but the fact that the mechanism has > >> >> such an experience is part of the operation of the mechanism. > > >> >> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object that > >> >> > it > >> >> > would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an > >> >> > alternative > >> >> > universe, which followed the same known laws of physics, but there > >> >> > were no subjective experiences associated with it, it would act the > >> >> > same. > > >> >> There is a contradiction here. Either your alternate universe does not > >> >> follow the same laws of physics or the mechanism itself is not > >> >> identical > >> >> in structure or operation. > > >> >> > The objection that if it followed the same known laws of > >> >> > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively experienced, if > >> >> > it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the known laws of > >> >> > physics don't reference subjective experiences, thus it is > >> >> > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both following the > >> >> > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having subjective > >> >> > experiences and one not, without the need for any of the known > >> >> > laws > >> >> > of physics to be altered. > > >> >> The laws of physics don't have to reference subjective experience. The > >> >> subjective experience is, by definition of the problem, entailed by > >> >> the > >> >> structure of certain mechanisms. > > >> > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: > > >> > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: > > >> > ------------- > >> > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program > >> > "Philosophy Talk". > > >> > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy > >> > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to ook > >> > at it, and there are two scenarios: > > >> > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft > >> > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and > >> > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a > >> > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does > >> > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's > >> > happening, more or less. > > >> > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard > >> > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and > >> > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a > >> > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how > >> > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where > >> > it's happening, more or less. > > >> > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is > >> > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? > >> > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. > > >> > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering > >> > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on > >> > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in > >> > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we > >> > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves > >> > consciousness? > >> > ------------- > > >> > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > >> > I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, > > >> Really .. where is this robot? > > >> > and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, > >> > I > >> > explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the > >> > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what > >> > basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did > >> > because it had subjective experiences? > > >> On what basis would you think that it was NOT acting because it had > >> subjective experiences > > >> > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any > >> > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism > >> > following the known laws of physics. > > >> Ofcourse it would make a difference, unless you claim that subjective > >> experiences do not influence behaviour. > > >> > So its behaviour, if you still > >> > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be > >> > said to be influenced by them, > > >> Yes, it could > > >> > as it would be expected to act the same > >> > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective > >> > experiences. > > >> So are you saying that if you can make a mechanism that emulates the same > >> behaviour as subjective experiences, then that proves that subjective > >> experiences are not a mechanism. > > >> That's utter nonsense > > >> > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism ollowing > >> > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > >> > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > >> No. We do behave the way we do and we do have subjective experiences and > >> we > >> are biological mechanisms. > > >> You've not proven otherwise. > > >> [snip same old tripe] > > >> > With regards to the universe scenario, there is no contradiction, it > >> > is simply that they both follow the same laws of physics that are > >> > known to us, which as you acknowledge, don't reference whether > >> > anything is subjectively experienced or not, allowing for in one the > >> > mechanism to be subjectively experienced, in the other it not. It is > >> > simply a device to illustrate the same point that is I have made above > >> > in this response. > > >> You have made no points at all .. you just keep stating tautologies .. > >> and > >> are too cowardly to address that fact despite my numerous replies to you. > > > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: > > Coward. You refuse to address my point and soimply post the same thing that > I JUST REPONSED TOO VERBATIM. > Well it wasn't the same as what is above before you snipped, but obviously the point is the same. I notice you didn't respond to it. Your snipping of the response shows that it is you that is the coward. Also your flooding the thread with your posts is also pathetic, did you really think I would waste my time responding to each when you haven't even the courage to face reason? Here is what you snipped again, and feel free to point out your objections. The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: ------------- I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program "Philosophy Talk". Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to look at it, and there are two scenarios: 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's happening, more or less. 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's happening, more or less. Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves consciousness? ------------- To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that if I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did because it had subjective experiences? Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism following the known laws of physics. So its behaviour, if you still chose to consider it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective experiences. Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. They in themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the behaviour). The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 04:12, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 6 Jun, 04:06, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > > > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >news:1181098347.552992.235120@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > > > On 6 Jun, 03:49, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > > >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >>news:1181096859.045313.216360@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > > >> > On 4 Jun, 18:47, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: > > >> >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > > >> >> innews:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com: > > > >> >> > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard as > > >> >> > responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed there were > > >> >> > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. No knowledge of > > >> >> > whether there were any subjective experiences or not would be > > >> >> > required. > > > >> >> Whether or not the mechanism did in fact have subjective experiences, > > >> >> knowledge of that fact by an external observer would not be necessary > > >> >> to > > >> >> explain the operation of the mechanism in terms of the physical > > >> >> structure of the mechanism. However, the fact that the mechanism > > >> >> does > > >> >> have subjective experiences is part of the operation of that mechanism > > >> >> and therefore does influence the behavior of the mechanism. > > > >> >> > So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced or not, > > >> >> > wouldn't influence the behaviour. So if we were to be regarded as a > > >> >> > biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our subjective > > >> >> > experiences because they actually existed. > > > >> >> Wrong. The external observer does not know the content of the > > >> >> mechanism's subjective experience, but the fact that the mechanism has > > >> >> such an experience is part of the operation of the mechanism. > > > >> >> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object that > > >> >> > it > > >> >> > would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an > > >> >> > alternative > > >> >> > universe, which followed the same known laws of physics, but there > > >> >> > were no subjective experiences associated with it, it would act the > > >> >> > same. > > > >> >> There is a contradiction here. Either your alternate universe does not > > >> >> follow the same laws of physics or the mechanism itself is not > > >> >> identical > > >> >> in structure or operation. > > > >> >> > The objection that if it followed the same known laws of > > >> >> > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively experienced, if > > >> >> > it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the known laws of > > >> >> > physics don't reference subjective experiences, thus it is > > >> >> > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both following the > > >> >> > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having subjective > > >> >> > experiences and one not, without the need for any of the known > > >> >> > laws > > >> >> > of physics to be altered. > > > >> >> The laws of physics don't have to reference subjective experience. The > > >> >> subjective experience is, by definition of the problem, entailed by > > >> >> the > > >> >> structure of certain mechanisms. > > > >> > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: > > > >> > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: > > > >> > ------------- > > >> > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program > > >> > "Philosophy Talk". > > > >> > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy > > >> > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to ook > > >> > at it, and there are two scenarios: > > > >> > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft > > >> > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and > > >> > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a > > >> > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does > > >> > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's > > >> > happening, more or less. > > > >> > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard > > >> > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and > > >> > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a > > >> > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how > > >> > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where > > >> > it's happening, more or less. > > > >> > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is > > >> > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? > > >> > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. > > > >> > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering > > >> > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on > > >> > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in > > >> > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we > > >> > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves > > >> > consciousness? > > >> > ------------- > > > >> > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > > >> > I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, > > > >> Really .. where is this robot? > > > >> > and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, > > >> > I > > >> > explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the > > >> > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what > > >> > basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did > > >> > because it had subjective experiences? > > > >> On what basis would you think that it was NOT acting because it had > > >> subjective experiences > > > >> > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any > > >> > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism > > >> > following the known laws of physics. > > > >> Ofcourse it would make a difference, unless you claim that subjective > > >> experiences do not influence behaviour. > > > >> > So its behaviour, if you still > > >> > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be > > >> > said to be influenced by them, > > > >> Yes, it could > > > >> > as it would be expected to act the same > > >> > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective > > >> > experiences. > > > >> So are you saying that if you can make a mechanism that emulates the same > > >> behaviour as subjective experiences, then that proves that subjective > > >> experiences are not a mechanism. > > > >> That's utter nonsense > > > >> > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism ollowing > > >> > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > > >> > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > > >> No. We do behave the way we do and we do have subjective experiences and > > >> we > > >> are biological mechanisms. > > > >> You've not proven otherwise. > > > >> [snip same old tripe] > > > >> > With regards to the universe scenario, there is no contradiction, it > > >> > is simply that they both follow the same laws of physics that are > > >> > known to us, which as you acknowledge, don't reference whether > > >> > anything is subjectively experienced or not, allowing for in one the > > >> > mechanism to be subjectively experienced, in the other it not. It is > > >> > simply a device to illustrate the same point that is I have made above > > >> > in this response. > > > >> You have made no points at all .. you just keep stating tautologies .. > > >> and > > >> are too cowardly to address that fact despite my numerous replies to you. > > > > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: > > > Coward. You refuse to address my point and soimply post the same thing that > > I JUST REPONSED TOO VERBATIM. > > Well it wasn't the same as what is above before you snipped, but > obviously the point is the same. I notice you didn't respond to it. > Your snipping of the response shows that it is you that is the coward. > Also your flooding the thread with your posts is also pathetic, did > you really think I would waste my time responding to each when you > haven't even the courage to face reason? > > Here is what you snipped again, and feel free to point out your > objections. > > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: > > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: > > ------------- > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program > "Philosophy Talk". > > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to look > at it, and there are two scenarios: > > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's > happening, more or less. > > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where > it's happening, more or less. > > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. > > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves > consciousness? > ------------- > > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > if I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, > and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, > I explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of > the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on > what basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it > did because it had subjective experiences? > > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism > following the known laws of physics. So its behaviour, if you still > chose to consider it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be > said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective > experiences. > > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. They in > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it > would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective > experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the > behaviour). The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. Actually I owe you an appology, there is text above, that does seem like the same. My response to you, is that it isn't that we don't have subjective experiences, obviously we do, and yes they do influence our behaviour, but if we were simply a biological mechanism, they couldn't do, as explained above. As for where is the robot, it is just a conceptual device to illustrate the point, and follows on from the discussion Jim07D7 made. Quote
Guest Richo Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On Jun 6, 12:34 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 6 Jun, 03:29, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > On Jun 5, 1:18 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 5 Jun, 02:23, Matt Silberstein > > > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > > On Mon, 04 Jun 2007 17:16:13 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > <1181002573.602439.47...@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > > [snip] > > > > > >Sorry, I hadn't written it clearly enough. > > > > > >Do do you accept that conceptually the behaviour of any mechanism > > > > >following the known laws of physics could be explained in terms of the > > > > >physical mechanism > > > > >following the known laws of physics, and that this will not reference > > > > >whether there are any associated subjective experiences or not? > > > > > Sorry but that still seems to assume that subjective experience either > > > > does not exist or is not a physical phenomenon. If subjective > > > > experience is a physical phenomenon then our explanations will > > > > reference that experience. Perhaps the problem you have with wording > > > > this is that you have some bad assumptions. > > > > It doesn't make any assumptions. It is a fact that the known laws of > > > physics don't reference subjective experiences. > > >So it is a fact that > > > the behaviour of any mechanism following the known laws of physics can > > > be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the said > > > laws, > > > "Can be" means it is possible. > > That is not the same as saying Matt or anyone alive can do it right > > now - it just says its possible. > > You are apparently saying it is not possible. > > How do you know it is not possible? > > > No one has done it so far. > > There are still areas of science for which we do not know the whole > > story - which is good - there is still something for science to do. > > > > and as they don't reference whether there are any associated > > > subjective experiences, the explanation won't reference whether there > > > are any associated subjective experiences. > > > We haven't got the explanation in front of us - so we cannot say what > > it looks like. > > You are speculating that IF we ever get a complete explanation of the > > phenomenon of consciousness in purely physical terms then it will not > > refer to the subjective experiences. > > This is a hypothetical and also it seems to me that if it did not > > account for the subjective experiences it would not qualify as > > "complete". > > You are really saying that any incomplete explanation of conscious > > experience would exclude the subjective. > > I would agree with that. > > > > Since it is obvious you can't deny that the behaviour of any mechanism > > > following the known laws of physics can conceptually be explained in > > > terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, > > > I dont deny that t is possible - such an explanation my not exist > > for another 500 years. > > > > are you denying that it is a fact that the known laws of physics don't > > > reference whether there are any associated subjective experiences? > > > The laws of physics don't reference the existence of vanilla ice > > cream - but that does not imply that anything about the existence of > > vanilla ice cream is in conflict with the laws of physics. > > I'm not sure what you are suggesting I am saying is impossible. > The point of your questions is - I presume - to get us to think that conciousness as we experience cannot be explained by the known laws of physics. Many people are trying to find such an explanation - Francis Crick (till his death) and his student Koch , Daniel Dennet, Marvin Minsky etc. You are saying they cannot succeed. That it is impossible for them to succeed. The only fact you have at hand is that they haven't done it yet. > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: > > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: > ------------- > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program > "Philosophy Talk". > > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to ook > at it, and there are two scenarios: > > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's > happening, more or less. > > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where > it's happening, more or less. > > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. > > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves > consciousness? > ------------- > > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > if I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, > and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, > I explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of > the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on > what basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it > did because it had subjective experiences? > Well this is a hypothetical but let us imagine the possible consequences: Did your explanation of how the mechanism generate the appearance of conscious subjective experience also apply equally well to you and me? If so then there is obviously no dilemma - you have produced an explanation of conscious subjective experience entirely in terms of the known laws of physics. Further study and experimentation could be designed to test this explanation to see if it holds up - if it does Nobel prizes and fame forever is yours. IF your explanation of how the mechanism generated the the appearence of conscious subjective experience does NOT apply to you and I then obviously we could decide that such an explanation is not possible OR we could keep looking for one. So in short it would leave us where we are now. > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism > following the known laws of physics. I can see it would depend on the circumastances as outlined above. > So its behaviour, if you still > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be > said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective > experiences. > You observe what you observe - whether or not you understand the mechanism behind what you observe. That it is possible for you to misunderstand or to simply not understand what is happening does not mean that it is impossible for all time to not understand the mechanism behind something. > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism ollowing > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. No I dont see that. > They in > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it > would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective > experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the > behaviour). The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. We were theorizing that the conscious subjective experiences were caused by the underlying known laws of physics. Now you are saying they would be "coincidental" - they certainly would not be if they caused by the operation of the known laws of physics. Mark. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181099538.521277.61500@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > On 6 Jun, 04:06, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> news:1181098347.552992.235120@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... [snip] >> >> You have made no points at all .. you just keep stating tautologies .. >> >> and >> >> are too cowardly to address that fact despite my numerous replies to >> >> you. >> >> > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: >> >> Coward. You refuse to address my point and soimply post the same thing >> that >> I JUST REPONSED TOO VERBATIM. >> > > Well it wasn't the same as what is above before you snipped, It was > but obviously the point is the same. Obviously, as it was the same > I notice you didn't respond to it. I had. ou ignored it as you seem to do with most people replies > Your snipping of the response shows that it is you that is the coward. No . .it shows you copying and pasting the same things multipel times .. which you have done again here. > Also your flooding the thread with your posts is also pathetic, I am replying to your posts .. that's not flooding. You simply don't respond > did > you really think I would waste my time responding to each when you > haven't even the courage to face reason? It is you who are the coward who won't face reason. You make statements that are tautologies as if they had some meaning. They don't. Learn how to reason. > Here is what you snipped again, and feel free to point out your > objections. [snip the same thing your spammed three time in a row (plus elsewhere in the thread) ] Now coward .. have the guts to respond to my points that you are simply stating tautologies and your assumptions are unfounded and unsupported. I should not have to post them all again (as you refused to reply to them when they were originally made) Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 04:30, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > On Jun 6, 12:34 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 6 Jun, 03:29, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > On Jun 5, 1:18 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 5 Jun, 02:23, Matt Silberstein > > > > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > > > On Mon, 04 Jun 2007 17:16:13 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > <1181002573.602439.47...@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > > > [snip] > > > > > > >Sorry, I hadn't written it clearly enough. > > > > > > >Do do you accept that conceptually the behaviour of any mechanism > > > > > >following the known laws of physics could be explained in terms of the > > > > > >physical mechanism > > > > > >following the known laws of physics, and that this will not reference > > > > > >whether there are any associated subjective experiences or not? > > > > > > Sorry but that still seems to assume that subjective experience either > > > > > does not exist or is not a physical phenomenon. If subjective > > > > > experience is a physical phenomenon then our explanations will > > > > > reference that experience. Perhaps the problem you have with wording > > > > > this is that you have some bad assumptions. > > > > > It doesn't make any assumptions. It is a fact that the known laws of > > > > physics don't reference subjective experiences. > > > >So it is a fact that > > > > the behaviour of any mechanism following the known laws of physics can > > > > be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the said > > > > laws, > > > > "Can be" means it is possible. > > > That is not the same as saying Matt or anyone alive can do it right > > > now - it just says its possible. > > > You are apparently saying it is not possible. > > > How do you know it is not possible? > > > > No one has done it so far. > > > There are still areas of science for which we do not know the whole > > > story - which is good - there is still something for science to do. > > > > > and as they don't reference whether there are any associated > > > > subjective experiences, the explanation won't reference whether there > > > > are any associated subjective experiences. > > > > We haven't got the explanation in front of us - so we cannot say what > > > it looks like. > > > You are speculating that IF we ever get a complete explanation of the > > > phenomenon of consciousness in purely physical terms then it will not > > > refer to the subjective experiences. > > > This is a hypothetical and also it seems to me that if it did not > > > account for the subjective experiences it would not qualify as > > > "complete". > > > You are really saying that any incomplete explanation of conscious > > > experience would exclude the subjective. > > > I would agree with that. > > > > > Since it is obvious you can't deny that the behaviour of any mechanism > > > > following the known laws of physics can conceptually be explained in > > > > terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, > > > > I dont deny that t is possible - such an explanation my not exist > > > for another 500 years. > > > > > are you denying that it is a fact that the known laws of physics don't > > > > reference whether there are any associated subjective experiences? > > > > The laws of physics don't reference the existence of vanilla ice > > > cream - but that does not imply that anything about the existence of > > > vanilla ice cream is in conflict with the laws of physics. > > > I'm not sure what you are suggesting I am saying is impossible. > > The point of your questions is - I presume - to get us to think that > conciousness as we experience cannot be explained by the known laws of > physics. > Many people are trying to find such an explanation - Francis Crick > (till his death) and his student Koch , Daniel Dennet, Marvin Minsky > etc. > You are saying they cannot succeed. > That it is impossible for them to succeed. > The only fact you have at hand is that they haven't done it yet. > > > > > > > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: > > > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: > > ------------- > > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program > > "Philosophy Talk". > > > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy > > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to ook > > at it, and there are two scenarios: > > > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft > > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and > > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a > > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does > > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's > > happening, more or less. > > > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard > > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and > > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a > > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how > > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where > > it's happening, more or less. > > > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is > > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? > > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. > > > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering > > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on > > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in > > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we > > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves > > consciousness? > > ------------- > > > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > > if I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, > > and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, > > I explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of > > the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on > > what basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it > > did because it had subjective experiences? > > Well this is a hypothetical but let us imagine the possible > consequences: > Did your explanation of how the mechanism generate the appearance of > conscious subjective experience also apply equally well to you and > me? > If so then there is obviously no dilemma - you have produced an > explanation of conscious subjective experience entirely in terms of > the known laws of physics. Further study and experimentation could be > designed to test this explanation to see if it holds up - if it does > Nobel prizes and fame forever is yours. > > IF your explanation of how the mechanism generated the the appearence > of conscious subjective experience does NOT apply to you and I then > obviously we could decide that such an explanation is not possible OR > we could keep looking for one. > So in short it would leave us where we are now. > > > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any > > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism > > following the known laws of physics. > > I can see it would depend on the circumastances as outlined above. > > > So its behaviour, if you still > > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be > > said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same > > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective > > experiences. > > You observe what you observe - whether or not you understand the > mechanism behind what you observe. > That it is possible for you to misunderstand or to simply not > understand what is happening does not mean that it is impossible for > all time to not understand the mechanism behind something. > > > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism ollowing > > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > No I dont see that. > > > They in > > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it > > would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective > > experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the > > behaviour). The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. > > We were theorizing that the conscious subjective experiences were > caused by the underlying known laws of physics. > Now you are saying they would be "coincidental" - they certainly would > not be if they caused by the operation of the known laws of physics. > You didn't understand the point. It is implausible that we are simply a biological mechanism, for if we were then we couldn't be talking about them because they existed, it would have to be a coincidence. So you can see, that skipping over this, and making statements in regards to whether the explanation of how the robot functioned could apply to us, as though it was the coincidence, is obscuring the point, as it is implausible that we are simply a biological mechanism. With regards to where I said: ------- Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. ------- And you replied: ------- No I dont see that. ------- Did you manage to understand why it would be the case with the robot, in that it would be acting as expected to without the added assumption that it had subjective experiences? Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 04:34, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181099538.521277.61500@w5g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > > > > > > > On 6 Jun, 04:06, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > >>news:1181098347.552992.235120@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > [snip] > >> >> You have made no points at all .. you just keep stating tautologies .. > >> >> and > >> >> are too cowardly to address that fact despite my numerous replies to > >> >> you. > > >> > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: > > >> Coward. You refuse to address my point and soimply post the same thing > >> that > >> I JUST REPONSED TOO VERBATIM. > > > Well it wasn't the same as what is above before you snipped, > > It was > > > but obviously the point is the same. > > Obviously, as it was the same > > > I notice you didn't respond to it. > > I had. ou ignored it as you seem to do with most people replies > > > Your snipping of the response shows that it is you that is the coward. > > No . .it shows you copying and pasting the same things multipel times .. > which you have done again here. > > > Also your flooding the thread with your posts is also pathetic, > > I am replying to your posts .. that's not flooding. You simply don't > respond > > > did > > you really think I would waste my time responding to each when you > > haven't even the courage to face reason? > > It is you who are the coward who won't face reason. You make statements > that are tautologies as if they had some meaning. They don't. Learn how to > reason. > > > Here is what you snipped again, and feel free to point out your > > objections. > > [snip the same thing your spammed three time in a row (plus elsewhere in the > thread) ] > > Now coward .. have the guts to respond to my points that you are simply > stating tautologies and your assumptions are unfounded and unsupported. > > I should not have to post them all again (as you refused to reply to them > when they were originally made) > What assumptions did I make? I just simply stated the FACT that the laws of physics don't reference subjective experiences, and that in the case of a robot, even if you were to assume that it did have subjective experiences, you couldn't claim they were influential, as the robot would be behaving exactly as you would expect it to without the added assumption that it had subjective experiences. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181100237.756555.254150@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > Actually I owe you an appology, there is text above, that does seem > like the same. No kidding .. that's what happens when you copy and paste the same reponse over and over > My response to you, is that it isn't that we don't have subjective > experiences, obviously we do, Yes > and yes they do influence our behaviour, Yes > but if we were simply a biological mechanism, they couldn't do, as > explained above. You have not shown at all that it is impossible for a biological mechanism to have subjective experiences (not that you've defined what those are) or for those experiences to influence its behaviour. You have simply made assertions. That we are biological mechanisms and we have subjective experiences are facts. Part of our biological mechanism is our brains and our sense organs, we experience the world, we process it, we react to it, we remember it. So .. the burden of proof is on you to 1) define subjective experience And 2) show that either: ( ) biological mechanisms cannot have subjective experiences ( ) subjective experiences cannot affect the behaviour of biological mechanisms Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181101163.939465.160590@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > You didn't understand the point. You simply don't make one sucessfully .. you just assert > It is implausible that we are simply > a biological mechanism, for if we were then we couldn't be talking > about them does them = "subjective experiences" ? > because they existed why .. if they exist, why can't we talk about them? Or do you claim that it is not physically possible to have subjective experiences? If so, what are your grounds for such a claim. > , it would have to be a coincidence. why? > So > you can see, that skipping over this, and making statements in regards > to whether the explanation of how the robot functioned could apply to > us, as though it was the coincidence, is obscuring the point, as it is > implausible that we are simply a biological mechanism. Word salad > With regards to where I said: > ------- > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > ------- > > And you replied: > ------- > No I dont see that. > ------- Because the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises. > Did you manage to understand why it would be the case with the robot, You've not shown it to be the case with the robot > in that it would be acting as expected to without the added assumption > that it had subjective experiences? If it had the experiences, then they would form part of its mechanism and its behaviour. If it did not, then it would be a different mechanism and behaviour. You really are not making any logical sense here. You make a lot of assumption and assertions and prove none of them, yet expect us to agree with the conclusion you attempt to erroneously draw from them. Think your arguments through more thoroughly. Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 04:47, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181100237.756555.254150@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > > Actually I owe you an appology, there is text above, that does seem > > like the same. > > No kidding .. that's what happens when you copy and paste the same reponse > over and over > > > My response to you, is that it isn't that we don't have subjective > > experiences, obviously we do, > > Yes > > > and yes they do influence our behaviour, > > Yes > > > but if we were simply a biological mechanism, they couldn't do, as > > explained above. > > You have not shown at all that it is impossible for a biological mechanism > to have subjective experiences (not that you've defined what those are) or > for those experiences to influence its behaviour. You have simply made > assertions. > > That we are biological mechanisms and we have subjective experiences are > facts. Part of our biological mechanism is our brains and our sense organs, > we experience the world, we process it, we react to it, we remember it. > > So .. the burden of proof is on you to > > 1) define subjective experience > > And > > 2) show that either: > > ( ) biological mechanisms cannot have subjective experiences > ( ) subjective experiences cannot affect the behaviour of biological > mechanisms I'm not getting into defining subjective experiences, you can pretend that you don't experience being in the physical world if you wish, and that you have no idea what I am referencing, its up to you. Neither have I stated that biological mechanisms cannot have subjective experiences. I have shown that subjective experiences could not affect the behaviour of any mechanism biological or otherwise if it simply followed the known laws of physics. This was shown by the fact that a mechanism such as a robot which follows the known laws of physics, would always be behaving exactly as you would expect it to, without the added assumption that it had subjective experiences. Which would mean, if we were thought to be simply a biological mechanism which simply followed the laws of physics, our behaviour could not be affected by having any subjective experiences, which would mean it would be a coincidence that we actually have the subjective experiences that we are currently discussing, as having them couldn't be influencing our behaviour. The coincidence shows the suggestion that we are simply a biological mechanism following the known laws of physics to be implausible (this is not the same as impossible, because you could always claim that it is just a coincidence we have the subjective experiences we are discussing). Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 04:56, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181101163.939465.160590@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > > You didn't understand the point. > > You simply don't make one sucessfully .. you just assert > > > It is implausible that we are simply > > a biological mechanism, for if we were then we couldn't be talking > > about them > > does them = "subjective experiences" ? > > > because they existed > > why .. if they exist, why can't we talk about them? Or do you claim that it > is not physically possible to have subjective experiences? If so, what are > your grounds for such a claim. > > > , it would have to be a coincidence. > > why? > > > So > > you can see, that skipping over this, and making statements in regards > > to whether the explanation of how the robot functioned could apply to > > us, as though it was the coincidence, is obscuring the point, as it is > > implausible that we are simply a biological mechanism. > > Word salad > > > With regards to where I said: > > ------- > > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following > > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > ------- > > > And you replied: > > ------- > > No I dont see that. > > ------- > > Because the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises. > > > Did you manage to understand why it would be the case with the robot, > > You've not shown it to be the case with the robot > > > in that it would be acting as expected to without the added assumption > > that it had subjective experiences? > > If it had the experiences, then they would form part of its mechanism and > its behaviour. If it did not, then it would be a different mechanism and > behaviour. > > You really are not making any logical sense here. You make a lot of > assumption and assertions and prove none of them, yet expect us to agree > with the conclusion you attempt to erroneously draw from them. Think your > arguments through more thoroughly. Now you are just being pathetic, I am already corresponding with you, and you are just posting to other converstations, other than the one we are having, presumably in the hope you can claim that I didn't respond to you. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181101365.448809.6120@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > What assumptions did I make? Many .. just about everything you say is either a tautology or an unsupported assertion. > I just simply stated the FACT that the > laws of physics don't reference subjective experiences, That's correct. That does NOT mean they do not apply to it, or that they cannot describe or model it. > and that in the case of a robot, even if you were to assume that it did > have > subjective experiences, Please define "subjective experiences" > you couldn't claim they were influential, Yes .. one can. Again .. you assert that one cannot do something that one can clearly do. As evidence, human beings have subjective experiences and they influence their behaviour. There is no reason to assume a robot would be any different if it too has subjective experiences. > as the robot would be behaving exactly as you would expect it to without > the added assumption that it had subjective experiences. Again, an assumption that the subjective experiences of the robot cannot influence its behaviour. You have no ground for making that assertion. You cannot prove yourself right through circular reasoning. Quote
Guest Denis Loubet Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181095407.100411.107720@q69g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > On 6 Jun, 02:33, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1181091930.182688.105050@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> > On 5 Jun, 22:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >>news:1181074124.893550.190550@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> > On 5 Jun, 17:12, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >>news:1181044055.576591.170490@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> > On 5 Jun, 04:17, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >>news:1180997004.586680.126950@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 23:27, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180992269.825596.105660@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 19:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 16:07, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180915714.304693.138900@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 00:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180903459.945467.317500@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 21:38, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180891870.230456.185600@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 18:27, "Denis Loubet" >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180875033.790773.206010@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist page >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >can >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >understand >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Any mechanism which simply followed the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have its behaviour explained with the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wasn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > conscious (had no subjective experiences). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No. If the mechanism was conscious, then the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> explanation >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> its >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would necessarily include that consciousness. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Which means that whether it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Which is nonsense. The explanation of its >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> necessarily >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> include >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the operation of its consciousness if it was >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Therefore if we were simply a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > about >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences because of their existance. It >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > coincidence that we actually experienced >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > what >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > claimed >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > we >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did, which isn't plausible. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Well, since you obviously don't understand >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> what >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> surprising that you've reached incorrect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusions. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Why would I be required to assume any mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > followed >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the laws of physics was conscious, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Who said you had to? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > why couldn't I explain it simply in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > terms of the physical mechanism following the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption that it wasn't? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If you fully describe the behavior of the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism following the laws of physics, then you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> all >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events that contribute to that behavior. If the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness will be included in the description >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Consciousness >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Consciousness >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> just >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> our >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> word that labels a particular VARIETY of physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws of physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > While I you can believe that the mechanism is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > responsible >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective experiences, you avoided explaining why >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > terms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism following the laws of physics, with the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there were no subjective experiences, or could I? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I did not say you couldn't explain the behaviour of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms of the physical mechanism following the laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> assumption that there were no subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> defy >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> point out where I did. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What I DID say is that in explaining the behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in terms of the physical mechanism following the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> assumption that there were no subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> necessity, include in that explanation the physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> constitute >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness if they occurred. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Unless, of course, you arbitrarily want to avoid >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> those >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events that constitute consciousness, and affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> leave >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> your >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> explanation incomplete. You are free to do that. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So you admit, that the behaviour of the mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explained >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with the assumption that it didn't have any >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Sure. But if it did have subjective experiences, those >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> included in the explanation in terms of physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws of physics. In other words, you could explain the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> rote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> description of physical events, unaware that you are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences and their effect on behavior, in terms of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Can you follow that this being the case, whether it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > didn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > any subjective experiences couldn't influence the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did, its behaviour could not be explained without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > taking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > into >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > account >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > whether it did or didn't have any subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If it has subjective experiences, then they are part of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> its >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> any explanation that failed to include them would be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> incomplete, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> by >> >> >> >> >> >> >> definition. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard >> >> >> >> >> >> > as >> >> >> >> >> >> > responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed >> >> >> >> >> >> > there >> >> >> >> >> >> > were >> >> >> >> >> >> > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "Only"? I never suggested that was the only factor that >> >> >> >> >> >> effects >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior. >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm saying that if you want a complete explanation of >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> have >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> account for all factors. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> And are you attempting to separate subjective experience >> >> >> >> >> >> form >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> responsible for it? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > No knowledge of >> >> >> >> >> >> > whether there were any subjective experiences or not >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> > required. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> True. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced >> >> >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> > not, >> >> >> >> >> >> > wouldn't influence the behaviour. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Of course it would affect the behavior. Haven't you >> >> >> >> >> >> listened >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> word >> >> >> >> >> >> I've >> >> >> >> >> >> said? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So if we were to be regarded as a >> >> >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences because they actually existed. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Our subjective experiences actually exist as material >> >> >> >> >> >> patterns >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> brains. >> >> >> >> >> >> These material patterns affect behavior. Is this >> >> >> >> >> >> impossible >> >> >> >> >> >> for >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> understand? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would >> >> >> >> >> >> > object >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> > would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was >> >> >> >> >> >> > an >> >> >> >> >> >> > alternative >> >> >> >> >> >> > universe, which followed the same known laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> > but >> >> >> >> >> >> > there >> >> >> >> >> >> > were no subjective experiences associated with it, it >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> > act >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> > same. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No. If you disallow the material process of consciousness >> >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, then you've obviously got a universe that >> >> >> >> >> >> behaves >> >> >> >> >> >> differently >> >> >> >> >> >> from the one we're in. You're trying to violate the >> >> >> >> >> >> principle >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> identity, >> >> >> >> >> >> which pretty much hoses logic completely. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The objection that if it followed the same known laws >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively >> >> >> >> >> >> > experienced, >> >> >> >> >> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> >> > it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the >> >> >> >> >> >> > known >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics don't reference subjective experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> We do not note any subjective experiences in the absence >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> brains. >> >> >> >> >> >> Thus we are justified in holding the tentative conclusion >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> brains are required for subjective experience. Since we >> >> >> >> >> >> note >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> manipulation of the physical brain produces changes in >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, we are justified in holding the tentative >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusion >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective experience depends on the arrangement of matter >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> brain. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > thus it is >> >> >> >> >> >> > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both >> >> >> >> >> >> > following >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences and one not, without the need for any of the >> >> >> >> >> >> > known >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> > of physics to be altered. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So this is a "Consciousness of the Gaps" argument? >> >> >> >> >> >> > Do you accept that you could conceptually due to the >> >> >> >> >> > known >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> > physics not referencing subjective experiences, have a two >> >> >> >> >> > universes >> >> >> >> >> > which both followed the same known laws of physics, and >> >> >> >> >> > yet >> >> >> >> >> > in >> >> >> >> >> > one, >> >> >> >> >> > a given mechanism gave rise to subjective experiences, and >> >> >> >> >> > in >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> > other it didn't? >> >> >> >> >> >> No. >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm a materialist, and you're asking me to abandon the >> >> >> >> >> principle >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> identity. You're asking me to abandon logic. >> >> >> >> >> >> I will not do so. >> >> >> >> >> > Sit in denial if you like, >> >> >> >> >> Thank you, I will keep adhering to logic. >> >> >> >> >> > but it is conceptually possible to consider >> >> >> >> > two universes following the same known laws of physics, and >> >> >> >> > yet >> >> >> >> > one >> >> >> >> > having subjective experiences and the other not, >> >> >> >> >> Well, I can conceive of a universe just like this one that >> >> >> >> doesn't >> >> >> >> have >> >> >> >> subjective experiences, but it would be trillions of years >> >> >> >> further >> >> >> >> along >> >> >> >> its >> >> >> >> timeline where proton decay has finally removed all matter from >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> universe. No matter, no subjective experiences. >> >> >> >> >> > because the laws of >> >> >> >> > physics don't reference whether anything subjectively >> >> >> >> > experiences. >> >> >> >> >> How do you know they don't? If you record the actions of all the >> >> >> >> atoms >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> my >> >> >> >> brain, then you'll have a complete record of my subjective >> >> >> >> experiences >> >> >> >> if >> >> >> >> materialism is correct. >> >> >> >> >> > So >> >> >> >> > you can sit there not being able to even face thinking about >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> Actually, I just showed I can think about it. It's just stupid. >> >> >> >> >> > because it would show your whole world perspective to be >> >> >> >> > implausible, >> >> >> >> >> You haven't managed to do that yet to anyone's satisfaction. >> >> >> >> It's >> >> >> >> just >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> making an assertion. No one else appears to agree with you. >> >> >> >> >> > but it seems to me pathetic and cowardly to not be able to >> >> >> >> > face >> >> >> >> > reason. >> >> >> >> >> It is pathetic and cowardly not to be able to face reason, is >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> your >> >> >> >> excuse? >> >> >> >> >> > When you feel brave enough, maybe you'll read it again, and >> >> >> >> > consider the possibility, and how it highlights how you had >> >> >> >> > been >> >> >> >> > deceived. >> >> >> >> >> By the same logic, you're terrified by materialism and can't >> >> >> >> face >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> truth. >> >> >> >> >> See how bland assertions don't get you anywhere? >> >> >> >> > Unlike you, I'm not afraid of following reason though. If you >> >> >> > were >> >> >> > to >> >> >> > ask me to conceptually consider that God didn't exist for example >> >> >> > to >> >> >> > highlight a point you were making, I wouldn't turn around and >> >> >> > reply >> >> >> > that I couldn't, and that I'd refuse to, as you did about an >> >> >> > alternative universe which followed the same known laws of >> >> >> > physics >> >> >> > but >> >> >> > in which there were no subjective experiences. >> >> >> >> What if I asked you to believe that god did exist and didn't exist >> >> >> at >> >> >> the >> >> >> same time? That's the equivalent of what you asked me to do. It's >> >> >> not >> >> >> that I >> >> >> don't want to conceive of such things, it's that I can't. Maybe you >> >> >> can >> >> >> hold >> >> >> two mutually contradictory ideas in your head at once and call both >> >> >> true, >> >> >> but I can't. I have to respect logic. >> >> >> >> Besides, I admitted I could conceive of such a universe, and >> >> >> described >> >> >> how >> >> >> it would have to be. Another way would be if the universe didn't >> >> >> have >> >> >> any >> >> >> matter in it because of a perfectly balanced ratio of matter to >> >> >> antimatter. >> >> >> All that's required is that a universe be in such a state that >> >> >> brains >> >> >> cannot >> >> >> form. Without brains, you have no consciousness. >> >> >> >> But you don't like my solution to your little conundrum, so you >> >> >> pretend I >> >> >> didn't respond. >> >> >> >> > I'm sure if it had been >> >> >> > a thought experiment which could have been used to pose a >> >> >> > question >> >> >> > about how could God exist, then you would have had no problem, >> >> >> > but >> >> >> > because it points out how your world view is implausible, you'd >> >> >> > rather >> >> >> > be deaf and blind about the matter, and not even consider it. >> >> >> >> No. Please acknowledge that I conceived of your stupid universe >> >> >> scenario. >> >> >> >> It's you who are unable to conceive of the idea that your scenario >> >> >> might >> >> >> be >> >> >> silly. >> >> >> >> > You aren't adhering to logic, you are refusing to look at it >> >> >> > reasonably. >> >> >> >> You have not shown that to be the case. Until you do, you're just >> >> >> blabbering. >> >> >> >> > It isn't as though it couldn't be done, for example if a >> >> >> > robot behaved >> >> >> >> What? Universes and robots are equivalent in your mind? >> >> >> >> > as though it might have subjective experiences, i.e. it >> >> >> > talked about them etc, you could surely conceive of that either >> >> >> > (a) >> >> >> > it >> >> >> > did have, or (b) it didn't have. >> >> >> >> Yes. So what? >> >> >> >> > In one universe you could conceive of >> >> >> > it having subjective experiences, in the other that it didn't. >> >> >> >> You said the universes were the SAME! If they're the same, then >> >> >> they're >> >> >> the >> >> >> same. If one possesses consciousness, then the other one does too. >> >> >> If >> >> >> one >> >> >> doesn't, then the other doesn't either. You can't say they're the >> >> >> same >> >> >> but >> >> >> different. >> >> >> >> > In >> >> >> > either though it would be acting just the same, as in both it >> >> >> > would >> >> >> > simply just be a mechanism following the known laws of physics. >> >> >> >> In other words, the same but different. Sorry, that violates the >> >> >> principle >> >> >> of identity. A cannot equal NOT A. You've cast logic out the >> >> >> window. >> >> >> >> > The >> >> >> > same would apply to humans if you were to consider them to be >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> > biological mechanisms following the known laws of physics, even >> >> >> > if >> >> >> > you >> >> >> > run from logic and reason, when it goes against your unfounded >> >> >> > bias. >> >> >> >> Phrase your question where it does not violate fundamental >> >> >> principle >> >> >> of >> >> >> logic and I might entertain it. >> >> >> > It is simply a case of both universes following the known laws of >> >> > physics. >> >> >> Then as far as we know, they're THE SAME! We will expect exactly the >> >> same >> >> behaviors in both. >> >> >> > There was no need to add other differences to them as you did >> >> > to avoid facing the issue. >> >> >> The distant future universe with no matter is not different from ours. >> >> It's >> >> exactly the same. Our universe will be exactly that universe. >> >> >> > Which bit are you finding illogical? >> >> >> The part where you say something is the same, but different. Logic >> >> dictates >> >> that things that are the same CAN'T be different. >> >> >> If you want to throw out logic, that's fine, but the discussion ends >> >> there. >> >> >> > Supposing there was a robot that >> >> > behaved as though it might be conscious. You could know how it >> >> > worked, >> >> > but it wouldn't tell you anything about whether it was subjectively >> >> > experienced or not. >> >> >> What? I don't know that. It could easily be that if I knew how it >> >> worked, >> >> I'd know whether it had subjective experiences or not. >> >> >> > Now in the thought experiment, in one universe it >> >> > could be considered that it did have subjective experiences, in the >> >> > other that it did not. >> >> >> It? What it? The robot? The robot wasn't involved in your universe >> >> scenario >> >> until just now. >> >> >> So the robot works differently in the two universes. Ok...So...? >> >> >> > By doing so you could see that whether it did >> >> > or didn't it couldn't affect its behaviour, as in both, it will >> >> > simply >> >> > behave the same, i.e. follow the laws of physics, so in fact it >> >> > isn't >> >> > only logical, it is a useful tool. >> >> >> No. It still makes no sense. If the same operation results in >> >> consciousness >> >> in one universe, and no consciousness in the other universe, then the >> >> universes are different. >> >> >> One would expect different behaviors in different universes with >> >> different >> >> laws. >> >> >> > It shows the implausibility of your >> >> > world view for starters. >> >> >> No. It doesn't appear to do that at all. >> >> >> > Is truthfully so difficult for you, or is it >> >> > that you can't face applying reason to your perspective? >> >> >> You have yet to establish that you are speaking truthfully. Or >> >> utilizing >> >> reason. >> >> > How would knowing that the behaviour of the robot was explainable in >> > terms of it following the known laws of physics, give you any >> > indication of whether it subjectively experienced or not. >> >> I didn't say it would. I offered the possibility that it could. YOU are >> the >> one making the absolute statement said it wouldn't. >> >> Care to back up that assertion? >> >> > You seem to >> > be living in some sci-fi fantasy world. >> >> And you don't seem to understand the difference between a speculation and >> a >> statement of fact. >> >> > Regarding the thought experiment, the robots would both be following >> > the same known laws of physics. So perhaps you could explain why you >> > suggest they would act differently. >> >> Robots? This is the first time you've suggested more than one robot. You >> seem to enjoy adding more and more items to your scenarios willy-nilly >> before we've even settled the original point you're trying to make. >> >> Ok, are we talking identical robots in identical universes? Then I >> suppose >> they'd behave exactly the same. >> >> If we're talking robots that are different in identical universes, then I >> suppose they'd behave differently. >> >> If we're talking identical robots in universes that are different, then I >> suppose they'd behave differently. >> >> And if we're talking robots that are different in universes that are >> different, I suppose they'd behave differently there too. (Unless there >> was >> the unlikely event that the differences cancelled each other out.) >> >> I can't think of another permutation. Did I answer your question? It >> boils >> down to things that are the same act the same, and things that are >> different >> act different. Did you want me to go into some sort of explanation of >> this >> conclusion? It seems pretty self explanatory. >> >> If, on the other hand, you're back to your "The universes are the same, >> but >> magically different" tune, then I have no answer for you, as you've >> abandoned logic and I can't follow you there. >> > > Well there are two universes, and a robot in each, so how is it the > first time it was mentioned that there were two of them? Now you're being disingenuous. I can look back in this thread and see that you started the argument with two universes. Then several posts later, you dragged in a robot that behaved differently in each universe. Then a few posts later you dragged in another robot. People CAN read, you know. > The universes are the same in regards to the known laws of physics. > In case you weren't aware, the laws of physics don't touch on the > subject of whether anything is subjectively experienced or not. Then stop talking about it. > Therefore you could conceptually have two universes, which both follow > the same laws of physics, and yet in one, the mechanism had no > subjective experiences, and the other it did. So the universes are not the same. > So no the universes > wouldn't be identical, they would simply both follow the known laws of > physics. So you admit you are postulating two universes that are different. > Regarding the question, how would knowing that the behaviour of the > robot was explainable in > terms of it following the known laws of physics, give you any > indication of whether it subjectively experienced or not, you didn't > answer it. That's not the question you asked. But I'll answer this one. It wouldn't. It wouldn't give you any indication. You would have to know how it worked to do that. > As for backing up the assertion, well it is backed up by > the fact that there would be no indication, and that neither you nor > any materialist experiencing the physical world could point to one. But that's not the claim I asked you to back up. I asked you to back up THIS one: "Supposing there was a robot that behaved as though it might be conscious. You could know how it worked, but it wouldn't tell you anything about whether it was subjectively experienced or not." The claim above stated that I KNEW HOW IT WORKED, not just that I knew it operated according to the laws of physics. Your clumsy use of language implies that I have all sorts of knowledge about the robot. That I can follow all the operations of the mechanical brain. If that's the case, It's just as likely that I can open the user interface of the robot and see what it says under the "Subjective Experience" tab. That'll tell me all I need to know. > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: > > ------------- > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program > "Philosophy Talk". > > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to look > at it, and there are two scenarios: > > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's > happening, more or less. > > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where > it's happening, more or less. > > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. I see no reason in either case to change my opinion. > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves > consciousness? No. But if someone built the computer that we have decided is conscious, it implies that the guy who built it knows how to achieve consciousness in a computer. Of course, that's a necessarily tentative conclusion, because we know that we could be wrong about the computer being conscious. Heck, we could be wrong about the meat brain being conscious too. > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, and > you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I > explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what > basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did > because it had subjective experiences? I would have to be assured that the physical operation of the robot, following known laws of physics, didn't actually constitute consciousness. > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism > following the known laws of physics. No. For it to behave a certain way without consciousness, it would have to be programmed differently to behave the same way with consciousness. > So its behaviour, if you still > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be > said to be influenced by them, No. Consciousness appears to modify behavior. Conscious things usually move about, unconscious things usually lie inert. > as it would be expected to act the same > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective > experiences. It can be programmed to fool me. So what? > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. No. We are biological machanisms following the laws of physics. Our subjective experiences are part of that biological mechanism. The biological mechanism determines our behavior. Therefore subjective experience, as part of our biological mechanism following the laws of physics, affects our behavior. > They in > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, As part of the biological mechanism that determines our behavior, they do. > which would mean it > would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective > experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the > behaviour. The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. Well, when an argument is as wrong as yours, stupid conclusions are to be expected. > As I've said, you seem to having problems facing this point, but it is > a fact regarding the known laws of physics nevertheless. And you have trouble facing the idea that you might be wrong. -- Denis Loubet dloubet@io.com http://www.io.com/~dloubet http://www.ashenempires.com Quote
Guest someone2 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 05:00, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181095407.100411.107720@q69g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > > On 6 Jun, 02:33, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >>news:1181091930.182688.105050@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > >> > On 5 Jun, 22:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >>news:1181074124.893550.190550@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> > On 5 Jun, 17:12, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >>news:1181044055.576591.170490@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> > On 5 Jun, 04:17, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >>news:1180997004.586680.126950@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 23:27, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >> >>news:1180992269.825596.105660@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 19:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 16:07, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180915714.304693.138900@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 00:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180903459.945467.317500@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 21:38, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180891870.230456.185600@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 18:27, "Denis Loubet" > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180875033.790773.206010@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist page > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >can > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >understand > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Any mechanism which simply followed the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have its behaviour explained with the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wasn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > conscious (had no subjective experiences). > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No. If the mechanism was conscious, then the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> explanation > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> its > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would necessarily include that consciousness. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Which means that whether it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Which is nonsense. The explanation of its > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> necessarily > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> include > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the operation of its consciousness if it was > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Therefore if we were simply a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > about > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences because of their existance. It > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > coincidence that we actually experienced > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > what > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > claimed > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > we > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did, which isn't plausible. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Well, since you obviously don't understand > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> what > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it's > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> surprising that you've reached incorrect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusions. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Why would I be required to assume any mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > followed > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the laws of physics was conscious, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Who said you had to? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > why couldn't I explain it simply in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > terms of the physical mechanism following the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption that it wasn't? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If you fully describe the behavior of the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism following the laws of physics, then you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> all > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events that contribute to that behavior. If the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness will be included in the description > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Consciousness > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Consciousness > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> just > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> our > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> word that labels a particular VARIETY of physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> following > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws of physics. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > While I you can believe that the mechanism is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > responsible > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > for > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective experiences, you avoided explaining why > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > couldn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > terms > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism following the laws of physics, with the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there were no subjective experiences, or could I? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I did not say you couldn't explain the behaviour of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms of the physical mechanism following the laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> assumption that there were no subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> defy > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> point out where I did. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What I DID say is that in explaining the behaviour > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in terms of the physical mechanism following the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> assumption that there were no subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> necessity, include in that explanation the physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> constitute > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness if they occurred. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Unless, of course, you arbitrarily want to avoid > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> those > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events that constitute consciousness, and affect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> leave > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> your > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> explanation incomplete. You are free to do that. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So you admit, that the behaviour of the mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explained > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with the assumption that it didn't have any > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Sure. But if it did have subjective experiences, those > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> included in the explanation in terms of physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> following > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws of physics. In other words, you could explain the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> rote > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> description of physical events, unaware that you are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences and their effect on behavior, in terms of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Can you follow that this being the case, whether it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > didn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > any subjective experiences couldn't influence the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > for > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did, its behaviour could not be explained without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > taking > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > into > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > account > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > whether it did or didn't have any subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If it has subjective experiences, then they are part of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> its > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> any explanation that failed to include them would be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> incomplete, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> by > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> definition. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard > >> >> >> >> >> >> > as > >> >> >> >> >> >> > responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed > >> >> >> >> >> >> > there > >> >> >> >> >> >> > were > >> >> >> >> >> >> > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> "Only"? I never suggested that was the only factor that > >> >> >> >> >> >> effects > >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior. > >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm saying that if you want a complete explanation of > >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> have > >> >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> >> account for all factors. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> And are you attempting to separate subjective experience > >> >> >> >> >> >> form > >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> responsible for it? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > No knowledge of > >> >> >> >> >> >> > whether there were any subjective experiences or not > >> >> >> >> >> >> > would > >> >> >> >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> > required. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> True. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced > >> >> >> >> >> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >> > not, > >> >> >> >> >> >> > wouldn't influence the behaviour. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> Of course it would affect the behavior. Haven't you > >> >> >> >> >> >> listened > >> >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> word > >> >> >> >> >> >> I've > >> >> >> >> >> >> said? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > So if we were to be regarded as a > >> >> >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our > >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences because they actually existed. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> Our subjective experiences actually exist as material > >> >> >> >> >> >> patterns > >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> brains. > >> >> >> >> >> >> These material patterns affect behavior. Is this > >> >> >> >> >> >> impossible > >> >> >> >> >> >> for > >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> >> understand? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would > >> >> >> >> >> >> > object > >> >> >> >> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> >> >> > it > >> >> >> >> >> >> > would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was > >> >> >> >> >> >> > an > >> >> >> >> >> >> > alternative > >> >> >> >> >> >> > universe, which followed the same known laws of > >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, > >> >> >> >> >> >> > but > >> >> >> >> >> >> > there > >> >> >> >> >> >> > were no subjective experiences associated with it, it > >> >> >> >> >> >> > would > >> >> >> >> >> >> > act > >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> > same. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> No. If you disallow the material process of consciousness > >> >> >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, then you've obviously got a universe that > >> >> >> >> >> >> behaves > >> >> >> >> >> >> differently > >> >> >> >> >> >> from the one we're in. You're trying to violate the > >> >> >> >> >> >> principle > >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> identity, > >> >> >> >> >> >> which pretty much hoses logic completely. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > The objection that if it followed the same known laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively > >> >> >> >> >> >> > experienced, > >> >> >> >> >> >> > if > >> >> >> >> >> >> > it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the > >> >> >> >> >> >> > known > >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics don't reference subjective experiences, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> We do not note any subjective experiences in the absence > >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> brains. > >> >> >> >> >> >> Thus we are justified in holding the tentative conclusion > >> >> >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> brains are required for subjective experience. Since we > >> >> >> >> >> >> note > >> >> >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> >> >> manipulation of the physical brain produces changes in > >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, we are justified in holding the tentative > >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusion > >> >> >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective experience depends on the arrangement of matter > >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> brain. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > thus it is > >> >> >> >> >> >> > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both > >> >> >> >> >> >> > following > >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having > >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences and one not, without the need for any of the > >> >> >> >> >> >> > known > >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> > of physics to be altered. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> So this is a "Consciousness of the Gaps" argument? > > >> >> >> >> >> > Do you accept that you could conceptually due to the > >> >> >> >> >> > known > >> >> >> >> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> > physics not referencing subjective experiences, have a two > >> >> >> >> >> > universes > >> >> >> >> >> > which both followed the same known laws of physics, and > >> >> >> >> >> > yet > >> >> >> >> >> > in > >> >> >> >> >> > one, > >> >> >> >> >> > a given mechanism gave rise to subjective experiences, and > >> >> >> >> >> > in > >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> > other it didn't? > > >> >> >> >> >> No. > > >> >> >> >> >> I'm a materialist, and you're asking me to abandon the > >> >> >> >> >> principle > >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> identity. You're asking me to abandon logic. > > >> >> >> >> >> I will not do so. > > >> >> >> >> > Sit in denial if you like, > > >> >> >> >> Thank you, I will keep adhering to logic. > > >> >> >> >> > but it is conceptually possible to consider > >> >> >> >> > two universes following the same known laws of physics, and > >> >> >> >> > yet > >> >> >> >> > one > >> >> >> >> > having subjective experiences and the other not, > > >> >> >> >> Well, I can conceive of a universe just like this one that > >> >> >> >> doesn't > >> >> >> >> have > >> >> >> >> subjective experiences, but it would be trillions of years > >> >> >> >> further > >> >> >> >> along > >> >> >> >> its > >> >> >> >> timeline where proton decay has finally removed all matter from > >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> universe. No matter, no subjective experiences. > > >> >> >> >> > because the laws of > >> >> >> >> > physics don't reference whether anything subjectively > >> >> >> >> > experiences. > > >> >> >> >> How do you know they don't? If you record the actions of all the > >> >> >> >> atoms > >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> my > >> >> >> >> brain, then you'll have a complete record of my subjective > >> >> >> >> experiences > >> >> >> >> if > >> >> >> >> materialism is correct. > > >> >> >> >> > So > >> >> >> >> > you can sit there not being able to even face thinking about > >> >> >> >> > it > > >> >> >> >> Actually, I just showed I can think about it. It's just stupid. > > >> >> >> >> > because it would show your whole world perspective to be > >> >> >> >> > implausible, > > >> >> >> >> You haven't managed to do that yet to anyone's satisfaction. > >> >> >> >> It's > >> >> >> >> just > >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> making an assertion. No one else appears to agree with you. > > >> >> >> >> > but it seems to me pathetic and cowardly to not be able to > >> >> >> >> > face > >> >> >> >> > reason. > > >> >> >> >> It is pathetic and cowardly not to be able to face reason, is > >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> your > >> >> >> >> excuse? > > >> >> >> >> > When you feel brave enough, maybe you'll read it again, and > >> >> >> >> > consider the possibility, and how it highlights how you had > >> >> >> >> > been > >> >> >> >> > deceived. > > >> >> >> >> By the same logic, you're terrified by materialism and can't > >> >> >> >> face > >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> truth. > > >> >> >> >> See how bland assertions don't get you anywhere? > > >> >> >> > Unlike you, I'm not afraid of following reason though. If you > >> >> >> > were > >> >> >> > to > >> >> >> > ask me to conceptually consider that God didn't exist for example > >> >> >> > to > >> >> >> > highlight a point you were making, I wouldn't turn around and > >> >> >> > reply > >> >> >> > that I couldn't, and that I'd refuse to, as you did about an > >> >> >> > alternative universe which followed the same known laws of > >> >> >> > physics > >> >> >> > but > >> >> >> > in which there were no subjective experiences. > > >> >> >> What if I asked you to believe that god did exist and didn't exist > >> >> >> at > >> >> >> the > >> >> >> same time? That's the equivalent of what you asked me to do. It's > >> >> >> not > >> >> >> that I > >> >> >> don't want to conceive of such things, it's that I can't. Maybe you > >> >> >> can > >> >> >> hold > >> >> >> two mutually contradictory ideas in your head at once and call both > >> >> >> true, > >> >> >> but I can't. I have to respect logic. > > >> >> >> Besides, I admitted I could conceive of such a universe, and > >> >> >> described > >> >> >> how > >> >> >> it would have to be. Another way would be if the universe didn't > >> >> >> have > >> >> >> any > >> >> >> matter in it because of a perfectly balanced ratio of matter to > >> >> >> antimatter. > >> >> >> All that's required is that a universe be in such a state that > >> >> >> brains > >> >> >> cannot > >> >> >> form. Without brains, you have no consciousness. > > >> >> >> But you don't like my solution to your little conundrum, so you > >> >> >> pretend I > >> >> >> didn't respond. > > >> >> >> > I'm sure if it had been > >> >> >> > a thought experiment which could have been used to pose a > >> >> >> > question > >> >> >> > about how could God exist, then you would have had no problem, > >> >> >> > but > >> >> >> > because it points out how your world view is implausible, you'd > >> >> >> > rather > >> >> >> > be deaf and blind about the matter, and not even consider it. > > >> >> >> No. Please acknowledge that I conceived of your stupid universe > >> >> >> scenario. > > >> >> >> It's you who are unable to conceive of the idea that your scenario > >> >> >> might > >> >> >> be > >> >> >> silly. > > >> >> >> > You aren't adhering to logic, you are refusing to look at it > >> >> >> > reasonably. > > >> >> >> You have not shown that to be the case. Until you do, you're just > >> >> >> blabbering. > > >> >> >> > It isn't as though it couldn't be done, for example if a > >> >> >> > robot behaved > > >> >> >> What? Universes and robots are equivalent in your mind? > > >> >> >> > as though it might have subjective experiences, i.e. it > >> >> >> > talked about them etc, you could surely conceive of that either > >> >> >> > (a) > >> >> >> > it > >> >> >> > did have, or (b) it didn't have. > > >> >> >> Yes. So what? > > >> >> >> > In one universe you could conceive of > >> >> >> > it having subjective experiences, in the other that it didn't. > > >> >> >> You said the universes were the SAME! If they're the same, then > >> >> >> they're > >> >> >> the > >> >> >> same. If one possesses consciousness, then the other one does too. > >> >> >> If > >> >> >> one > >> >> >> doesn't, then the other doesn't either. You can't say they're the > >> >> >> same > >> >> >> but > >> >> >> different. > > >> >> >> > In > >> >> >> > either though it would be acting just the same, as in both it > >> >> >> > would > >> >> >> > simply just be a mechanism following the known laws of physics. > > >> >> >> In other words, the same but different. Sorry, that violates the > >> >> >> principle > >> >> >> of identity. A cannot equal NOT A. You've cast logic out the > >> >> >> window. > > >> >> >> > The > >> >> >> > same would apply to humans if you were to consider them to be > >> >> >> > simply > >> >> >> > biological mechanisms following the known laws of physics, even > >> >> >> > if > >> >> >> > you > >> >> >> > run from logic and reason, when it goes against your unfounded > >> >> >> > bias. > > >> >> >> Phrase your question where it does not violate fundamental > >> >> >> principle > >> >> >> of > >> >> >> logic and I might entertain it. > > >> >> > It is simply a case of both universes following the known laws of > >> >> > physics. > > >> >> Then as far as we know, they're THE SAME! We will expect exactly the > >> >> same > >> >> behaviors in both. > > >> >> > There was no need to add other differences to them as you did > >> >> > to avoid facing the issue. > > >> >> The distant future universe with no matter is not different from ours. > >> >> It's > >> >> exactly the same. Our universe will be exactly that universe. > > >> >> > Which bit are you finding illogical? > > >> >> The part where you say something is the same, but different. Logic > >> >> dictates > >> >> that things that are the same CAN'T be different. > > >> >> If you want to throw out logic, that's fine, but the discussion ends > >> >> there. > > >> >> > Supposing there was a robot that > >> >> > behaved as though it might be conscious. You could know how it > >> >> > worked, > >> >> > but it wouldn't tell you anything about whether it was subjectively > >> >> > experienced or not. > > >> >> What? I don't know that. It could easily be that if I knew how it > >> >> worked, > >> >> I'd know whether it had subjective experiences or not. > > >> >> > Now in the thought experiment, in one universe it > >> >> > could be considered that it did have subjective experiences, in the > >> >> > other that it did not. > > >> >> It? What it? The robot? The robot wasn't involved in your universe > >> >> scenario > >> >> until just now. > > >> >> So the robot works differently in the two universes. Ok...So...? > > >> >> > By doing so you could see that whether it did > >> >> > or didn't it couldn't affect its behaviour, as in both, it will > >> >> > simply > >> >> > behave the same, i.e. follow the laws of physics, so in fact it > >> >> > isn't > >> >> > only logical, it is a useful tool. > > >> >> No. It still makes no sense. If the same operation results in > >> >> consciousness > >> >> in one universe, and no consciousness in the other universe, then the > >> >> universes are different. > > >> >> One would expect different behaviors in different universes with > >> >> different > >> >> laws. > > >> >> > It shows the implausibility of your > >> >> > world view for starters. > > >> >> No. It doesn't appear to do that at all. > > >> >> > Is truthfully so difficult for you, or is it > >> >> > that you can't face applying reason to your perspective? > > >> >> You have yet to establish that you are speaking truthfully. Or > >> >> utilizing > >> >> reason. > > >> > How would knowing that the behaviour of the robot was explainable in > >> > terms of it following the known laws of physics, give you any > >> > indication of whether it subjectively experienced or not. > > >> I didn't say it would. I offered the possibility that it could. YOU are > >> the > >> one making the absolute statement said it wouldn't. > > >> Care to back up that assertion? > > >> > You seem to > >> > be living in some sci-fi fantasy world. > > >> And you don't seem to understand the difference between a speculation and > >> a > >> statement of fact. > > >> > Regarding the thought experiment, the robots would both be following > >> > the same known laws of physics. So perhaps you could explain why you > >> > suggest they would act differently. > > >> Robots? This is the first time you've suggested more than one robot. You > >> seem to enjoy adding more and more items to your scenarios willy-nilly > >> before we've even settled the original point you're trying to make. > > >> Ok, are we talking identical robots in identical universes? Then I > >> suppose > >> they'd behave exactly the same. > > >> If we're talking robots that are different in identical universes, then I > >> suppose they'd behave differently. > > >> If we're talking identical robots in universes that are different, then I > >> suppose they'd behave differently. > > >> And if we're talking robots that are different in universes that are > >> different, I suppose they'd behave differently there too. (Unless there > >> was > >> the unlikely event that the differences cancelled each other out.) > > >> I can't think of another permutation. Did I answer your question? It > >> boils > >> down to things that are the same act the same, and things that are > >> different > >> act different. Did you want me to go into some sort of explanation of > >> this > >> conclusion? It seems pretty self explanatory. > > >> If, on the other hand, you're back to your "The universes are the same, > >> but > >> magically different" tune, then I have no answer for you, as you've > >> abandoned logic and I can't follow you there. > > > Well there are two universes, and a robot in each, so how is it the > > first time it was mentioned that there were two of them? > > Now you're being disingenuous. I can look back in this thread and see that > you started the argument with two universes. Then several posts later, you > dragged in a robot that behaved differently in each universe. Then a few > posts later you dragged in another robot. > > People CAN read, you know. > > > The universes are the same in regards to the known laws of physics. > > In case you weren't aware, the laws of physics don't touch on the > > subject of whether anything is subjectively experienced or not. > > Then stop talking about it. > > > Therefore you could conceptually have two universes, which both follow > > the same laws of physics, and yet in one, the mechanism had no > > subjective experiences, and the other it did. > > So the universes are not the same. > > > So no the universes > > wouldn't be identical, they would simply both follow the known laws of > > physics. > > So you admit you are postulating two universes that are different. > > > Regarding the question, how would knowing that the behaviour of the > > robot was explainable in > > terms of it following the known laws of physics, give you any > > indication of whether it subjectively experienced or not, you didn't > > answer it. > > That's not the question you asked. But I'll answer this one. > > It wouldn't. It wouldn't give you any indication. You would have to know how > it worked to do that. > > > As for backing up the assertion, well it is backed up by > > the fact that there would be no indication, and that neither you nor > > any materialist experiencing the physical world could point to one. > > But that's not the claim I asked you to back up. I asked you to back up THIS > one: "Supposing there was a robot that behaved as though it might be > conscious. You could know how it worked, but it wouldn't tell you anything > about whether it was subjectively experienced or not." > > The claim above stated that I KNEW HOW IT WORKED, not just that I knew it > operated according to the laws of physics. Your clumsy use of language > implies that I have all sorts of knowledge about the robot. That I can > follow all the operations of the mechanical brain. If that's the case, It's > just as likely that I can open the user interface of the robot and see what > it says under the "Subjective Experience" tab. That'll tell me all I need to > know. > > > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: > > > ------------- > > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program > > "Philosophy Talk". > > > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy > > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to look > > at it, and there are two scenarios: > > > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft > > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and > > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a > > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does > > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's > > happening, more or less. > > > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard > > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and > > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a > > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how > > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where > > it's happening, more or less. > > > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is > > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? > > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. > > I see no reason in either case to change my opinion. > > > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering > > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on > > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in > > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we > > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves > > consciousness? > > No. But if someone built the computer that we have decided is conscious, it > implies that the guy who built it knows how to achieve consciousness in a > computer. > > Of course, that's a necessarily tentative conclusion, because we know that > we could be wrong about the computer being conscious. Heck, we could be > wrong about the meat brain being conscious too. > > > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > > I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, and > > you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I > > explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the > > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what > > basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did > > because it had subjective experiences? > > I would have to be assured that the physical operation of the robot, > following known laws of physics, didn't actually constitute consciousness. > > > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any > > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism > > following the known laws of physics. > > No. > > For it to behave a certain way without consciousness, it would have to be > programmed differently to behave the same way with consciousness. > > > So its behaviour, if you still > > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be > > said to be influenced by them, > > No. Consciousness appears to modify behavior. Conscious things usually move > about, unconscious things usually lie inert. > > > as it would be expected to act the same > > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective > > experiences. > > It can be programmed to fool me. So what? > > > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following > > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > No. > > We are biological machanisms following the laws of physics. Our subjective > experiences are part of that biological mechanism. The biological mechanism > determines our behavior. Therefore subjective experience, as part of our > biological mechanism following the laws of physics, affects our behavior. > > > They in > > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, > > As part of the biological mechanism that determines our behavior, they do. > > > which would mean it > > would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective > > experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the > > behaviour. The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. > > Well, when an argument is as wrong as yours, stupid conclusions are to be > expected. > > > As I've said, you seem to having problems facing this point, but it is > > a fact regarding the known laws of physics nevertheless. > > And you have trouble facing the idea that you might be wrong. > It seems you can't read. There were initially two universes, and a robot in each, and it remained so. It also seems you are unable to follow the points being made, and avoided the questions. For example where I said: ------- To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did because it had subjective experiences? ------- To which you replied: ------- I would have to be assured that the physical operation of the robot, following known laws of physics, didn't actually constitute consciousness. ------- Avoiding totally stating on what basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did because it had subjective experiences? You also were seemingly unable to comprehend that even if you were to regard it as having subjective experiences, it would still be behaving as it would be expected to without the assumption that it was. Quote
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