Guest Harry Hope Posted July 16, 2007 Posted July 16, 2007 Air Force general Richard Myers, now retired, says top military officials dealt with a number of vehicle issues, including armoring Humvees. The MRAP, however, was "not one of them." Something related to MRAPs "might have crossed my desk," Myers says, "but I don't recall it." Why the issue never received more of a hearing from top officials early in the war remains a mystery, given the chorus of concern. One Pentagon analyst complained in an April 29, 2004, e-mail to colleagues, for instance, that it was "frustrating to see the pictures of burning Humvees while knowing that there are other vehicles out there that would provide more protection." .................................................................................................... In February 2005, two months after Nadeau solicited ideas for better armor for the Iraqis and was told MRAPs were an answer, an urgent-need request for the same type of vehicle came from embattled Marines in Anbar province. The request, signed by then-brigadier general Dennis Hejlik, said the Marines "cannot continue to lose Quote
Guest JHR Posted July 16, 2007 Posted July 16, 2007 "Harry Hope" <rivrvu@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message news:v2sm93tbomj8j24dv1a6v9qodkuolii5t5@4ax.com... > > Air Force general Richard Myers, now retired, says top military > officials dealt with a number of vehicle issues, including armoring > Humvees. > > The MRAP, however, was "not one of them." > > Something related to MRAPs "might have crossed my desk," Myers says, > "but I don't recall it." > > Why the issue never received more of a hearing from top officials > early in the war remains a mystery, given the chorus of concern. > > One Pentagon analyst complained in an April 29, 2004, e-mail to > colleagues, for instance, that it was "frustrating to see the pictures > of burning Humvees while knowing that there are other vehicles out > there that would provide more protection." > > ................................................................................................... > > In February 2005, two months after Nadeau solicited ideas for better > armor for the Iraqis and was told MRAPs were an answer, an urgent-need > request for the same type of vehicle came from embattled Marines in > Anbar province. > > The request, signed by then-brigadier general Dennis Hejlik, said the > Marines "cannot continue to lose . serious and grave casualties to > IEDs . at current rates when a commercial off-the-shelf capability > exists to mitigate" them. > > Officials at Marine headquarters in Quantico, Va., shelved the request > for 1,169 vehicles. > > Fifteen months passed before a second request reached the Joint Chiefs > and was approved. > > Those vehicles finally began trickling into Anbar in February, two > years after the original request. > > > From USA TODAY, 7/15/07: > http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2007-07-15-ied-cover_N.htm > > Pentagon balked at pleas from officers in field for safer vehicles > > By Peter Eisler, Blake Morrison and Tom Vanden Brook, USA TODAY > > > Pfc. Aaron Kincaid, 25, had been joking with buddies just before their > Humvee rolled over the bomb. > > His wife, Rachel, later learned that the blast blew Kincaid, a father > of two from outside Atlanta, through the Humvee's metal roof. > > Army investigators who reviewed the Sept. 23 attack near Riyadh, Iraq, > wrote in their report that only providence could have saved Kincaid > from dying that day: > > "There was no way short of not going on that route at that time (that) > this tragedy could have been diverted." > > A USA TODAY investigation of the Pentagon's efforts to protect troops > in Iraq suggests otherwise. > > Years before the war began, Pentagon officials knew of the > effectiveness of another type of vehicle that better shielded troops > from bombs like those that have killed Kincaid and 1,500 other > soldiers and Marines. > > But military officials repeatedly balked at appeals - from commanders > on the battlefield and from the Pentagon's own staff - to provide the > life-saving Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, or MRAP, for > patrols and combat missions, USA TODAY found. > > In a letter to Defense Secretary Robert Gates late last month, two > U.S. senators said the delays cost the lives of an estimated "621 to > 742 Americans" who would have survived explosions had they been in > MRAPs, rather than Humvees. > > The letter, from Sens. Joseph Biden, D-Del., and Kit Bond, R-Mo., > assumed the initial calls for MRAPs came in February 2005, when > Marines in Iraq asked the Pentagon for almost 1,200 of the vehicles. > > USA TODAY found that the first appeals for the MRAP came much earlier. > > As early as December 2003, when the Marines requested their first 27 > MRAPs for explosive disposal teams, Pentagon analysts sent detailed > information about the superiority of the vehicles to the Joint Chiefs > of Staff, e-mails obtained by USA TODAY show. > > Later pleas came from Iraq, where commanders saw that the approach the > Joint Chiefs embraced- adding armor to the sides of Humvees, the > standard vehicles in the war zone - did little to protect against > blasts beneath the vehicles. > > Despite the efforts, the general who chaired the Joint Chiefs until > Oct. 1, 2005, says buying MRAPs "was not on the radar screen when I > was chairman." > > Air Force general Richard Myers, now retired, says top military > officials dealt with a number of vehicle issues, including armoring > Humvees. > > The MRAP, however, was "not one of them." > > Something related to MRAPs "might have crossed my desk," Myers says, > "but I don't recall it." > > Why the issue never received more of a hearing from top officials > early in the war remains a mystery, given the chorus of concern. > > One Pentagon analyst complained in an April 29, 2004, e-mail to > colleagues, for instance, that it was "frustrating to see the pictures > of burning Humvees while knowing that there are other vehicles out > there that would provide more protection." > > The analyst was referring to the MRAP, whose V-shaped hull puts the > crew more than 3 feet off the ground and deflects explosions. > > It was designed to withstand the underbelly bombs that cripple the > lower-riding Humvees. > > Pentagon officials, civilians and military alike, had been searching > for technologies to guard against improvised explosive devices, or > IEDs. > > The makeshift bombs are the No. 1 killer of U.S. forces. > > The MRAP was not new to the Pentagon. > > The technology had been developed in South Africa and Rhodesia in the > 1970s, making it older than Kincaid and most of the other troops > killed by homemade bombs. > > The Pentagon had tested MRAPs in 2000, purchased fewer than two dozen > and sent some to Iraq. > > They were used primarily to protect explosive ordnance disposal teams, > not to transport troops or to chase Iraqi insurgents. > > The goal: Iraqis 'stand up' so U.S. can 'stand down' > > Even as the Pentagon balked at buying MRAPs for U.S. troops, USA TODAY > found that the military pushed to buy them for a different fighting > force: the Iraqi army. > > On Dec. 22, 2004 - two weeks after President Bush told families of > servicemembers that "we're doing everything we possibly can to protect > your loved ones" - a U.S. Army general solicited ideas for an armored > vehicle for the Iraqis. > > The Army had an "extreme interest" in getting troops better armor, > then-brigadier general Roger Nadeau told a subordinate looking at > foreign technology, in an e-mail obtained by USA TODAY. > > In a follow-up message, Nadeau clarified his request: > > "What I failed to point out in my first message to you folks is that > the US Govt is interested not for US use, but for possible use in > fielding assets to the Iraqi military forces." > > In response, Lt. Col. Clay Brown, based in Australia, sent information > on two types of MRAPs manufactured overseas. > > "By all accounts, these are some of the best in the world," he wrote. > > "If I were fitting out the Iraqi Army, this is where I'd look (wish we > had some!)" > > The first contract for what would become the Iraqi Light Armored > Vehicle - virtually identical to the MRAPs sought by U.S. forces then > and now, and made in the United States by BAE Systems - was issued in > May 2006. > > The vehicles, called Badgers, began arriving in Iraq 90 days later, > according to BAE. > > In September 2006, the Pentagon said it would provide up to 600 more > to Iraqi forces. > > As of this spring, 400 had been delivered. > > The rush to equip the Iraqis stood in stark contrast to the Pentagon's > efforts to protect U.S. troops. > > In February 2005, two months after Nadeau solicited ideas for better > armor for the Iraqis and was told MRAPs were an answer, an urgent-need > request for the same type of vehicle came from embattled Marines in > Anbar province. > > The request, signed by then-brigadier general Dennis Hejlik, said the > Marines "cannot continue to lose . serious and grave casualties to > IEDs . at current rates when a commercial off-the-shelf capability > exists to mitigate" them. > > Officials at Marine headquarters in Quantico, Va., shelved the request > for 1,169 vehicles. > > Fifteen months passed before a second request reached the Joint Chiefs > and was approved. > > Those vehicles finally began trickling into Anbar in February, two > years after the original request. > > Because of the delay, the Marines are investigating how its > urgent-need requests are handled. > > The long delay infuriates some members of Congress. > > "Every day, our troops are being maimed or killed needlessly because > we haven't fielded this soon enough," says Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss. > > "The costs are in human lives, in kids who will never have their legs > again, people blind, crippled. That's the real tragedy." > > Not until two months ago did the Pentagon champion the MRAP for all > U.S. forces. > > Gates made MRAPs the military's top priority. > > The plan is to build the vehicles as fast as possible until conditions > warrant a change, according to a military official who has direct > knowledge of the program but is not authorized to speak on the record. > Thousands are in the pipeline at a cost so far of about $2.4 billion. > > Gates said he was influenced by a press report - originally in USA > TODAY - that disclosed Marine units using MRAPs in Anbar reported no > deaths in about 300 roadside bombings in the past year. > > His tone was grave. "For every month we delay," he said, "scores of > young Americans are going to die." > > One reason officials put off buying MRAPs in significant quantities: > > They never expected the war to last this long. > > President Bush set the tone on May 1, 2003, six weeks after the U.S. > invasion, when he declared on board the aircraft carrier Abraham > Lincoln that "major combat operations in Iraq have ended." > > Gen. George Casey, the top commander in Iraq from June 2004 until > February this year, repeatedly said that troop levels in Iraq would be > cut just as soon as Iraqi troops took more responsibility for > security. > > In March 2005, he predicted "very substantial reductions" in U.S. > troops by early 2006. > > He said virtually the same thing a year later. > > Casey wasn't the only optimist. > > In May 2005, Vice President Cheney declared that the insurgency was > "in its last throes." > > Given the view that the war would end soon, the Pentagon had little > use for expensive new vehicles such as the MRAP, at least not in large > quantities. > > __________________________________________________ > > Support our troops, eh? > > Harry "We go to war with the army we have, not the army we want" Donald Rumsfeld (Former Secretary of Defense 2001-2006) Quote
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