Guest someone2 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 05:00, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181101365.448809.6120@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > > > What assumptions did I make? > > Many .. just about everything you say is either a tautology or an > unsupported assertion. > > > I just simply stated the FACT that the > > laws of physics don't reference subjective experiences, > > That's correct. That does NOT mean they do not apply to it, or that they > cannot describe or model it. > > > and that in the case of a robot, even if you were to assume that it did > > have > > subjective experiences, > > Please define "subjective experiences" > > > you couldn't claim they were influential, > > Yes .. one can. Again .. you assert that one cannot do something that one > can clearly do. As evidence, human beings have subjective experiences and > they influence their behaviour. There is no reason to assume a robot would > be any different if it too has subjective experiences. > > > as the robot would be behaving exactly as you would expect it to without > > the added assumption that it had subjective experiences. > > Again, an assumption that the subjective experiences of the robot cannot > influence its behaviour. You have no ground for making that assertion. You > cannot prove yourself right through circular reasoning. So state one of the assumptions that you claim I made. How can you claim that subjective experiences were influencing the behaviour of the robot if it were behaving exactly as expected without the assumption that it had any subjective experiences? Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181102279.036851.309750@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> So .. the burden of proof is on you to >> >> 1) define subjective experience >> >> And >> >> 2) show that either: >> >> ( ) biological mechanisms cannot have subjective experiences >> ( ) subjective experiences cannot affect the behaviour of biological >> mechanisms > > I'm not getting into defining subjective experiences, you can pretend > that you don't experience being in the physical world if you wish, and > that you have no idea what I am referencing, its up to you. The question is do YOU know what YOU are talking about, and are we talking about the same thing. What is it you mean by "subjective experiences" .. is it the emiotions you feel about things that happen, is it experiences that we perceive as happening in the subjective model of the real world .. what exactly is it .. as "subjective experience"appears crucial to your agrument, you MUSThave a good idea of what it is. So .. do share it with us. > Neither have I stated that biological mechanisms cannot have > subjective experiences. Great .. so do you still have a point to make? > I have shown that subjective experiences could > not affect the behaviour of any mechanism biological > or otherwise But it does. > if it simply followed the known laws of physics. But you admit humans have subjective experiences (whatever you mean by that) and they affect human behaviour. So does that mean human behaviour does not follow the known laws of physics? > This was shown by the > fact that a mechanism such as a robot which follows the known laws of > physics, would always be behaving exactly as you would expect it to, Its behaviour could be explained yes.. whether or not it can be predicted (ie for you to expect something) is adifferent matter. > without the added assumption that it had subjective experiences. You have not shown that .. you've simply asserted it. Where is your proof for that assertion? > Which > would mean, if we were thought to be simply a biological mechanism > which simply followed the laws of physics, our behaviour could not be > affected by having any subjective experiences, You have not shown that .. you've simply asserted it. Where is your proof for that assertion? > which would mean it > would be a coincidence that we actually have the subjective > experiences that we are currently discussing, as having them couldn't > be influencing our behaviour. We know that is not the caes, so that would mean there is an error in your premises or your logic. > The coincidence shows the suggestion > that we are simply a biological mechanism following the known laws of > physics to be implausible No .. it doesn't at all. > (this is not the same as impossible, because > you could always claim that it is just a coincidence we have the > subjective experiences we are discussing). What I claim is that you have made assertions and provided no proof whatsoever to back them up. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181102396.521378.15370@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > On 6 Jun, 04:56, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1181101163.939465.160590@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> > You didn't understand the point. >> >> You simply don't make one sucessfully .. you just assert >> >> > It is implausible that we are simply >> > a biological mechanism, for if we were then we couldn't be talking >> > about them >> >> does them = "subjective experiences" ? >> >> > because they existed >> >> why .. if they exist, why can't we talk about them? Or do you claim that >> it >> is not physically possible to have subjective experiences? If so, what >> are >> your grounds for such a claim. >> >> > , it would have to be a coincidence. >> >> why? >> >> > So >> > you can see, that skipping over this, and making statements in regards >> > to whether the explanation of how the robot functioned could apply to >> > us, as though it was the coincidence, is obscuring the point, as it is >> > implausible that we are simply a biological mechanism. >> >> Word salad >> >> > With regards to where I said: >> > ------- >> > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following >> > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way >> > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. >> > ------- >> >> > And you replied: >> > ------- >> > No I dont see that. >> > ------- >> >> Because the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises. >> >> > Did you manage to understand why it would be the case with the robot, >> >> You've not shown it to be the case with the robot >> >> > in that it would be acting as expected to without the added assumption >> > that it had subjective experiences? >> >> If it had the experiences, then they would form part of its mechanism and >> its behaviour. If it did not, then it would be a different mechanism and >> behaviour. >> >> You really are not making any logical sense here. You make a lot of >> assumption and assertions and prove none of them, yet expect us to agree >> with the conclusion you attempt to erroneously draw from them. Think >> your >> arguments through more thoroughly. > > Now you are just being pathetic, Pathetic is what your arguments have been so far. You make assertions and write tautologies and expect others to accept them without proof. > I am already corresponding with you, You are now .. you weren't before > and you are just posting to other converstations, other than the one > we are having, presumably in the hope you can claim that I didn't > respond to you. If you respond to me, then I won't claim that .. if you do not respond, then I will. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181103051.931034.31370@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > On 6 Jun, 05:00, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1181101365.448809.6120@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... >> >> > What assumptions did I make? >> >> Many .. just about everything you say is either a tautology or an >> unsupported assertion. >> >> > I just simply stated the FACT that the >> > laws of physics don't reference subjective experiences, >> >> That's correct. That does NOT mean they do not apply to it, or that they >> cannot describe or model it. >> >> > and that in the case of a robot, even if you were to assume that it did >> > have >> > subjective experiences, >> >> Please define "subjective experiences" >> >> > you couldn't claim they were influential, >> >> Yes .. one can. Again .. you assert that one cannot do something that >> one >> can clearly do. As evidence, human beings have subjective experiences >> and >> they influence their behaviour. There is no reason to assume a robot >> would >> be any different if it too has subjective experiences. >> >> > as the robot would be behaving exactly as you would expect it to >> > without >> > the added assumption that it had subjective experiences. >> >> Again, an assumption that the subjective experiences of the robot cannot >> influence its behaviour. You have no ground for making that assertion. >> You >> cannot prove yourself right through circular reasoning. > > So state one of the assumptions that you claim I made. I already have > How can you claim that subjective experiences were influencing the > behaviour of the robot if it were behaving exactly as expected without > the assumption that it had any subjective experiences? You are only asserting that the behaviour is the same .. you've not given any reasoning for why it would be. Quote
Guest Richo Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On Jun 6, 1:39 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 6 Jun, 04:30, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > On Jun 6, 12:34 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 6 Jun, 03:29, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > On Jun 5, 1:18 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 5 Jun, 02:23, Matt Silberstein > > > > > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > > > > On Mon, 04 Jun 2007 17:16:13 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > > <1181002573.602439.47...@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > > > > [snip] > > > > > > > >Sorry, I hadn't written it clearly enough. > > > > > > > >Do do you accept that conceptually the behaviour of any mechanism > > > > > > >following the known laws of physics could be explained in terms of the > > > > > > >physical mechanism > > > > > > >following the known laws of physics, and that this will not reference > > > > > > >whether there are any associated subjective experiences or not? > > > > > > > Sorry but that still seems to assume that subjective experience either > > > > > > does not exist or is not a physical phenomenon. If subjective > > > > > > experience is a physical phenomenon then our explanations will > > > > > > reference that experience. Perhaps the problem you have with wording > > > > > > this is that you have some bad assumptions. > > > > > > It doesn't make any assumptions. It is a fact that the known laws of > > > > > physics don't reference subjective experiences. > > > > >So it is a fact that > > > > > the behaviour of any mechanism following the known laws of physics can > > > > > be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the said > > > > > laws, > > > > > "Can be" means it is possible. > > > > That is not the same as saying Matt or anyone alive can do it right > > > > now - it just says its possible. > > > > You are apparently saying it is not possible. > > > > How do you know it is not possible? > > > > > No one has done it so far. > > > > There are still areas of science for which we do not know the whole > > > > story - which is good - there is still something for science to do. > > > > > > and as they don't reference whether there are any associated > > > > > subjective experiences, the explanation won't reference whether there > > > > > are any associated subjective experiences. > > > > > We haven't got the explanation in front of us - so we cannot say what > > > > it looks like. > > > > You are speculating that IF we ever get a complete explanation of the > > > > phenomenon of consciousness in purely physical terms then it will not > > > > refer to the subjective experiences. > > > > This is a hypothetical and also it seems to me that if it did not > > > > account for the subjective experiences it would not qualify as > > > > "complete". > > > > You are really saying that any incomplete explanation of conscious > > > > experience would exclude the subjective. > > > > I would agree with that. > > > > > > Since it is obvious you can't deny that the behaviour of any mechanism > > > > > following the known laws of physics can conceptually be explained in > > > > > terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, > > > > > I dont deny that t is possible - such an explanation my not exist > > > > for another 500 years. > > > > > > are you denying that it is a fact that the known laws of physics don't > > > > > reference whether there are any associated subjective experiences? > > > > > The laws of physics don't reference the existence of vanilla ice > > > > cream - but that does not imply that anything about the existence of > > > > vanilla ice cream is in conflict with the laws of physics. > > > > I'm not sure what you are suggesting I am saying is impossible. > > > The point of your questions is - I presume - to get us to think that > > conciousness as we experience cannot be explained by the known laws of > > physics. > > Many people are trying to find such an explanation - Francis Crick > > (till his death) and his student Koch , Daniel Dennet, Marvin Minsky > > etc. > > You are saying they cannot succeed. > > That it is impossible for them to succeed. > > The only fact you have at hand is that they haven't done it yet. > > > > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: > > > > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: > > > ------------- > > > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program > > > "Philosophy Talk". > > > > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy > > > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to ook > > > at it, and there are two scenarios: > > > > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft > > > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and > > > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a > > > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does > > > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's > > > happening, more or less. > > > > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard > > > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and > > > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a > > > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how > > > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where > > > it's happening, more or less. > > > > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is > > > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? > > > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. > > > > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering > > > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on > > > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in > > > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we > > > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves > > > consciousness? > > > ------------- > > > > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > > > if I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, > > > and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, > > > I explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of > > > the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on > > > what basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it > > > did because it had subjective experiences? > > > Well this is a hypothetical but let us imagine the possible > > consequences: > > Did your explanation of how the mechanism generate the appearance of > > conscious subjective experience also apply equally well to you and > > me? > > If so then there is obviously no dilemma - you have produced an > > explanation of conscious subjective experience entirely in terms of > > the known laws of physics. Further study and experimentation could be > > designed to test this explanation to see if it holds up - if it does > > Nobel prizes and fame forever is yours. > > > IF your explanation of how the mechanism generated the the appearence > > of conscious subjective experience does NOT apply to you and I then > > obviously we could decide that such an explanation is not possible OR > > we could keep looking for one. > > So in short it would leave us where we are now. > > > > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any > > > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > I can see it would depend on the circumastances as outlined above. > > > > So its behaviour, if you still > > > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be > > > said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same > > > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective > > > experiences. > > > You observe what you observe - whether or not you understand the > > mechanism behind what you observe. > > That it is possible for you to misunderstand or to simply not > > understand what is happening does not mean that it is impossible for > > all time to not understand the mechanism behind something. > > > > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism ollowing > > > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > > > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > > No I dont see that. > > > > They in > > > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it > > > would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective > > > experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the > > > behaviour). The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. > > > We were theorizing that the conscious subjective experiences were > > caused by the underlying known laws of physics. > > Now you are saying they would be "coincidental" - they certainly would > > not be if they caused by the operation of the known laws of physics. > > You didn't understand the point. That is possible. > It is implausible that we are simply > a biological mechanism, for if we were then we couldn't be talking > about them because they existed, it would have to be a coincidence. Why. >So > you can see, that skipping over this, and making statements in regards > to whether the explanation of how the robot functioned could apply to > us, as though it was the coincidence, is obscuring the point, as it is > implausible that we are simply a biological mechanism. > Why is it implausible. > With regards to where I said: > ------- > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > ------- > > And you replied: > ------- > No I dont see that. > ------- > > Did you manage to understand why it would be the case with the robot, > in that it would be acting as expected to without the added assumption > that it had subjective experiences? I assume you are conscious and have subjective experiences because I have them and so I think that beings that resemble me also have them. If I encountered a Robot/computer/alien being that gave all the indications that it was having subjective experiences I could assume that it was and see what it and I had in common that could account for us both having these experiences. I could assume that neither the robot nor you had any such experiences - but that would be dangerous. Since ethics is based upon compassion and empathy for our fellow creatures. It is possible that I am the only conscious being on the planet that has subjective experiences and that all the rest of you are all robots following your programming. I make the choice to believe otherwise. Cheers, mark. Quote
Guest someone3 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 05:40, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181102279.036851.309750@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> So .. the burden of proof is on you to > > >> 1) define subjective experience > > >> And > > >> 2) show that either: > > >> ( ) biological mechanisms cannot have subjective experiences > >> ( ) subjective experiences cannot affect the behaviour of biological > >> mechanisms > > > I'm not getting into defining subjective experiences, you can pretend > > that you don't experience being in the physical world if you wish, and > > that you have no idea what I am referencing, its up to you. > > The question is do YOU know what YOU are talking about, and are we talking > about the same thing. > > What is it you mean by "subjective experiences" .. is it the emiotions you > feel about things that happen, is it experiences that we perceive as > happening in the subjective model of the real world .. what exactly is it .. > as "subjective experience"appears crucial to your agrument, you MUSThave a > good idea of what it is. So .. do share it with us. > > > Neither have I stated that biological mechanisms cannot have > > subjective experiences. > > Great .. so do you still have a point to make? > > > I have shown that subjective experiences could > > not affect the behaviour of any mechanism biological > > or otherwise > > But it does. > > > if it simply followed the known laws of physics. > > But you admit humans have subjective experiences (whatever you mean by that) > and they affect human behaviour. So does that mean human behaviour does not > follow the known laws of physics? > > > This was shown by the > > fact that a mechanism such as a robot which follows the known laws of > > physics, would always be behaving exactly as you would expect it to, > > Its behaviour could be explained yes.. whether or not it can be predicted > (ie for you to expect something) is adifferent matter. > > > without the added assumption that it had subjective experiences. > > You have not shown that .. you've simply asserted it. Where is your proof > for that assertion? > > > Which > > would mean, if we were thought to be simply a biological mechanism > > which simply followed the laws of physics, our behaviour could not be > > affected by having any subjective experiences, > > You have not shown that .. you've simply asserted it. Where is your proof > for that assertion? > > > which would mean it > > would be a coincidence that we actually have the subjective > > experiences that we are currently discussing, as having them couldn't > > be influencing our behaviour. > > We know that is not the caes, so that would mean there is an error in your > premises or your logic. > > > The coincidence shows the suggestion > > that we are simply a biological mechanism following the known laws of > > physics to be implausible > > No .. it doesn't at all. > > > (this is not the same as impossible, because > > you could always claim that it is just a coincidence we have the > > subjective experiences we are discussing). > > What I claim is that you have made assertions and provided no proof > whatsoever to back them up. As for your examples of subjective experiences, yes they all are subjective experiences. If the robot is simply following the known laws of physics, which don't reference whether anything is subjectively experienced, then it would behaving exactly as it would be expected to if it didn't have subjective experiences. This isn't an assertion, it is simply that there would be no need to assume that it did have subjective experiences in order to explain its behaviour. If you dispute this is the case, simply state why the explanation would need to include the concept of it having subjective experiences, i.e. couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics (i.e. without including the concept of it having subjective experiences), in the same way the behaviour of a car or mobile phone can be explained without including the concept of it having subjective experiences. True you could add the assumption that they did, but it wouldn't be required for an explanation of their behaviour. They act the same as you would expect them to if they didn't, as would any mechanism following the known laws of physics. Quote
Guest someone3 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 05:45, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181103051.931034.31370@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > > > > > > On 6 Jun, 05:00, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >>news:1181101365.448809.6120@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > > >> > What assumptions did I make? > > >> Many .. just about everything you say is either a tautology or an > >> unsupported assertion. > > >> > I just simply stated the FACT that the > >> > laws of physics don't reference subjective experiences, > > >> That's correct. That does NOT mean they do not apply to it, or that they > >> cannot describe or model it. > > >> > and that in the case of a robot, even if you were to assume that it did > >> > have > >> > subjective experiences, > > >> Please define "subjective experiences" > > >> > you couldn't claim they were influential, > > >> Yes .. one can. Again .. you assert that one cannot do something that > >> one > >> can clearly do. As evidence, human beings have subjective experiences > >> and > >> they influence their behaviour. There is no reason to assume a robot > >> would > >> be any different if it too has subjective experiences. > > >> > as the robot would be behaving exactly as you would expect it to > >> > without > >> > the added assumption that it had subjective experiences. > > >> Again, an assumption that the subjective experiences of the robot cannot > >> influence its behaviour. You have no ground for making that assertion. > >> You > >> cannot prove yourself right through circular reasoning. > > > So state one of the assumptions that you claim I made. > > I already have > > > How can you claim that subjective experiences were influencing the > > behaviour of the robot if it were behaving exactly as expected without > > the assumption that it had any subjective experiences? > > You are only asserting that the behaviour is the same .. you've not given > any reasoning for why it would be. > Well consider the robot. You can explain its behaviour in terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics. Now whether it did or didn't have subjective experiences (and you don't know whether it does or doesn't), what difference would you expect see? If there was an expected difference you could test for it, but how could there be, if either way all the mechanism would ever do is simply follow the known laws of physics. I have given reasons, the reason is that the explanation will be the same (the physical mechanism following the laws of physics), and it doesn't reference whether or not there would be any subjective experiences. Also regarding the assumptions, why don't you simply state one here, are you too lazy? Quote
Guest someone3 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 05:54, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > On Jun 6, 1:39 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > On 6 Jun, 04:30, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > On Jun 6, 12:34 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 6 Jun, 03:29, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > > On Jun 5, 1:18 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 5 Jun, 02:23, Matt Silberstein > > > > > > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On Mon, 04 Jun 2007 17:16:13 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > > > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > > > <1181002573.602439.47...@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > [snip] > > > > > > > > >Sorry, I hadn't written it clearly enough. > > > > > > > > >Do do you accept that conceptually the behaviour of any mechanism > > > > > > > >following the known laws of physics could be explained in terms of the > > > > > > > >physical mechanism > > > > > > > >following the known laws of physics, and that this will not reference > > > > > > > >whether there are any associated subjective experiences or not? > > > > > > > > Sorry but that still seems to assume that subjective experience either > > > > > > > does not exist or is not a physical phenomenon. If subjective > > > > > > > experience is a physical phenomenon then our explanations will > > > > > > > reference that experience. Perhaps the problem you have with wording > > > > > > > this is that you have some bad assumptions. > > > > > > > It doesn't make any assumptions. It is a fact that the known laws of > > > > > > physics don't reference subjective experiences. > > > > > >So it is a fact that > > > > > > the behaviour of any mechanism following the known laws of physics can > > > > > > be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the said > > > > > > laws, > > > > > > "Can be" means it is possible. > > > > > That is not the same as saying Matt or anyone alive can do it right > > > > > now - it just says its possible. > > > > > You are apparently saying it is not possible. > > > > > How do you know it is not possible? > > > > > > No one has done it so far. > > > > > There are still areas of science for which we do not know the whole > > > > > story - which is good - there is still something for science to do. > > > > > > > and as they don't reference whether there are any associated > > > > > > subjective experiences, the explanation won't reference whether there > > > > > > are any associated subjective experiences. > > > > > > We haven't got the explanation in front of us - so we cannot say what > > > > > it looks like. > > > > > You are speculating that IF we ever get a complete explanation of the > > > > > phenomenon of consciousness in purely physical terms then it will not > > > > > refer to the subjective experiences. > > > > > This is a hypothetical and also it seems to me that if it did not > > > > > account for the subjective experiences it would not qualify as > > > > > "complete". > > > > > You are really saying that any incomplete explanation of conscious > > > > > experience would exclude the subjective. > > > > > I would agree with that. > > > > > > > Since it is obvious you can't deny that the behaviour of any mechanism > > > > > > following the known laws of physics can conceptually be explained in > > > > > > terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, > > > > > > I dont deny that t is possible - such an explanation my not exist > > > > > for another 500 years. > > > > > > > are you denying that it is a fact that the known laws of physics don't > > > > > > reference whether there are any associated subjective experiences? > > > > > > The laws of physics don't reference the existence of vanilla ice > > > > > cream - but that does not imply that anything about the existence of > > > > > vanilla ice cream is in conflict with the laws of physics. > > > > > I'm not sure what you are suggesting I am saying is impossible. > > > > The point of your questions is - I presume - to get us to think that > > > conciousness as we experience cannot be explained by the known laws of > > > physics. > > > Many people are trying to find such an explanation - Francis Crick > > > (till his death) and his student Koch , Daniel Dennet, Marvin Minsky > > > etc. > > > You are saying they cannot succeed. > > > That it is impossible for them to succeed. > > > The only fact you have at hand is that they haven't done it yet. > > > > > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: > > > > > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: > > > > ------------- > > > > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program > > > > "Philosophy Talk". > > > > > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy > > > > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to ook > > > > at it, and there are two scenarios: > > > > > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft > > > > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and > > > > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a > > > > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does > > > > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's > > > > happening, more or less. > > > > > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard > > > > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and > > > > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a > > > > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how > > > > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where > > > > it's happening, more or less. > > > > > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is > > > > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? > > > > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. > > > > > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering > > > > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on > > > > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in > > > > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we > > > > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves > > > > consciousness? > > > > ------------- > > > > > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > > > > if I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, > > > > and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, > > > > I explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of > > > > the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on > > > > what basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it > > > > did because it had subjective experiences? > > > > Well this is a hypothetical but let us imagine the possible > > > consequences: > > > Did your explanation of how the mechanism generate the appearance of > > > conscious subjective experience also apply equally well to you and > > > me? > > > If so then there is obviously no dilemma - you have produced an > > > explanation of conscious subjective experience entirely in terms of > > > the known laws of physics. Further study and experimentation could be > > > designed to test this explanation to see if it holds up - if it does > > > Nobel prizes and fame forever is yours. > > > > IF your explanation of how the mechanism generated the the appearence > > > of conscious subjective experience does NOT apply to you and I then > > > obviously we could decide that such an explanation is not possible OR > > > we could keep looking for one. > > > So in short it would leave us where we are now. > > > > > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any > > > > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > I can see it would depend on the circumastances as outlined above. > > > > > So its behaviour, if you still > > > > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be > > > > said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same > > > > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective > > > > experiences. > > > > You observe what you observe - whether or not you understand the > > > mechanism behind what you observe. > > > That it is possible for you to misunderstand or to simply not > > > understand what is happening does not mean that it is impossible for > > > all time to not understand the mechanism behind something. > > > > > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism ollowing > > > > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > > > > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > > > No I dont see that. > > > > > They in > > > > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it > > > > would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective > > > > experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the > > > > behaviour). The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. > > > > We were theorizing that the conscious subjective experiences were > > > caused by the underlying known laws of physics. > > > Now you are saying they would be "coincidental" - they certainly would > > > not be if they caused by the operation of the known laws of physics. > > > You didn't understand the point. > > That is possible. > > > It is implausible that we are simply > > a biological mechanism, for if we were then we couldn't be talking > > about them because they existed, it would have to be a coincidence. > > Why. > > >So > > you can see, that skipping over this, and making statements in regards > > to whether the explanation of how the robot functioned could apply to > > us, as though it was the coincidence, is obscuring the point, as it is > > implausible that we are simply a biological mechanism. > > Why is it implausible. > > > With regards to where I said: > > ------- > > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following > > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > ------- > > > And you replied: > > ------- > > No I dont see that. > > ------- > > > Did you manage to understand why it would be the case with the robot, > > in that it would be acting as expected to without the added assumption > > that it had subjective experiences? > > I assume you are conscious and have subjective experiences because I > have them and so I think that beings that resemble me also have them. > If I encountered a Robot/computer/alien being that gave all the > indications that it was having subjective experiences I could assume > that it was and see what it and I had in common that could account for > us both having these experiences. > I could assume that neither the robot nor you had any such experiences > - but that would be dangerous. Since ethics is based upon compassion > and empathy for our fellow creatures. > > It is possible that I am the only conscious being on the planet that > has subjective experiences and that all the rest of you are all robots > following your programming. > I make the choice to believe otherwise. > So if on the robot the behaviour that you thought indicated that it had subjective experiences, was explained to you to simply be the result of the components of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics, and that it was behaving as it was expected to without the added assumption that it was subjectively experiencing, on what basis would you claim that its behaviour indicated that it was subjectively experiencing? Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181106526.090570.99520@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > So if on the robot the behaviour that you thought indicated that it > had subjective experiences, was explained to you to simply be the > result of the components of the physical mechanism following the laws > of physics, So if someone explained to you that human subjective experience are the result of components of the human brain that follow the laws of physcis .. would that mean we can then assume there are no subjective experiences? > and that it was behaving as it was expected to without the > added assumption that it was subjectively experiencing, on what basis > would you claim that its behaviour indicated that it was subjectively > experiencing? You seem to be implying here that because a robot can emulate the behaviour of a mechanism that has subjective behaviour, then that means subjective behaviour is not part of the mechanism being emulated? ie that because a robot without subjective experience can be made to behave in the same way as a person, then that means the subjective experience of a person is not part of the mechanism of the person. The same logic would mean that the muscles in a human being are not physical mechanisms, because we can make a robot that walks but does not have muscles. Your logic is nonsense. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181105766.163105.108880@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > On 6 Jun, 05:40, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1181102279.036851.309750@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> So .. the burden of proof is on you to >> >> >> 1) define subjective experience >> >> >> And >> >> >> 2) show that either: >> >> >> ( ) biological mechanisms cannot have subjective experiences >> >> ( ) subjective experiences cannot affect the behaviour of biological >> >> mechanisms >> >> > I'm not getting into defining subjective experiences, you can pretend >> > that you don't experience being in the physical world if you wish, and >> > that you have no idea what I am referencing, its up to you. >> >> The question is do YOU know what YOU are talking about, and are we >> talking >> about the same thing. >> >> What is it you mean by "subjective experiences" .. is it the emiotions >> you >> feel about things that happen, is it experiences that we perceive as >> happening in the subjective model of the real world .. what exactly is it >> .. >> as "subjective experience"appears crucial to your agrument, you MUSThave >> a >> good idea of what it is. So .. do share it with us. >> >> > Neither have I stated that biological mechanisms cannot have >> > subjective experiences. >> >> Great .. so do you still have a point to make? >> >> > I have shown that subjective experiences could >> > not affect the behaviour of any mechanism biological >> > or otherwise >> >> But it does. >> >> > if it simply followed the known laws of physics. >> >> But you admit humans have subjective experiences (whatever you mean by >> that) >> and they affect human behaviour. So does that mean human behaviour does >> not >> follow the known laws of physics? >> >> > This was shown by the >> > fact that a mechanism such as a robot which follows the known laws of >> > physics, would always be behaving exactly as you would expect it to, >> >> Its behaviour could be explained yes.. whether or not it can be predicted >> (ie for you to expect something) is adifferent matter. >> >> > without the added assumption that it had subjective experiences. >> >> You have not shown that .. you've simply asserted it. Where is your >> proof >> for that assertion? >> >> > Which >> > would mean, if we were thought to be simply a biological mechanism >> > which simply followed the laws of physics, our behaviour could not be >> > affected by having any subjective experiences, >> >> You have not shown that .. you've simply asserted it. Where is your >> proof >> for that assertion? >> >> > which would mean it >> > would be a coincidence that we actually have the subjective >> > experiences that we are currently discussing, as having them couldn't >> > be influencing our behaviour. >> >> We know that is not the caes, so that would mean there is an error in >> your >> premises or your logic. >> >> > The coincidence shows the suggestion >> > that we are simply a biological mechanism following the known laws of >> > physics to be implausible >> >> No .. it doesn't at all. >> >> > (this is not the same as impossible, because >> > you could always claim that it is just a coincidence we have the >> > subjective experiences we are discussing). >> >> What I claim is that you have made assertions and provided no proof >> whatsoever to back them up. > > As for your examples of subjective experiences, yes they all are > subjective experiences. What is it YOU mean by "subjective experience" ? > If the robot is simply following the known laws of physics, Like people do > which > don't reference whether anything is subjectively experienced, nor do they reference vanilla icecream, or the colour of a leaf, or the size of a breadbox or any number of things that they can still explain > then it > would behaving exactly as it would be expected to if it didn't have > subjective experiences. There is your unsupported assertion again. > This isn't an assertion, Yes .. it is > it is simply that > there would be no need to assume that it did have subjective > experiences in order to explain its behaviour. That is an assertion. > If you dispute this is the case, I do .. and the burdne of proof is on you to show proof for your assertion. > simply state why the explanation would need to include the > concept of it having subjective experiences, You need to state why it would NOT. If the mechanism has subjective experiences, then those experiences form part of the meachnism, and so can affect its behaviour. > i.e. couldn't be > explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws > of physics It could be .. and those laws would also explain the subjetive experiences that the mechanism has > (i.e. without including the concept of it having subjective > experiences), Only if the mechanism did not have subjective experiences, or those experiences were not involved in the particular behaviour you ar etrying to explain. > in the same way the behaviour of a car or mobile phone > can be explained without including the concept of it having subjective > experiences. A car or mobile phone does not have subjective experiences. So taking non-existnt experiences into account would be pointless. > True you could add the assumption that they did, but it > wouldn't be required for an explanation of their behaviour. If mobile phones and cars could have subjective experiences, then there is no reason to assume such experiences would not influence its behaviour .. just as it does for human beings. > They act > the same as you would expect them to if they didn't, > as would any > mechanism following the known laws of physics. No .. you only assert that. Please show me a mobile phone with subjective experiences and we'll see. Or rather .. I can show you a mechanism with subjective experiences .. a human being. And you will see that human beings obey all the laws of physics AND are influenced by subjective experiences. Quote
Guest someone3 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 06:31, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181106526.090570.99520@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > > So if on the robot the behaviour that you thought indicated that it > > had subjective experiences, was explained to you to simply be the > > result of the components of the physical mechanism following the laws > > of physics, > > So if someone explained to you that human subjective experience are the > result of components of the human brain that follow the laws of physcis .. > would that mean we can then assume there are no subjective experiences? > > > and that it was behaving as it was expected to without the > > added assumption that it was subjectively experiencing, on what basis > > would you claim that its behaviour indicated that it was subjectively > > experiencing? > > You seem to be implying here that because a robot can emulate the behaviour > of a mechanism that has subjective behaviour, then that means subjective > behaviour is not part of the mechanism being emulated? > > ie that because a robot without subjective experience can be made to behave > in the same way as a person, then that means the subjective experience of a > person is not part of the mechanism of the person. The same logic would > mean that the muscles in a human being are not physical mechanisms, because > we can make a robot that walks but does not have muscles. > > Your logic is nonsense. Again you are posting to converstations that I am having with other people, when you assured me that you wouldn't. As I have said, your behaviour in this regard is pathetic. Quote
Guest Richard Smol Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On Jun 6, 4:23 am, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "Ron Baker, Pluralitas!" <t...@aint.me> wrote in messagenews:4666153e$0$16659$4c368faf@roadrunner.com... > > >> If I could, then it wouldn't be something i don't know > > > So if you don't know the number of cats in Glasgow > > you can't say you don't know the number of > > cats in Glasgow. > > So .. you claim that science knows everything .. No, he doesn't. Learn how to read. RS Quote
Guest someone3 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 06:40, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181105766.163105.108880@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > > > > > > > On 6 Jun, 05:40, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >>news:1181102279.036851.309750@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> So .. the burden of proof is on you to > > >> >> 1) define subjective experience > > >> >> And > > >> >> 2) show that either: > > >> >> ( ) biological mechanisms cannot have subjective experiences > >> >> ( ) subjective experiences cannot affect the behaviour of biological > >> >> mechanisms > > >> > I'm not getting into defining subjective experiences, you can pretend > >> > that you don't experience being in the physical world if you wish, and > >> > that you have no idea what I am referencing, its up to you. > > >> The question is do YOU know what YOU are talking about, and are we > >> talking > >> about the same thing. > > >> What is it you mean by "subjective experiences" .. is it the emiotions > >> you > >> feel about things that happen, is it experiences that we perceive as > >> happening in the subjective model of the real world .. what exactly is it > >> .. > >> as "subjective experience"appears crucial to your agrument, you MUSThave > >> a > >> good idea of what it is. So .. do share it with us. > > >> > Neither have I stated that biological mechanisms cannot have > >> > subjective experiences. > > >> Great .. so do you still have a point to make? > > >> > I have shown that subjective experiences could > >> > not affect the behaviour of any mechanism biological > >> > or otherwise > > >> But it does. > > >> > if it simply followed the known laws of physics. > > >> But you admit humans have subjective experiences (whatever you mean by > >> that) > >> and they affect human behaviour. So does that mean human behaviour does > >> not > >> follow the known laws of physics? > > >> > This was shown by the > >> > fact that a mechanism such as a robot which follows the known laws of > >> > physics, would always be behaving exactly as you would expect it to, > > >> Its behaviour could be explained yes.. whether or not it can be predicted > >> (ie for you to expect something) is adifferent matter. > > >> > without the added assumption that it had subjective experiences. > > >> You have not shown that .. you've simply asserted it. Where is your > >> proof > >> for that assertion? > > >> > Which > >> > would mean, if we were thought to be simply a biological mechanism > >> > which simply followed the laws of physics, our behaviour could not be > >> > affected by having any subjective experiences, > > >> You have not shown that .. you've simply asserted it. Where is your > >> proof > >> for that assertion? > > >> > which would mean it > >> > would be a coincidence that we actually have the subjective > >> > experiences that we are currently discussing, as having them couldn't > >> > be influencing our behaviour. > > >> We know that is not the caes, so that would mean there is an error in > >> your > >> premises or your logic. > > >> > The coincidence shows the suggestion > >> > that we are simply a biological mechanism following the known laws of > >> > physics to be implausible > > >> No .. it doesn't at all. > > >> > (this is not the same as impossible, because > >> > you could always claim that it is just a coincidence we have the > >> > subjective experiences we are discussing). > > >> What I claim is that you have made assertions and provided no proof > >> whatsoever to back them up. > > > As for your examples of subjective experiences, yes they all are > > subjective experiences. > > What is it YOU mean by "subjective experience" ? > > > If the robot is simply following the known laws of physics, > > Like people do > > > which > > don't reference whether anything is subjectively experienced, > > nor do they reference vanilla icecream, or the colour of a leaf, or the size > of a breadbox or any number of things that they can still explain > > > then it > > would behaving exactly as it would be expected to if it didn't have > > subjective experiences. > > There is your unsupported assertion again. > > > This isn't an assertion, > > Yes .. it is > > > it is simply that > > there would be no need to assume that it did have subjective > > experiences in order to explain its behaviour. > > That is an assertion. > > > If you dispute this is the case, > > I do .. and the burdne of proof is on you to show proof for your assertion. > > > simply state why the explanation would need to include the > > concept of it having subjective experiences, > > You need to state why it would NOT. > > If the mechanism has subjective experiences, then those experiences form > part of the meachnism, and so can affect its behaviour. > > > i.e. couldn't be > > explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws > > of physics > > It could be .. and those laws would also explain the subjetive experiences > that the mechanism has > > > (i.e. without including the concept of it having subjective > > experiences), > > Only if the mechanism did not have subjective experiences, or those > experiences were not involved in the particular behaviour you ar etrying to > explain. > > > in the same way the behaviour of a car or mobile phone > > can be explained without including the concept of it having subjective > > experiences. > > A car or mobile phone does not have subjective experiences. So taking > non-existnt experiences into account would be pointless. > > > True you could add the assumption that they did, but it > > wouldn't be required for an explanation of their behaviour. > > If mobile phones and cars could have subjective experiences, then there is > no reason to assume such experiences would not influence its behaviour .. > just as it does for human beings. > > > They act > > the same as you would expect them to if they didn't, > > as would any > > mechanism following the known laws of physics. > > No .. you only assert that. Please show me a mobile phone with subjective > experiences and we'll see. > > Or rather .. I can show you a mechanism with subjective experiences .. a > human being. And you will see that human beings obey all the laws of > physics AND are influenced by subjective experiences. > I have stated repeatedly why the explanation of the behaviour wouldn't need to include the concept of it having subjective experiences. The reason is that the known laws of physics don't, and the behaviour could be explained in terms of physical mechanism following the known laws of physics. Quote
Guest Jeckyl Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181106159.566600.184050@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > On 6 Jun, 05:45, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1181103051.931034.31370@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 6 Jun, 05:00, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >>news:1181101365.448809.6120@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> > What assumptions did I make? >> >> >> Many .. just about everything you say is either a tautology or an >> >> unsupported assertion. >> >> >> > I just simply stated the FACT that the >> >> > laws of physics don't reference subjective experiences, >> >> >> That's correct. That does NOT mean they do not apply to it, or that >> >> they >> >> cannot describe or model it. >> >> >> > and that in the case of a robot, even if you were to assume that it >> >> > did >> >> > have >> >> > subjective experiences, >> >> >> Please define "subjective experiences" >> >> >> > you couldn't claim they were influential, >> >> >> Yes .. one can. Again .. you assert that one cannot do something that >> >> one >> >> can clearly do. As evidence, human beings have subjective experiences >> >> and >> >> they influence their behaviour. There is no reason to assume a robot >> >> would >> >> be any different if it too has subjective experiences. >> >> >> > as the robot would be behaving exactly as you would expect it to >> >> > without >> >> > the added assumption that it had subjective experiences. >> >> >> Again, an assumption that the subjective experiences of the robot >> >> cannot >> >> influence its behaviour. You have no ground for making that >> >> assertion. >> >> You >> >> cannot prove yourself right through circular reasoning. >> >> > So state one of the assumptions that you claim I made. >> >> I already have >> >> > How can you claim that subjective experiences were influencing the >> > behaviour of the robot if it were behaving exactly as expected without >> > the assumption that it had any subjective experiences? >> >> You are only asserting that the behaviour is the same .. you've not given >> any reasoning for why it would be. >> > > Well consider the robot. You can explain its behaviour in terms of the > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics. Yes .. that is possible to do > Now whether it did or didn't have subjective experiences (and you don't > know whether > it does or doesn't), what difference would you expect see? That depends on the subjective experience it had, and whether that experience influences the parts of the mechanism whose behaviour we were observing. > If there > was an expected difference you could test for it, Yes .. although you may not be able to predict the resultant behaviour, you could explain it. > but how could there > be, if either way all the mechanism would ever do is simply follow the > known laws of physics. Whywoudln't there be? We know that tehre would be, because it happens in human beings. > I have given reasons, No .. you just make assertions. > the reason is that the explanation will be the > same (the physical mechanism following the laws of physics) There's you assertion > and it > doesn't reference whether or not there would be any subjective > experiences. There's another > Also regarding the assumptions, why don't you simply state one here, > are you too lazy? See above. Quote
Guest someone3 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 06:48, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181106159.566600.184050@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > > > > > > On 6 Jun, 05:45, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >>news:1181103051.931034.31370@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > >> > On 6 Jun, 05:00, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: > >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >>news:1181101365.448809.6120@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> > What assumptions did I make? > > >> >> Many .. just about everything you say is either a tautology or an > >> >> unsupported assertion. > > >> >> > I just simply stated the FACT that the > >> >> > laws of physics don't reference subjective experiences, > > >> >> That's correct. That does NOT mean they do not apply to it, or that > >> >> they > >> >> cannot describe or model it. > > >> >> > and that in the case of a robot, even if you were to assume that it > >> >> > did > >> >> > have > >> >> > subjective experiences, > > >> >> Please define "subjective experiences" > > >> >> > you couldn't claim they were influential, > > >> >> Yes .. one can. Again .. you assert that one cannot do something that > >> >> one > >> >> can clearly do. As evidence, human beings have subjective experiences > >> >> and > >> >> they influence their behaviour. There is no reason to assume a robot > >> >> would > >> >> be any different if it too has subjective experiences. > > >> >> > as the robot would be behaving exactly as you would expect it to > >> >> > without > >> >> > the added assumption that it had subjective experiences. > > >> >> Again, an assumption that the subjective experiences of the robot > >> >> cannot > >> >> influence its behaviour. You have no ground for making that > >> >> assertion. > >> >> You > >> >> cannot prove yourself right through circular reasoning. > > >> > So state one of the assumptions that you claim I made. > > >> I already have > > >> > How can you claim that subjective experiences were influencing the > >> > behaviour of the robot if it were behaving exactly as expected without > >> > the assumption that it had any subjective experiences? > > >> You are only asserting that the behaviour is the same .. you've not given > >> any reasoning for why it would be. > > > Well consider the robot. You can explain its behaviour in terms of the > > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics. > > Yes .. that is possible to do > > > Now whether it did or didn't have subjective experiences (and you don't > > know whether > > it does or doesn't), what difference would you expect see? > > That depends on the subjective experience it had, and whether that > experience influences the parts of the mechanism whose behaviour we were > observing. > > > If there > > was an expected difference you could test for it, > > Yes .. although you may not be able to predict the resultant behaviour, you > could explain it. > > > but how could there > > be, if either way all the mechanism would ever do is simply follow the > > known laws of physics. > > Whywoudln't there be? We know that tehre would be, because it happens in > human beings. > > > I have given reasons, > > No .. you just make assertions. > > > the reason is that the explanation will be the > > same (the physical mechanism following the laws of physics) > > There's you assertion > > > and it > > doesn't reference whether or not there would be any subjective > > experiences. > > There's another > > > Also regarding the assumptions, why don't you simply state one here, > > are you too lazy? > > See above. > The known laws of physics don't reference subjective experiences, that isn't an assertion, it is a FACT. Quote
Guest Richo Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On Jun 6, 3:08 pm, someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 6 Jun, 05:54, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > On Jun 6, 1:39 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 6 Jun, 04:30, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > On Jun 6, 12:34 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 6 Jun, 03:29, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > > > On Jun 5, 1:18 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 5 Jun, 02:23, Matt Silberstein > > > > > > > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On Mon, 04 Jun 2007 17:16:13 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > > > > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > > > > <1181002573.602439.47...@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > [snip] > > > > > > > > > >Sorry, I hadn't written it clearly enough. > > > > > > > > > >Do do you accept that conceptually the behaviour of any mechanism > > > > > > > > >following the known laws of physics could be explained in terms of the > > > > > > > > >physical mechanism > > > > > > > > >following the known laws of physics, and that this will not reference > > > > > > > > >whether there are any associated subjective experiences or not? > > > > > > > > > Sorry but that still seems to assume that subjective experience either > > > > > > > > does not exist or is not a physical phenomenon. If subjective > > > > > > > > experience is a physical phenomenon then our explanations will > > > > > > > > reference that experience. Perhaps the problem you have with wording > > > > > > > > this is that you have some bad assumptions. > > > > > > > > It doesn't make any assumptions. It is a fact that the known laws of > > > > > > > physics don't reference subjective experiences. > > > > > > >So it is a fact that > > > > > > > the behaviour of any mechanism following the known laws of physics can > > > > > > > be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the said > > > > > > > laws, > > > > > > > "Can be" means it is possible. > > > > > > That is not the same as saying Matt or anyone alive can do it right > > > > > > now - it just says its possible. > > > > > > You are apparently saying it is not possible. > > > > > > How do you know it is not possible? > > > > > > > No one has done it so far. > > > > > > There are still areas of science for which we do not know the whole > > > > > > story - which is good - there is still something for science to do. > > > > > > > > and as they don't reference whether there are any associated > > > > > > > subjective experiences, the explanation won't reference whether there > > > > > > > are any associated subjective experiences. > > > > > > > We haven't got the explanation in front of us - so we cannot say what > > > > > > it looks like. > > > > > > You are speculating that IF we ever get a complete explanation of the > > > > > > phenomenon of consciousness in purely physical terms then it will not > > > > > > refer to the subjective experiences. > > > > > > This is a hypothetical and also it seems to me that if it did not > > > > > > account for the subjective experiences it would not qualify as > > > > > > "complete". > > > > > > You are really saying that any incomplete explanation of conscious > > > > > > experience would exclude the subjective. > > > > > > I would agree with that. > > > > > > > > Since it is obvious you can't deny that the behaviour of any mechanism > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics can conceptually be explained in > > > > > > > terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, > > > > > > > I dont deny that t is possible - such an explanation my not exist > > > > > > for another 500 years. > > > > > > > > are you denying that it is a fact that the known laws of physics don't > > > > > > > reference whether there are any associated subjective experiences? > > > > > > > The laws of physics don't reference the existence of vanilla ice > > > > > > cream - but that does not imply that anything about the existence of > > > > > > vanilla ice cream is in conflict with the laws of physics. > > > > > > I'm not sure what you are suggesting I am saying is impossible. > > > > > The point of your questions is - I presume - to get us to think that > > > > conciousness as we experience cannot be explained by the known laws of > > > > physics. > > > > Many people are trying to find such an explanation - Francis Crick > > > > (till his death) and his student Koch , Daniel Dennet, Marvin Minsky > > > > etc. > > > > You are saying they cannot succeed. > > > > That it is impossible for them to succeed. > > > > The only fact you have at hand is that they haven't done it yet. > > > > > > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: > > > > > > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: > > > > > ------------- > > > > > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program > > > > > "Philosophy Talk". > > > > > > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy > > > > > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to ook > > > > > at it, and there are two scenarios: > > > > > > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft > > > > > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and > > > > > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a > > > > > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does > > > > > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's > > > > > happening, more or less. > > > > > > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard > > > > > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and > > > > > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a > > > > > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how > > > > > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where > > > > > it's happening, more or less. > > > > > > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is > > > > > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? > > > > > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. > > > > > > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering > > > > > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on > > > > > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in > > > > > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we > > > > > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves > > > > > consciousness? > > > > > ------------- > > > > > > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > > > > > if I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, > > > > > and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, > > > > > I explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of > > > > > the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on > > > > > what basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it > > > > > did because it had subjective experiences? > > > > > Well this is a hypothetical but let us imagine the possible > > > > consequences: > > > > Did your explanation of how the mechanism generate the appearance of > > > > conscious subjective experience also apply equally well to you and > > > > me? > > > > If so then there is obviously no dilemma - you have produced an > > > > explanation of conscious subjective experience entirely in terms of > > > > the known laws of physics. Further study and experimentation could be > > > > designed to test this explanation to see if it holds up - if it does > > > > Nobel prizes and fame forever is yours. > > > > > IF your explanation of how the mechanism generated the the appearence > > > > of conscious subjective experience does NOT apply to you and I then > > > > obviously we could decide that such an explanation is not possible OR > > > > we could keep looking for one. > > > > So in short it would leave us where we are now. > > > > > > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any > > > > > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > I can see it would depend on the circumastances as outlined above. > > > > > > So its behaviour, if you still > > > > > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be > > > > > said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same > > > > > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective > > > > > experiences. > > > > > You observe what you observe - whether or not you understand the > > > > mechanism behind what you observe. > > > > That it is possible for you to misunderstand or to simply not > > > > understand what is happening does not mean that it is impossible for > > > > all time to not understand the mechanism behind something. > > > > > > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism ollowing > > > > > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > > > > > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > > > > No I dont see that. > > > > > > They in > > > > > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it > > > > > would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective > > > > > experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the > > > > > behaviour). The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. > > > > > We were theorizing that the conscious subjective experiences were > > > > caused by the underlying known laws of physics. > > > > Now you are saying they would be "coincidental" - they certainly would > > > > not be if they caused by the operation of the known laws of physics. > > > > You didn't understand the point. > > > That is possible. > > > > It is implausible that we are simply > > > a biological mechanism, for if we were then we couldn't be talking > > > about them because they existed, it would have to be a coincidence. > > > Why. > > > >So > > > you can see, that skipping over this, and making statements in regards > > > to whether the explanation of how the robot functioned could apply to > > > us, as though it was the coincidence, is obscuring the point, as it is > > > implausible that we are simply a biological mechanism. > > > Why is it implausible. > > > > With regards to where I said: > > > ------- > > > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following > > > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > > > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > > ------- > > > > And you replied: > > > ------- > > > No I dont see that. > > > ------- > > > > Did you manage to understand why it would be the case with the robot, > > > in that it would be acting as expected to without the added assumption > > > that it had subjective experiences? > > > I assume you are conscious and have subjective experiences because I > > have them and so I think that beings that resemble me also have them. > > If I encountered a Robot/computer/alien being that gave all the > > indications that it was having subjective experiences I could assume > > that it was and see what it and I had in common that could account for > > us both having these experiences. > > I could assume that neither the robot nor you had any such experiences > > - but that would be dangerous. Since ethics is based upon compassion > > and empathy for our fellow creatures. > > > It is possible that I am the only conscious being on the planet that > > has subjective experiences and that all the rest of you are all robots > > following your programming. > > I make the choice to believe otherwise. > > So if on the robot the behaviour that you thought indicated that it > had subjective experiences, was explained to you to simply be the > result of the components of the physical mechanism following the laws > of physics, and that it was behaving as it was expected to without the > added assumption that it was subjectively experiencing, on what basis > would you claim that its behaviour indicated that it was subjectively > experiencing? There are a lot of assumptions to tend with here: That the explanation you proposed was convincing - that the explanation was more plausible than simply assuming the mechanism was actually conscious and actually having subjective experiences etc. Likewise you could give me an "explanation" that one member of a set of human twins was merely a mechanism - made of bone, blood and meat - but a mechanism none the less - behaving according to a sophisticated set of rules while the other twin had a soul. "Bill is a human with a soul but Bob is just a clever mechanism - a meat robot. The fertilized egg only had one soul and when it split into twins we were left with one twin with a soul and another was just a meat robot." I am being asked to judge an explanation I have not seen - for the behavior of a robot (or soulless Zombie) I have not seen. In any case: The basis for my claim that the creature was having subjective experiences would be exactly the same for my claim that another human was having subjective experiences - that they were sufficiently complex in their actions and reactions to perceptions/stimuli and by their ability/desire to communicate with me to indicate that they were a creature similar to myself. I assume other creatures have subjective experiences because I do - I cannot sense it/perceive it in them directly. It is always a deduction, an inference. This applies to my wife as much as it does to your hypothetical robot. I perceive through my senses - light, sound, touch, smell - I do not directly perceive another creatures internal subjective experience. I deduce that they are sufficiently similar to myself and so also have internal subjective experiences. In the future we may have a general theory of conciousness and all these problems will be tractable in a practical way. Till then it is all speculation. Cheers, Mark. Quote
Guest someone3 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 07:36, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > On Jun 6, 3:08 pm, someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 6 Jun, 05:54, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > On Jun 6, 1:39 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 6 Jun, 04:30, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > > On Jun 6, 12:34 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 6 Jun, 03:29, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > > > > On Jun 5, 1:18 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 5 Jun, 02:23, Matt Silberstein > > > > > > > > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On Mon, 04 Jun 2007 17:16:13 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > > > > > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > > > > > <1181002573.602439.47...@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > [snip] > > > > > > > > > > >Sorry, I hadn't written it clearly enough. > > > > > > > > > > >Do do you accept that conceptually the behaviour of any mechanism > > > > > > > > > >following the known laws of physics could be explained in terms of the > > > > > > > > > >physical mechanism > > > > > > > > > >following the known laws of physics, and that this will not reference > > > > > > > > > >whether there are any associated subjective experiences or not? > > > > > > > > > > Sorry but that still seems to assume that subjective experience either > > > > > > > > > does not exist or is not a physical phenomenon. If subjective > > > > > > > > > experience is a physical phenomenon then our explanations will > > > > > > > > > reference that experience. Perhaps the problem you have with wording > > > > > > > > > this is that you have some bad assumptions. > > > > > > > > > It doesn't make any assumptions. It is a fact that the known laws of > > > > > > > > physics don't reference subjective experiences. > > > > > > > >So it is a fact that > > > > > > > > the behaviour of any mechanism following the known laws of physics can > > > > > > > > be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the said > > > > > > > > laws, > > > > > > > > "Can be" means it is possible. > > > > > > > That is not the same as saying Matt or anyone alive can do it right > > > > > > > now - it just says its possible. > > > > > > > You are apparently saying it is not possible. > > > > > > > How do you know it is not possible? > > > > > > > > No one has done it so far. > > > > > > > There are still areas of science for which we do not know the whole > > > > > > > story - which is good - there is still something for science to do. > > > > > > > > > and as they don't reference whether there are any associated > > > > > > > > subjective experiences, the explanation won't reference whether there > > > > > > > > are any associated subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > We haven't got the explanation in front of us - so we cannot say what > > > > > > > it looks like. > > > > > > > You are speculating that IF we ever get a complete explanation of the > > > > > > > phenomenon of consciousness in purely physical terms then it will not > > > > > > > refer to the subjective experiences. > > > > > > > This is a hypothetical and also it seems to me that if it did not > > > > > > > account for the subjective experiences it would not qualify as > > > > > > > "complete". > > > > > > > You are really saying that any incomplete explanation of conscious > > > > > > > experience would exclude the subjective. > > > > > > > I would agree with that. > > > > > > > > > Since it is obvious you can't deny that the behaviour of any mechanism > > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics can conceptually be explained in > > > > > > > > terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, > > > > > > > > I dont deny that t is possible - such an explanation my not exist > > > > > > > for another 500 years. > > > > > > > > > are you denying that it is a fact that the known laws of physics don't > > > > > > > > reference whether there are any associated subjective experiences? > > > > > > > > The laws of physics don't reference the existence of vanilla ice > > > > > > > cream - but that does not imply that anything about the existence of > > > > > > > vanilla ice cream is in conflict with the laws of physics. > > > > > > > I'm not sure what you are suggesting I am saying is impossible. > > > > > > The point of your questions is - I presume - to get us to think that > > > > > conciousness as we experience cannot be explained by the known laws of > > > > > physics. > > > > > Many people are trying to find such an explanation - Francis Crick > > > > > (till his death) and his student Koch , Daniel Dennet, Marvin Minsky > > > > > etc. > > > > > You are saying they cannot succeed. > > > > > That it is impossible for them to succeed. > > > > > The only fact you have at hand is that they haven't done it yet. > > > > > > > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: > > > > > > > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: > > > > > > ------------- > > > > > > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program > > > > > > "Philosophy Talk". > > > > > > > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy > > > > > > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to ook > > > > > > at it, and there are two scenarios: > > > > > > > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft > > > > > > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and > > > > > > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a > > > > > > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does > > > > > > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's > > > > > > happening, more or less. > > > > > > > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard > > > > > > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and > > > > > > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a > > > > > > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how > > > > > > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where > > > > > > it's happening, more or less. > > > > > > > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is > > > > > > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? > > > > > > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. > > > > > > > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering > > > > > > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on > > > > > > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in > > > > > > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we > > > > > > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves > > > > > > consciousness? > > > > > > ------------- > > > > > > > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > > > > > > if I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, > > > > > > and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, > > > > > > I explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of > > > > > > the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on > > > > > > what basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it > > > > > > did because it had subjective experiences? > > > > > > Well this is a hypothetical but let us imagine the possible > > > > > consequences: > > > > > Did your explanation of how the mechanism generate the appearance of > > > > > conscious subjective experience also apply equally well to you and > > > > > me? > > > > > If so then there is obviously no dilemma - you have produced an > > > > > explanation of conscious subjective experience entirely in terms of > > > > > the known laws of physics. Further study and experimentation could be > > > > > designed to test this explanation to see if it holds up - if it does > > > > > Nobel prizes and fame forever is yours. > > > > > > IF your explanation of how the mechanism generated the the appearence > > > > > of conscious subjective experience does NOT apply to you and I then > > > > > obviously we could decide that such an explanation is not possible OR > > > > > we could keep looking for one. > > > > > So in short it would leave us where we are now. > > > > > > > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any > > > > > > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism > > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > I can see it would depend on the circumastances as outlined above. > > > > > > > So its behaviour, if you still > > > > > > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be > > > > > > said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same > > > > > > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective > > > > > > experiences. > > > > > > You observe what you observe - whether or not you understand the > > > > > mechanism behind what you observe. > > > > > That it is possible for you to misunderstand or to simply not > > > > > understand what is happening does not mean that it is impossible for > > > > > all time to not understand the mechanism behind something. > > > > > > > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism ollowing > > > > > > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > > > > > > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > > > > > No I dont see that. > > > > > > > They in > > > > > > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it > > > > > > would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective > > > > > > experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the > > > > > > behaviour). The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. > > > > > > We were theorizing that the conscious subjective experiences were > > > > > caused by the underlying known laws of physics. > > > > > Now you are saying they would be "coincidental" - they certainly would > > > > > not be if they caused by the operation of the known laws of physics. > > > > > You didn't understand the point. > > > > That is possible. > > > > > It is implausible that we are simply > > > > a biological mechanism, for if we were then we couldn't be talking > > > > about them because they existed, it would have to be a coincidence. > > > > Why. > > > > >So > > > > you can see, that skipping over this, and making statements in regards > > > > to whether the explanation of how the robot functioned could apply to > > > > us, as though it was the coincidence, is obscuring the point, as it is > > > > implausible that we are simply a biological mechanism. > > > > Why is it implausible. > > > > > With regards to where I said: > > > > ------- > > > > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following > > > > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > > > > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > > > ------- > > > > > And you replied: > > > > ------- > > > > No I dont see that. > > > > ------- > > > > > Did you manage to understand why it would be the case with the robot, > > > > in that it would be acting as expected to without the added assumption > > > > that it had subjective experiences? > > > > I assume you are conscious and have subjective experiences because I > > > have them and so I think that beings that resemble me also have them. > > > If I encountered a Robot/computer/alien being that gave all the > > > indications that it was having subjective experiences I could assume > > > that it was and see what it and I had in common that could account for > > > us both having these experiences. > > > I could assume that neither the robot nor you had any such experiences > > > - but that would be dangerous. Since ethics is based upon compassion > > > and empathy for our fellow creatures. > > > > It is possible that I am the only conscious being on the planet that > > > has subjective experiences and that all the rest of you are all robots > > > following your programming. > > > I make the choice to believe otherwise. > > > So if on the robot the behaviour that you thought indicated that it > > had subjective experiences, was explained to you to simply be the > > result of the components of the physical mechanism following the laws > > of physics, and that it was behaving as it was expected to without the > > added assumption that it was subjectively experiencing, on what basis > > would you claim that its behaviour indicated that it was subjectively > > experiencing? > > There are a lot of assumptions to tend with here: > That the explanation you proposed was convincing - that the > explanation was more plausible than simply assuming the mechanism > was actually conscious and actually having subjective experiences etc. > > Likewise you could give me an "explanation" that one member of a set > of human twins was merely a mechanism - made of bone, blood and meat - > but a mechanism none the less - behaving according to a sophisticated > set of rules while the other twin had a soul. "Bill is a human with a > soul but Bob is just a clever mechanism - a meat robot. The fertilized > egg only had one soul and when it split into twins we were left with > one twin with a soul and another was just a meat robot." > > I am being asked to judge an explanation I have not seen - for the > behavior of a robot (or soulless Zombie) I have not seen. > > In any case: > The basis for my claim that the creature was having subjective > experiences would be exactly the same for my claim that another human > was having subjective experiences - that they were sufficiently > complex in their actions and reactions to perceptions/stimuli and by > their ability/desire to communicate with me to indicate that they were > a creature similar to myself. > I assume other creatures have subjective experiences because I do > - I cannot sense it/perceive it in them directly. > It is always a deduction, an inference. > > This applies to my wife as much as it does to your hypothetical robot. > I perceive through my senses - light, sound, touch, smell - I do not > directly perceive another creatures internal subjective experience. > I deduce that they are sufficiently similar to myself and so also have > internal subjective experiences. > > In the future we may have a general theory of conciousness and all > these problems will be tractable in a practical way. > Till then it is all speculation. > For starters, there will never be a materialistic explanation of consciousness. It is impossible, you could never explain why we have the subjective experiences we do, and not fluctuations in the colour green dependent on the amount of neurons firing. So your statement is blantantly deceptive. Regarding the robot issue, there is no question of the plausibility of the explanation of the robots behaviour, it does follow the known laws of physics, and can be shown to do so. Is the basis of your claim that it had subjective experiences, was based on the way it behaved, even though you knew it was behaving as it would be expected to if it didn't have any subjective experiences? If so, do you understand that even if you were considering it to have subjective experiences, they couldn't be influencing its behaviour, as otherwise it wouldn't be behaving as expected to if it didn't have any subjective experiences? Quote
Guest Richo Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On Jun 6, 5:03 pm, someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 6 Jun, 07:36, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > On Jun 6, 3:08 pm, someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > On 6 Jun, 05:54, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > On Jun 6, 1:39 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 6 Jun, 04:30, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > > > On Jun 6, 12:34 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 6 Jun, 03:29, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On Jun 5, 1:18 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 5 Jun, 02:23, Matt Silberstein > > > > > > > > > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, 04 Jun 2007 17:16:13 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > > > > > > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > > > > > > <1181002573.602439.47...@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > [snip] > > > > > > > > > > > >Sorry, I hadn't written it clearly enough. > > > > > > > > > > > >Do do you accept that conceptually the behaviour of any mechanism > > > > > > > > > > >following the known laws of physics could be explained in terms of the > > > > > > > > > > >physical mechanism > > > > > > > > > > >following the known laws of physics, and that this will not reference > > > > > > > > > > >whether there are any associated subjective experiences or not? > > > > > > > > > > > Sorry but that still seems to assume that subjective experience either > > > > > > > > > > does not exist or is not a physical phenomenon. If subjective > > > > > > > > > > experience is a physical phenomenon then our explanations will > > > > > > > > > > reference that experience. Perhaps the problem you have with wording > > > > > > > > > > this is that you have some bad assumptions. > > > > > > > > > > It doesn't make any assumptions. It is a fact that the known laws of > > > > > > > > > physics don't reference subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > >So it is a fact that > > > > > > > > > the behaviour of any mechanism following the known laws of physics can > > > > > > > > > be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the said > > > > > > > > > laws, > > > > > > > > > "Can be" means it is possible. > > > > > > > > That is not the same as saying Matt or anyone alive can do it right > > > > > > > > now - it just says its possible. > > > > > > > > You are apparently saying it is not possible. > > > > > > > > How do you know it is not possible? > > > > > > > > > No one has done it so far. > > > > > > > > There are still areas of science for which we do not know the whole > > > > > > > > story - which is good - there is still something for science to do. > > > > > > > > > > and as they don't reference whether there are any associated > > > > > > > > > subjective experiences, the explanation won't reference whether there > > > > > > > > > are any associated subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > > We haven't got the explanation in front of us - so we cannot say what > > > > > > > > it looks like. > > > > > > > > You are speculating that IF we ever get a complete explanation of the > > > > > > > > phenomenon of consciousness in purely physical terms then it will not > > > > > > > > refer to the subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > This is a hypothetical and also it seems to me that if it did not > > > > > > > > account for the subjective experiences it would not qualify as > > > > > > > > "complete". > > > > > > > > You are really saying that any incomplete explanation of conscious > > > > > > > > experience would exclude the subjective. > > > > > > > > I would agree with that. > > > > > > > > > > Since it is obvious you can't deny that the behaviour of any mechanism > > > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics can conceptually be explained in > > > > > > > > > terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, > > > > > > > > > I dont deny that t is possible - such an explanation my not exist > > > > > > > > for another 500 years. > > > > > > > > > > are you denying that it is a fact that the known laws of physics don't > > > > > > > > > reference whether there are any associated subjective experiences? > > > > > > > > > The laws of physics don't reference the existence of vanilla ice > > > > > > > > cream - but that does not imply that anything about the existence of > > > > > > > > vanilla ice cream is in conflict with the laws of physics. > > > > > > > > I'm not sure what you are suggesting I am saying is impossible. > > > > > > > The point of your questions is - I presume - to get us to think that > > > > > > conciousness as we experience cannot be explained by the known laws of > > > > > > physics. > > > > > > Many people are trying to find such an explanation - Francis Crick > > > > > > (till his death) and his student Koch , Daniel Dennet, Marvin Minsky > > > > > > etc. > > > > > > You are saying they cannot succeed. > > > > > > That it is impossible for them to succeed. > > > > > > The only fact you have at hand is that they haven't done it yet. > > > > > > > > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: > > > > > > > > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: > > > > > > > ------------- > > > > > > > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program > > > > > > > "Philosophy Talk". > > > > > > > > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy > > > > > > > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to ook > > > > > > > at it, and there are two scenarios: > > > > > > > > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft > > > > > > > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and > > > > > > > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a > > > > > > > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does > > > > > > > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's > > > > > > > happening, more or less. > > > > > > > > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard > > > > > > > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and > > > > > > > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a > > > > > > > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how > > > > > > > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where > > > > > > > it's happening, more or less. > > > > > > > > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is > > > > > > > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? > > > > > > > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. > > > > > > > > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering > > > > > > > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on > > > > > > > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in > > > > > > > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we > > > > > > > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves > > > > > > > consciousness? > > > > > > > ------------- > > > > > > > > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > > > > > > > if I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, > > > > > > > and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, > > > > > > > I explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of > > > > > > > the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on > > > > > > > what basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it > > > > > > > did because it had subjective experiences? > > > > > > > Well this is a hypothetical but let us imagine the possible > > > > > > consequences: > > > > > > Did your explanation of how the mechanism generate the appearance of > > > > > > conscious subjective experience also apply equally well to you and > > > > > > me? > > > > > > If so then there is obviously no dilemma - you have produced an > > > > > > explanation of conscious subjective experience entirely in terms of > > > > > > the known laws of physics. Further study and experimentation could be > > > > > > designed to test this explanation to see if it holds up - if it does > > > > > > Nobel prizes and fame forever is yours. > > > > > > > IF your explanation of how the mechanism generated the the appearence > > > > > > of conscious subjective experience does NOT apply to you and I then > > > > > > obviously we could decide that such an explanation is not possible OR > > > > > > we could keep looking for one. > > > > > > So in short it would leave us where we are now. > > > > > > > > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any > > > > > > > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > > I can see it would depend on the circumastances as outlined above. > > > > > > > > So its behaviour, if you still > > > > > > > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be > > > > > > > said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same > > > > > > > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective > > > > > > > experiences. > > > > > > > You observe what you observe - whether or not you understand the > > > > > > mechanism behind what you observe. > > > > > > That it is possible for you to misunderstand or to simply not > > > > > > understand what is happening does not mean that it is impossible for > > > > > > all time to not understand the mechanism behind something. > > > > > > > > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism ollowing > > > > > > > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > > > > > > > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > > > > > > No I dont see that. > > > > > > > > They in > > > > > > > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it > > > > > > > would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective > > > > > > > experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the > > > > > > > behaviour). The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. > > > > > > > We were theorizing that the conscious subjective experiences were > > > > > > caused by the underlying known laws of physics. > > > > > > Now you are saying they would be "coincidental" - they certainly would > > > > > > not be if they caused by the operation of the known laws of physics. > > > > > > You didn't understand the point. > > > > > That is possible. > > > > > > It is implausible that we are simply > > > > > a biological mechanism, for if we were then we couldn't be talking > > > > > about them because they existed, it would have to be a coincidence. > > > > > Why. > > > > > >So > > > > > you can see, that skipping over this, and making statements in regards > > > > > to whether the explanation of how the robot functioned could apply to > > > > > us, as though it was the coincidence, is obscuring the point, as it is > > > > > implausible that we are simply a biological mechanism. > > > > > Why is it implausible. > > > > > > With regards to where I said: > > > > > ------- > > > > > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following > > > > > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > > > > > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > > > > ------- > > > > > > And you replied: > > > > > ------- > > > > > No I dont see that. > > > > > ------- > > > > > > Did you manage to understand why it would be the case with the robot, > > > > > in that it would be acting as expected to without the added assumption > > > > > that it had subjective experiences? > > > > > I assume you are conscious and have subjective experiences because I > > > > have them and so I think that beings that resemble me also have them. > > > > If I encountered a Robot/computer/alien being that gave all the > > > > indications that it was having subjective experiences I could assume > > > > that it was and see what it and I had in common that could account for > > > > us both having these experiences. > > > > I could assume that neither the robot nor you had any such experiences > > > > - but that would be dangerous. Since ethics is based upon compassion > > > > and empathy for our fellow creatures. > > > > > It is possible that I am the only conscious being on the planet that > > > > has subjective experiences and that all the rest of you are all robots > > > > following your programming. > > > > I make the choice to believe otherwise. > > > > So if on the robot the behaviour that you thought indicated that it > > > had subjective experiences, was explained to you to simply be the > > > result of the components of the physical mechanism following the laws > > > of physics, and that it was behaving as it was expected to without the > > > added assumption that it was subjectively experiencing, on what basis > > > would you claim that its behaviour indicated that it was subjectively > > > experiencing? > > > There are a lot of assumptions to tend with here: > > That the explanation you proposed was convincing - that the > > explanation was more plausible than simply assuming the mechanism > > was actually conscious and actually having subjective experiences etc. > > > Likewise you could give me an "explanation" that one member of a set > > of human twins was merely a mechanism - made of bone, blood and meat - > > but a mechanism none the less - behaving according to a sophisticated > > set of rules while the other twin had a soul. "Bill is a human with a > > soul but Bob is just a clever mechanism - a meat robot. The fertilized > > egg only had one soul and when it split into twins we were left with > > one twin with a soul and another was just a meat robot." > > > I am being asked to judge an explanation I have not seen - for the > > behavior of a robot (or soulless Zombie) I have not seen. > > > In any case: > > The basis for my claim that the creature was having subjective > > experiences would be exactly the same for my claim that another human > > was having subjective experiences - that they were sufficiently > > complex in their actions and reactions to perceptions/stimuli and by > > their ability/desire to communicate with me to indicate that they were > > a creature similar to myself. > > I assume other creatures have subjective experiences because I do > > - I cannot sense it/perceive it in them directly. > > It is always a deduction, an inference. > > > This applies to my wife as much as it does to your hypothetical robot. > > I perceive through my senses - light, sound, touch, smell - I do not > > directly perceive another creatures internal subjective experience. > > I deduce that they are sufficiently similar to myself and so also have > > internal subjective experiences. > > > In the future we may have a general theory of conciousness and all > > these problems will be tractable in a practical way. > > Till then it is all speculation. > > For starters, there will never be a materialistic explanation of > consciousness. That is your belief. You don't have a rational basis for holding this belief with any certainty. (I am not convinced that you have anything other than argument from ignorance or fallacy of composition.) > It is impossible, you could never explain why we have > the subjective experiences we do, and not fluctuations in the colour > green dependent on the amount of neurons firing. So your statement is > blantantly deceptive. > You don't know that - and the strength of your conviction doesn't constitute an argument. > Regarding the robot issue, there is no question of the plausibility of > the explanation of the robots behaviour, it does follow the known laws > of physics, and can be shown to do so. > This is the hypothetical explanation for a hypothetical robot! How the hell do I know if there is a plausibility issue or not? Are you asking that I assume that your explanation is plausible? Are you further insisting that your explanation does not involve the mechanism having a complex internal model of itself and the world which is not capable of self modifying ? Etc etc Then yes IF all of these things are satisfied then I suppose I would come to the conclusion that the robot did not have internal subjective experiences. That does not preclude some other mechanism also following the known laws of physics in every aspect of its functioning from HAVING complex internal states which model itself and the world to such a degree that it DID have subjective internal mental experiences. So IF you assume your conclusion from the outset then YES you will arrive at your conclusion. > Is the basis of your claim that it had subjective experiences, was > based on the way it behaved, even though you knew it was behaving as > it would be expected to if it didn't have any subjective experiences? > I didn't actually claim the robot had subjective experiences - this is a hypothetical robot remember? If I did make such a claim it would be based on the same reason that I claim my wife has internal subjective mental states - that she is a creature similar to me and I assume she has internal subjective mental experiences. If I found your explanation plausible AND the explanation did not involve having complex internal states with sufficient self referential ability and self modifying capacity etc etc THEN I suppose I would conclude that the creature had no subjective experiences. > If so, do you understand that even if you were considering it to have > subjective experiences, they couldn't be influencing its behaviour, as > otherwise it wouldn't be behaving as expected to if it didn't have any > subjective experiences? I don't understand the point of repeating this question/assertion. I have no way of assessing the internal subjective mental states of other beings - robots, women, children, rats, pumpkins. I merely assume that beings that resemble me closely enough have internal subjective experiences. I cannot directly perceive another's subjective mental states. IF you set up the problem/question in such a way as it forces your answer then Yes your answer emerges. IS this the only way we can imagine these things operating? No - it is not. I can imagine a machine that strictly obeys the laws of physics in every particular of its operation that has conciousness and subjective mental experiences. I believe I am an example of such a mechanism. You haven't presented an argument that I am not such a machine - merely insisted that I cannot be such a machine - an assertion is not an argument no matter how fervently it is put. Mark. Quote
Guest Denis Loubet Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 "someone2" <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in message news:1181102866.269868.46180@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > On 6 Jun, 05:00, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> news:1181095407.100411.107720@q69g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> > On 6 Jun, 02:33, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >>news:1181091930.182688.105050@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> > On 5 Jun, 22:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >>news:1181074124.893550.190550@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> > On 5 Jun, 17:12, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >>news:1181044055.576591.170490@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> > On 5 Jun, 04:17, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180997004.586680.126950@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 23:27, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180992269.825596.105660@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 19:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 16:07, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180915714.304693.138900@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 00:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180903459.945467.317500@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 21:38, "Denis Loubet" >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180891870.230456.185600@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 18:27, "Denis Loubet" >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > <dlou...@io.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180875033.790773.206010@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >page >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >can >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >understand >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Any mechanism which simply followed the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have its behaviour explained with the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wasn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > conscious (had no subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No. If the mechanism was conscious, then >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> explanation >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> its >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would necessarily include that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Which means that whether it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Which is nonsense. The explanation of its >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> necessarily >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> include >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the operation of its consciousness if it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> was >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Therefore if we were simply a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism, we couldn't be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > talking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > about >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences because of their existance. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > It >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > coincidence that we actually experienced >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > what >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > claimed >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > we >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did, which isn't plausible. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Well, since you obviously don't understand >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> what >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it's >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> surprising that you've reached incorrect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusions. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Why would I be required to assume any >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > followed >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the laws of physics was conscious, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Who said you had to? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > why couldn't I explain it simply in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > terms of the physical mechanism following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption that it wasn't? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If you fully describe the behavior of the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism following the laws of physics, then >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> all >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events that contribute to that behavior. If >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness will be included in the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> description >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Consciousness >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Consciousness >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> just >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> our >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> word that labels a particular VARIETY of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws of physics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > While I you can believe that the mechanism is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > responsible >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective experiences, you avoided explaining >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > why >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > couldn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > terms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism following the laws of physics, with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there were no subjective experiences, or could >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I did not say you couldn't explain the behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms of the physical mechanism following the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> assumption that there were no subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> defy >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> point out where I did. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What I DID say is that in explaining the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behaviour >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in terms of the physical mechanism following the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> assumption that there were no subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> necessity, include in that explanation the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> constitute >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness if they occurred. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Unless, of course, you arbitrarily want to avoid >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> those >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events that constitute consciousness, and affect >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> leave >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> your >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> explanation incomplete. You are free to do that. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So you admit, that the behaviour of the mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explained >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with the assumption that it didn't have any >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Sure. But if it did have subjective experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> those >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> included in the explanation in terms of physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws of physics. In other words, you could explain >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> rote >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> description of physical events, unaware that you are >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences and their effect on behavior, in terms >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Can you follow that this being the case, whether >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > didn't >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > any subjective experiences couldn't influence the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did, its behaviour could not be explained without >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > taking >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > into >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > account >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > whether it did or didn't have any subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If it has subjective experiences, then they are part >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> its >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> any explanation that failed to include them would be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> incomplete, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> by >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> definition. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > regard >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > as >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > were >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "Only"? I never suggested that was the only factor that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> effects >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm saying that if you want a complete explanation of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> have >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> account for all factors. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> And are you attempting to separate subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience >> >> >> >> >> >> >> form >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> responsible for it? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > No knowledge of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > whether there were any subjective experiences or not >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > required. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> True. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So for any given mechanism, whether it were >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experienced >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > or >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > not, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wouldn't influence the behaviour. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Of course it would affect the behavior. Haven't you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> listened >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> word >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I've >> >> >> >> >> >> >> said? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So if we were to be regarded as a >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences because they actually existed. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Our subjective experiences actually exist as material >> >> >> >> >> >> >> patterns >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brains. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> These material patterns affect behavior. Is this >> >> >> >> >> >> >> impossible >> >> >> >> >> >> >> for >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> >> >> >> understand? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > object >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > was >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > an >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > alternative >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > universe, which followed the same known laws of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > but >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > were no subjective experiences associated with it, it >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > act >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > same. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No. If you disallow the material process of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, then you've obviously got a universe that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behaves >> >> >> >> >> >> >> differently >> >> >> >> >> >> >> from the one we're in. You're trying to violate the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> principle >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> identity, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> which pretty much hoses logic completely. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The objection that if it followed the same known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experienced, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics don't reference subjective experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> We do not note any subjective experiences in the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> absence >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brains. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Thus we are justified in holding the tentative >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusion >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brains are required for subjective experience. Since we >> >> >> >> >> >> >> note >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> manipulation of the physical brain produces changes in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, we are justified in holding the tentative >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusion >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective experience depends on the arrangement of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> matter >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brain. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > thus it is >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > having >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences and one not, without the need for any of >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of physics to be altered. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So this is a "Consciousness of the Gaps" argument? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Do you accept that you could conceptually due to the >> >> >> >> >> >> > known >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws >> >> >> >> >> >> > of >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics not referencing subjective experiences, have a >> >> >> >> >> >> > two >> >> >> >> >> >> > universes >> >> >> >> >> >> > which both followed the same known laws of physics, >> >> >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> > yet >> >> >> >> >> >> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> > one, >> >> >> >> >> >> > a given mechanism gave rise to subjective experiences, >> >> >> >> >> >> > and >> >> >> >> >> >> > in >> >> >> >> >> >> > the >> >> >> >> >> >> > other it didn't? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm a materialist, and you're asking me to abandon the >> >> >> >> >> >> principle >> >> >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> >> >> identity. You're asking me to abandon logic. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I will not do so. >> >> >> >> >> >> > Sit in denial if you like, >> >> >> >> >> >> Thank you, I will keep adhering to logic. >> >> >> >> >> >> > but it is conceptually possible to consider >> >> >> >> >> > two universes following the same known laws of physics, and >> >> >> >> >> > yet >> >> >> >> >> > one >> >> >> >> >> > having subjective experiences and the other not, >> >> >> >> >> >> Well, I can conceive of a universe just like this one that >> >> >> >> >> doesn't >> >> >> >> >> have >> >> >> >> >> subjective experiences, but it would be trillions of years >> >> >> >> >> further >> >> >> >> >> along >> >> >> >> >> its >> >> >> >> >> timeline where proton decay has finally removed all matter >> >> >> >> >> from >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> universe. No matter, no subjective experiences. >> >> >> >> >> >> > because the laws of >> >> >> >> >> > physics don't reference whether anything subjectively >> >> >> >> >> > experiences. >> >> >> >> >> >> How do you know they don't? If you record the actions of all >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> atoms >> >> >> >> >> in >> >> >> >> >> my >> >> >> >> >> brain, then you'll have a complete record of my subjective >> >> >> >> >> experiences >> >> >> >> >> if >> >> >> >> >> materialism is correct. >> >> >> >> >> >> > So >> >> >> >> >> > you can sit there not being able to even face thinking >> >> >> >> >> > about >> >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> >> >> Actually, I just showed I can think about it. It's just >> >> >> >> >> stupid. >> >> >> >> >> >> > because it would show your whole world perspective to be >> >> >> >> >> > implausible, >> >> >> >> >> >> You haven't managed to do that yet to anyone's satisfaction. >> >> >> >> >> It's >> >> >> >> >> just >> >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> >> making an assertion. No one else appears to agree with you. >> >> >> >> >> >> > but it seems to me pathetic and cowardly to not be able to >> >> >> >> >> > face >> >> >> >> >> > reason. >> >> >> >> >> >> It is pathetic and cowardly not to be able to face reason, is >> >> >> >> >> that >> >> >> >> >> your >> >> >> >> >> excuse? >> >> >> >> >> >> > When you feel brave enough, maybe you'll read it again, and >> >> >> >> >> > consider the possibility, and how it highlights how you had >> >> >> >> >> > been >> >> >> >> >> > deceived. >> >> >> >> >> >> By the same logic, you're terrified by materialism and can't >> >> >> >> >> face >> >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> >> truth. >> >> >> >> >> >> See how bland assertions don't get you anywhere? >> >> >> >> >> > Unlike you, I'm not afraid of following reason though. If you >> >> >> >> > were >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> > ask me to conceptually consider that God didn't exist for >> >> >> >> > example >> >> >> >> > to >> >> >> >> > highlight a point you were making, I wouldn't turn around and >> >> >> >> > reply >> >> >> >> > that I couldn't, and that I'd refuse to, as you did about an >> >> >> >> > alternative universe which followed the same known laws of >> >> >> >> > physics >> >> >> >> > but >> >> >> >> > in which there were no subjective experiences. >> >> >> >> >> What if I asked you to believe that god did exist and didn't >> >> >> >> exist >> >> >> >> at >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> same time? That's the equivalent of what you asked me to do. >> >> >> >> It's >> >> >> >> not >> >> >> >> that I >> >> >> >> don't want to conceive of such things, it's that I can't. Maybe >> >> >> >> you >> >> >> >> can >> >> >> >> hold >> >> >> >> two mutually contradictory ideas in your head at once and call >> >> >> >> both >> >> >> >> true, >> >> >> >> but I can't. I have to respect logic. >> >> >> >> >> Besides, I admitted I could conceive of such a universe, and >> >> >> >> described >> >> >> >> how >> >> >> >> it would have to be. Another way would be if the universe didn't >> >> >> >> have >> >> >> >> any >> >> >> >> matter in it because of a perfectly balanced ratio of matter to >> >> >> >> antimatter. >> >> >> >> All that's required is that a universe be in such a state that >> >> >> >> brains >> >> >> >> cannot >> >> >> >> form. Without brains, you have no consciousness. >> >> >> >> >> But you don't like my solution to your little conundrum, so you >> >> >> >> pretend I >> >> >> >> didn't respond. >> >> >> >> >> > I'm sure if it had been >> >> >> >> > a thought experiment which could have been used to pose a >> >> >> >> > question >> >> >> >> > about how could God exist, then you would have had no problem, >> >> >> >> > but >> >> >> >> > because it points out how your world view is implausible, >> >> >> >> > you'd >> >> >> >> > rather >> >> >> >> > be deaf and blind about the matter, and not even consider it. >> >> >> >> >> No. Please acknowledge that I conceived of your stupid universe >> >> >> >> scenario. >> >> >> >> >> It's you who are unable to conceive of the idea that your >> >> >> >> scenario >> >> >> >> might >> >> >> >> be >> >> >> >> silly. >> >> >> >> >> > You aren't adhering to logic, you are refusing to look at it >> >> >> >> > reasonably. >> >> >> >> >> You have not shown that to be the case. Until you do, you're >> >> >> >> just >> >> >> >> blabbering. >> >> >> >> >> > It isn't as though it couldn't be done, for example if a >> >> >> >> > robot behaved >> >> >> >> >> What? Universes and robots are equivalent in your mind? >> >> >> >> >> > as though it might have subjective experiences, i.e. it >> >> >> >> > talked about them etc, you could surely conceive of that >> >> >> >> > either >> >> >> >> > (a) >> >> >> >> > it >> >> >> >> > did have, or (b) it didn't have. >> >> >> >> >> Yes. So what? >> >> >> >> >> > In one universe you could conceive of >> >> >> >> > it having subjective experiences, in the other that it didn't. >> >> >> >> >> You said the universes were the SAME! If they're the same, then >> >> >> >> they're >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> same. If one possesses consciousness, then the other one does >> >> >> >> too. >> >> >> >> If >> >> >> >> one >> >> >> >> doesn't, then the other doesn't either. You can't say they're >> >> >> >> the >> >> >> >> same >> >> >> >> but >> >> >> >> different. >> >> >> >> >> > In >> >> >> >> > either though it would be acting just the same, as in both it >> >> >> >> > would >> >> >> >> > simply just be a mechanism following the known laws of >> >> >> >> > physics. >> >> >> >> >> In other words, the same but different. Sorry, that violates the >> >> >> >> principle >> >> >> >> of identity. A cannot equal NOT A. You've cast logic out the >> >> >> >> window. >> >> >> >> >> > The >> >> >> >> > same would apply to humans if you were to consider them to be >> >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> >> > biological mechanisms following the known laws of physics, >> >> >> >> > even >> >> >> >> > if >> >> >> >> > you >> >> >> >> > run from logic and reason, when it goes against your unfounded >> >> >> >> > bias. >> >> >> >> >> Phrase your question where it does not violate fundamental >> >> >> >> principle >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> logic and I might entertain it. >> >> >> >> > It is simply a case of both universes following the known laws >> >> >> > of >> >> >> > physics. >> >> >> >> Then as far as we know, they're THE SAME! We will expect exactly >> >> >> the >> >> >> same >> >> >> behaviors in both. >> >> >> >> > There was no need to add other differences to them as you did >> >> >> > to avoid facing the issue. >> >> >> >> The distant future universe with no matter is not different from >> >> >> ours. >> >> >> It's >> >> >> exactly the same. Our universe will be exactly that universe. >> >> >> >> > Which bit are you finding illogical? >> >> >> >> The part where you say something is the same, but different. Logic >> >> >> dictates >> >> >> that things that are the same CAN'T be different. >> >> >> >> If you want to throw out logic, that's fine, but the discussion >> >> >> ends >> >> >> there. >> >> >> >> > Supposing there was a robot that >> >> >> > behaved as though it might be conscious. You could know how it >> >> >> > worked, >> >> >> > but it wouldn't tell you anything about whether it was >> >> >> > subjectively >> >> >> > experienced or not. >> >> >> >> What? I don't know that. It could easily be that if I knew how it >> >> >> worked, >> >> >> I'd know whether it had subjective experiences or not. >> >> >> >> > Now in the thought experiment, in one universe it >> >> >> > could be considered that it did have subjective experiences, in >> >> >> > the >> >> >> > other that it did not. >> >> >> >> It? What it? The robot? The robot wasn't involved in your universe >> >> >> scenario >> >> >> until just now. >> >> >> >> So the robot works differently in the two universes. Ok...So...? >> >> >> >> > By doing so you could see that whether it did >> >> >> > or didn't it couldn't affect its behaviour, as in both, it will >> >> >> > simply >> >> >> > behave the same, i.e. follow the laws of physics, so in fact it >> >> >> > isn't >> >> >> > only logical, it is a useful tool. >> >> >> >> No. It still makes no sense. If the same operation results in >> >> >> consciousness >> >> >> in one universe, and no consciousness in the other universe, then >> >> >> the >> >> >> universes are different. >> >> >> >> One would expect different behaviors in different universes with >> >> >> different >> >> >> laws. >> >> >> >> > It shows the implausibility of your >> >> >> > world view for starters. >> >> >> >> No. It doesn't appear to do that at all. >> >> >> >> > Is truthfully so difficult for you, or is it >> >> >> > that you can't face applying reason to your perspective? >> >> >> >> You have yet to establish that you are speaking truthfully. Or >> >> >> utilizing >> >> >> reason. >> >> >> > How would knowing that the behaviour of the robot was explainable in >> >> > terms of it following the known laws of physics, give you any >> >> > indication of whether it subjectively experienced or not. >> >> >> I didn't say it would. I offered the possibility that it could. YOU >> >> are >> >> the >> >> one making the absolute statement said it wouldn't. >> >> >> Care to back up that assertion? >> >> >> > You seem to >> >> > be living in some sci-fi fantasy world. >> >> >> And you don't seem to understand the difference between a speculation >> >> and >> >> a >> >> statement of fact. >> >> >> > Regarding the thought experiment, the robots would both be following >> >> > the same known laws of physics. So perhaps you could explain why >> >> > you >> >> > suggest they would act differently. >> >> >> Robots? This is the first time you've suggested more than one robot. >> >> You >> >> seem to enjoy adding more and more items to your scenarios willy-nilly >> >> before we've even settled the original point you're trying to make. >> >> >> Ok, are we talking identical robots in identical universes? Then I >> >> suppose >> >> they'd behave exactly the same. >> >> >> If we're talking robots that are different in identical universes, >> >> then I >> >> suppose they'd behave differently. >> >> >> If we're talking identical robots in universes that are different, >> >> then I >> >> suppose they'd behave differently. >> >> >> And if we're talking robots that are different in universes that are >> >> different, I suppose they'd behave differently there too. (Unless >> >> there >> >> was >> >> the unlikely event that the differences cancelled each other out.) >> >> >> I can't think of another permutation. Did I answer your question? It >> >> boils >> >> down to things that are the same act the same, and things that are >> >> different >> >> act different. Did you want me to go into some sort of explanation of >> >> this >> >> conclusion? It seems pretty self explanatory. >> >> >> If, on the other hand, you're back to your "The universes are the >> >> same, >> >> but >> >> magically different" tune, then I have no answer for you, as you've >> >> abandoned logic and I can't follow you there. >> >> > Well there are two universes, and a robot in each, so how is it the >> > first time it was mentioned that there were two of them? >> >> Now you're being disingenuous. I can look back in this thread and see >> that >> you started the argument with two universes. Then several posts later, >> you >> dragged in a robot that behaved differently in each universe. Then a few >> posts later you dragged in another robot. >> >> People CAN read, you know. >> >> > The universes are the same in regards to the known laws of physics. >> > In case you weren't aware, the laws of physics don't touch on the >> > subject of whether anything is subjectively experienced or not. >> >> Then stop talking about it. >> >> > Therefore you could conceptually have two universes, which both follow >> > the same laws of physics, and yet in one, the mechanism had no >> > subjective experiences, and the other it did. >> >> So the universes are not the same. >> >> > So no the universes >> > wouldn't be identical, they would simply both follow the known laws of >> > physics. >> >> So you admit you are postulating two universes that are different. >> >> > Regarding the question, how would knowing that the behaviour of the >> > robot was explainable in >> > terms of it following the known laws of physics, give you any >> > indication of whether it subjectively experienced or not, you didn't >> > answer it. >> >> That's not the question you asked. But I'll answer this one. >> >> It wouldn't. It wouldn't give you any indication. You would have to know >> how >> it worked to do that. >> >> > As for backing up the assertion, well it is backed up by >> > the fact that there would be no indication, and that neither you nor >> > any materialist experiencing the physical world could point to one. >> >> But that's not the claim I asked you to back up. I asked you to back up >> THIS >> one: "Supposing there was a robot that behaved as though it might be >> conscious. You could know how it worked, but it wouldn't tell you >> anything >> about whether it was subjectively experienced or not." >> >> The claim above stated that I KNEW HOW IT WORKED, not just that I knew it >> operated according to the laws of physics. Your clumsy use of language >> implies that I have all sorts of knowledge about the robot. That I can >> follow all the operations of the mechanical brain. If that's the case, >> It's >> just as likely that I can open the user interface of the robot and see >> what >> it says under the "Subjective Experience" tab. That'll tell me all I need >> to >> know. >> >> > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: >> >> > ------------- >> > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program >> > "Philosophy Talk". >> >> > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy >> > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to look >> > at it, and there are two scenarios: >> >> > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft >> > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and >> > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a >> > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does >> > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's >> > happening, more or less. >> >> > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard >> > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and >> > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a >> > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how >> > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where >> > it's happening, more or less. >> >> > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is >> > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? >> > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. >> >> I see no reason in either case to change my opinion. >> >> > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering >> > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on >> > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in >> > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we >> > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves >> > consciousness? >> >> No. But if someone built the computer that we have decided is conscious, >> it >> implies that the guy who built it knows how to achieve consciousness in a >> computer. >> >> Of course, that's a necessarily tentative conclusion, because we know >> that >> we could be wrong about the computer being conscious. Heck, we could be >> wrong about the meat brain being conscious too. >> >> > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that >> > I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, and >> > you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I >> > explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the >> > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what >> > basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did >> > because it had subjective experiences? >> >> I would have to be assured that the physical operation of the robot, >> following known laws of physics, didn't actually constitute >> consciousness. >> >> > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any >> > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism >> > following the known laws of physics. >> >> No. >> >> For it to behave a certain way without consciousness, it would have to be >> programmed differently to behave the same way with consciousness. >> >> > So its behaviour, if you still >> > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be >> > said to be influenced by them, >> >> No. Consciousness appears to modify behavior. Conscious things usually >> move >> about, unconscious things usually lie inert. >> >> > as it would be expected to act the same >> > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective >> > experiences. >> >> It can be programmed to fool me. So what? >> >> > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following >> > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way >> > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. >> >> No. >> >> We are biological machanisms following the laws of physics. Our >> subjective >> experiences are part of that biological mechanism. The biological >> mechanism >> determines our behavior. Therefore subjective experience, as part of our >> biological mechanism following the laws of physics, affects our behavior. >> >> > They in >> > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, >> >> As part of the biological mechanism that determines our behavior, they >> do. >> >> > which would mean it >> > would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective >> > experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the >> > behaviour. The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. >> >> Well, when an argument is as wrong as yours, stupid conclusions are to be >> expected. >> >> > As I've said, you seem to having problems facing this point, but it is >> > a fact regarding the known laws of physics nevertheless. >> >> And you have trouble facing the idea that you might be wrong. >> > > It seems you can't read. There were initially two universes, and a > robot in each, and it remained so. Now you're just lying. Anyone can see that you first brought up the universe argument on the 4th at 11:25 AM. Robots weren't mentioned until 3 exchanges later with your 5:47 AM post on the 5th. And you didn't mention a second robot until 2 exchanges later on the 5th at 7:05 PM. Go on, read your posts. I'll wait. Can I expect an apology, or at least an admission that you made a mistake? > It also seems you are unable to follow the points being made, and > avoided the questions. For example where I said: > > ------- > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, and > you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I > explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what > basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did > because it had subjective experiences? > ------- > > To which you replied: > ------- > I would have to be assured that the physical operation of the robot, > following known laws of physics, didn't actually constitute > consciousness. Yes? And? > Avoiding totally stating on what basis would you continue to think > that it was acting the way it did because it had subjective > experiences? Why do you have a question mark at the end of a declarative sentence? I would continue to think it was acting in response to subjective experiences because apparently that's what it looks like it's doing. And your word alone isn't enough to dissuade me. You would have to show me that it's acting in what I would consider a non-conscious manner. > You also were seemingly unable to comprehend that even if you were to > regard it as having subjective experiences, it would still be behaving > as it would be expected to without the assumption that it was. Only if the non-conscious version was designed to mimic the conscious version. Note that the conscious version wouldn't need that bit of programming. -- Denis Loubet dloubet@io.com http://www.io.com/~dloubet http://www.ashenempires.com Quote
Guest someone3 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 09:03, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > On Jun 6, 5:03 pm, someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > On 6 Jun, 07:36, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > On Jun 6, 3:08 pm, someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > On 6 Jun, 05:54, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > > On Jun 6, 1:39 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 6 Jun, 04:30, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > > > > On Jun 6, 12:34 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 6 Jun, 03:29, Richo <m.richard...@utas.edu.au> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On Jun 5, 1:18 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On 5 Jun, 02:23, Matt Silberstein > > > > > > > > > > > <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, 04 Jun 2007 17:16:13 -0700, in alt.atheism , someone2 > > > > > > > > > > > <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> in > > > > > > > > > > > > <1181002573.602439.47...@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > [snip] > > > > > > > > > > > > >Sorry, I hadn't written it clearly enough. > > > > > > > > > > > > >Do do you accept that conceptually the behaviour of any mechanism > > > > > > > > > > > >following the known laws of physics could be explained in terms of the > > > > > > > > > > > >physical mechanism > > > > > > > > > > > >following the known laws of physics, and that this will not reference > > > > > > > > > > > >whether there are any associated subjective experiences or not? > > > > > > > > > > > > Sorry but that still seems to assume that subjective experience either > > > > > > > > > > > does not exist or is not a physical phenomenon. If subjective > > > > > > > > > > > experience is a physical phenomenon then our explanations will > > > > > > > > > > > reference that experience. Perhaps the problem you have with wording > > > > > > > > > > > this is that you have some bad assumptions. > > > > > > > > > > > It doesn't make any assumptions. It is a fact that the known laws of > > > > > > > > > > physics don't reference subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > > >So it is a fact that > > > > > > > > > > the behaviour of any mechanism following the known laws of physics can > > > > > > > > > > be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the said > > > > > > > > > > laws, > > > > > > > > > > "Can be" means it is possible. > > > > > > > > > That is not the same as saying Matt or anyone alive can do it right > > > > > > > > > now - it just says its possible. > > > > > > > > > You are apparently saying it is not possible. > > > > > > > > > How do you know it is not possible? > > > > > > > > > > No one has done it so far. > > > > > > > > > There are still areas of science for which we do not know the whole > > > > > > > > > story - which is good - there is still something for science to do. > > > > > > > > > > > and as they don't reference whether there are any associated > > > > > > > > > > subjective experiences, the explanation won't reference whether there > > > > > > > > > > are any associated subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > > > We haven't got the explanation in front of us - so we cannot say what > > > > > > > > > it looks like. > > > > > > > > > You are speculating that IF we ever get a complete explanation of the > > > > > > > > > phenomenon of consciousness in purely physical terms then it will not > > > > > > > > > refer to the subjective experiences. > > > > > > > > > This is a hypothetical and also it seems to me that if it did not > > > > > > > > > account for the subjective experiences it would not qualify as > > > > > > > > > "complete". > > > > > > > > > You are really saying that any incomplete explanation of conscious > > > > > > > > > experience would exclude the subjective. > > > > > > > > > I would agree with that. > > > > > > > > > > > Since it is obvious you can't deny that the behaviour of any mechanism > > > > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics can conceptually be explained in > > > > > > > > > > terms of the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, > > > > > > > > > > I dont deny that t is possible - such an explanation my not exist > > > > > > > > > for another 500 years. > > > > > > > > > > > are you denying that it is a fact that the known laws of physics don't > > > > > > > > > > reference whether there are any associated subjective experiences? > > > > > > > > > > The laws of physics don't reference the existence of vanilla ice > > > > > > > > > cream - but that does not imply that anything about the existence of > > > > > > > > > vanilla ice cream is in conflict with the laws of physics. > > > > > > > > > I'm not sure what you are suggesting I am saying is impossible. > > > > > > > > The point of your questions is - I presume - to get us to think that > > > > > > > conciousness as we experience cannot be explained by the known laws of > > > > > > > physics. > > > > > > > Many people are trying to find such an explanation - Francis Crick > > > > > > > (till his death) and his student Koch , Daniel Dennet, Marvin Minsky > > > > > > > etc. > > > > > > > You are saying they cannot succeed. > > > > > > > That it is impossible for them to succeed. > > > > > > > The only fact you have at hand is that they haven't done it yet. > > > > > > > > > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: > > > > > > > > > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: > > > > > > > > ------------- > > > > > > > > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program > > > > > > > > "Philosophy Talk". > > > > > > > > > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy > > > > > > > > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to ook > > > > > > > > at it, and there are two scenarios: > > > > > > > > > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft > > > > > > > > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and > > > > > > > > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a > > > > > > > > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does > > > > > > > > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's > > > > > > > > happening, more or less. > > > > > > > > > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard > > > > > > > > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and > > > > > > > > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a > > > > > > > > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how > > > > > > > > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where > > > > > > > > it's happening, more or less. > > > > > > > > > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is > > > > > > > > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? > > > > > > > > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. > > > > > > > > > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering > > > > > > > > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on > > > > > > > > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in > > > > > > > > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we > > > > > > > > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves > > > > > > > > consciousness? > > > > > > > > ------------- > > > > > > > > > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > > > > > > > > if I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, > > > > > > > > and you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, > > > > > > > > I explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of > > > > > > > > the physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on > > > > > > > > what basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it > > > > > > > > did because it had subjective experiences? > > > > > > > > Well this is a hypothetical but let us imagine the possible > > > > > > > consequences: > > > > > > > Did your explanation of how the mechanism generate the appearance of > > > > > > > conscious subjective experience also apply equally well to you and > > > > > > > me? > > > > > > > If so then there is obviously no dilemma - you have produced an > > > > > > > explanation of conscious subjective experience entirely in terms of > > > > > > > the known laws of physics. Further study and experimentation could be > > > > > > > designed to test this explanation to see if it holds up - if it does > > > > > > > Nobel prizes and fame forever is yours. > > > > > > > > IF your explanation of how the mechanism generated the the appearence > > > > > > > of conscious subjective experience does NOT apply to you and I then > > > > > > > obviously we could decide that such an explanation is not possible OR > > > > > > > we could keep looking for one. > > > > > > > So in short it would leave us where we are now. > > > > > > > > > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any > > > > > > > > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism > > > > > > > > following the known laws of physics. > > > > > > > > I can see it would depend on the circumastances as outlined above. > > > > > > > > > So its behaviour, if you still > > > > > > > > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be > > > > > > > > said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same > > > > > > > > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective > > > > > > > > experiences. > > > > > > > > You observe what you observe - whether or not you understand the > > > > > > > mechanism behind what you observe. > > > > > > > That it is possible for you to misunderstand or to simply not > > > > > > > understand what is happening does not mean that it is impossible for > > > > > > > all time to not understand the mechanism behind something. > > > > > > > > > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism ollowing > > > > > > > > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > > > > > > > > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > > > > > > > No I dont see that. > > > > > > > > > They in > > > > > > > > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it > > > > > > > > would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective > > > > > > > > experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the > > > > > > > > behaviour). The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. > > > > > > > > We were theorizing that the conscious subjective experiences were > > > > > > > caused by the underlying known laws of physics. > > > > > > > Now you are saying they would be "coincidental" - they certainly would > > > > > > > not be if they caused by the operation of the known laws of physics. > > > > > > > You didn't understand the point. > > > > > > That is possible. > > > > > > > It is implausible that we are simply > > > > > > a biological mechanism, for if we were then we couldn't be talking > > > > > > about them because they existed, it would have to be a coincidence. > > > > > > Why. > > > > > > >So > > > > > > you can see, that skipping over this, and making statements in regards > > > > > > to whether the explanation of how the robot functioned could apply to > > > > > > us, as though it was the coincidence, is obscuring the point, as it is > > > > > > implausible that we are simply a biological mechanism. > > > > > > Why is it implausible. > > > > > > > With regards to where I said: > > > > > > ------- > > > > > > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following > > > > > > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > > > > > > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > > > > > ------- > > > > > > > And you replied: > > > > > > ------- > > > > > > No I dont see that. > > > > > > ------- > > > > > > > Did you manage to understand why it would be the case with the robot, > > > > > > in that it would be acting as expected to without the added assumption > > > > > > that it had subjective experiences? > > > > > > I assume you are conscious and have subjective experiences because I > > > > > have them and so I think that beings that resemble me also have them. > > > > > If I encountered a Robot/computer/alien being that gave all the > > > > > indications that it was having subjective experiences I could assume > > > > > that it was and see what it and I had in common that could account for > > > > > us both having these experiences. > > > > > I could assume that neither the robot nor you had any such experiences > > > > > - but that would be dangerous. Since ethics is based upon compassion > > > > > and empathy for our fellow creatures. > > > > > > It is possible that I am the only conscious being on the planet that > > > > > has subjective experiences and that all the rest of you are all robots > > > > > following your programming. > > > > > I make the choice to believe otherwise. > > > > > So if on the robot the behaviour that you thought indicated that it > > > > had subjective experiences, was explained to you to simply be the > > > > result of the components of the physical mechanism following the laws > > > > of physics, and that it was behaving as it was expected to without the > > > > added assumption that it was subjectively experiencing, on what basis > > > > would you claim that its behaviour indicated that it was subjectively > > > > experiencing? > > > > There are a lot of assumptions to tend with here: > > > That the explanation you proposed was convincing - that the > > > explanation was more plausible than simply assuming the mechanism > > > was actually conscious and actually having subjective experiences etc. > > > > Likewise you could give me an "explanation" that one member of a set > > > of human twins was merely a mechanism - made of bone, blood and meat - > > > but a mechanism none the less - behaving according to a sophisticated > > > set of rules while the other twin had a soul. "Bill is a human with a > > > soul but Bob is just a clever mechanism - a meat robot. The fertilized > > > egg only had one soul and when it split into twins we were left with > > > one twin with a soul and another was just a meat robot." > > > > I am being asked to judge an explanation I have not seen - for the > > > behavior of a robot (or soulless Zombie) I have not seen. > > > > In any case: > > > The basis for my claim that the creature was having subjective > > > experiences would be exactly the same for my claim that another human > > > was having subjective experiences - that they were sufficiently > > > complex in their actions and reactions to perceptions/stimuli and by > > > their ability/desire to communicate with me to indicate that they were > > > a creature similar to myself. > > > I assume other creatures have subjective experiences because I do > > > - I cannot sense it/perceive it in them directly. > > > It is always a deduction, an inference. > > > > This applies to my wife as much as it does to your hypothetical robot. > > > I perceive through my senses - light, sound, touch, smell - I do not > > > directly perceive another creatures internal subjective experience. > > > I deduce that they are sufficiently similar to myself and so also have > > > internal subjective experiences. > > > > In the future we may have a general theory of conciousness and all > > > these problems will be tractable in a practical way. > > > Till then it is all speculation. > > > For starters, there will never be a materialistic explanation of > > consciousness. > > That is your belief. > You don't have a rational basis for holding this belief with any > certainty. > (I am not convinced that you have anything other than argument from > ignorance or fallacy of composition.) > > > It is impossible, you could never explain why we have > > the subjective experiences we do, and not fluctuations in the colour > > green dependent on the amount of neurons firing. So your statement is > > blantantly deceptive. > > You don't know that - and the strength of your conviction doesn't > constitute an argument. > > > Regarding the robot issue, there is no question of the plausibility of > > the explanation of the robots behaviour, it does follow the known laws > > of physics, and can be shown to do so. > > This is the hypothetical explanation for a hypothetical robot! > How the hell do I know if there is a plausibility issue or not? > Are you asking that I assume that your explanation is plausible? > Are you further insisting that your explanation does not involve the > mechanism having a complex internal model of itself and the world > which is not capable of self modifying ? > Etc etc > Then yes IF all of these things are satisfied then I suppose I would > come to the conclusion that the robot did not have internal subjective > experiences. > > That does not preclude some other mechanism also following the known > laws of physics in every aspect of its functioning from HAVING complex > internal states which model itself and the world to such a degree that > it DID have subjective internal mental experiences. > > So IF you assume your conclusion from the outset then YES you will > arrive at your conclusion. > > > Is the basis of your claim that it had subjective experiences, was > > based on the way it behaved, even though you knew it was behaving as > > it would be expected to if it didn't have any subjective experiences? > > I didn't actually claim the robot had subjective experiences - this is > a hypothetical robot remember? > If I did make such a claim it would be based on the same reason that I > claim my wife has internal subjective mental states - that she is a > creature similar to me and I assume she has internal subjective mental > experiences. > > If I found your explanation plausible AND the explanation did not > involve having complex internal states with sufficient self > referential ability and self modifying capacity etc etc THEN I suppose > I would conclude that the creature had no subjective experiences. > > > If so, do you understand that even if you were considering it to have > > subjective experiences, they couldn't be influencing its behaviour, as > > otherwise it wouldn't be behaving as expected to if it didn't have any > > subjective experiences? > > I don't understand the point of repeating this question/assertion. > I have no way of assessing the internal subjective mental states of > other beings - robots, women, children, rats, pumpkins. > I merely assume that beings that resemble me closely enough > have internal subjective experiences. > I cannot directly perceive another's subjective mental states. > > IF you set up the problem/question in such a way as it forces your > answer then Yes your answer emerges. > IS this the only way we can imagine these things operating? > No - it is not. > I can imagine a machine that strictly obeys the laws of physics in > every particular of its operation that has conciousness and subjective > mental experiences. > I believe I am an example of such a mechanism. > > You haven't presented an argument that I am not such a machine - > merely insisted that I cannot be such a machine - an assertion is not > an argument no matter how fervently it is put. > Well first things first lets just go through the situation with the robot, and then we can get onto the plausibility of you being a biological mechanism that strictly follows the known laws of physics. You are right, it is a hypothetical robot, a hypothetical robot that behaves as though it has subjective experiences, but whose workings are known to the builder, but which can involve complex complex internal states with sufficient self referential ability and self modifying capacity. Let's assume for the sake of debate that it is a neural network, with 1 million times more nodes than you have neurons (not all of which have to be used at anyone time, but allow for the configuration of what is used to change according to what the mechanism detected in its environment). Messages between each node could contain such information as the source node, the destination node (which could be the same as the source node in the case of feedback inputs), the time etc, and each node could write out to a seperate log. At the end of your converstation with it, a bank of computers could run through the logs, checking that no unexplained messages appeared, and that given the inputs each node received, it gave the outputs it would be expected to if it were following the known laws of physics. So while an explanation of how it did what it did might not be immediately available, it could be confirmed that it was indeed still following the known laws of physics, and behaving as it would be expected to without the assumption that it had any subjective experiences. You have claimed that if it behaved as though it had subjective experiences, you would deduce that it has. Do you wish to still maintain this claim? If so, is the basis of your claim that it had subjective experiences, based on the way it behaved, even though you knew it was behaving as it would be expected to if it didn't have any subjective experiences? If so, do you understand that even if you were considering it to have subjective experiences, they couldn't be influencing its behaviour, as otherwise it wouldn't be behaving as expected to if it didn't have any subjective experiences? Quote
Guest Martin Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 someone3 wrote: > > Again you are posting to converstations that I am having with other > people, when you assured me that you wouldn't. As I have said, your > behaviour in this regard is pathetic. Take it to email then asswipe. This _is_ a common conversation, you don't like it, piss off. > Quote
Guest someone3 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 09:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > news:1181102866.269868.46180@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > > > On 6 Jun, 05:00, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >>news:1181095407.100411.107720@q69g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > >> > On 6 Jun, 02:33, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >>news:1181091930.182688.105050@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> > On 5 Jun, 22:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >>news:1181074124.893550.190550@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> > On 5 Jun, 17:12, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >>news:1181044055.576591.170490@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> > On 5 Jun, 04:17, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >> >>news:1180997004.586680.126950@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 23:27, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180992269.825596.105660@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 19:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 16:07, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180915714.304693.138900@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 00:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180903459.945467.317500@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 21:38, "Denis Loubet" > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180891870.230456.185600@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 18:27, "Denis Loubet" > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > <dlou...@io.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180875033.790773.206010@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >page > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >can > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >understand > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Any mechanism which simply followed the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have its behaviour explained with the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wasn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > conscious (had no subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences). > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No. If the mechanism was conscious, then > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> explanation > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> its > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would necessarily include that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Which means that whether it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Which is nonsense. The explanation of its > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> necessarily > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> include > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the operation of its consciousness if it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> was > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Therefore if we were simply a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism, we couldn't be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > talking > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > about > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences because of their existance. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > It > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > coincidence that we actually experienced > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > what > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > claimed > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > we > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did, which isn't plausible. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Well, since you obviously don't understand > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> what > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it's > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> surprising that you've reached incorrect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusions. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Why would I be required to assume any > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > followed > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the laws of physics was conscious, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Who said you had to? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > why couldn't I explain it simply in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > terms of the physical mechanism following > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption that it wasn't? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If you fully describe the behavior of the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism following the laws of physics, then > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> all > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events that contribute to that behavior. If > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness will be included in the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> description > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Consciousness > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Consciousness > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> just > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> our > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> word that labels a particular VARIETY of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> following > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws of physics. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > While I you can believe that the mechanism is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > responsible > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > for > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective experiences, you avoided explaining > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > why > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > couldn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > terms > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism following the laws of physics, with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there were no subjective experiences, or could > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I did not say you couldn't explain the behaviour > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms of the physical mechanism following the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> assumption that there were no subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> defy > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> point out where I did. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What I DID say is that in explaining the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behaviour > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in terms of the physical mechanism following the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> assumption that there were no subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> necessity, include in that explanation the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> constitute > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness if they occurred. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Unless, of course, you arbitrarily want to avoid > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> those > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events that constitute consciousness, and affect > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> leave > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> your > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> explanation incomplete. You are free to do that. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So you admit, that the behaviour of the mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explained > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with the assumption that it didn't have any > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Sure. But if it did have subjective experiences, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> those > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> included in the explanation in terms of physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> following > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws of physics. In other words, you could explain > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> rote > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> description of physical events, unaware that you are > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences and their effect on behavior, in terms > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Can you follow that this being the case, whether > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > didn't > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > any subjective experiences couldn't influence the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > for > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did, its behaviour could not be explained without > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > taking > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > into > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > account > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > whether it did or didn't have any subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If it has subjective experiences, then they are part > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> its > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> any explanation that failed to include them would be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> incomplete, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> by > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> definition. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > regard > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > as > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > were > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "Only"? I never suggested that was the only factor that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> effects > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm saying that if you want a complete explanation of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> have > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> account for all factors. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> And are you attempting to separate subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> form > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> responsible for it? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > No knowledge of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > whether there were any subjective experiences or not > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > required. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> True. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So for any given mechanism, whether it were > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experienced > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > or > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > not, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wouldn't influence the behaviour. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Of course it would affect the behavior. Haven't you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> listened > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> word > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I've > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> said? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So if we were to be regarded as a > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences because they actually existed. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Our subjective experiences actually exist as material > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> patterns > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brains. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> These material patterns affect behavior. Is this > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> impossible > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> for > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> understand? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > object > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > was > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > an > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > alternative > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > universe, which followed the same known laws of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > but > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > were no subjective experiences associated with it, it > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > act > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > same. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No. If you disallow the material process of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, then you've obviously got a universe that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behaves > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> differently > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> from the one we're in. You're trying to violate the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> principle > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> identity, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> which pretty much hoses logic completely. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The objection that if it followed the same known > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experienced, > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics don't reference subjective experiences, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> We do not note any subjective experiences in the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> absence > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brains. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Thus we are justified in holding the tentative > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusion > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brains are required for subjective experience. Since we > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> note > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> manipulation of the physical brain produces changes in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, we are justified in holding the tentative > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusion > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective experience depends on the arrangement of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> matter > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brain. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > thus it is > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > having > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences and one not, without the need for any of > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of physics to be altered. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So this is a "Consciousness of the Gaps" argument? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > Do you accept that you could conceptually due to the > >> >> >> >> >> >> > known > >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws > >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics not referencing subjective experiences, have a > >> >> >> >> >> >> > two > >> >> >> >> >> >> > universes > >> >> >> >> >> >> > which both followed the same known laws of physics, > >> >> >> >> >> >> > and > >> >> >> >> >> >> > yet > >> >> >> >> >> >> > in > >> >> >> >> >> >> > one, > >> >> >> >> >> >> > a given mechanism gave rise to subjective experiences, > >> >> >> >> >> >> > and > >> >> >> >> >> >> > in > >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> >> >> >> > other it didn't? > > >> >> >> >> >> >> No. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm a materialist, and you're asking me to abandon the > >> >> >> >> >> >> principle > >> >> >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> >> >> identity. You're asking me to abandon logic. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> I will not do so. > > >> >> >> >> >> > Sit in denial if you like, > > >> >> >> >> >> Thank you, I will keep adhering to logic. > > >> >> >> >> >> > but it is conceptually possible to consider > >> >> >> >> >> > two universes following the same known laws of physics, and > >> >> >> >> >> > yet > >> >> >> >> >> > one > >> >> >> >> >> > having subjective experiences and the other not, > > >> >> >> >> >> Well, I can conceive of a universe just like this one that > >> >> >> >> >> doesn't > >> >> >> >> >> have > >> >> >> >> >> subjective experiences, but it would be trillions of years > >> >> >> >> >> further > >> >> >> >> >> along > >> >> >> >> >> its > >> >> >> >> >> timeline where proton decay has finally removed all matter > >> >> >> >> >> from > >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> universe. No matter, no subjective experiences. > > >> >> >> >> >> > because the laws of > >> >> >> >> >> > physics don't reference whether anything subjectively > >> >> >> >> >> > experiences. > > >> >> >> >> >> How do you know they don't? If you record the actions of all > >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> atoms > >> >> >> >> >> in > >> >> >> >> >> my > >> >> >> >> >> brain, then you'll have a complete record of my subjective > >> >> >> >> >> experiences > >> >> >> >> >> if > >> >> >> >> >> materialism is correct. > > >> >> >> >> >> > So > >> >> >> >> >> > you can sit there not being able to even face thinking > >> >> >> >> >> > about > >> >> >> >> >> > it > > >> >> >> >> >> Actually, I just showed I can think about it. It's just > >> >> >> >> >> stupid. > > >> >> >> >> >> > because it would show your whole world perspective to be > >> >> >> >> >> > implausible, > > >> >> >> >> >> You haven't managed to do that yet to anyone's satisfaction. > >> >> >> >> >> It's > >> >> >> >> >> just > >> >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> >> making an assertion. No one else appears to agree with you. > > >> >> >> >> >> > but it seems to me pathetic and cowardly to not be able to > >> >> >> >> >> > face > >> >> >> >> >> > reason. > > >> >> >> >> >> It is pathetic and cowardly not to be able to face reason, is > >> >> >> >> >> that > >> >> >> >> >> your > >> >> >> >> >> excuse? > > >> >> >> >> >> > When you feel brave enough, maybe you'll read it again, and > >> >> >> >> >> > consider the possibility, and how it highlights how you had > >> >> >> >> >> > been > >> >> >> >> >> > deceived. > > >> >> >> >> >> By the same logic, you're terrified by materialism and can't > >> >> >> >> >> face > >> >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> >> truth. > > >> >> >> >> >> See how bland assertions don't get you anywhere? > > >> >> >> >> > Unlike you, I'm not afraid of following reason though. If you > >> >> >> >> > were > >> >> >> >> > to > >> >> >> >> > ask me to conceptually consider that God didn't exist for > >> >> >> >> > example > >> >> >> >> > to > >> >> >> >> > highlight a point you were making, I wouldn't turn around and > >> >> >> >> > reply > >> >> >> >> > that I couldn't, and that I'd refuse to, as you did about an > >> >> >> >> > alternative universe which followed the same known laws of > >> >> >> >> > physics > >> >> >> >> > but > >> >> >> >> > in which there were no subjective experiences. > > >> >> >> >> What if I asked you to believe that god did exist and didn't > >> >> >> >> exist > >> >> >> >> at > >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> same time? That's the equivalent of what you asked me to do. > >> >> >> >> It's > >> >> >> >> not > >> >> >> >> that I > >> >> >> >> don't want to conceive of such things, it's that I can't. Maybe > >> >> >> >> you > >> >> >> >> can > >> >> >> >> hold > >> >> >> >> two mutually contradictory ideas in your head at once and call > >> >> >> >> both > >> >> >> >> true, > >> >> >> >> but I can't. I have to respect logic. > > >> >> >> >> Besides, I admitted I could conceive of such a universe, and > >> >> >> >> described > >> >> >> >> how > >> >> >> >> it would have to be. Another way would be if the universe didn't > >> >> >> >> have > >> >> >> >> any > >> >> >> >> matter in it because of a perfectly balanced ratio of matter to > >> >> >> >> antimatter. > >> >> >> >> All that's required is that a universe be in such a state that > >> >> >> >> brains > >> >> >> >> cannot > >> >> >> >> form. Without brains, you have no consciousness. > > >> >> >> >> But you don't like my solution to your little conundrum, so you > >> >> >> >> pretend I > >> >> >> >> didn't respond. > > >> >> >> >> > I'm sure if it had been > >> >> >> >> > a thought experiment which could have been used to pose a > >> >> >> >> > question > >> >> >> >> > about how could God exist, then you would have had no problem, > >> >> >> >> > but > >> >> >> >> > because it points out how your world view is implausible, > >> >> >> >> > you'd > >> >> >> >> > rather > >> >> >> >> > be deaf and blind about the matter, and not even consider it. > > >> >> >> >> No. Please acknowledge that I conceived of your stupid universe > >> >> >> >> scenario. > > >> >> >> >> It's you who are unable to conceive of the idea that your > >> >> >> >> scenario > >> >> >> >> might > >> >> >> >> be > >> >> >> >> silly. > > >> >> >> >> > You aren't adhering to logic, you are refusing to look at it > >> >> >> >> > reasonably. > > >> >> >> >> You have not shown that to be the case. Until you do, you're > >> >> >> >> just > >> >> >> >> blabbering. > > >> >> >> >> > It isn't as though it couldn't be done, for example if a > >> >> >> >> > robot behaved > > >> >> >> >> What? Universes and robots are equivalent in your mind? > > >> >> >> >> > as though it might have subjective experiences, i.e. it > >> >> >> >> > talked about them etc, you could surely conceive of that > >> >> >> >> > either > >> >> >> >> > (a) > >> >> >> >> > it > >> >> >> >> > did have, or (b) it didn't have. > > >> >> >> >> Yes. So what? > > >> >> >> >> > In one universe you could conceive of > >> >> >> >> > it having subjective experiences, in the other that it didn't. > > >> >> >> >> You said the universes were the SAME! If they're the same, then > >> >> >> >> they're > >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> same. If one possesses consciousness, then the other one does > >> >> >> >> too. > >> >> >> >> If > >> >> >> >> one > >> >> >> >> doesn't, then the other doesn't either. You can't say they're > >> >> >> >> the > >> >> >> >> same > >> >> >> >> but > >> >> >> >> different. > > >> >> >> >> > In > >> >> >> >> > either though it would be acting just the same, as in both it > >> >> >> >> > would > >> >> >> >> > simply just be a mechanism following the known laws of > >> >> >> >> > physics. > > >> >> >> >> In other words, the same but different. Sorry, that violates the > >> >> >> >> principle > >> >> >> >> of identity. A cannot equal NOT A. You've cast logic out the > >> >> >> >> window. > > >> >> >> >> > The > >> >> >> >> > same would apply to humans if you were to consider them to be > >> >> >> >> > simply > >> >> >> >> > biological mechanisms following the known laws of physics, > >> >> >> >> > even > >> >> >> >> > if > >> >> >> >> > you > >> >> >> >> > run from logic and reason, when it goes against your unfounded > >> >> >> >> > bias. > > >> >> >> >> Phrase your question where it does not violate fundamental > >> >> >> >> principle > >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> logic and I might entertain it. > > >> >> >> > It is simply a case of both universes following the known laws > >> >> >> > of > >> >> >> > physics. > > >> >> >> Then as far as we know, they're THE SAME! We will expect exactly > >> >> >> the > >> >> >> same > >> >> >> behaviors in both. > > >> >> >> > There was no need to add other differences to them as you did > >> >> >> > to avoid facing the issue. > > >> >> >> The distant future universe with no matter is not different from > >> >> >> ours. > >> >> >> It's > >> >> >> exactly the same. Our universe will be exactly that universe. > > >> >> >> > Which bit are you finding illogical? > > >> >> >> The part where you say something is the same, but different. Logic > >> >> >> dictates > >> >> >> that things that are the same CAN'T be different. > > >> >> >> If you want to throw out logic, that's fine, but the discussion > >> >> >> ends > >> >> >> there. > > >> >> >> > Supposing there was a robot that > >> >> >> > behaved as though it might be conscious. You could know how it > >> >> >> > worked, > >> >> >> > but it wouldn't tell you anything about whether it was > >> >> >> > subjectively > >> >> >> > experienced or not. > > >> >> >> What? I don't know that. It could easily be that if I knew how it > >> >> >> worked, > >> >> >> I'd know whether it had subjective experiences or not. > > >> >> >> > Now in the thought experiment, in one universe it > >> >> >> > could be considered that it did have subjective experiences, in > >> >> >> > the > >> >> >> > other that it did not. > > >> >> >> It? What it? The robot? The robot wasn't involved in your universe > >> >> >> scenario > >> >> >> until just now. > > >> >> >> So the robot works differently in the two universes. Ok...So...? > > >> >> >> > By doing so you could see that whether it did > >> >> >> > or didn't it couldn't affect its behaviour, as in both, it will > >> >> >> > simply > >> >> >> > behave the same, i.e. follow the laws of physics, so in fact it > >> >> >> > isn't > >> >> >> > only logical, it is a useful tool. > > >> >> >> No. It still makes no sense. If the same operation results in > >> >> >> consciousness > >> >> >> in one universe, and no consciousness in the other universe, then > >> >> >> the > >> >> >> universes are different. > > >> >> >> One would expect different behaviors in different universes with > >> >> >> different > >> >> >> laws. > > >> >> >> > It shows the implausibility of your > >> >> >> > world view for starters. > > >> >> >> No. It doesn't appear to do that at all. > > >> >> >> > Is truthfully so difficult for you, or is it > >> >> >> > that you can't face applying reason to your perspective? > > >> >> >> You have yet to establish that you are speaking truthfully. Or > >> >> >> utilizing > >> >> >> reason. > > >> >> > How would knowing that the behaviour of the robot was explainable in > >> >> > terms of it following the known laws of physics, give you any > >> >> > indication of whether it subjectively experienced or not. > > >> >> I didn't say it would. I offered the possibility that it could. YOU > >> >> are > >> >> the > >> >> one making the absolute statement said it wouldn't. > > >> >> Care to back up that assertion? > > >> >> > You seem to > >> >> > be living in some sci-fi fantasy world. > > >> >> And you don't seem to understand the difference between a speculation > >> >> and > >> >> a > >> >> statement of fact. > > >> >> > Regarding the thought experiment, the robots would both be following > >> >> > the same known laws of physics. So perhaps you could explain why > >> >> > you > >> >> > suggest they would act differently. > > >> >> Robots? This is the first time you've suggested more than one robot. > >> >> You > >> >> seem to enjoy adding more and more items to your scenarios willy-nilly > >> >> before we've even settled the original point you're trying to make. > > >> >> Ok, are we talking identical robots in identical universes? Then I > >> >> suppose > >> >> they'd behave exactly the same. > > >> >> If we're talking robots that are different in identical universes, > >> >> then I > >> >> suppose they'd behave differently. > > >> >> If we're talking identical robots in universes that are different, > >> >> then I > >> >> suppose they'd behave differently. > > >> >> And if we're talking robots that are different in universes that are > >> >> different, I suppose they'd behave differently there too. (Unless > >> >> there > >> >> was > >> >> the unlikely event that the differences cancelled each other out.) > > >> >> I can't think of another permutation. Did I answer your question? It > >> >> boils > >> >> down to things that are the same act the same, and things that are > >> >> different > >> >> act different. Did you want me to go into some sort of explanation of > >> >> this > >> >> conclusion? It seems pretty self explanatory. > > >> >> If, on the other hand, you're back to your "The universes are the > >> >> same, > >> >> but > >> >> magically different" tune, then I have no answer for you, as you've > >> >> abandoned logic and I can't follow you there. > > >> > Well there are two universes, and a robot in each, so how is it the > >> > first time it was mentioned that there were two of them? > > >> Now you're being disingenuous. I can look back in this thread and see > >> that > >> you started the argument with two universes. Then several posts later, > >> you > >> dragged in a robot that behaved differently in each universe. Then a few > >> posts later you dragged in another robot. > > >> People CAN read, you know. > > >> > The universes are the same in regards to the known laws of physics. > >> > In case you weren't aware, the laws of physics don't touch on the > >> > subject of whether anything is subjectively experienced or not. > > >> Then stop talking about it. > > >> > Therefore you could conceptually have two universes, which both follow > >> > the same laws of physics, and yet in one, the mechanism had no > >> > subjective experiences, and the other it did. > > >> So the universes are not the same. > > >> > So no the universes > >> > wouldn't be identical, they would simply both follow the known laws of > >> > physics. > > >> So you admit you are postulating two universes that are different. > > >> > Regarding the question, how would knowing that the behaviour of the > >> > robot was explainable in > >> > terms of it following the known laws of physics, give you any > >> > indication of whether it subjectively experienced or not, you didn't > >> > answer it. > > >> That's not the question you asked. But I'll answer this one. > > >> It wouldn't. It wouldn't give you any indication. You would have to know > >> how > >> it worked to do that. > > >> > As for backing up the assertion, well it is backed up by > >> > the fact that there would be no indication, and that neither you nor > >> > any materialist experiencing the physical world could point to one. > > >> But that's not the claim I asked you to back up. I asked you to back up > >> THIS > >> one: "Supposing there was a robot that behaved as though it might be > >> conscious. You could know how it worked, but it wouldn't tell you > >> anything > >> about whether it was subjectively experienced or not." > > >> The claim above stated that I KNEW HOW IT WORKED, not just that I knew it > >> operated according to the laws of physics. Your clumsy use of language > >> implies that I have all sorts of knowledge about the robot. That I can > >> follow all the operations of the mechanical brain. If that's the case, > >> It's > >> just as likely that I can open the user interface of the robot and see > >> what > >> it says under the "Subjective Experience" tab. That'll tell me all I need > >> to > >> know. > > >> > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: > > >> > ------------- > >> > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program > >> > "Philosophy Talk". > > >> > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy > >> > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to look > >> > at it, and there are two scenarios: > > >> > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft > >> > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and > >> > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a > >> > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does > >> > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's > >> > happening, more or less. > > >> > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard > >> > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and > >> > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a > >> > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how > >> > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where > >> > it's happening, more or less. > > >> > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is > >> > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? > >> > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. > > >> I see no reason in either case to change my opinion. > > >> > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering > >> > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on > >> > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in > >> > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we > >> > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves > >> > consciousness? > > >> No. But if someone built the computer that we have decided is conscious, > >> it > >> implies that the guy who built it knows how to achieve consciousness in a > >> computer. > > >> Of course, that's a necessarily tentative conclusion, because we know > >> that > >> we could be wrong about the computer being conscious. Heck, we could be > >> wrong about the meat brain being conscious too. > > >> > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > >> > I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, and > >> > you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I > >> > explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the > >> > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what > >> > basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did > >> > because it had subjective experiences? > > >> I would have to be assured that the physical operation of the robot, > >> following known laws of physics, didn't actually constitute > >> consciousness. > > >> > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any > >> > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism > >> > following the known laws of physics. > > >> No. > > >> For it to behave a certain way without consciousness, it would have to be > >> programmed differently to behave the same way with consciousness. > > >> > So its behaviour, if you still > >> > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be > >> > said to be influenced by them, > > >> No. Consciousness appears to modify behavior. Conscious things usually > >> move > >> about, unconscious things usually lie inert. > > >> > as it would be expected to act the same > >> > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective > >> > experiences. > > >> It can be programmed to fool me. So what? > > >> > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following > >> > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > >> > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > >> No. > > >> We are biological machanisms following the laws of physics. Our > >> subjective > >> experiences are part of that biological mechanism. The biological > >> mechanism > >> determines our behavior. Therefore subjective experience, as part of our > >> biological mechanism following the laws of physics, affects our behavior. > > >> > They in > >> > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, > > >> As part of the biological mechanism that determines our behavior, they > >> do. > > >> > which would mean it > >> > would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective > >> > experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the > >> > behaviour. The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. > > >> Well, when an argument is as wrong as yours, stupid conclusions are to be > >> expected. > > >> > As I've said, you seem to having problems facing this point, but it is > >> > a fact regarding the known laws of physics nevertheless. > > >> And you have trouble facing the idea that you might be wrong. > > > It seems you can't read. There were initially two universes, and a > > robot in each, and it remained so. > > Now you're just lying. Anyone can see that you first brought up the universe > argument on the 4th at 11:25 AM. Robots weren't mentioned until 3 exchanges > later with your 5:47 AM post on the 5th. And you didn't mention a second > robot until 2 exchanges later on the 5th at 7:05 PM. > > Go on, read your posts. I'll wait. > > Can I expect an apology, or at least an admission that you made a mistake? > > > It also seems you are unable to follow the points being made, and > > avoided the questions. For example where I said: > > > ------- > > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > > I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, and > > you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I > > explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the > > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what > > basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did > > because it had subjective experiences? > > ------- > > > To which you replied: > > ------- > > I would have to be assured that the physical operation of the robot, > > following known laws of physics, didn't actually constitute > > consciousness. > > Yes? And? > > > Avoiding totally stating on what basis would you continue to think > > that it was acting the way it did because it had subjective > > experiences? > > Why do you have a question mark at the end of a declarative sentence? > > I would continue to think it was acting in response to subjective > experiences because apparently that's what it looks like it's doing. And > your word alone isn't enough to dissuade me. You would have to show me that > it's acting in what I would consider a non-conscious manner. > > > You also were seemingly unable to comprehend that even if you were to > > regard it as having subjective experiences, it would still be behaving > > as it would be expected to without the assumption that it was. > > Only if the non-conscious version was designed to mimic the conscious > version. Note that the conscious version wouldn't need that bit of > programming. > Regarding the post on the 4th (and I don't know why you couldn't have cut and pasted these instead of me having to do it) it stated: ---------- To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object that it would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an alternative universe, which followed the same known laws of physics, but there were no subjective experiences associated with it, it would act the same. The objection that if it followed the same known laws of physics, then it would automatically be subjectively experienced, if it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the known laws of physics don't reference subjective experiences, thus it is conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both following the same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having subjective experiences and one not, without the need for any of the known laws of physics to be altered. ---------- Here mechanisms are mentioned being in each universe, but you are correct, in that I didn't specifically mention robots. Though for each mechanism, it would be existing twice, once in each universe (thus "...both following the same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having subjective experiences and one not"). On the post on the 5th: ---------- You aren't adhering to logic, you are refusing to look at it reasonably. It isn't as though it couldn't be done, for example if a robot behaved as though it might have subjective experiences, i.e. it talked about them etc, you could surely conceive of that either (a) it did have, or (b) it didn't have. In one universe you could conceive of it having subjective experiences, in the other that it didn't. In either though it would be acting just the same, as in both it would simply just be a mechanism following the known laws of physics. The same would apply to humans if you were to consider them to be simply biological mechanisms following the known laws of physics, even if you run from logic and reason, when it goes against your unfounded bias. ---------- There are two universe, and a robot is in each, obviously the same robot isn't existing in both simultaneously. I'm not sure if this is what you are referring to (as the time stamps I see are different) ---------- Regarding the thought experiment, the robots would both be following the same known laws of physics. So perhaps you could explain why you suggest they would act differently. ---------- Again, there are two robots. If it was different bits you were referring to, then I suggest that you cut and paste them yourself, so there can be no confusion. Anyway, back to the real issue, regarding where I said: ---------- Avoiding totally stating on what basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did because it had subjective experiences? ---------- You replied ---------- Why do you have a question mark at the end of a declarative sentence? I would continue to think it was acting in response to subjective experiences because apparently that's what it looks like it's doing. And your word alone isn't enough to dissuade me. You would have to show me that it's acting in what I would consider a non-conscious manner. ---------- So you would base your belief that it was acting in response to subjective experiences, even though it was behaving exactly as it would be expected to, without the added assumption that it was subjectively experiencing? If so, what influence would you consider the subjective experiences to be having, given that it is behaving as it would be expected to without the assumption that it had any subjective experiences? Quote
Guest someone3 Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 On 6 Jun, 09:42, someone3 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote: > On 6 Jun, 09:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > > > "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > >news:1181102866.269868.46180@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > > > > On 6 Jun, 05:00, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > > >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > > >>news:1181095407.100411.107720@q69g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > > >> > On 6 Jun, 02:33, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > > >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > > >> >>news:1181091930.182688.105050@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > > >> >> > On 5 Jun, 22:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > > >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > > >> >> >>news:1181074124.893550.190550@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > > >> >> >> > On 5 Jun, 17:12, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > > >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > > >> >> >> >>news:1181044055.576591.170490@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com... > > > >> >> >> >> > On 5 Jun, 04:17, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > > >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > > >> >> >> >> >>news:1180997004.586680.126950@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > > >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 23:27, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message > > > >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180992269.825596.105660@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com... > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 19:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 16:07, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180915714.304693.138900@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 4 Jun, 00:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180903459.945467.317500@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com... > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 21:38, "Denis Loubet" > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > <dlou...@io.com> > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180891870.230456.185600@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com... > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > On 3 Jun, 18:27, "Denis Loubet" > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > <dlou...@io.com> > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wrote: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> message > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>news:1180875033.790773.206010@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com... > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >page > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >can > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >understand > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following: > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Any mechanism which simply followed the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have its behaviour explained with the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wasn't > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > conscious (had no subjective > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences). > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No. If the mechanism was conscious, then > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> explanation > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> its > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would necessarily include that > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Which means that whether it > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Which is nonsense. The explanation of its > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> necessarily > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> include > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the operation of its consciousness if it > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> was > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Therefore if we were simply a > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism, we couldn't be > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > talking > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > about > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences because of their existance. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > It > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > to > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > a > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > coincidence that we actually experienced > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > what > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > claimed > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > we > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did, which isn't plausible. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Well, since you obviously don't understand > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> what > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> wrote, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it's > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> not > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> surprising that you've reached incorrect > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusions. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Why would I be required to assume any > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > simply > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > followed > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the laws of physics was conscious, > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Who said you had to? > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > why couldn't I explain it simply in > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > terms of the physical mechanism following > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption that it wasn't? > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If you fully describe the behavior of the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism following the laws of physics, then > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> all > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events that contribute to that behavior. If > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conscious, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness will be included in the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> description > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Consciousness > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical mechanisms following the laws of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Consciousness > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> is > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> just > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> our > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> word that labels a particular VARIETY of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> following > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws of physics. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > While I you can believe that the mechanism is > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > responsible > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > for > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > our > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective experiences, you avoided explaining > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > why > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > couldn't > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > in > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > terms > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physical > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > mechanism following the laws of physics, with > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > assumption > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there were no subjective experiences, or could > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > I? > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I did not say you couldn't explain the behaviour > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> terms of the physical mechanism following the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> assumption that there were no subjective > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> defy > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> point out where I did. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What I DID say is that in explaining the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behaviour > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> simply > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in terms of the physical mechanism following the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physics, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> assumption that there were no subjective > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> necessity, include in that explanation the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> constitute > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness if they occurred. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Unless, of course, you arbitrarily want to avoid > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> those > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events that constitute consciousness, and affect > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> leave > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> your > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> explanation incomplete. You are free to do that. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So you admit, that the behaviour of the mechanism > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > could > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > explained > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > with the assumption that it didn't have any > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Sure. But if it did have subjective experiences, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> those > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> would > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> be > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> included in the explanation in terms of physical > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanisms > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> following > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> laws of physics. In other words, you could explain > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> with a > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> rote > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> description of physical events, unaware that you are > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> describing > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experiences and their effect on behavior, in terms > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> events. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Can you follow that this being the case, whether > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > or > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > didn't > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > have > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > any subjective experiences couldn't influence the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > behaviour, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > for > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > did, its behaviour could not be explained without > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > taking > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > into > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > account > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > whether it did or didn't have any subjective > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences? > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If it has subjective experiences, then they are part > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> its > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> any explanation that failed to include them would be > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> incomplete, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> by > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> definition. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > regard > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > as > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > were > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> "Only"? I never suggested that was the only factor that > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> effects > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm saying that if you want a complete explanation of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behavior > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> have > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> account for all factors. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> And are you attempting to separate subjective > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> form > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mechanism > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> responsible for it? > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > No knowledge of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > whether there were any subjective experiences or not > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > be > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > required. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> True. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So for any given mechanism, whether it were > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experienced > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > or > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > not, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > wouldn't influence the behaviour. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Of course it would affect the behavior. Haven't you > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> listened > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> a > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> word > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I've > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> said? > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > So if we were to be regarded as a > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences because they actually existed. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Our subjective experiences actually exist as material > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> patterns > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brains. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> These material patterns affect behavior. Is this > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> impossible > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> for > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> to > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> understand? > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > object > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > that > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > was > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > an > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > alternative > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > universe, which followed the same known laws of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > but > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > there > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > were no subjective experiences associated with it, it > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > would > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > act > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > same. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> No. If you disallow the material process of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> consciousness > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, then you've obviously got a universe that > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> behaves > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> differently > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> from the one we're in. You're trying to violate the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> principle > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> identity, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> which pretty much hoses logic completely. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The objection that if it followed the same known > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experienced, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > if > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics don't reference subjective experiences, > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> We do not note any subjective experiences in the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> absence > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brains. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Thus we are justified in holding the tentative > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusion > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brains are required for subjective experience. Since we > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> note > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> manipulation of the physical brain produces changes in > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> experience, we are justified in holding the tentative > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> conclusion > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> that > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> subjective experience depends on the arrangement of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> matter > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> in > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> physical > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> brain. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > thus it is > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > following > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > having > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > subjective > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > experiences and one not, without the need for any of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > known > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > of physics to be altered. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So this is a "Consciousness of the Gaps" argument? > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > Do you accept that you could conceptually due to the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > known > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > laws > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > physics not referencing subjective experiences, have a > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > two > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > universes > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > which both followed the same known laws of physics, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > and > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > yet > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > in > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > one, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > a given mechanism gave rise to subjective experiences, > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > and > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > in > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > other it didn't? > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> No. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm a materialist, and you're asking me to abandon the > > >> >> >> >> >> >> principle > > >> >> >> >> >> >> of > > >> >> >> >> >> >> identity. You're asking me to abandon logic. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> I will not do so. > > > >> >> >> >> >> > Sit in denial if you like, > > > >> >> >> >> >> Thank you, I will keep adhering to logic. > > > >> >> >> >> >> > but it is conceptually possible to consider > > >> >> >> >> >> > two universes following the same known laws of physics, and > > >> >> >> >> >> > yet > > >> >> >> >> >> > one > > >> >> >> >> >> > having subjective experiences and the other not, > > > >> >> >> >> >> Well, I can conceive of a universe just like this one that > > >> >> >> >> >> doesn't > > >> >> >> >> >> have > > >> >> >> >> >> subjective experiences, but it would be trillions of years > > >> >> >> >> >> further > > >> >> >> >> >> along > > >> >> >> >> >> its > > >> >> >> >> >> timeline where proton decay has finally removed all matter > > >> >> >> >> >> from > > >> >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> >> universe. No matter, no subjective experiences. > > > >> >> >> >> >> > because the laws of > > >> >> >> >> >> > physics don't reference whether anything subjectively > > >> >> >> >> >> > experiences. > > > >> >> >> >> >> How do you know they don't? If you record the actions of all > > >> >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> >> atoms > > >> >> >> >> >> in > > >> >> >> >> >> my > > >> >> >> >> >> brain, then you'll have a complete record of my subjective > > >> >> >> >> >> experiences > > >> >> >> >> >> if > > >> >> >> >> >> materialism is correct. > > > >> >> >> >> >> > So > > >> >> >> >> >> > you can sit there not being able to even face thinking > > >> >> >> >> >> > about > > >> >> >> >> >> > it > > > >> >> >> >> >> Actually, I just showed I can think about it. It's just > > >> >> >> >> >> stupid. > > > >> >> >> >> >> > because it would show your whole world perspective to be > > >> >> >> >> >> > implausible, > > > >> >> >> >> >> You haven't managed to do that yet to anyone's satisfaction. > > >> >> >> >> >> It's > > >> >> >> >> >> just > > >> >> >> >> >> you > > >> >> >> >> >> making an assertion. No one else appears to agree with you. > > > >> >> >> >> >> > but it seems to me pathetic and cowardly to not be able to > > >> >> >> >> >> > face > > >> >> >> >> >> > reason. > > > >> >> >> >> >> It is pathetic and cowardly not to be able to face reason, is > > >> >> >> >> >> that > > >> >> >> >> >> your > > >> >> >> >> >> excuse? > > > >> >> >> >> >> > When you feel brave enough, maybe you'll read it again, and > > >> >> >> >> >> > consider the possibility, and how it highlights how you had > > >> >> >> >> >> > been > > >> >> >> >> >> > deceived. > > > >> >> >> >> >> By the same logic, you're terrified by materialism and can't > > >> >> >> >> >> face > > >> >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> >> truth. > > > >> >> >> >> >> See how bland assertions don't get you anywhere? > > > >> >> >> >> > Unlike you, I'm not afraid of following reason though. If you > > >> >> >> >> > were > > >> >> >> >> > to > > >> >> >> >> > ask me to conceptually consider that God didn't exist for > > >> >> >> >> > example > > >> >> >> >> > to > > >> >> >> >> > highlight a point you were making, I wouldn't turn around and > > >> >> >> >> > reply > > >> >> >> >> > that I couldn't, and that I'd refuse to, as you did about an > > >> >> >> >> > alternative universe which followed the same known laws of > > >> >> >> >> > physics > > >> >> >> >> > but > > >> >> >> >> > in which there were no subjective experiences. > > > >> >> >> >> What if I asked you to believe that god did exist and didn't > > >> >> >> >> exist > > >> >> >> >> at > > >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> same time? That's the equivalent of what you asked me to do. > > >> >> >> >> It's > > >> >> >> >> not > > >> >> >> >> that I > > >> >> >> >> don't want to conceive of such things, it's that I can't. Maybe > > >> >> >> >> you > > >> >> >> >> can > > >> >> >> >> hold > > >> >> >> >> two mutually contradictory ideas in your head at once and call > > >> >> >> >> both > > >> >> >> >> true, > > >> >> >> >> but I can't. I have to respect logic. > > > >> >> >> >> Besides, I admitted I could conceive of such a universe, and > > >> >> >> >> described > > >> >> >> >> how > > >> >> >> >> it would have to be. Another way would be if the universe didn't > > >> >> >> >> have > > >> >> >> >> any > > >> >> >> >> matter in it because of a perfectly balanced ratio of matter to > > >> >> >> >> antimatter. > > >> >> >> >> All that's required is that a universe be in such a state that > > >> >> >> >> brains > > >> >> >> >> cannot > > >> >> >> >> form. Without brains, you have no consciousness. > > > >> >> >> >> But you don't like my solution to your little conundrum, so you > > >> >> >> >> pretend I > > >> >> >> >> didn't respond. > > > >> >> >> >> > I'm sure if it had been > > >> >> >> >> > a thought experiment which could have been used to pose a > > >> >> >> >> > question > > >> >> >> >> > about how could God exist, then you would have had no problem, > > >> >> >> >> > but > > >> >> >> >> > because it points out how your world view is implausible, > > >> >> >> >> > you'd > > >> >> >> >> > rather > > >> >> >> >> > be deaf and blind about the matter, and not even consider it. > > > >> >> >> >> No. Please acknowledge that I conceived of your stupid universe > > >> >> >> >> scenario. > > > >> >> >> >> It's you who are unable to conceive of the idea that your > > >> >> >> >> scenario > > >> >> >> >> might > > >> >> >> >> be > > >> >> >> >> silly. > > > >> >> >> >> > You aren't adhering to logic, you are refusing to look at it > > >> >> >> >> > reasonably. > > > >> >> >> >> You have not shown that to be the case. Until you do, you're > > >> >> >> >> just > > >> >> >> >> blabbering. > > > >> >> >> >> > It isn't as though it couldn't be done, for example if a > > >> >> >> >> > robot behaved > > > >> >> >> >> What? Universes and robots are equivalent in your mind? > > > >> >> >> >> > as though it might have subjective experiences, i.e. it > > >> >> >> >> > talked about them etc, you could surely conceive of that > > >> >> >> >> > either > > >> >> >> >> > (a) > > >> >> >> >> > it > > >> >> >> >> > did have, or (b) it didn't have. > > > >> >> >> >> Yes. So what? > > > >> >> >> >> > In one universe you could conceive of > > >> >> >> >> > it having subjective experiences, in the other that it didn't. > > > >> >> >> >> You said the universes were the SAME! If they're the same, then > > >> >> >> >> they're > > >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> same. If one possesses consciousness, then the other one does > > >> >> >> >> too. > > >> >> >> >> If > > >> >> >> >> one > > >> >> >> >> doesn't, then the other doesn't either. You can't say they're > > >> >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> >> same > > >> >> >> >> but > > >> >> >> >> different. > > > >> >> >> >> > In > > >> >> >> >> > either though it would be acting just the same, as in both it > > >> >> >> >> > would > > >> >> >> >> > simply just be a mechanism following the known laws of > > >> >> >> >> > physics. > > > >> >> >> >> In other words, the same but different. Sorry, that violates the > > >> >> >> >> principle > > >> >> >> >> of identity. A cannot equal NOT A. You've cast logic out the > > >> >> >> >> window. > > > >> >> >> >> > The > > >> >> >> >> > same would apply to humans if you were to consider them to be > > >> >> >> >> > simply > > >> >> >> >> > biological mechanisms following the known laws of physics, > > >> >> >> >> > even > > >> >> >> >> > if > > >> >> >> >> > you > > >> >> >> >> > run from logic and reason, when it goes against your unfounded > > >> >> >> >> > bias. > > > >> >> >> >> Phrase your question where it does not violate fundamental > > >> >> >> >> principle > > >> >> >> >> of > > >> >> >> >> logic and I might entertain it. > > > >> >> >> > It is simply a case of both universes following the known laws > > >> >> >> > of > > >> >> >> > physics. > > > >> >> >> Then as far as we know, they're THE SAME! We will expect exactly > > >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> same > > >> >> >> behaviors in both. > > > >> >> >> > There was no need to add other differences to them as you did > > >> >> >> > to avoid facing the issue. > > > >> >> >> The distant future universe with no matter is not different from > > >> >> >> ours. > > >> >> >> It's > > >> >> >> exactly the same. Our universe will be exactly that universe. > > > >> >> >> > Which bit are you finding illogical? > > > >> >> >> The part where you say something is the same, but different. Logic > > >> >> >> dictates > > >> >> >> that things that are the same CAN'T be different. > > > >> >> >> If you want to throw out logic, that's fine, but the discussion > > >> >> >> ends > > >> >> >> there. > > > >> >> >> > Supposing there was a robot that > > >> >> >> > behaved as though it might be conscious. You could know how it > > >> >> >> > worked, > > >> >> >> > but it wouldn't tell you anything about whether it was > > >> >> >> > subjectively > > >> >> >> > experienced or not. > > > >> >> >> What? I don't know that. It could easily be that if I knew how it > > >> >> >> worked, > > >> >> >> I'd know whether it had subjective experiences or not. > > > >> >> >> > Now in the thought experiment, in one universe it > > >> >> >> > could be considered that it did have subjective experiences, in > > >> >> >> > the > > >> >> >> > other that it did not. > > > >> >> >> It? What it? The robot? The robot wasn't involved in your universe > > >> >> >> scenario > > >> >> >> until just now. > > > >> >> >> So the robot works differently in the two universes. Ok...So...? > > > >> >> >> > By doing so you could see that whether it did > > >> >> >> > or didn't it couldn't affect its behaviour, as in both, it will > > >> >> >> > simply > > >> >> >> > behave the same, i.e. follow the laws of physics, so in fact it > > >> >> >> > isn't > > >> >> >> > only logical, it is a useful tool. > > > >> >> >> No. It still makes no sense. If the same operation results in > > >> >> >> consciousness > > >> >> >> in one universe, and no consciousness in the other universe, then > > >> >> >> the > > >> >> >> universes are different. > > > >> >> >> One would expect different behaviors in different universes with > > >> >> >> different > > >> >> >> laws. > > > >> >> >> > It shows the implausibility of your > > >> >> >> > world view for starters. > > > >> >> >> No. It doesn't appear to do that at all. > > > >> >> >> > Is truthfully so difficult for you, or is it > > >> >> >> > that you can't face applying reason to your perspective? > > > >> >> >> You have yet to establish that you are speaking truthfully. Or > > >> >> >> utilizing > > >> >> >> reason. > > > >> >> > How would knowing that the behaviour of the robot was explainable in > > >> >> > terms of it following the known laws of physics, give you any > > >> >> > indication of whether it subjectively experienced or not. > > > >> >> I didn't say it would. I offered the possibility that it could. YOU > > >> >> are > > >> >> the > > >> >> one making the absolute statement said it wouldn't. > > > >> >> Care to back up that assertion? > > > >> >> > You seem to > > >> >> > be living in some sci-fi fantasy world. > > > >> >> And you don't seem to understand the difference between a speculation > > >> >> and > > >> >> a > > >> >> statement of fact. > > > >> >> > Regarding the thought experiment, the robots would both be following > > >> >> > the same known laws of physics. So perhaps you could explain why > > >> >> > you > > >> >> > suggest they would act differently. > > > >> >> Robots? This is the first time you've suggested more than one robot. > > >> >> You > > >> >> seem to enjoy adding more and more items to your scenarios willy-nilly > > >> >> before we've even settled the original point you're trying to make. > > > >> >> Ok, are we talking identical robots in identical universes? Then I > > >> >> suppose > > >> >> they'd behave exactly the same. > > > >> >> If we're talking robots that are different in identical universes, > > >> >> then I > > >> >> suppose they'd behave differently. > > > >> >> If we're talking identical robots in universes that are different, > > >> >> then I > > >> >> suppose they'd behave differently. > > > >> >> And if we're talking robots that are different in universes that are > > >> >> different, I suppose they'd behave differently there too. (Unless > > >> >> there > > >> >> was > > >> >> the unlikely event that the differences cancelled each other out.) > > > >> >> I can't think of another permutation. Did I answer your question? It > > >> >> boils > > >> >> down to things that are the same act the same, and things that are > > >> >> different > > >> >> act different. Did you want me to go into some sort of explanation of > > >> >> this > > >> >> conclusion? It seems pretty self explanatory. > > > >> >> If, on the other hand, you're back to your "The universes are the > > >> >> same, > > >> >> but > > >> >> magically different" tune, then I have no answer for you, as you've > > >> >> abandoned logic and I can't follow you there. > > > >> > Well there are two universes, and a robot in each, so how is it the > > >> > first time it was mentioned that there were two of them? > > > >> Now you're being disingenuous. I can look back in this thread and see > > >> that > > >> you started the argument with two universes. Then several posts later, > > >> you > > >> dragged in a robot that behaved differently in each universe. Then a few > > >> posts later you dragged in another robot. > > > >> People CAN read, you know. > > > >> > The universes are the same in regards to the known laws of physics. > > >> > In case you weren't aware, the laws of physics don't touch on the > > >> > subject of whether anything is subjectively experienced or not. > > > >> Then stop talking about it. > > > >> > Therefore you could conceptually have two universes, which both follow > > >> > the same laws of physics, and yet in one, the mechanism had no > > >> > subjective experiences, and the other it did. > > > >> So the universes are not the same. > > > >> > So no the universes > > >> > wouldn't be identical, they would simply both follow the known laws of > > >> > physics. > > > >> So you admit you are postulating two universes that are different. > > > >> > Regarding the question, how would knowing that the behaviour of the > > >> > robot was explainable in > > >> > terms of it following the known laws of physics, give you any > > >> > indication of whether it subjectively experienced or not, you didn't > > >> > answer it. > > > >> That's not the question you asked. But I'll answer this one. > > > >> It wouldn't. It wouldn't give you any indication. You would have to know > > >> how > > >> it worked to do that. > > > >> > As for backing up the assertion, well it is backed up by > > >> > the fact that there would be no indication, and that neither you nor > > >> > any materialist experiencing the physical world could point to one. > > > >> But that's not the claim I asked you to back up. I asked you to back up > > >> THIS > > >> one: "Supposing there was a robot that behaved as though it might be > > >> conscious. You could know how it worked, but it wouldn't tell you > > >> anything > > >> about whether it was subjectively experienced or not." > > > >> The claim above stated that I KNEW HOW IT WORKED, not just that I knew it > > >> operated according to the laws of physics. Your clumsy use of language > > >> implies that I have all sorts of knowledge about the robot. That I can > > >> follow all the operations of the mechanical brain. If that's the case, > > >> It's > > >> just as likely that I can open the user interface of the robot and see > > >> what > > >> it says under the "Subjective Experience" tab. That'll tell me all I need > > >> to > > >> know. > > > >> > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: > > > >> > ------------- > > >> > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program > > >> > "Philosophy Talk". > > > >> > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy > > >> > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to look > > >> > at it, and there are two scenarios: > > > >> > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft > > >> > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and > > >> > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a > > >> > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does > > >> > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's > > >> > happening, more or less. > > > >> > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard > > >> > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and > > >> > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a > > >> > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how > > >> > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where > > >> > it's happening, more or less. > > > >> > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is > > >> > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? > > >> > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. > > > >> I see no reason in either case to change my opinion. > > > >> > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering > > >> > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on > > >> > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in > > >> > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we > > >> > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves > > >> > consciousness? > > > >> No. But if someone built the computer that we have decided is conscious, > > >> it > > >> implies that the guy who built it knows how to achieve consciousness in a > > >> computer. > > > >> Of course, that's a necessarily tentative conclusion, because we know > > >> that > > >> we could be wrong about the computer being conscious. Heck, we could be > > >> wrong about the meat brain being conscious too. > > > >> > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > > >> > I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, and > > >> > you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I > > >> > explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the > > >> > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what > > >> > basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did > > >> > because it had subjective experiences? > > > >> I would have to be assured that the physical operation of the robot, > > >> following known laws of physics, didn't actually constitute > > >> consciousness. > > > >> > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any > > >> > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism > > >> > following the known laws of physics. > > > >> No. > > > >> For it to behave a certain way without consciousness, it would have to be > > >> programmed differently to behave the same way with consciousness. > > > >> > So its behaviour, if you still > > >> > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be > > >> > said to be influenced by them, > > > >> No. Consciousness appears to modify behavior. Conscious things usually > > >> move > > >> about, unconscious things usually lie inert. > > > >> > as it would be expected to act the same > > >> > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective > > >> > experiences. > > > >> It can be programmed to fool me. So what? > > > >> > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism following > > >> > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > > >> > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. > > > >> No. > > > >> We are biological machanisms following the laws of physics. Our > > >> subjective > > >> experiences are part of that biological mechanism. The biological > > >> mechanism > > >> determines our behavior. Therefore subjective experience, as part of our > > >> biological mechanism following the laws of physics, affects our behavior. > > > >> > They in > > >> > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, > > > >> As part of the biological mechanism that determines our behavior, they > > >> do. > > > >> > which would mean it > > >> > would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective > > >> > experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the > > >> > behaviour. The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. > > > >> Well, when an argument is as wrong as yours, stupid conclusions are to be > > >> expected. > > > >> > As I've said, you seem to having problems facing this point, but it is > > >> > a fact regarding the known laws of physics nevertheless. > > > >> And you have trouble facing the idea that you might be wrong. > > > > It seems you can't read. There were initially two universes, and a > > > robot in each, and it remained so. > > > Now you're just lying. Anyone can see that you first brought up the universe > > argument on the 4th at 11:25 AM. Robots weren't mentioned until 3 exchanges > > later with your 5:47 AM post on the 5th. And you didn't mention a second > > robot until 2 exchanges later on the 5th at 7:05 PM. > > > Go on, read your posts. I'll wait. > > > Can I expect an apology, or at least an admission that you made a mistake? > > > > It also seems you are unable to follow the points being made, and > > > avoided the questions. For example where I said: > > > > ------- > > > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > > > I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, and > > > you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I > > > explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the > > > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what > > > basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did > > > because it had subjective experiences? > > > ------- > > > > To which you replied: > > > ------- > > > I would have to be assured that the physical operation of the robot, > > > following known laws of physics, didn't actually constitute > > > consciousness. > > > Yes? And? > > > > Avoiding totally stating on what basis would you continue to think > > > that it was acting the way it did because it had subjective > > > experiences? > > > Why do you have a question mark at the end of a declarative sentence? > > > I would continue to think it was acting in response to subjective > > experiences because apparently that's what it looks like it's doing. And > > your word alone isn't enough to dissuade me. You would have to show me that > > it's acting in what I would consider a non-conscious manner. > > > > You also were seemingly unable to comprehend that even if you were to > > > regard it as having subjective experiences, it would still be behaving > > > as it would be expected to without the assumption that it was. > > > Only if the non-conscious version was designed to mimic the conscious > > version. Note that the conscious version wouldn't need that bit of > > programming. > > Regarding the post on the 4th (and I don't know why you couldn't have > cut and pasted these instead of me having to do it) it stated: > ---------- > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object that it > would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an alternative > universe, which followed the same known laws of physics, but there > were no subjective experiences associated with it, it would act the > same. The objection that if it followed the same known laws of > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively experienced, if > it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the known laws of > physics don't reference subjective experiences, thus it is > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both following the > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having subjective > experiences and one not, without the need for any of the known laws > of physics to be altered. > ---------- > > Here mechanisms are mentioned being in each universe, but you are > correct, in that I didn't specifically mention robots. Though for each > mechanism, it would be existing twice, once in each universe (thus > "...both following the same laws of physics as known to us, but with > one having subjective experiences and one not"). > > On the post on the 5th: > ---------- > You aren't adhering to logic, you are refusing to look at it > reasonably. It isn't as though it couldn't be done, for example if a > robot behaved as though it might have subjective experiences, i.e. it > talked about them etc, you could surely conceive of that either (a) it > did have, or (b) it didn't have. In one universe you could conceive of > it having subjective experiences, in the other that it didn't. In > either though it would be acting just the same, as in both it would > simply just be a mechanism following the known laws of physics. The > same would apply to humans if you were to consider them to be simply > biological mechanisms following the known laws of physics, even if > you > run from logic and reason, when it goes against your unfounded bias. > ---------- > > There are two universe, and a robot is in each, obviously the same > robot isn't existing in both simultaneously. > > I'm not sure if this is what you are referring to (as the time stamps > I see are different) > ---------- > Regarding the thought experiment, the robots would both be following > the same known laws of physics. So perhaps you could explain why > you > suggest they would act differently. > ---------- > > Again, there are two robots. > > If it was different bits you were referring to, then I suggest that > you cut and paste them yourself, so there can be no confusion. > > Anyway, back to the real issue, regarding where I said: > ---------- > Avoiding totally stating on what basis would you continue to think > that it was acting the way it did because it had subjective > experiences? > ---------- > > You replied > ---------- > Why do you have a question mark at the end of a declarative sentence? > > I would continue to think it was acting in response to subjective > experiences because apparently that's what it looks like it's doing. > And your word alone isn't enough to dissuade me. You would have to > show me that it's acting in what I would consider a non-conscious > manner. > ---------- > > So you would base your belief that it was acting in response to > subjective experiences, even though it was behaving exactly as it > would be expected to, without the added assumption that it was > subjectively experiencing? > > If so, what influence would you consider the subjective experiences to > be having, given that it is behaving as it would be expected to > without the assumption that it had any subjective experiences? Anyway, I'm going to get some sleep while you have a think about it. Feel free to snip any of the old stuff. Also I don't mean to be rude in suggesting that you might, but obviously don't avoid the main issue. Quote
Guest Fred Stone Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 someone2 <glenn.spigel2@btinternet.com> wrote in news:1181096859.045313.216360@p47g2000hsd.googlegroups.com: > On 4 Jun, 18:47, Fred Stone <fston...@earthling.com> wrote: >> someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote >> innews:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com: >> >> > So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard as >> > responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed there were >> > any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour. No knowledge of >> > whether there were any subjective experiences or not would be >> > required. >> >> Whether or not the mechanism did in fact have subjective experiences, >> knowledge of that fact by an external observer would not be necessary >> to explain the operation of the mechanism in terms of the physical >> structure of the mechanism. However, the fact that the mechanism >> does have subjective experiences is part of the operation of that >> mechanism and therefore does influence the behavior of the mechanism. >> >> > So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced or not, >> > wouldn't influence the behaviour. So if we were to be regarded as a >> > biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our subjective >> > experiences because they actually existed. >> >> Wrong. The external observer does not know the content of the >> mechanism's subjective experience, but the fact that the mechanism >> has such an experience is part of the operation of the mechanism. >> >> > To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object that >> > it would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an >> > alternative universe, which followed the same known laws of >> > physics, but there were no subjective experiences associated with >> > it, it would act the same. >> >> There is a contradiction here. Either your alternate universe does >> not follow the same laws of physics or the mechanism itself is not >> identical in structure or operation. >> >> > The objection that if it followed the same known laws of >> > physics, then it would automatically be subjectively experienced, >> > if it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the known laws >> > of physics don't reference subjective experiences, thus it is >> > conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both following the >> > same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having subjective >> > experiences and one not, without the need for any of the known >> > laws of physics to be altered. >> >> The laws of physics don't have to reference subjective experience. >> The subjective experience is, by definition of the problem, entailed >> by the structure of certain mechanisms. >> > > The point I am getting at can be illustrated in the following: > > Below is an extract posted by Jim07D7: > > ------------- > I heard a very good point made on this subject, on the radio program > "Philosophy Talk". > > Suppose you come across something which, on the basis of lengthy > communications, you decide is conscious. Then you get a chance to ook > at it, and there are two scenarios: > > 1. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of soft > organic matter organized into lobes, supplied with energy and > information inputs by other arrangements of organic matter. (It's a > brain with lobes and supporting organs.) You don't know how it does > what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where it's > happening, more or less. > > 2. Its conscious thinking seems to be going on in a mass of hard > inorganic matter organized into modules,supplied with energy and > information inputs by other arrangements of inorganic matter. (It's a > computer with modules and supporting peripherals.) You don't know how > it does what you thought was conscious thinking, you only know where > it's happening, more or less. > > Which, if either case, justifies changing your opinion that it is > conscious? How does its being organic, or not, make a difference? > After all, you didn't examine it as part of deciding it is conscious. > Neither case justifies changing my opinion. > The conclusion is, if and when we feel justified in considering > something that turns out to be a computer conscious, based on > communicating with it, we will not be philosophically justified in > changing that opinion when we learn it is a computer. And if we say we > have to show how it works, well, do we know how the brain achieves > consciousness? Wait a minute, where did that bit about showing how it works come from? > ------------- > > > To which I pointed out (though tidied up a bit here for clarity), that > I made a robot that acted as though it has subjective experiences, and > you thought it did, but actually after you had made your decision, I > explained to you that it behaved the way it did simply because of the > physical mechanism following the known laws of physics, then on what > basis would you continue to think that it was acting the way it did > because it had subjective experiences? > Why would I change my opinion? I still have subjective experiences and those experiences influence my behavior and I still believe that I am subject to the laws of physics. Your inability to construct real paradoxes out of semantic confusion can never convince me otherwise, Glenn. > Can you see that whether it did or it didn't, it couldn't make any > difference to the way it was behaving if it was simply a mechanism > following the known laws of physics. So its behaviour, if you still > chose to considered it to be having conscious experiences, couldn't be > said to be influenced by them, as it would be expected to act the same > even without your added assumption that it really did have subjective > experiences. > Of course it could be said to be influenced by them. If it behaved as if it were having subjective experiences, I would have to conclude that it was having subjective experiences, regardless of whether it was an organic blob of protoplasm or an electronic box with blinking lights. I consider the pzombie paradox to be a fallacious contradiction. In my not so humble opinion, it is not possible to have "conscious behavior" without having "consciousness" in the thing which is doing the behavior. > Can you also see that if we were simply biological mechanism ollowing > the laws of physics, like the robot, we couldn't be behaving the way > we do because of any subjective experiences we were having. No, I cannot see that. You set up the problem by saying that you have a machine that behaves as if it is having subjective experiences. That implies that those subjective experiences are causing its behavior. Now you want to contradict yourself. You're not very good at setting up paradoxes, Glenn. You've been trying these tricks for years now, and you're still failing miserably. > They in > themselves couldn't be influencing our behaviour, which would mean it > would have to be coincidental that we actually have the subjective > experiences we talk about (as they couldn't have influenced the > behaviour. The coincidence makes the perspective implausible. > You're contradicting yourself by claiming that you have an organism or a machine that acts as if it is having subjective experiences and then saying that the subjective experiences have no influence on behavior. > Though your point is taken, that if it was just a coincidence, then it > would be, though my counter point is as I have said that it is > implausible that it is just a coincidence that we have the subjective > experiences our behaviour expresses, and that in reality our behaviour > of us talking about them, was uninfluenced by their existance. > > With regards to the universe scenario, there is no contradiction, it > is simply that they both follow the same laws of physics that are > known to us, which as you acknowledge, don't reference whether > anything is subjectively experienced or not, allowing for in one the > mechanism to be subjectively experienced, in the other it not. It is > simply a device to illustrate the same point that is I have made above > in this response. > No, Glenn, the contradiction is still there. Your point is invalid. The internal state of the mechanism is not the same, therefore the machine is not the same, therefore your two scenarios are not the same. -- Fred Stone aa# 1369 "When they put out that deadline, people realized that we were going to lose," said an aide to an anti-war lawmaker. "Everything after that seemed like posturing." -- Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com Quote
Guest Fred Stone Posted June 6, 2007 Posted June 6, 2007 someone3 <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in news:1181108912.019669.139700@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com: > On 6 Jun, 06:40, "Jeckyl" <n...@nowhere.com> wrote: >> "someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message >> >> Or rather .. I can show you a mechanism with subjective experiences >> .. a human being. And you will see that human beings obey all the >> laws of physics AND are influenced by subjective experiences. >> > > I have stated repeatedly why the explanation of the behaviour wouldn't > need to include the concept of it having subjective experiences. The > reason is that the known laws of physics don't, and the behaviour > could be explained in terms of physical mechanism following the known > laws of physics. > You're assuming your conclusion, Glenn. -- Fred Stone aa# 1369 "When they put out that deadline, people realized that we were going to lose," said an aide to an anti-war lawmaker. "Everything after that seemed like posturing." -- Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com Quote
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